




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

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
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
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The Effects of the NATIONAL DEBT;
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the CONTINENT; with the Nature of our
Present SUBSIDY FORCES, and the Antient
MERCENARIES;

Are fully DISCUSSED.



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BY

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OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

IN TWO VOLUMES

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
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HOEVER has attentively considered the Turn which Affairs have lately taken, with the Causes which have long been operating to produce it, will see very clearly, that our Fate as a Nation, must in a great Measure, depend upon the Use we make of the present Conjunction.

Great Britain and *France* are the first Movers, by whose Conduct and Fortune those of all the other States in *Europe* are now constantly determined. The great Object of the Policy of *Britain*, is to preserve her own Freedom and Importance, by preserving the Independency and the Balance of all the others; the Drift of the *French* Poli-

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ticks is to overturn this Balance, by diminishing that Power, whose Weight alone can preserve it. Great Difficulties always attended the Designs of *France* when they were pursued in *Europe*; the Alarm was easily taken; all Advances were slow, and dearly bought; and after a long War, and the Waste of infinite Blood and Treasure, a Peace left their Landmarks just where they were before; one Treaty, for some few Family Honours, but no solid national Advantage, destroyed the Effect of so many prosperous Sieges and successful Battles. They had felt a Wound too in a Part, which shewed them more clearly than ever that their first Plan was ill laid.

Foiled therefore in their direct Designs upon the Liberties of *Europe*, they took a Compass, to come with the more Certainty, because let's Suspicion at their purposed Point. The Way they took was by encreasing their own Strength, and lessening ours upon the Continent of *North America*. The Wealth *France* had already drawn from the *West-Indies*, and her considerable Establishments there, made her feel the Necessity of a Force upon the Continent, for turning those Establishments to the best Account, and for drawing new and greater Advantages from a Country, whose Situation destined it the Seat of the most extensive and beneficial Commerce. It was obvious, that a mighty Augmentation of naval Strength, must be the certain Consequence a of Superiority in *America*; and a naval Strength must
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be every Thing to *France* in her Scheme of Aggrandisement in *Europe*. What added to the Advantage of extending herself upon that Side, was the Ease with which it might be accomplished. *England* had been supine enough with Regard to the Colonies; they grew to what they are, more from their own excellent Situation, and the Influence of the *English* Liberty and Laws, which they carried into the Desarts, than by any extraordinary Encouragement from Home; and as for the other Powers of *Europe*, they expected but little Opposition from them; as the Object was very remote, and none of them had any immediate Concern in it; add to this, that the grossest Ignorance of *American* Affairs prevailed almost universally. In many of these Points, *France* was undoubtedly not at all mistaken; she made an insensible, but not an inconsiderable Progress; her Encroachments were very great; and she supported them with Forts and Garrisons; gained the Natives to their Interests, and omitted nothing to extend and secure their Settlements upon every Side.

The Importance of our Colonies and their Danger appeared to us at the same Time; this brought on a Quarrel between us and *France*; and this Quarrel brought the Rest of *Europe* to attend to *America* and to be interested in the Success of the contending Parties there. *America*, is now added to the System of *Europe*. This is a real Revolution, and begins a new and a memorable Æra in Po-

liticks. It is not long since this Part of the World has been much attended to, and much of the present Trouble arose from this Inattention. In Treaties, the Regulation of Rights there was generally postponed; it was looked upon as little more than a Station for the Fur Trade, and *France* would have it still considered in no other Light; but the Extent and Firmness of the Roots she has cast there, shews she likes the Soil; this Quarrel is really something more than *about the making a few Hats*. Indeed this Part of the World is such a Fund of Commerce, supplies so many new Articles, and so connects and binds together the detached Parts of its System, abounds with such an Exuberance of all Sorts of Provisions, and is such a natural Magazine of all Sorts of naval Stores, that the Power of any State there must be, in a great Measure, the Standard, which will regulate the Rank it is to hold in *Europe*.

We are now at the Point of this Adjustment, and the Event of the impending War must finally determine, whether we must be a precarious Power, supported only by the contending Interests of the others, and ever subservient to the Uppermost; or whether we shall sit at the Head of *Europe*, with Authority to give the Law and Power to enforce it, as the general Safety, and our own Dignity may require. It is therefore no Wonder, that the Attention of every Body is turned to the Publick Transactions; but it is therefore of the greatest Moment for every Body to be cautious,
and

and to keep as detached as possible from all such private or party Considerations, as might influence them to form Judgments contrary to the real Nature of Things, or to take Steps prejudicial to the general Interest. We play at present for a very great Stake; and every Disturbance our Passion may give those, who manage the Game for us, must be productive of our own Ruin.

It is not only the Greatness of the Interest we contend for, but the Party too with whom we contend, which makes it incumbent on every Body to think and to act with particular Moderation at this Time. On the Eve of a War with one of the most powerful Monarchies the World ever saw; with a State doubly exasperated, by having its Views to our Prejudice discovered and disconcerted, and by having itself received Provocations, which for some Time they could neither resent with Prudence, nor pass by with Honour. And what is yet of further Consideration; we are on the Point of engaging with this most powerful and most exasperated of all Enemies, on this most interesting of all Causes, with some internal Disadvantages; we are considerably in Debt; and this Circumstance, which those who wish ill to the Publick, make frequent Mention of to disunite us, ought really, in a Time of Danger, to be the strongest Bond of our Union.

A little before the Opening of this remarkable Scene, we lost a Minister of long Experience in Affairs; they are now partly in new
Hands,

Hands, and an Opposition is formed from a new Quarter, which has joined itself to the old One, and both proceeded with much Violence though hitherto, I think, with but little Success. They have excepted against the Capacity and Integrity of the now Minister; they have condemned every Step he has taken in the Conduct of Affairs, and have added to their particular Objections all those Complaints, which for many Years have been common in our Mouths, of the general Corruption, the Decay of publick Spirit, the national Weakness, and other popular Topics, which give a Currency to more refined Notions, and such Arguments, as are of a Nature too remote from common Apprehension.

I am very far from thinking that we do not want some Reformation in many Things; the People is perhaps much corrupted, and the *British* Spirit lowered. These are Evils, which all good Men feel very sensibly; and they complain of them with perhaps more Sincerity, though with Less Violence, than many of those who have winked at this Corruption and Degeneracy, and sometimes even contributed to them, to serve one Set of Ends, and now rail at them to serve another. There is a great and a material Difference, between those, who speak of our Faults or our Weakness to amend us, and those, who only call them up, with a Design to confound us in our Endeavours to get clear of their ill Consequences. I have a Nephew who, by his Vices and Extravagance,

travagance, has drawn himself into indigent and almost desperate Circumstances; but I have some Regard for his Family, which is my own; when therefore he came to me some Time ago, expressing a Sense of his former Errors, shewed me that he was entering into a Course of Industry, which might redeem what he had lost by his ill Conduct, I advanced him such a Sum, as, with the Advice I gave him, might put him once again in the Way of being a Credit and Advantage to his Family. But had I, when he applied to me, severely reproached his former Life, ridiculed and thwarted his Schemes for repairing his past Follies, and turned him out of Doors without a Penny of Money; had I done this, I had certainly done as a great Part of the World would upon the like Occasion; but as certainly, nobody in his Senses could say I was a *Friend* to this young Man, notwithstanding the Gravity of my Sentences, or the Severity of my Reflection upon his ill Conduct. Such is always the Difference between the Advice of a Friend, and the Reproaches of an Enemy, in publick and private Life; in States, and in Families. For good Sense and good Policy are the same Things acting only upon different Objects.

Confessing then, that the publick Debt is great; that publick Spirit has decayed; that the Nation is upon the Brink of Ruin, and that our Patriot Orators are seriously intent upon preserving us from it. What Inference shall we draw from this? Shall we, because we are perhaps

perhaps less able to resent Injuries than formerly, suffer Injuries that must further disable us? Shall we, because we are a corrupted Nation, and deserve Punishment, draw down that Punishment upon our own Heads, and inflict it with our own Hands? Or shall we wish for a Change of Ministry, until we wish for a Change of Measures, and until the Candidates for the Succession can plead some better Title than their Discontent, and their Desire of such a Change?

Undoubtedly, before we made any Preparation for War, we ought to have been well convinced that it was extremely necessary; and that a Peace, though with a smoother and more flattering Appearance, would be finally more prejudicial to the Nation. And in Fact we were convinced of this; the general Opinion was, that for many Years before the *Spanish War*, we had been directed by a pusillanimous System of Politicks, which was detrimental to our Credit; and ruinous to our Interests abroad. We saw, with great Uneasiness, the Rivalship of the *French Commerce*: We complained of the Injuries our own had tamely suffered in the *Spanish West-Indies*; we were exasperated at the Length and Fruitlessness of the Negotiations, which was the Way then taken to redress them; the Light this Conduct appeared in, was, what gave a Colour to the Opposition which shook the then Minister, and occasioned the *Spanish*, and by Degrees all the subsequent Wars. We have
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been accused of Pusillanimity in the Treaty of *Aix*, I dont enquire with what Reason, I think with very little, but it was blamed; and the defective Execution of it was no less complained of afterwards. The Timidity of our Ministry, and the national Disgrace were constant Topics; we were alarmed by the Progress the *French* had made in *America*, and by the Attention they gave to the Encrease of their Marine. The debauching our *India* Allies, the constant Hostilities of those in *Nova Scotia*, the Forts erected in that Province, as well as in *New England* and *Virginia*, gave us the greatest Uneasiness for the Present; but the Prospect was worse for Futurity; the Extention of the *French* Settlements from the Gulph of *St. Lawrence* to the Mouth of the *Mississippi*; the Ruin this must bring on the most valuable Parts of our Trade; a Confinement within a narrow Tract; a vast Frontier to defend; future and worse Encroachments encouraged by past Impunity; these were Things which made the Nation demand a War; the Ministry acted from the same Spirit, and the whole People, as a Man, seemed to think that, the only Step which could restore us to a respectable Condition.

Some Wars we have had, into which a regal or ministerial Ambition had betrayed the People; others into which popular Fury had forced the Minister; we have often mistaken our Interests, or pursued them by mistaken Measures; but this is a War, called for by the Desires of the People, confirmed by the Judg-

ment of the Ministry, warranted by our Interest, sanctified by the Justice of the Motives, and carried on in a Manner, of all others, best adapted to our own Circumstances, and the most effectual to oppose the Designs of the Enemy.

I do not think that any Body, at that Time, testified the least Displeasure at the Preparations which were made for a War, nor at the Manner of making them. They were indeed carried on with great Vigour, and Dispatch; and to this Vigour, we must probably owe a great Part of what Advantages, we may hope from the Continuance of the War with Success; or the Prevention of it, by reasonable Concessions from the Court of *France*; we were not wanting to ourselves, either in *Europe*, or in *America*; though in the latter Part, we had not all that Success, which we promised ourselves; for to say the Truth, Affairs in that Part of the World were then, as at most other Times, carried on without a sufficient Knowledge of the several Circumstances of the Country, which is a new Scene of Operation; therefore it is no Wonder that some Errors have been committed; but they are neither very great, nor irreparable, nor in any Sort fit to balance the Advantages, we derive from the vigorous and effective Steps we have taken. These have always very remarkable Effects; they strike a Dread into the Enemy, and they create a respectable Opinion of us in our own Minds, and in those of our Allies;

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we give them a Pledge, by this resolute Exertion of our Strength, that we are not willing to compound our Claims, or to leave them to the Issue of tedious and unfruitful Negotiations; besides that, such a Beginning makes the Breach between us and the Enemy so wide, that it can never be repaired, but upon Terms very advantageous to us, or very destructive; and this Circumstance is a further Security for a vigorous Proceeding. Therefore, as we were to a man convinced of the Necessity of those Measures, as we thought them to be truly *British*, and for an Interest truly *British*; and as we had Reason to be pleased with the Spirit which animated all our Proceedings, we shall for ever renounce our *English* Spirit, if we suffer ourselves to fall into such Discontent and murmuring upon this Occasion, as may throw us once more upon such dilatory and ineffectual Measures, as we ourselves were formerly so loud in condemning.

Parties, which in Time of publick Tranquility are useful, and perhaps essential to our Constitution, are as destructive when we are threatened by a foreign Enemy. In War it is unavoidable, that Trade must suffer something; that publick Credit should be occasionally damped; publick Impositions must encrease; and some ill Successes must happen in the Course of the most prosperous Wars, which are apt to dispirit the People; if to these necessary Inconveniencies, a factious and discontented Uneasiness be added, it is not difficult to perceive,

what a Clog the whole must be upon all our Operations. Whereas a national Union diffuses a Life and Spirit into every Member of the State; it diffuses a Satisfaction and a Firmness into the Military, even to its minutest Parts; and it encourages every Person in civil Life to bear his Part of the Burthen, when he sees all the rest drawing chearfully along with him.

But besides the Humour of the People, which in all Affairs of Moment is ever of the greatest Moment, it is highly necessary, when all the Care and Attention of the Ministry, is not more than sufficient to support the Nation, that no considerable Part of that Care should be diverted to support itself; whilst they have Faction at home, as well as an Enemy abroad to manage. Experience has abundantly shewn, that such Factions, at critical Times, have always operated to the Ruin of the Nation which nourished them; sometimes by forcing a Minister to pass by every Insult rather than engage in a War, whilst he was torn by an intestine Division; sometimes to run rashly upon a War, to avail himself of the Confusion; sometimes to patch up a Peace, more ruinous than any War; sometimes to precipitate, and sometimes to delay Matters, directed not by the Exigencies of Affairs abroad, but by those at Home.

If the vigorous Steps we have already taken should not prevent the Necessity of a War, the next Point to be considered is, how the Burthen of it is to be supported. Some of those

those who allow, that we ought to right ourselves by Arms, from every other Consideration, object to it because we are unable to bear the Expence.

To form a solid Judgment upon this Point, we ought not to consider our own Condition only without any further View. The Condition of the Enemy must be considered. It is true we are very considerably in Debt, but with that Debt, it is certain that we are better able to bear any Expence than any other Power now in *Europe*. None but *France* can come into any Competition with us. But is *France* not in Debt? Are not their necessary Charges incomparably greater than ours? Are not their People loaden with Taxes, oppressive in their Quantity and their Kind, and yet more oppressive, by their Manner of laying them on and collecting them? Have they been the best Oeconomists in the World? Or has any publick Money been raised amongst them for a long Time past, without Murmuring and Discontent? Is their Credit to raise Money upon an Emergency greater than ours? And are they without internal Divisions, the more destructive, as they subsist in a State where they are unnatural?

It is a great Mistake, that arbitrary Governments are more abundant in their Resources than free States. I am sure all Experience is to the contrary. For free States have always expended more by far, in Proportion to their natural Advantages, than those which were
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not free. In free Nations, when they are not extremely divided, every Individual is concerned in the publick Transactions; and thinks himself so. In Forms of this Kind, there really exists such a Thing as the Publick, and therefore all Property is in some Sort publick too, since every Man is satisfied, that what is expended, is expended for the Benefit of himself, and his Family; and here Self-love fortifies the general Principle. In arbitrary Governments, it is true, the Prince may command at his Pleasure the Lives and Properties of all those who are subjected to him. But even the Principle which supports absolute Power, can only bear a determinate Weight, and that not a very heavy one; free Countries are usually more largely taxed; yet, Taxations have caused more frequent Murmuring, and even Seditions in the Regions of arbitrary Power. Here it is, that the great Difference between what is *taken*, and what is *given* makes itself to be felt. The People under arbitrary Governments are not a proper Object of heavy Taxes; and every Body knows, that all Impositions upon Goods, when carried beyond a certain Point, are sure to contradict their own Purposes.

If such be the Condition of *France*, some may, perhaps, imagine we are ourselves in a yet worse Condition.

In all Questions concerning the Power of the Nation, the Reasoning is generally influenced by a Consideration of the Nation Debt;

no Scheme of Operation is proposed, but this comes like an evil Spirit, to haunt our Imaginations, and distract us from our Purpose. It will, therefore, I believe, be far from impertinent here, to make some Remarks upon that Debt, and enquire how far the Consideration of it ought to discourage us upon this interesting Occasion; for, if it can be shewn, notwithstanding some Inconveniences, which must naturally wait on all human Inventions, that, upon the whole, the national Debt is rather a Support than a Burthen to us; and, if it be sufficiently clear, that we bear all the indubitable Marks of a most opulent People, I suppose, it will not be thought impossible for us to find such Resources, as may support us in the Prosecution of a necessary War: I say necessary War, because no Nation is, or can be in a proper Condition, to reject reasonable Terms of Accommodation, in the Hopes of getting more by the Issue of a War, in which there can be nothing certain, but the Bloodshed and Expence.

Our Debt not only answers that internal End of good Policy, for which it was originally calculated, but it answers a similar End externally too, in attaching many abroad to us, by the Part they take in that Interest, in which they have embarked their own.

A similar Policy has been successfully used by other States; the *Genoese* Nobility, have long, not only been suffered, but encouraged to acquire large landed Property in the Kingdom

dom of *Naples*, and in the Spirit of the same Policy it is, that all Alienation is most strictly forbidden them, except in Favour of Nobles of their own Nation; the Rulers of that Kingdom do not consider how much of its Revenues are necessarily carried abroad by this Means: They are glad to purchase, at so easy a Rate, a certain Interest in a Republick, which, by its Situation, is always of such Importance in the Troubles of *Italy*.

But our Policy, as it is juster, so it is more effectual too, the Freedom of selling out, in our Funds, is, in Reality, one of the principal Streams that fills them; and by the Credit we have gained from the Strength of our Security, and the Justice, and punctuality of our Payments, we extend our Resources beyond the Wealth of our own Nation; and lay foreign States under a Sort of Contribution to us upon an Emergency.

Suppose it should be found necessary, at any Time, to make sudden, as well as great Preparations for War: To form a large naval Equipment: To raise a numerous Military, and to enter into expensive Engagements with Allies abroad: What should we do? impose what Taxes you please, they must have Time to come in;—but the Exigency presses.—Here, if there was not a Plan, to proceed on, found effectual by Experience, a Scheme, to which money'd Men might resort; Ties by which they are united; and a Discipline, by which they are perfected in the Arts and Policies

licies of raising Money ; it would have proved next to impossible to answer, in so compleat a Manner, the expensive and hasty Calls of those mighty Wars, which, during almost all the last Century, have engaged all *Europe*. And, indeed, if we had not contracted this Debt at the Time we did, the Nation must necessarily either have bowed under the Power of *France*, or have submitted at once to such enormous Taxations, as without being sufficient to answer their Purposes, would have pump'd out the whole Wealth of the Nation at a few Strokes ; but by chusing rather to go into Debt, our Taxations with a longer Continuance have been more moderate ; Peace shares the Burthen of the War ; and the whole is moderated by being extended.

It is true, that the Discontented never forget to remind us, that the two last Princes of the *Stuart* Family contracted no Debt, and that they left the Nation clear and unburthened at the Revolution. But in Fact, those very Princes are, in a great Measure, the Authors of the Necessity of this Debt ; for by the Indolence of one, and the false Politicks of both, they raised the Power of *France* to such an immoderate Height, that no moderate Expence was sufficient to bound it ; had they made an early Opposition, it might have been a less Expensive one ; but at any Rate to make an effectual Opposition, and at the same Time, not to overstrain the Sinews of the Nation, by a sudden and violent Exertion of its Strength,

a Debt must have been contracted; this has been done since; and the Character of the Nation abroad, and its flourishing State at home, justify us in what we have done.

Since the first Formation of the national Debt, our Commerce has been extending, our Manufactures improving, our Agriculture increasing, and with them, our People multiplying daily; now it is certain, that a Debt gradually growing for above Half a Century, until it has stretched beyond seventy Millions, can never be a Thing indifferent to a Nation; it can never be unoperative, it must be productive of Good, or of Evil; and if it can be demonstrated, that under this Debt, we have advanced in every Respect, and that we have advanced by quicker Steps, than we have ever done, in the same Length of Time before, it is surely a very fair Presumption, that our Debt is a principal Cause of our Increase; and I would demand of any Person versed in the commercial and funded Systems of this Kingdom, if the Whole of the Latter should cease, even by a Payment, whether it would not sensibly prejudice the Former?

But besides this, there is another, and as important Consideration, which shews the Usefulness, and almost Necessity of a national Debt; there is so much Wealth accumulated in many Parts of *Europe*, as well as among ourselves, more than can well be employed in Trade, that there must be a general well established Depository of Credit somewhere, if
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we are not that Depository, some other State will be so; and wheresoever that Credit is, there much Wealth, much Influence, much Power, must be of Course.

A very stinted Commerce in a barbarous Nation, may be supported by mere Barter; where the Trade is more enlarged, and the Intercourse more general, Money is necessary; the antient Commerce probably went no further; but could our Trade at this Day stand on so narrow a Bottom? Could it subsist without Bills of Exchange, and the Credit from which they grow? By Means of these, Traders extend themselves far beyond what their meer Capitals would carry them; funded Securities are national Bills of Exchange, and they, like the former, enable a Government to do what hardly any possible Sums of Money could, at the same Time that they add to the Riches of the Nation, a new Kind of Wealth; a Wealth, far from Imaginary, as some have called it, since it has the whole Strength of this Nation to support it, and can even landed Property promise itself a great Security?

And it carries with it an Advantage of its own; for the Easiness of transferring Stock, makes this Property as solid as Land, pass as readily in all Sorts of large Payments as Money itself: Partaking thus, the Nature and Benefit both of fixt and moveable Goods.

To serve the Exigences of an extensive and various Trade, Money itself becomes too confined, and burthensome; and amongst a great

People, where many are born to Opulence, and many arrive at it; by other Methods than those of Trade; another Credit, besides that of Trade, is wanting: A Credit, that shall be common to all, and fit to unite the various Systems, which compose a great, learned, and trading Nation; and to carry all of them to an Height attainable only by such an Union.

There are no trading and free Nations, which have not contracted a large Debt; among other Causes to which Sir *William Temple* attributed the Power of the *United Provinces*, he mentions their Debt as one and a principal one. *Genoa* owed the Temperament of its Government, its internal Order, and its foreign Reputation to that Debt which formed the Foundation of the Bank of *St. George*. *Machiavel*, one well acquainted with this State, and no mean Person in this Science, expressly says so; and even in our own Days they have derived all their Nourishment from this Source, even after the Decline of their Commerce, and the almost total Extinction of their Power

I know it is objected, that this Currency of the Stocks is but imaginary; that whilst the Nation is at Peace, it has the Effect of real Money; but, upon the least Danger, it sinks into nothing; and if an Enemy once invades the Kingdom, then, like fairy Money, it would be found but Dust and Ashes. To this I think the Answer is plain, and in the Affirmative,

Affirmative,—It would so. But then I would gladly know, in a Country that is the Seat of War, is there not every where, and has there not been at all Times, a universal Disappearance of Money, and a compleat Stagnation of all Business? on a Peace, this Money begins gradually to re-appear, and sure it is no worse in the Case of the Funds: When Peace is restored, publick Credit revives, and the Stocks have their former Value.

The rising and falling of Stocks is objected to them, whereas the Value of Money is said to be fixed. It is granted—but in Countries and Times where no publick Funds are found, Complaints of the Deficiency of the Money are very frequent: Whatever falls the Stocks, is, where there are no Stocks, a Cause to make money'd Men unwilling to lend out their Money. In both Cases there is a Loss, there is an Inconvenience, and but a small Difference in their Circumstances; in one, the Stock-holder sells under Par; in the other, the Borrower gives more than the common Interest. I have here, for Argument's Sake, allowed the worst that could happen to the Stocks, tho' I do not remember at any Times, no not even at the highest Pitch of the late Rebellion, I do not remember that the Stocks ever were below Par.

I do not know that any Nation has entered into a considerable War, to which the Difficulty of raising Supplies to carry it on, has not been made a capital Objection; the Resources,

sources did not always immediately appear, but Necessity has been a Master, and the Exigencies themselves have taught the Expedients.

To enter into a minute Discussion of all the Ways and Means which might be suggested for carrying on the War, in Case we should be obliged to enter into one, would not only be a very uncertain Enquiry, but an impertinent one too, when we are not called upon to do it. Let these Sort of Things stand upon what Footing they will, the Attempt always carries with it something of Ridicule; and it is no Way surprising, since it is hardly possible to lay down any sure Abstract Plan for Supplies, until the Juncture calls for them; for it must not only be considered, how large a Tax the Wealth of a People can answer, and in what Manner it had best be raised, but what their Genius and Temper can bear, must be considered too; and 'tis well known they will bear at one Time, and on one Occasion, what at other Times and Occasions they would never endure; all these Things, and many more, must be taken into Consideration, before the Business of Calculation can be depended upon; otherwise 'tis only begging the Question; and with all the Appearance of Mathematical Certainty, is the most fallacious of all Methods of Reasoning, and the best adapted to conceal Errors from vulgar Observation. One plain Fact, one clear Proof that we are a rich Nation, will go further to demonstrate to every Understanding,

ing, that we are able to carry on the War, even where Ways and Means don't readily appear, than a Thousand the most curious Schemes for raising Money, where that can't be shewn; if I am to undertake an expensive Building, it will go further to persuade myself, and others too, of my Ability to carry it on; if I can shew a moral Certainty of my having ten thousand Pounds in my strong Box, though the Key should be lost or mislaid, and we should be a little puzzled to get at the Money; than if a Consultation of the ablest Lock-smiths in *England*, had contrived the most effectual Ways and Means to open the Box; but that still it remained very doubtful, whether there was any Thing to be found in it, when opened.

It is curious to hear the Complaints of some Men, of the Misery to which we are reduced, *beggared, ruined, undone, desolated, exhausted*, you would fancy they were talking of the wretched Inhabitants of some sad Region of *Siberia*; but all this is spoken of *England*, in the midst of *England*, in the midst of the most exuberant Plenty; the most flourishing Trade, the most unbounded Luxury, that has been perhaps ever seen in any Country of the Globe: Is not the Wealth of our Gentry almost proverbial all over *Europe*, by their Expences abroad, and the Grandeur of their Living at home? Does not the Substance of our Tradesmen come to rival it? Do not our common People, even to the lowest, partake every

Necessary, and every comfortable Provision of Life, beyond any of their Class in the known World? They too have their own Luxuries, suited to their Taste, and quite unknown to all of their Rank in other Nations? Our Wealth is diffused through every Part of the Community, Men and Dogs may drink it till they burst; and can it be thought in a Nation so rich, no Means can be found to get Part of that Money for publick and national Uses, and to divert the Current from idle Luxury, into Channels really beneficial to the Nation.

From these Considerations we may depend upon Resources, which, if well studied in the Manner of raising, distributed with Oeconomy, and applied to their Uses with Vigour and Prudence, may promise all that Success, with which Providence is usually pleased to crown a just Cause, whose Supporters are not wanting to themselves; and that they will be so raised, and so managed, I do not think we have as yet any the least Reason to doubt. I defy any Body to shew, in any Country, or in any Age, such great Preparations, in so short a Time; so many Things carried on by Land and by Sea; in the Way of open Force, and in that of Negotiation. But we have done more, we have not only been preparing, but we have been acting too. And now, in little more than a Year, since the first Beginnings of this Rupture, have done more towards damaging and disheartening the Enemy, more towards procuring an useful Peace, or defraying

ing the Expences of a War, than our Ancestors have done, in any the most shining Period of our History. With this material Difference besides in our Favour, that, at the Time when they fought successfully against *France*, they took her at a Time when she was much disabled, and at best much less extended, and less entire than she is at this Day. This, without Suspicion of Flattery, may be said for those at the Helm, and cannot, I am sure, be denied without Malice.

But taking the Necessity of vigorous Measures for granted, and taking it for granted too, that we are well able to support ourselves in them; a Question still arises upon the best Manner of carrying on the War. There are some who think we ought to confine ourselves to a naval one, and that it is against Reason, and Prudence for us to take any Part, in the Transactions on the Continent. I shall state their Arguments with all the Strength and Fairness in my Power, and then deliver my own Sentiments upon them in the best Manner I am able.

In the first Place, they observe, that we are an Island; that this Circumstance makes it an extremely difficult, chargeable, and hazardous Undertaking for any foreign Enemy to invade this Kingdom; especially as we have, for the Defence of our Coast, a very numerous and well-appointed Fleet, far exceeding every Thing, which our Enemies could employ against us of the same Kind. Whilst we are

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thus secured from all Danger at home! we are at full Liberty to exert our natural Strength; we can bombard their maritime Towns; we can block up their Ports; we can intercept their Commerce, and thus cut off that Nourishment without which War cannot subsist in either Element. Secondly, by this Method of pursuing the War; the Expence, however great, does not exhaust the Nation. The Money circulates among ourselves; and such a War instead of draining us of our Cash, and casting a Damp upon Business, really sets many useful Trades afloat, and turns a Part of the Money of the Nation into Channels which would otherwise be dry, and useless to the Kingdom. Again they argue; that if we meddle upon the Continent, and make the Balance of Power, the Pretext for that meddling, we must suppose the *Dutch*, the *Germanic* Body, and other Powers to be in much more immediate Danger than we are; and if they are really in such Danger, they must be sensible of it; and if they are sensible of it, they must join their Forces to guard against it; and if they join their Forces, they are sufficiently able to defend themselves, without Armies or Subsidies from us; but that we, by following a chimerical Idea of the Balance of Power, and engaging in other idle political Projects, have entered into Quarrels in Favour of Princes, who never thought themselves Principals in them; and have bribed People with our Money and our Blood, to the
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Defence of their own Lives and their own Properties.

The Arguments, on which this Notion of our being utterly unconnected with the Continent, are founded, flatter our national Humour, and they derive a Force from thence, and from their being often and confidently asserted, which they have not from their Reasonableness, and which, perhaps, no Reasoning could give them. Those who are originally at the Trouble of spreading such Opinions, do not themselves give Credit to them: But they answer a present End, and form a plausible Topic, and that is all *they* desire. I am fully satisfied, that no Man who has examined this Matter, wants any new Arguments to satisfy him on which Side of the Question he ought to decide. But many take up their Notions upon a very slight Examination, and these remain in their Errors; because Men of Refinement have rarely Compliance enough to more common Understandings, to take Pains to argue particularly upon Points which are to themselves sufficiently clear already; it is for this Reason I shall spend a little Time in examining this Question, which whether it be of great Difficulty, or not, is certainly of great Importance to us.

I readily admit, that if we could detach ourselves entirely from the Continent, and could terminate all our Disputes in the Manner we are best able, by a maritime War, it

would be infinitely the most eligible upon all Accounts. But there is a Difficulty in this Case. We cannot determine by ourselves in what Manner we shall make War. The Enemy must have his Part in the Deliberation. And the Reasons which induce us to wish for a Naval War, because it is easiest for us; will incline him to a Land War, because it is the worst for us, and more convenient for him.

The Question then is narrowed to one Point; whether we, pursuing our Choice, or *France* proceeding in the Way of her Strength, she or we be in the better Road to that Point, which is the common Aim of both? Let us suppose, that, in Pursuance of the favourite Maxim, we take no Measures to oppose the Enemy on the Continent. In these Circumstances let us suppose War declared, and Hostilities commenced upon both Sides. That our Fleets have put to Sea, and that the *French* Armies have taken the Field. It is pretty certain, that whether the *French* chose to act upon the Side of the Low Countries, or on that of *Germany*, they could meet but little effectual Resistance on either. Those numerous and celebrated Fortifications in the former, many ruined, and all neglected, could serve to no other Purpose, than to afford an Exercise to their Troops, and an Eclat to the Rapidity of their Conquests. If, in the last War, when they were in perfect Order, were well garrisoned, and had a numerous Army of the Allies in the Field to relieve them, if
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then they could not ward off their Fate for above three Campaigns, nor prevent the Marshals *Saxe* and *Lowendabl* from bursting open the Sanctuary of the *United Provinces*; Is it probable, that now, ungarrisoned, unfortified, neglected, almost abandoned as they are, they could hold out even for a single Campaign? or prevent the *Hollanders*, weakened by a Series of internal Disorders, and divided by the most ruinous Factions, from throwing themselves into the Arms of *France*, and entering into such Engagements, as the unfortunate Circumstances of all, and the Inclinations of but too many amongst them, might induce them to consent to? *Holland*, feeble in itself, and a broken Reed for us to lean on, would be a Rod to chastise all *Europe* in the Hands of *France*.

If *France* should turn her Arms to the Side of the Empire, we have very convincing Experience how little that divided Body, or rather that Chaos of inconsistent Parts could resist such a compacted Force. There are Princes in that Quarter who would find their Account in throwing every Thing into the utmost Confusion. So that, let the Power of *France* be turned which Way it will, it is next to an absolute Certainty, that, without our Interposition, it must prevail and gain every Day an Accession of new Power. All this, and much more might be done, even in one Campaign. Let us see now, what amends our Naval Force could make for these Losses,

supposing

supposing our Endeavours crowned with all the Success we could possibly wish; suppose that not one *French* Man of War dares put to Sea; or if that be more favourable, let us suppose that they should be hardy enough to engage us; and that by this Rashness, they should lose twenty Ships of the Line; suppose vast Numbers of their Merchantmen taken, and their whole Commerce interrupted. I will suppose too, that we make successful Descents upon the Coasts, and pillage the Country for a considerable Way. Will any one say, we could promise ourselves a Success greater than this? Yet will any be confident enough to assert, that all this could balance the Loss we should suffer, by letting the *French* take the Course they please, to distress our Allies, and in the End our own Nation?

For surely we do not imagine, that *France*, by this Accession of Territory, and the Influence following a Train of Success, will not, nay must not grow into a considerable naval Strength. She might for a while keep her Fleets at home, and acquiesce under a temporary Loss for the Sake of a lasting Advantage; having conquered, cheated, terrified, and bribed half *Europe*, might turn the Funds she now employs on the Land Service to the Encrease of her Marine; besides the vast Supplies, which might be drawn from another maritime Power, now become her Friend and Ally. Do we forget the astonishing naval Armaments of *Louis XIV*? Have we taken no
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Notice of the prodigious Encrease of the *French* Marine since the last War? Or shall we pretend Ignorance of the constant Attention of that Court to encrease it yet further? And if, in the Reign of *Louis XIV.* in the Infancy of their Commerce, raw as they were in the Art of building Ships, inexpert in their Management, and stinted to what they are now in the Number of Hands proper to Man them; if then, they terrified us with the Greatness of their naval Force, actually under Sail to invade us, and this, at a Time, that *Holland* was our close Ally, was armed with a real Strength, and was hearty in the Use of it; what ought we to apprehend now from the Marine of *France*, already not contemptible, encreased by Alliance, formerly ours, and raised to such a Pitch as the whole Force of that great Empire, diverted into this one Channel, could raise it? We might then, notwithstanding our *Insular* Policy, find the Power of *France* but too near us; we might then discover, when the Enemy had penetrated into the Body of the Place, that a Defence of the Out-works was something else than a wasting of our Strength.

There is a very material Difference between the Operations of a Sea, and a Land War; and I am surpris'd that it is not considered in this Case, more deeply than it commonly is. At Land, a certain Force may always depend upon a certain determinate Success, in Proportion to that Force; for an Army greatly inferior
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can very little check the Career of that which prevails extremely in Number ; it can afford no Relief to the Towns which are besieged, and may at last be compelled to fight to its own certain Destruction, or be obliged entirely to evacuate the Country. But at Sea, we can never insure ourselves even a Meeting with the Enemy ; Fogs, contrary Winds, the Uncertainty of the Longitude, all these, and many more Auxiliaries may fight for the weaker Side. If you block up a Port, it does not depend upon you, how long this Blockade may continue. A Storm may drive you off the Coast. Nor is it possible on Account of the Danger to remain long hovering over any Coast. Whenever therefore any of these Causes leave the Port open, the inferior Navy sails out, and acts in such a Manner, as its Affairs require and its Strength can execute. It may transport Troops into a distant Part of the World ; act against its Enemies in the *East* or *West Indies*, should they have Settlements there ; or fall in upon their Trade, however protected by Convoys. In a Land War, suppose a great Superiority of Force, and the Event is certain ; in a naval War no Superiority can ensure even a Meeting with the Enemy ; so that, waving every other Consideration, in a War carried on upon the Principles of some of our Schemists ; the *French* may depend upon a certain determinate Success, *as if they are not opposed by us upon the Continent they undoubtedly may ;* whereas

whereas our Success must be as uncertain as the Element in which it is waged.

The second Objection to our taking Part upon the Continent from the greater Expence falls, if the first cannot stand. If a War on the Continent be *necessary*, it must be supported, or we are actually unequal to our own Protection. We are Tenants at Will; being even a Nation, but at the good Pleasure of our Enemies. Thanks to Providence, this is far from our Case; we are well able to traverse the Designs of *France* upon the Continent; and when we have secured that Point, and kept their Hands full in that Quarter, we can then employ all the great Power we derive from our Situation to annoy the Enemy. But it will be said; if we are thus perpetually to meddle upon the Continent, of what Advantage is our Situation? What! is the Number of our excellent Ports, which form our Naval Strength, of no Advantage to us? Is the Difficulty of being invaded no Advantage to us? And is it no Advantage to be exempted from the Necessity of immense standing Armies, and an extensive Frontier to be fortified and kept up at incredible Charges? These are Circumstances highly favourable, but they do not by any Means render us absolutely impenetrable, and invulnerable, nor exempt us from attending to many other Things, which a sensible Foresight and Precaution dictate.

As to the third Objection, that may *appear* to have more Weight, which if it *really* had,

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it would be retroactive, and strengthen the others. The Princes of the Empire, the *Dutch*, and many other Powers of *Europe*, are nearer the Danger than we are, and if united to prevent it, might very probably be sufficient for the Undertaking; but the Point is, have we any Reason to believe they will so unite; if their real solid Interest was clearly and dispassionately considered by them, the Consequences, it is possible, might be such an Union; but there are in the Views of all Councils, a nearer and remoter Interest, which are very frequently opposed to each other; and in most Councils the Majority is often operated upon by the nearer; we have scarce ever heard of any State which has refused a present glaring Advantage, or refused to form Connections in Consequence of it; though it might have been demonstrated that this Advantage, and these Connections, would, in a Century, prove the Ruin of that State. It is a great Mistake, that Nations, any more than private Men, are solely influenced by a Consideration of their real Interests. Those who oppose our present Measures contend, that we are now acting against our own; and will they be surprized to find, others acting from no wiser Motives?

But they who reason upon such a supposed Union, do not know, or do not at all consider the Nature and Constitution of the *Germanic* Body; in this, there is another Balance, besides the general Balance of *Europe*, which produces

produces other Connections, and other Enmities. The Power of *France* does not appear so formidable to many of the *German* Sovereigns, as that of the House of *Austria*. That of *France* is abroad, the other is at home, and to several by far more odious. Besides that, their several petty Pretensions on each other, their mutual Jealousies, Piques, Resentments, their personal Affronts, and national Aversions, must prove unsurmountable Bars to any Union for their common Defence. The very uniting of one Part of that Body in one Cause, would prove a sufficient Reason for a contrary Union in the same Body, to oppose it: Not to mention, that the Intrigues and Money of *France* have as much Influence in the Empire as ours; and *would probably have the same, though we should never think of doing any Thing to counter-act them, by the Use of the same Methods.* When was it known, that the Princes upon the Continent of *Europe*, or elsewhere, have always united or divided, as the general Interest of *Europe*, or of any other System, ought to have directed them? In what Conjunction was such an Union more wanting than in the Year 1683, when the Grand Vizier penetrated into the Empire itself, and lay with a mighty and victorious Army before the Walls of *Vienna*? At that Time, when a most potent, and at the same Time a most barbarous Enemy, the Enemy of Liberty, Learning, Arts, and Industry, the avowed, principled Enemy of the *Christian*

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Name, was just on the Point of removing the only Bar, which could hinder him from over-running the greatest Part of *Europe*; at that Time, we might have expected all *Germany* at least, as the next in Danger, to be in Arms, and united to a Man; we might have expected a Confederacy of all the *Christian* Princes to guard against an Evil, scarce one Degree removed from them. But was this the Case? Were such Confederacies formed? Far from it. Almost all Parties looked on coolly; and waited the Event with the same Indifference, with which we attend the Catastrophe of a Performance at the Theatre. Indeed, whoever bestows the least Attention to the State of *Europe*, must easily and painly see, that there can never be any reasonable Hope of an Union, sufficient to withstand the Power of *France*, unless we form the Cement of it. Unless we give it a Substance, and animate it too, it can only be the Shadow, the Picture of an Union. And I much fear, that those who are for leaving the Princes upon the Continent, to take Care each of his own particular Safety, have very little Regard to ours, whatever they may pretend. Should we follow their Counsels, *France* might now with great Reason boast that Advantage which *Rome* had formerly (*nec aliud adversus validissimas nationes pro nobis utilis, quam quod in communie non consulunt*) and she might most certainly draw the same Effects from it.

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Whenever a Nation trusts to those Advantages, which she owes solely to some Circumstance in her Situation, she must infallibly suffer by it in the End, if she is engaged with a bold and vigilant Enemy. For there can be no Advantage of that Sort, which may not be rendered useless by some Policy of him who attacks. And when we have for a long Time reposed all our Trust upon any one Bottom, on the first Failure of that, all our Courage is generally lost, and we seem to have no other Resource.

When *Alexander* the Great projected the Reduction of *Tyre*; that common Wealth reposed, and not without Reason, a great Confidence in her Situation; it was an Island, strongly fortified, strongly garrisoned, and abounding with military Stores and Provisions in the greatest Plenty. She had besides a very powerful Navy, and *Alexander* at this Time had none. But we do not find, that she had any Allies, or that she took any effectual Measures to obtain them, in these Circumstances however, *Tyre* seemed impregnable. But such was the Genius and Application of *Alexander*, that he projected a Work that removed one of the greatest Advantages of this City. He made a Mole from the Continent to the Foot of the Walls of *Tyre*, and was thus in a Condition to batter and assault the Place directly. The Astonishment caused by such a vast Work, answered half the Purpose of it. In the mean Time, the rising Reputation of this Conqueror, the Jealousy

busy of other maritime States to that of *Tyre*, and other Motives now unknown, induced several of the Neighbouring Nations to unite their Fleets under his Flag. These Fleets engaged with that of *Tyre*, and Fortune decided the Victory in their Favour. Here fell, at once, all the Advantages arising from the Situation of that City. It was now attacked with the same Ease with any other. And, notwithstanding the Obstinacy of the Resistance, it fell in a short Time into the Hands of an incensed Conqueror.

Had this wealthy and trading City, when she was resolved to keep no Measures with *Alexander*, sent Ambassadors to confederate all the neighbouring States, to join unanimously and heartily in their common Defence; had they roused the *Phenicians*; had they animated the *Jews*; had they given proper Succours to the Governor of *Ægypt*; and enabled all to form a proper Body to act on the Land Side, whilst with a powerful Fleet, they had attempted to cut off *Alexander's* Succours, and over-awed all the Coast; had they opened their Treasures to bring a large Body of *Arabians*, whom their Money would have engaged, to harass their Enemy, and retard his Operations. Had they done this, and whatever else Prudence, and the Circumstances of the Time would have suggested, I believe there is no Man who would not have thought they had consulted their Safety far better, than by confiding in their single Strength, and the Nature
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of their Situation, considerable as the one, and advantageous as the other, was ; and if, after all, they had fallen, they would have had the Honour with all Posterity of having made a Defence worthy the Grandeur and Antiquity of their City.

In examining ancient History, one frequently meets, in the Accounts of Sieges, that Towns and Fortresses have been very often taken, in those Parts, which Nature seemed to have made impenetrable ; such Advantages to imprudent Men are so many Prejudices, because they abate the Vigilance of the Defenders, and make them neglect other Means of Defence. Modern Story is not without Instances of the same Kind. *Gibraltar*, so secured by its Situation, that it might laugh at a Siege, was taken by Surprise by an Handful of Seamen. In short, there is always some Flaw in all natural Advantages, which no-body suspects until it is fatally discovered, and all Hopes of amending it, are utterly gone. So that a prudent Man will make the most of all Advantages which Nature has given him ; but at the same Time he will take all the Steps to secure himself, that he should, had he these Advantages in a smaller Degree, or not at all, I mean so as not idly to dissipate his Strength.

To come home to our own Affairs. Was it ever known, that we were engaged in a War with *France*, that Power with which we ever were, and ever must be embroiled, when we did not endeavour by every Means, and
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even by Means of our Money, to procure as many Allies as we possibly could? Were we ever unconnected even with the minutest Concerns of the Dutchies of *Burgundy* and *Britany*, whilst these States subsisted? The first *Edward*, one of the ablest Princes who ever filled the Throne of this Kingdom, knew what a formidable Enemy he had to cope with in *France*, even in the Condition it then was; and he knew perfectly well by what Means to cope with her. He did not decline all Engagements on the Continent, and content himself with fitting out Fleets to harraßs the Coast of *France*; he gained to his Interest the Earl of *Flanders*, *Adolphus* of *Nassau*, the Emperor, the Duke of *Austria*, the Archbishop of *Cologne*, and several other Princes of *Germany*; the Dukes of *Brabant*, the Earls of *Holland*, *Juliers* and *Luxemburg*, who were (says the Historian) engaged in the League by the Great Sums *Edward* was to furnish them with. The third of that Name, was full as fond of connecting himself with the Continent, and for the same Reasons, he secured (to use the Words of the same Writer) in his Interests, the Emperor *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, the Duke of *Brabant*, the Earls of *Guilder* and *Hainault*, his Brother-in-law the Archbishop of *Cologne*, and several other *German* Princes; he omitted not the private Succours of divers Lords of *Germany*, *Flanders*, *Holland*, *Brabant*, and *Gascoign*, who were to furnish him with a Number of Horse, in Proportion to the Sums
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he gave them. What a Field would such a Proceeding at this Day have opened to the *popular Declaimer*; how pathetically would he have complained in every *Harangue* “ to see
 “ not only so many sovereign, and so many
 “ subordinate Princes, and not only Princes,
 “ but petty Lords, subsidized almost all over
 “ *Europe*, in *Germany*, in the *Low Countries*, in
 “ *France*, every where; and the Treasure of
 “ *England*, the vital Blood of the Nation,
 “ streaming from a thousand Wounds, and
 “ transfused into a thousand foreign Chan-
 “ nels.” And yet at this Time *England* bore
 a much smaller Proportion in Point of Wealth
 to those Countries, and a much larger one in
 Point of idle Hands, than she does now, with-
 out all Comparison; and notwithstanding, this
 Conduct of our Princes, has been censured by
 no Historian; on the contrary, it has ever
 been highly and justly commended, and held
 up as a Pattern to all succeeding Monarchs.
 The Example of *Edward I.* was followed
 by *Edward III.* *Henry V.* trod in the same
 Steps; and indeed all our Kings, except such
 as were a Disgrace to their Thrones, and a
 Misfortune to their People, never slighted the
 Continent, from the earliest Accounts we
 have, to the present most interesting Period.
 And here I appeal to the Hearts of those, who
 oppose our Treaties, whether they think we
 could do any Thing more acceptable to our
 Enemies, than to drop all Connection with
 the Continent, and renounce these subsidiary

Treaties, which they hold to be so prejudicial to us?

Hoc It'erus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.

I have not think they would venture to affirm, that *France* wishes us the Continuance of those Allies upon those Terms; or, that she has never attempted to prevent such Alliances, as so many Hinderances to the Execution of her Schemes. Were they so ruinous to us, as some would represent them, and the Proceeding so irrational, the *French* would certainly rather encourage, or at least would wink at such a Procedure. We may know whether any Step against the Enemy be right, as well from his Eagerness to oppose, as from our own to take it.

Now if our wisest and best Princes, in all Times, have judg'd a Connection with the Continent absolutely necessary, and Alliances there to be so valuable, as to be purchas'd at the greatest Expence; shall we suppose, that we are so much more powerful, and *France* so much weaker, and the Nature of all Things so much revers'd, that we ought now to trust solely to our own Strength, and suffer the common Enemy, by Force or by Management, to make what Advances he can, whilst we confine ourselves to one single Method of attacking him? Again, if this Enemy abroad has shewn, by his Opposition to our Alliances, that he looks upon them as prejudicial to him, and of Course useful to us, *what shall we think*

think of those, who with so much Rancour oppose those Alliances, at home?

Perhaps it may be excepted to the Examples which I have given, that, in these early Times, we had less Trade, and a smaller Maritime Force than we now have; and that we were therefore under a Necessity, of taking the Part, which we then took upon the Continent. But, in answer to this, it must not be forgot, that we were then an Island, as well as now; and that we were equally well protected by our Situation from all Danger of an Invasion. If we had not then considerable Fleets, yet our Fleets, when we thought proper to turn our Strength that Way, were more considerable than those of *France*, as our Trade was, even at that Time. In the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth* we had a greater naval Force than any Power in *Europe* after the Defeat of the *Armada*; and yet that sagacious Princess, and the wise Advisers she had, during the long Course of her memorable Reign, never thought they acted weakly in maintaining Armies, and expending considerable Sums upon the Continent. Indeed, had our Ministry deviated from these Maxims of sound Policy, observed by all wise States, who never go to War without first looking out for Alliances; had they, when the Injuries we had suffered, and the Resentment of the Nation called upon them to act in an hostile Manner, had they, neglected to secure us one Ally on the Continent; had they formed no Treaties, stipulated for

no Succours, but left *France* to the full Exertion of her prodigious Strength, and the full Employment of her dangerous Intrigues; then, indeed, the Terms of *weak and wicked Minister*, which is now but Cant, the Voice of restless Faction, and disappointed Ambition, would have been a Charm to conjure up a destroying Spirit, to punish the Advisers of such a fool-hardy Proceeding. Those who now accuse them so bitterly for a contrary Conduct, have undoubtedly their own Reasons for doing so. The Publick has long entertained an Opinion, that the principal Men in Opposition have ever, as one of their chief Ends, if not their sole End, the Removal of the chief Men of the Ministry; and of filling themselves their Places, with *Integrities and Abilities superior*. This is undoubtedly a laudable Ambition; but if we judge of the Measures they would pursue, when in Power, as the direct contrary to those which they oppose when out of Power, I believe few Men, who love their Country and understand its Interest, will wish for any Change which may put the Game into their Hands.

A Clamour is raised against the subsidiary Treaties, upon another Principle; mercenary Troops are condemned, upon the Authority of some political Writers, and the Example of some Mischiefs, which have attended them recorded in History. They observe, that when you suffer your own People to grow into a Disuse of Arms, and habituate them to commit their
 their

their Defence to Foreigners, they naturally become effeminate and cowardly, unwilling and unable to protect themselves from their more avowed Enemies, or the Imposition and Tyranny of those whom they have hired to defend them. This Observation, as a general one, I allow to be extremely just. Those who have the Sword in their Hand, and not those who have the Purse, are in Effect the Masters; and those who pay others to fight their Battles, out of Cowardice, will in the End have nothing left to pay; because no Defence is solid, and to be relied on, but that which comes from the proper Strength of a Nation itself. I do not controvert the general Principle; but I positively deny the Fact as charged upon us; we have not trusted to foreign Defence, nor to mercenary Forces. Let those who reproach us with this pusillanimous Conduct look over the Votes of this Session of Parliament. They will find, that for the present Year we have thirty-four thousand *British* Soldiers on Foot in *Great Britain*; we have in *Ireland* twelve thousand at least, all *British* too; we have ten thousand in the Plantations, *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*, besides the Troops raised in the Colonies; we have ten thousand Marines, and forty thousand *British* Seamen in our Navy. We have then upwards of an hundred thousand *British* Subjects in Arms, in the different Parts of our military Establishment. How then can we suffer the prostitute Impudence of some Writers,

who

who say we have disarmed and discouraged our own People, and committed our Defence to the Hands of mercenary Foreigners? If we have engaged with other Powers to furnish us with Troops, it is because a yet greater Force, than this I have mentioned, is necessary to counterbalance that of the Enemy; that these Troops are better situated to act in our Favour, upon many Occasions, and can be maintained at an infinitely less Expence, than would serve to keep up half that Force of our own Subjects. But still they urge the Danger arising from Mercenaries; that they are turbulent, disobedient to their Commanders, and highly dangerous to the State which employs them. Examples from Antiquity are produced to support this. But are there no Examples on the other Side? Did not the Kings of *Persia* place a great and just Confidence in the *Greek* Mercenaries? And did not the younger *Cyrus*, in his Attempt upon the Throne of that Empire, rely on them above all others? Was not *Perseus*, King of *Macedon*, ruined, when, to gratify a mean, avaricious Principle, he broke a Subsidy Treaty, which he had entered into with a neighbouring warlike Peope? And if the *Carthaginian* Republick was near being ruined by a Sedition of her mercenary Forces; let it be remembered likewise, that by its mercenary Forces this Republick was near being carried to universal Empire.

But

But let the Question concerning the ancient Mercenaries be decided which Way it will, according to its own Merits; it has no sort of Concern with us at this Day. It is unfortunate, that any should read History, who are entirely deficient in Judgment, to apply Facts, and who have not Capacity sufficient to take in all that Diversity of Circumstances and Relations which are essentially requisite to the proper Use of any historical Example. In Reality, the Mercenaries mentioned in ancient Writers were altogether of a Nature different from those Forces, which confederate Princes engage to furnish us with, on the Payment of certain stipulated Sums, at this Time. The ancient Mercenaries were generally a Set of Soldiers of Fortune, detached from any Relation to their several Countries, often Fugitives from them, who entered into the Service of some foreign State, hoping to enrich themselves by Pay or Plunder; and consequently had no Ties which could hold them steadily to their Duty; such were the Mercenaries in the *Carthaginian* Service, who mutinied under *Spendius* and *Matbo*. No Man who had not oblique Views, to distort his Sight, could perceive any essential Likeness between the Employment of such Forces, and a Subsidy Treaty. In the Case of a Subsidy Treaty, the Soldiers are under Obedience to their proper Prince; they are disciplined by his Generals; they are paid out of his Treasury; and they are accountable to him as Subjects for any

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Disorders, they may commit. The antient Mercenaries had no Allegiance at home to secure them; and abroad had no Law but their Interest. In our Case, they are in no sort mercenary Forces; our whole Business is with their Prince, whom we enable to serve us more effectually, by advancing him certain Sums of Money. If we are in no Danger from the Troops, who are very different from all that have ever been dangerous to their Employers, we can fear none from any sinister Design of the Emperors of *Russia* or the Landgrave of *Hesse Cassel*. It is their Interest to uphold, and not to destroy those, whose Cause is the same with their own, and who contribute their Share in the Support of that Cause. There is indeed one Case, wherein a subsidiary Treaty might be really of dangerous Consequence. If we should enter into an Engagement with a Prince, to furnish Troops for our Defence, who had himself a very great Force, that Force very near us, and whose Situation, and Connexions might make it advantageous, and easy to him to use such a Treaty, as an Instrument to enslave us. As if we had entered into a Treaty of this kind with *France*. In such a Case, it would be highly absurd, either to give or to receive a Subsidy.

There is an Objection still remaining against Subsidies, which is, I conceive, full as weak as the rest. It is said, that we can never be secure in such an Alliance; the Friend who

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is only so because he is paid to be our Friend, will attach himself to the Enemy, for a greater Payment. To this I shall only answer, that in every thing we do, we can have but a Probability of Success. And, since it is impossible we should have more, wise Men always acquiesce in that, and think themselves sufficiently secure when the Probability is strong in their Favour. And if the most indubitable Interest of Princes, the Experience of their past Conduct, the Faith of the most solemn Treaties, and a Subsidy into the Bargain, be not a Security for their Steadiness, I own I cannot see what human Prudence can do towards securing an Ally. But People have first called the Troops, stipulated in such Alliances, *Mercenaries*, and to that Idea have affixed those of Venality and Perfidiousness, without the least Foundation of Fact; or Experience. On such an Occasion it is usual with these Gentlemen to cry up a National Militia, who, being incorruptible, and fighting for all that is dear to them, would have a Courage infinitely superior to those who fight only for Pay.

The Militia, is one of the nicest Questions in our national Policy; because it seems to carry a Dilemma with it, let us determine which Way, we will: On what Footing to settle the Militia, so as to be at once useful to the Nation, and at the same Time, not dangerous to the Constitution; by adding too much

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Power

Power, to one or other of the constituent Parts, is a Point, which ought to be deeply and maturely considered. But let us, in the End, come to what Resolution we please, upon that Subject; a Militia could answer none of those Ends, for which we entered into the Subsidiary Treaties. To digest a proper Scheme for a Militia, would take up much Time; to put this Scheme in Execution, would require more; and nothing, but a long and assiduous Practice, could make it useful and effective. In the mean Time an Invasion might take us unprepared; and as to the most necessary Purposes on the Continent, a Militia is no Assistance at all. It is an ill Policy to confide all upon one Cast. A Militia might repulse an Invader; it may be defeated too; and what terrible Consequences might such a De-Defeat draw after it within the Kingdom? It is true, that the Circumstance of fighting in ones own Country, in the Presence of their Families, and Friends, *pro aris & focis*, has often given great Spirit to an Army; but on the other Hand, it is no way improbable, that the Consideration of the ruinous Consequence attending a Loss may dishearten them; and it has often done so in similar Cases. The Romans always fared worst in *Italy*. *Africa* was the weak Part of the *Carthaginians*. And it was the Opinion of *Agefilaus*, that the King of *Persia* could not be hurt but in his own Territories.

I do

I do not think, that our own People have generally made a Defence worthy of their great military Character, when they have been attacked by a foreign Enemy in *England*.

As I believe it is pretty clear, that to do ourselves Right, indeed to protect ourselves, we must have Connections upon the Continent; and that the Way of Subsidies is the cheapest and best Method of keeping up that Connection, and making it effectual for our Purposes. I believe it may be shewn, with equal Clearness, that those Courts, with whom we have engaged, can do us the most Service in preventing those Evils, for the averting of which we entered into the Engagements, in Question.

And; first, should *France* attempt to disturb the Tranquility of the Empire, and molest his Majesty's Electoral Dominions; for his Heroic Regard to his Regal ones; can there be any Prince better situated to afford a speedy Succour, than the Landgrave of *Hesse Cassell*, whose Territories border upon those of his Majesty? The Succours from thence might be almost instantaneous; and are far from contemptible, when joined with the Forces his Majesty has already on Foot in that Quarter; and those which a People, justly sensible of the Blessings which they enjoy under the best of Princes, must compose, when all that is dearest to them in the World is at Stake; these surely may keep the Enemy at Bay at

least, until a more considerable Succour could arrive.

As to *Russia*, I think, the Advantages derived from that Alliance, as they are greater, so I think them more easily discerned too. For could we suppose, that there is any Prince in the Empire of boundless Ambition, and who might in part satisfy that Ambition in a general Confusion; I do not know any Power so capable, by its Strength and Situation, of being a Check upon him. It is said, indeed, that all the Mischief may be done before the Troops stipulated can possibly arrive. I allow it possible, that much Mischief may be done, as in War how can it be avoided? But what is proposed, is not to prevent all Sorts of Evils, which would be an idle Undertaking; but to prevent the Designs of the Enemy from taking a lasting Effect: We cannot prevent all the Calamities incident to War; what we ought to aim at is, to guard against the last and worst. It is an idle Business, to scheme at a Distance, the Operations of possible Campaigns; but will any say, that a Force sufficient to make some Stand, in the Electoral Dominions, may not be had together, until the *Russian* Auxiliaries were transported by Sea (could no better Means of Passage be had) to his Majesties Port of *Harbourg*? And might not this be done in part, at least, as soon as ever there was a probable Appearance of a Design to disturb the Tranquility

quilty of the Empire? Must not the *French* Army take a Time to march? And if they take Time, in the Execution of their Designs, is not that Time open for us to oppose them? On the whole, we have not the least Reason to apprehend, that these Treaties will not answer their Purposes very sufficiently, should Things come to extremeties, *but perhaps they may do more; and prevent the Necessity of ever being brought into Act.* I am sure, they have already caused one of the most extraordinary Phænomena, that ever appeared in the political System; and seem to have confounded those Heads, whose Cabals had been the Cause of all the Confusion in *Europe.*

The Fact speaks itself; I shall therefore say no more upon it; but only intreat my Countrymen, every one to use his own Reason, to judge for himself, and to consider, "This is a Time of Publick Danger;" and that one Consideration will, I think, at once discover to every reasonable Man the *Propriety* of their Reasonings, who, at such a Time, do all they can to infuse Doubts, and raise Discontents among the People.

So long a Discussion indeed was not necessary to those who *spread* Opinions, prejudicial to the Publick Peace; though perhaps it may not be useless to them, who are infected by them. The Fears of *those Persons*, are, in Reality, lest our Auxiliaries should justify the Steps which have been taken, by being a
real

feal Advantage to us. They forebode Ill from their Malice, and their Pride makes them fear to be disappointed. They are a Sort of Men, which grow up in all Commonwealths (of which they are the Pest) Men of an overweening Opinion of their own Talents, and an insatiable Ambition; who can think well of no Counsels, but their own; and care not what becomes of their Country, when it does not submit to be guided by their Direction. These are a People, who when the publick Counsels are unsuccessful, take an Opportunity to triumph over the Nation's Weakness, and to extol their own Sagacity. And if the Nation should triumph, they have ever the Sagacity to discern some latent Mischief, even in our Successes. Our present Joy is to be productive of a future Sorrow; something must be amiss. Either the Advantage was not pursued sufficiently; or it was carried too far. Physicians, they are, ever reading Lectures on the Disease, but who speak nothing of the Remedy; Builders, whose Skill consists in demolishing; but who know nothing of that noble Architecture, which transforms a little Town, into a great City. Perpetual *Disputants*, who never can settle or decide. So habituated to searching out Faults, that they have lost all Relish for Perfection. So long enured to Poison, that it becomes their natural Food.

Should

Should a Reptile of this Species, whom Fear, Despair, and Greediness had long buried in his Hole, where he lay wound up in himself, feeding on Rancour and Discontent; should such a Reptile, in the active Season, cast off his Slough, and spring out in the Face of Day, you will know him by these Marks. His Characteristicks are a *Rattle* and a *Sting*; his only Language is an *Hiss*; slippery and glossy, and *Glittering*, nimble and *ready at a Turn*; but without Feature, or Limbs, or Proportion. Should this Monster attempt to scatter his Poison among the Herd

—*Cape Saxa manu, Cape robora, pastor,
Tollentemque Minas, et Sibila Colla tumentem
Dejice*—

F I N I S.

