




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

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
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SPEECH

OF

HON. C. ASHLEY, OF ARKANSAS,

ON

THE OREGON QUESTION.

DELIVERED

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FRIDAY, APRIL 3, 1846.

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WASHINGTON:

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF BLAIR AND RIVES,

1846.

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## THE OREGON QUESTION.

The Joint Resolution for giving the notice to terminate the convention between the United States and Great Britain, relative to the Oregon Territory, being under consideration—

Mr. ASHLEY addressed the Senate as follows:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I can scarcely hope, indeed no one could reasonably expect, that I should be able to throw much additional light, or to advance anything new on the important subject before the Senate at this late stage of its discussion. The utmost I could hope to do, would be, to present some of the old arguments under a new guise, and state the results of those arguments on my own mind. I shall, of course, be liable to present many thoughts and arguments in a manner somewhat crude, and not sufficiently matured. Be that as it may, I do not feel myself justified, as one of the representatives of a sovereign State, to give a silent vote on a question so momentous, which may possibly result in involving the peace of this country with one of the most powerful nations of the earth, as England is vauntingly represented in this chamber, but feel myself conscientiously bound to give the reasons which will govern my own vote on the various propositions now under consideration, and for the strength and correctness of which I hold myself responsible to my constituents.

In the discussion of this question, various topics have been introduced, which, in my judgment, were altogether irrelevant, and have really nothing to do with its merits. If we had confined ourselves to the isolated question legitimately and properly before us, it appears to me that there could be scarcely any difference of sentiment as to the proper course which ought to be adopted. The simple question of notice alone, would surely have long ago been determined upon, if all who believed we had any claims to Oregon had acted in concert. There are, nevertheless, some other subjects which, though not strictly connected with the question before us, it may not be improper for the Senate of the United States—a most important branch of the Government—to look forward to, and carefully weigh: such as the results that might be anticipated as likely to spring out of the giving the contemplated notice. If we believe war will probably follow, then prudence and sound wisdom would require us to make adequate preparation, in view of such a contingency.

Thus far it might be proper to go beyond the intrinsic merits of the question before the Senate; and I cannot assent to the propriety of introducing anything else. Notwithstanding many irrelevant and extraneous matters have been brought into this discussion, (which I should not have introduced myself,) yet, having been frequently referred to, and commented on, in the previous debate, I am unwilling to pass in silence, lest the Democratic party should be subjected to wrong constructions, and imputations wholly gratuitous and unfounded, and our silence adduced as evidence of the justness of the allegations made, and inferences deduced from them by our Whig friends on the other side of the chamber. One of these irrelevant matters, which has most surprised me, is the introduction into this chamber and this debate of the doings of the Baltimore convention; and I have been yet more surprised at a charge made by an honorable Senator from Virginia, on the other side of the chamber, [Mr. ARCHER,] that the convention and its introduction here was the result of *Jacobinism*; and not to misrepresent the remark of the gentleman, I beg leave to read from his published speech a short extract. He says:

"The authority of the Baltimore convention had been openly invoked in the discussion, as one of the appropriate means to influence it. It was proper that the people should be made acquainted with the fact, and with the fearful bearing of this appeal. The Baltimore convention! What was it? The authority of an association unknown to the institutions of the country, made the subject of appeal to control the legislation of the country! This body, really self-appointed, or nearly so, convened for an alleged specific object, to carry into effect an assumed public sentiment in relation to that object. Its first proceeding had been to discard the admitted public sentiment which it purported to have met to effectuate. Its notorious course of proceeding had been, not to receive, but to make a public sentiment, in substitution of that which it professed to have been sent to execute; and then to raise political issues which might be inflamed in aid of this operation. A Junta, with no authority of any kind, or acting in admitted contradiction and violation of its professed authority, had been successful in dictating its most important election to the country; and its authority was now employed, on the *prestige* of that success, to dictate the legislation of the country on a subject of the most vital importance. This was the first open avowal the country had ever known of *Jacobinism* in its halls of legislation. It was yet to be seen how the avowal would be received."

It is manifest from these remarks, that the Senator wishes to induce the people to believe that there has been an attempt to dictate to the Legislature, to influence their decisions improperly; and



to control their action, as the celebrated Jacobin club of Paris did in the days of the French Revolution. Is he borne out in this by anything that has transpired in this chamber?—by anything that has been done out of it?—by the acts of the Baltimore convention itself, or the Democratic party, whose delegates composed that convention? Sir, that convention was composed of delegates from all parts of the Union, representing the will and wishes of the whole Democracy of the United States; possessed of high talents, and the full confidence of those whom they represented, convened to consult on the common weal of the party, and to select candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency of this great Republic, that should meet the wishes and carry out the principles of the Democratic party—the principles of a Washington, a Jefferson, a Madison, and a Jackson—and well did they perform their duty. Allow me, Mr. President, to read from the proceedings of that convention what they did in relation to the subject now before the Senate. Mr. B. F. Butler, of New York, offered a series of resolutions expressive of the sentiments and principles of the party, which were unanimously adopted by the convention, among which, the only one referring to the subject now under discussion, is the following:

“Resolved, That our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other Power; and that the reoccupation of Oregon and the reannexation of Texas, at the earliest practicable period, are great American measures, which this convention recommends to the cordial support of the Democracy of the Union.”

Was there any Jacobinism in this? If so, in what did it consist? After a thorough examination of the whole proceedings of that body, and all that has been done since under those recommendations, in and out of this chamber, I can find no foundation for the charge so gravely made by the Senator from Virginia. This resolution I have read, contains, I think, good sound doctrine, and recommends the reoccupation of Oregon, and the reannexation of Texas, as great American measures. Is such a recommendation Jacobinical? If it is, sir, a large portion of the American people have shown their love of Jacobinism, by adopting one of those American measures. They have already reannexed Texas, and have added the lone star of that little republic to our own bright and glorious constellation; and within a few days past, we have witnessed the full evidence of its consummation in this chamber. It was, sir, one of the proudest days of my life, when I heard the oath of office administered to her Senators, and they took their seats in our midst as the representatives of that young and chivalrous State, whose independence was obtained by her sons on the memorable field of San Jacinto. This resolution was neither more nor less than a recommendation of great measures to the Democratic party throughout the United States; and they, as I presume, will at this day be acknowledged on both sides of this chamber to constitute a large majority of the people of the United States. I see some gentlemen on the other side of the chamber shaking their heads at this proposition. Is it not true, sir? Have we not the most overwhelming evidence of its truth? But if they will not admit it, we can resort to actual demonstration of its truth. Look, sir, at the triumphant

majority by which we elected our President and Vice President, nominated by this convention, in opposition to the idol of the opposite party. Look at the large majority of the Democratic party in the House of Representatives; and look at this body also, with a majority against us prior to the 4th of March last, and now having a large majority on our side of the chamber. Surely such evidence is full and complete, and establishes my proposition too fully to be endangered by the shaking of heads on the other side, or the force of argument itself. I deny that it is Jacobinical; and how its introduction here can be called a Jacobinical measure, quite passes my comprehension. I admit its introduction was not called for in this discussion, and I should not have introduced it; but introduced it has been, and I will now, therefore, tell you what I do claim under the authority of that convention. Whether the resolutions there adopted bind the whole Democratic party or not, it is not necessary to investigate or determine; but I am quite sure, and I believe the Senators on the other side of the chamber even, will agree with me that the resolutions of that convention bound the President and Vice President of the United States, actually elected under nominations made by it, accompanied by their declaration of principles—“their confession of faith.” Long anterior to the Baltimore convention, Mr. Polk, as was well known, had given to the world similar views on the Oregon question to those which were presented in the resolution, (and similar views to those presented by the whole series of resolutions adopted by that convention,) and he was selected by the convention for the high office he holds, as the exponent of these great principles promulgated to the American people, and known to have been in accordance with those entertained by him previous to the meeting of the convention. I repeat, sir, the President and Vice President were bound to carry out those principles, by having accepted the nomination of the convention that had at the time declared them; bound, sir, as much as an elector for President and Vice President is to cast his vote in favor of the person whom he had pledged himself to support when he offered himself to the people as a candidate for their suffrages. The resolution, then, does but embody doctrines and sentiments which Mr. Polk put forth publicly long before the convention was held, and which, indeed, he had always avowed. He claimed the whole of Oregon as strongly as even the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Benton] did in 1825 and 1842. He took this ground in public addresses, and published it to the whole United States. When the convention was called, they proclaimed the same principles; and, as representing the Democracy of this Union, they called upon him, as their nominee, to carry their principles into action. If he, after that, accepted their nomination, he is most assuredly bound by their resolutions. He gave his bond to the American people. I hope the gentlemen on the other side will all agree with me, that whoever else may or may not be bound by the acts of that convention, those whom the convention nominated as candidates, and whom the people afterwards elected, were undeniably bound, just as much as they would have been if they had issued a manifesto containing their political creed. In all this, if there is Jacobinism, then it makes a

large majority to the chamber in being selected. There is no man from a rather distant as a western people of the nation upon dictated. The proper to people: he has permanent—the blessing would in permanent, state the s to read an  
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President and convention, in party. Look at this as prior to the large majority such evidence as my proposition the shaking of e of argument ; and how its colonial mens- . I admit its but introduced , tell you what ant convention. opted bind the is not necessary um quite sure, her side of the hat the resolu- President and actually elected e accompanied by their confession . I more conven- had given to the question to those tion, (and simi- whole series of on,) and he was e high office he great principles ple, and know those entertained the convention. President were , by having sen- tion that had sir, as much as President is to whom he had he offered him- their suffrages. body doctrines t forth publicly eld, and which, He claimed the ven the Senator d in 1825 and e addresses, and States. When proclaimed the ng the Democ- on him, as their into action. If mination, he is solutions. He ple. I hope he agree with me, ot be bound by whom the con- and whom the denably bound, een if they had political creed. then it makes w

large majority of the American people amenable to the charge; and I, for one, Mr President, glory in being such a Jacobite.

There is another topic introduced by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. ARCHER.] It is, I know, a rather delicate matter, but I feel myself bound, as a western Representative, to vindicate the people of the West, and not suffer the unjust imputation upon them to pass unnoticed or uncontradicted. The gentleman from Virginia has thought proper to decry the *intelligence* of the western people: he had accused them of a recklessness of temperament—but charitably expressed the hope that the blessings of a more *diffused education* among us would in time correct the evil effects of that temperament. But, sir, lest I should not properly state the sentiments of the gentleman, I beg leave to read an extract from his published speech:

"A supposed peculiar western interest on this subject of Oregon had been adduced to explain the propensity to extreme measures manifested in that quarter of the country, and by its Representatives here. He (Mr. A.) did not ascribe the vehemence of this propensity to the influence of any such selfish consideration. But he did ascribe it to a peculiarity of western temperament, the incident, perhaps, of their stage of social condition. The people were notoriously brave; but this bravery ran into recklessness of all consequences in controversy with foreign Powers. They were as undoubtedly generous; but they had the quality too often found in alliance with spirit and generosity—impudence of resistance to their views, and the disposition to domineer over it. He (Mr. A.) admitted his indulgence of any such selfish consideration. But he did ascribe it to a peculiarity of western temperament, the incident, perhaps, of their stage of social condition. The people were notoriously brave; but this bravery ran into recklessness of all consequences in controversy with foreign Powers. They were as undoubtedly generous; but they had the quality too often found in alliance with spirit and generosity—impudence of resistance to their views, and the disposition to domineer over it. He (Mr. A.) admitted his indulgence of any such selfish consideration. But he did ascribe it to a peculiarity of western temperament, not in relation to the present instance only of its display, but the large future which was before us; the political power of the country being destined, probably, to pass to that region, before this temperament passed away from it, under the influence of its only corrective, *diffused education*. Lamentation on this topic, he had to confess, had for some time kept him in terror."

Put into plain English, this means neither more nor less than that the whole people of the West are so ignorant that they could not be expected to be right, either on this Oregon question or any other. This is certainly a most sweeping charge, and seems to involve all the people west of the Alleghenies. Now, I ask that gentleman, and the Senate, to look at the political character of these people—to look at what they have done, and omitted to do, and in what this western temperament has manifested itself in their conduct and history; and I aver that there are no people in these United States who have manifested so strong an attachment to their Government, or such a zealous devotion to the union of these States. Why, sir, if the honorable Senator had described us all as the lineal descendants of patient Job, and had summed up our character by saying we were all the children of meekness and patience, he would have been far more correct. What have we ever done as a people to show our recklessness and our proneness to run into extremes? Look at our past history, and see whether I claim too much for the meekness, forbearance, and patience of the people of the West. On the formation of the Confederation, the Old Thirteen became sovereign and independent, and in the adoption of the Constitution of the General Government, made provision for the admission of new States, and subsequently entered into a compact with Virginia, and a treaty with France, that certain new States should be admitted "on an equal footing with the original States;" and then, forsooth, although the original

States were the absolute owners of the soil within their limits, they, in violation of their own compacts, refused to the new States that right of soil inherent to sovereignty, and which each original State possessed itself, but held on to it, and peddled it out for the sole advantage of the General Government. What did the West do? Rebel? Get up a civil war? Nullify the laws of Congress, thus violating our sovereignty? No, sir. We have, from time to time, complained and protested only. What did the people of Arkansas do, when forty miles in width of the whole western portion of her recognised territory was taken from her, and by which hundreds of her citizens were removed from their farms, opened and improved by the labor of their own hands, and given to the Indians, to induce them to remove west of the Mississippi, out of the States where they were born, and their ancestors had lived, from time immemorial? Did we resist? No, sir. We have shown ourselves a law-abiding people, and have never, in any instance, gone against, or resisted, his authority. Take, as a further illustration, the tariff of 1842. I am not going into its merits, but I ask, what is the public sentiment in the whole West in regard to it? It is perfectly well known that a large majority of western men consider it as a system of "legalized robbery;" and yet, how have we deported ourselves under it? Have we held public meetings, and adopted resolutions to resist the law? No, sir, we have resorted to remonstrance—we have made an appeal to reason and to justice; and this reckless western temperament has contented itself with resorting to the ballot-box alone to correct the evil. That is our disposition for "running to extremes." No, sir, we never had, in our part of the country, any Hartford Conventions; we have never put arms into the hands of our militia to resist their own Government. We never called upon our people to prevent the collection of an excise tax. We have never attempted, in any of our Legislatures, to do away with the compromises of the Constitution, or to declare the Union dissolved, because a new State had been admitted into the Union, agreeable to the terms of the Constitution itself. Nothing of the kind. On the contrary, I insist that the people of the West have shown more attachment to the Union than those of any other portion of the United States. Yet the gentleman says that our rash recklessness of character will be corrected by-and-by, by the influence of education. Yes, sir, by the influence of education! Why, sir, I hold that the population of the western States are, at this moment, better informed than the people of any State in this Union, except those of New England, where they have long enjoyed the advantage of the system of common schools. I say confidently, that there is no portion of the people of the southern, or of the middle States, that can compare at all in useful knowledge, and the general prevalence of education, with the people of the West. In confirmation of this statement, and as a test of its truth, I beg leave to refer to a small statistical table which I hold in my hand, and which has been made out at my request, in the office of the Secretary of the Senate, from data contained in the census of 1840. It exhibits the relative number of those who are unable to read and write, as compared with the entire

population. This is intended to include only those States whose Senators have been called "the Hotspurs of the Senate," "the ultra men," "the all-or-none-party," the 54° 40' men; and I have left out the remaining southern and western States, because neither could have been referred to in the remarks of the Senator. This table I especially commend to the attention of the Senator from Virginia:

*Proportion of white persons over 20 years of age who cannot read and write, to the aggregate white population of the following States, according to the census of 1840.*

In Virginia.....	7.72 per cent.
Arkansas.....	8.25 "
Illinois.....	5.82 "
Missouri.....	5.97 "
Indiana.....	5.61 "
Michigan.....	1.02 "
Ohio.....	2.35 "

Average per cent. proportion of the six last-named States, 4.84 per cent.

And now, how stands this matter in old Virginia, in the "Old Dominion," the "mother of States and statesmen?" with her long-settled country—her university—her colleges, and all her academies and common schools? Rather more within her borders can neither read nor write than double the proportion in the western States. Her average stands 7.72!!!—below any western State but Arkansas; while the one has been settled more than two hundred years, and the other some twenty-five; one a free sovereign State for seventy years, and the other ten only. [A voice: "But, then, Arkansas has always been Democratic."] True, Mr. President, she always has been Democratic; and I trust in Heaven will always remain so. It is that democracy, that equality of rights and privileges resulting from it, that has extended among the whole mass of her citizens the blessings of diffused education, of which she may well boast. After having so recently taken her station among her sister republics as a free, sovereign, and independent State of this Union—only one-half of one per cent. below Virginia—with all her wealth, her literary institutions, her age, and superior advantages in every respect!! I have taken this general fact as an indication of the state of information in a community; nor do I know a better or fairer test; and it places Virginia in a position where her Representatives in this chamber should have been the very last to say a word on the want of education in the West. Is it he that charges us with ignorance, and measures our temperament by it? I leave it to the candor of the gentleman from Virginia himself to say, whether, according to this standard of educational geography, if the West, through her ignorance, goes for 54° 40', Virginia ought not to stand firm at least as high as latitude 75°?

There is one other subject to which I cannot but refer. I do so with regret, and without the least purpose of casting censure on any one. I refer to the discussion in this chamber of the British title. I concede to gentlemen on the other side quite as much patriotism as is possessed by those on this. I am far from charging them with advocating British interests in opposition to those of their own

country, with a view of benefiting them and injuring us. We are all American citizens; but when a contest exists in regard to titles between us and Great Britain, I hold it wrong to advocate the British title, or express doubts about our rights, in open debate, in an American Senate. I was much gratified to hear the honorable Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEBSTER] say "that his tongue should bluster before he would say one word in derogation of the American title so long as the subject was under negotiation. I think that in that determination he was perfectly right; other Senators have thought and acted differently. I give them credit for the best intentions, but not for good judgment. I disagree with them in their ideas of duty. But what may be the effect of this line of conduct? Mr. Buchanan, in his correspondence with Mr. Pakenham, says that the claim of England, on the ground of the treaty of Nootka Sound, was first suggested by the American negotiator, Mr. Rush. In this it is possible he is mistaken; but I shall not venture to contradict the Secretary of State without a further investigation than I have been able to make as yet. Let gentlemen only look what a curious position they may find themselves placed in. Since this negotiation commenced, the British Ministers have been compelled to change their whole ground. In the correspondence which took place in 1818, the British negotiators never once referred to the Nootka convention. They relied then on some purchase from the Indians, on Captain Cook's discoveries, and the Lord knows what else; but not a word about the convention of Nootka. Now, they rely on that convention altogether, and on nothing else; and yet this, which they now consider as their strongest ground, was first suggested to them by one of our own advocates. If my views of that matter are correct, they have got to change their ground once more; for I hold that they have not a shadow of title under that treaty. Will not those gentlemen, who have devised arguments here on the British side of the question, feel rather strangely if Mr. Pakenham should, on a renewal of the negotiations, bring forward new arguments, such as he never used before, which have been taught him on the other side of this chamber? I fancy they will have placed themselves in an extremely awkward position. I give credit to this Senate, as a legislative body, for the possession of talents equal to those of any other body of men on the face of the earth; and cheerfully admit that the gentlemen on the other side of the chamber are entitled to the credit of their full share. Who cannot select out of that portion of the Senate at least ten gentlemen who, in point of talents and knowledge, are quite equal to Mr. Pakenham? I fancy their vanity will forbid their giving a negative to this assertion. Now, if men of such calibre set themselves down to investigate a national title, is there not ground to suppose that they will hit upon arguments and considerations such as Mr. Pakenham never would have thought of? They must remember, when they are urging arguments to restrain our claims in Oregon, they are addressing not merely us, ultra claimants, as they choose to term us, but they are talking to England also, and to the whole world.

I believe most sincerely that the case as pre-

sented is not quoting as Maine over his arguments and such a sister never would be right knowledge, sue a fraud case of the in common dence; but I as never was vious negoti Oregon mat have produc

"There is a of our claim, examine before into war. I t parently, with title, by a Mr. sordly know, one of the des spirit which d partially to G authority, but and Clarke, th make discover the purpose of that they appli ports, and actu profess, in indee the usual mark script from th we got Louisa much of our gr the Columbia such is the fact discussion. W

I have no d I don't believ See what the intention, I h thing to inju cation was t passports for recorded in t can be produ ble argumen the Nootka d thing Great not, indeed, weaken one Clarke's ex getting Louis and Clarke t our new pur world as one but if the sta it was no suc commercial c hunters, and men—an ex jects. This of our prev ence that has theirs, based

Allow me, the vast num raised. The [a] says: " authority to

sented is not exaggerated. Let me illustrate by quoting an instance of it. The Senator from Maine over the way, [Mr. EVANS,] suggested in his argument the other day, matters entirely new, and such as I will venture to say the British Minister never heard of before. I do not say that it would be right in us, if we were possessed of a knowledge of facts which England has not, to pursue a fraudulent course in their concealment, as was done by the British negotiator in the famous case of the red-line map. I admit that we might, in common honesty, be bound to produce evidence; but I say it was a new argument, and such as never was urged against us in any of the previous negotiations which have taken place on this Oregon matter, and which we were not bound to have produced. The Senator said:

"There is another thing which throws doubt on this part of our claim, and which we should carefully and thoroughly examine before we take steps that may plunge the nation into war. I have seen a fact stated in a book, written, apparently, with a view of maintaining the soundness of our title, by a Mr. Robertson, a gentleman whom I do not personally know, but who, as I understand, is connected with one of the departments of the Government, and written in a spirit which abundantly exempts him from all imputation of partiality to Great Britain. The writer does not give his authority, but he says, speaking of the exploration by Lewis and Clarke, that the object of their expedition was not to make discoveries, but that it was purely commercial—for the purpose of opening a trade west of our possessions; and that they applied to Spain, England, and Russia, for passports, and actually obtained them. The passage does not profess, indeed, to be a literal quotation—that is, it had not the usual marks of quotation, but is introduced as a transcript from the instructions given, and that at a time before we got Louisiana. If this be so, it entirely repudiates so much of our ground of title as rests upon the exploration of the Columbia river by Lewis and Clarke. I do not say that such is the fact. All I say is, that this is a grave subject for discussion. We may be able to answer the difficulty."

I have no doubt myself but this is a "fish story;" I don't believe a word of it. Still, it may be true. See what the Senator has done! It was not his intention, I know, and cheerfully admit, to do anything to injure his country. If it be true that application was made to the British Government for passports for Lewis and Clarke, the fact must be recorded in the British archives; and if the proof can be produced, it will furnish a far more plausible argument against us than Mr. Pakenham's on the Nootka convention—more plausible than anything Great Britain has been able to adduce. I do not, indeed, say it will be conclusive, but it will weaken one of our arguments based on Lewis and Clarke's exploration. We have said, that after getting Louisiana from France, we sent out Lewis and Clarke to investigate and examine the value of our new purchase. We have trumpeted it to the world as one of the wise acts of our Government; but if the statement of this Mr. Robertson is true, it was no such thing. They were sent only on a commercial errand, to procure fresh furs for our hunters, and new fishing grounds for our fishermen—an exploration wholly for commercial objects. This refutes, at one blow, all the arguments of our previous negotiators in all the correspondence that has passed between our Government and theirs, based on that exploration.

Allow me, Mr. President, to refer to one other of the vast number of new objections that have been raised. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. ALEXANDER] says: "Discovery was not one of the titles to authority to be found in the Constitution for the

'acquisition of territory;' and that we had, by the Constitution, the power of acquiring territory by treaty only, and discovery was no evidence of a treaty-making faculty. If this objection was well taken, it was conclusive against our title by our own discoveries, explorations, and settlement, of Oregon, and one that has never occurred to the British Government. I will not argue such a question, that we cannot acquire territory by discovery, for it is an undeniable incident of sovereignty: such a construction would render our Government a laughing-stock to the world. I might add twenty other similar new objections that have never before been made from any quarter, but I leave them; and I doubt whether gentlemen will be able to satisfy the American people that such arguments are admissible, or proper in the mouths of American Senators: they legitimately belong to the British Parliament only.

The subject of war had been introduced here, and reasons have been given for supposing that notice may lead to war. Of this I do not complain. But there has been one thing introduced here, which is totally inexcusable. We have had most glowing descriptions of the horrors and devastations of war. Great eloquence has been displayed in all this; but the question is, *cui bono?* What good purpose is to be effected by it? Can gentlemen expect by this to influence any member of this Senate? Surely not. Can it be in order to "prepare the hearts of the people" for peace—to alarm the fears of the American people? If these are not the objects aimed at, then I cannot understand why these descriptions are introduced at all. I consider it as all wrong.

There was another thing to which I must also object. A resolution was introduced by the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. J. M. CLAYTON,] calling on the Secretary of the Navy to lay before the Senate the naval force of all the nations of Europe, and of the world. The Secretary complied with the call, and I beg leave to read the British force:

NAVAL FORCE OF GREAT BRITAIN.\*

CLASS OF SHIPS.	IN COMMISSION.		BUILDING.		IN ORDINARY.		Total ships.
	No.	Guns.	No.	Guns.	No.	Guns.	
Ships of the line.....	17	1,570	23	2,124	75	6,258	115
Frigates.....	32	1,145	15	498	73	3,030	120
Sloops, brigs, and bombs.....	71	356	21	305	40	521	132
Schooners, cutters, tenders, and ketches.....	33	66	-	-	6	18	39
Steam frigates.....	6	60	12	120	4	40	22
Steam sloops.....	54	270	20	100	6	30	80
Steam packets.....	21	42	3	6	-	-	24
Other steamers.....	9	18	6	12	-	-	15
Transports and troop ships.....	5	70	-	-	-	-	5
Receiving ships, coast guards, and other non-effective vessels; as coal depôts, convict hulks, &c., employed in service connected with the navy.....	84	1485	-	-	-	-	84
Total.....	332	4,583	100	3,165	204	9,933	636

\* From the Navy List of January, 1846.

† Nominal armament.

g them and in- citizens; but titles between ng to advocate about our rights, Senate. I was le Senator from say "that his would say one an title so long on. I think that uly right; other lions, but not for them in their the effect of this , in his corre. ys that the claim renty of Nootka the American ne- is possible he ure to contradict urther investiga- as yet. Let us sion they Since this ne- gisters have been ground. In the in 1818, the Brit- ed to the Nootka a some purchase k's discoveries," but not a word Now, they rely on nothing else; consider as their ested to them by ny views of that t to change their they have not a Will not those arguments here on el rather strange- a renewal of the guments, such as been taught him I fancy they will rency awkward ate, ns legislative ts equal to those face of the earth; endemen on the tited to the credit select out of that gentlemen who, e, are quite equal r vanity will for- assertion. Now, selves down to ere not ground to n arguments and ham never would remember, when restrain our claims not merely us, ul- tern us, but they nd to the whole the case as pre-

**NOTE.**—The official list numbers 671 vessels, but names only 636.

Number of vessels in the British navy, 636; mounting, when armed, 17,681 guns.	
Number of men employed in the navy, 1845-46.....	97,500
Do boys do do do.....	2,000
Do marines do do do.....	10,500
Total.....	40,000

Revenue vessels commanded by officers of the royal navy, 73; mounting 144 guns.	
Indian navy, 1844—( <i>Engineers and Architects' Journal</i> )—	
Sloops.....	4
Brigs.....	4
Schooners.....	4
Cutters.....	3
Steamers.....	22
Total.....	38
Total mounting.....	106
Total.....	60
Total.....	106

Total steamers of all classes in the English navy.....	141
Do in the revenue service.....	1
Do in the Indian navy.....	22
"Contract mail steamer" under the control of the Admiralty, for war purposes, estimated at.....	35
Total effective steam navy, vessels.....	199

#### EAST INDIA MAIL STEAMERS.

In this service there are nine steamers, averaging 833 tons, mounting three guns each, (32 and 36-pounders), showing a total number of 922 officers and men.

I now refer you to the American naval force, and it makes, I confess, but a small show by the side of the other.

#### NAVAL FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES.\*

CLASS OF SHIPS.	IN COMMISSION.		BUILDING.		IN ORDINARY.	
	No.	Guns.	No.	Guns.	No.	Guns.
Ships of the line.....	4	374	5	430	2	164
Frigates and razes.....	7	374	3	150	5	209
Sloops of war.....	15	314	2	40	6	130
Brigs of war.....	6	60	-	-	2	20
Steamers of war.....	3	21	1	4	3	12
Schooners.....	1	10	-	-	-	-
Small unarmed vessels and storeships.....	11	-	-	-	1	-
Aggregate.....	47	1,155	11	614	19	576

Total number of Government vessels, of all classes, 77.

Total number of guns, when all armed, 2,345.

Total number of seamen and boys employed in the naval service, 1845, 1846..... 7,500

Total number of marine corps, exclusive of officers... 1,224

Total..... 8,724

Of the four line-of-battle ships marked as in commission, one only is at sea. The other three are used as receiving ships. Of the five marked as building, one is at Sackett's Harbor.

Of the steamers, one of the three in the column of "ordinary" is for harbor defence. The other is a steam tug.

Now, sir, although the gentleman called for this information while the bill for an increase of our navy was pending, it was during the pendency of the Oregon question also, and supporting the views presented in his speech: and with what object was this display made? Was it "to prepare the hearts of the people" for peace by alarming their fears? It was not needed by us, but it may be very useful as a political instrument. This comparative strength of Great Britain may be trumpeted forth.

\* Official documents, January, 1846.

to the people to compel a peace. I hold that the whole proceeding is wrong. If we have rights, (and who doubts them,) we are not to be terrified from enforcing them by such a parade of the power of the British empire. If not only Great Britain but the whole world were arrayed against us, I hold, that although they might greatly injure, they could not conquer, and ought not to be permitted to deter us from enforcing all our just rights. I do not say this in a boasting spirit. I refer to our position—our geographical position—our remoteness from Europe—and our vast resources in men and material; and we may proudly challenge a contest with the world in arms against us without ultimate danger to our free institutions. But if the case were otherwise, would it furnish any reason why this Senate should forbear from claiming, to their full extent, the just rights of this nation? Prudence, indeed, might induce delay, but that is all it should do. Tell us, as if we were children, about the horrors of war! Why, what man of the least reflection does not know that war is the greatest curse, and peace the greatest blessing that nations know? Why, then, these fine poetical harangues, and these rhetorical pictures of the horrors of the battle-field, of the blood, carnage, and devastation that war may occasion? But the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] went even further than this. He not only treated us to some pictures of bloodshed, but he mentioned the effect of war upon the finances of the country; and, according to his calculation, we were to be left with a debt of some seven or eight hundred millions; we must raise two hundred thousand men, and keep them in constant pay; and have seven armies and two navies; and when the fight was over, after ten years' foreign war, we were to encounter civil war, to have some half a dozen military chieftains fighting for ascendancy and the presidential chair. I cannot agree with the Senator that we are in any such danger. I believe we never shall have anything to fear from "military chieftains" till our whole national character shall be changed—never till the American people shall have become enervated by luxury, and reduced, through the corruption of the whole mass of our people, to such degradation that we shall no longer deserve to enjoy the blessings of liberty and freedom, purchased and consecrated by the glorious deeds of our sainted fathers of the Revolution; then, and then only, shall we have cause to fear the inglorious contests for supremacy among our "military chieftains," so eloquently described by the gentleman from South Carolina. We have already passed through two wars, and a Washington and a Jackson—the military chieftains of those wars—have each occupied the presidential chair (without fighting for it) by the free and unpurchased votes of millions of freemen.

I beg leave, Mr. President, with a view of counteracting the false impressions that are thus endeavored to be made upon our fears, to present a different picture, the results shown by our census, exhibiting the number of free white males at the end of this year, and our annual increase. I exhibit this, prepared in the Secretary's office at my request, to show that our present numbers, with the annual increase, present results that have no parallel in the world.

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From this statement it appears that—

"In 1830, we had of white males 5,355,133, and in 1840, 7,340,431—showing an average increase of about 3.51 per cent per annum. Supposing the increase to continue the same ratio from 1840 to 1846, inclusive, we should have at the end of that year 8,545,235. The foregoing is based upon an average annual increase of the first ten years; but, as the progressive or geometrical ratio was greater, say about 4.32 per cent, for the period in which our population is supposed to double, a calculation founded on that ratio would give, in the last six years, an increase of 1,870,053, or a total of 9,098,487—affording 858 births of males per day, 48 per cent of whom, agreeably to the bills of mortality, attain the age of 18 years, and thus the daily increase of males attaining 18 years of age would be 419, and making the enormous addition of 149,380 annually, capable of bearing arms."

Mr. President, you may examine the census of every other nation on the face of the earth, and find nothing to compare with this. In this country, the whole community having arms in their hands, enables the Government to raise a physical power that, for defence, would be adequate to any and every emergency. Is such a nation to have their fears alarmed by any force that can be brought against it by sea or by land? No, sir, no. This Government, on any emergency, can thus easily command the services of a body of fighting men which, when brought together by the power of steam, would constitute an army far exceeding in number that with which the great captain of modern times invaded the Russian empire. This immense force is wanted for defence only, and not for foreign conquests; all we require in war is the ability to defend ourselves.

In contrast with this, allow me for one moment very briefly to refer to the position and military strength of Great Britain, and her necessities for its use, and see whether she has such a power at her command as can justly be held up in *terrorem* over us, and to which we have been so often referred in this debate.

She has her subjects scattered over the whole extent of the habitable globe, and nearly all of them kept in subjection by the power of her army and navy. *She dare not trust arms in the hands of her subjects*; and it requires nearly the whole of her disposable military force to keep the peace, to hold her own people in subjection to her monarchical Government. Is not this true now? Has it not been true for the last century? Were it not for her military force, how long would the immense empire in the East Indies remain a dependency on England? How long would down-trodden Ireland continue in the abject slavery she now endures so impatiently? How long would the starving population of even England herself remain as they now are—dying for want of food and the necessities of life?

The first act of the British Government towards removing her army from India, would deal a mortal blow to her supremacy and authority there; and the millions now kept in abject slavery, would then strike for freedom and emancipation from the iron rule of despotic power, and soon efface and utterly destroy every vestige of British domination under which they have suffered for centuries all the degradation and misery that English cupidity, avarice, and tyranny could inflict on an unoffending people. And Ireland—brave and generous Ireland—how much longer would she remain a dependency—how much longer suffer the galling tyranny of the

British Government? Not a moment longer, sir, than it would require to call a parliament of her own, and take her rank as one of the independent nations of the world. She would loathe and spurn any connexion with haughty, overbearing England, that has so long contemned, enslaved, and bowed her sons to the dust.

And look at old England herself: the whole power of the Government in the hands of the few, and the many—the masses—ground to the dust by arbitrary, unjust, and iniquitous laws, by which even the absolute necessities of life are scarcely attainable by a large portion of her people, and the food of man itself rendered, by their iniquitous laws, too dear to be purchased by her thousands, solely to increase the enormous wealth of the few hundreds that own the land of the country. How long would such a population, thus oppressed, continue to suffer, to starve, to die, from want and misery, were the power of her military force diminished materially or withdrawn?

Sir, not a month would be suffered to pass, ere the oppressed masses of her people would rise in their majesty, and call their rulers to an awful account for the oppressions under which they have so long suffered. Sir, they would abolish the exactions of the landlord, destroy her overbearing aristocracy, and keep up, with the spirit of the age, and establish our great democratic principle, that "all men are born free and equal," and thus produce a revolution in her existing Government that would materially change the destinies of a large proportion of the inhabitants of the world.

The British empire—that most imperial Government of fragments, surrounding the entire globe, and divided, as has been well remarked in this chamber, into "seventy-two different parts, separated from each other by water"—requires a military force to preserve her supremacy, and to keep the people in subjection in each and every one of those parcels of her empire. We, on the other hand, suffer no standing army, require no armed force to protect our Government against the people. Our Government has its foundation in the hearts and affections of the whole mass of our citizens, and each man here feels that he forms a part of the Government itself, and that on him rests a portion of the sovereign power of the people. Thus Great Britain can never command a disposable force on this continent, three thousand miles from her resources, sufficient to cope with our immense disposable means. She dare not withdraw any considerable part of her army from their present employment, of guarding and protecting her Government against her own citizens, and preserving dominion over the fragments of her empire, scattered in every part of the habitable globe, and conquered from nearly every other nation in the world, and held by the power of the sword alone.

True, she may injure our commerce greatly; though it may well be doubted whether she would not suffer in her own commerce far greater injury and loss than she could inflict on ours. I then repent, it is idle to address our fears. Let us pursue the even tenor of our way, do justice to all, "demand nothing but what is right, and submit to nothing that is wrong," regardless of the power and threats of even England herself, so often denominated "the most powerful nation of the

world." We have no cause to fear her, or any combination she may form. With near two millions of men with arms in their hands, and an annual increase of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand, we may well thank Heaven for having thus placed our safety and destiny in our own hands and in our own keeping.

I trust, then, every attempt to operate upon the fears of the American people will prove abortive. Who will doubt, with such means at command, that we can successfully protect ourselves against the assaults of, not Great Britain only, but of all the civilized world? Although fully sensible of our strength—our ability to protect ourselves—yet I am an advocate for peace. I am for applying the golden rule of "doing to others as we would that others should do to us;" which doubtless applies with as much force to nations as to individuals. But, sir, I doubt whether a nation—even a Christian nation—can literally apply to herself the Scriptural injunction, "Whoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." Acting under such an injunction, we should soon exchange the blessings of freedom and independence, for slavery, degradation, and infamy. Whoever, then, desires to press upon us as a Christian nation an obligation to avoid war, I would especially refer to the *Christian, philanthropic*, English nation, the sole aggressors, and to whom alone their hostilities can properly and appropriately apply.

Although, Mr. President, I do not believe that in this discussion it was proper to investigate the extent of our title to Oregon, as all will agree that we have a title to some portion of it, and all, therefore, ought to be willing to go for the notice; yet as nearly every one has investigated the title who has preceded me in this debate, I shall detain you a short time in a similar research, and will endeavor to avoid the beaten track, in presenting my views, as far as practicable.

I have said that Great Britain now depends on the Nootka convention for the whole ground of her title to Oregon. She has placed her reliance on that convention, and I say that thereby she has committed a suicidal act. If she depends for her entire claim on the treaty of Nootka Sound, and avows this before the world, then I insist that she destroys every shadow and vestige of claim that she ever had to any part of the territory.

And here let me again refer to the statement of the honorable Senator from Virginia, [Mr. Arcuri.] That gentleman seems to suppose, that even could we succeed in driving England from her claim on the Nootka convention, she has still other claims to which she may resort. Allow me to read a short extract from his speech:

"The language of the English commissioners in 1825 was, that if the conflicting claims with Spain had not been finally adjusted by the Nootka convention, and all arguments and pretensions definitively set at rest by the signature of that convention, nothing would be more easy than to demonstrate that the claims of Great Britain to that country, as opposed to those of Spain, were so far from visionary or arbitrarily assumed, that they established more than a party of title to the possession of the country in question, either as against Spain or any other nation." They said, that the rights of Great Britain are recorded and defined in the convention. They speak of them as 'fixed,' never as created, by the convention; treating this instrument as evidence of a recognition of these pretensions, never as importing any grant or institution of them."

If the honorable Senator had but read the next

sentence, he would have seen that the declaration of the British negotiator was a mere idle boast. If she had not parted with her claim, she would doubtless still have retained it, such as it was. If a man had not given a deed for his farm, and vested a fee-simple title in the purchaser, he doubtless might have still owned it; and if Great Britain had not parted with her claim of title to Spain, she might still have retained it—that is all. Unfortunately for her, she did part with the title, and she has now none to urge. Let me read to the Senator the sentence to which I refer:

"Whatever that title may have been, however, either on the part of Great Britain, or on the part of Spain, prior to the convention of 1790, it was from then forward no longer to be traced in vague narratives of discoveries, several of them admitted to be apocryphal, but in the text and stipulations of that convention itself."

Thus she is estopped. She cannot go behind her own deed to find and set up title. I do apprehend that the position taken by the Senator from Virginia is wholly untenable. The title of England was "fixed" by the Nootka convention as firmly as if it had been bought with money. I refer to the whole diplomatic correspondence respecting Oregon, from 1826 till now, for proof that her whole claim, from the very commencement, has rested on this; and that she has abandoned all previous title, resting on and "limited" by that convention alone.

What were the respective claims of Great Britain and of Spain in 1790? What claim did Great Britain then advance? Her only grounds of reliance were the discovery of Cook, and a pretended purchase of an Indian chief, for she wholly abandoned all pretensions on the ground of what had been done by the freebooter Drake. She claimed on Cook's discovery, and on some alleged purchase from a certain Indian chief. This was her claim, and nothing more.

Yet I claim, and can easily prove, that Spain discovered the coast before, and I might also admit, for argument sake, that the basis of mere discovery, without subsequent settlement, is valueless, and therefore Great Britain's right to all explorations previous to 1790, have superseded the Spanish right from discovery, if she had followed up these explorations by settlement. But did she do it? Not at all. She made no settlements, but only followed out the Spanish discovery, by a more minute investigation and survey of the coasts and inlets. This, I insist, could not abrogate the previous claims of Spain, from discovery. Spain never abandoned that claim; she had the inchoate right from discovery, and might at any time complete that right by actual settlement; but neither she nor Great Britain did this, save that Spain had a small settlement at Nootka, and occupied it. This Great Britain endeavored to take from her, but the Spanish Governor bravely resisted and successfully repelled her attack. What happened after this? Great Britain demanded satisfaction from Spain for the insult to her flag, but the result was, that Spain never did recognise any preëxisting right on the part of Great Britain to territory on the Northwest coast. Nor did any other nation recognise it. The Nootka convention was a concession made by a sovereign Power, having a right to the whole coast in which she permitted Great Britain to come there and trade and fish.

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This was the whole amount of that treaty. I aver, therefore, that, in 1790, Great Britain had not the shadow of a claim to any portion of Oregon. If she put her pretension on the right of discovery, Spain had discovered the country before her; if she put it on the fact of settlement, she had made no settlement, but Spain had at Nootka.

Under what circumstances were that convention made? Freely, or by coercion? It was obtained at the cannon's mouth. She obtained a concession from Spain in a way she never will obtain any from the United States; for sure I am that there is no Senator here who will not say that he would sooner draw the sword, and throw away the scabbard, than think, for one moment, of yielding up rights at the mouth of the British cannon, as was tamely done by the Government of Spain. I have not yet heard any attempt, in this debate, to give a construction of the grounds of that treaty. I have carefully examined its terms, and I have placed my own construction upon them. I may be in error, but I have been unable to discover in what respect. If I am right, then I say that the production of that convention by the British negotiators was a suicidal act. I say that Great Britain has thereby placed herself in a position where she has defeated every claim she ever could have had; and I infer this from taking in connexion the convention of Nootka, between England and Spain, with the convention of 1827, between England and the United States. The whole object of Great Britain was to do away the claim set up by Spain on her grant from the Pope. However such a grant may now be ridiculed, the title derived from it was at that time good and valid—never disputed, for more than two hundred years; which circumstance was, of itself, sufficient to make the title good, let its origin be what it might. The third article of the Nootka convention is in these words:

"ART. 3. In order to strengthen the bonds of friendship, and to preserve in future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the two contracting parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects shall not be disturbed or molested either in navigating or carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in landing on the coast of those seas in places not already occupied, for the purpose of carrying on their commerce, by the natives of the country, or of making settlements;—the whole subject, nevertheless, to the restrictions specified in the three following articles."

Now, what was the object in agreeing to this article? Spain had had possession of the country for two or three centuries, and there was then a controversy between the two nations, arising from the fact that England had molested her in this possession. Spain, in this article, says that English subjects might come there for purposes of hunting, fishing, and trade, and might make settlements; but the settlements referred to, are obviously such as might be necessary to further these objects, and none other. To take the word "settlements" as here used in its ordinary and general acceptation, would be to defeat all the rest of the article;—that, at least, is my construction of it. I apprehend that treaties between nations are to be interpreted by the rules of common sense. It is then added, that all the provisions in this article are to be held subject to the restrictions contained in the three following articles, viz: 4th, 5th, and 6th. Now, if we look at the 5th article, we shall see that these settlements are those subjected to the restriction, that

they must be north "of places already occupied by Spain." Spain then occupied Nootka, and all British settlements are here confined to the coast above Nootka. But for this, Great Britain might have claimed the right of making settlements as far south as Mexico, provided she could have found one vacant spot on all that coast. This, I say, is a lawyer's construction of this instrument. The 5th article is in these words:

"ART. 5. As well in the places which are to be restored to the British subjects, by virtue of the first article, as in all other parts of the northwestern coasts of North America, or of the islands adjacent, situate to the north of the parts of the said coast already occupied by Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the two Powers shall have made settlements since the month of April, 1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other shall have free access, and shall carry on their trade without any disturbance or molestation."

Now, where was the most northerly point occupied by Spain? It was unquestionably at Nootka; for when Vancouver came back, he found at that place ten houses, in the possession of Spanish occupants. He very modestly claimed the whole as belonging to Great Britain; but the Spanish commandant utterly repudiated any such claim, and offered to restore to him a little spot on the beach at Friendly Cove, (about a quarter of an acre,) where Meares had erected two little huts. Vancouver contended that the most northerly settlement of Spain was far below, at the Bay of San Francisco; but the fact was the reverse. It was at Nootka; and that settlement was never restored. Although Great Britain prepared an armament which cost her fifteen millions of dollars, she never got it back from Spain. If it ever was surrendered to her, the proof of such surrender would have been in her archives, and she could have produced it; but this she never did, and the affair was suffered to drop. Nor is this surprising. The reason for it is plain and obvious. England became involved in the wars of the French Revolution, and she actually forgot Nootka and the Nootka convention for thirty-four years, until reminded of it by Mr. Rush in 1824.

I have made the assertion that the intentions of the parties are to be gathered from the instrument itself—from a fair construction of its terms; but that position may be strengthened by the contemporaneous exposition by the parties. We can show that the British Parliament itself gave to the treaty this construction. In the debates in the British Parliament, we find this convention spoken of as unworthy of England, and, in fact, literally sneered at. This is a matter of history; and is it to be supposed that, had the statesmen of that time any notion of the value to them of that convention, which is now attached to it, they would have allowed the representations which were made in Parliament to go forth to the world uncontradicted? I cannot imagine such a thing. It is incomprehensible, and no man can believe it. Let me refer to this matter for a moment. The Duke of Montrose, in the House of Lords, on the occasion of a vote of thanks being proposed to the King for the negotiation of the convention, says:

"We are not only restored to Nootka, but we may participate in a more northern settlement, if we should find at any time that a more northern situation would be profitable for the carrying on of the trade."—*Parliamentary History*, vol. 28, p. 924.

This is the language of an individual who was



in favor of the Government; and, from what he says, it is clear he did not believe a word of the sentiments now advanced by the British Minister. After looking well into the matter, after consulting all sources of information, having the best opportunity of hearing all that could be said in relation to the claims of Great Britain, he contents himself with saying that they had acquired the right of settlement north of Nootka Sound.

In the House of Commons, Mr. Fox said:

"He was as much a friend to the claims of Spain, sanctioned by the treaty of Utrecht, as Count Florida Blanca, or any Spanish Minister, because they were founded in justice. These were, an exclusive right of territory, navigation, and commerce, on the seas and coasts of Spanish America. The absurd and extravagant claims arose from extending the term Spanish America, to seas and coasts where Spain had no right of occupancy. To what did we object before, but to the indefinite limits of Spanish America? The objection still remained; for the limits of Spanish America were still undefined."—p. 901.

Following up the same argument, he adds:

"Where our admitted right of settlement on the northwest coast commenced was completely undefined. If it was said at Nootka, we did not know that Nootka would be restored."—*Ibid.*

And again:

"Thus we had given up all right to settle, except for temporary purposes, to the south of the Spanish settlements, or in the intervals between them, if they happened to be distant. We had obtained an admission of our right to settle to the north, and even that we had not obtained with clearness. As Spanish settlements were the only mark of limits, suppose we were to meet with one farther to the north than we expected, and a dispute were to arise, whether it was new or old, it would be some difficulty to send out our builders to decide," &c.—p. 905.

Mr. Fox was, it is admitted, the leader of the Opposition in Parliament, and was complaining of and objecting to the Nootka convention; but did Mr. Pitt, the then Prime Minister, controvert the positions taken by his talented opponent? Did any member of the British Cabinet? Were the positions controverted by any one during the debate? No, sir, not a word of it. Mr. Pitt, in his response, only claimed that they had additional facilities for their fisheries, had a temporary use of the territory north of Nootka for hunting and trading with the natives, and the erection of temporary huts in furtherance of those objects. He says:

"If they had acquired no territorial rights, they had gained some advantages they did not before possess."

I believe this is perfectly conclusive, and shows how this convention was understood at the time. It always appeared to me, Mr. President, that the views taken by the British Minister were suicidal of the claims of Great Britain. Mr. Pakenham has said this convention is in force up to the present time. But let me ask, if it is in force, how does it happen that she never claimed under it the country down to the bay of San Francisco? How does it happen, that Great Britain, who has shown it her constant purpose to lay hold of every foot of this earth she can, has never claimed as far as the bay of San Francisco? Why, she felt she had no right; and if she has ever done so since, it was altogether an afterthought, for the purpose of opposing our claims. Nothing else can account for it. Great Britain slept over her absurd claim for more than thirty years, and until she found it necessary to adduce new and more plausible arguments to sustain her unfounded pretensions, and endeavor to rebut and weaken the "irrefragable facts and argu-

ments" by which our American rights were demonstrated, and she was driven to claim under the Nootka convention, because she had nothing else to bring forward—nothing else to rely on.

I will not go through the argument, as the Secretary of State has done, to show that the convention was terminated by the war. It is not needed to sustain my argument. But the exposition of Great Britain herself shows that the convention was ended by the war of 1796. What does Mr. Pakenham say on this point? His ground is, that there are some national rights which survive a war; but he has not pointed them out. He says the treaty was revived in 1814; but I contend, that if it ever was revived, it could not be revived by the treaty of 1814, because there were other parties then besides Great Britain and Spain who had claims on the coast as well as themselves. We were actually in possession of the country at the time, and could not be put out by the revival of the Nootka convention.

There is one argument not used by Mr. Buchanan, or any one else that I have seen, which I consider as having great force. If the Nootka convention is still in force, what became of it in our own convention of 1827? In 1818, we were not in possession of the Spanish title; but when it was renewed in 1827, we had then all the rights of Spain, including sovereignty, the eminent domain, and all the rights she had under the Nootka convention. If, then, the convention is in force at this hour, how is it possible this was not included in the convention of 1827? It was; and Great Britain and the United States owned all the claims to Oregon which were then in existence; all her rights under the Nootka convention were "limited" to joint occupancy with Spain—Spain puts us in her shoes. When the convention for joint occupancy is terminated, England goes back to her original rights. Rights to what? To joint occupancy? For be it observed, England abandoned to Spain all her claims, prior to 1790, on entering into the Nootka convention, and declares to the world that her whole claim or pretension is "limited" to a joint occupancy with Spain, and her right is only to be found in "the text and stipulations" of that convention; and Spain having, on the 22d of July, 1819, transferred her rights to us, England has a joint occupancy with us by the convention of 1827, by the 3d article of which it is agreed, that nothing in the convention "shall be construed to impair, or in any manner affect, the claims which either of the contracting parties may have to any part of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains." Now, then, pray what are her "claims," which are not "affected" or "impaired"? She has none whatever but that of "joint occupancy" under the Nootka convention, which was merged in the convention of 1827, and thus the termination of her "joint occupancy" would not "affect" or "impair" her "joint occupancy." This is a contradiction in terms, and shows that the only claims that are not "affected" or "impaired," must be those of sovereignty, eminent domain, or title of some kind; not one of which does she possess, or even claim. This may be called "chopping logic" by gentlemen on the other side of the chamber; if it is, let them show how Great Britain can escape the conclusion. I think the inference irresistible, and that the "quod erat demonstrandum" of the mathematician might fairly

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and legitimately applied to it, and that she has no  
just claim, by her own showing, to one foot of ter-  
ritory west of the Rocky Mountains. She has  
completely tripped up her own heels, and thrown  
herself out of all shadow of claim *below*, or even  
*above*, the magical line of 54° 40'—and that we  
possess, if not a perfect, undoubtedly the best title  
in existence to the whole.

I pray you to observe, Mr. President, that,  
if the Nootka Sound convention is in force, as  
claimed by the British Minister, then Great  
Britain could have done no act during its exist-  
ence to vest any *exclusive* right in herself. Van-  
couver's exploration of the Columbia river in  
1792, and taking possession in the name of the  
King of England, was a void act on his part, and  
in violation of the "text and stipulations" of the  
Nootka convention; and instead of claiming under  
it, as the British Government have modestly done,  
they ought at the time to have ensnared Van-  
couver, and dismissed him from her service, for thus  
trampling upon the good faith of the British na-  
tion. The exploration of Mackenzie, and the set-  
tlements subsequently made in that territory, on  
Fraser's river and elsewhere, cannot be claimed  
as giving exclusive rights to Great Britain. They  
were made solely under that convention, and under  
which she can claim no exclusive right for herself.

And allow me to observe, in addition, that the  
3d article of the treaty between the United States  
and Great Britain, of 20th October, 1818, applies  
to "any country that may be claimed by either  
party on the northwest coast of America, west-  
ward of the Stony Mountains;" and thus includes  
the whole country from latitude 42° to the Rus-  
sian possessions in latitude 54° 40', and all the re-  
gion east of the Russian possessions and west of  
the Rocky Mountains—the Russian line going  
through Portland channel to latitude 56°, and  
thence a line parallel to the coast ten marine leagues  
therefrom to 141st degree of longitude, and in that  
meridian to the Frozen ocean. All which northern  
region is included within the conventions of 1818  
and 1827, and which I have never seen any refer-  
ence to in any speech delivered; and yet it is  
manifest our joint occupancy extends to the whole,  
and the rights of each to every part is to be de-  
termined whenever a division of territorial rights shall  
be made.

I cannot, Mr. President, permit myself to pass  
unnamed the title which we have to the country  
drained by the waters of the Columbia, by the ex-  
ertion and enterprise of our own citizens—acquired  
by our own discovery, exploration, and settlement.  
If a bare, naked discovery is not deemed sufficient,  
we do not depend upon that alone. That Captain  
Gray discovered the Columbia river before any  
British subject had seen it, is now conceded even  
by England herself; and that Mr. Jefferson first  
had the river explored by Lewis and Clarke, in  
1805-6, and shortly afterwards published their do-  
ings, and thus publicly proclaimed to the world  
our intention to occupy and settle that country,  
are matters of history, as well known to the British  
Government as our own. We subsequently (in  
1809, 1810, and 1811, and prior to any other settle-  
ment) made the settlement of Astoria, at the mouth  
of the Columbia river, and also established a post  
on the Okanagan, six hundred miles up the river;

another at the mouth of the Spokane, fifty miles  
higher up; and others on the Kooskooskee and  
Willamette rivers; and (although the Nootka con-  
vention is claimed by England to have been then in  
full force, by which she sets up a pretence to a  
right of joint occupancy over that whole region)  
without a whisper of remonstrance or objection on  
her part. Our hands were untied then—no con-  
vention controlled us; we claimed a right by virtue  
of our purchase of Louisiana, whether rightfully  
or not, I do not deem it necessary for my present  
argument to inquire. If any nation had a right to  
object, it was Spain, and Spain alone; and she did  
not object. I claim, then, that our right to the  
country drained by the waters of the Columbia,  
founded on our own discovery, exploration, and  
settlement, was complete and perfect, agreeably to  
the most stringent requisitions of the law of nations,  
consecrated by the universal practice of all nations,  
in relation to the American continent; and this view  
Great Britain herself has fully recognised, and by  
her acts fully acknowledged our title. We were  
thus in possession of the valley of the Columbia at  
the commencement of the late war; and during that  
war our possessions were captured, and passed into  
the hands of Great Britain. By the treaty of Ghent,  
"all territories, places, and possessions whatsoever,  
taken by either party from the other during the war,  
&c., shall be restored without delay." Our  
Government demanded, after the restoration of  
peace, that those possessions should be restored.  
After some negotiation, and some delay, the whole  
was restored to us—an account of which I ask the  
indulgence of the Senate to read:

"Mr. Bagot [the British Plenipotentiary at Washington]  
at the same time communicated the circumstances to his  
Government, and they became the subject of discussion be-  
tween Lord Castlereagh, the British Secretary of Foreign  
Affairs, and Mr. Rush, the American Plenipotentiary at  
London. Lord Castlereagh proposed that the question re-  
specting the claim to the post on the Columbia should be  
referred to commissioners, as many other disputed points  
had been, agreeably to the treaty of Ghent; to which Mr.  
Rush objected, for the simple reasons that the spot was in  
the possession of the Americans before the war; that it fell,  
by belligerent capture, into the hands of the British during  
the war; and that "under a treaty which stipulated the mu-  
tual restitution of all places reduced by the arms of either  
party, the right of the United States to immediate and full  
repossession could not be impugned."

"The British Secretary, upon this, admitted the right of the  
Americans to be reinstated, and to be the party in possession  
while treating on the title; though he regretted that the Gov-  
ernment of the United States should have employed means  
to obtain restitution which might lead to difficulties.

"Mr. Rush had no apprehensions of that kind; and it was  
finally agreed that the post should be restored to the Ameri-  
cans, and that the question of title to the territory should  
be discussed in the negotiation as to limits and other mat-  
ters which was soon to be commenced. Lord Bathurst,  
the British Secretary for the Colonies, accordingly sent to  
the agents of the Northwest Company at the mouth of the  
Columbia a despatch, directing them to afford due facilities  
for the reoccupation of the post at that point by the Ameri-  
cans; and an order to the same effect was also sent from the  
Admiralty to the commander of the British naval forces in  
the Pacific."

The rights of the parties in regard to the posses-  
sion of the country having thus been adjusted and  
defined, the restoration was accordingly made, as  
the following official documents will show:

"In obedience to the command of His Royal Highness the  
Prince Regent, signified in a despatch from the right hono-  
rable the Earl Bathurst, addressed to the partners or agents  
of the Northwest Company, bearing date the 27th of Jan-  
uary, 1818, and in obedience to a subsequent order dated

the 25th of July, from W. H. Sheriff, Esq., captain of his Majesty's ship *Andromache*, we, the undersigned, do, in conformity to the first article of the treaty of Ghent, restore to the Government of the United States, through its agent, J. B. Prevost, Esq., the settlement of Fort George, on the Columbia river.

"Given under our hands, in triplicate, at Fort George, (Columbia river), this 6th day of October, 1818.

"F. HICKEY,

"Captain of his Majesty's ship *Blossom*.

"J. KEITH,

"Of the *Northwest Company*."

The acceptance on the part of the United States is in these words:

"I do hereby acknowledge to have this day received, in behalf of the Government of the United States, the possession of the settlement designated above, in conformity to the first article of the treaty of Ghent.

"Given under my hand, in triplicate, at Fort George, (Columbia river), this 6th day of October, 1818.

"J. B. PREVOST,

"Agent of the United States."

On the consummation of these acts of the restoration of the valley of the Columbia river, in conformity with the treaty of Ghent, and the acknowledgment of our right "to be the party in possession while treating on the title," Mr. Greenhow remarks:

"The British flag was then formally lowered, and that of the United States having been hoisted in its stead over the fort, was added by the *Blossom*."

"The documents cited—the only ones which passed between the commissioners on the occasion—are sufficient to show that no reservation or exception was made on the part of Great Britain, and that the restoration of Astoria to the United States was complete and unconditional."

These transactions occurred in the year 1818, and in the month of October, being the same year and month in which the convention of joint occupancy was entered into.

And to show the view entertained by our own Government of this surrender, I beg leave to read from the instructions of Mr. Clay, when Secretary of State, to Mr. Gallatin, our Minister to England, dated 19th June, 1826:

"It was stated by the British Plenipotentiaries to Mr. Rush, that the surrender to the United States of the post at the mouth of Columbia river was in fulfilment of the stipulations of the first article of the treaty of Ghent, without affecting questions of right on either side. It is most true that the restoration was in conformity to that article, but there is nothing in the terms of the article which implies any reservation of right on the part of Great Britain. And does not the stipulation itself, in virtue of which she was bound to restore it, demonstrate, that at the date of that treaty she had no pretensions to the mouth of Columbia? If she then had any claim, would she have contracted to restore the possession unconditionally, and without even the formality of a reservation of her right? The course which was adopted in regard to another territorial possession, claimed by both parties, was very different. She had retained, by her arms, Moose Island, in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, as well as the post at Columbia. She refused to restore Moose Island, on the ground of the title which she set up to it, as being included within the limits of Nova Scotia; and the respective titles of both parties were agreed to be referred to a board of commissioners. Now, if, with respect to two possessions, taken by her arms during the war, she agreed to restore one unconditionally, and insisted upon retaining the occupancy of the other, as belonging to her, is not the inference irresistible, that her present claim to that which was so restored did not then exist, but has been subsequently gotten up?"

This established our right fully to the whole valley drained by the waters of the Columbia, and that valley extends to about the latitude of 53° north. I would like to hear the grounds upon which the advocates for the line on the 49th parallel, on the other side of the chamber, and the

few on this, will justify themselves to the American people in thus proposing to give up any portion of the valley of the Columbia, thus shown to be ours, without an adverse claim having any just foundation. If we had no other title or claim, our own would be full and conclusive to latitude 53°.

The President, having made an offer to settle our boundary on the parallel of 49°, "in deference alone to what had been done by his predecessors," it has been gravely claimed in argument here that he is bound by that offer, although withdrawn; the offer having been thrice made by his predecessors, in 1818, 1824, and 1826. I cannot agree to this doctrine. All offers of compromise are efforts to buy one's peace, and therefore, under the wise provisions of our law, are not suffered to be adduced as evidence. I fail to see any difference between nations and individuals in this respect. The reason is surely the same. What nation would ever make a proposal or offer of a concession for the sake of peace, if, against her will and consent, it was always binding upon her, accepted or not? The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Breaux) says this principle cannot apply to nations, because they have no common arbiter. I deem this is no reason whatever. The rule, as applicable to individuals, is not based upon such a consideration, but upon sound policy, to encourage attempts at compromise, and to avoid litigation; and the same reason exists in respect to nations, and with greater force; but nations do now have common arbiters. The opinions and judgment of the civilized world are now those arbiters between nations, and to which all civilized Governments find it necessary to submit. I hold, then, that no obligation rested on our Government to fix the boundary on 49°. If the President was bound in honor, as some allege, to have made the offer because similar offers had been made by his predecessors, then the offer made by Mr. Polk was dishonorable, because it did not include the navigation of the Columbia river, as his predecessors had done; for surely, if he was bound in honor at all, he was bound for the whole. Besides, one of the offers of the navigation of the Columbia, made by his predecessor, was trammelled with the condition that the river should prove to be navigable where the parallel of 49° struck it; in such contingency to grant the free navigation to England, and not otherwise. Which offer, then, bound the President? The offer of 49°, in 1818, if without the navigation of the Columbia, was less objectionable, because we then had not acquired the Spanish title; since that, it has never been called for by any just regards to our rights or the British claims. The most she ever could have justly asked would have been a division of the residue of that immense region north of the head waters of the Columbia, west of the Rocky Mountains, and up to the Russian line, and east of the Russian possession to the Frozen Ocean. And although I deny that she has shown a shadow of title to one part of the territory to which our Spanish title extended, a fair division of our claims above 53°, as derived from Spain, and her own, whatever they were north of 61°, thrown into hotchpot by our convention of 1818 and 1827, would give us all up at least to 54° 40', if not far beyond.

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I then, Mr. President, advocate the propriety of giving the notice recommended by the President, provided for in the convention. It can, of itself, afford no just cause of war; on the contrary, sir, it is a peace measure, intended to preserve the peace of the country, and, in my judgment, the only measure that can do so. The tide of emigration is setting strongly into that territory now, and will doubtless yearly increase its volume. The hardy sons of the West, with their wives and children, and flocks and herds, already swarm on the road to Oregon, and are preparing to occupy and settle it; and settling, too, promiscuously with the English subjects already there. The partners, agents, and servants of the Hudson Bay Company have dotted the whole country with their stockade forts and trading posts. They have military possession, and have the British laws already extended over the country, not confined to British subjects only in terms, but apparently intended to include all within the country. (Notwithstanding the British Minister says those laws are intended only for our own subjects.) But, Mr. President, what assurance do we have that she will not claim all that have been born within her dominions as her citizens, under her long asserted principle that no one of her subjects can throw off his allegiance, can expatriate himself. Must our citizens carry evidence to show that they were native born? No, sir, never; and neither will they submit to the laws of a foreign Power. Whether we do or do not give this notice, we are bound to furnish adequate protection to our citizens. We have encouraged them to go there, and the honor and good faith of the country are pledged to protect them; we owe them the protection of the American eagle, and will extend its wings over them. Then, sir, can it be imagined that the subjects of England, and the citizens of the United States, can live promiscuously together, subject to different laws, amenable to different magistrates, and owing allegiance to their respective Governments, without any common arbitrator, with no mode of deciding controversies that may arise between the citizens of one and the subjects of the other? Such a double-headed Government is wholly impracticable; and it is preposterously absurd to expect that they could thus live without disturbance and violence, and eventually bloodshed. If we fail, then, to give the notice, I deem a quarrel inevitable. No one who has a spark of American feeling in his bosom, would desire that our citizens should be thus placed, and liable to be involved in such difficulties, if not dangers. But, sir, look a little further. Can it be imagined that our people, already organized into a government of their own, will long permit the Hudson Bay Company to exercise authority among them? Most assuredly they will not. I then claim, we must give this notice, and have exclusive jurisdiction, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" and at the expiration of twelve months, Great Britain will possess no other claim than that of arrogant pretension, already too long tacitly acquiesced in by the American people.

Allow me, sir, to refer to the third article of the convention of 20th October, 1818, and the convention of 1827, which I beg the indulgence of the Senate to read:

"ART. 3. It is agreed that any country that may be claim-

ed by either party on the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains, (now called Rocky Mountains,) shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open, for the term of ten years from the date of the signature of the present convention, to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers; it being well understood that this agreement is not to be construed to the prejudice of any claim which either of the two high contracting parties may have to any part of said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the claims of any other Power or State to any part of the said country; the only object of the high contracting parties, in that respect, being to prevent disputes and differences among themselves."

Convention between the United States and Great Britain, signed at London, August 6, 1827.

"ART. 1. All the provisions of the third article of the convention concluded between the United States of America and his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the 20th of October, 1818, shall be, and they are hereby, further indefinitely extended and continued in force, in the same manner as if all the provisions of the said article were herein specifically recited.

"ART. 2. It shall be competent, however, to either of the contracting parties, in case either should think fit, at any time after the 20th October, 1828, on giving due notice of twelve months to the other contracting party, to annul and abrogate this convention; and it shall, in such case, be accordingly entirely annulled and abrogated, after the expiration of the said term of notice.

"ART. 3. Nothing contained in this convention, or in the third article of the convention of the 20th October, 1818, hereby continued in force, shall be construed to impair, or in any manner affect, the claims which either of the contracting parties may have to any part of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains."

In my legal construction of this language, I cannot see where we get the authority to settle this territory at all, and keep good faith with England, if we consider the convention in force. In 1818 Oregon was a wilderness, and all we then wanted was to have the country, as well as the harbors, bays, and creeks, "free and open" to the subjects of one, and the citizens of the other; and no one had a right to "appropriate" any portion of the country exclusively to his own use; but if the country remains free and open to the citizens of both nations, how can we have a right to send our people, with their wives and children, to occupy and settle it? I do not think that we have such a right, unless we disregard the convention on the ground that it has been already violated by Great Britain; then we may go on and settle it, and build forts, and extend our laws over it, for the convention is abrogated, in fact, at this very hour. But if we hold that it is still in force, how the "masterly-inactivity" scheme of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] can be carried out in good faith, I cannot imagine. If the country is, by the terms and spirit of the convention, to be kept "free and open," we have no right to locate there, and close it up with settlements; and I ask whether, in two years from this time, the Willamette valley will be "free and open" to the citizens of one, and the subjects of the other? No, sir, it will all be occupied and settled by the enterprising citizens of the West, to the exclusion of British subjects. I do not make this suggestion with a view to prevent emigration. I insist that our people have a full right to go and settle there, because, in fact, the convention has been already nullified by England herself; if not, let us give the notice at once, before they do settle. We owe it to them, and we owe it to the world, and to our own good faith, openly to declare the abrogation of the convention, in order that we may settle the country rightfully.

But, Mr. President, I will not enlarge. I wish for the notice to be given; but I cannot vote for the resolution introduced by the gentleman from Kentucky, [Mr. CRITTENDEN,] for two reasons—first, because it devolves on the President the discretion of giving the notice. I am quite willing to take my share of the responsibility, and not cast it on the President. Congress alone should determine such an important matter, although I have entire confidence in our Chief Magistrate, and have no doubt, if this resolution should pass, he would exercise "his discretion" by giving immediate notice. And the second reason, because this resolution contemplates that the President shall not give the notice till after the expiration of the present session of Congress. I have heard no one suggest the difficulty which presents itself to my mind.

If the President gives the notice, as proposed by this amendment, I can see no reason why the British Minister may not, on the very next day, say to the President: "We do not want the twelve months' notice before the expiration of the convention; the allowance of that interval is intended for the advantage, and as a privilege to us as the party to whom the notice is given, and we can waive the privilege if we choose; we do waive it, and insist that the matter shall stand now as it would stand at the end of twelve months." Suppose the British Minister should insist on this: I want to know how you could avoid it?—how you could claim that the convention should not be abrogated at once, and not be deferred for twelve months? I confess I do not see how it would be possible to guard against such a contingency; and therefore I wish notice to be given while Congress is in session. If war should come, I should not like to be "Copenhagened" at any rate; but if such attempt is to be made, I should choose that Congress should be in session at the time.

And, sir, I cannot vote for the amendment proposed by the Senator from Georgia, not only for the reasons I have urged against the resolutions of the gentleman from Kentucky, [Mr. CRITTENDEN,] but also on account of the second resolution, which I beg the indulgence of the Senate to read:

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That it is earnestly desired that the long-standing controversy respecting limits in the Oregon territory be speedily settled by negotiation and compromise, in order to tranquillize the public mind, and to preserve the friendly relations of the two countries."

Now, sir, every Senator knows that the recommendation of notice by the President was not made as a war measure, but to preserve the peace of the country; and the Senator, I believe, honestly supposed that his amendment would be a means of carrying out the wishes of the President. Yet, according to my conception, it will certainly defeat the object the gentleman had in view. If it is sent, in its present form, to the House of Representatives, it will most certainly be rejected there; and

then there will be no notice given, and the ultimate consequences of that will endanger the peace of the two countries. For this notice is the only measure, in my judgment, that can preserve peace. I go for it as a peace measure, though I am ready to use it as a war measure, too, if that shall be needed. If that amendment is carried in this chamber, it will be carried by a small fraction of the Democratic party, with the help of all the Whigs; and then it is sure to be rejected in the other House.

By referring to the protocol of the sixth conference, in the negotiations of 1844, it will be seen to contain the following declaration by the British Minister:

"That he did not feel authorized to enter into discussion respecting the territory north of the 49th parallel of latitude, which was understood by the British Government to form the basis of negotiation on the side of the United States, as the line of the Columbia formed that on the side of Great Britain."

This language has never been retracted by the British Minister. He says he will not negotiate respecting the country north of 49°; and we say we will not negotiate to settle the boundary on the north bank of the Columbia. While the two Governments stand thus, Congress says that it is our earnest desire to effect a settlement by compromise. But what will compromise be held to mean? One offers 49°, the other insists on the Columbia;—a compromise will be a division of the country somewhere between these two lines. That will be the fair construction of the term. I know that the Senator from Georgia means no such thing, yet that would be the construction put upon it by the British Minister; and it would be a legitimate construction. And will any Senator consent to pass it under such circumstances? Will any gentleman put such an instrument into the hands of the British Minister? Does any man here wish to see a compromise on a boundary south of 49°? Is there any man who would not rather go to war? I am sure there is not. No gentleman on either side of the chamber would consent to such a result, or even dare to advocate it.

I conclude with expressing my hope that the Senate will pass this notice. Whether it shall result in war or peace, we owe the measure to ourselves and to the country; and I hope it will pass untrammelled by any condition which shall endanger it in the other House. I should prefer the bare, naked notice, as reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations; but rather than send the subject back to the other House again, I will vote for the House resolutions, with the expectation and hope that we shall thus preserve the peace of the country; but if disappointed in this reasonable expectation, and war comes, with the intention of giving it the fullest support in my power, and leave the consequences to Him who holds the destinies of individuals and nations in His hand.

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