



## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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### A CANADIAN VIEW OF NATO

A statement by Mr. Howard Green, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Nato Council, October 28, 1959

I am very glad on my first official visit to Europe to have this opportunity of calling on the Council. In the few months since I took up my present position I have been impressed by the importance of the Council as a forum in which my country and others can make known their views. There is a refreshing quality of informality here which is seldom found in other diplomatic forums.

#### Support for Nato

At the outset of my remarks I wish to state once more that the Canadian Government is devoted to the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty and that we continue to give it high priority among Canada's international obligations. The most recent example of our continuing support for NATO is the recent decision of the Canadian Government to re-equip the Canadian Air Division in Europe with the most modern aircraft -- a decision which we took at a time of budgetary deficits when we were unable to increase total defence expenditures.

The North Atlantic Treaty binds us together for the defence of North America and Europe. Unlike most members of the Alliance, the Canadian defence effort cannot be concentrated only in Europe. We must provide, in co-operation with the United States, for the defence of the long frontier bordering the Soviet empire in the north. In the age of missiles and long-range bombers, the defence of North America is as important to NATO as a whole as is the defence of Western Europe. The requirements of the defence of North America are expanding and costly. The maintenance of Canadian forces in Europe is a contribution to NATO over and above heavy commitments now being undertaken by the Canadian Government in the defence of the Canada-United States region.

### Interdependence

One of the principles underlying the North Atlantic Alliance is that no state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and welfare in the nuclear age by national action alone. To all its members - large, medium and small - NATO brought, in the face of a serious Soviet military challenge, a measure of security and purpose, and today endows us with a sense of mutual confidence and responsibility for the negotiations which lie ahead which no member, by itself, could have attained.

By the same token, the very interdependence of a grouping of states of varying sizes and responsibilities means that the action of one can affect, and often vitally, the security and welfare of all. Interdependence requires above all mutual confidence. It must exist to a very high degree, and it is of the utmost importance that it be maintained. In the Canadian view the most effective way of preserving our faith and trust in each other is through frequent and frank consultations.

### Political Consultations

The Canadian Government has consistently emphasized the great significance of political consultation within the Alliance and we are encouraged by the considerable progress which has been achieved. It is now accepted practice that member states should not, without advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members.

We are confident that member states are prepared to live up to this recommendation and there is, we believe, an increasing sense of responsibility and obligation regarding consultation. During the last few months, consultations have been particularly useful on the Berlin issue and during the Geneva conferences.

There have also been fruitful and intimate exchanges on a variety of problems arising outside of the NATO area but capable of possible repercussions on the interest of the Alliance or its members. We are entering into this field in the knowledge that the purpose of such consultations is not the formulation of common NATO policies in parts of the world outside the NATO area or the widening of the commitments of the individual members. Rather, the object is to discuss questions of common concern so that NATO governments in the formulation of their national policies will fully understand each other's points of view and preoccupations. I am sure this approach is shared by all governments represented around this table.

### Adequacy of Nato Machinery

It is to the credit of its authors that the Treaty is as adequate to the problems we face today as it was ten years ago. It is up to us to use it. Of late we have had indications that some members of the Alliance are considering the possibility of setting up special machinery for political consultation on a regional basis outside the NATO framework. We welcome exchanges generally and continue to use our own bilateral and multilateral contacts with other countries. It has always seemed to us undesirable, however, that such consultations should take the place of or frustrate political consultation within the Council. In particular, we would view with concern any development which might tend to produce pre-fixed positions by a number of member countries on problems of interest to the Alliance as a whole. We hope that this view is generally shared and that no decision will be taken the results of which would be to weaken the effectiveness of consultation within NATO.

During the next few weeks the Council will move to its new headquarters. The process of consultation will surely be intensified by the mere presence under one roof of all member delegations and of the Secretary-General and his staff. Indeed it would be quite normal in these new surroundings for some permanent delegations to meet informally and discuss problems of more immediate concern to their countries. The Council on the other hand could remain in more or less permanent session and be available at the call of the chair at a few minutes' notice. It seems to us therefore that, given goodwill on all sides, the Council could fulfill with a minimum of complications most if not all of the responsibilities which the new international situation may call for. As far as Canada is concerned I can assure you that we will continue to co-operate fully and whole-heartedly. The Canadian Government strongly endorses what President Eisenhower said here in this Council last month about no member nation having to take a second place in our organization. NATO is and must remain animated by a spirit of equality. In practical terms, this surely means that NATO policies should continue to be determined by all NATO members.

### Economic Co-operation

Today the position of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole is one of unprecedented economic strength; and almost without exception our individual countries are economically more prosperous than ever before. This economic growth and strength should serve as convincing evidence as to the efficacy of our own economic systems. Now that the economic scene has changed somewhat we should satisfy ourselves that our actions and programmes are still wholly appropriate to present circumstances..

We all share the conviction made explicit in Article II of our Treaty that conflicts in our international economic policies should be eliminated and hence that the possibility of an economic

split not only in Europe but between Europe and North America and the rest of the free world should not be allowed to develop. In the Canadian view, which I trust is shared by all, regional economic arrangements should stimulate progress towards the expansion of international trade, freed from the burden of restrictions and discrimination.

We must see to it that our own economic techniques are used in such a way as to increase the economic strength of the free world at the greatest possible rate. Our world economic institutions and our codes of international economic conduct, if properly used and applied, will go a long way toward relieving some of the economic burdens of the under-developed countries. Equally important is a recognition of the need for increased financial and technical assistance from those countries which are now finding themselves in highly improved economic conditions. What I am suggesting, of course, is that the increased financial strength which the European members of our Alliance have been successful in achieving should permit of more liberal commercial policies, increased foreign investment and a more direct participation in plans for the assistance of less-developed countries, whether inside the Alliance, or outside. I am not suggesting that the NATO machinery should be used to develop plans to these ends. There are other organizations designed for economic co-operation and more suited to this purpose. But discussions of political and economic problems in NATO should be carried out against the background of these objectives.

### Summit Meeting

With the visit to the U.S.A. of Mr. Khrushchev we have entered a new phase of diplomatic activity and it does present NATO and NATO governments with problems as well as opportunities. While we do well to take stock of those problems, it would, I think, be a great mistake to be so preoccupied with them that we neglect the negotiating opportunities which may be before us. It is equally true, of course, that we must not be so enthusiastic about what we hope will emerge from negotiations that have not yet taken place that we neglect the very real basis of strength which is and will remain a necessary prerequisite for successive negotiations until real disarmament has been achieved.

We now look forward to a summit meeting. The question is no longer whether such a meeting should be held but when and where and on the basis of what Western positions. The Western negotiating powers will be expected to keep the Council in their confidence in the preparation of the questions under consideration. If negotiations are to be fruitful between the Great Powers, the West will have to continue to work together. The Council should become the laboratory of the West in the formulation of its policies.

Conclusion

In the competition or co-existence which we face, I believe that what unites us is always more important than any issues which may temporarily divide us. The function of leadership must be to place our internal differences in the broader and so much more important perspective of the values that unite our peoples.

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