





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


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L E T T E R
T O T H E
PEOPLE of ENGLAND,
O N T H E
NECESSITY of putting an Immediate
End to the W A R ;
A N D
The MEANS of obtaining an Advantageous
PEACE.

Premenda occasio.



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Countrymen and Friends,

IT is inconceivable, to Slaves of other Nations, in what Degree every Individual in this Kingdom may justly boast himself to have a Share, as well in giving Laws to his Country, as in the immediate Administration of its Government.

The Sovereign, indeed, makes Choice of his Ministers, and the People have their Representatives in Parliament; but neither, by the Allegiance they pay the one, nor the Confidence they place in the other, do *Britons* give up this natural Right, to be still Masters of their own Properties, and Guardians of their own Liberties.

The recent Experience of a few Years past may furnish us with striking Instances, how loud the Voice of the People is heard in *England*, both on the Throne and in the Senate; Instances, that prove the vast Importance of its being distinguished from the impetuous Clamour of a factious Multitude, by its Conformity to the more sober Dictates of Reason and Truth. *Non omnino temere fit, quod vulgo dicuntur.*

It is to you, therefore, my Fellow-Countrymen, and not to any of those great men, whose Importance depends, in so eminent a Degree, on the Conformity of their Conduct to the Voice of the Public, that I conceive it necessary to address myself at this Juncture.

Amidst the Preparations for acting fresh Scenes of Slaughter and Desolation, the ensuing Campaign, a *Peace* is sometimes talked of; and we are flattered by many that it is near at Hand. God grant it may! A favourable Prospect, indeed, presents itself, of obtaining a no less honourable than lasting one, if we trifle not with the present Opportunity, and the enemy be, as it is surmised, really desirous of putting an immediate end to the War.

But, perhaps, the latter is not so certain as is commonly imagined; and, with respect to the former, I confess it, I am not without my Fears. For I will make no Scruple to declare it of the utmost Consequence to this Nation, that the expected Treaty should be hastened, by all the prudent Means the most artful Negotiator can suggest; and that for us wilfully to run the Hazard of unnecessary Delays, will be as impolitic, as the Consequences may be dangerous.

In our present Circumstances, it might ill become us to sue for Peace; but, to offer reasonable Terms of Accommodation, and to enter readily into every Measure, consistent with our Honour and Interest, to facilitate it, may, I presume, be, without Difficulty, proved not only expedient but necessary.

You have, indeed, been frequently told, on this Occasion, that you are under no Necessity to have recourse to the Arts of Negotiation; that you are in a Condition to impose your own
 Terms

Terms on the vanquished Enemy; and that, in your Circumstances as Victors, you should deliberate at Leisure on a Peace; for no Delay can be dangerous. But have these notable Advisers assured you how long we shall remain in these victorious Circumstances? Have they monopolized the Means of Success, and left nothing to the future Fortune of War? You may remember we were not always Victors; and it would not be improper to reflect, we may not always continue such.

As it is not my Design, however, to indulge romantic Hopes and ill grounded Expectations on the one Hand; so, on the other, I do not mean to encourage chimerical Suspicions, or intimidate with groundless Fears. I cannot conceive, nevertheless, that we have any sufficient Reason to presume the Hand of Providence will always continue to be exerted in so wonderful a Manner, as it has lately been, in our Favour. As Prescience is not the Gift of Humanity, it is therefore, by the general Experience of past Times, and the common Course of Events, that we must regulate our Conduct.

On the present Occasion then, let us calmly consider what has contributed to those Events, that have so surprisngly elated this Nation, and depressed its Enemies. Let us take an impartial View of our different Circumstances at present, and thence judge by Probability of the future.

Perhaps, notwithstanding all the Reason we have had, of late, to be satisfied with the Measures of a wise and prudent Administration; notwithstanding all the just Encomiums so freely made on the Conduct of our Commanders, and the Intrepidity of our Troops; if Partiality to ourselves were entirely laid aside, we should find our late Success no less owing to a providential Concurrence of fortunate Circumstances, than either to ministerial Wisdom or military Valour.

In like Manner, were our real Situation duly attended to, notwithstanding the Advantages we have gained of the Enemy, we should, perhaps, find little Reason for our immoderate Triumph. Perhaps also, those Advantages would be found less decisive, and the Enemies Losses less irreparable, or at least much less ruinous and intolerable, than we now are apt to flatter ourselves they are.

Respecting the Means of our Success; it would be an invidious Task to enter minutely into Particulars, and might be construed into a malevolent Design of depreciating the Merit of many, to whose gallant or prudent Behaviour, in their respective Stations, their Country is so greatly indebted.

But, without disparaging the Conduct of any of those, who may have deserved well at the Hands of their Fellow-Countrymen, without casting the least Soil, by Reflection, on the Lustre of their Characters, it may be justly asserted

serted that some of our late Expeditions have been ill planned, and worse directed; and that the Design of others, as well as the Persons and Means employed to carry them into Execution, have been ill adapted to such arduous Enterprises. This has been palpable enough, where we have been unsuccessful; as the several Blunders made on the Coast of *France*, and in *North America*, may ingloriously testify. And if, in some others more prudently directed, we have been so happy as to succeed, has it not rather been owing to adventitious Circumstances, and the greatest good Fortune in the World, than to the Measures calculated to insure Success?

I will not insist on our shameful Miscarriage at *Rochfort*, or foolish Retreat at *St. Cas*; the Siege of *Quebec*, and the Battle of *Minden* are our favourite Objects of Triumph. But if our Expedition against the former had not succeeded, (and how great a Chance has it appeared that it did not!) might it not, at this Time, have been represented as a wrong-headed Enterprize, favouring of Quixotism, and tending only to the Destruction of the Adventurers; who were too few, too ill supplied, or too ill directed, to carry their Point? Might not the projected Assistance of our *American* Troops, in the Neighbourhood of *Crown-Point*, have been virulently exploded, as (it indeed appears to have been) premature and chimerical? Might it not have been esteemed a gross Instance of
 Ignorance

Ignorance or Imprudence in the Projectors of such an Armament, to have made the most formidable Part of it such, as the very Nature of the Place would render useless; while, at the same Time, they had sent only a handful of brave Men to oppose the whole Force of *Canada* *? Nay, might not hence the whole Design have been condemned, as a futile and insufficient Attempt, unadvisedly and foolishly calculated to sacrifice our Men and Money, without effectually indemnifying ourselves, or annoying the Enemy?

This might have been done; I may venture to assert, it would have been done, and would have obtained Credit too, among Thousands of those who now attribute to the Wisdom of the Administration, and the Greatness of our military Force, that Success, which the late brave Man, to whom we owe it, once despaired of, and, urged perhaps by that Motive, to a most desperate Attempt, was himself the only Means of obtaining, at the Expence of his Life, I say only Means, as it is more than probable, in the Circumstances the Besiegers then were, that no

* By the Nature of the River, the most formidable Part of this Armament is deprived of the Power of acting, yet we have almost the whole Force of *Canada* to oppose.—The Affairs of *Great Britain*, I know, require vigorous Measures; but then the Courage of a Handful of brave Men should be exerted only where there is some Hope of a favourable Event.

Wolfe's Letter to Secretary PITT.

other

other General in the Service (without the least Disparagement to the Bravery of any) would have hazarded the Attempt, which crowned their Enterprize with Success. Nay, perhaps, had it not been attended with that Success, the Attempt itself might have been condemned, by Men more cautious than bold, as rash and imprudent.

Again, the Battle of *Minden* was as unprovided for as the Victory was unexpected; nay, certain it is, that the Commander in chief was so powerfully possessed of the Notion that he must be defeated, if he should be forced, at that Time, into a Battle, that he could hardly credit the Fact, when, by an amazing Instance of Valour in the *British* Infantry, he saw the Enemy beaten out of the Field.

Is it now from the miraculous Success of untimely and ill-planned Projects; is it from the accidental Gain of desperate Battles, into which we have been surprized, and wherein Victory turned only on the superior Bravery of a Handful of Men, that we confidently promise ourselves Security and future Conquest? It may be remembered, the Plains of *Fontenoy*, as well as those of *Minden*, have witnessed the Superiority of *British* Valour, though not with equal Success.

Nunc pluit, et claro nunc Jupiter æthere fulget.

But,

But, leaving this apparently invidious Subject, let us consider what Reasons we may have to flatter ourselves with the Continuation of our present Superiority in the War, either from our own peculiar Abilities to prosecute it, or those which our late Advantages over the Enemy may have given us.

Perhaps, a View of our present Circumstances, stript of that Gloss and false Colouring, which recent Success has thrown upon the Perspective, will not be pleasing. Nay, were it not contrasted to some Advantage by the more cloudy Prospect of the Situation of the Enemy, it were enough to make us tremble at our own.

The Government an hundred Millions in Debt, the necessary Expences of the War increasing this immense Sum yearly, by additional Millions, in what can this monstrous Burthen of national Credit end? Will not the enormous Weight of such a Debt very soon infallibly crush the Author of its Being? Nay, what shall we not have to fear on this Account, even though a speedy Peace should enable us to sit down with only a few Millions added to the present Sum?

Might we not, in speaking on this Subject, join heartily with the zealous Patriot, who lately expressed his Apprehensions for the Independency of the Constitution, when reflecting on that infinite Dependance on the Crown, that has been created by Means of the national *Debt* *?

* See a Letter to *Two Great Men*, p. 44.

Does not another Consideration, also, as little attended to as greatly important, naturally arise, when we think on the Numbers of those who are supported in Indolence or Luxury, by the Interest of the Funds? Indolence in every State is destructive; and though moderate Luxury (if such an Expression may be used) in Possessors and Cultivators of Land, in Artists, Manufacturers, &c. may have its Use, as it can be supported only by Ingenuity and Industry, in the Cultivation of the mechanical or economical Arts; yet nothing can be more pernicious than the Luxury of those, who live idly on the Labour of others.

There are Men, it is true, so short-sighted as to suppose the Consumption of those Commodities, from which the Government draws its Revenues, so necessary, that, while the Proprietors of Stock spend their Income at home, they conceive them to act the Part of useful Citizens, and to be profitable Members to the Commonwealth. Did Art or Nature, indeed, so generously reward the Labour of Individuals, by so plentifully providing them thereby, with the Articles of Convenience or Luxury, as to afford besides a Superfluity of those Articles for others, these useless *Consumers* might be overlooked as insignificant: But, since the Case is far otherwise, it is evident the whole Tribe of Stock-holding Gentry, with their numerous Attendants, are supported at the Expence of the

landed and laborious Part of the Nation; and, though made Use of as the Means of raising the Taxes, instead of facilitating their Payment, add grievously to the Burthen and increase the Difficulty of supporting it.

As the Increase of Taxes, also, tends to increase the Number of Stock-holders, so must the Price of all the Means of Life, and consequently of Labour, increase, till it come to a Degree incompatible with the Prosperity, or even the Being, of many of our Manufactories.

It is further a melancholy Reflection to think, in how many Instances the Necessity of raising such vast Sums as the Exigencies of State require, contributes to promote Idleness and Debauchery, in the lower Classes of People. It may be sufficient here to hint only at the Distillery; and barely to mention the Case of Tipling Houses, the unlimited Number of which are so pernicious to the Morals and Manners of those, on whom both the Wealth and Strength of the Nation ultimately depend.

Can it be denied that in these, as in many other Cases, the most prudential Maxims of domestick Polity have not been dispensed with, under Pretence of the Necessity of promoting the Revenue? Nothing, indeed, can be more absurd than to imagine the Duties, arising from the Means of Intoxication, Debilitation and Riot, more beneficial to a state, than Sobriety

and

and Regularity of Manners : but while Thousands find their Interest so intimately connected with the increase of the Revenues, it is no wonder, while such a Plea is at Hand, that it should be too often made Use of, to dangerous Purposes.

Waving these Considerations, however, as perhaps too general for the present Occasion, let me ask, if the Weight of this Incumbrance is not likely very soon to affect us too sensibly, in the Means of carrying on the War? Can it be conceived that the Danger attending our immense Debt is still at too great a Distance to be feared, or provided against? May we not be said to have already felt the contrary? Reflect on the mortifying Instance of the Loss the Subscribers sustained last Year, in being obliged, many of them, to sell out, at almost Twenty per Cent. under *Par*. Tell me at what Price does their Stock stand now?

The World may, for awhile, be blinded by the secret Allowance of Premiums to large Subscribers; but this Method of raising Money, if ever it should be practised, cannot last long. I know Occasion has been taken, from our having been able to provide so *immensely* for the Supplies of another Year, to boast that the like may be done for Years to come*. If it be put to the Proof, we shall, perhaps, find

* See Letter to Two Great Men, p, 51.

ourselves greatly mistaken. I hope, therefore, we shall not run the Risque of so mortifying a Disappointment; which, after our inordinate boasting, may subject us to the Ridicule of all Europe.

But, supposing we may yet borrow, at the Hazard of National Ruin, five or six Millions annually, for some Time longer; at what rate is this Money to be had? It is most infallibly certain that we must soon give greater Interest than we have as yet done; and perhaps than the Purposes for which we borrow will enable us to pay.

The Rise of Interest was plainly foreseen last Year; and, though the critical Bankruptcy of the French Government gave ours a temporary Advantage in their late Subscription, do we not see the Adventurers already in a fair Way of repenting their Bargain?

Reflect on the ordinary Expences of Government, at the present Juncture. From twelve to fourteen Millions Sterling annually! What an immense Sum! It may have been necessary. It may have been well applied. But, for God's sake, what possible Advantages can we think to gain, by continuing the War beyond the present Period, sufficient to indemnify us even in the Article only of these exorbitant Expences?

In answer to this Question, we are naturally led to the more pleasing Prospect of our Circumstances, relieved by Contrast with those of the
Enemy.

Enemy. On a careful Inspection, however, favourable as it is, even this may be found to afford us too barren a View, to give us hope of reaping a more glorious Harvest by the Prosecution of the War.

As I have not exaggerated our own Situation, respecting the Risque our National Credit will infallibly run, by continuing the War, and our Inabilities to carry it on, but at the Hazard of domestick Ruin; I shall admit only of as just a Representation of the Circumstances of the Enemy. I shall not scruple to say, therefore, these have been much exaggerated; as future Experience will, in all Probability, convince you.

That the French Nation have suffered extremely in their Navigation and Commerce, and consequently the State must be greatly distressed in its Finances, are undoubted Truths; such, indeed, as we cannot reflect upon, as Britons, but with the greatest Satisfaction. Stript of their Colonies, and ruined in their Marine, they are undoubtedly, as a commercial and maritime Nation, reduced low indeed. But let us not plume ourselves too much on this Reflection. France is still formidable as a military Power; still capable of doing an infinite deal of Mischief to others, though but little of benefiting itself.

However exhausted its Finances; however ruined in its Trade; it hath still its Resources.

It

It is a Country to which Nature has been so indulgent, that it is not easily eat up at home; and what is it that a Sovereign, who is in a great Degree absolute Master of the Lives and Properties of his Subjects, cannot effect, when urged by the Necessities of the Times to take desperate Measures to support a desperate Cause.

God grant, indeed, their Cause be actually so ruinous as the least sanguine among us suppose. And yet, perhaps, Circumstances, really desperate, may, eventually at least, be the worst a Nation, prudently desirous of a Peace, should wish their Enemy reduced to. To have little or nothing more to lose that can be lost; and to have every Thing to hope, that can at all be hoped for, from their Perseverance in the War, are not Motives to excite them to speedy Terms of Accommodation.

On the contrary, will not such Motives naturally induce them to try the Fortune of another, and yet another, Campaign? at the End of which, who can tell how far our own Situation may be comparatively changed for the worse? *Nescis quid serus vesper vebit.*

It has, indeed, been roundly asserted, and that with the most egregious Assurance, that
 ‘ it is entirely owing to the *German* Part of the
 ‘ present War, that France *appears* so low in
 ‘ the political Scale of Strength and Riches,
 ‘ that

‘ that she is *found to be* a sinking Monarchy, nay
 ‘ a Monarchy already sunk.’

‘ Full of the Project,’ it is said, ‘ of conquering *Hanover*, she saw herself obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid and maintained in Westphalia, and on the Rhine; vast Sums were to be advanced to the Court of *Vienna*, always as indigent as it is haughty; the ravenous Russians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move unless allured by Subsidies; and the Mouth of every hungry *German* Prince was to be stopt with the *Louis d’ors* of *France*. Involved in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from strengthening themselves at Sea, where England had most Reason to dread their becoming strong*.’

This declamatory Method of Argumentation, however plausible it may seem, is little conclusive. General Assertions prove nothing. It is not, for Instance, made as yet very clear that the Conquest of *Hanover* cost *France* such an immense Sum in the Acquisition, as is here hinted at:

The Armies maintained in Westphalia, and on the Rhine, cost the French Government little more (I have been told less) than they would have done, had those Troops been all the while idling at home. And, in general, the

* Letter to Two Great Men, p. 36, 37, 38.

great Number of Men which the French keep on foot, even in Time of Peace, makes the additional Expence of a War on the Continent much less to them than is commonly imagined by us, on whom the Maintenance of a handful falls so burthensome. In fact, also, the Quantum of the Subsidies paid by the Enemy to their Allies, during this War, has not been so prodigious as to impoverish the so much as you have been taught to believe. No; it has not been the *continental* but the *naval* Part of the War, in which the natural Force of Great Britain has been properly exerted, that has reduced France so low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches.

That the Enemy's Want of Money, occasioned by the exorbitant Expence of their Alliances and the Maintenance of their Armies in Germany, was the only, or at least the principal Reason, that prevented their strengthening themselves by Sea, is a Position, indeed, almost too absurd to be debated. There is not a Man of Common Sense in the Kingdom, but must be sensible that the Loss they sustained, before and after the formal Declaration of War, by the Capture of their Ships, and the Detention of their Seamen in our Prisons, was more effectual in preventing their strengthening themselves by Sea than all the extraordinary Engagements they have entered into, or Armies they have paid and supported on the Continent.

After

After the War broke out, also, many Difficulties presented themselves, from their Want of Materials for building, repairing and equipping their Ships, which no Money, had they ever so much in the Treasury, or were their Finances in ever such good order, could obviate.

With respect to Hanover too, it is certain that, had they been as successful in keeping, as in acquiring it, they would have found themselves Gainers by the Expedition; abstracted from the Consideration of what general Use it might have been to them, in prosecuting the War, or in negotiating a Peace. It is notorious that Hanover fell an easy Sacrifice: And there is Reason to believe that, had not that experienced and able General *, who conquered it, been obliged to leave the Army, on Account of the Intrigues and Cabals of his personal Enemies at Court, his great Prudence and Foresight would have taken such Measures as would have more effectually secured its Possession: Even as it was, however, the accidental Mortality among their Troops undoubtedly operated more than any other Cause to the Enemy's evacuating that Electorate.

It is not without sufficient Reason, also, should it be asserted that the Cause why they have not been already in Possession of it again, is rather owing to the clashing of personal Interests at Court, and divided Councils both in the

* Marshal D'Etrées.

Cabinet and the Field, than to their natural Inability, either from want of Men or Money, to prosecute the War on the Side of Germany with Success.

This having been the Case, who can tell but repeated Ill-Success may have the same Effect on the disjointed Councils of France as it had, not long since, on those of this Kingdom? Self-interest and private Resentment may subside; Ministers and Commanders may unite to do their Duty; and the Consequence, as in our own Case, be the Revival of a dispirited, despised People to Conquest and to Glory.

Consider, my Fellow Countrymen, what a mortifying Stroke this will prove to us, after having indulged ourselves, as we now do, in the utmost Excess of Triumph and Exultation. Let us not, therefore, give Occasion for it by relying too much on the Distress and supposed Weakness of the Enemy.

This, at least, is certain; that they may reap some Advantages, as to their future Abilities of carrying on the War, even from their ill Fortune. The Gain flowing into the Treasury, from the Duties laid on the Articles of their extensive Commerce, is, indeed, put a Stop to. But, at the same Time, on the other-hand, the Charge of supporting a large Marine, and a distant expensive Colony, is rendered needless, by the Destruction of the one and the Loss of the other. They will, therefore, hardly, for the future, fit out Fleets at a great Expence to sail without an Errand,

rand, or freight Ships only to be taken. Fatal Experience will, doubtless, teach them a Lesson we ourselves have so greatly profited by, notwithstanding we appear at present so very willing to unlearn it again; which is, to employ their natural Strength against their Enemies, and push with all their Force on that Element and in that Quarter, where their Endeavours are most likely to succeed.

They see, or have Reason enough to see, very plainly, that their Trade and Colonies are indefensible by any Effort they can now make with their Marine; and that it may be as well to let their few remaining Ships of War rot in their Harbours, as to fit them out only to fall into the Hands of the Enemy. They have, therefore, no other probable Way of indemnifying themselves for the Losses already sustained, or of prevailing on us to accede to a Treaty of Peace on any Terms, short of the most disgraceful and disadvantageous, than to prosecute the War with all their Force in Germany.

To do this, they will probably begin to think of assisting the Queen of Hungary in earnest, and push forward to make themselves again Masters of Hanover: In which Case, who can pretend to say what may be our Situation at the End of another Campaign?

You have been told that we shall, in all Probability, lose none of the Advantages gained in the last Campaign, by the ensuing one, ' if our Army, still headed by Prince *Ferdinand*, who

' has already gained so many Laurels, be rendered more formidable by sending to it *some Thousands* more of our national Troops *.' I hope we shall not; but as to the Probability of it, I must confess I am of another Opinion. Not that I doubt the Capacity of Prince Ferdinand, the Conduct of our present British Generals, or the Valour of our Troops. But unless, instead of *some Thousands*, we could send *as many* as we should have Reason to think would suffice, I conceive it more probable that we shall lose, than gain, Advantages in that Quarter.

I have already mentioned that our Success in the last Campaign was in a great Degree accidental, and very reasonably unexpected; nor can I be persuaded that we shall, or indeed that we have it in our Power, to augment Prince Ferdinand's Army so much as the French can, and actually will, do theirs.

We may flatter ourselves that they will be prevented from sending sufficient Supplies into Germany, lest we should again make Attempts on their Coasts. But what sufficient Reason have we to think this will be really the Case? Let those, who pretend that the present distressed Condition of France is *entirely* owing to the German Part of the War, tell us, whether her Coasts were left unguarded when her Troops last invaded Hanover. Did we find her Coasts, in fact, so destitute of Troops when we were lately sacrificing our Men and Money in expensive Expeditions, that neither paid Costs, or did us Honour? It is

* Letter to Two Great Men.

true, we destroyed one of the Enemy's Ports, and levied Contributions on a few petty Villages; which done, they had nothing more to fear, nor did they on that Occasion recal one single Regiment from Germany.

You may still say, indeed, that though they were not obliged on any particular Occasion to recall their Forces, the Apprehension of the Consequences of those Expeditions in general, prevented them primarily from sending more. This, however, is to assert a Negative that cannot easily be proved.

But, be this as it will, certain it is, they did not appear on those Occasions under any great Apprehensions for the Event of such Attempts; well knowing in what they must necessarily end. And can it be supposed they will be much more so now, when even the Security of their Ports is of less Consequence to them, than at the Beginning of the War? as in their present Situation they cannot hope to recruit their Marine, so far during the War as to cope with us again at Sea.

Can this be supposed, I say, when they must be effectually convinced that their acting merely on the defensive can be to no Purpose? Let us suppose them then ever so hard put to it to find Troops to guard their Coasts, and at the same Time to push the German War, we have all the Reason in the World to think they will exert every Limb, strain every Nerve, and at least neglect nothing to insure Success on the Side of Germany, where only perhaps any Thing can now be done

to retrieve their shattered Affairs. Instead, therefore, of the Probability being on the Side of those who conceive, we are not likely to lose in another Campaign the Advantages we gained in the last, the contrary appears not only probable, but not unreasonably to be feared, and, indeed, too justly to be expected.

Consider further the Situation of our brave and indefatigable Ally, the King of Prussia, who, after having surprized the admiring World with the most astonishing Instances of Fortitude and military Skill, finds himself at length surrounded by his Enemies, overpowered by superior Numbers, his Country exhausted, and his Cause supported only by those who are in no Situation to recruit his Armies, and but very little able to second his Operations.

You may plume yourselves, from the uncommon Difficulties this great Prince hath hitherto encountered and surmounted, with hopes, that he will be still able to defend himself from his Enemies, and keep them at bay till they shall be willing to enter into a Peace, on Terms neither dishonourable to himself, or disadvantageous to his Allies.

Be not too sanguine; you may be deceived. The court of Vienna, indigent as it is, hath powerful Resources. The Empress Queen can never want Men; and while her Arms are crowned with any Share of Success, Money, at some rate or other, will certainly be had.

If we reflect, also, on the present System of Austrian Policy, adopted by her Neighbours and

Al-

Allies, it is become necessary to their common Interest and Security, that the Wings of the towering Eagle of Brandenburg should be clipp'd.

Can it be imagined then they will not pursue those Advantages, which the present embarrassed Situation of his Prussian Majesty gives them, to accomplish their Design: A Design long premeditated, and which has unhappily been too earnestly pursued.

Should Hanover then again fall a Prey to a rapacious Enemy, or should the King of Prussia be reduced to Extremities, should not we be called upon, to deliver the one and extricate the other, by all the Ties of Honour, Justice and Humanity? And, can it be thought that, in the Case of either, we should be able to obtain the same advantageous Terms of Peace that we might probably do at present?

But we will suppose this heroick Prince should be able, for some Time, to sustain the united Efforts of his Enemies against him; that, under the Protection of that Providence, which has hitherto so signally interposed in his Favour, he may continue to detect their Intrigues, to disappoint their Machinations, and still to share in the Honours and Advantages of the Field. More cannot reasonably be expected. It cannot be expected that, harrassed as he has been, and is, on every Side, in his Person, his narrow Districts depopulated, his Veterans wasted by continual Slaughter, he should be ever, during this War, in a State to reduce his imperious Enemies so low, as to beg or accept of Peace on his own Terms.

Such

Such an Expectation would be in the highest Degree extravagant. The most sanguine of his Friends, the most zealous Admirers of his great Qualities, cannot hope this with any shew of Reason.

Let us suppose further that, by the Unanimity and prudential Conduct of our Generals, assisted by the Valour of our Troops, the French may be kept out of Hanover. What can we gain at best by prolonging the War? How long may we not *seige and battle* it on the Continent before we oblige them to accept of Terms more advantageous to this Nation than they may be disposed to do at present?

In the mean Time, let me ask, at whose Expence is the King of Prussia to be supported? At whose Cost is Hanover and the rest of his Majesty's German Dominions, and those of his other Allies, to be protected? At whose, but at this Nation's? What a Reflection! What waste of Blood and Treasure must necessarily attend our maintaining a continental War, in Conjunction only with a few exhausted Allies, against the united Forces and Interest of France and the House of Austria!

What, for God's sake, can it be expected that in these Circumstances we shall be able to do, even though the Increase of our national Debt, and the Hazard we thereby run of domestick Ruin, were Matters of no Consideration? By sending a large Fleet into the Baltick we might perhaps over-awe the Swedes and Ruffians, and thereby prevent their acting forcibly against Prussia.

By keeping another large Fleet at Home, and Troops continually ready for Embarkation, or by keeping those Troops stiving on Board Transports, and hovering on the *French* Coasts, we might keep them from sending so formidable a Reinforcement to their Armies in *Germany*, as perhaps they might otherwise do. How little may all this avail! How short may it fall of counterballancing the Expence!

The King of *Prussia* does not want, at present, the united Forces of all his Enemies to keep him low enough; and to crush him entirely was, perhaps, never the Intent of any. At least, so it has appeared from all the Motions of the *Swedes* and *Russians*, and even of the *French* themselves. Without the Assistance, therefore, of the *Russians* and *Swedes*, the Empress-Queen will, in all human Probability, prove a tolerable Match for the *Prussian* Hero, in his present State of Depression, Loss, and Fatigue.

The Advantages, however, which his Cause is likely to gain, by our taking a Step of that Nature, (supposing by the Way too, that it might give no Umbrage to the Court of *Denmark*) will evidently never compensate for the Expence we must be at on the Occasion; since, if the *Austrian* Troops should find the *Prussian* full Employment, the *Russians* would most probably, as they have hitherto done in like Circumstances, remain voluntarily inactive; and, if the contrary should happen, it might not be in our Power to oblige them to desist from fulfilling their Engagements with their Allies, in a

Cause which they seem earnestly to have espoused, on Principles not very distant from those of Self-Preservation and private Interest.

With respect also to our Expeditions on the *French Coast*; the Number of Troops we must ourselves employ therein, will as effectually prevent us reinforcing our national Troops in *Germany*, as those Expeditions will hinder the Enemy's sending sufficient Reinforcements to theirs: So that, if a continental War must be carried on, it may differ to us very little, whether we maintain an additional Number of Troops in *Westphalia*, or harrass them out with Embarkations and Re-embarkations on fruitless Expeditions against the Coasts of *Brittany* and *Normandy*. Nay, perhaps, it might be even better to do the former, that, in the mean Time, our Fleets may be better employed.

But let us employ our naval Force in the best Manner we can; though we strip the Enemy of the few Settlements they have left, they have no better Method of avenging themselves, or of obtaining the Restitution of any thing at a Peace, but by invading the Dominions of *Great Britain* or *Hanover*.

As to the former; the present Condition of their Fleet seems to have entirely incapacitated them for making the Attempt. Let us not put too much Confidence, however, in our own Advantages, or the Weakness of the Enemy. The Race does not always belong to the apparently Swift, or the Battle to the Strong. It is true, the
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most timid of our Fellow-countrymen, even such as have been under a constant Pannic, ever since the Beginning of the War, on account of a threatened Invasion, are now cured of their Fears, and, since the Defeat of *Conflans's* Squadron, begin to triumph in their Security.

It does not yet follow, that what cannot be executed To-day, may not be, nevertheless, successfully attempted To-morrow. There is no Man in *England*, indeed, less apprehensive of such an Event than myself; although I do not think the Difficulty of it, even in the Circumstances the *French* Marine now is, so great as is generally conceived. But, whatever are the Difficulties, while it is not totally impracticable, who can tell what Opportunity our future Operations may give them? Or what Reason we may not have to repent the last Efforts of despairing Poverty and disappointed Ambition?

Supposing, however, the Hydra of Rebellion unable to lift up its Head; supposing the destructive Monster of Invasion, at which we have so often trembled, be a mere Chimera, while we keep our Eyes on *Germany*, we shall behold sufficient Cause to embrace the first, as the best, Opportunity of making a Peace.

At all Events, *Hanover* must be protected or redeemed, and *Prussia* be preserved from Destruction. This must be done too by us. None else either will, or can do it; and if the Enemy should prove to have the longest Sword on the Continent, (the Probability of which, as I have

already observed, is greatly against us) what is likely to become of our Conquests at a Peace?

With Fire in your Eyes, and Impatience in your Hearts, methinks I hear some few of you (distinguished by your, at present, unfashionable Antipathy to continental Connections) cry out on this Reflection, "What are *Prussia* and *Hanover* to *Great Britain*? What is their Interest to ours, that we should renounce the Conquests obtained at our own Expence, and with the Lives of our Fellow-countrymen, to procure them Indemnification and Security? What is the real Protection or Assistance either of them can afford us in Time of War? What do we get by them in a Time of Peace? What are the reciprocal good Offices they can do us for such important Services?"

What think you, my Countrymen, of the Protestant Cause in *Germany*? Is it not worth your Care and Support? Would you not most willingly give up one Branch of your Commerce? none of your newly-acquired Settlements? not a Sugar-Island, or a District in *Canada*, to preserve from Ruin, or reward the Magnanimity of that Hero, for whose Success you have publicly put up your Prayers, for whose Victories you have made such extravagant Rejoicings, and for the Support of whose Cause you have so generously proposed, and so liberally promoted, pecuniary Subscriptions?

If Things are really come to that Pass in *Germany*, that the Ruin of the King of *Prussia* will
be

be soon followed by the Ruin of the Protestant Religion in the Empire, it may not have been without Reason, perhaps, that you have been told, " That whatever Conquests we have made, or may still make, upon the *French*, excepting only *North America*, should be looked upon as given back to *France*, for a most important Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of *Prussia* from any unforeseen Distresses *." But you will be perverse and sceptical enough, perhaps, to doubt the Truth of the above Supposition; you will be curious enough to ask, in what Particular has the Protestant Cause appeared so imminently endangered by the Circumstances of the present War? Or, if it really has been in any Danger, what are the Steps its pretended Champion has taken, in what has he appeared zealous to support it? In what Respect have the Interests of the Protestant Religion been shewn to be the Motive, Means, or End of the present War?

I cannot, indeed, give a satisfactory Answer to these Questions. I shall wave it therefore, and ask in my Turn, what you think of the Danger in which the Balance of Power must be, of being entirely overthrown, unless supported on one Side of its Beam by the Force and Riches of *Great Britain*?

Equally impatient as about the Interests of Religion, you reply, by asking me further, why *Great Britain* is to be always the heavy Weight at the short End of the Lever? " What, say

* Letter to *Two Great Men*, p. 41.

" you,

“ you, have we to do with the Jealousies and
 “ Quarrels of Princes, who, left to themselves,
 “ would maintain the Balance of Power among
 “ each other, for their own Sake without us ?
 “ Is it not enough for us to keep up this Ba-
 “ lance on the Ocean and among the maritime
 “ Powers ? And is it not much too much, to
 “ take upon us, on every Occasion, to set our-
 “ selves up to be Arbiters, in the Disputes ari-
 “ sing between all the Powers of *Europe* ?”

These are Questions, my good Friends, that
 have been asked a thousand Times, and a Thou-
 sand Times answered. Indeed, the most puny
 Politician of the present Times will furnish you
 with Store of Reasons, as they are called, for our
 continental Embarrassments. As none of them,
 however, have ever appeared very satisfactory to
 me, I cannot flatter myself they will be convinc-
 ing to you, I shall not therefore intrude on your
 Patience to repeat them.

Thus far, nevertheless, we are obliged to al-
 low, that the Protection of *Hanover* might justify
 our entering into defensive Alliances with conti-
 nental Powers; if those Alliances answered the
 End, and we could by their Means effectually
 obtain the Protection sought; but to pay Subsidi-
 es, to maintain a numerous Body of national
 Troops in *Westphalia* or *Flanders*, and, after all,
 to miss of that Protection, and be obliged to re-
 deem that Electorate, by giving up the Conquests
 we may have made in other Parts of the World;
 this is surely disagreeable enough to think of.

And

And yet so are we circumstanced, that, however earnestly or reasonably we may wish, as *Englishmen*, that no such dead Weight, as the Protection of *Hanover* and Support of our insufficient Allies, were link'd to the Prosperity of these Islands, it is impossible, in our present Situation, to shake it off, without breaking all those Bonds of Honour, Justice, and Gratitude, that ought to be revered among Nations. In Favour of the *Hanoverians* it is not unjustly remarked, that their Country has been attacked, only because it belonged to the King of *Great Britain*; and that it would be cruel and inhuman to leave them to suffer from the Consequences of Quarrels originally *British*.

Respecting the King of *Prussia* also, and our other Allies, even supposing our Connections with them only necessary on the Account of *Hanover*, the same Plea holds good in their Favour.

Hence it behoves us to bear the Burthen, we yet have so much Reason to lament, in the best Manner we can; and to make it as light as possible. *Feras, non culpes, quod vitare non potest.*

Though the Support of the Protestant Interest, or the Balance of Power in *Germany*, therefore, should not affect us, let us comfort ourselves with the Contemplation on those inestimable Blessings, which have been derived from the Succession of the Protestant Line to the Throne of these Kingdoms: Let us consider, that *Hanoverians* and *Englishmen* have an equal Title to the Protection of the same gracious Sovereign; and that, burthensome as their Connections are to the latter,

we might have been much less able to bear them, if, in Default of the *Hanover* Succession, Popery and arbitrary Power had seated themselves on the Throne of *Great Britain*. And hence also, let us endeavour with Patience, to look upon the Interests of this Kingdom as, at the present Juncture, inseparably connected with that of his Majesty's *German* Dominions and those of his Allies.

While I am desirous, however, that we should without grumbling submit to Necessity, I am very unwilling that we should imagine the Necessity greater than it really is; or that because it is expedient for us to do something to support the Interest of our Allies, we should sacrifice every Thing to it, by forgetting our own.

I presume, that if I have not demonstrated the absolute Necessity, I have at least shewn, plainly enough, the Expediency, if it were in our Power, of putting an immediate End to the War; and the little Probability there is of our being hereafter in a Situation more promising of an advantageous Peace; I shall now, therefore, beg your Patience, my Fellow-countrymen, while I communicate those Reasons on which my Apprehensions, of our trifling away the present Opportunity, are grounded, and endeavour to point out the Means whereby, I conceive, so desirable an Event may most probably be brought about, and that to our least Disadvantage.

With respect to the former; let me ask, if those Apprehensions are not too justly founded? Have we not, in the first Place, too much Reason to
fear

fear that, flushed with our late extraordinary Successes, we may pertinaciously insist on Conditions, which the most artful Negotiators will not be able to procure us? Or, at least, that whatever Conditions it may be thought proper to stipulate, they will be proposed, and insisted on, in such a Manner as to raise insurmountable Difficulties, and protract the Negotiation of the Treat.?

Have not already our Great Men, as well as the Public, been addressed by Patriots, real or pretended, in order to excite a Spirit of national Pride, by which our Interest may be sacrificed to our Vanity? Have we not heard some talk in the unadvised and haughty Strain of demanding Hostages, before we know in what Particular any may be necessary; and of requiring the Demolition of *Dunkirk* as a Preliminary to Treaty?

Have we not heard others, equally sanguine and imperious, advise our insisting on having the Congress of the Negotiators held in *London*; on having the Articles of the Treaty debated in Parliament; and on subjecting the Plenipotentiaries to the Mortification of dancing Attendance on the Resolutions of an House of Commons? Surely nothing of this Kind is the essential and necessary Prelude to a good Peace! I hope no such impolitic Pertinacity will reduce us to the Necessity of acceding to a bad one!

But what if the *French* were indeed so humbled as to sue for Peace in the most abject Manner; what if we could impose our own Terms in our own Method; would it be of any good Consequence

quence to this Nation, to behave, on such an Occasion, with Haughtiness and Insolence? The Fortifications of Dunkirk have, indeed, long afforded a glaring Instance of the Enemy's Breach of Faith and the Regard they pay to the most solemn Treaties. It might not, therefore, be improper to insist on their Demolition as a Preliminary to Treaty, were there any Probability it would be complied with, or were it not likely to delay its Conclusion.

But the Supposition of the Enemy's submitting to such a Proposal, were it made, is ridiculous*; and, were it not so, the Delay occasioned by putting it in Execution might prove of much greater Consequence to this Nation, than even giving up that Circumstance entirely.

Nature seems herself determined, in Spite of the Efforts of the most able and approved Engineers, to choak up that Port; so that there is not the least Appearance, at present, of its being ever made capable of receiving Ships of Force or Burden; and destroy the Fortifications and Works as you please, it will be always in a State to afford, in a very short Time, a secure nestling Place for small Privateers.

Supposing, nevertheless, that we do not think it safe to trust to the dilatory Operations of Nature, all that it can be prudent to do, is to

* It cannot be imagined that any Nation is so ignorant and foolish, as not to know that the weakening its Hands before a Negotiation for Peace, is not the Way to secure it good Terms in that Negotiation. See Remarks on a Letter to Two Great Men, p. 15.

make the Demolition of this Port an Article in the Treaty, but it never can be so, to insist on it as a Preliminary. For, let me repeat it again, it is highly expedient for us to hasten the Peace by every Method consistent with our Honour and Interest: And I should be sorry to find my Countrymen had so little Share of Solidity and good Sense, as to think these dependant on Punctilio's of this Nature.

Let us not conceive that, were it in our Power thus to mortify the Enemy, their abject Compliance with our unprofitable Demands would make them hereafter more afraid or ashamed of shuffling with Treaties, or of breaking their Faith with us, when Opportunity should enable them to do it with Impunity. We ought to know the French Nation too well to think so.

Their Insincerity, and that Art they are Masters of to extricate themselves out of Difficulties, which they have submitted to by the most solemn Treaties, is so notorious, that even Hostages themselves might be no sufficient Security for the effectual Performance of any Part of a Treaty, which they might see their Advantage to break.

So good a Reason as this for our accepting them, however, is not even assigned for the proposed Demand, No: The Motive is merely vain-glorious and impertinent. At the last Peace we condescended to send Hostages to Paris as Pledges of our good Faith to bind us in the Performance of an Article, to which the Enemy had

it not in their Power to compel us: Now to efface this imaginary Stain on our National Character, we are advised to demand Hostages of them, not as a Security for their performing any Thing we have not in our Power to compel them to do, but merely for the Sake of Parade, and that the good People of London and Westminster may have something to stare at.

If we have really reduced the Enemy so low as to kiss our Footstool, while we sit securely deliberating at Leisure on the Terms of a Peace, let us not shew them, by accepting Hostages on any Account, that we think they dare to trifle with us in the Performance of every Article of the Treaty.

Instead of reflecting on our former Condescension as disgraceful to our National Character, let us regard that Circumstance only as a tacit Confession that the Enemy were in no Condition to enforce Respect to the Treaty by other Means. And if the Vanity of the French will still make them construe it otherwise, let them comfort themselves, and boast to other Nations, with Reflections on their Importance at the last Peace, for the Loss of the more substantial Advantages we may reap by that which is at hand.

I might give another, and perhaps a better, Reason why unnecessary and useless Hostages ought not to be insisted on. Indeed I could wish never to have so insidious and dangerous an Animal as a French Man of Quality reside at our Court, or even in our Country, unless very closely

closely confined, on any Occasion or Pretence whatever.

Need I explain myself? What have not the French learned of our national Weakness by residing among us! How have we not laid ourselves open to the Enemy by caressing even our Prisoners of War!

But you despise the Power, the Genius, the Arts of these reduced, impotent, insignificant People. You laugh at the distant Consequences of my Insinuations. Alas! my Countrymen, how soon and how greatly is your Note changed! How little a while is it ago, since an insignificant French Man, landing at one of our Out-Ports would have been imagined the Fore-runner of an Invasion, or his known Departure been construed into the Prelude of a speedy Rebellion!

How little a while ago is it since, dejected by Ill-Success, one would have thought, by the Virulence of your Complaints and the Loudness of your Clamours, that you were on the Brink of Destruction!

I do not, I need not, ask what has produced this extraordinary Change. I admit, in great Part, the Justice of your Motives and rejoice in the Concurrence of such a Number of glorious and fortunate Events. But with all this, let us remember to what kind of Causes these Events have been owing. Neither the Persons or Measures of the Administration have been *so much changed* as to give us any Reason to depend on the superior Wisdom at the Helm. Or, were

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It so, Men still are Men, the best sometimes forget, and the Wisest of them are not immortal. Let us not, therefore, grown imperious by casual Success, wantonly insult the Enemy, or enhance the Terms of our Demand, lest, being obliged hereafter to accept of much less, we should bring upon ourselves that Contempt in which we now hold the late idle Gasconades of the Enemy.

Far be it from me to mean to throw out any invidious Insinuations against respectable Characters. Far be it from the Reader, also, to think me so little of an Englishman, as not to rejoice, equally with the most sanguine of my Countrymen, in our present Superiority over the Enemy. It is, indeed, for this very Reason; it is because I take so great a Part in the Honour and Interest of my Country, that I am anxious to prevent, if possible, any Diminution of its present Superiority and Glory.

Tenacious of our present Advantages, therefore, let us behave with Resolution; but not Haughtiness. Elevated by Conquest, let us preserve our acquired Dignity, by not stooping so low as to pique the Vanity of the vainest Court in the Universe, in captiously sticking for Trifles: And if any Thing must be given up to facilitate so necessary an Event as a Peace, let our Concessions be made with as good a Grace as possible.

Think not, I hold National Honour cheap; or that, least of all, I would have victorious
 Britons

Britons submit to Indignities. The Occasion cannot demand it. We do not sue for, but should offer, Terms of Pacification. But I see some of you look grave, my Countrymen, at my talking of Concessions, as a Matter almost indispensable. You are willing, perhaps, to restore *nothing*. I hope you will not be obliged to give up *much*: Nay, were a Treaty of Peace now actually on the Carpet, perhaps, an able Negotiator might find a Necessity of restoring but *little*: but I tremble for the Delay. I tremble at the Consequences of the War in Germany: At the Close of the last War the Ministry gave up Cape Breton. The Nation in general, and the People of New-England in particular, were dissatisfied with this Concession. But might not the Ministry, at that Time, have excused themselves, in the Manner Demosthenes once did on a similar Occasion; might they not have said, “ It is not we that give up Cape Breton; it is the Necessities of the Times; it is the fatal Effects of the Rebellion; it is the Battle of *Fontenoy*; the Siege of *Bergen-op-Zoom*; it is the Cowardice and Impotence of the *Dutch*; it is the Security of *Hanover* that give up *Cape Breton*.”

God grant that, by any sinister Event, the present, or any future, Ministry may not have as good a Plea, for giving up the more considerable Advantages we are now possessed of. But let those who have the greatest Aversion to Continental Connections (if any can have greater than

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than myself) reflect on the Consequence of Hanover's falling again into the Hands of the French. Let them reflect on the Consequence of the Dutch being hereafter impolitickly induced to do something, which the French will construe into a Breach of Neutrality *. It is impossible for us to think of a Peace without procuring the Restitution of the Electorate, or providing for the Security of a dastardly and impotent Ally. And can we do either without making the Enemy some valuable Consideration ?

Nay, who can think of a Peace without including the Restitution of Minorca ? and will the French insist on nothing in the Room of it ? Doubtless they will : and certainly must have it too.

But you object that Hanover is not yet in the Enemy's Hands, that the Dutch have taken no Part in our Quarrel, and that probably neither of these Circumstances may ever happen. I hope we shall be able to say we see no Appearance of either, this Time Twelvemonth.

It matters, however, little whether we are obliged to give up any of our Conquests, to ob-

* There is perhaps more fear of this, than the Publick general imagine. The late grumbling, and half insolent, Tone of this Republick is changed. In Conjunction with our Enemy, they imagined they might have controuled our Authority at Sea. But since the French Navy has been so terribly reduced, their Fears are prevalent ; and, acquiescing in our Superiority, they seem more ready to oblige us, by insulting the Enemy, than it is our Interest they should. It is not long since they were just on the Point of unadvisedly seizing some Cannon belonging to the French, in its transport through their Territories.

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tain the Restitution of Hanover and Security for any of our Allies; or are necessitated to spend the Value of those Conquests in their Defence and Protection. Before we form hasty Resolutions, therefore, to give up none of our Acquisitions for a present Peace, but to keep them at the Hazard of prolonging the War; let it be calmly deliberated, whether we may not in the End be Sufferers by such Conduct; and that, instead of our being considered hereafter as, in this Instance, justly tenacious of the Honour and Interest of our Country, we may not, in lamenting the Consequences, reflect on ourselves as acting under the Influence of pertinacious Insolence and invincible Obstinacy. *Aut minus animi, aut plus potentiae.*

Again, as to the Place where, or the Persons by whom, a Peace is to be negotiated; it matters less that we should make a vain-glorious Choice, in either of these Particulars, than that in both we should consult Expedition, and the Expediency of Terms.

Here also a thousand Difficulties are started, that can serve only to protract the Negotiation: The greatest Difficulty, however, is not to know what Terms it is our Interest to demand, or consent to; but to prevail on the Enemy to accede to such Terms, as every Man in *England* knows we ought to get, if we can.

To effect this, doubtless, all the Abilities of the most artful Negotiators are requisite: But I cannot think such Abilities exclusively annexed to the Person of any particular Minister of State,

whose Office would prevent his attending a Congress at the Hague, or elsewhere.

It is pretended further, that the indefinite and equivocal Manner of Expression, common to former Treaties, might be avoided in this, by our taking Time for sufficient Deliberation, and debating the Terms of each Article in Parliament *. I will not deny it. It is possible that by making the whole Body of the Representatives of the Kingdom, in a Manner, Negotiators, the Articles of the Treaty might be better expressed, and attended with greater Precision than otherwise; but the Query still recurs, whether the Advantages we are likely to gain thereby will compensate for the Danger of the Delay such a Method of Negotiation must necessarily cause, in bringing the Treaty to a Conclusion ?

Will not our Deliberations, in that Case, too much resemble those of some Republican States, from the Nature of whose Constitution we find them so long debating about War and Peace, till they often lose the Opportunity of Vengeance meditated in the one, and the Advantages they proposed to secure by the other.

I do not deny that Precision in the Terms and Expressions of a Treaty are material, and necessary to be well attended to: But, however indispensable it may be in Cases determinable by established Laws and equitable Courts of Justice, I will venture to say it is not so essential in Matters of Agreement between Nations, wherein

* See *Reasons why the approaching Treaty of Peace should be debated in Parliament.*

the *Lex ultima regum*, the Sword of Power, determines much oftener than that of Justice.

Can we think that the *French*, had they wisely considered they were not a Match for us in *North-America*, would have taken Advantage of the indefinite Terms of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, to make Inroads on *Nova Scotia* and the Territories of *New England* and the *Ohio*?

There is a wide Difference between the Precision required in wording the polemical Themes of Academics, or in drawing up a Bill in Parliament, and that acquired in the Terms of Treaties between Sovereigns. And I make no doubt that, by our keeping Possession of all *Canada*, by Virtue of an Article, however indefinitely expressed in the Treaty, we shall be more advantaged, and the Peace will be more lasting, than if we gave back the least Part of it, however limited it might be, even by actual Surveys and Land-Marks erected on the Spot.

For, be the Articles of the Treaty as definite as Words can make them, there is no doubt that the French will make little Scruple of breaking them when their Interest and Ambition interfere with the *Letter*, and either is seconded by their Power.

Could any Thing be more precise and definite than the Article relating to the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, in former Treaties? And yet did they not readily break it, and that in the Face of all *Europe*, without blushing?

The Experience of two Centuries past may, indeed, serve to convince us (if we yet need any

farther Retrospect to be convinced of it) that nothing but Power and Resolution on our Part, to compel them to be just, can keep them so.

Our principal Business, therefore, is to obtain a Peace on Terms that will in some Measure keep themselves; that is, enable us to make the Enemy, at all Times, respect our own Construction of them.

Now the present Circumstances are so favourable to us in this Particular, that we ought to trust nothing needlessly to the future, in hopes of better; lest, like the Dog in the Fable, anxious, with our Mouths already full, after more, we are obliged to relinquish what we have already acquired. *Ne umbra pro corpore.*

I shall next, therefore, my Countrymen, endeavour to point out the Means, whereby an Event so desirable, so requisite to the Welfare of this Nation, may possibly be brought about.

I flatter myself you are already convinced of the little Probability there is that the French will accept of a Peace, and sit down with their present Losses. The Outlines of the Prospect of the Consequences of the German War, which I have not unjustly drawn in their Favour, are yet greatly so. Minorca too is in their Hands. Something must, therefore, necessarily be given up to prevail on them to enter immediately into Terms of Accommodation.

What this is to be, becomes thus the principal Object of our present Consideration. Much has already been said and written on this Subject.

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The Importance of our several Acquisitions have been debated, and that of each been enhanced and undervalued, in turn. This Consideration, however, is not the only one we should attend to, in the present Case. In order to bring the Enemy to a speedy Accommodation, it is necessary to consider as well the real as imaginary Value of those Acquisitions to them.

That which is of the least Importance to us is doubtless what we should the soonest chuse to relinquish: But if this, at the same Time, be equally unimportant to the Enemy, they will no doubt set as just a Value on the Concession as we.

It has been maintained, by some of our Patriots, that no Part of our Conquests on the Continent of North America, should be given up on any Consideration whatever; while the Insignificancy of *Senegal* and *Goree*, and the inferior Consequence of *Guadeloupe* have been offered, as Reasons for our relinquishing those Places.

On the other Hand, again, it has, with no less Appearance of Reason, been alledged that the single Isle of *Guadeloupe* is of more Importance to this Nation than all *Canada*. It is said that the whole Trade of *Canada* consists in that of Furs and Skins, and fell short in its most flourishing State of 140,000 l. a Year; while *Guadeloupe* produces more Sugar than any of our Islands, except *Jamaica*; by which Branch of Trade alone 300,000 l. *per Annum* might be cleared by our Merchants: For that, having sufficient from
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our own Islands to supply our Home Consumption, the whole Sugar Produce of Guadeloupe might be exported, and would consequently be so much clear Money to Great Britain *.

Might we not ask, however, on this Occasion, at what Rate is our Home Consumption at present supplied? Were Sugars cheaper, there is little Reason to doubt our Home Consumption would be much more considerable.

Has it not, also, been long notorious that our own Islands would produce much more Sugar than they have lately done, had not injurious Combinations been entered into, to prevent the bringing such Quantities to Market as must lower the Price?

I have been further very credibly informed that, notwithstanding it is pretended by many that the Lands of *Guadeloupe* are much better than those of our own Sugar Islands, yet its Sugars are considerably less valuable than ours, or those of the Island of *Martinico*.

I will not pretend, however, to assert the superior Value and Importance of Canada, taken solely in a commercial Point of View: Since in Guadeloupe they raise, besides Sugar, great Quantities of Indigo, Cotton, Coffee, Ginger, &c. all which is not only sent to the European Markets; but a considerable Trade is also carried on between that Island and the Caraccas, and other Parts of the Spanish Main, which Trade is wholly confined to the Manufactures of Europe, the Returns for which are chiefly in Ready

* See Remarks on a Letter to Two Great Men, p. 40.

Money.

Money. If to this we add that the Slaves now in the Island are alone, at the lowest Valuation, worth upwards of One Million Sterling, there is no doubt but Guadeloupe is of more Consequence in a commercial View than Canada.

As an Acquisition, also, that may be of Service in a Time of War, *Guadeloupe* is by no Means inconsiderable. The infinite Disadvantage it has been of to us during the present, is universally allowed. The Island of *La Desfrade*, being the first Land usually made by our Ships bound to the West-Indies, they are easily perceived in their Course from thence, by the Privateers of Guadeloupe; which could not have a more convenient Station to annoy us, in this particular, than that Island.

Notwithstanding these Considerations, however, I must give my Voice entirely for those who would rather give up Guadeloupe, with every other Acquisition we have made, or may make, in the West-Indies, than part with one single foot of Canada.

In my Reasons for it I differ, however, from those who affect to esteem it important, on account either of its Trade, the Number of Inhabitants, or the Fertility of its Soil; the principal Objection that appears to me, against giving up any Part of Canada is the Danger we thereby run of giving Occasion, in a few Years, for another War: An Objection that does not equally oppose the relinquishing *Guadeloupe*. It has been said that, by establishing proper Limits, and

and securing them properly, we might very prudently restore *Canada* to the French. But the Misfortune is, that no Limits we can make in that Part of the World would be proper, for the very Reason, that it is impossible they can at present be properly secured, without putting both Nations to an Expence much greater than the present Value of the Matter in dispute.

It is also much to be doubted whether, if this were practicable, the French would not be as willing to desist entirely from the Demand as to be effectually restrained within those Bounds to which it is absolutely necessary for us to confine them.

If they should give up their long-since-projected Scheme of elbowing our Colonies, and of edging down by Degrees to the Sea-Coast, *Canada* will certainly be of little Advantage.

But, supposing the two Courts could come to a right Understanding in this Point, and be satisfied with the Limits assigned; we have an Example, in the Manner in which the present War commenced, how very soon it is likely to be disturbed.

It is well known what Kind of Men our Colonists, and in particular the Traders with the Indians, generally are; nor do we suppose those belonging to the French are a Jot more scrupulous in their Morals. Now, let the Harmony subsisting between the two Courts be ever so well established, or kept up in Europe; let them be ever so desirous of remaining on good Terms with each other; how long can we promise ourselves

elves this Harmony will continue; when, on the first Temptation of any considerable Profit, the adventuring Borderers will insult each other? their Complaints will be heard by their respective Sovereigns, and the two Nations be involved again in a ruinous and bloody War.

Hence, although, by restoring Guadeloupe, we should in Fact give up an Acquisition of more Importance, in almost every other Consideration; yet the Expediency of our taking such Measures as will not only procure an advantageous, but secure a lasting, Peace, requires that Guadeloupe, with the other Islands attendant on that Conquest, be rather restored entire to the Enemy, than that we should give up one Foot of *Canada*.

As it is of great Moment, however, toward the Negotiation of the Treaty, that we should consider in what light the French look on these different Concessions; perhaps it will be found that, seeing the little Prospect there is of their ever succeeding in their grand Scheme, against our too-powerful Colonies in North-America, they will give up the Design; and, considering the vast Importance Guadeloupe is of to their Commerce, they will more readily enter into this Measure than the other.

As they will require, also, the Convenience which *Senegal* and *Goree* afforded them, of procuring Slaves for their West-India Islands, the Restoration of those Places, added to that of *Guadeloupe*, &c. will appear so valuable a Consideration, that we have all the Reason in the

World to think they will, on such an Offer, enter gladly into Terms of Pacification, and sit down contented with the Loss of their Ships preceding the Declaration of War.

On giving up, further, Cape Breton, after demolishing the Fortifications, and on renewing their Privilege of Fishing, &c. on the Banks and Coast of Newfoundland, they will also very probably resign *Minorca* in exchange, and be so ready to concur in the necessary Measures to a speedy Accommodation, that the Empress Queen will think it prudent, also, to enter into the like with the King of *Prussia*.

As the latter may, even at present, stand in need of our Assistance, it will doubtless be requisite to lend a helping Hand to this brave Ally; which, rather than give any further Advantage to the *French*, should be done by Means of a Sum of Money, to be paid to the Court of *Vienna*, and another to the Elector of *Saxony*.

I prefer this Method to any other, as ready Money will be so likely to be accepted of; and the Sums we need give will not probably amount to a twentieth Part of what it may cost us to carry on the War, if no such Steps are taken.

I doubt not but many of you will break out on this Proposal, and exclaim against it, as an Indignity. What! after all our Success and Conquests, you will say, shall we at last shamefully buy a Peace?

But let me advise you, my good Friends, to recollect that celebrated Adage, so familiar in every

every economical Nation, ' A Penny saved is a Penny got : ' And reflect that a good Peace, cheaply bought, will redound more to the Honour and Advantage of this Kingdom, than all the Bargains we may make in the Continuation of the War, by the inhuman Purchase of Rapine and Blood.

In the present Success of our Arms, the Disbursement of Money cannot be supposed a reproachful Circumstance ; since it will appear as well a Proof of your superior Wealth, as be evident to all *Europe*, that the Purchase of a Peace is not necessary for own Sake, but only for our Allies.

The *Quota*, destined to the Indemnification of the Elector of Saxony, must also be esteemed rather as a Mark of Generosity than Meanness ; and it will doubtless appear, in the Eyes of all the World, as a noble Instance of ours to relieve that unfortunate, though perhaps blameable, Prince. As to the Terms on which the King of Prussia and the Empress Queen may agree, with regard to Silesia, I do not see that we have any Business to intermeddle with Particulars. The former, it has been justly observed, has not been reduced to his present Distress in Consequence of his Connections with us ; and, as we have already been an useful Ally, so, in our endeavouring thus, at our own Expence, to bring about a general Pacification, although we should not be able to procure him all he could wish, he ought to be content.

Again,

Again, as to the Manner in which *France* and the Court of *Vienna* may agree about sharing the Expences of the War, and their mutual Indemnification; I do not see also that it much concerns us. The French did not move to the Assistance of the Empress Queen, till they had first taken a few Towns in Flanders into their Possession, apparently by Way of Security for the Repayment of their Expences. As their principal Operations, also, have tended rather to distress the Elector of *Hanover*, by Way of avenging their own Cause of Quarrel with *England*, the Empress has doubtless Reason to expect her Towns again at the Peace. But shou'd it prove otherwise, we are too little interested in it to make any farther Concessions, as some inconsistent Politicians would have us, in order to take them out of the Hands of France, and put them into hers.

A British Administration, it has been said *, must tremble at seeing Newport and Ostend become French Property. I would not have it so: And yet it is not every Administration that would tremble at it.

We have had e'er now very great Men at the Helm, who knew little of the real Value or Importance of the Places they have bought, sold, or bartered for, with Foreign Powers. The great Earl of *Clarendon* has assured us, that when *Dunkirk* was sold to the French, it was a good

* Letter to Two Great Men, p. 42.

Bargain on our Side; and yet, by his own Confession, this same eminent Statesman did not even know whereabouts the Isle of *Sheepey*, at the Mouth of the Thames, was situated.

I make no scruple, however, that our present Administration are well apprized of the Importance of *Newport* and *Ostend*, and that they are under no very great Apprehensions of there being a Port opened on that Coast, from which this Nation has so much hereafter to fear, as to make it now worth while to sacrifice any Thing of Consequence to prevent its falling into the Hands of the *French*.

If the Queen of Hungary were, indeed, our Ally, and had suffered in our Cause, something might be said for it: But, as it is otherwise, and we can place no Dependance on her Honour or Gratitude, who knows but, after we should have purchased the Evacuation of these Towns of the French, she might put them again into their Hands? Is she not capable of it? *Ingratum si dixeris, omnia dixeris.*

But, supposing it be not quite so prudent to leave the Flemish Towns, now in the Possession of the French, in their Hands, at a Peace; all that we can at present propose to do, is either on Consideration of their evacuating them, to recede from the Demolition of the Fortifications of *Louisbourg*; or in Lieu of it to pay them a Sum of Money, as a better and more acceptable Equivalent.

Thus

Thus have I taken a cursory Examination of those Circumstances that should induce us to hasten a Peace, and the Terms which I conceive the Enemy may, at present, be brought to accede to. If my Remarks are just; if my Proposals are reasonable; they will, I doubt not, have their due Weight with the Publick. If they are not so, it is Pity they should. I shall less regret my Loss of Time and Trouble than the being, in any Degree, instrumental in misleading my Fellow-Countrymen, either to their Publick or Private Disadvantage.

I am,

My Friends and Countrymen,

Yours, &c. &c.

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