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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Excerpts from a speech by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons, January 14, 1957.)

... Recent events, especially events in the Middle East, have emphasized to all Canadians the importance and the responsibilities of Canadian foreign policy, even in respect of far away areas where there may seem to be few direct Canadian interests but where the paramount interests of all in peace and war are often involved. These events have also brought about, not only widespread public discussion of the decisions that we have made and may have to make, but also a reassessment of the principles which have underlined our policies and the factors which influence them. It has, I think, Mr. Speaker, been confirmed, if confirmation was necessary, that our foreign policy must be Canadian, based on Canadian considerations, Canadian values and Canadian interests, the greatest of which, however, apart from freedom itself, is peace. But a Canadian policy, in this day and age, is not necessarily the same as an independent policy. There is no country in the world today, even the most powerful, which in the preservation of peace and security can afford the luxury of, or run the risk of, a policy of independence in foreign affairs, in the sense that independence means isolation from one's friends or immunity from the effect of their decisions and their actions.

We should not, of course, and we do not, automatically or unhesitatingly follow the policy of the United States or the United Kingdom or any other country. Nevertheless, we cannot, and I suggest we should not, make our own decisions and our own policies without being influenced by, without taking into consideration, the policies of the United Kingdom or the United States or those of our other friends and allies with whom we are associated. No country is in a better position to appreciate

the necessity and indeed, if you like, the opportunities of interdependence in the realm of foreign policy than Canada, situated as we are on the North American Continent but being an active member, as we are also, of the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO and the United Nations and trying to play a responsible part in all those associations. We are of course, a free and a sovereign state, but freedom and sovereignty do not mean for us, or for other nations, either isolation or immunity; unless we abandon all of our national and international responsibilities, and perhaps not even then. It seems to me evident, then, that Canadian foreign policy must be influenced by various factors which we can and indeed which we often try to modify, but which we ignore at our peril.

These principal factors, I suggest, are four in number. The first is our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, four-fifths of the people of which are now Asian, 443 million out of 530 million. Action by any of the Commonwealth nations which seems likely to foster and strengthen the ties which bind us together is almost certain to deserve, and certainly should receive, our support. The reverse, of course, is also often true.

In actual practice, there have been over the last 10 years or so since World War II very few international occasions when we have not been on the side of Great Britain; the centre of our Commonwealth. But the rarity of dissenting occasions stems not from our automatic acceptance of the policies of Great Britain but from the fact in the vast majority of international questions our interest and hers have happily been almost invariably identical. When that does not happen we, of course, regret it deeply and we do our best to reconcile our differences without delay and without recrimination. We experienced such regret indeed to the point of distress when we differed, not perhaps in objectives but in methods and procedures, with the United Kingdom on certain occasions at the United Nations Assembly meeting last autumn in connection with the Suez crisis. The Commonwealth was indeed deeply split on that issue and our relief was therefore correspondingly great, a relief shared in full measure by the Asian members of the Commonwealth, where the separation pressures were most intense, when this danger to the Commonwealth was removed by the Anglo-French decision to accept the cease-fire resolution of the United Nations Assembly. So the Commonwealth association remains strong and close. The friendly, informal and frank exchange of views in a sincere effort to reach agreement on all matters of common concern goes on, and the Commonwealth continues to play its invaluable and constructive role in today's troubled world; a role for which the whole world has reason to be grateful.

Mr. Churchill: What nations of the Commonwealth would have left the Commonwealth had the British and French not abided by the resolution of the United Nations?

Mr. Pearson: There is evidence, strong evidence, which I and others have received, to suggest that if the fighting in Egypt between Anglo-French and Israeli forces and Egyptian forces had continued and if the United Nations Assembly cease-fire resolution had been repudiated or rejected, the pressures in regard to separation from the Commonwealth in certain Asian members of the Commonwealth would have been so great that it would have been indeed very difficult to resist them. We have had evidence to that effect both from New Delhi and from Karachi.

Mr. Churchill: Has that not been denied by both Ceylon and India?

Mr. Pearson: This has been questioned, I believe, in Ceylon, including the Prime Minister. Mr. Speaker, I am giving my opinion on the basis of information which I have received from the highest authorities in the Government of India. I am not suggesting Mr. Speaker—and in my earlier statement on this I think I made it clear in the House I did not suggest—those pressures affected that we sometimes call the old members of the Commonwealth, but they certainly did affect those new members which, as I have just said, constitute four-fifths of the population of the Commonwealth.

It seems to me that this Commonwealth association, which all its members wish to preserve to be of enduring value must strive for the widest possible areas of agreement between its members. It seems to me also that the limits of such areas, though not often expressed, may be pretty clearly discerned. Whether or not we speak of it, there are certain fundamental things that unite the governments and the peoples of the Commonwealth: freedom, personal and national; parliamentary democracy and the supremacy of the individual over the state. There is also a certain basis of morality in political action to which Commonwealth members are by tacit consent expected to adhere. Such a basis can easily be disregarded, on the other hand, by those who do not share our Commonwealth beliefs and our ways of doing things. They have, for instance, often been and are being disregarded by the Soviet Union in Hungary; but the barbaric luxury of this type of conduct is not open to us. Indeed, it is completely foreign to us and that is one reason, perhaps a main reason, why we can and must work together in the Commonwealth. It is more important than ever for us at this time to strengthen within the Commonwealth our will to work together in defence of these principles; for very significant events are now about to occur in the Commonwealth as significant perhaps as those which took place 10 years ago when India, Pakistan and Ceylon became members.

We often also, Mr. Speaker, speak of the Commonwealth as a bridge, as it is, between Asia and the West; and perhaps it would not be inappropriate at this moment if I expressed my own feeling of gratitude for what the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), in his recent trip to Asia, has done

to strengthen that bridge. If there is such a bridge, it has been made possible by the accession of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, which was in its turn the result of an act of constructive abdication by the United Kingdom in India in 1947. Now, this evolving process is about to shift to Africa. On March 6 next we shall welcome a new member into the Commonwealth, the State of Ghana, at present known as the Gold Coast. It will be the first native African member, and its progress as an independent nation inside the Commonwealth will be watched with great interest throughout Africa and Asia, and also in the West and by the Soviet Union.

Ghana will probably be the first of a series of new members to emerge from the continents of Africa and Asia. It may be that by 1960 and 1962 the Commonwealth will include also Malaya, Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and nearer home the Caribbean Federation.

Thus the process of what I might call creative withdrawal continues to the special credit and indeed to the glory of the heart and centre of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom. As has been said, "The smaller the Empire the greater the Commonwealth." New nations arise from former colonial territories to take their place among the free democracies of the world. As an older member of the Commonwealth Canada is proud, I am sure, to assist in welcoming these young countries, as they attain independence, to our growing family and to assure them of our friendship and our support.

A second factor influencing Canadian foreign policy, Mr. Speaker, is the United Nations, now going through a testing period that will have far-reaching effects on this future as an organization effective for the promotion of international peace, security and justice.

It should, I think, be clear to us that so long as we try to discharge our obligations we have accepted under the United Nations Charter we must by that fact accept some limitation on our complete independence in international affairs. There are now 80 members in the United Nations Assembly with widely varied resources, traditions and political experience. The Assembly's decisions which are, after all, merely recommendations and not laws, although this is sometimes forgotten, necessarily involve a great deal of give and take. We cannot expect always to have our own way on matters which are decided by the wisdom, or if you like the unwisdom, of a majority of 80 sovereign states with differing interests, differing loyalties and unfortunately with different conceptions of peace and justice.

The activities of the United Nations Assembly in recent weeks in regard to the Middle East have given us some ground for hope that the Organization can be used effectively and swiftly in bringing about a cessation of hostilities, though it remains to be seen whether it will be as effective in bringing about a

just settlement of the issues that brought about those hostilities. That will be for the United Nations a more important and I suspect a more difficult task. We can take satisfaction over what has already been done in the Assembly, but recent developments have raised in our minds some questions regarding its future and I want to mention one or two of these.

In the first place, Mr. Speaker, we have become more aware than we were previously of the gap between responsible and irresponsible membership; between the membership of those democratic countries such as the United Kingdom and France who are loyal members of the Organization and as such take heed of its recommendations and those totalitarian despotisms such as the Soviet Union which treat such recommendations with contempt when they cut across their own national policies.

This has led to a demand in some quarters that somehow or other United Nations Assembly should take action to enforce effectively its own recommendations. This of course ignores the fact that such compulsory enforcement procedure through the Assembly is not in accordance with the terms of the Charter as drafted; and also that resolutions that may be passed by an irresponsible majority in the Assembly may be such that we ourselves would find great difficulty in accepting them and the enforcement of which we would in certain circumstances resist.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What does the Minister mean by irresponsible?

Mr. Pearson: Well, I mean by exercising the right of membership in an irresponsible fashion against the principles of the Charter which was accepted by all members. This leads to another question which causes some anxiety in our minds, and that is the growing tendency in the Assembly, which is of course facilitated by the one-state one-vote principle, and regardless of the powers of state, to force through, by sheer voting strength, resolutions that are impractical and at times quite unreasonable. In reverse there is the power of a minority of one-third plus one to prevent reasonable and useful resolutions of the majority which we may consider ourselves to be both practical, reasonable and desirable.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, in a very real sense the effectiveness of this unique instrument for the preservation of peace, the United Nations Assembly, rests with a majority of small nations now operating at least to some extent in blocs. If the group veto or the bloc veto in the Assembly, irresponsibly exercised, replaces the single-power veto in the Security Council, the larger body will soon become as futile as on so many occasions the smaller body has become. I suggest therefore that each member of the Assembly has now a greater duty than ever before to exercise its rights with a clear and unprejudiced understanding of their implications for the future of the Organization and for international peace and security. If they do it in that way they will be showing a sense of responsibility.

The need for a constructive and moderate approach to complex political and economic problems without which the General Assembly will not be able to function effectively and may not even survive can be illustrated, this is only one illustration, by the attitude taken by some members of the Assembly to what are called the colonial powers. Incidentally, those who use that term at the United Nations often exclude from its meaning the greatest colonial power, of all and the one which exercises that power in the most arbitrary and tyrannical fashion, the Soviet Union. The old colonialism is disappearing inevitably and, if the process is orderly, desirably; but that is all the more reason why those countries which still have direct responsibilities for non-self-governing territories should not be made to feel at the United Nations or elsewhere that they are oppressors to be deprived arbitrarily of their rights or indeed their reputations. The actual fact is that these countries for the most part have been leading participants in the great twentieth century experiment of bringing national consciousness and self-government to peoples who have never known them before.

There is another danger, Mr. Speaker, which faces the Assembly of the United Nations, the tendency to forget that while the world organization can perform and is performing, as I see it, an indispensable role it is no substitute for the national policies of its members. It reflects those policies, it influences them, but it rarely creates them. I think it is wrong, even dangerous, to suggest that it does or to try to replace the necessity of hammering out wise and constructive policies among one's friends merely by a resort to high-sounding moral platitudes at the Assembly. As Mr. Dean Acheson put it the other day, "Nothing more comes out of the United Nations than we put into it."

I think it is also wrong to rely on United Nations decisions only for a particular area or a particular situation. It should be remembered that if governments are to use the United Nations when they consider it in their interest to do so, and ignore it on other occasions when they find it a less convenient instrument for their purposes, the Organization will be very greatly weakened indeed and will be open to the criticism of being merely an agency for power politics. I am not suggesting that these things have happened at the United Nations but I am suggesting that we should watch carefully to see that they do not happen.

Recently the Assembly took a very important step indeed in extending its functions into the field of security after the Security Council itself became powerless in that field through the exercise of the veto. I refer, of course, to the Emergency Force which was set up to supervise and secure a cessation of hostilities. Now, Mr. Speaker, the immediate value of this force which now numbers, incidentally, about 5,500 of whom over 1,100 are Canadians, in respect of the specific emergency which brought

it into being has I think been well established. Its continuing value in helping to bring about and maintain peaceful conditions and security in the area in which it operates remains, of course, to be proven. I myself think it should be of a great value for this purpose also, provided it remains genuinely international in control, composition and function, and providing also that its limitations are recognized, especially that it is a voluntary organization which must act strictly within the terms of resolutions which are only morally binding and which must be passed by two-thirds of the Assembly in each case. But even within these limitations the United Nations Force can, I think, play an important part in bringing about an honourable and enduring political settlement in the Palestine and Suez area.

We have been discussing the possibilities of such a settlement with friendly governments in recent weeks and it seems to be the general view among members of the United Nations that the present atmosphere, charged as it is with fears and suspicions which have been exacerbated by recent armed conflicts is not at the moment conducive to the kind of discussion and negotiation which would have to precede such a settlement. I think perhaps we have to accept that position. But if, however, the passions and the bitterness of fighting must be given time to recede, that does not, as I see it, mean we can safely sit back and let nature take its course. There may be some reason for delay; there is none for indifference or for indefinite avoidance by the United Nations of a responsibility which is escapable; to make peace in the area, without which the cease-fire would not have any permanent value.

While the political climate of the Middle East is maturing toward the time when conditions will be more appropriate for a comprehensive settlement it is essential, I think, for the countries of the region, and indeed for us all, that there should be no return to the former state of strife and tension and conflict on the borders; that security should be maintained and, indeed, guaranteed. I suggest that for this purpose there will be a continuing need during the period until a political settlement is achieved for the stabilizing international influence that the emergency Force is now exercising. And this essential stabilizing role might well require the continuing presence of a United Nations Force along the boundary between Egypt and Israel; perhaps also for a time in the Gaza Strip and, with the consent of the States involved, along the borders between Israel and her other Arab neighbours, though that of course would require a further resolution from the United Nations Assembly.

It seems to me that some such United Nations supervision might help to ensure the security of the nations concerned which is so vital if they are to approach with the necessary confidence negotiations toward a comprehensive solution of their conflicts.

Not only, Mr. Speaker, in my view, must the borders be made secure between Israel and her neighbours; so must freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba. As the Canal will soon be open to traffic again it is, I think, very important indeed to press on with discussions which have already begun at the United Nations so that the control of the operation, maintenance and development of the Canal will be in accordance with the six principles agreed on at the Security Council last September—I think it was last September. Events since that time, far from weakening the validity of these principles, have strengthened that validity and I think it is now more important than ever that the operation of this essential international waterway be—and I quote from one of these principles—"insulated from the politics of any one nation" and that the United Nations recognize and confirm that fact.

This is a problem which is right on top of us at the United Nations Assembly now, and it must be solved satisfactorily or there will be further trouble in that area. It is obvious of course—I think it is obvious, though I wish it were not—that the Soviet Union will do its best to prevent such an agreed solution on terms satisfactory both to the users of the Canal and to Egypt. Moscow has already shown that its policy is to trouble these waters and to fish in them.

Looking further ahead, the experience of the United Nations in respect of the Suez crisis, especially the necessity for hasty improvisation, underlines, I think, the desirability and the need of some international police force on a more permanent basis. We have recognized this need in the past. We have expressed that recognition at the United Nations and elsewhere as recently as in the General Assembly before the recess and we have done all we could to translate that necessity into reality, but for one reason or another it has never been possible for the United Nations, except in the special and limited cases of Korea and the Middle East, to have armed forces at its disposal; the reason for that I will not go into at this time.

Mr. Fulton: Is it the view of the Canadian Government that the United Nations Emergency Force should be assigned a stabilizing role in connection with the Suez Canal?

Mr. Pearson: Well, Mr. Speaker, there are possibilities for that if such a role is needed, but if there is agreement between the users of the Canal and the Government of Egypt which would in its turn provide for a satisfactory means of resolving the dispute over the use of the Canal it might not be necessary for any outside United Nations Force to be present on the Canal while the agreement is in effect. I think the best thing to do is to wait and see how these discussions work out.

This present Emergency Force in the Middle East is a unique experiment in the use of an international policy agency to secure and supervise the cease-fire which has been called for by the General Assembly. Why should we not, therefore, on the basis of this experience—the experience we have gained by the operation and establishment and organization of this force—consider how a more permanent United Nations machinery of this kind might be created for use in similar situations as required?

What the United Nations now would seem to need for these limited and essentially police functions is perhaps not so much a force in being as an assurance that members would be prepared to contribute contingents when asked to do so, to have ready and organized for that purpose; with some appropriate central United Nations machinery along the lines of that which has already been established for this present Emergency Force.

The kind of Force we have in mind would be designed to meet situations calling for action, intermediate if you like, between the passing of resolutions and the fighting of a war, and which might incidentally have the effect of reducing the risks of the latter. It would not, however, as I see it, be expected to operate in an area where fighting was actually in progress; it would be preventive and restoratory rather than punitive or belligerent.

It is not possible to determine in advance what would be required in any emergency, but surely members through the proper legislative processes could take in advance the necessary decisions in principle so that should the occasion arise the executive power could quickly meet United Nations requests for assistance which had been approved by it. In doing so we would be making at least some progress in putting international action behind international work.

The third factor that has a bearing on our independence in foreign policy is NATO, our membership in which gives us, not only the assurance of a strong and collective defence if we are attacked but, even more important, is our strongest deterrent against attack. Since I last had occasion to speak on foreign affairs in the House a NATO Council Meeting of very considerable importance has taken place in Paris.

The meeting, to which I have just referred, took place in Paris from December 11 to December 15. Ministers from each of the NATO countries met in Paris. My colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) and I represented the Canadian Government at this meeting. In addition to the annual stocktaking of NATO's defence plan and the approval of a directive for future military planning, secret of course, which took into account both economic and atomic capabilities, we had what we considered

to be useful discussions of the general international situation, particularly on the impact on the alliance of developments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

In these discussions we devoted more time than usual to political developments outside of what is described as the NATO treaty area. That merely reflected the increasing awareness of the NATO Governments that the security, stability and well being of an area like the Middle East, to quote one example, is essential to the maintenance of world peace, which in turn is the matter of primary concern to the NATO members.

A significant aspect of this recent meeting was the evident desire on the part of all members to strengthen the non-military side of NATO; as we increasingly realized that relations between the Western alliance and the Soviet have become a contest in terms of political judgment and action; of economic and industrial power, and not merely a contest in military strength. Having said that, it would be unwise not to add that it was recognized at our Council meeting that events in Hungary and the use of naked military force there by the Soviet Union, which use might have had far-reaching effects; these events have underlined the absolute necessity of maintaining also our military defensive strength as we become more and more preoccupied with the political and economic aspects of the struggle. As has been said by so many people so many times, we have to continue to do both.

It was to these problems of non-military co-operation confronting the Alliance that the Committee of Three Report addressed itself. That Report, which has been made public, was submitted to the Council and its recommendations were accepted by the Council members. Apart from maintaining defensive military strength the most important need of the NATO alliance in the present circumstances is for the development of common policies, as essential to that unity which is important as strength itself. The Committee of Three Report recognized this, also that new institutional arrangements or organizational changes or changes in structure would not in themselves meet this need.

What is required, and this is easier to say than to bring about, is a sustained will and desire on the part of member governments to work out through consultation policies which will take into account the common interests of the members of the Alliance. If that is not done and if national factors alone prevail in the formulation of policy, then the Alliance will have great difficulty in surviving. Certainly it will not develop beyond a purely military arrangement which will disappear if and when the fears and emergencies of the present lessen and disappear.

The most powerful member of our NATO coalition, and as recent history has perhaps demonstrated the only one which now has the economic and military power to enable it to discharge fully truly world-wide responsibilities, is the United States. Within the last few days the administration in Washington has proposed to Congress an increased acceptance of those responsibilities in the Middle East in what is called the Eisenhower Doctrine.

I do not think it would be appropriate for me to discuss in detail a proposal of the United States Government which is now before Congress and concerning which differences of opinion have already appeared, but I think I can say without impropriety that the ideas behind this doctrine are welcomed by this Government as evidence of the increased interest of the United States in the Middle East in terms of both defence and economic aid for the development of the area. It seems to me important that those two things go together there as elsewhere.

Mr. Dulles, in quoting the President's declaration to a Congressional Committee, has warned, and I think the warning is a good one, that no single formula will solve all the problems in the Middle East and that there is no single panacea for them. Nevertheless it is quite obvious I think that those proposals have very important implications which have been very well put in my view by the Washington correspondent of the Winnipeg Free Press, and I quote from one of his articles as follows:

The American Government, once Congress has given its expected approval,—

Or perhaps as I should say "if Congress gives its expected approval."

—will be committed to a solemn and unprecedented obligation in the Middle East. It will be pledged to use force if necessary to protect that region from Russia or from any state responsive to Russia's pressures.

Then Mr. Freedman went on to say this:

That is the ultimate commitment. There can be none greater. It has been defined in this challenging form to prevent Russia from believing that the eclipse of British and French influence allows it to bring the Middle East under Moscow's control.

Mr. Steward (Winnipeg North): Does that doctrine not suggest there is a danger of by-passing the United Nations?

Mr. Pearson: I do not think so. It has been said that the principles and the procedures envisaged in this doctrine are the same as those which prompted Anglo-French intervention in the Suez crisis last October. But I doubt whether that deduction will be borne out by the text of the presidential declaration which contains the following points, and some of these bear on the particular point raised by my friend the Hon. Member for Winnipeg North: (1) any assistance against aggression would be given only at the request of the State attacked; (2) any obligation to give such assistance is restricted to overt aggression by any nation controlled by international communism; (3)—and this is of some importance—any measures taken must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or any recommendations of the United Nations; and I take it that would mean either positive or negative action by the United Nations.

Does that mean that action is taken first and then the United Nations acts afterwards or just what does it mean?

Mr. Pearson: I think I had better stick to the wording of the declaration. You know what happened in the case of Korea, Mr. Speaker. Certain action was taken by one member of the United Nations. But within half an hour or an hour, I forget which—within a very short time—the matter was referred at once to the Security Council and this action was before Security Council for confirmation or otherwise.

Mr. Green: That is only because Russia was absenting herself.

Mr. Pearson: True, confirmation was received only because Russia absented herself from the Security Council. But we now have a procedure which, when action is vetoed in the Security Council, the Assembly can be called together within twenty-four hours and the matter referred to the Assembly, as was done indeed last October.

The fourth point is that the measures to be taken or envisaged would be "subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter".

Then, Mr. Speaker, I think I should also point out—and this is of some importance—that the declaration does not deal with conflict between non-communist states in the Middle East nor does it deal with communist subversion brought about by non-military means.

Welcome as is this indication of the acceptance by the United States of a direct and immediate responsibility for peace and economic progress in the Middle East, even more welcome to a Canadian would be the full restoration of close and

friendly relations between London, Paris and Washington in respect of that area, and the strengthening of their co-operation generally.

Perhaps we in Canada are particularly conscious of the desirability and the need of this result. For that reason I think we would all want to give particularly wholehearted support, especially at this time, to one sentence from President Eisenhower's State of the Union message last Thursday when he said this:

America, alone and isolated, cannot assure even its own security. We must be joined by the capability and resolution of nations that have proved themselves dependable defenders of freedom. Isolation from them invites war.

I think it is hardly necessary to add in this House that no people in the world have proved themselves more "dependable defenders of freedom" than have the British.

Co-operation in the Commonwealth of Nations, in the United Nations and in NATO—all this—is important, indeed essential. But nothing is more important in the preservation of peace and the promotion of progress than is an enduring and solid friendship as the basic for co-operation and unity between the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The recent NATO Council Meeting in Paris—and this may have been almost its most important achievement—began the process of restoring and strengthening that cooperation after the strains and interruptions to it brought about by the Suez crisis. It is essential that this process should continue.

We now have a great opportunity to profit from the unhappy experiences of the recent past by taking steps to ensure that those experiences will not be repeated.

Perhaps I should not close, Mr. Speaker, without at least mentioning—and there will be time only to mention it—a fourth factor which bears strongly on the formulation and execution of Canadian foreign policy. I refer to the fact that we are a neighbour of the United States on the North American continent.

On our relations with the United States my colleagues and I have often spoken over the last few years. I think we have made it abundantly clear that our acknowledgement of the United States as the inevitable and indispensable leader of the free world does not at all imply automatic agreement with all its policies. I have even been told by some of my friends below the line that we have a tendency to make this fact almost unnecessarily clear. On the other hand, it seems to me to be difficult to

imagine a really critical situation in international affairs, one which involved final questions of war or peace, on which we should be likely to diverge very widely from the attitude of our neighbours. If we had to, for Canadian purposes, we would certainly be in a most uneasy position. For us in Canada, therefore, to formulate and try to follow foreign policies which do not take into account the closeness of all the ties which link us—and must do so—with the United States, would surely be nothing but unrealistic and unprofitable jingoism. The time when we can comfortably enjoy this particular form of national indulgence seems to me to have long since disappeared.

In our relations, then, with the Commonwealth with the United Nations, with NATO, and with the United States, we have the fullest liberty to propose, to persuade, to advise, to object; and this liberty I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, we have used and shall use whenever a Canadian interest requires it. We will not, however, be using this freedom for the benefit of our country if we try to secede or weaken from our international commitments or if we try to ignore or take away from the geographic and economic facts of life on this Continent. Membership in the international association to which we belong undoubtedly brings us nationally very great advantages in terms of security and progress. The national advantages are, however, coupled with international responsibilities. I think, Mr. Speaker, that Canada's record in the discharge of those responsibilities over the years has been a good one and I am sure it will continue to be so.

S/C