




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

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CANADA—OUR FROZEN FRONTIER.

THE probability of a war with the Northern States of America makes us anxious to inquire what the condition of our colonies in that quarter of the globe is at present, and what assistance they may expect to receive from the mother country during the winter months.

Having passed a portion of last autumn in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Canada, we may perhaps be able to throw some light upon a subject which just now is one of great national interest.

Early in September a conversation took place in our hearing on board one of those excellent steamers which ply between the rapids of St. Anns—the scene of Moors's "Canadian Boat-song"—and the town of Ottawa, the new seat of

Government for the United Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada.

The party consisted of a distinguished officer in the English army on full pay; a merchant, resident at St. John, New Brunswick; an Englishman well "posted" in public affairs at home; and a member of one of the Colonial Legislatures.

These gentlemen we will for brevity call respectively—"Miles," "Mercator," "Civis," and "Senator."

They were all proceeding to Ottawa,—Miles to make a report on certain Government works; Mercator to see his partner, who was engaged in the lumber-trade; Civis for curiosity, information, and fishing; Senator for the purpose of conferring with a contractor respect-

* Report, i. 260.

† Resolutions, &c. p. 23.

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ing the extension of railways in his own province.

A brandy cocktail, after a substantial and well-cooked dinner, had made them all just sufficiently communicative and tolerant to be both pleasant talkers and good listeners.

CIVIS.—“How beautiful this river is! When one looks at the gorgeous foliage on the banks, the settler dropping calmly but quickly down the stream in his canoe, and feels the soft, warm, clear air, one can hardly realise the fact that before three months are passed the broad rapid stream will be completely frozen over, the branches of the trees borne down with snow, and the inhabitants along the banks almost entirely without occupation.”

MERCATOR.—“Yes; the lumbering is nearly over for this year now, and very few rafts will start from Ottawa after the first week in September.”

CIVIS.—“When do the steamers discontinue running?”

MERCATOR.—“They knock off about the 20th of November, I am sorry to say, as I have shares in the company; and grumble extremely at our property being idle for full four months every year.”

SENATOR.—“You will have more reason, I fear, to complain of your profits in the timber-trade falling off this year than your dividend in the steamboat company.”

MERCATOR.—“Yes; but our profits are pretty good most years, and we can afford to have a bad one in that trade now and then.”

CIVIS.—“Have the troubles in the States affected the timber-trade of Canada much?”

MERCATOR.—“Yes, sir, enormously; and that is one of those things which you people in England forget when you tell us that we must take care of ourselves in matters of military defence. Peace with the States is essential for the prosperity of almost all trades in Canada, but especially the timber-trade. Anything that affects the quiet of the United States acts immediately upon our business, for I

can show by books of our own that we export as much to the United States every year as to Europe.”

CIVIS.—“And what has been the falling off this year?”

MERCATOR.—“With the United States we have done nothing; trade there has been so paralysed, and prices have been so low, that we could not deal with them, except at a loss, and have therefore preferred to keep our stock on hand.”

MILES.—“How unfair, then, it is for England to suppose that Canada can defend herself in case of war between Great Britain and America. Her whole frontier must bear the brunt of the battle whenever it comes; and, owing to her proximity to the foe, she must suffer in a far greater proportion than the mother country.”

CIVIS.—“Suppose a war were to take place between the two nations upon a subject which did not directly affect the interests of Canada, what view do you think the Canadians would be likely to take of it?”

MERCATOR.—“I not only think, but know, that both provinces are as loyal as the county of Middlesex. We are proud of our connection with the old country. We send our children there to be educated when we can; we speak of it as ‘home;’ we cling to monarchical principles. When the Prince of Wales was here, he was received throughout the whole territory with an enthusiasm impossible to describe or overrate, in spite of occasional maladroit advice and consequent arrangements devoid of tact and good judgment. In the Upper Province of Canada there are many subjects upon which men differ, and concerning which there are continually angry disputes in the Legislature. In the Lower, the land tenure question being now settled, there can scarcely be said to be one matter of public importance upon which the public mind is at all agitated. Between the provinces the question of representation, of course, is one that divides parties, fills the newspapers with angry

arguments, and keeps up that unhappy feeling which their union was intended to obliterate, and which, in a great measure, it has allayed. But the people of both provinces believe that they have a better form of government than that which any foreign prince or president can offer them."

CIVIS.—"You hardly answer my question. If England was obliged to embark in a war with the United States, for the cause of which the colonies could in no way be held responsible, and the *casus belli* one that they were never asked their opinion upon, and were totally indifferent to, do you not think that the feelings of the Legislature would be to throw off a connection which made them obnoxious to their friends, without giving them the means of protecting themselves from their enemies?"

MERCATOR.—"You almost suppose an impossibility. America is not likely to go to war for any cause arising out of European disputes. But if she were to quarrel with you upon a question which affected England's honour, no matter how great our stake would be, or how little we had to do with the origin of the quarrel, we should prepare to defend our border with as much determination as if it were a question in which Canada alone was consulted and concerned."

SENATOR.—"I am not so sure about that. I believe the whole of the North American colonies would, if possible, on such an occasion, act as Mercator has described; but, in case of a sudden invasion in the winter season by a large army, they would very likely be driven to surrender, and would be obliged to make the best bargain they could for themselves."

MILES.—"I don't fear that any disaster of that kind could happen, even with the limited number of troops which we now have on the continent. We could, even with these, defend some of the strong places and positions, while our militia would in a few weeks be

quite as numerous and well drilled as any soldiers that they would be likely to meet."

SENATOR.—"The loyalty of the people was sufficiently shown during the Crimean war, by their contributions to the Patriotic Fund, and during the Indian mutiny, by the raising of the 100th regiment; and I believe nothing short of insult from the mother country will eradicate the feeling of devotion to England and England's honour, that universally pervades all classes in our colonies. At the same time, I hold it to be the plain duty of England, under existing circumstances, to keep many more troops on this continent than she has hitherto done. Look at the frontier we have to defend. From Detroit to the River St. John is more than nine hundred miles, and thence to the Bay of Fundy is more than three hundred."

CIVIS.—"You don't propose that this should all be placed in a state of defence?"

SENATOR.—"Certainly not; such a thing would be impossible, of course; but I mention it to show our vulnerability. If a trouble were to arise suddenly, we could only do as Lord Seaton did in 1837—concentrate our forces, form magazines, and organise our militia."

CIVIS.—"For my own part, I do not see that much ultimate harm would ensue if a lodgment were made in Canada during the winter months by a force from the United States. It would be impossible for them to penetrate far into the interior. The absence of roads, the nature of the country, and the severity of the climate, would prevent them from making any way."

SENATOR.—"I hope that is not the opinion of English statesmen at home. It is true that the loyalty of the inhabitants of Canada would render it almost impossible for the hostile army to penetrate far; but the efforts made by the inhabitants, which alone would prevent a successful invasion, would be founded upon the conviction that they might

expect succour from England before long, and that England is ready to protect our interests, and indeed to defend her own honour, which would be for ever sacrificed if she were to regard with coldness an attack upon our soil."

CIVIS. — "You mistake me. I mean that the invasion of Canada would not be attended with ultimate success. We could, when the St. Lawrence opens, crowd the lakes with gunboats, cut off the enemy's basis of operations, and capture the whole of their invading force."

SENATOR. — "But see what destruction would be effected in the mean time! Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, totally undefended, would very probably fall. Batteries might be erected, which would render their recapture difficult and expensive. Besides, if England does not think that it is of vital importance that our towns should be saved from pillage, the sooner we know it the better, in order that we may be able to take measures in time to save ourselves from such a calamity."

CIVIS. — "If anything like the destruction of defenceless towns were to take place, we could have the most ample revenge by attacking and destroying the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and many others along the coast."

SENATOR. — "An operation which would be nearly as injurious to your own merchants and countrymen as to the Yankees, putting humane notions aside."

MILES. — "As we are at present, in case of an unexpected attack, the only thing to be done would be to seize a few strong positions, and hold them with the regular army, and leave the militia to account for the enemy when they crossed at other places; but the rapid manner in which the Americans have developed their railway system has altered the whole state of things in respect to the defence of Canada since 1837. Besides, that was only a rebellion, and danger was not actually felt beyond our own fron-

tier. But supposing that we were at war with the States, they would threaten by railway our New Brunswick frontier, from Bangor in the State of Maine. At Richmond they could, by sending troops from Portland, intercept our railway between Montreal and Quebec, and from this point to Detroit, in the extreme west, they would have lines along every inch of their border, communicating with the great seats of industry and population — Boston, Lowell, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati — and the Atlantic coast."

CIVIS. — "We could send you reinforcements from England in a month."

MILES. — "Suppose the difficulty were to take place in the winter. The St. Lawrence is practically closed by Christmas, and it would be madness to attempt to land troops on the lower part of the river, even if ships could get into the centre of the stream. The snow-storms in the beginning of December are fearful — perfectly blinding, and the navigation most dangerous."

MERCATOR. — "There can be no better proof of that statement, than that after the middle of November owners find it extremely difficult to effect insurances on the strongest ships."

MILES. — "No wonder. The channel is narrow and tortuous. The masses of ice floating about the river are sufficient to break the strongest paddle-wheels to pieces, and to damage the most powerful screw. The ropes of the ships become coated and stiff with ice, which prevents their running through the blocks. The 'bordage,' consisting of rough masses of frozen water, shifting, rushing, and grinding with the action of the tide and wind, and varying from a mile to two in width, would render the landing of troops a most perilous undertaking. No common sailors could be of the least use in overcoming the difficulties, or in managing the ice-boats necessary for a disembarkation. And I should

be very sorry to entrust any number of men to the charge of the most experienced 'voyageurs,' wonderful as their daring and skill is in getting through this inhospitable stuff. A very short time ago, the 1st regiment was wrecked at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The men were all saved; and as the winter had not set in, a steamer was sent down from Quebec, which took them off. Had it been later in the year, it is impossible to say what the consequences would have been, for there was no road to escape by, and no ship could have come near them. Then again, if we were to look for help from Halifax or St. John, I believe the road from Fredericton to Riviere du Loup, the point where the Grand Trunk Railway terminates, is narrow and bad, and would offer many difficulties to an army in the winter."

SENATOR. — "From the Lake Temiscouata to the St. Lawrence it is new, and, I have heard, good; at any rate it ought to be an excellent one, for it has cost the province a very large sum of money."

MILES. — "Is it macadamised?"

CIVIS. — "Oh dear, no! It is a common clay road, with ruts in places two feet deep, many of which are capacious enough to inter a file of grenadiers."

"The country is covered by dense forests, only thinly populated, and buried in ice and snow for at least four months in the year."

MERCATOR. — "In peace we have a ready access to Canada through Portland, in the State of Maine, over a railway to Quebec, which is leased to the Grand Trunk Railway Company, and worked by them. This of course would be closed to us in war, and we should therefore be confined during the winter to one route — namely, that through New Brunswick, which Civis seems to have lately seen."

CIVIS. — "I shall not forget it in a hurry. About a fortnight ago I passed over it all with a friend, in travelling from St. John to Quebec."

MILES. — "Then, as we are speaking of the defences of Canada, will you give a description of your journey, for there is nothing so important connected with that subject as the means of transport through New Brunswick?"

CIVIS. — "We left St. John one morning about the end of August, in one of the steamers which ply daily during the summer and autumn between there and Fredericton, the town which, for some good cause, I have no doubt, is the seat of government rather than St. John, the commercial capital of the province, and the most flourishing place between Quebec and the 'hungry' Galway. The passengers on board the steamer gave one a fair notion of what the travelling population is. One or two settlers, intelligent and hardy Scotchmen, returning to their farms after making arrangements at St. John with merchants there, about sending down their corn for exportation; lumberers returning to their clearings; a few timber-merchants running up to get a peep at their various saw-mills and depots along the river; and three or four copper-coloured parties, attired like dilapidated inhabitants of Monmouth Street, whose long, black, straight-matted hair, dark, narrow, long eyes, high cheek-bones, flattish nose, wide mouth, bad teeth, and Tartar-like expression, made our first impression of the 'red man' anything but romantic. A few of them are here generally seen in every steamer, lying lazily on the cargo near the engine, or crowded with their squaws and children in some snug corner of the vessel."

"They are dreadfully poor and indolent, and defy the exertions of all settlers to make them work. Nothing will induce them either to dig the ground or hew the timber, and they seem perfectly incapable of learning any trade which might keep them in competence. They live in wretched villages of wooden huts, and support life by hunting and fishing, while the women make

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baskets, as well as that bark-work, ornamented with flowers in mouse hair, so familiar to us at home. At the same time, no one can build a canoe like an Indian. His work in that line contrasts as favourably with that of the Anglo-Saxon as one of Barker's broughams does with a hackney cab; and no foreigner can call a moose, track a bear, or spear a salmon in comparison to him. They are perfectly harmless; and although living completely apart from Europeans, freely mix with them in the towns, solicit their alms, sell them game, and accompany Englishmen as guides in all sporting expeditions.

"For the first ten miles after leaving St. John, the river spreads out into a series of lakes, each of which varies in breadth from two to four miles. Hills of considerable height, clothed with pine and oak from the top to the water's edge, fall precipitously to the shore; and rocky cliffs occasionally jut out into the stream, which in many places is so deep that the steamers can run up close to the trees that hang along the banks. Where the Kennebecasis joins the St. John, the traveller may think that he has arrived at some great inland lake; for, in looking into its broad mouth, the watery horizon is only slightly varied by the mirage floating under the clear sky.

"The stoppages at regular stations along the St. John are not frequent, but many boats push from shore to take off and bring back passengers. This does not in each case occupy more than two minutes. The vessel is eased, a rope thrown to the boat, which a man seizes with consummate skill, and away goes the steamer again at full speed, towing the boat along until the process of disembarkation is effected.

"Those who have seen the Danube at Orsova, can form from that a good notion of the St. John river, thirty miles away from its mouth, except that the colour of the former is brown, and that of the latter clear and blue: but the high wooded

banks, the great width, and the bold cliffs, are very much alike in both. As we approached Fredericton, the banks became tamer, the clearings very frequent, and the appearance of the soil extremely rich. Meadows, on which were feeding large quantities of sheep and cattle, were situated near the river, behind which rose hills covered with wood, putting one in mind of the Clifden valleys around Maidenhead.

"The distance from St. John to the capital is about seventy miles, and is performed by the steamers in eight hours against the tide, which runs up nearly the whole way. Great numbers of sailing vessels are met, loaded many feet above the deck with planks sawn at the various mills which lie along the river. But the rafts are much larger than those we have seen on the Ottawa, some extending over six or seven acres. They are very unmanageable, and where there are shoals and islands, often offer serious impediments to the course of the steamers."

MILES.—"Is there any road between Fredericton and St. John upon which artillery can travel?"

CIVIS.—"Yes. On the left bank of the river, from Carleton there is a very good one, over which the transport of troops would be quite practicable.

"The town of Fredericton may be said to consist of one long street lying along the river. The houses are generally built of wood, and are of a very poor character. A few pretty villas are situated on the wings of the town, which have a comfortable appearance, and command a fine view of the broad stream in front. The only public conveyance north of this point is the Woodstock 'stage,' a sort of George II. coach, very heavy, rough, and uncomfortable. We have, however, pleasant recollections of the seat behind the coachman, as we there made the acquaintance of the first down-eastern 'cousin' we had the honour of meeting. After answering the common-form questions of the Yankee catechism, re-

specting our country, business, and destination, our friend said, with that curt sharp coolness of his countrymen — 'Well, as you come from England, s'pose you know Taylor of Sheffield?' We thought for a moment, and were obliged to express our regret that we had not the advantage of Mr. Taylor's acquaintance. 'Strange, that,' replied he; 'thought he was well known. Smart man, Taylor, and prompt in business matters. He travels for Smith and Company. One of you very much resembles him.' 'Indeed,' said we, 'we know a great many Taylors, but we fear we can't boast the acquaintance of Messrs. Smith's Taylor.'

"The road lies along the banks of the St. John the whole way to Woodstock, a distance of sixty-five miles. The scenery resembles Saxon Switzerland — luxuriant meadows near the banks, and rich land in all directions; the clearings numerous, and the country thickly populated. About seven miles from Fredericton the Madamkeswick joins the St. John, forming one of the most lovely views on the continent of America. The Yankee remarks — 'I guess the Moose river in the State of Maine whips it?' 'No, sir,' replied the driver, a loyal New Brunswicker; 'all your folks that comes on my coach swears this is the prettiest spot in the whole airtie.' Nothing can be much worse than the road, but our vehicle was well horsed and went down the most precipitous dips and over the loose wooden bridges at a pace which tried our nerves to the utmost. These bridges consist of rough wooden battresses, on which are placed strong timber logs laid longitudinally and covered over with transverse planks, which generally have nothing to keep them in their position but their own weight; and as we passed over the mountain-streams the boiling torrent was frequently seen through the larger crevices, which any other wheels in the world, we believe, would have fallen into.

"The great drawback to travelling in New Brunswick is the bad food which one is obliged to eat; and about half-way to Woodstock, where the coach dines, we were obliged to ill-treat our hearty appetites with salt pork, greasy trout, bad butter, and execrable tea. On arriving at our destination, we found, however, a comfortable little inn, kept by a Mr. English, which is the only place between Fredericton and the St. Lawrence where anything approaching to a civilised repast can be obtained. The next day's journey was to Grand Falls, a distance of seventy-five miles, which we were obliged to perform in a waggon kindly provided for us by Major Tupper, who has the contract for the mails to Rivière du Loup. As far as Tobique, a small village close to the St. John river, the scenery was very much the same as that of the previous day, but the road a good deal rougher, so that it was impossible to travel more than about five miles an hour. After passing Tobique the clearings got less frequent and the forests more dense. The road leaves the river and passes over a ridge of hills covered with pine, hemlock, maple, ash, and oak. Below the town of Grand Falls the St. John, about one hundred yards wide, throws itself over a rugged and irregular bed of rock quite seventy feet high, and rushes down a deep-wooded and very picturesque gorge — taking three or four more leaps in the space of about two miles. Here we found ourselves close to the frontier of the State of Maine, and were not surprised to be told that a considerable immigration had taken place into New Brunswick since the beginning of the war. The people, apprehending a large amount of taxation, have preferred to immigrate to British soil, although the advantages, in respect to the purchase of land, are not so great here as in the States. The next day a drive of twenty-six miles brought us to Little Falls, a small town at the junction of the rivers Madawaska and St. John,

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to travelling the bad food to eat; and stock, where we are obliged to have appetites with bad butter, on arriving at the end, however, we were kept by a man, kept by a the only place and the St. ing approach- that can be ob- day's journey a distance of h we were ob- waggon kindly Major Tupper, for the mails As far as To- close to the enery was very at of the pre- ad a good deal was impossible about five miles passing Tobique as frequent and use. The road passes over a red with pine, and oak. Be- nd Falls the St. red yards wide, rugged and ir- rite seventy feet down a deep- cturesque gorge ur more leaps in wo miles. Here close to the of Maine, and to be told that migration had New Brunswick of the war. ending a large have preferred British soil, al- ges, in respect land, are not so e States. The of twenty-six Little Falls, a junction of the and St. John,

when we bade a final adieu to the latter, after adhering with great fidelity to its course for more than two hundred and forty miles."

MILES.—"How far is this from the frontier?"

CIVIS.—"I will answer your question better by saying that at Woodstock we were about fifteen miles from the boundary line, but near Tobique it strikes the St. John, which continues to be the frontier for sixty miles beyond Little Falls."

MILES.—"So that between Tobique and Little Falls the road is close to the frontier?"

CIVIS.—"Exactly; it then follows the river to the foot of the Lake Temiscouata, where we stopped for the night at a house outside the hamlet of Degillé. About half-way between Little Falls and Degillé we passed a long straight cutting in the forest, which we found to be the boundary between New Brunswick and Canada. The next morning we embarked on the lake in a fine canoe, propelled by two men using alternately paddles and poles, as they considered best. Where the river Madawaska leaves the lake we passed a place which never freezes even in the coldest weather. Six or seven feet of ice may be all around, but at this spot there is always flowing water. We could not hear that there were any hot springs, but there can be no doubt that the coldest winter has little effect upon the temperature of this part of the lake. The wind was considerable, and it was remarkable to see the light and easy way in which our 'Indian bark' glided over the waves, not forcing or dashing herself through them like our boats, but slipping politely and quietly over the crest of each, insinuating herself gracefully into their captivated affections. Lake Temiscouata reminded us of Loch Lomond—the hills densely and universally wooded from top to bottom, and their foliage tinged with every variety of gorgeous colour—

'Umbrageous hill, sweet glades, and forests fair.'

But silence reigned over the whole scene. No house, no smoking cottage, no boat, nor picturesque peasant; all is lonely and deserted, but at the same time bright and luxuriant. If there were on its pleasant hills a few inhabitants like those at home, Temiscouata would, I fear, make some of our Scotch lakes hide their diminished heads, and even render it advisable that Killarney should avoid watering her colours quite as much as she does if she wishes to retain her rank amongst the sweet waters of the globe. At the head of the lake we found a waggon which had been sent to meet us from Rivière du Loup, some forty-five miles farther north. This journey we performed on the new road which Mercator has been speaking of, but were disappointed to find it very little better than that between Little Falls and Degillé. The drive was through wilderness, broken by very few settlements, until we came to the watershed. Here the streams falling into the St. Lawrence have only about twenty miles to travel, while those falling into the Bay of Fundy pass over the whole length of the province of New Brunswick. The view on descending was very splendid—the St. Lawrence, twenty miles in width, lay at our feet studded with large islands, and dotted with ships beating up and down in all directions. On the other side is a noble range of mountains, into which the gloomy Saguenay winds its fathomless course; and here ended my first journey in the New World, which I must say was an extremely rough, but by no means a disagreeable one."

SENATOR.—"I suppose the population is chiefly French?"

CIVIS.—"Between St. John and Grand Falls they are almost all of English and Scotch origin, but after passing Little Falls, one rarely meets a person who can speak any language except the French patois."

MILES.—"You see from Civis's description how exposed our fron-

tier is between Woodstock and the St. Lawrence, and what a difficult country it would be to march an army through in winter."

SENATOR.—"In the winter they would come as the troops did in 1837 and 1838, at the time of the Canadian rebellion, if they could."

MILES.—"Then they only marched in companies through a friendly country, which is very different from moving an army in time of war along the enemy's frontier."

SENATOR.—"I forget the details of that expedition; but I daresay Miles can tell us the particulars."

MILES.—"My recollection of the history of that march is distinct, for it has always been looked upon by military men as a memorable transaction, and was attended with a success which the great risk rendered very remarkable; and when these troubles in America commenced, I rubbed up my memory, by looking at some interesting records on the subject, now to be found at the library at Quebec.

"When the attack of the rebels on the Richelieu broke out the first week in November, the 43d and 85th were ordered from New Brunswick, and the 34th from Halifax. These three regiments marched along the route which Civis has just described, and the season is said to have been one of the severest on record."

SENATOR.—"I very much doubt that fact; for I recollect that the 83d regiment was brought up by steamboat from Quebec to Montreal in December of the same year, that being much later than usual for the river to remain open."

MILES.—"Well, I am inclined to agree with you that the year was not so severe as those who have described the march represent it. The two first regiments I have mentioned followed each other in quick succession: the 43d left Fredericton on the 11th of December,* and reached the St. Lawrence in

twelve days. The 85th started from St. John a few days after, and proceeded by the same route, but accomplished the distance one day quicker than the 43d, the path being in some degree better, and the snow hardened by the first regiment.

"The 34th, after the reverse at St. Dennis, were marched up from Halifax, and left St. John about ten days after the 85th. This regiment seems to have been able to make more use of the river, and to have been transported upon it a considerable portion of the way, but does not appear to have done the distance in a shorter time than the other two. In December of the following year the 11th regiment left St. John and proceeded in exactly the same mode as the 34th, but seem to have suffered more from the cold than their predecessors. This, however, did not prevent the gallant 11th from being bivouacked in the depth of the winters of 1838-39 and 1839-40 on the banks of the Temiscouata, during the dispute upon the boundary question between Great Britain and the United States, and the regiment had the distinction of marching thirteen hundred miles in the snow during the two winters which they spent in America."

CIVIS.—"In what numbers did the men travel through New Brunswick?"

MILES.—"In companies of nearly one hundred, and were carried in sleighs, each of which held eight men. During the first part of the march, the 43d and 85th were able to get along at the rate of twenty-five miles per day, but the seven last days, which they passed between Little Falls and the St. Lawrence, were extremely severe, and the country was a great deal wilder and less settled than that through which the first part of the journey lay."

SENATOR.—"I believe there were few bridges there at that time?"

* Since the above was written, an interesting account of the march of the 43d has appeared in the *Army and Navy Gazette* of December 14th.

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MILES.—"I think not. I recollect that they were obliged to cross the great rivers in boats."

SENATOR.—"Well, in that respect the route could be more easily performed now, for, according to Civis, although his nerves were severely tried, he was never reduced to passing through one of those torrents, the view of which, through the creaking and broken planks, appears so to have disturbed his peace of mind."

MILES.—"Of course the journey could now be done much more easily than it was in 1838, but you must recollect that we were then at peace with the States; but if we were at war we might not be able to venture to send men by companies; they would be then obliged to travel in large bodies, and bring with them artillery."

CIVIS.—"Not all the way, surely."

MILES.—"Well, from Woodstock to the St. Lawrence the road runs so near the frontier that I don't believe any officer could recommend a march by companies. They would be exposed to be cut off by an enemy who would thoroughly know the country, and could bring a considerable body of men to bear upon many points of the line. Besides which, unless we had troops at St. Andrews, the Yankees would probably seize that terminus, and send their own forces along the new line to Woodstock, and in that way cut off our communication entirely, and render any advance impossible."

SENATOR.—"I was going to suggest that this new line would be of much service to us."

MILES.—"So it would, no doubt, if we were sure of holding it; and it would be the best way now to get troops to Quebec so long as we can command it; but the enemy have got perfect railway communication to Bangor, within fifty miles of this town, and there can be no doubt that the whole of the St. Andrews and Quebec track would be continually in danger. There is, however, a good access to the har-

bour of St Andrews, which is more free from those fogs that are the curse of the Bay of Fundy, than St. John; but if it were determined to make the latter place a central depot, there is a good road to St. Andrews, and the distance not more than sixty miles, so that the railway would be quite accessible, if it were thought desirable to use it."

SENATOR.—"I believe in ordinary times there are not more than three regiments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, besides a few artillery; and in case of war with the States, these could not be spared. In fact, Halifax and St. John would require large garrisons, and St. Andrews ought to be protected as well."

MILES.—"I quite agree with you. The harbour of Halifax would be the great object; the forts at its mouth would require to be manned, and the citadel must be taken care of as well."

CIVIS.—"Lord Mulgrave seemed fully impressed with this idea, and when I was there the other day the people spoke of him in terms of great praise for the successful efforts he had been making to raise volunteer corps in the neighbourhood."

MILES.—"Volunteer artillery corps would be invaluable at Halifax, and I am glad to hear that they have been induced to see the necessity of raising them. The fleet would, I think, prevent any serious attempt being made upon the harbour; but it is such a vital point, that no effort ought to be spared to put the works in a thorough state of defence and have every gun properly manned, which it is quite possible to effect with volunteers, when we consider the large population and feeling of the place."

MERCATOR.—"The trade of St. John is so extensive, and the shipping so great that it would be a tempting place for the Yankee privateers to make a dash at from time to time."

MILES.—"The remarks which I made with regard to Halifax apply with equal force to St. John. Of course more damage could be

done to commerce at St. John, but I hold Halifax must always be the real basis of operations; its harbour is open throughout the whole winter, and never exposed to those awful fogs which hang continually round St. John, and in fact the whole mouth of the Bay of Fundy."

MERCATOR.—"There can be no nastier navigation than that round the western extremity of Nova-Scotia; a heavy sea continually runs there; the tide is the most rapid in the world, and the atmosphere is almost always thick."

CIVIS.—"Well, suppose the contingency we are contemplating were to take place in the winter, after the St. Lawrence is closed, where would you send the troops to?"

MILES.—"Undoubtedly to Halifax."

SENATOR.—"There is a line of railway open from there to Truro, sixty miles; and from that to Peti-codiac, a station on the Shediac and St. John Railway, is only seventy miles. Could not troops be marched across there and get straight down to St. John by rail?"

CIVIS.—"From Truro to Amherst the country is well settled and the road excellent. In the winter, of course, it is covered with ice and snow; and from Amherst to the railway it is dense forest, with a fair road and a well-to-do population, who could afford the troops plenty of assistance."

MILES.—"The march would be a long one, and time would be valuable under the circumstances we are supposing; so I should much prefer sending troops by railway to Windsor, and then run them across the Bay of Fundy to St. John."

CIVIS.—"Why not then send them straight to St. John from England?"

MILES.—"Because we should in the way I propose avoid the dangerous navigation we have been speaking of, and could send them down the bay in smaller numbers than if we were to transport them direct from England. Besides, I hold Halifax with its accommodation

for almost any amount of shipping, to be the best port of embarkation."

CIVIS.—"Now if you were to have a carte blanche given you by the commander-in-chief, to transport ten thousand men to Canada in the winter, how would you manage it?"

MILES.—"If they were to leave England after November, I should certainly prefer sending them to St. John by Halifax and Windsor, to running the risk of landing them amidst the storms, snow, and ice in the Lower St. Lawrence. I believe they would meet with fewer casualties in following the example of 1837. Arrangements could be easily made for putting a regiment or two under cover every night, along the march through New Brunswick. The lumberers would run up sheds at intervals of nineteen or twenty miles, into which plenty of stores could be put, and where the men could bivouac for the night. Food could easily be provided at each of these places, and there is no reason in the world why, with proper clothing, the men should suffer. Probably they would be obliged to march on snowshoes, but after a regiment or two had passed, guns could be transported without difficulty on sleighs. A guard would be placed over these depots; and although some danger would be incurred from the liability of an invasion from the State of Maine, the roads upon which the enemy could come are so few and far between that a small force would be sufficient to check any attempt of this nature. The St. Andrews Railway would have to be guarded, or at least watched; the various roads leading from the State to the frontier should be broken up and the bridges destroyed; while a body of lumberers, each of whom could hew down the largest tree in twenty minutes, would make the roads impassable in a few hours, and render the march of the troops comparatively safe."

CIVIS.—"Is it not strange that a railway has not been made before

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SENATOR.—“You, sir, have hit the right nail on the head: if that were done I believe it is out of the power of man to describe the benefit which the provinces would derive from it. New Brunswick would rapidly become settled. Halifax would successfully rival Portland. The colonies would get the advantage of the postal contract which England is now obliged to give to the States. St. John and Quebec, brought into direct and rapid communication with each other, would increase with giant strides in wealth and importance. The trade of Canada, now shut up for six months in the year, would find an outlet through British ports. The mother country would save money in being relieved from keeping garrisons in Canada even as large as she does now, and the colonists would at length feel that they were brought nearer to England; while a closer intimacy would create increased affection for your laws and civilisation. The great obstacle to the extension of a railway from Halifax to Quebec has been the want of means by which the Governments of the three provinces through which it would run can act in concert. One province may make a railway, but there is no machinery by which the concurrence of all can be obtained, which is absolutely necessary for such a work as you allude to. This has been our great stumbling-block; and the example of the States shows what a detriment it has been to our advancement. There railways are made through wildernesses and prairies without inhabitants, but which soon become settled, cultivated, and wealthy. The lines may not and do not pay, but the State receives enormous advantage, and is indirectly recompensed a hundred-fold.”

MERCATOR.—“Commerce would be benefited in a similar degree by the line you speak of. Vessels could make three voyages to Halifax for two to Quebec in the course

of the year; we should save the heavy insurances required for early and late voyages through the St. Lawrence; and the trade now crowded into six months would be equally diffused throughout the twelve. I am inclined also to think more favourably of the direct paying prospects than Senator; for half the year the St. Lawrence would not compete with it, and for the other half it would give a route to Europe and back more expeditious and safe than any other.”

CIVIS.—“From a superficial observation of the resources of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, I should think that railways through the interior would develop many sources of industry now unknown.”

SENATOR.—“Undoubtedly. Immigration would become rapidly increased, agriculture would be extended in proportion to the amount of labourers coming over to us. Those provisions which we now get from the States to the amount of nearly a million of dollars a-year, we could raise for ourselves; and if any surplus remained, we should become successful competitors with the far West for the European trade, possessing enormous advantages, as we should, in situation over the farmers of the prairies and the Mississippi valley.”

CIVIS.—“If the advantages are so great, how is it that this railway has not been built before now?”

MERCATOR.—“Chiefly for the reason which Senator has assigned; but we think we have a right to ask the mother country to help us.”

CIVIS.—“I fear the doctrine of subsidies to Colonial Governments is exploded, and that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer is one of the most determined enemies to its revival.”

SENATOR.—“I cannot understand how such a friend to peace as Mr. Gladstone can object to the promotion of an object that, by relieving the colonies from a weakness that invites aggression, will perhaps some day prevent a war, one year's expense of which would perhaps

pay for two or three railways from Halifax to Quebec."

MERCATOR.—"When we get to Ottawa, I think I shall be able to show Cavis that, if the mother country will comply with the request which will be made upon her Chancellor of the Exchequer this winter, she would not only not lose, but save several thousands per annum."

On our arrival at Ottawa, we had an opportunity of meeting several gentlemen who were on a tour through Canada and the States, for the purpose of investigating the prospects and position of the Grand Trunk Railway, and who were kind enough to put us in possession of certain facts, and permitted us to see papers and documents, from which we think we can lay before our readers a statement respecting the importance of direct communication with Canada, a subject that has since derived additional interest from the state of our relations with America. Since the year 1836, the project of connecting Quebec with the Atlantic, by means of a railroad through British territory, has been anxiously and seriously debated; and during the disputes respecting the boundary question, which were not finally settled for some years afterwards, the probability of St. Andrews becoming the Atlantic terminus of this line served as an additional stimulus to the Americans to bring their frontier as near to that harbour as possible. This they finally accomplished, and the mouth of the river St. Croix was unfortunately taken as the limit of the boundary of the United States, instead of Penobscot Bay, as it had originally been intended. On the establishment of transatlantic steam navigation, Lord Durham was directed to turn his attention to the formation of a road between Halifax and Quebec; and, after pointing out the difficulties which the relation of the various provinces to each other presented to the undertaking, that

noble Lord remarked, in his report, that the completion of any satisfactory communication between Halifax and Quebec "would in fact produce relations between the provinces that would render a general union absolutely necessary. Several surveys have proved that a railway would be perfectly practicable the whole way. Indeed, in North America the expense of making a railway bears by no means the excessive proportion to that of a common road that it does in Europe. It appears to be a general opinion in the United States that the severe snows and frosts of that continent very slightly impede, and do not prevent, the travelling on railroads; and if I am rightly informed, the Utica Railroad, in the northern part of the State of New York, is used throughout the winter. If this opinion be correct, the formation of a railroad from Halifax to Quebec would entirely avoid some of the leading characteristics of the Canadas. Instead of being shut out from all direct intercourse with England during half of the year, they would possess a far more certain and speedy communication throughout the winter than they now possess in summer. The passage from Ireland to Quebec would be a matter of ten or twelve days, and Halifax would be the great port by which a large portion of the trade, and all the conveyance of passengers, to the whole of British North America would be carried on."

In 1843, the project of a military road was entertained by the Government of Sir Robert Peel, but was abandoned in consequence of the survey which was then made by Sir James Alexander and Colonel Simmonds, proving how much more advisable it would be to spend the money upon a railroad. And in 1846 a second survey took place, under the auspices of Major Robinson and Captain Henderson, and two reports were consequently made and presented to Parliament.

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constructed down the right bank of the St. Lawrence, on to the Bay of Chaleur, then, near Northumberland Straits, across the Miramichi river, and so on to Shediac, Truro, and Halifax, with a branch from Shediac to St. John. In these able papers, it was shown most plainly that the railway could be constructed at a much less expense than those in the States. The enormous advantages of the line, in a military and mercantile point of view, were pointed out with great minuteness; and the benefit which would result to our fisheries along the Bay of Chaleur and Northumberland Straits was fully considered and demonstrated. Major Robinson and Captain Henderson considered that "it was the one great means by which alone the power of the mother country can be brought to bear on this side of the Atlantic, and restore the balance of power fast turning to the side of the United States. Every new line of railway adds to their power, enabling them to concentrate their forces almost wherever they please; and by the lines, of which there are already some, and there will soon be more, reaching to their northern frontier, they can choose at their own time any point of attack on the long extended Canadian frontier, and direct their whole strength against it. The provinces, therefore, and the empire, having such interest in the formation of the Halifax and Quebec line, it should be undertaken by them in common, as a great public work for the public weal." The subject was taken up with warmth by the Government which succeeded that of Sir Robert Peel; and in 1848 Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, in expressing his belief that great advantages would result not only to the territory chiefly interested in the work, but to the empire at large, requested the Governors of the several provinces to bring the matter before their respective Legislatures, in order that the Government might know the degree of importance attached to

the enterprise by them before recommending the Imperial Parliament to afford the necessary assistance.

The view which the Provincial Governments took of the project was, that no other measure could be conceived that would so surely consolidate the colonies and perpetuate the connection with Great Britain. The Parliament of Canada passed an Act declaring, "That if her Majesty's Government shall undertake the construction of the said railway either directly, or through the instrumentality of a private company, it shall be lawful for the Governor in Council, on behalf of this province, to undertake to pay yearly, in proportion as the works advance, a sum not exceeding £20,000 sterling towards making good the deficiency (if any) in the income from the railway, to meet the interest of the sum expended upon it, and to place at the disposal of the Imperial Government all the ungranted lands within the province lying in the line of railway, to the extent of ten miles on each side thereof; and to undertake to obtain, pay for, and place at the disposal of the Imperial Government all the land required within the province for the line of railway, and for proper stations and termini." The provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in effect, did the same thing. In 1850 the Hon. Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia was sent to England with the view of inducing the Government to take active measures towards giving effect to the resolutions of the different Legislatures, and on the 10th of March the decision of the Government was conveyed to Mr. Howe. The credit of England was to be employed to enable the provinces to raise upon advantageous terms the funds necessary for the works. This assistance was only to be given in case of provision being made for a complete line between Halifax and Quebec; but that of Major Robinson and Captain Henderson was

not insisted upon as a *sine quâ non*, although any deviation from it was to be subject to the approval of her Majesty's Government. Subsequently, the valley of St. John was agreed upon by Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia as the proper route; but this being so great a deviation from the proposed line of Major Robinson, another application to the home authorities was necessary. At this time a change of ministry took place in England, and the Colonial Secretary did not conceive that the Government would be justified in carrying out the pledge of assistance to the project, now that it was so much changed from the original plan. Then came the Russian war, followed by the Indian mutiny, which had the effect of hanging up the matter till 1857, when delegates from Canada and Nova Scotia were again sent to England, and once more the subject was pressed upon the Government, the same arguments being used and similar offers made by the provinces. The following year both branches of the Legislature of Nova Scotia and Canada addressed the Crown, praying — "That arrangements may be matured for the early commencement and the completion of this work by the united efforts of the three provinces of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, with such co-operation and aid from your Majesty's Imperial Government as may be commensurate with the greatness of the object, and the magnitude of the national interests which it promotes."

Public meetings were held, resolutions passed, and the Colonial Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were again waited on, when it was pointed out that Provincial Legislatures, having passed the acts affording assistance to the scheme so far back as 1849, might consider that these acts had fallen into desuetude, and that, as the arrangements had not been carried out, the provinces might think themselves absolved from the pledges

given ten years previously. A noble lord was then deputed to visit British North America and ascertain how far the colonies would be disposed to ratify the engagements of 1849. He reported that the majority of the people in the three provinces were desirous of seeing the work undertaken, and that the acts of 1849 were considered to be in full force. Delegates from Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, were again sent to England for the purpose of pressing the subject on the Imperial Government. They addressed Sir Edward Lytton and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the autumn of 1858, but a change of Government occurred before any action was taken by the home authorities. We believe that gentlemen have this year come over to England in hopes of inducing the Colonial Office and the Treasury at last to grant them the same assistance promised by Lord Grey in 1851, and which, by a series of untoward circumstances, for which the colonies are not to blame, has never been afforded to them. Since the negotiations commenced in 1849, a line has been opened from Quebec to Rivière du Loup in Canada, from St. John to Shediac in New Brunswick, and from Halifax to Truro in Nova Scotia. These are all portions of the great Halifax and Quebec route, to complete which a junction must be made between Truro and Shediac, and between Fredericton and Rivière du Loup, or a length of nearly three hundred and seventy miles of new railway, which it is estimated will cost about £3,000,000.

We believe that the proposal made to the present Government is that the three provinces will each charge their revenues with the payment of £20,000, to meet the interest of capital expended in case the line is not remunerative; that the British Government should guarantee a minimum dividend at 4 per cent on the whole amount, which would amount to £120,000 per annum. For

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this she would have the guarantee never to pay a cent beyond its working expenses. of the Provincial Governments for £60,000, and the security of the land for ten miles on each side of the line. As to the other £60,000, we should have the payment in our own hands, for we now pay the United States £25,000 for the transmission of mails to Canada, a service which would be transferred to the projected line. We should save £25,000 a-year on the Cunard contract, by Halifax being more than five hundred miles nearer our shores than New York, and we should receive from the United States at least £20,000 per annum for the transmission of their mails by the railway; so that, provided the Provincial Governments meet their engagement, which there can be no reason to doubt their ability or willingness to do, the mother country would be ten thousand a-year richer for this guarantee upon their hands than without it, even if the railway were

A golden opportunity now offers itself of completing this great work; public attention is drawn to the locality. The whole nation must feel the necessity for it; the anxiety which pervades us all as to the safe arrival of the army that has just left our shores, and which we are told is supplied with every appliance that can make it formidable to our enemies, would be considerably allayed if we were certain that it could with ease, and without risk, reach its destination. At any rate, let the work be begun. We think we have shown that it can be accomplished without cost to this country; and we believe that, independently of military considerations, it would tend more to establish our supremacy on the American continent, than anything that a bountiful Providence has hitherto given us the means of accomplishing.

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THE CONVULSIONS OF AMERICA.

EVERYBODY who has thought, talked, and read much about America of late, must feel that English opinions on the subject, as rendered by the tone of our press, have been qualified by the medium that transmits them. Nobody in private life talks about "our Transatlantic kinsmen,"—nobody desires to claim peculiar ties with the performers in the absurd and barbarous dances which the American nation executes round its idols of the hour, any more than with the worshippers of Mumbo Jumbo. Our conversation on the topic is not silly or sentimental. We do not speak of the least sanguinary of civil wars as "the terrible and fratricidal struggle which is drenching America with blood." It is not a fact, as is sometimes asserted in print and public speeches, that every Englishman worthy of the name deplors the separation between North and South. The view commonly taken by Englishmen, who do not on that account consider themselves unworthy of the name, is, that every day tends to justify the judgment and policy of the South in withdrawing from a system, the results of which are what we contemptuously witness. We do not desire above all things that the struggle should be at once concluded, no matter how; because a conclusion which would leave the South at the mercy of a vindictive, unfair, and ungenerous enemy, would gratify nobody. We do not lament over the unexampled display of weakness made by the great Republic, because we knew that such weakness existed, and it was not for the interest of truth, nor of the world that it should any longer be disguised, or allowed to vaunt itself as matchless force. Nor do we, as a people, desire to accept any slight, shifty pretence of reparation for the recent ruffianly outrage, which may be held by some among us, to whom honour is but a fantastic name, to absolve us from the necessity of war; for previous insults from the same quarter still remain unatoned for: and now that we have, at enormous cost, and with patient and self-denying efforts, amassed an armament which adequately represents the power of England, we should have no objection to employ it in administering a sharp chastisement to the vainglorious people who have so often cheaply defied us. Sentiments, conciliatory even to poltroonery, and pacific even to disgrace, are frequently ascribed to us; yet they have no real origin in the heart of the nation. It would be impossible for the national vanity of America, hungry as it is, to extract any nourishment from what is expressed on the subject in the conversation of intelligent Englishmen. When they read the speeches of American public men, and the articles of American newspapers, they feel only scorn for the blind followers to whom such blind guides are possible. They are unable to see anything peculiarly tragical in the fact that half-a-million of men have been brought together in arms to hurl big words at each other across a river. Nor do we see anything in the circumstance that America was first colonised from our own shores, to induce us to treat with extraordinary indulgence the composite population with whose manners, customs, and character, we have so little in common. What truth can there be in the plea of relationship as an inducement to conceal our real sentiments, when we so loudly derided our own fellow-subjects of the Irish Brigade, who went forth from among us to make themselves ridiculous? And why should we conceal our contempt when absurdities far more mischievous, and on an immensely extended scale, are committed by those whom twaddling sentimentalists term "our American cousins"?

[Jan.

If asked these hard things to explain,
 I own I am wholly unable;
 And hold the attempt the more vain,
 When I think of the Building of Babel.
 The primitive world to lay bare,
 Philologists try, but I doubt it:
 As none of them chanced to be there,
 It's clear they know nothing about it.
 Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

What Adam in Eden might speak,
 Could not be the tongue of his mother;
 It may have been Gaelic or Greek;
 It must have been something or other.
 It may have been Sanscrit or Zend,
 Chaldaic, Assyrian, Arabic:
 It may have had joints without end,
 Or it may have been monosyllabic.
 Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

But why should we puzzle our brains
 With Etymological folly?
 The prize wouldn't prove worth the pains,
 Or help us a bit to be jolly.
 For if we in twenty strange tongues
 Could call for a beef-steak and bottle,
 By dint of mere learning and lungs,
 They wouldn't be nearer our throttle.
 Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

I've ranged, without drinking a drop,
 The realms of the dry Mithridates:
 I've studied Grimm, Burnouf, and Bopp,
 Till patience cried "*Ohe jam satis.*"
 Max Müller completed my plan,
 And, leave of the subject now taking,
 As wise as when first I began,
 I end with a head that is aching.
 Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

The speech of Old England for me,
 Which serves us on every occasion!
 Henceforth, like our soil, let it be
 Exempted from foreign invasion.
 It answers for friendship and love,
 And all sorts of feeling and thinking;
 And, lastly, all doubt to remove—
 It answers for singing and drinking.
 Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

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THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

THE storm which lately threatened us from the far West, has blown over. We are not going to have war with America about the question of the Trent. But the question of the Trent never would have arisen, had not the feelings of the American people and Government been very hostile to England, and there is nothing to show that the American Government and people are at all reconciled to us by the manner of its solution. The evidence, on the contrary, is all the other way. The Americans have been coerced into an act of justice, which they performed with the worst possible grace; and we are frankly assured that the time is coming, when they mean to take ample vengeance for present humiliations. It appears, then, that a war with the Federal States of America is only deferred. If not imminent, it is pretty sure to come sooner or later. The point, therefore, for us to determine, in the meanwhile, is—How shall we prepare for such a contingency, and conduct the war when it comes?

There are two modes of carrying on war with America—one aggressive, the other defensive. We shall probably adopt both. We shall assail their harbours, burn their fleets, destroy their commerce, and keep their whole seaboard in a state of constant alarm; and we shall give employment by these means to no inconsiderable portion of the half million of men whom they boast to have under arms. But we shall have a defensive war likewise to provide for, on the side of Canada. How shall we best effect that purpose? This is a question which cannot be rightly answered unless we possess some knowledge of what has occurred in that part of the world already; for it is not less true of wars in America than of wars elsewhere, that, making due allowance for change of time and

circumstances, they almost always repeat themselves. We propose, therefore, in the present paper, to preface our suggestions, in regard to the future, with a brief sketch of the various contests which have already taken place, in and for the mastery of Canada.

Before the breaking out of the seven years' war, which occurred in 1754-5, the American provinces which now acknowledge the sway of Queen Victoria were, with one or two exceptions, dependent upon France. Cape Breton, with the whole of what is now called New Brunswick, formed their extreme limits on the east; and they stretched away westward by Lake Champlain, through Lake Ontario to Niagara, whence they held out their hands by the Ohio river towards New Orleans. In contradistinction to this arrangement, Nova Scotia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, were English settlements; of which both the dignity, and, as it was assumed, the material interests, were endangered by this bold attempt on the part of their rivals to hem them in, by connecting Lake Erie with the Mississippi.

There had been little amity between the English and French settlers at any time, and now the encroachments of the latter upon their hunting-grounds, stirred the indignation of the former to a high degree. Frequent skirmishes went on between them, till at last the Cabinet of St. James's determined to bring matters to an issue, and to strike in that quarter with all the force of the Empire. Accordingly, General Braddock, carrying with him 2000 regular troops, sailed from England, and in February 1755 arrived in America.

General Braddock called together the provincial governors at Alexandria in Virginia, and arranged with them a plan of campaign. It

was settled that the enemy should be assailed on four distinct lines at the same time. First, that Braddock himself, with 2000 of the best of the troops, provincial as well as regular, should march against Fort Du Quesne on the Ohio; second, that two regiments should be detached by the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, and by Lake Oneida to Oswego, a British post on Lake Ontario, whence they were to fall on the newly-erected French fort at Niagara; third, that a corps of provincials should blockade Crown Point on Lake Champlain; and, lastly, that the disposable troops from Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, about 2000 in number, should attack the French settlements in the Bay of Fundy, particularly Fort Beau Sejour, on the isthmus connecting the peninsula of Nova Scotia with the continent, where Fort Cumberland now stands.

It is not our intention to describe the operations which followed. General Braddock, as is well known, failed. He had 226 miles to traverse through the primeval forest, in which a full month, all but two days, was expended; and being attacked at disadvantage, just as Fort Du Quesne became visible, he was defeated and killed. The operation against Fort Niagara came to nothing, and the blockade of Crown Point, though vigorously attempted, broke down. On the side of the Bay of Fundy alone success attended the British arms. There Fort Beau Sejour fell after a brief bombardment, and the French were removed from every point whence they could seriously annoy, or even threaten, the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. We shall be glad, however, if our readers can bear in mind how this campaign was conducted, in order that, when the proper time comes, they may be able to follow such reasoning as the circumstances of the case seem to suggest.

The year 1756 was not remarkable on the side of the English for plans more wisely arranged or more vigorously carried into effect. Re-

inforcements of troops were indeed sent from Europe, and in the month of July Lord Lowdon arrived to command them. But his arrangements for the campaign seemed to be pretty much what those of his predecessors had been, only on a more limited scale. He determined to act upon two instead of upon four lines; to resume with one corps the abandoned attack on Fort Niagara, and to establish the supremacy of the English on Lake Ontario; while with the other he possessed himself of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, both of them on Lake Champlain. The total strength of the army assembled for these purposes at Albany was 16,000 men, of which 6000 were allotted to the attack on Fort Niagara, the remainder to the operations on Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

Early made aware of the danger which threatened, the French general took vigorous steps to avert it. He strengthened his works at Niagara and Crown Point, and formed an entrenched camp at Ticonderoga. Not content with this, he equipped a flotilla on Lake Ontario, and determined to anticipate the English by assuming the initiative. Lord Lowdon had made choice of Oswego as the point where the depot for the left column of his army should be established. It could be reached with comparative facility from Albany by the Mohawk river and Lake Oneida, and by the river Onondaga, which flows out of Lake Oneida into Lake Ontario. Indeed, there was safe water-carriage almost all the way, a distance of 160 miles, both for troops and stores. From Oswego, however, Niagara could be approached only by navigating the broad waters of Lake Ontario, for which purpose vessels of a larger size than mere bateaux would be required. Hence, before putting his columns in motion, Lord Lowdon sent forward a body of artificers under the escort of 1400 troops, with directions to strengthen the works at Oswego, to afford protection to the stores

as they came in, and to build, with as little delay as possible, such a flotilla as might be trusted on the lake at all seasons.

It is never safe in war to select a base which shall lie between your own headquarters and the army of the enemy. The Marquis de Montcalm, Governor-General of Canada, saw that Lord Lowdon had committed this mistake, and took advantage of it. At Frontignac, now called Toronto, he embarked 3000 excellent troops, and on the 10th of August appeared off Oswego, his lighter vessels being protected by two sloops, one of sixteen, the other of twelve guns. To land and invest the place was the work of a few hours, and on the 14th it surrendered. There was an immediate end to the campaign. The vessels of war and of transport, which the English were building, fell into the enemy's hands; so did all the provisions and stores which during the summer had been accumulated. Lord Lowdon, therefore, despaired of success against either Niagara or Crown Point, and, leaving garrisons in his own advanced posts at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, he withdrew into winter quarters in and about Albany.

It will be seen that in both of these campaigns Canada was threatened after precisely the same fashion. The object of the invaders was to gain the command of Lake Ontario, while at the same time they moved upon Montreal by the route of Lakes George and Champlain. In 1757 a new scheme was devised. Lord Lowdon received instructions from home to act everywhere else on the defensive, while, with all the force which he could collect, he endeavoured to reduce Cape Breton. Sixteen line-of-battle ships and eight frigates accordingly assembled at Halifax, for the purpose of transporting to Cape Breton an army of 10,000 men. But, before the expedition could sail, intelligence was received of the arrival at Louisburg of a superior French fleet; and at the

same time such an account was given of the strength and preparations of the garrison, that Lord Lowdon despaired, with the force at his disposal, of being able to reduce it. The projected invasion of Cape Breton was therefore abandoned, and the army again broke up. But the campaign was not abortive merely. The enemy, taking advantage of the exposed condition of the frontier, moved upon Fort William Henry. It was gallantly defended for a while, but surrendered on the 9th of August by capitulation; after which Montcalm, made aware of Lord Lowdon's return to Albany, blew up the works, and fell back again to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

Dissatisfied, as they had every reason to be, with the mismanagement exhibited in these proceedings, the British Government superseded Lord Lowdon, and gave the command of the army, already on the spot, to Major-General Abercrombie. He was directed, with 15,000 men, of whom 6500 were regular troops, to resume the attack on Crown Point and Ticonderoga; while a second corps, 7000 strong, and entirely composed of provincials, should move, as General Braddock had done, on Fort Duquesne. At the same time, a third division from England, having General Amherst at its head, was to reduce Cape Breton, assisted in that operation by a fleet of twenty-two ships of the line and fifteen frigates. All these instructions seem to have been issued early in 1758. But there was no locomotion in those days either on land or water by steam, and fleets took months to accomplish voyages which are now calculated by weeks. As, therefore, on this as on former occasions, the march of the several corps was to be simultaneous — as, indeed, success in one operation was expected to be coincident with, or at all events necessary to, success in all — neither General Abercrombie nor General Forbes, the latter commanding the force which was di-

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reached the scene of action. This he
appears to have done about the mid-
dle of May. He brought with him
11,000 good troops, and sailing from
Halifax on the 28th, he anchored on
the 2d of June in Cabarus Bay, Cape
Breton.

General Amherst carried all be-
fore him. Wolfe, who commanded
the brigade which first made good
its landing, soon effected the in-
vestment of Louisburg. More than
one hundred boats were indeed lost
while conveying troops and stores
to the shore, and a garrison of
3000 men, supported by 2500 sea-
men, offered a stout resistance; but
on the 26th of July the place capi-
tulated. The capitulation included,
not the whole of Cape Breton only,
but Prince Edward Island into the
bargain, and both have continued
ever since dependent upon the Brit-
ish Crown. Neither were General
Abercrombie's efforts, though foiled
in their main object, altogether
fruitless. He passed his corps on
the 5th of July down Lake George
in 1035 boats, which he had assem-
bled at the point where Fort Wil-
liam Henry formerly stood, and,
driving in the enemy's pickets,
made preparations to carry Ticon-
deroga by assault. It was a strong
position on the neck of land lying
between the waters of Lake George
and the river, which in its course
opens out to form Lake Champlain,
and was covered by intrenchments,
having a line of abattis laid down
in front of them. Just where the
waters meet, stood a small square
fort with bastions, serving the pur-
poses of a keep to the other works.
Without, as it would appear, having
paused to reconnoitre these in-
trenchments, General Abercrombie
sent his troops against them in six
columns of attack, of which the
consequence was, that his people got
into confusion, and were repulsed
with the loss of nearly 2000 men.
He immediately withdrew to the
head of Lake George, where, amid
the ruins of what had once been

Fort William Henry, he began to
intrench himself. But he did not
remain entirely on the defensive.
Intrusting 3000 men to Colonel
Bradstreet, an enterprising and able
officer, he sent them to execute a
plan which the Colonel had devised.
They passed by the Mohawk river
and Lake Onelda to Oswego,
whence, having provided them-
selves with a sufficiency of boats
and canoes, they crossed the lake
unobserved, and landed on the 25th
of August close to Fort Frontignac.
This they immediately invested,
and on the 27th made themselves
masters of the place. It was, however,
too much in advance of the English
lines to be permanently retained;
and so Bradstreet, after loading with
stores all the vessels which he could
find, of which not fewer than nine
carried from eighteen to eight guns
respectively, partially ruined the for-
tifications, and recrossed the lake to
Oswego.

Alarmed and disappointed by the
failure before Ticonderoga, General
Amherst left sufficient garrisons at
Louisburg and Halifax, and set off
with five of his most effective bat-
talions to join General Abercrom-
bie. Had he proceeded by sea to
New York, there might yet have
been time, before winter set in to
retrieve the disaster; but, distrust-
ing the winds which had kept him
a fortnight between Cape Breton
and Boston, he made up his mind
to disembark at the latter place.
The distance from Boston to Albany
is only 165 miles; but not only were
there in those days no roads through
the forest, but it does not appear
that the country had ever been sur-
veyed. General Amherst accord-
ingly found that he had undertaken
a very difficult task. He made his
way slowly, with much labour and
fatigue to his men, and reached
Fort William Henry only on the
5th of October, too late in the sea-
son to commence operations with any
hope of bringing them to a successful
issue.

He left his battalions with Gene-
ral Abercrombie, and returned to

Albany, where in due time information came in of the complete success of General Forbes. That officer had marched from Philadelphia, threaded the forest in the track which Braddock's army had cleared, and after a sharp action in which his advanced-guard suffered severely, debouched in front of Fort du Quesne. The French governor, not considering himself strong enough to sustain a siege, evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by the English. These repaired and enlarged the works, and leaving a garrison, called it Fort Pitt, the name which it still retains.

The capture of Fort Du Quesne was important only so far as it redeemed to some extent the tarnished lustre of the British arms, and relieved the colonists of Maryland and Virginia from the vicinity of neighbours who had long kept them uneasy. Had Abererombie carried Ticonderoga, establishing at the same time his ascendancy on Lake Ontario, the front of Canada would have been a good deal exposed; but neither achievement, however complete in itself, could have vied in importance with the conquest of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island. The loss of these settlements cut off, during six months in the year, all communication between France and her American settlements. No French fleet could longer find shelter in the Bay of Fundy, and the St. Lawrence was as completely closed against navigation then as it is now, except in seasons unnaturally mild, from the middle of December up to the middle of May. Nor was this all. There was no reason why the tide of conquest should stop at Fort Beau Séjour. The whole of New Brunswick lay open to invasion, and through it, when overrun, a road might be constructed, which should lead an invading force to the Lower St. Lawrence. It does not appear, indeed, that the value of the conquest presented itself in this point of view to the authorities either at home or abroad; but they equally

saw that a good base was established for a combined operation of the fleet and army in Lower Canada; and the Government made its preparations during winter to turn it to account.

The plan of campaign for 1759 was formed upon a grand scale. It was settled that upon four separate lines the enemy should be assailed. Away upon the extreme left, a force was to assemble at Fort Du Quesne for the reduction of all the posts which the French had established in order to keep open the communications between Lake Erie and the Ohio. The expedition which had been arranged in 1755 against Niagara was to be renewed. Once more Ticonderoga and Crown Point were to be assailed from Albany, and an attempt made to penetrate by Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, while a powerful armament, despatched from England, should make its way up that river, and endeavour to take possession of Quebec itself. Once more we must ask our readers to stop and consider the scope and tendency of these arrangements. The operations from Fort Du Quesne were rather local than imperial; they sought no higher object than to clear away certain hornets' nests which troubled the English trappers, and kept the advanced colonists of Maryland and Virginia uneasy. The rest were manifestly aimed at the conquest of French America; and though, in the circumstances which then existed, the most remote of the three, that directed against Niagara, may be regarded as superfluous, even in this case there was something like a definite end to serve. The capture of Fort Niagara, it was assumed, would isolate the whole of the enemy's settlements on Lake Erie, besides contributing to establish for the English the command of the navigation of Lake Ontario. No doubt the command of Lake Ontario, and of all the lakes, must have fallen as a matter of course to the power which, being already mistress of the provinces to

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the south of the St. Lawrence, should have reduced to subjection those lying to the north of the same line. But we are writing about times when strategy was not so well understood as it is now; and to threaten an enemy on many points at once was considered more artistic than to strike boldly and in force at his capital. Hence the expedition against Niagara, though in point of fact a mistake, had some show of reason in its favour; which reason, curiously enough, has operated ever since, and may perhaps operate again, whenever the Federal States shall make up their minds to go in for the conquest of Canada.

It is not necessary to narrate in detail the progress of these several enterprises. That on the extreme left succeeded with scarcely any loss. The French evacuated all their posts up to Detroit, and concentrated thereby a respectable field force, with which they endeavoured to interrupt the siege of Niagara. But Niagara, which had been approached as before by the Mohawk river, Lake Oneida, and across Lake Ontario from Oswego, was already invested as early as the 4th of July, and on the 24th the army which advanced to its relief sustained a defeat. Next day the place, with its garrison of 600 men, surrendered, and the immediate object of the enterprise was achieved. Yet no results conducive to the final success of the campaign appear to have followed. The enemy, masters of Frontignac, now Toronto, were still masters of the navigation of Lake Ontario. They even attempted from that post to surprise Oswego, and the troops which had been left there to guard the depôts of the Niagara column. Though repulsed, they made good their retreat, and continued to be formidable. Thus two corps of the invading army wasted their strength on isolated enterprises, leaving the third to break itself against natural obstacles, which it never ought to have encountered, and which it proved quite incapable of overcoming.

General Amherst conducted in person the corps of which we have last spoken. At the head of 11,000 men, he followed the same route which all who served before him in that part of the country had taken, and landed on the 22d of July, where Abercrombie had formerly done, within a mile or two of the position of Ticonderoga. The French, whose total force did not exceed 3500 men, withdrew from their lines in the night, leaving a garrison of 400 good troops in the keep. But these were too valuable to be thrown away, so on the 26th the keep was likewise abandoned. Even Crown Point the Marquis de Montcalm did not consider defensible, and on the 4th of August it likewise fell. There, however, General Amherst's triumphs ended. He was inferior on the lake in armed vessels to the enemy. He applied himself to building such vessels, and strengthening the works at Crown Point, which gave him full occupation till the middle of October; when the weather broke, and a succession of adverse winds hindered him from following up his successes. The consequence was, that, after being baffled in two attempts to reach Isle au Noix, he brought the campaign to a close by quartering his troops at Crown Point, Fort William Henry, Fort Edward, and Albany; and returned himself to New York, where he arrived on the 11th of December.

Meanwhile the expedition from England, of which General Wolfe was at the head, was playing its part in the great game. It quitted England as early as the middle of February, and arrived off Louisburg on the 2d of April; but finding the harbour still frozen, the fleet bore away, and took shelter in Halifax. There it waited till the navigation was everywhere clear, when twenty-two sail of line-of-battle ships, thirty-five frigates, and a multitude of transports, having on board 8000 troops, went round to the mouth of the St. Lawrence to strike at Quebec.

Look now for a moment at the dispositions which the Marquis de Montcalm had made, and the force at his disposal wherewith to meet the threatened danger. His whole army including militia, did not exceed 20,000 men. With about 2000 he held what we should now call Toronto; with 3500 he observed Lake Champlain; 1500 occupied Montreal; and 2000 posted themselves on the north of the St. Lawrence, about twenty miles above Quebec, between the Jacques Cartier river and the Pointe aux Trembles. As to Niagara, he left it with its ordinary small garrison, scarcely perhaps expecting that it would be attacked, and little concerned as to the issues. Ten thousand he kept with himself for the protection of Quebec, which could not, as he calculated, after such a distribution of his force, be approached with safety to the invaders except from below. We need not go over the particulars of the operations which followed. Wolfe, thwarted in his endeavour to pass the Montmorenci river, appears to have been at his wits' end, till a fortunate accident brought to his knowledge the unguarded state of a pass above the town, by which the heights of Abraham could be reached. How he landed his troops and marched them up the south bank of the river, while a portion of the fleet sailed past the enemy's batteries — how he re-embarked, and fell down the stream again in boats, landing in Wolfe's Cove, and scaling the steep bank — history has recorded. It was an enterprise which ought to have resulted in his total destruction. Had Montcalm kept within his lines till the corps from Jacques Cartier river showed itself in rear of the English, nothing could have saved them. But Montcalm's impetuosity overcame his prudence. He engaged his adversary in a battle of musketry, and was defeated, his own life and that of Wolfe being sacrificed at the call of duty. In consequence of this defeat, the French army broke up into two bodies: the stronger of the two,

chiefly provincials, joined the corps in the neighbourhood of the Jacques Cartier river, which thus became formidable; while 1000 men, all of them regulars, withdrew into Quebec. The battle was fought on the 13th of September, and on the 18th the city, with its garrison, surrendered on capitulation.

Thus ended the campaign of 1759, the fifth since the commencement of the war; in every one of which, except the last, the same plans of attack had been followed, without any results proportionate to the losses sustained. No doubt the fate of Ticonderoga and Crown Point deprived the French of two valuable outposts, and the capture of Niagara left the head of Lake Ontario free, besides supplying the captors with a building-yard, in which a flotilla might be fitted out. But both the lake and the river were as yet untouched, and as long as these remained in the hands of the French Canadians, Canada itself might be considered tolerably safe. The fall of Quebec, however, proved a heavy blow; it entirely changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy's position was turned on its left flank, and a new and readier means of penetrating into the country was opened to the assailants. Indeed, the fate of Canada may be said to have been decided by the fight on the heights of Abraham, assuming always that the French should prove unable to retrieve the disaster from Europe. This, as we need scarcely stop to observe, they failed to do; and so, in 1760, Montreal surrendered, and the entire province submitted to the British Crown.

If we had space at our disposal, and it were worth while to dwell at any length upon affairs of such old date, nothing could be more easy than to point out the exceeding unskillfulness with which, on both sides, the campaign of 1760 was conducted. To bring up from Quebec to Montreal every disposable man, was indeed a proceeding dictated by all the rules of war; but General Amherst's eccentric move-

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ment with the main body of his army, first from Albany, to Oswego, then from Oswego across Lake Ontario, then down the rapids of the St. Lawrence, by Long Sault and Lake St. Louis, ought to have ended in his destruction. It was not only as uncalled for as it was perilous, but it necessarily retarded, even when successful, the attainment of the object which it was meant to subserve. In the then state of the war, a direct movement by Lake Champlain was all that could be necessary in connection with the ascent from Quebec. The route from thence to Montreal was far shorter and more direct; the natural obstacles to be overcome were much less formidable, and to 14,000 men whom he had at his disposal the enemy could have opposed scarcely 4000; whereas, by carrying 10,000 men round by Lake Ontario, he not only exposed them to the danger of 230 miles of difficult navigation, but laid them open to be attacked in flank while struggling in the rapids, and their communications to be cut off both from above and from below. Fortune favoured him, however, and his only loss was occasioned by the upsetting of sixty boats between Lake Francis and Lake St. Louis; while his subsidiary column, under Colonel Haviland, though barely 3200 strong, made its way from Lake Champlain by the Isle au Noix to Fort St. John. The enemy evacuated both works as Colonel Haviland approached. They had vainly endeavoured to arrest the progress of the flotilla from Quebec: they now came in both from the Three Rivers and from Sorel, two points, of which they had been especially jealous—the former, because it crossed the line of march from Quebec; the latter, because it guarded the Richelieu river and Lake Champlain—and, shutting themselves up in the Island of Montreal, awaited their doom. It could not be averted, and they laid down their arms.

Once more we must ask our readers to observe by what process, and along what lines, Canada was

in those old days invaded. It was next to impossible to remove troops and stores to any distance inland, except by water, the country being destitute of roads, and overspread by primeval forests. Indians, and men as little encumbered as Indians, could alone pass through them till, by prodigious labour, paths had been cleared and depôts established, which it was found always difficult, and often impossible, to defend. Hence the object of both Bellegers was to keep and retain the command of the Lakes, and especially of Lake Champlain, which formed at once the advanced covering and the weakness of Montreal. No doubt the English, had they earlier succeeded in establishing a superiority there and on Lake Ontario, would have still found the St. Lawrence, with its strong current and many rapids, a serious obstacle; but from the day in which they made themselves masters of Quebec, rapids and current, looking to the fact that the sea was open to them, ceased to be of importance. It was not, therefore, by the vigour and skill of their front-attacks that they made themselves masters of Canada; and a glance at the contests which have since taken place in that part of the world, will show that front-attacks upon Canada from the south have never led to any but imperfect and temporary successes.

Fifteen years elapsed, after Canada became a British province, before the possibility of defending it against an enemy who should approach from what are now called the United States, was put to the proof. In 1775, soon after the first American Congress met, the insurgent government determined to take advantage of the favourable position of its affairs, and to carry the war into Canada. The province was then destitute of troops. Only one weak battalion held it, and the militia no one as yet thought of calling out. While, therefore, General Gage suffered a state of blockade in Boston, two expeditions were secretly fitted out, one of which was to fall upon Montreal by the

old route of Lake Champlain, while the other, passing by sea to the mouth of the Kenebec river, was to cross the ridge between New England and Canada, and to descend the Schaudiere river, which runs into the St. Lawrence nearly opposite to Quebec.

The American corps to be employed against Montreal amounted to about 3000 men. It was led by General Montgomery, and did its work well. Sir Guy Carleton, who commanded on the other side, had small means at his disposal, and he appears not to have managed them very judiciously. Instead of keeping his regular troops, in number about 500, as a nucleus round which the militia might gather, he pushed them to the front, and lost them almost entirely in the unimportant post of Fort St. John and Chambly, which he was unwise enough to defend. Thwarted in an attempt to relieve the former, he threw a garrison of militiamen into Fort Sorel, but the garrison dispersed as the enemy drew on, and the fort was occupied. There speedily followed upon this the surrender of Montreal itself, and of eleven British vessels which had taken shelter there, General Carleton escaping with difficulty in a boat by night, and passing the American batteries with muffled oars. Meanwhile General Arnold, at the head of 1200 men, passed, as was proposed, to the mouth of the Kenebec, and there embarked upon an enterprise such as no other armed body ever undertook before, or has ever undertaken since. For six weeks he and his men were in the swampy forest; for four they never saw a hut nor encountered a human being. The Kenebec, which they ascended, is rapid and full of shoals; the Schaudiere, which they had to descend, was even more rapid and rocky. Two-thirds of Arnold's people refused to go on, and with less than 400 he arrived at last on the 3d of November in sight of the St. Lawrence. He touched the stream at Point Levi, found or collected there boats enough to con-

vey his troops, and crossed immediately. The regular garrison of Quebec consisted at that moment of only one company of infantry, but the marines and seamen of a sloop of war lying in the river strengthened it, and the inhabitants likewise taking up arms, Sir Guy Carleton found himself at the head of 1500 or 1600 men. Though the arrival of Arnold, therefore, greatly surprised him, he never lost heart, but made preparations to defend the town to the last extremity.

While this was going on, General Montgomery established garrisons in Montreal and Fort St. John; after which he descended the St. Lawrence with the remainder of his corps, in order to unite himself with Arnold. The junction took place on the 5th of December; and with such means as they could command, amounting to six field-guns and five small mortars, the American generals pressed the siege. It made no progress; and the season of the year rendering a continuous operation next to impossible, they determined to try the effect of an escalade. Two false attacks on the fronts facing the heights of Abraham were intended to draw off the attention of the garrison from the lower town, which was to be entered, by Arnold and the column under his orders, between the St. Charles and the heights—by Montgomery and his division, between the St. Lawrence and the precipices of Cape Diamond. We cannot account for this selection of the points of real attack, inasmuch as the occupation of the lower town does not necessarily imply the fall of the upper, whereas he who is master of the upper town has the lower at his mercy. But whatever the hopes of the assailants might be, and on whatever data founded, they came to nothing. Both assaults were repulsed; General Montgomery being killed while cheering on the one, General Arnold being disabled by a severe wound while conducting the other.

The Americans were not prepared for a regular campaign. They

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had made a rush at Canada, hoping to surprise it. They were destitute of means for a prolonged contest, even if no reinforcements should be sent from England. General Arnold, indeed, continued the blockade of Quebec throughout the winter, and early in the spring had his numbers raised to 3000 men. Montreal, St. John, and Chambly were at the same time occupied by 4000, and strenuous efforts were made to enlist the inhabitants, French as well as English, on the side of the Revolution. But in this the Americans failed; and the arrival on the 6th of May of a squadron of English men-of-war in the St. Lawrence, and of three brigades of infantry, with artillery, at once decided their line of action. Arnold withdrew from before Quebec. Montreal, Chambly and Fort St. John were evacuated, and Canada became again, what it has ever since continued to be, a loyal British province.

It is a fact curious in itself, and strongly illustrative of the peculiar temperament of the American people, that they have never been able to divest themselves of the persuasion that they have only to raise the banner of the stars and stripes in Canada, in order to insure the co-operation in their favour of at least a large majority of its inhabitants. Strong in this conviction, they sent Montgomery and Arnold to add the provinces north of the St. Lawrence to those which, in the south, had declared themselves independent. And the same fatuity led them, in 1812, to count upon the subjection of Canada as the necessary result of its invasion. It would appear, too, as if they had carefully studied the operations of the English generals half a century earlier, and done their best to repeat them, even to their blunders. But before we proceed to sketch with a rapid pen the progress of a war of which the true history is yet to be written, it may be well if we endeavour to convey to the mind of the reader something like a distinct idea of the locale upon which it was waged.

The boundary-line between the

United States and British North America, though clearly settled by the treaty of severance, seems in 1812 to have become a good deal obscured. On the east and south-east, Nature has sufficiently sketched her own map; but the waving line which now passes from St. Andrew's Bay to the Grand Falls of the St. John, and from the Grand Falls southward, and thence westward at a right angle to Lake St. Francis in the St. Lawrence, had then no existence. Men knew that the State of Massachusetts belonged to the Union, but where Lower Canada began, and Massachusetts or Maine ended, was by no means so certain. Lake Champlain, however, was undeniably a State lake, except on its northern shore, and there England had a post a few miles distant from the American St. Albans, while the St. Lawrence was in all its course English, from its exit out of Lake Ontario to its mouth. Above this outfall the limits of the two commonwealths were plain enough. The great lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior they shared between them; and the rivers which connect these, the Niagara between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, the St. Clair between Lake Huron and Lake Erie, were, as well as the St. Mary, which flows out of Lake Superior into Lake Huron, their well-defined frontiers, far up into the west. Any good map will show where, upon these lakes and rivers, such places as Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Plattsburg, Sacketts Harbour, Sandy Point, Oswego, Fort Niagara, and Buffalo stand, on one side; and Joseph's Point, Michilimackinac, Amherstburg, Sandwich, Long Point, York (now called Toronto), Kingston, and many more, on the other. Having mastered these, as well as the names of other places and positions on either bank of the St. Lawrence, from the Lake of a Thousand Isles downward to Montreal, the intelligent observer will not, we think, find it very difficult to follow the thread of our story.

Though little concerned in the present paper with the causes in which

the rupture between Great Britain and America originated in 1812, we may perhaps be allowed to state that, throughout the long struggle of this country with revolutionary France, America gave all her sympathies to the latter power. She carried on, at the same time, a brisk trade between France and her colonies—as long as France retained any colonies; and was not always careful to confine her imports to harmless colonial produce. This necessarily subjected American vessels to search, and from time to time, when contraband of war was found in them, to seizure. The consequence thence arising became aggravated a hundred-fold, when Napoleon, by his Berlin and Milan Decrees, tempted England to make reprisals, and to prohibit all intercourse between neutral vessels and French ports. There accompanied this a rather free-and-easy custom of taking out of American ships men whom the visiting officers believed to be deserters from the English navy. Remonstrances and complaints ensued, to which no attention was paid, and America in the end declared war. It is past dispute that she anticipated at that time the speedy dissolution of the British Empire, which she resolved to help forward by taking possession of Canada.

The plan of campaign, arranged at Washington long before the declaration of war was issued, embraced three objects—the subjugation of Amherstburg at the head of Lake Erie, the occupation of the Niagara district, and the capture of Montreal. Under the pretext of watching some hostile Indians, 2500 men had been thrown forward to the neighbourhood of Amherstburg early in the summer; about 6300 were put in motion towards the Niagara frontier as soon as circumstances would allow; while 7000 received orders to assemble at Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, which they did later in the season.

Of British regular troops there were at this time in the provinces not more than 4500, of whom 3000 garrisoned Quebec and Montreal,

while 1500 were spread over Upper Canada. These latter, divided among Kingston, Toronto or York, the Niagara frontier, and Amherstburg, could show but a feeble front anywhere; and they were further weakened by having a detachment stationed in Joseph's Island, at the head of Lake Huron.

The naval preparations on both sides were inconsiderable enough. On Lake Ontario the Americans had one brig, the English one ship of 300 tons, with three smaller vessels. On Lake Erie the Americans had one armed brig and three schooners; the English had nothing.

Notwithstanding the advantages in preparation enjoyed by the Americans, the English were the first in this war to strike a blow. The officer in command at Isle Joseph no sooner heard of the declaration of hostilities, than he embarked his detachment in open boats, passed over to the island of Michilimackinac, a distance of forty miles, and, assisted by some Canadian voyageurs and Indians, compelled the American garrison, numbering sixty men, to lay down its arms. The conquest was not unimportant, because Michilimackinac stood directly in the way of a brisk trade which the Americans carried on through Lake Huron from Detroit; and the English arms acquired, over and above, the prestige of an opening triumph.

Meanwhile the American corps destined for the invasion of Amherstburg took the field. It had assembled at Detroit, on the river of the same name, as early as the 5th of July; and on the 12th it crossed to Sandwich, and moved upon Amherstburg town. The garrison of that place consisted of 450 men, of whom 300 were militia. It was further strengthened by the presence of 150 Indians, and had its advanced posts at the river Aux-cunards, a small stream which interposes between Sandwich and Amherstburg, and falls into the Detroit. This stream the Americans never succeeded in passing. They skirmished with the English from

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approached the bridge, without ven-
turing upon it; while the English,
detaching their Indians, some mili-
tia, and a few regular troops, fell
upon the enemy's communications,
and cut them off. Alarmed as well
as inconvenienced by the stoppage
of their provisions, the Americans
retreated on the 7th of August, and,
contenting themselves with send-
ing 500 men to act against the Eng-
lish detachment, returned with their
main body to Detroit.

Meanwhile General Brock, who
commanded in Upper Canada, em-
barked 300 men, of whom 260 were
militia, at Long Point on Lake Erie.
He had previously forwarded two
weak parties, numbering between
them 160 men, and he arrived at
Amherstburg with the others while
these operations were yet in pro-
gress. He immediately assumed
the offensive, and establishing a
battery at Sandwich, which fired
across the river at Detroit, he pass-
ed the stream with 300 regular in-
fantry, 400 militia, 600 Indians, and
80 artillerymen, and invested the
place on the opposite front. He had
completed his preparations for as-
saulting the fort, when the Ameri-
can general hung out a white flag.
The place surrendered, and 2500
troops and 30 pieces of cannon fell
into the hands of the victors.

Leaving a garrison in Detroit, he
hastened back to the Niagara fron-
tier, where he arrived on the 24th
of August. His purpose was to at-
tack, from Fort George, Fort Niagara
on the American side of the river;
but he was prevented from carrying
the project into effect; for, just as
his plans were completed, intelli-
gence arrived of the establishment
of an armistice. Sir George Pre-
vost, it appeared, had been made
aware of the repeal of their Orders
in Council by the British Govern-
ment; and as the injustice of these
Orders stood foremost in the list of
grievances of which the Americans
complained, he naturally concluded
that the Washington Cabinet, when
informed that the grievance had
ceased, would willingly suspend hos-

tilities, which both sides affected to
deplere. He accordingly arranged
an armistice along the entire fron-
tier, till reference should be made
to Washington; and General Brock,
greatly to his own disgust, found
himself included in it. At the same
time, it is fair to add that Brock's
projected enterprise against Fort
Niagara was bold even to rashness.
He had under his orders barely 1200
men, of whom less than one-half
were regular troops. The Ameri-
cans faced him with 6500; and suc-
cess itself, had he even succeeded
against such odds, must have crip-
pled him. He could not have re-
tained Fort Niagara after it fell,
except by shutting up within its
walls 300 or 400 men, and with the
handful which remained he could
have done nothing. Though he
chafed, therefore, and though his
friends complained, the conduct of
Sir George Prevost was not in this
instance open to censure. Delay is
everything in a war purely defen-
sive, especially in this instance, where
there were levies to be called out
and drilled; nor was the force at
Brock's disposal such as to warrant
his converting defensive into offensive
operations.

While the armistice lasted, and
for a week or two after its close,
the English and Americans looked
at one another from opposite sides
of the Niagara river. Of the Ame-
ricans, 1100 were at Fort Niagara,
3200 at Louistown, and 2000 be-
tween Black Rock and Buffalo. The
British troops occupied Forts Erie
and George, at opposite extremities
of their line, keeping four companies
(two of the 49th regiments, two of the
militia) at Queenstown, in observa-
tion of Louistown.

The Cabinet at Washington hav-
ing rejected Sir George Prevost's
advances, hostilities recommenced;
and in the night of the 11th of Oc-
tober the Americans made a move.
They pushed 250 men from Loui-
stown across the river, which was
there about a quarter of a mile in
width, and immediately sent back
the boats to bring up a second divi-
sion. The officer in command at

Queenstown had two companies, with two pieces of cannon, on the brow of a hill which overlooks the town, and commands the river. The other two companies he had placed in the town itself, and these became immediately engaged with the Americans on the beach. The sound of firing was heard at Fort George, and General Brock galloped off to the point of danger. Just as he arrived, a second American division touched the shore, and fearing lest the two companies in the town should be overpowered, he caused those on the hill to descend to their assistance. It was an unfortunate movement, for the enemy had already landed 500 men higher up the stream, who, observing that the hill was bare, ran forward and seized it. General Brock instantly put himself at the head of a portion of his people, and endeavoured to retake the hill, but was killed in the attempt. The British troops fell back to the edge of the ridge, where one detachment after another from Fort Erie arrived to support them; and General Sheaffe, on whom the command had devolved, led them forward to the charge. The Americans broke and fled; 71 officers and 858 non-commissioned officers and men laid down their arms; the remainder escaped in the boats.

The superiority of British over American troops was marked throughout this affair. The assailants were defeated, and many of their boats sunk, chiefly, as the American general reported, because he could not, by threats or entreaties, prevail upon the 2000 men who looked on from the further bank to cross the Niagara, and come to the assistance of their comrades.

One more attempt was made by the Americans to penetrate into the Niagara district above the Falls. Four thousand men from Louisville, Black Rock, and Buffalo, were employed on this service, but they accomplished nothing. Their advanced-guard, which, on the night of the 28th of November, embarked in ten boats, was attacked and overpowered at a landing-place called

Red House. The fugitives escaped, leaving thirty prisoners behind them, and the army forthwith broke up, and retired into winter-quarters.

Nothing could be more feeble or out of place than these two attempts. They were ill-arranged, and worse executed. Indeed, it is hard to say what objects they could be interred to serve, unless it were, that, by drawing away the bulk of the troops from Lower Canada, they might render more easy the proposed occupation of Montreal. But on that enterprise the enemy never ventured. Their corps of 7000 men lay idle at Plattsburg till the 15th of November, and made no attempt, when it did move, to penetrate beyond the village of Champlain. Threatened there by a British brigade of 900 men, and having a patrol, which had felt its way as far as the bridge over the Lacolle, driven in by a picket of Canadian voyageurs and militia, the Americans precipitately retired, and soon afterwards went into winter-quarters.

It is worthy of remark, that all this while the regular troops and provincials in Canada, waged, so to speak, a war with America on their own account. In London a serious rupture with the United States seems scarcely to have been contemplated, till tidings arrived of the rejection of the proposed armistice at Washington; nor was any formal declaration of war issued by England till the beginning of 1813. No preparations had, therefore, been made to meet the invasion when it came. The inland waters were left unguarded, the ordinary peace garrisons occupied the principal posts on shore; yet these peace garrisons, supported by gallant and loyal militia, repelled the invaders at every point. The Americans, on the other hand, long bent upon a particular purpose, got such a start of England upon the lakes, as England was never afterwards able to overtake. Hostilities were scarcely begun, when Commodore Chauncey arrived at Sacketts Harbour, where, in the course of the summer, he either built, or fitted for war purposes, six

itives escaped, behind them, with broke up, quarters. more feeble or two attempts, ed, and worse is hard to say d be interred were, that, by k of the troops hey might ren- proposed occu- But on that y never ven- 7000 men lay l the 15th of e no attempt, e to penetrate of Champlain. a British bri- and having a its way as far Lacolle, driven Canadian voya- the Americans and soon after- quarters. mark, that all ar troops and waged, so to erica on their ondon a seri- United States een contem- rived of the oed armistice as any formal used by Eng- of 1813. No herefore, been asion when it aters were left ary peace gar- principal posts ce garrisons, and loyal mi- aders at every , on the other a particular rt of England England was to overtake. rarily begun, uncey arrived where, in the er, he either r purposes, six

schooners. These, added to the brig, raler the American naval force to more than an equality with that of their rivals, who could still count on only one ship and three smaller vessels. At the same time, a navy yard was established, at Presqu'ile, on Lake Erie, whence two brigs were in due time turned out, to reinforce the squadron which already dominated there. Immense advantages these, had the enemy known how to turn them to account! But, happily for England, the absence of military knowledge, on the part of the Americans, more than compensated for their superior activity and skill in naval affairs. Hence the campaign of 1813 proved as little decisive against Canada as that of 1812, though it opened with a greater show of energy, and brought increased numbers into the field on both sides.

The Americans proposed to act this year upon three, or, to speak more correctly, upon four lines. Assembling one corps at Sandusky, at the western end of Lake Erie, they were to employ it in the retaking of Detroit and the reduction of Amherstburg. A second, collected at Sacketts Harbour, was in the first instance to occupy Kingston and Toronto, after which it was to proceed against Forts George and Erie in the Niagara district, in co-operation with a subsidiary force which should assemble at Buffalo. The third operation was to be directed from Lake Champlain against Montreal, being aided by the descent of the victorious troops from Lake Ontario by the St. Lawrence. The total number of men to be employed in these various enterprises was reckoned at 30,000, though it scarcely appears that anything approaching to that number ever came under fire. Operations began very early in the direction of the Amherstburg district. The English headquarters were then in Detroit, and they had a post at Frenchtown, forty-five miles in advance of it. On the 18th of January the Americans advanced against that picket, which retired to a place called

Brownstown. Here Colonel Proctor, who commanded in this quarter, joined at the head of 500 men, chiefly militia, and 450 Indians. He attacked the Americans on the 22d, who gave way and fled, leaving 500 prisoners in his hands. The total loss to the English was 152 killed and wounded.

Though successful in this affair, Colonel Proctor did not consider himself strong enough to hold his ground. He fell back, therefore, to Detroit, and ultimately to Sandwich. He was not very vigorously pursued; indeed, the enemy contented themselves with removing their headquarters from Sandusky to the river Miamis, on the banks of which they erected a fort for the protection of their stores. Colonel Proctor was tempted to strike a blow at that fort, by embarking 1000 men at Amherstburg, and directing 1200 Indians to join him by land. He succeeded in ascending the Miamis unopposed; he was joined by the Indians within a mile and a half of the fort, but he missed his object entirely through lack of skill in the management of details. He unwisely divided his little army, throwing himself astride upon the Miamis, and had thus two distinct operations to carry on at the same time. He was attacked simultaneously on both sides, and, though victorious in the battle, found himself at its close under the necessity of abandoning his enterprise. He returned to Sandwich, where he remained till the 1st of August, when he made a fresh attempt on an American post at the mouth of the Sandusky river. This time he met with a decided check. Repulsed in an attempt to escalate the works, he retreated again to Sandwich, having lost in killed and wounded ninety-six men.

It was an unfortunate enterprise altogether. It cost some valuable lives, and wasted precious time; for it interfered with a plan which had already been matured for an attack from Long Point on Presqu'ile, and upon the two brigs which were in process of construction there, in

which a detachment from Amherstburg was to have joined. The brig got to sea before the Amherstburg division recovered itself, and the difficulties of communicating with Amherstburg from below were increased fourfold. The consequence was, that when, by the junction of the corps from Long Point, the force at Amherstburg was raised to 1000 British and 3500 irregular troops, the very strength of the garrison, straitened both for provisions and ammunition, became its weakness. For at the period of which we are writing, the Amherstburg district, thinly peopled and destitute of roads, carried on its intercourse with the lower settlements, and brought in all its supplies, by water. The appearance of the enemy's squadron, therefore, off the harbour, struck Proctor and his people with dismay. They pressed forward the completion of a ship of war which had long been on the stocks, and sent her out, manned by a few seamen and 150 soldiers, to raise the blockade. She engaged the Americans, who were in every respect superior, and, together with one or two smaller vessels, fell into their hands.

The complete command of the lake being thus acquired, the Americans were in a condition to bring up their troops by the Sandusky and Miamis rivers to the neighbourhood of the town of Amherstburg. They greatly exceeded Proctor's corps in numbers, and could boast, among other things, of a mounted regiment 1200 strong. There remained, therefore, for Proctor no other resource than to evacuate both Detroit and Amherstburg, and to retire up the valley of the Thames in the direction of the Moravian settlement, and of Ancaster. The valley of the Thames is now comparatively a flourishing district; it was then little better than a wilderness, without houses, without cultivation, without roads. The few stores which the English possessed — their provisions, baggage, and spare ammunition — they conveyed by boat up the stream,

and their column, which marched along the woody banks, became weaker and weaker every day. On the 4th of October the Americans overtook the boats, and captured them. On the 5th, Colonel Proctor, with not quite 500 troops, and as many Indians, determined to make a stand. He was attacked by 5000 Americans, overpowered and driven off. He retreated to Ancaster, which he reached on the 17th, with only 204 rank and file, all that remained to him of his original force.

Thus far success attended the invaders. They were masters of the forts at Detroit and Amherstburg, and of the Amherstburg territory as far as the head of the valley of the Thames. But they were not brought thereby nearer to the subjugation of Canada; that must be effected by operations farther to the east; and in the month of April, when the navigation of Lake Ontario becomes free, these operations began. Six thousand men were collected at Sacketts Harbour, with a squadron, consisting of a ship, a brig, and eleven schooners. The object of this armament was to seize Toronto and Kingston, while yet the frozen state of the St. Lawrence prevented their being reinforced from below; and it was partially effected. On the 25th, 2000 men landed close to Toronto, which the English garrison, 300 regular troops, as many militiamen, and forty Indians, did not consider themselves in sufficient force to defend. They retired, therefore, towards Kingston, after a short contest, in which they lost 130 killed and wounded; though not till they had burnt a ship upon the stocks, with which it was intended to reinforce the English squadron on the lake. The Americans likewise had suffered severely, and did not venture to pursue: on the contrary, they changed their plan, took ship on the 8th of May, and arrived the same evening off the Four-mile Creek, close to the mouth of the Niagara river. The troops being landed, the flotilla re-

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turned to Sacketts Harbour, between
which place and Niagara it contin-
ued to ply till the 26th, when
the whole corps was brought up.
Two schooners only remained below
to cruise off Kingston, and to ob-
serve the movements of the Eng-
lish.

The Niagara frontier was held
at this time by 1800 regular British
troops, 500 militia, and forty In-
dians. Of these, 1000 regular
troops, 300 of the militia, and all
the Indians, were in and about Fort
George; so that there remained for
the defence of the rest of the line,
including the garrison of Fort Erie,
only 800 regulars and 200 militia.
The enemy's force consisted of 7000
men, divided into three brigades; and
on the 27th of May the whole were
ferried across the river, under cover
of the fire from Fort Niagara, and
from their own flotilla mounting
fifty-six guns. General Vincent,
who commanded in this quarter,
offered a stout resistance to their
disembarkation, but was forced to
retreat with the loss of 450 men.
He fell back by Queenstown and
Beaver Dam to Burlington Heights,
at the head of Lake Ontario, call-
ing in at the same time his detach-
ments from Fort Erie and the
Chippeway. The junction of these
raised his available strength to 1600
bayonets; but his condition was
extremely critical. In his front
lay a superior force, well supplied
and flushed with success. He had
no reserves on which to retire, nor
any hope of support from Toronto,
of the fate of which he was aware.
There needed but common hardi-
hood and a little judgment on the
part of the invaders to secure his
destruction; but these were want-
ing. The American general, in-
stead of falling upon Vincent with
his entire corps, was content to
detach two brigades of infantry,
his light guns, and a regiment of
cavalry in pursuit, while, with the
remaining brigade, he halted to take
possession of the various defensible
posts which the English had aban-
doned. There was in General Vin-
cent's little army a gallant soldier,

Colonel Sir John Harvey, who pro-
posed that, instead of walling to
receive an attack on Burlington
Heights, the English should make
a night attack upon the enemy.
This was done on the night of the
5th June at Stony Creek, to which
the Americans had advanced; and
so complete was the success of the
enterprise, that both of the Ameri-
can brigadiers, with 123 officers
and men, and four pieces of cannon,
fell into the hands of the assailants.
The remainder fled in confusion,
making no halt till they reached For-
ty-mile Creek, eleven miles from the
scene of action.

The enormous extent of the
American lakes never comes before
us more strikingly than when we
read of the military operations that
were carried on along their shores,
and over the surface of their waters.
Though the superiority of the
enemy on Lake Ontario was at this
time decided, we find an English
squadron sailing from Kingston
with 280 troops on board, and
arriving unmolested at Forty-mile
Creek, three days after the Ameri-
can fugitives had established them-
selves there. The gunboats and
armed schooners which escorted
the bateaux opened fire upon the
enemy, and drove them from their
encampment. Immediately the troops
landed. They joined General Vin-
cent's column, and the whole set
out in pursuit of the Americans,
who fell back upon Fort George.
There they made a stand with a
view to call in the detachments
which they had established at Fort
Erie and along the Chippeway.
But all courage seemed to have de-
serted them. They made no aggres-
sive movement. They permitted
the English, whom the arrival of a
fresh regiment from Lower Canada
had greatly encouraged, to close in
upon them, and to straiten their
supplies; and at last, on the 1st
of October, they took ship and
sailed away. About 1500 militia
from the State of New York were
left to garrison Fort George and
Fort Niagara; the rest, amounting
to 6000 of all arms, proceeded first

to Oswego, and by-and-by to Sacketts Harbour.

Meanwhile the corps which had assembled on Lake Champlain took the field. It consisted of 7000 infantry, 250 cavalry, and 10 guns; and it advanced across the lake by Plattsburg to Chateaugay-Four-corners, where it arrived on the 8th of October. It was evident from this arrangement that the American general intended to move by the mouth of the Chateaugay river, and to attempt the passage of the St. Lawrence above the Chine rapids at Lake St. Louis. This was a judicious plan—too much dependent, however, on the success of the column from Lake Ontario, which, be it remembered, was to descend the St. Lawrence from the lake, and to co-operate in the projected attack on Montreal. But it was feebly carried into effect. A small force, consisting entirely of Provincials (it did not exceed 1000 muskets, including 170 Indians), took post about twenty-four miles from the Four-corners, on the road by which the enemy must advance; and the enemy, although they attacked it with all their strength on the 26th, made no impression. Immediately the American general lost heart. He retired to the Four-corners, where he halted only to take breath, and on the 11th of November withdrew to Plattsburg. He there broke up his army, and put it into winter quarters.

While this was going on, the English from the Niagara frontier, and the Americans from Sacketts Harbour, both put themselves in motion. The former, apprehensive for the safety of Kingston, sent down two weak regiments to reinforce the garrison; the latter took ship and steered for the British waters. They appear to have hesitated in their course of action, whether to delay the descent of the St. Lawrence till they should have possessed themselves of Kingston, or to leave Kingston behind and descend the St. Lawrence at once. They finally decided upon the latter course; and, on the 5th of Novem-

ber, 8000 men approached the source of the river. They established their depot of stores and provisions on the American side, where also the troops landed, leaving the boats to pass Fort Wellington empty. Fort Wellington stands upon the English bank, and commands the navigation; but by muffling their oars the boatmen managed, under cover of night, to elude observation, and on the 8th the troops re-embarked at Ogdensburg. It was a wild project, taken up, as it appears to us, in imitation of General Amherst's lucky hazard in 1780, and it ended in complete failure. The rapids proved too dangerous to be faced with loaded boats: the troops landed and re-embarked repeatedly. About 800 men of the garrison of Kingston hung upon their rear, and on the 11th overtook and engaged two brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and six guns. The battle was fought at the head of the Long Sault, at a place called Chrysalis Farm, and ended in the discomfiture of the Americans. The English lost 180 officers and men—the Americans 339, besides 100 taken prisoners. They retired to their boats during the night, and, descending the river four miles, were landed on the American side. From that moment all hope of success abandoned them. They continued the descent of the St. Lawrence till they reached the mouth of the Salmon river, which falls into the St. Lawrence on the right bank. Up that stream, for about seven miles, they pushed their flotilla, when they finally disembarked, and, after remaining idle till February 1814, burnt their boats and retreated to Plattsburg and Burlington.

We must now cast our eyes back for a moment to the Amherstburg district, and take account of the effect produced along the Niagara frontier by the tidings which came in of the disasters there sustained. Apprehensive of an attack in the rear, and anxious to save the wreck of Proctor's corps, the Niagara division fell back from Fort George

after the departure of the American regular army, and resumed its position on Burlington Heights. Here Proctor joined it; and early in December the English again approached Fort George. The American pickets being driven in, the garrison, consisting entirely of militia, did not consider itself competent to hold the fort. It retreated across the Niagara, though not till the little town of Newark, with all the farm-houses and buildings near, had been wantonly burnt down. This was a cruel act in the dead of a Canadian winter, and it was terribly avenged. Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond, who had assumed the command in Upper Canada, passed the Niagara in two columns, and, falling at night on the fort of the same name, entered it by a gate which had been left open for the relief of the sentries. He made himself master of the place with the loss of only 11 men killed and wounded; his prisoners amounted to 400, and he took 27 pieces of cannon. At the same time a body of Indians broke into Louistown and set it on fire; while a few days subsequently — viz., on the 30th and 31st of December — Black Rock and Buffalo were likewise burnt down. These were sharp reprisals, but they had their effect; after which the army went into cantonments at Fort Niagara, St. David's, Burlington Heights, and Toronto.

Thus ended the campaign of 1813, as little to the permanent advantage of the invaders as that which preceded it. With the exception of the passage of the Niagara in May, and the defeat in October of Proctor's feeble corps in the Amherstburg territory, the Americans executed no single movement with vigour; and the little which they gained by the former of these operations, their subsequent blundering threw away. The night-action at Stony Creek saved the Niagara district, and the retreat of the enemy from Fort George enabled the English to establish a footing for themselves across the river. Lower down, disaster and

defeat attended the enemy throughout. Their march from Champlain by Four-corners, to the mouth of the Chateaugay river, was judicious. They avoided thereby the obstructions of Fort St. John and the Isle aux Noix, while at the mouth of Chateaugay they secured a harbour for the boats which were to convey them across the St. Lawrence. But their inability to overcome the opposition of a mere handful of Provincials between Four-corners and the Chateaugay, besides proving how deficient they still were in discipline, entirely deranged a plan which depended for its execution on the timely arrival of the column from Lake Ontario. As to that movement, it was from first to last a false movement. It was undertaken without proper understanding with the Lake Champlain corps; it began too late, and lay exposed — a fatal error — to be impeded by attacks in the rear. On the whole, the generalship of the Americans was as contemptible as the want of steadiness, not to say of courage, was conspicuous in their men. On the other hand, the mistakes committed by the English were numerous enough. They permitted the enemy to establish a superiority over them, both on Lake Erie and on Lake Ontario. They fought actions on these waters with ships ill-manned and ill-equipped, and were defeated; and they mismanaged an attack upon Sacketts Harbour from Kingston, which, had it been vigorously pushed, could have hardly failed of success. The best excuse to be made for them is this, that they had an enormous frontier to defend with very inadequate means, and that the mother country was too busy with its great war in Europe to pay the necessary attention to its little war in America. But a change in this respect was at hand.

We come now to the campaign of 1814, which was entered upon by the American Government with views less pretensions than had heretofore been entertained. Experience seems to have taught them

that, among the population of the Canadas, they had no allies, and that, without some assistance from within, the subjugation of the country was beyond their means. They determined, therefore, to limit their exertions to three objects—to retain their hold upon Amherstburg; to retake the island of Michilimackinac, so important to their trade on Lakes Erie and Michigan; and to capture and destroy Kingston. With a view to facilitate the accomplishment of these purposes, they considered it necessary to make a feint on the Niagara territory, and to threaten Montreal; which they did after a fashion, and with such results, as it shall be our business presently to describe.

In the Amherstburg district no hostilities occurred. The Americans remained in quiet possession, without any attempt on the part of the English to disturb them. It was not so on Isle Michilimackinac. In spite of the enemy's superiority on both lakes, 65 soldiers and 25 seamen, with a supply of provisions and ammunition, were conveyed from Toronto to Lake Simcoe, and from Lake Simcoe to Nottawasaga Creek, on Lake Huron. Thence they crossed in open boats. After a voyage of twenty-five days, they reached the island on the 18th of May; and on the 4th of August 900 American troops from Detroit arrived, to accept, as was imagined, the surrender of the garrison. But the garrison, instead of laying down its arms, attacked and defeated the invading force, and followed the fugitives so sharply, that they boarded a couple of schooners before the anchors could be raised, and took them.

Meanwhile, on the Niagara frontier, two brigades of American troops crossed from Buffalo and Black Rock, and landed, the one about a mile above, the other about the same distance below, Fort Erie. To the extreme astonishment of all concerned, the fort made no defence, though it had been sufficiently provided to hold out till the force allotted for the defence of the

district should have time to assemble. The force in question consisted of three battalions of regular infantry, a troop of dragoons, a detachment of artillery, 300 militia, and as many Indians. A fourth battalion, with 300 militia, were at the other extremity of the line, divided between Forts George and Niagara.

Major-General Riall, who commanded here, drew together all except the garrisons of Fort George and Fort Niagara, and advanced to the Chippeway river, on the northern bank of which he took up a position. It was an extremely good one, interposing between Fort Erie and Fort George; for the Chippeway joins the Niagara at right angles a little way above the Falls; and there was a rivulet, called Street Creek, about a mile and a half in advance of it, where he established his outposts. These the enemy drove in on the 4th, after which they crossed, and encamped opposite to the English on the southern bank of the Chippeway. General Riall, who had under his orders about 2000 men, with three pieces of cannon, considered himself strong enough to fight a battle. He therefore passed the Chippeway on the 5th, attacked the enemy, and was repulsed with a loss of 500 men. He retreated immediately to the Twenty-mile Creek, on Lake Ontario, reinforcing, as he passed, the garrisons of Fort George and Fort Niagara. His intention was to make a stand on Burlington Heights, where he expected to be joined by a battalion from Toronto. The enemy, however, did not follow him up further than Queenstown. They moved cautiously likewise, and on the 24th returned to the Chippeway, in order to protect the approach of a convoy of provisions which they expected to be landed at the mouth of that river. Meanwhile Riall, being joined by the promised reinforcements, resumed the offensive, and advanced to a place called Fifteen-Mile Creek, wondering that he was not opposed. Here intelligence reached

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him of the retrogressive movement of the enemy, and he immediately detached 900 men in observation, directing them to occupy certain high grounds about a mile and a half from the Chippeway, and close to the Falls of Niagara. These marched all night, and, in the morning of the 25th, took up a position at Lundy's Lane, on the highest ground of the Queenstown hill, and at right angles with the road which passes from Fort Erie to Fort George. Nothing occurred throughout the day; but about five in the evening the English were attacked, first by a single brigade, and next by the whole American army, which, since its passage of the Niagara, had been reinforced by two additional brigades. The action was fierce; but the English were losing ground, when General Riall came up. He saw that he was opposed by very superior numbers, and he directed the officer in command of the corps of observation to retire into Queenstown, towards which place also, instead of towards the heights, the steps of the main body were turned. By great good fortune, Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond, who had arrived at Fort Niagara the same morning from Toronto, with the 89th regiment and some detachments, landed at this moment in Queenstown. He pushed forward to Lundy's Lane, halted the troops who had begun their retreat, and formed them on the crest of the hill. It was now six o'clock in the evening, and 1800 British bayonets, supported by five guns, were opposed to the whole American army. Mounted officers galloped off in hot haste to bring up Riall's division, which arrived at last about ten o'clock, weary and spent with a nine-hours' march. Wearied as they were, however, these gallant men, 1250 in number, did excellent service. It was bright moonlight, and the battle raged till half-past eleven, when the enemy gave way, and retreated, leaving the English masters of the field and of two pieces of cannon.

This was by far the sharpest

action which occurred during the war. The English brought into line 3200 men, with seven guns; the Americans showed between 7000 and 8000, and were greatly superior in artillery. The loss was pretty equal on both sides, though heaviest on that of the victors, who had 878 officers and men placed *hors de combat*, as against 854 on the part of the vanquished. It was evident, moreover, from the boldness of their advance, and by the resolute manner in which they met the charge of the English, that the Americans were beginning to assume the character of good troops. And this was again evinced on two subsequent occasions: first, when Sir Gordon Drummond, attempting to carry Fort Erie by escalade, was repulsed; and again at a sortie in force made by the garrison, in which 609 British, and 510 American officers and men, were killed and wounded. The general result of the campaign in this quarter was, however, a failure. On the 5th of November the Americans evacuated Fort Erie, and retired across the Niagara. On the 10th of December the British troops along that frontier went into winter quarters.

While these things were going on, an American division, 5000 strong, moved from Plattsburg, with no other view than to distract the attention of the English, and to alarm them for Montreal. It advanced as far as Champlain town on the Chaizie close to the frontier, and was opposed on the left by the British garrison of Isle aux Noix, by a fortified mill on the Lacolle river in the centre, and by a strong picket on the Burtonville road on the right. On the 12th of March the enemy endeavored to take the mill, but without success, sacrificing 154 officers and men, while the loss of the English did not exceed 64.

Satisfied with this demonstration, the Americans moved off from the Montreal frontier towards Sacketts Harbour. They left garrisons at Plattsburg, Burlington, and Verdes—three posts in which a flotilla was constructed for the defence

of Lake Champlain. But partly because what was intended for a feint on Niagara had taken a serious turn, partly because England, relieved from her war with France, was pouring her Peninsular regiments into Canada, the projected attack on Kingston never took place. On the contrary the garrison at Kingston began to act on the offensive. On the 4th of May, 1000 soldiers, supported by 200 seamen, took ship, and landed on the 6th, under the guns of Oswego. The place was stormed and taken, and such stores as had been collected there were destroyed. But the American loss in this respect was not heavy, for they had very prudently formed their principal magazine on Lake Oneida. The expedition cannot be said, however, to have been entirely abortive, because it contributed to divert the attention of the enemy from measures of offence to those of defence merely. But, in truth, the tide was by this time turning strong in favour of Canada, which, with a little more of prudence on the part of her naval, and of hardihood and judgment in her military, commander-in-chief, might, and ought to, have come out of the struggle everywhere triumphant.

Great exertions had of late been made by both parties to increase their squadrons on Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain. On all the other lakes, Erie, Michigan, and Huron, the Americans had a decided superiority; but on Ontario, the belligerent forces were by this time equalised, and the enemy naturally conceived that the English would be induced, by their superior military efficiency, to strike at the source of the naval strength of America by destroying Sacketts Harbour. With a view to protect that point, troops were called in from all quarters, and Lake Champlain was left, as has just been explained, to be defended by weak garrisons at Plattsburg and other posts. The American squadron on Lake Champlain consisted of one ship, one brig, one sloop, one schooner, and

ten gunboats, carrying among them eighty-six heavy guns, and manned by 988 first-rate seamen. The launching of a new vessel on the 26th of August at Isle aux Noix raised the British squadron to one ship, one brig, two sloops, and twelve gunboats. The whole were superior in numbers of cannon to the enemy, for they carried among them 91; but their crews were the offscourings both of the Royal Navy and of the transport service, supplemented by French Canadians and soldiers. The new ship, moreover, the *Confiance*, was absolutely in the builder's hands, and her powder carried in lighters alongside when she quitted the stocks to go into action; and her commander, the commodore of the little fleet, seems to have been entirely wanting in that calm thought which is even more necessary than courage to direct a great battle either by land or sea.

Having despatched one of the brigades, which reached him from the Garonne, to secure Kingston and the Niagara frontier, Sir George Prevost, the commander-in-chief in British North America, moved from the camp which he had formed near Montreal. He began his march with 11,000 men on the 1st of September, and on the 3d, after driving in the enemy's outposts, took possession of the town of Champlain on the Chaizie. The American general, Macomb, had but a single brigade of regular troops under his orders. With these he fell back to Plattsburg, the heights above which were already surmounted with a few field-works, all of them incapable of a protracted defence. Unfortunately Sir George Prevost had arrived at the opinion that a victory by land would serve no purpose, unless the American flotilla should in the first instance be destroyed. He was so far correct, that, though victorious over the troops encamped at Plattsburg, he would have found it impossible to cross the lake and to advance upon Sacketts Harbour, the Americans retaining their superiority on

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the waters; but he was entirely wrong in assuming that an action on shore would be profitless till the American flotilla was defeated; and still more mistaken if he conceived that a victory at sea was to any extent necessary in order to insure a victory on shore. Nothing could have prevented him from driving the American general out of his works had he moved up, as he might have done, on the 5th. But he did not arrive in sight of these works till the 6th, and then he halted. Repeated messages were sent after this to Captain Downie, demanding when he would be in a condition to advance from Isle aux Noix. The enemy's squadron lay about two miles from Plattsburg, in communication with their army. Could not Captain Downie hurry his preparations, and sweep the American flotilla aside, while the troops, under Sir George Prevost, stormed the heights? Downie suffered himself to be chafed, and hurried his preparations. Indeed, he did more: he took advantage of a fair wind on the 11th, and, rushing on with the *Confiance*, which far outsailed her consorts, engaged the whole American fleet single-handed. The results are well known. One by one, as the British vessels came up, they were disabled, and the command of the lake, which it was anticipated they would establish, remained more decidedly than ever with the Americans.

Sir George Prevost has been generally blamed as the sole cause of this disaster. We have no intention to become his advocates; but the truth is, that he was the cause of it only in part. It is a mistake to assume that the American flotilla could not have engaged the English successfully, had the British army been in possession of the heights. Not a gun from the heights could reach the anchorage where the flotilla lay. The success of Sir George Prevost could therefore have had no influence, except a moral influence, favourable to Captain Downie. But Captain Downie's defeat

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deniably frustrated the whole plan of the campaign. For the sake of effect, Sir George ought, even on the 11th, to have stormed the enemy's works; for the sake of effect, he ought to have achieved that easy conquest long before the sails of the British squadron became visible in the distance; but he could have done no more. He managed, however, to tarnish the honour of troops which had never till then suffered disgrace. He stopped his columns on the 11th when moving to the attack, broke up his position before the enemy, and retreated harassed by their riflemen through the woods. No more was attempted that year. The victors of the Peninsula, out of humour with their commander, went into quarters at Isle aux Noix, Chambly, and Laprairie, and before an opportunity could be afforded them of wiping off their shame, preliminaries of peace were signed between Great Britain and America.

It will be seen from this plain statement of facts, that the war into which she ungenerously entered in 1812 brought to America neither profit nor honour. In almost all the encounters which occurred between her troops and those of England on the Canadian frontiers, the Americans were beaten. They established themselves, no doubt, in 1813, in the Amherstburg district, and kept it till the end of the war; but to counterbalance this, they lost Fort Niagara and the island of Michilimackinac, which were not given up till hostilities ceased. More curious still, as showing how weary they had become of the contest, not one of the wrongs complained of as the cause of the quarrel was so much as taken into consideration when the quarrel ended. The claims of neutrals to free navigation, immunity from search at sea, the right of affording an asylum to deserters — these points were all left precisely where they stood when the war began. Had it not been, in-

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deed, for Sir George Prevost's blundering, and the disastrous issues of the New Orleans expedition, the Americans themselves must have been forced to acknowledge that a war with England is the least hopeful game that the United States can play. The defeat at New Orleans was indeed a fair defeat: we owe it to the rash impetuosity of Sir Edward Pakenham, who died like a gallant soldier in the field; and to the incapacity of Sir John Keane, who lived many years afterwards, and contrived to flounder into a peerage. But Sir George Prevost's mishap was an outrage on British honour, as uncalled for as ever befell. Had he attacked Plattsburg on the 6th or 7th, there is no telling what the effect might have been; and having failed to do this, at least he ought to have carried it on the 11th. His refusal to do so, and still more his precipitate retreat, probably saved a few hundred lives at the time, but it sacrificed, what would have been cheaply purchased at the expense of five thousand lives, the halo of victory which up to that moment had surrounded the English colours, and amid the full radiance of which it was especially desirable that this American war should end.

On the other hand, there is no denying that, in the naval struggle for the command of the lakes, the Americans had the advantage throughout. England could make no head against them on Lakes Erie and Huron. On Lake Champlain she suffered a defeat; and on Ontario, no more can be said than that by great exertion she managed to bring up her own strength at last to a level with that of the enemy. This is not to be wondered at. The Canadian shores of the Upper Lakes were very thinly inhabited half a century ago. Even the Amherstburg district between Lake Erie and Lake Huron, had scarcely begun to be cleared; and to establish navy-yards where there are neither towns nor roads, nor the means of feeding workmen, is simply impossible. So likewise in

regard to Lake Ontario: there was no position along its northern shore, not even Kingston, which could compare half a century ago in point of convenience with Sacketts Harbour. With respect to Lake Champlain, it was throughout an American lake, and afforded facilities for building and equipping fleets which were denied to a power possessing but a single harbour, that of Isle aux Noix, at its extremity. Besides, the Americans had everything on the spot — timber, iron, artificers, guns, stores — the latter secured on Lake Oneida, whence they could easily be transported to other lakes as required; whereas England, when she took seriously to ship-building, was obliged to send out all, even the frames of the vessels themselves, piecemeal from Europe. The marvel, therefore, is, not that the United States should have achieved an ascendancy on these inland waters, but that the ascendancy should have been so far from decided, and that so little should have been made of it in promoting the great objects of the war. Canada was never conquered, nor in any danger of being conquered. How would the case stand now? How would it have stood had the Federal Government refused to do justice in the matter of the Trent?

Between December 1814, when the preliminaries of peace were signed at Ghent, and December 1861, when the ultimatum of the British Government reached Washington, forty-seven years had run their course. During that extended interval, the friendly relations of Great Britain with the United States, though more than once endangered, were never absolutely interrupted. We permitted ourselves to be wronged on the boundary question, and took no notice of the deceit practised upon us when it was discovered. We forbore from demanding redress for the outrages of American sympathisers in 1837; and even the gross violation of law and right, in the seizure of Isle St. Juan, we refrained from chastising.

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This continued forbearance on our part was probably a mistake, but it sufficed in the meanwhile to keep the peace; and peace brought immense physical advantages, both to Canada and the United States. With respect to Canada, there is now a belt on both sides of the St. Lawrence, and along the shores of the lakes, which has long ceased, to the extent of 1000 miles, to be the wilderness which it was in 1812. The forest has largely disappeared from the Amherstburg territory. The Niagara district exhibits an extensive breadth of cultivation; and Toronto, though it has ceased to be the capital of a province, flourishes. Kingston likewise has become a respectable town, and can boast of an excellent harbour. As to Lower Canada, crowds of emigrants, both from Great Britain and Ireland, have poured into it; till now, the British settlers as far exceed the French *habitants* in number as they surpass them in industry and strength of character. The population of Montreal alone, chiefly English and Irish, has grown to 100,000; and that of both Canadas reaches well nigh to 3,000,000. Neither has the prosecution of useful public works been neglected. In order to surmount the difficulties in navigation presented by the St. Lawrence, various canals have been dug. The first, as we proceed upwards from Quebec, passes through the southern extremity of the island of Montreal, and is about two miles in length. It carries vessels clear of the rapids of La Chine, and brings them out again into the quiet waters of the river above these rapids. The next is much longer, and has unfortunately been cut on the right or American bank of the river, at a distance of less than fifteen miles from the frontier. It clears the cascades and the Oidars, and, extending from Beauharnais to Hungry Bay, is called the Beauharnais Canal. A third, the Cornwall Canal, stretches from Cornwall to Dickenson's Landing, and avoids, thereby the Long Sault. Beyond this are short de-

tached canals, at Farrand's Point, the Platte, Iroquois, and the Galopa Rapids. After these the navigation is safe through the Thousand Islands into Lake Ontario, with capacity enough to float anything which shall not exceed 136 feet in length, 44 in beam, and 9 feet draught. Now, though works like these tend greatly to develop the resources of the districts through which they pass, and to facilitate the commerce of the Far West with Canada and with Europe, we must not, when considering the military position of Canada itself, count too much upon them. It has been assumed, and doubtless correctly, that they present a channel through which gun-boats, and even small-class frigates, might pass. Indeed, we have heard it gravely argued, that from this time forth no special preparation will be necessary in order to insure to England the command of the lakes; because, in the event of war, her squadrons which blockade the American coasts can detach force enough to sweep from these inland waters every hostile pennant. But they who reason thus, forget that no dependence can be placed upon a series of canals, any one of which runs within fifteen miles of an enemy's frontier. A few bags of gun-powder judiciously applied in a dark night, a few hours' work with pick and spade by men who have won a brief command of the situation by guile or violence, would break up the whole channel. Nor can we derive much comfort from turning our eyes towards the Rideau Canal, much as it was at one time counted upon. It forms a safe and ready communication between Kingston and the town of Ottawa; but vessels seeking to ascend from Montreal to Ottawa must follow the course of the Ottawa river, which, besides being both circuitous and rapid, is here and there beset by shallows, such as the merchant steamers plying between the Atlantic and Lake Ontario find it impossible, for the most part, to surmount. Indeed, it was this defect in

the Rideau Canal, rendering it comparatively useless for purposes of trade, which led to the construction of the canals just enumerated. It would never do, therefore, to trust to navigation of this sort, assuming the command of the lakes to be as important now to the defence of Canada as it was half a century ago. In like manner the railways which have been constructed on the same principle as the canals will scarcely suffice, in Lower Canada, to multiply our military resources by facilitating the movement of troops. The Grand Trunk, which runs all the way from Riviere du Loups to Lake Huron, is carried as far as Montreal on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, never keeping farther than sixty, and approaching where it is nearest within ten miles of the frontier. How are you to defend a line thus exposed, throughout an extent, as the bird flies, of 250 miles—and how could you, being unable to defend, venture to make use of it, after hostilities began, for the transport of troops and stores from the coast to the interior?

Again, the effect of the Ashburton Treaty has been to render a thousand times more difficult than it ought to be military communication between Canada and the mother country, and between one portion of British America and another. From the month of December, when the navigation of the St. Lawrence closes, till the month of May, when it opens again, the only ports in North America accessible to English men-of-war, and transports, are Halifax in Nova Scotia, and St. John in New Brunswick. Now, such is the position of these ports relatively to Quebec, that though, as the bird flies, the nearest of them is within 300 miles of that city, you could not construct a railroad between them, which would be at all safe, except on a detour of upwards of 600 miles; and even then you must arrive at last on a point where your line shall connect itself with the Grand Trunk, and thus be brought within ten miles of the frontier. This never

ought to have been, and never would have been, had not Sir Robert Peel sent to negotiate with our slippery cousins a nobleman, disposed, if not by personal interests, without doubt by timidity, to sacrifice everything in the future to present peace. The State of Maine, of which the north boundary was marked on the map accepted by Franklin in 1785 at the 44th degree of latitude, was stretched down in a tongue by Lord Ashburton to the 45th degree, and the State now interposes for sixty geographical miles between two portions of British territory, wellnigh isolating both.

Meanwhile the United States, free from all apprehension of aggressive war on our parts, have gone on spreading cultivation northwards, and connecting by many lines of rail their great commercial towns with Lakes Erie and Ontario, and with the Canadian frontier. They have lines from Portland, Boston, Rhode Island, London, and New York—all of which join the Canadian Grand Trunk, or, to speak more correctly, are joined by it at a place called Mozer, about three miles within their own frontier. They have a line of their own which communicates with these, skirting the frontier as far as Ogdensburg, and which at Champlain is not more than 30 miles distant from Montreal. And more vexatious still, they have got possession, by virtue of the Ashburton Treaty, of the fort at Rouse's Point, which we built as on our own territory, before railways existed, in order to command the approaches to Montreal by Lake Champlain. It will be seen that their facilities of attack, in the event of a new war, are by these means greatly increased since 1814, for any number of troops may be moved by these various lines; and so long as the lines continue open, an army operating in front of them can be supplied as well and almost as speedily from Boston and New York as from magazines formed, as of old, at Plattsburg and Oswego.

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war in December last did not seriously alarm us. Men enough, we doubt not, the Americans could have got together. Indeed, there was a rumour in circulation, to which, however, we gave little credence, that they had collected as many as 20,000 close to the frontier. But to collect men and to move them are two different things, and to feed and provide for them, after they are fairly launched into a campaign, is a third matter, which inexperienced persons will find it easier to talk about than to settle. Still, if the Federals should by chance succeed, either in conquering the Confederates or in separating from them amicably, then we have every reason to expect that the Washington Cabinet will find it necessary to seek employment for its enormous army somewhere away from home. Nor is it difficult, if we may judge from the tone of the American newspapers, to guess in what direction General McLellan and his troops will be turned. Assume then, that a new quarrel is likely to be fastened upon England, and that the long-cherished idea of annexing Canada is resumed. How is it probable that the attack will be made, and by what means may we, while time and opportunity are afforded, best provide against the emergency?

We take it for granted that the Federal Government will for many reasons direct against Canada the largest amount of its disposable force which it can command. Less than 200,000 men would not suffice for so grave an undertaking; and if there really be, when hostilities begin, half a million under arms, there is no reason why 300,000 should not enter on the campaign.* The probabilities are likewise, that as far as the altered condition of both countries may allow, the assailants will advance by the same lines as in 1813. They will push forward three, perhaps four columns,

one from Washington to Detroit, at the top of Lake Erie; another from New York to Buffalo, at the bottom of the same lake; possibly a third to Sacketts Harbour, with a view to the reduction of Kingston; and a fourth from Boston to Rouse's Point, at the bottom of Lake Champlain. This last we may safely put down at not less than 100,000 men, while the other three may number 25,000 respectively. Previously to all this, strenuous exertions will have been made to build and launch such a number of war vessels as shall give them the command of Lake Ontario—an object which, unless we be beforehand with them, there is nothing to prevent them from effecting. Grant all this to be done, and well done, what follows? While Amherstburg and Niagara are both invaded, and Kingston invested, the larger army at Rouse's Point separates into two masses, one of which will threaten, and, if the opportunity serve, attack Montreal in front; while the other crosses the St. Lawrence opposite to Cornwall, and takes the city in reverse.

We assume that the officer who shall direct these operations has acquired in his contests with the Confederates some knowledge of the art of war. He will have learned, for example, that it is necessary, in conducting offensive operations, to keep open the communications of his own army with its rear, and having 25,000 men to spare, he will doubtless employ them on this service. They will watch Nova Scotia and New Brunswick from their own portion of the valley of St. John, and be ready, as occasion shall arise, either to repel an aggressive movement, or to make one. All this may not come to pass, nor even a portion of it, but all is undoubtedly upon the cards. What is England required to do in anticipation of it?

There may be both justice and wisdom in the theory, that colonies,

* It will be seen that we look at this matter from a purely American point of view. That the Federal States will have 500,000 men, or anything like that force, to draw on when their present troubles cease, we entirely disbelieve. But it is best to prepare for the worst, and the measures which we recommend are just as necessary against 100,000 invaders as against 300,000.

as soon as they acquire the rights of self-government, should be called upon to provide for their own defence in war. Like other general rules, however, this admits of exceptions, and the case of British North America must to a certain extent be regarded as exceptional. Perhaps England should not be taxed to keep soldiers continually at the Cape of Good Hope, in the Australasian group, or even in the West India Islands. Every one of these colonies is rich enough to maintain such armed force as it requires in time of peace, because they are all sufficiently guarded by distance, or by the naval supremacy of the mother country, from the sudden attacks of regular armies. But British North America is differently circumstanced. It stands face to face with a power which, in the appliances of modern science and in the courage and endurance of its people, is a match for the most military of European nations. An American army, when it first takes the field, may be little better than a rabble; but give it the experience of a year or two, and it becomes able to hold its own against the best troops in the world. So our people found half a century ago, and so, if the storm which we are now contemplating do not burst till 1863, our people may find again. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the Imperial Government is bound to garrison British North America in time of peace, and to render it all the support which can be spared when war arises. The Imperial Government may likewise, in our opinion, be expected to share in the expense of constructing such permanent works as prudence may suggest, and for this reason, that there are ten chances to one that war with the Federal States, when it occurs, will arise not out of colonial but out of Imperial questions. On the other hand, British North America cannot expect — we are sure that she does not expect — to be defended altogether by the mother country. She must out of her own resources sup-

plement the regular garrison, which the mother country supplies, with a numerous, stout, and well-disciplined militia. She has all the machinery ready, though for lack of use it has got out of gear: and she must restore it to working order, no matter what inconvenience the effort may occasion. We believe that a militia in Canada alone could be raised to the amount of 150,000 men, without any serious drain upon the industry of the country. Of this mass, 50,000 might easily be called out at a time, and kept under arms for three months. At the end of three months a second batch, to the like extent, should take their places, and thus in the course of a single summer we should be able to show a force of 100,000 disciplined soldiers in case of need. In winter all might drill, as our own Volunteers drill at home, at odd hours, in halls and under sheds, by squads and companies. With 150,000 provincials thus prepared, and 10,000 or 15,000 British troops behind them, Canada might safely, according to our view of the subject, defy the world in arms.

The same rule which we apply to Canada we should apply to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is not exacting too much from these provinces to require that they shall each supply 10,000 or 15,000 effective militia, which, supported by 5000 regular troops, will render them competent to play their parts in any game to which they may be called.

The American colonies will naturally look to the mother country for arms and stores. We do not think that they ought to accept these things as free gifts. They are rich enough to purchase their own *matériel*, as well as to clothe, pay, and feed their own troops when embodied. But if unable to bear the heavy expense of a first equipment, it seems to us that they cannot scruple to share it with the mother country, or at all events to take upon themselves the burden of keeping up the stock when it has once been supplied. In like man-

ner they will be expected, if not to defray, certainly to share the cost of all such public works as shall serve the double purpose of commercial and military communication. The railway from Quebec to Montreal, for example, is on the wrong side of the river. In time of peace it may be convenient enough; in the event of war it would become useless. If a second line on the left bank be considered indispensable, the Canadian Governments should be required to provide a fair proportion of the funds necessary to make it. And still more, should competent authorities arrive at the conclusion that England's readiest mode of obtaining and keeping command of the lakes is to construct a new canal, which, embracing and enlarging the first of those now in use, shall pass thence into the Ottawa Canal, and from the Ottawa Canal to Kingston harbour, then must Canada, as well as the mother country, be taxed for the completion of it, though possibly the heavier portion of the expense may fall upon England. Such a work, executed sufficiently in rear of the St. Lawrence to prevent the possibility of molestation from the other side, would for all military as well as commercial purposes throw the inland waters of America and the Atlantic into one. It would then be easy for Great Britain to crowd into Lake Ontario such a fleet as must render competition on the part of the United States hopeless. For, in spite of all their skill, the Americans could never build as fast as our gunboats and frigates could ascend from the seaboard, while the door would always be open to them to return for the blockade of the enemy's coasts, as soon as they should have destroyed the enemy's harbours and captured their flotilla on the lakes. It is obvious that the sort of canal of which we are now speaking, must be rendered more capacious in every respect than the most convenient of those now in use; though for an unreasonable depth there can be no need, because stores and guns can be floated on rafts or barges in rear of

the larger frigates when they come into smooth water.

It has been suggested to add to these a line of railway, which shall connect Halifax and St. John with Quebec. For reasons elsewhere assigned, we consider this project as of doubtful value. Not that we are disposed to make much of the physical obstacles presented elsewhere than through the valley of the St. John by the face of the country in New Brunswick. Of whatever nature these may be, skill, industry, and capital can overcome them; but your railway, when constructed, must either end at Riviere du Loups, whence it will run for thirty miles within ten miles of the frontier, or it will carry you to some point lower down the St. Lawrence, where the river is wide, and in winter generally impassable. Moreover, in reaching the opposite bank, you will find no railway to take you up, but the prospect of a march of two hundred miles over a country intersected with torrents, and otherwise difficult. On the whole, we incline to think that, till our line of frontier is rectified, the construction of a railway between the St. John and the St. Lawrence would, so far as military operations are concerned, be money thrown away. We must be content, therefore, for a while, to consider New Brunswick and Nova Scotia as a flanking bastion or ravelin thrown out from Canada, which, though it be cut off from ready communication with the body of the place, is not therefore useless.

We come now to another point, which is equally worthy of attention. Should any new fortifications be thrown up in Canada? and if thrown up, where shall we place them? We confess ourselves little friendly to a system of defence which depends to any great extent upon fortified places. Here and there, as in the Austrian Quadrilateral, these may be of the utmost importance; but a country like Canada will never be defended at all, unless it be defended by armies in the field. Indeed, the attempt to cover the frontier, or even the most

exposed points in it, by forts, or other enclosed works, must lead only to discomfiture. You could not garrison a dozen or two of such places except by weakening too much your field force, while each, as the enemy passed it by, would be lost to you. The best army in the world, however, if it is to act in separate corps, and over an extended area, requires here and there a *place d'armes*, round which its levies may gather, and on which, in case of disaster, its fragments may retire. This rule, which holds good everywhere, is especially applicable to the state of a country with a frontier so extensive and exposed as that of Canada.

If it be the use of history to read the future in the past, then the plan of campaign which we sketched out for the Americans in 1863 is that which they will probably follow. Canada will be invaded again, as she has been repeatedly invaded before, by Amherstburg, Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal: we must provide, therefore, for every possible contingency in each of these directions. Possibly Quebec itself may be threatened, even at the commencement of the war; but we certainly do not consider the contingency probable. For though it be indisputable that the power which holds Quebec holds the gate of Canada against all comers, no Federal leader, even if he could command the passage of the river, would throw himself in these days upon Quebec, till he should have barred out the population of Canada West from coming to its relief. For our present purpose, therefore, it will suffice to look to the old lines of attack, and see if we can render them safe to ourselves and difficult of emprise to the enemy.

It may well appear at first sight impossible to provide effectually for the defence of Montreal. We admit the difficulty of the scheme, but deny its impossibility. Montreal is too extensive, and lies too much in a hollow, to be enclosed within walls and ditches; but you may render the approaches to it ex-

tremely difficult by detached works judiciously placed, especially by the construction of a strong *tête-de-pont* on the right bank of the river, and by planting on the hill which overlooks the town on the left a redoubt or citadel. But you must do more than this. On the first tidings of war, an attempt must be made to take possession of the fort at Rouse's Point. The occupation of this, and of the forts at Isle aux Noix, St. John, and Chambly, would block the way long enough to try the patience of the assailants; and when these places fall, if fall they must, you have still your *tête-de-pont* to maintain, with the broad and rapid St. Lawrence behind it. It is possible that, even by these means, you will not be able to save Montreal from bombardment; but, assuming your military canal to have been completed, or that you have ships enough on Lake Ontario to hinder the descent of *bateaux* from Sackett's Harbour, we really do not see how the enemy are to cross the St. Lawrence in the face of a few batteries judiciously planted. Everything will of course depend upon your power to prevent the laying of a bridge. Should the canals be still where they now are, and Lake Ontario in the enemy's possession, Montreal can hardly be saved, unless you be in force enough to fight a general action, and defeat the enemy under its walls.

With respect again to Kingston, as the approaches to the harbour are already fortified, nothing more seems necessary than to strengthen the existing works, and, perhaps, to enlarge them. We are aware of the obstacles presented to this by the surrender, some time ago, of all crown lands to the local government, and by the encroachments subsequently made upon the line of fire by private dwellings. But if it be considered too expensive to remove these dwellings, their owners must be prepared, on an emergency, to destroy them; while fresh batteries are erected wherever their action seems to be required. Beyond this, however, it seems un-

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necessary to go. Kingston cannot be attacked, except by water, till Upper Canada shall have fallen; and if you so distribute its defences as to render a landing difficult and dangerous, you have done all in this quarter which circumstances admit of. The case is different both in Amherstburg and Niagara. There such places as Sandwich and Fort Dalhousie would simply be in the way. They might tempt a general to throw a few men into them whom he would certainly lose. But in the rear both of Amherstburg and the Niagara there are positions which, if taken up and rendered as strong as the skill of man can make them, would render the subjugation of these districts, if not impossible, at all events very tedious and very difficult.

Looking first to the Amherstburg territory, we find that the only retreat left open to Colonel Proctor in the last war was up the valley of the Thames. The same line would certainly be chosen now by an army worsted on the frontier; for the Grand Trunk Railway runs from Amherstburg to London, and from London by Hamilton to Toronto and Kingston. London itself thus becomes an important strategical point, being at once sufficiently removed from the border to serve as a place of muster for the militia of the district, and sufficiently near to afford security to the corps which might have engaged and been overcome by an invading army in Essex county. It is important, likewise, as holding the key to the only door of rapid communication between the extreme west of what may be called the settled portions of Canada and the Atlantic. It appears to us, therefore, that the Imperial Government will do well to take possession of as much land in this quarter as may enable our engineers to construct, without delay, an intrenched camp capable of being defended by 5000 men. With such a camp interposing between them and a march down the country, it is not probable that the American column, even if successful in the first instance, will

ever venture more than a few miles from its place of landing.

For the same reasons, and because the material facilities of the ground are even more striking, we would suggest the construction of a second intrenched camp of similar dimensions on Burlington Heights. These heights, it will be remembered, constituted the *point d'appui* on which, during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, the troops told off for the protection of the Niagara district always rallied after some temporary reverse. The town of Hamilton is now connected with them, and they command both its harbour, which is good, and the Grand Trunk Railway. Five thousand men thrown into an intrenched camp in this position would hold at bay any number of invaders, till time should have been afforded to call out the whole strength of the province.

We have alluded elsewhere to the possibility of an attempt by *coup-de-main* on Quebec. Not that we consider such an occurrence at all likely to happen. An American general would scarcely venture, with New Brunswick on his flank, to march by the uncleared portions of Maine, only that he might fight his way up to a broad river, through a district so well peopled and so warlike as St. Francis. But in war even possibilities must be guarded against. Quebec is strong already; its strength will be increased by surrounding the detached towers which now crown the Heights of Abraham with solid earthworks; and by looking to that exposed corner of the lower town, by which, during the war of the Revolution, Arnold had wellnigh entered. This being done, and care taken to have the magazines and arsenals well filled, we need not entertain the smallest apprehension for Quebec; and so long as Quebec remains in possession of British troops, the permanent conquest of Canada by the Americans will remain to be effected.

Having thus provided points at which the local militia may collect, and places of strength to which corps, worsted in a first encounter,

may retire, the military authorities on the spot must select some position where the grand army, which they propose to employ in active operations shall assemble. Such a position ought to be central, so that support may be conveniently sent from it to either flank, without, however, too much weakening the force which is kept in hand, to act wherever the enemy may show himself in greatest strength. It is not for us to indicate where the position should be. Enough is done when we point out that it ought not to be too distant either from Montreal or from Quebec, and that it should be chosen with a special eye to the railways, canals, roads, and other lines of communication which, when manœuvring begins, can be made available.

This plan of ours may, perhaps, be objected to as implying the abandonment of all those valuable counties which lie on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, and, still more, of the Grand Trunk Railway between Quebec and Montreal. Why not endeavour, in the first instance, to retain your hold upon these counties? and if that be impossible, why give up the railway without a struggle? Our answer is, that it would be imprudent at the opening of a campaign to commit a young army to a general action with such a river as the St. Lawrence in its rear; and that, in order to nurse such an army, and render it effective, you must leave many outlying provinces to take care of themselves. With respect, again, to the Grand Trunk Railway, it has elsewhere been shown that, with an enterprising enemy in our front, it becomes useless to us as soon as hostilities begin. A chain, be its length what it may, is only as strong as its weakest link; and a railway which runs for thirty miles within ten, miles of a hostile frontier, can scarcely be made use of in war for the conveyance of troops. As to patrolling these thirty miles, either on foot or by detached cars, that expedient could serve no possible purpose. The first effort made by the enemy will be to pos-

sess themselves of the line, and destroy it; and unless you are prepared to support your patrols with an army, the patrols can offer no resistance which shall be effectual against superior numbers.

But though we may withdraw our divisions for a time from the districts to the South of the St. Lawrence, it does not therefore follow that they are abandoned. Each county has its own local militia — these will all turn out; and should the enemy be so ill advised as to weaken himself in order to put them down, they will show good fight for their hearths and homes against his detachments. But this is not all. The armies of New Brunswick and of Nova Scotia will not be idle. Leaving a sufficient number, say 2000 regular troops and 8000 or 10,000 militia, to guard the provinces, the remainder will act upon the enemy's communications, eluding or fighting the corps of observation which watches them, and breaking up every line of rail to which they can gain access. If successful here, success will soon attend the British arms elsewhere. The heavy columns in front of Montreal will find it necessary to retire. The British army will cross the St. Lawrence in pursuit, and the campaign is just as likely to end by establishing a new frontier for Canada, with Portland on one flank, and Lake Ontario on the other, as by leaving the enemy in permanent possession of a mile of Canadian territory.

We give these speculations for what they are worth. The results of a war so waged must, of course, depend upon the military genius of the leaders on either side, and the bravery of the troops. But assuming these to be equal, we think the odds are in favour of our own countrymen. Indeed, if the proposed canal be completed in time, from the seaboard to Lake Ontario, and the flying corps, which is to harass the American coasts, do its duty, the war with England of 1863 will probably teach the Federals a lesson which they are not likely to forget for many years afterwards.

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