




### Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cat exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués cl-dessous.

	Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur		Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur
	Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagée		Pages damaged/ Pages endommagées
	Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée		Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
ļ	Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque		Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
	Coloured maps/ Cartes géographiques en couleur	~	Pages detached/ Pages détachées
	Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)	V	Showthrough/ Transparence
	Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur		Quality of print varies/ Qualité inégale de l'impression
2	Bound with other material/ Relié avec d'autres documents		Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
	Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ Lare liure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la		Only edition available/ Seule édition disponible
	distortion le long de la marge intérieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.		Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.
	Additional comments:/ Pages 119 to 226 are to Commentaires supplémentaires:	missing.	

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

ĺ



The to the

The post of the film

Orig begi the sion othe first sion or ill

The shall TINI which

Map diffe entin begi right requ met re létails es du modifier er une ilmage

8\$

errata to

pelure, on à The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:

Library of the Public Archives of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol  $\longrightarrow$  (meaning "CON-TINUED"), or the symbol  $\nabla$  (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too largs to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

La bibliothèque des Archives publiques du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'Impression ou d'Illustration, soit par le second plat, seion le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'Impression ou d'Illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole  $\longrightarrow$  signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole  $\nabla$  signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants lilustrent la méthode.



1	2	3
4	5	6

32X

### CANADA-OUR FROZEN FRONTIER.

THE probability of a war with the Government for the United Pro-Northern States of America makes us anxious to inquire what the condition of our colonies in that quarter of the globe is at present, and what assistance they may expect to receive from the mother country during the winter months.

Having passed a portion of last autumn in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Canada, we may perhaps be able to throw some light upon a subject which just now is one of great national interest.

Early in September a conversa-tion took place in our hearing on board one of those excellent steamers which ply between the rapids of St. Anns-the scene of Moore's "Canadian Boat - song" - and the town of Ottawa, the new seat of conferring with a contractor respect-

vinces of Upper and Lower Canada

The party consisted of a distinguished officer in the English army on full pay ; a merchant, resident at St. John, New Brunswick; an Englishman well " posted " in public affairs at home; and a member of one of the Colonial Legislatures.

These gentlemen we will for bre-vity call respectively — " Miles," "Mercator," " Civis," and " Senator."

They were all proceeding to Ot-tawa, - Miles to make a report on certain Government works ; Mercator to see his partner, who was en-gaged in the lumber - trade; Civia for curiosity, information, and fishing; Senator for the purpose of

+ Resolutions, &c., p. 23.

\* Report, i. 260.

ing the extension of raliways in his own province.

A brandy cocktail, after a substantial and well-cooked dinner, had made them all just sufficiently communicative and tolerant to be both pleasant talkers and good listeners.

CIVIS .- "How beautiful this river is! When one looks at the gorgeous foliage on the banks, the settler dropping calmly bat quickly down the stream in his cance, and feels the soft, warm, clear air, one can bardly realise the fact that before three months are passed the broad rapid stream will be completely frozen over, the branches of the trees borne down with snow, and the inhabitants along the banks almost entirely without occupation."

MERCATOR .- " Yes; the lambering is nearly over for this year now, and very few rafts will start from Ottawa after the first week in September."

Civis .--- "When do the steamers discontinue running ?"

MERGATOR. - "They knock off about the 20th of November, I am sorry to say, as I have shares in the company; and gramble extremely at our property being idle for full

four months every year." SENATOR.—"You will have more reason, I fear, to complain of your profits in the timber-trade falling off this year than your dividend in the steamboat company."

Pro-

Dan-

etin-

on

St.

ish-

e at

Co-

bre-

es,"

Ben-

Oton rca-

en-

ivie,

ishof

ect-

MERCATOR .- " Yes ; but our profits are pretty good most years, and we can afford to have a bad one in that trade now and then."

CIVIS .- " Have the troubles in the States affected the timber-trade of Canada much ?"

MERCATOR. - "Yes, sir, enor-mously; and that is one of those mously; and that is one of those and concerning which there are things which you people in Eng- continually angry disputes in the land forget when you tell us that Legislature. In the Lower, the land, we must take care of ourselves in tenure question being now settled, matters of military defence. Peace there can scarcely be said to be one with the States is essential for the matter of public importance upon prosperity of almost all trades in Canada, but especially the timbertrade.

can show by books of our own that we export as much to the United States every year as to Europe."

Civis .--- " And what has been the falling off this year ?"

MERCATOR. - "With the United States we have done nothing ; trade there has been so paralysed, and prices have been so low, that we could not deal with them, except at a loss, and have therefore preferred to keep our stock on hand."

MILES. - "How unfair, then, it is for England to suppose that Canada can defend herself in case of war between Great Britain and America. Her whole frontier must bear the brunt of the battle whenever it comes; and, owing to her proximity to the foe, she must suffer in a far greater proportion than the mother country."

CIVIS .- "Suppose a war were to take place between the two nations upon a subject which did not directly affect the interests of Canada, what view do you think the Canadians would be likely to take of it ?" MERCATOR .--- "I not only think,

but know, that both provinces are as loyal as the county of Middlesex. We are proud of our connection with the old country. We send our children there to be educated when we can; we speak of it as 'home;' we cling to monarchical principles. When the Prince of Wales was here, he was received throughout the whole territory with on enthusiasm impossible to describe or overrate, in spite of occasional maladroit advice and consequent arrangements devoid of tact and good judgment. In the Upper Province of Canada there are many subjects upon which men differ, matter of public importance upon which the public mind is at all agitated. Between the provinces Anything that affects the the question of representation, of quiet of the United States acts im- course, is one that divides parties, mediately upon our business, for I fills the newspapers with angry

arguments, and keeps up that unhappy feeling which their union was intended to obliterate, and which, in a great measure, it has allayed. But the people of both provinces believe that they have a better form of government than that which any foreign prince or president can offer them."

Civis.—"You hardly answer my question. If England was obliged to embark in a war with the United States, for the cause of which the colonies could in no way be held responsible, and the casus belli one that they were never asked their or nion upon, and were totally in-different to, do you not think that the feelings of the Legislature would be to throw off a connection which made them obnoxious to their friends, without giving them the means of protecting themselves from their enemies ?"

MERCATOR. - "You almost suppose an impossibility. America is not likely to go to war for any cause arising out of European disputes. But if she were to quarrel with you upon a question which affected England's honour, no matter how great our stake would be, or how little we had to do with the origin of the quarrel, we should prepare to defend our border with as much determination as if it were a question in which Canada alone was consulted and concerned."

SENATOR. - "I am not so sure about that. I believe the whole of the North American colonies would, if possible, on such an occasion, It would be impossible for them to act as Mercator has described ; but, in case of a sudden invasion in the winter season by a large army, they would very likely be driven to surrender, and would be obliged to make making any way." the best bargain they could for them- SENATOR.--- "I hope that is not selves."

MILES.—"I don't fear that any disaster of that kind could happen, even with the limited number of troops which we now have on the hostile army to penetrate far; but continent. We could, even with the efforts made by the inhabitants, these, defend some of the strong which alone would prevent a sucplaces and positions, while our cessful invasion, would be founded militia would in a few weeks be upon the conviction that they might

quite as numerons and well drilled as any soldiers that they would be likely to meet."

SENATOR .- "The loyalty of the people was sufficiently shown during the Crimean war, by their contributions to the Patriotic Fund, and during the Indian mutiny, by the raising of the 100th regiment; and I believe nothing short of insult from the mother country will eradicate the feeling of devotion to England and England's honour, that universally pervades all classes in our colonies. At the same time, I hold it to be the plain duty of England, under existing circumstances, to keep many more troops on this continent than she has hitherto done. Look at the frontier we have to defend. From Detroit to the River St. John is more than nine hundred miles, and thence to the Bay of Fundy is more than three hundred.

CIVIS .- "You don't propose that this should all be placed in a state of defence ?"

SENATOR --- " Certainly not : such a thing would be impossible, of course; but I mention it to show our vulnerability. If a trouble were to arise suddenly, we could only do as Lord Seaton did in 1837-concentrate our forces, form magazines, and organise our militia.'

Civis .--- " For my own part, I do not see that much ultimate harm would ensue if a lodgment were made in Canada during the winter months by a force from the United States. penetrate far into the interior. The absence of roads, the nature of the country, and the severity of the climate, would prevent them from

the opinion of English statesmen at home. It is true that the loyalty of the inhabitants of Canada would render it almost impossible for the

## drilled as be likely

of the own durheir conic Fund, utiny, by regiment; ort of inintry will votion to honour, all classes ame time, duty of circumore troops she has he frontier Detroit to nore than thence to than three

opose that a state of

ot; such a of course; v our vulere to arise lo as Lord entrate our d organise

part, I do nate harm were made ter months ted States. or them to erior. The ure of the ty of the them from

hat is not atesmen at the loyalty hada would ble for the far; but inhabitants, ent a sucpe founded they might expect succour from England before tier. But supposing that we were long, and that England is ready to protect our interests, and indeed to defend her own honour, which would be for ever sacrificed if she were to regard with coldness an attack upon our soil."

1862.1

CIVIS. — "You mistake me. I mean that the invasion of Canada would not be attended with ulti-mate success. We could, when the St. Lawrence opens, crowd the lakes with gunboats, cut off the enemy's basis of operations, and capture the whole of their invading force.

SENATOR. - " But see what destruction would be effected in the mean time I Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, totally unde-fended, would very probably fall. Batteries might be erected, which would render their recapture difficult and expensive. Besides, if England does not think that it is of vital importance that our towns should be saved from pillage, the sooner we know it the better, in order that we may be able to take measures in time to save ourselves from such a calamity.'

CIVIS. — " If anything like the destruction of defenceless towns were to take place, we could have the most ample revenge by attack-ing and destroying the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and many others along the coast.

SENATOR. - " An operation which would be nearly as injurious to your own merchants and countrymen as to the Yankees, putting humane notions aside."

MILES .- " As we are at present, in case of an unexpected attack, the ropes of the ships become coated and only thing to be done would be to stiff with ice, which prevents their seize a few strong positions, and running through the blocks. The hold them with the regular army, 'bordage,' 'consisting of rough and leave the militia to account for masses of frozen water, shifting, the enemy when they crossed at rushing, and grinding with the other places; but the rapid manner action of the tide and wind, and in which the Americans have de- varying from a mile to two in width, veloped their railway system has would render the landing of troops altered the whole state of things in a most perilous undertaking. No respect to the defence of Canada common sailors could be of the least since 1837. Besides, that was only use in overcoming the difficulties, or a rebellion, and danger was not in managing the ice-boats necessary actually felt beyond our own fron- for a disembarkation. And I should

at war with the States, they would threaten by railway our New Brunswick frontier, from Bangor in the State of Maine. At Richmond they could, by sending troops from Portland, intercept our railway be-tween Montreal and Quebec, and from this point to Detroit, in the extreme west, they would have lines along every inch of their border, communicating with the great seats of industry and popula-tion — Boston, Lowell, New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati — and the Atlantic coast."

C.vis.-" We could send you reinforcements from England in a month."

MILES. - " Suppose the difficulty were to take place in the winter. The St. Lawrence is practically closed by Christmas, and it would be madaess to attempt to land troops on the lower part of the river, even if ships could get into the centre of the stream. The snow-storms in the beginning of December are fearful - perfectly blinding, and the navigation most dangerous."

MERCATOR. - "There can be no better proof of that statement, than that after the middle of November owners find it extremely difficult to effect insurances on the strongest ships."

MILES .- "No wonder. The channel is narrow and tortuous. The masses of ice floating about the river are sufficient to break the strongest paddle-wheels to pieces, and to damage the most powerful screw. The be very sorry to entrust any num-ber of men to the charge of the most experienced 'voyageurs,' wonderful as their daring and skill is in getting through this inhospitable stuff. A very short time ago, the 1st regiment was wrecked at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The men were all saved; and as the winter had not set in, a steamer was sent down from Quebec, which took them off. Had it been later in the year, it is impossible to say what the consequences would have been, for there was no road to escape by, and no ship could have come near them. Then again, if we were to look for help from Halifax or St. John, I believe the road from Fredericton to Riviere du Loup, the point where the Grand Trunk Railway terminates, is parrow and bad, and would offer many difficulties to an army in the winter."

SENATOR — "From the Lake Terriscouata to the St. Lawrence it is now, and, I have heard, good; at any rate it ought to be an excellent one, for it has cost the province a very large sum of money."

MILES .- " Is it macada mised ?'

CIVIS. — "Oh dear, no! It is a common clay road, with ruts in places two feet deep, many of which are capacious enough to inter a file of grenadiers.

"The country is covered by dense forests, only thinly populated, and buried in ice and snow for at least four months in the year."

MERCATOR. — "In peace we have a ready access to Canada through Portland, in the State of Maine, over a railway to Quebec, which is leased to the Grand Trunk Railway Company, and worked by them. This of course would be closed to us in war, and we should therefore be confined during the winter to one route — namely, that through New Brunswick, which Civis seems to have lately seen."

Civis.—" I shall not forget it in a hurry. About a fortnight ago I passed over it all with a friend, in travelling from St. John to Quebec."

MILES.—"Then, as we are speaking of the defences of Canada, will you give a description of your journey, for there is nothing so important connected with that subject as the means of transport through New Brunswick ?"

Civis. - "We left St. John one morning about the end of August, in one of the steamers which ply daily during the summer and autumn between there and Fredericton, the town which, for some good cause, I have no doubt, is the seat of government rather than St. John, the commercial capital of the province, and the most flourishing place between Quebeo and the 'hungry' Galway. The passengers on board the steamer gave one a fair notion of what the travelling population is. One or two settlers, intelligent and hardy Scotchmen, returning to their farms after making arrangements at St. John with merchants there, about sending down their corn for exportation; lumberers returning to their clearings; a few timbermerchants running up to get a peep at their various saw-mills and depots along the river; and three or four copper-coloured parties, at-tired like dilapidated inhabitants of Monmouth Street, whose long, black, straight - matted hair, dark, narrow, long eyes, high cheek-bones, flattish nose, wide mouth, bad teeth, and Tartar-like expression, made our first impression of the 'red man' anything but ro-mantic. A few of them are here generally seen in every steamer, lying lazily on the cargo near the engine, or crowded with their squaws and children in some snug corner of the vessel.

"They are dreadfully poor and indolent, and defy the exertions of all settlers to make them work. Nothing will induce them either to dig the ground or hew the timber, and they seem perfectly incapable of learning any trade which might keep them in competence. They live in wretched villages of wooden huts, and support life by hunting and fishing, while the women make

# [Jan.

are speak-Canada, n of your ing so imat subject rt through

John one of August, which ply nd autumn Fredericton, some good is the seat n St. John, of the proishing place e 'hungry' on board ir notion of pulation is. elligent and ing to their rrangements hants there, eir corn for returning few timberto get a aw-mills and ; and three parties, atinhabitants whose long, hair, dark, high cheekwide mouth, like expresmpression of ng but roem are here ery steamer, rgo near the with their a some snug

y poor and exertions of them work. em either to w the timber. tly incapable which might They tence. s of wooden by hunting women make

baskets, as well as that bark-work, banks, the great width, and the ornamented with flowers in mouse bold cliffs, are very much allke in hair, so familiar to us at home. At both, As we approached Fredericthe same time, no one can build a tor, the banks became tamer, the cance like an Indian. His work clearings very frequent, and the apin that line contrasts as favourably pearance of the soil extremely rich. with that of the Anglo-Saxon as Meadows, on which were feeding one of Barker's broughams does large quantities of sheep and cattle, with a hackney cab; and no for- were situated near the river, behind eigner can call a moose, track a which rose hills covered with wood, bear, or spear a salmon in com- putting one in mind of the Clifden parison to him. They are per- valleys around Maidenhead. fectly harmless; and although liv- "The distance from St. John to fectly harmless; and although living completely apart from Europeans, freely mix with them in the towns, solicit their alms, sell them game, and accompany Englishmen as guides in all sporting expeditions.

1862.1

" For the first ten miles after leaving St. John, the river spreads out into a series of lakes, each of which varies in breadth from two to four miles. Hills of considerable height, clothed with pine and oak from the top to the water's edge, fall precipitously to the shore ; and rocky cliffs occasionally jut out into the stream, which in many places is so deep that the steamers can run np close to the trees that hang along the tween Fredericton and St. John Where the Kennebecasis banks. joins the St. John, the traveller may think that he has arrived at some great inland lake; for, in looking into its broad mouth, the watery horizon is only slightly varied by the mirage floating under the clear

sky. "The stoppages at regular stations along the St. John are not frequent, but many boats push from shore to take off and bring back passengers. This does not in each case occupy more than two minutes. The vessel is eaded, a rope thrown to the boat, mand a fine view of the broad which a man seizes with consum-stream in front. The only public mate skill, and away goes the conveyance north of this point steamer again at full speed, towing is the Woodstock 'stage,' a sort the boat along until the process of of George II. coach, very heavy, disembarkation is effected.

good notion of the St. John river, we there made the acquaintance of thirty miles away from its mouth, the first down-eastern 'cousin' we except that the colour of the former had the honour of meeting. After is brown, and that of the latter clear answering the common - form quesand blue : but the high wooded tions of the Yankee catechism, re-

the capital is about seventy miles, and is performed by the steamers in eight hours against the tide, which runs up nearly the whole way. Great numbers of sailing vessels are met, loaded many feet above the deck with planks sawn at the various mills which lie along the river. But the rafts are much larger than those we have seen on the Ottawa, some extending over six or seven acres. They are very unmanageable, and where there are shoals and islands, often offer serious impediments to the course of the steamers."

MILES. - " Is there any road beupon which artillery can travel?"

CIVIS .- "Yes. On the left bank of the river, from Carleton there is a very good one, over which the transport of troops would be quite practicable.

"The town of Fredericton may be said to consist of one long street lying along the river. The houses are generally built of wood, and are of a very poor character. A few pretty villas are situated on the wings of the town, which have a comfortable appearance, and comrough, and uncomfortable. We have, "Those who have seen the Danube however, pleasant recollections of at Orsova, can form from that a the seat behind the coachman, as specting our country, business, and destination, our friend srid, with that in New Brunswick is the bad food curt sharp coolness ot his countrymen — ' Well, as you come from Eng-land, s'pose you know Taylor of Sheffield?' We thought for a moment, and were obliged to express our regret that we had not the advantage of Mr. Taylor's acquaint-'Strange, that,' replied he ; ance. ' thought he was well known. Smart man, Taylor, and prompt in business matters. He travels for Smith and Company. One of you very much resembles him.' 'Indeed,' said we, 'we know a great many Taylors, but we fear we can't boast the acquaintance of Messrs. Smith's Taylor.

" The road lies along the banks of the St. John the whole way to Woodstock, a distance of sixty-five miles. The scenery resembles Saxon Switzerland - luxuriant meadows near the banks, and rich land in all directions; the clearings numerous, and the country thickly populated. About seven miles from Fredericton the Madamkeswick joins the St. John, forming one of the most lovely views on the continent of America. The Yankee remarks — 'I guess the Moose river in the State of Maine whips it?' 'No, sir,' replied the driver, a loyal New Brunswicker; 'all your folks that comes on my coach swears this is the prettiest spot in the whole airtile.' Nothing can be much Nothing can be much worse than the road, but our ve-hicle was well horsed and went down the most precipitous dips and over the loose wooden bridges at a pace which tried our nerves to the ntmost. These bridges consist of rough wooden buttresses, on which are placed strong timber logs laid longitudinally and covered over with transverse planks, which generally have nothing to keep them in their position but their own weight; and as we passed over the mountain - streams the boiling torrent was frequently seen through the larger crevices, which any other wheels in the world, we believe, would have fallen into.

" The great drawback to travelling which one is obliged to eat; and about half-way to Woodstock, where the coach dines, we were obliged to ill - treat our hearty appetites with salt pork, greasy trout, bad butter, and execrable tea. On arriving at our destination, we found, however, a comfortable little inn, kept by a Mr. English, which is the only place between Fredericton and the St. Lawrence where anything approaching to a civilised repast can be obtained. The next day's journey was to Grand Falls, a distance of seventy-five miles, which we were obliged to perform in a waggon kindly provided for us by Major Tupper, who has the contract for the mails to Rivière du Loup. As far as Tobique, a small village close to the St. John river, the scenery was very much the same as that of the previous day, but the road a good deal rougher, so that it was impossible to travel more than about five miles an hour. After passing Tobique the clearings got less frequent and the forests more dense. The road leaves the river and passes over a ridge of hills covered with pine, hemlock, maple, ash, and oak. Below the town of Grand Falls the St. John, about one hundred yards wide, throws itself over a rugged and irregular bed of rock quite seventy feet high, and rushes down a deepwooded and very picturesque gorge - taking three or four more leaps in the space of about two miles. Here we found ourselves close to the frontier of the State of Maine, and were not surprised to be told that a considerable immigration had taken place into New Brunswick since the beginning of the war. The people, apprehending a large amount of taxation, have preferred to immigrate to British soil, although the advantages, in respect to the purchase of land, are not so great here as in the States. The next day a drive of twenty-six miles brought us to Little Falls, a small town at the junction of the rivers Madawaska and St. John,

wher latter, after adhering with great scene. No house, no smoking cotfidelity to its course for more than tage, no boat, nor picturesque peatwo hundred and forty miles."

1862.1

frontier ?"

CIVIS .- " I will abswer your question better by saying that at Woodstock we were about fifteen miles from the boundary line, but near Tobique it strikes the St. John, which continues to be the frontier for sixty miles beyond Little Falls."

MILES .- "So that between Tobique and Little Falls the road is close to the frontier ?"

Civis.—" Exactly; it then fol-lows the river to the foot of the Lake Temiscouata, where we stopped for the night at a house outside the hamlet of Degilé. About halfway between Little Falls and Degilé we passed a long straight cutting in the forest, which we found to be the boundary between New Brunswick and Canada. The next on the lake morning we embarke. in a fine cance, propelled by two men using alternately paddles and falling into the St. Lawrence have poles, as they considered best. only about twenty miles to travel, Where the river Madawaska leaves while those falling into the Bay of the lake we passed a place which Fundy pass over the whole length never freezes even in the coldest weather. Six or seven feet of ice may be all around, but at this spot there is always flowing water. We could not hear that there were any hot springs, but there can be no doubt that the coldest winter has little effect upon the temperature of this part of the lake. The wind was considerable, and it was remarkable to see the light and easy way in which our 'Indian bark' glided over the waves, not forcing or dashing herself through them like our boats, but slipping politely and quietly over the crest of each, insinuating herself gracefully into their captivated affections. Lake Temiscouata reminded us of Loch Lomond - the hills densely and universally wooded from top to bottom, and their foliage tinged with every variety of gorgeous colour -

'Umbrageous hill, sweet glades, and forests

we bade a final adieu to the But silence reigned over the whole sant; all is lonely and deserted, MILES .- "How far is this from the but at the same time bright and If there were on its luxoriant. pleasant hills a few inhabitants like those at home, Temiscouata would, I fear, make some of our Scotch lakes hide their diminished heads, and even render it advisable that Killarney should avoid watering her colours quite as much as she does if she wishes to retain her rank amongst the sweet waters of the globe. At the head of the lake we found a waggon which had been sent to meet us from Rivière du Loup, some forty-five miles far-This journey we perther north. formed on the new road which Mercator has been speaking of, but were disappointed to find it very little better than that between Lit-tle Falls and Degilé. The drive was through wilderness, broken by very few settlements, until we came to the watershed. Here the streams of the province of New Brunswick. The view on descending was very splendid — the St. Lawrence, twenty miles in width, lay at our feet studded with large islands, and dotted with ships beating up and down in all directions. On the other side is a noble range of mountains, into which the gloomy Saguenay winds its fathomless course; and here ended my first journey in the New World, which I must say was an extremely rough, but by no means a disagreeable one."

SENATOR .- "I suppose the population is chiefly French ?"

Civis .- "Between St. John and Grand Falls they are almost all of English and Scotch origin, but after passing Little Falls, one . rarely meets a person who can speak any language except the French patois."

MILES .- "You see from Civis's description how exposed our fron-

to travelling

the bad food to eat; and dstock, where re obliged to ppetites with t, bad butter, n arriving at und, however, in, kept by a the only place and the St. ing approachst can be obday's journey a distance of h we were obwaggon kindly Major Tupper, for the mails As far as Toe close to the enery was very at of the pread a good deal was impossible bout five miles assing Tobique s frequent and ise. The road passes over a red with pine, and oak. Be nd Falls the St. ired yards wide, rugged and irreaite seventy feet down a deepcturesque gorge ur more leaps in wo miles. Here close to the of Maine, and to be told that migration had New Brunswick of the war. ending a large have preferred British soil, alges, in respect land, are not so e States. The of twenty six Little Falls, a junction of the and St. John,

1837 and 1838, at the time of the the snow hardened by the first regi-Canadian rebellion, if they could."

MILES .- " Then they only marched in companies through a friendly country, which is very different from moving an army in time of war along the enemy's frontier."

of that expedition; but I daresay to have been transported upon it Miles can tell us the particulars."

for it has always been looked upon by military men as a memorable following year the 11th regiment transaction, and was attended with left St. John and proceeded in exa success which the great risk rendered very remarkable; and when but seem to have suffered more these troubles in America commeuced, I rubbed up my memory, by looking at some interesting records on the subject, now to be found bivouscked in the depth of the winat the library at Quebec.

"When the attack of the rebels on the Richelieu broke out the first week in November, the 43d and 85th were ordered from New Brunswick, and the 34th from Halifax. These three regiments marched along the route which Civis has just described, and the season is said to have been one of the severest on record."

"SENATOR .- " I very much doubt wick ?" that fact; for I recollect that the 83d regiment was brought up by steamboat from Quebec to Montreal in December of the same year. that being much later than usual for the river to remain open."

MILES .- "Well, I am inclined to agree with you that the year was not so severe as those who have described the march represent it. The two first regiments I have mentioned followed each other in quick succession: the 43d left Fredericton on the 11th of December,\* and reached the St. Lawrence in few bridges there at that time?"

tier is between Woodstock and the twelve days. The 85th started from tier is between Woodstock and the twelve days. The soun started from St. Lawrence, and what a difficult St. John a few days after, and country it would be to march an army proceeded by the same route, but throngh in winter." SENATOR.—"In the winter they quicker than the 43d, the path would come as the troops did in being in some degree better, and ment.

"The 34th, after the reverse at St. Dennis, were marched up from Halifax, and left St. John about ten days after the 85th. This regiment seems to have been able to SENATOR .- "I forget the details make more use of the river, and a considerable portion of the way, MILES.-" My recollection of the but does not appear to have done history of that march is distinct, the distance in a shorter time than the other two. In December of the actly the same mode as the 34th, from the cold than their predeces-sors. This, however, did not prevent the galiant 11th from being ters of 1838-39 and 1839-40 on the banks of the Temiscouata, during the dispute upon the boundary question between Great Britain and the United States, and the regiment had the distinction of marching thirteen hundred miles in the snow during the two winters which they spent in America."

Civis.—"In what numbers did the men travel through New Bruns-

MILES. -- "In companies of nearly one hundred, and were carried in sleighs, each of which held eight men. During the first part of the march, the 43d and 85th were able to get along at the rate of twentyfive miles per day, but the seven last days, which they passed between Little Falls and the St. Lawrence, were extremely severe, and the country was a great deal wilder and less settled than that through which the first part of the journey lay."

SENATOR .- "I believe there were

\* Since the above was written, an interesting account of the march of the 43d has appeared in the Army and Navy Gazette of December 14th.

Jan.

1862.1

started from s after, and e route, but ance one day id, the path better, and the first regi-

[Jan.

he reverse at ched up from John about b. This regibeen able to he river, and orted upon it 1 of the way, to have done rter time than ecember of the 11th regiment roceeded in exas the 34th, suffered more their predeces-did not pre-th from being pth of the win-1839-40 on the iscouata, during boundary ques-Britain and the the regiment of marching les in the snow ters which they

t numbers did ugh New Bruns-

panies of nearly were carried in hich held eight first part of the 85th were able ate of twenty-but the seven last passed between 10 St. Lawrence, re, and the coun-l wilder and less brough which the hey lay." lieve there were

that time?"

e march of the 43d

MILES .- " I think not. I recollect that they were obliged to cross v al rivers in boats."

"INATOR .- " Well, in that respect the route could be more easily performed now, for, according to Civis, although his nerves were severely tried, he was never reduced to passing through one of those torrents, the view of which, through the creaking and broken planks, appears so to have disturbed his peace of mind."

MILES .- " Of course the journey could now be done much more easily than it was in 1838, but you must recollect that we were then at peace with the States; but if we were at war we might not be able to venture to send men by companies; they would be then obliged to travel in large bodies, and bring with them artillery."

Civis.—" Not all the way, surely." MILES.—" Well, from Woodstock

to the St. Lawrence the road runs so near the frontier that I don't believe any officer could recommend a march by companies. They would be exposed to be cut off by an enemy who would thoroughly know the country, and could bring a considerable body of men to bear upon many points of the line. Be-sides which, unless we had troops at St. Andrews, the Yankees would probably seize that terminus, and send their own forces along the new line to Woodstock, and in that way cut off our communication entirely, and render any advance impossible."

SENATOR .- " I was going to suggest that this new line would be of much service to us."

MILES .- "So it would, no doubt, if we were sure of holding it; and it would be the best way now to get troops to Quebec so long as we can command it; but the enemy have got perfect railway communi- tempting cation to Bangor, within fifty miles vateers to of this town, and there can be no to time." doubt that the whole of the St. An-MILES.

bour of St Andrews, which is more free from those fogs that are the curse of the Bay of Fundy, than St. John ; but if it were determined to make the latter place a central depot, there is a good road to St. Andrews, and the distance not more than sixty miles, so that the rail-way would be quite accessible, if it were thought desirable to use it."

SENATOR .- " I believe in ordinary times there are not more than three regiments in Nova Scotia and New Bruswick, besides a few artillery; and in case of war with the States, these could not be spared. In fact, Halifax and St. John would require large garrisons, and St. Andrews

ought to be protected as well." MILES.—" I quite agree with you. The harbour of Halifax would be the great object; the forts at its mouth would require to be manned, and the citadel must be taken care of as well.'

Civis. - " Lord Mulgrave seemed fully impressed with this idea, and when I was there the other day the people spoke of him in terms of great praise for the successful efforts he had been making to raise volunteer

corps in the neighbourhood." MILES. — " Volunteer artillery corps would be invaluable at Halifax, and I am glad to hear that they have been induced to see the necessity of raising them. The fleet would, I think, prevent any serious attempt being made upon the harbour; but it is such a vital point, that no effort ought to be spared to put the works in a thorough state of defence and have every gun properly manned, which it is quite possible to effect with volunteers, when we consider the large population

and feeling of the place." MERCATOR. — "The trade of St. John is so extensive, and the shipping so great that it would be a tempting place for the Yankee privateers to make a dash at from time

MILES. - " The remarks which I drews and Quebec track would be made with regard to Halifax ap-continually in danger. There is, ply with equal force to St. John. however, a good access to the har- Of course more damage could be

I hold Halifax must always be the to be the best port of embarkareal basis of operations; its harbour tion." is open throughout the whole winter, and never exposed to those have a carte blanche given you by awful fogs which hang continually round St. John, and in fact the whole mouth of the Bay of Fundy."

MERCATOR. - " There can be no age it ?" nastier navigation than that round the western extremity of Nova- England after November, I should Scotia; a heavy rea continually certainly prefer sending them to St. runs there; the tide is the most rapid in the world, and the atmosphere is almost always thick."

tingency we are contemplating were they would meet with fewer casualto take place in the winter, after the ties in following the example of St. Lawrence is closed, where would 1837. Arrangements could be easily you send the troops to ?"

MILES.—" Undoubtedly to Halifax."

SENATOR. - " There is a line of railway open from there to Truro, intervals of nineteen or twenty miles, sixty miles; and from that to Peti- into which plenty of stores. could codiac, a station on the Shediac and be put, and where the men could St. John Railway, is only seventy bivouac for the night. Food could miles. Could not troops be marched easily be provided at each of these across there and get straight down places, and there is no reason in the to St. John by rail ?"

the country is well settled and the would be obliged to march on snowroad excellent. course, it is covered with ice and had passed, guns could be transsnow; and from Amherst to the ported without difficulty on sleighs. railway it is dense forest, with a A guard would be placed over these fair road and a well-to-do popula- depots; and although some danger tion, who could afford the troops would be incurred from the liability plenty of assistance."

long one, and time would be valu- enemy could come are so few and able under the circumstances we far between that a small force are supposing; so I should much would be sufficient to check any prefer sending troops by railway to attempt of this nature. Windsor, and then run them across Andrews Railway would have to be the Bay of Fundy to St. John."

them straight to St. John from Eng- to the frontier should be broken up land ?"

the way I propose avoid the danger- could hew down the largest tree in ous navigation we have been speak- twenty minutes, would make the ing of, and could send them down roads impassable in a few hours, the bay in smaller numbers than if and render the march of the troops we were to transport them direct comparatively safe." from England. Besides, I hold

done to commerce at St. John, but for almost any amount of shipping,

CIVIS. -- " Now if you were to the commander-in-chief, to transport ten thousand men to Canada in the winter, how would you man-

MILES. - " If they were to leave certainly prefer sending them to St. John by Halifax and Windsor, to running the risk of landing them amidst the storms, snow, and ice in CIVIS .- "Well, suppose the con- the Lower St. Lawrence. I believe made for putting a regiment or two under cover every night, along the march through New Brunswick. The lumberers would run up sheds at St. John by rail?" world why, with proper clothing, the CIVIS.—" From Truro to Amherst men should suffer. Probably they In the winter, of shoes, but after a regiment or two of an invasion from the State of MILES .- " The march would be a Maine, the roads upon which the The St. guarded, or at least watched : the Civis. -- "Why not then send various roads leading from the State and the bridges destroyed; while MILES. - " Because we should in a body of lumberers, each of whom

Civis .--- " Is it not strange that a Halifax with its accommodation railway has not been made before

Jan.

it of shipping, of embarka-

you were to given you by ef, to transen to Canada ould you man-

were to leave nber, I should ng them to St. d Windsor, to landing them low, and ice in nce. I believe h fewer casualhe example of could be easily egiment or two ight, along the Brunswick. The a up sheds at or twenty miles, of stores. could the men could nt. Food could t each of these to reason in the per clothing, the Probably they march on snowegiment or two could be transulty on sleighs. laced over these gh some danger om the liability m the State of apon which the are so few and a small force to check any The St. ture. rould have to be t watched; the g from the State ld be broken up estroyed; while s, each of whom e largest tree in ould make the in a few hours, ch of the troops

bt strange that a een made before

1862.]

done I believe it is out of the power of man to describe the benefit which the provinces would derive from it. New Brunswick would rapidly be-come settled. Halifax would suc-cessfully rival Portland. The colonies would get the advantage of the postal contract which England is now obliged to give to the States. St. John and Quebec, brught into direct and rapid communication with each other, would increase with giant strides in wealth and importance. The trade of Canada, now shut up for six months in the year, would find an outlet through British ports. The mother country would save money in being relieved from keeping garrisons in Canada even as large as she does now, and the colonists would at length feel that they were brought nearer to England; while a closer intimacy would create increased affection for your laws and civilisation. The great obstacle to the extension of a railway from Halifax to Quebec has been the want of means by which the Governments of the three provinces through which it would run can act in concert. One province may make a railway, but there is no machinery by which the concurrence of all can be obtained, which is absolutely necessary for such a work as you allude to. This has been our great stumbling-block; and the example of the States shows what a detriment it has been to our advancement. There railways are made through wildernesses and prairies without inhabitants, but which become settled, cultivated, soon and wealthy. The lines may not and do not pay, but the State receives enormous advantage, and is indirectly recompensed a hundred-fold."

MERCATOR. -- " Commerce would be benefited in a similar degree by fax for two to Quebec in the course expense of which would perhaps VOL. XCI.

now along the St. John to the St. of the year; we should save the Lawrence?" heavy insurances required for early SENATOR.—"You, sir, have hit the right nail on the head: if that were Lawrence; and the trade now crowded into six months would be equally diffused thronghout the twelve. I am inclined also to think more favourably of the direct paying prospects than Senator; for half the year the St. Lawrence would not compete with it, and for the other half it would give a route to Europe and back more expeditious and safe than any other."

CIVIS .- "From a superficial observation of the resources of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, I should think that railways through the interior would develop many sources of industry now unknown."

SENATOR. - " Undoubtedly. Immigration would become rapidly increased, agriculture would be extended in proportion to the amount of labourers coming over to us. Those provisions which we now get from the States to the amount of nearly a million of dollars a-year, we could raise for ourselves; and if any surplus remained, we should become successful competitors with the far West for the European trade, possessing enormons advantages, as we should, in situation over the farmers of the prairies and the Mississippi valley."

CIVIS .--- " If the advantages are so great, how is it that this railway has not been built before now?"

MERCATOR .- " Chiefly for the reason which Senator has assigned; but we think we have a right to ask the mother country to help us."

Civis.—" I fear the doctrine of subsidies to Colonial Governments is exploded, and that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer is one of the most determined enemies to its revival."

SENATOR. -- " I cannot understand how such a friend to peace as Mr. Gladstone can object to the promotion of an object that, by relieving the colonies from a weakness the line you speak of. Vessels that invites aggression, will perhaps could make three voyages to Hali- some day prevent a war, one year's

show Civis that, if the mother country will comply with the request which will be made upon her Chancellor of the Exchequer this

an opportunity of meeting several gentlemen who were on a tour through Canada and the States, for the purpose of investigating the prospects and position of the Grand Trunk Railway, and who were kind enough to put us in possession of certain facts, and permitted us to of the State of New York, is used see papers and documents, from throughout the winter. If this which we think we can lay before opinion be correct, the formation our readers a statement respecting the importance of direct communication with Canada, a subject that the leading characteristics of the has since derived additional interest Canadas. Instead of being shut from the state of our relations with out from all direct intercourse with America. Since the year 1836, the project of connecting Quebec with the Atlantic, by means of a railroad through British territory, has been anxiously and seriously debated; and during the disputes respecting the boundary question, which were not finally settled for some years afterwards, the probability of St. Andrews becoming the Atlantic terminus of this line served as an ad- of passengers, to the whole of Brit-ditional stimulus to the Americans ish North America would be carminus of this line served as an adto bring their frontier as near to that ried on." harbour as possible. This they finally accomplished, and the mouth of the road was entertained by the Gov-river St. Croix was unfortunately ernment of Sir Robert Peel, but taken as the limit of the boundary was abandoned in consequence of of the United States, instead of Pe- the survey which was then made by nobscot Bay, as it had originally Sir James Alexander and Colonel been intended. On the establish- Simmonds, proving how much more ment of transatlantic steam navigation, Lord Durham was directed to money upon a railroad. And in 1846 turn his attention to the formation a second survey took place, under of a road between Halifax and Que- the auspices of Major Robinson and bec; and, after pointing out the Captain Henderson, and two reports difficulties which the relation of were consequently made and presented the various provinces to each other to Parliament. presented to the undertaking, that

pay for two or three railways from noble Lord remarked, in his report, Halifax to Quebee." that the completion of any satis-MERCATOR.—"When we get to factory communication between Ottawa, I think I shall be able to Halifax and Quebec "would in fact produce relations between the provinces that would render a general union absolutely necessary. Seve-ral surveys have proved that a railwinter, she would not only not lose, way would be perfectly practicable but save several thousands per an- the whole way. Indeed, in North num." railway bears by no means the excessive proportion to that of a com-On our arrival at Ottawa, we had mon road that it does in Europe. It appears to be a general opinion in the United States that the severe snows and frosts of that continent very slightly impede, and do not prevent, the travelling on railroads; and if I am rightly informed, the Utica Railroad, in the northern part of a railroad from Halifax to Quebec would entirely avoid some of England during half of the year, they would possess a far more certain and speedy communication throughout the winter than they now possess in summer. The pas-sage from Ireland to Quebec would be a matter of ten or twelve days, and Halifax would be the great port by which a large portion of the trade, and all the conveyance

> In 1843, the project of a military Simmonds, proving how much more advisable it would be to spend the

A line was recommended to be

Jan.

1862 ]

in his report, of any satisbetween ion would in fact veen the proider a general essary. Seveed that a railtly practicable eed, in North of making a means the exthat of a comoes in Europe. general opinion that the severe that continent , and do not g on railroads; informed, the e northern part v York, is used the formation Ialifax to Queavoid some of eristics of the of being shut intercourse with of the year, far more cercommunication ter than they mer. The paso Quebec would or twelve days, be the great arge portion of the conveyance whole of Britwould be car-

ct of a military d by the Gov-bert Peel, but consequence of then made by r and Colonel how much more be to spend the d. And in 1846 ok place, under r Robinson aud and two reports de and presented

nmended to be

constructed down the right bank of the enterprise by them before rethe St. Lawrence, on to the Bay of commending the Imperial Parlia-Chaleur, then, near Northumber- ment to afford the necessary assistland Straits, across the Miramichi ance. river, and so on to Shediac, Trnro, and Halifax, with a branch from Governments took of the project Shediac to St. John. In these able was, that no other measure could be papers, it was shown most plainly conceived that would so surely conthat the railway could be constructed solidate the colonies and perpetuate at a much less expense than those the counection with Great Britain. in the States. The enormous ad- The Parliament of Canada passed vantages of the line, in a military an Act declaring, "That if her and mercantile point of view, were Mejesty's Government shall underpointed out with great minuteness; take the construction of the said and the benefit which would re- railway either directly, or through sult to our fisheries along the Bay the instrumentality of a private of Chaleur and Northumberland company, it shall be lawful for the Straits was fully considered and Governor in Conncil, on behalf of demonstrated. and Captain Henderson considered yearly, in proportion as the works that "it was the one great means by advance, a sum not exceeding which alone the power of the mother  $\pm 20,000$  sterling towards making country can be brought to bear on good the deficiency (if any) in the this side of the Atlantic, and restore income from the railway, to meet the balance of power fast turning the interest of the sum expended to the side of the United States. upon it, and to place at the disposal-Every new line of railway adds to of the Imperial Government all the their power, enabling them to con- ungranted lands within the procentrate their forces almost wher- vince lying in the line of railway, to of which there are already some, side thereof; and to undertake to and there will soon be more, reach- obtain, pay for, and place at the ing to their northern frontier, they disposal of the Imperial Governcan choose at their own time any point of attack on the long extend- the province for the line of railway, ed Canadian frontier, and direct and for proper stations and ter-their whole strength against it. mini." The provinces of New The provinces, therefore, and the Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in empire, having such interest in the effect, did the same thing. In 1850 formation of the Halifax and Que- the Hon. Joseph Howe of Nova bec line, it should be undertaken Scotia was sent to England with by them in common, as a great the view of inducing the Governpublic work for the public weal." The subject was taken up with wards giving effect to the resoluwarmth by the Government which tions of the different Legislatures, succeeded that of Sir Robert Peel; and on the 10th of March the deciand in 1848 Earl Grey, the Colonial sion of the Government was con-Secretary, in expressing his belief veyed to Mr. Howe. The credit of that great advantages would result England was to be employed to not only to the territory chiefly in- enable the provinces to raise upon terested in the work, but to the advantageous terms the funds neempire at large, requested the Gov- cessary for the works. This assisternors of the several provinces to ance was only to be given in case bring the matter before their re- of provision being made for a comspective Legislatures, in order that plete line between Halifax and the Government might know the Quebec; but that of Major Robin-degree of importance attached to son and Captain Henderson was

The view which the Provincial Major Robinson this province, to undertake to pay ment all the land required within ment to take active measures to-

not insisted upon as a sine quâ non, given ten years previously. A although any deviation from it was noble lord was then deputed to to be subject to the approval of visit British North America and her Majesty's Government. Sub-sequently, the valley of St. John was agreed upon by Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia as the proper route; but this being so great a deviation from the proposed line of Major Robinson, another application to the home authorities was necessary. At this time a change of ministry took place in England, and the Colonial Secretary did not conceive that the Government would be justified in carrying out the pledge of assist-ance to the project, now that it was so much changed from the original plan. Then came the Russian war, followed by the Indian mutiny, which had the effect of hanging up the matter till 1857, when delegates from Canada and Nova Scotia were again sent to England, and once more the subject was pressed upon the Government, the same arguments being used and similar offers made by the provinces. The following year both branches of the Legislature of Nova Scotia and Canada addressed the Orown, praying -"That arrangements may be matured for the early commencement and Loup in Canada, from St. John to the completion of this work by the Shediac in New Brunswick, and united efforts of the three provinces of from Halifax to Truro in Nova Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, with such co-operation and aid from your Majesty's Imperial Government as may be commensurate with the greatness of and Shediac, and between Frede-the object, and the magnitude ricton and Rivière du Lonp, or of the national interests which it promotes."

Public meetings were held, resolutions passed, and the Colonial Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were again waited on, when it was pointed out that Provincial Legislatures, having passed the acts affording assistance to the scheme so far back as 1849, might consider that these acts had fallen is not remunerative; that the Britinto desnetude, and that, as the ar- ish Government should guarantee a rangements had not been carried minimum dividend at 4 per cent on out, the provinces might think them- the whole amount, which would

ascertain how far the colonies would be disposed to ratify the engage-ments of 1849. He reported that the majority of the people in the three provinces were desirous of seeing the work undertaken, and that the acts of 1849 were con-sidered to be in full force. Dele-gates from Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, were again sent to England for the purpose of pressing the subject on the Imperial Government. They addressed Sir Edward Lytton and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the autumn of 1858, but a change of Government occurred before any action was taken by the home authorities. We believe that gentlemen have this year come over to England in hopes of inducing the Colonial Office and the Treasury at last to grant them the same assistance promised by Lord Grey in 1851, and which, by a series of untoward circumstances, for which the colonies are not to blame, has never been afforded to them. Since the negotiations commenced in 1849, a line has been opened from Quebec to Rivière du Scotia. These are all portions of the great Halifax and Quebec route, to complete which a junc-tion must be made between Truro a length of nearly three hundred and seventy miles of new railway, which it is estimated will cost about £3,000,000.

We believe that the proposal made to the present Government is that the three provinces will each charge their revenues with the payment of £20,000, to meet the interest of capital expended in case the line selves absoived from the pledges amount to £120,000 per annum. For

116

previously. A ien deputed to h America and ne colonies would ify the engagele reported that e people in the ere desirous of undertaken, and 1849 were conall force. Delea, New Brunsotia, were again r the purpose of t on the Imperial y addressed Sir d the Chancellor n the autumn of e of Government any action was authorities. We lemen bave this England in hopes olonial Office and ast to grant them ice promised by 1. and which, by rd circumstances, lonies are not to r been afforded the negotiations 9, a line has been ec to Rivière du from St. John to Brunswick, and Truro in Nova are all portions ifax and Quebec e which a junc-de between Truro between Fredeere du Loup, or ly three bundred of new railway, ted will cost about

hat the proposal esent Government provinces will each nes with the payo meet the interest d in case the line ve; that the Britshould guarantee a at 4 per cent on int, which would U per annum. For this she would have the guarantee never to pay a cent beyond its of the Provincial Governments for working expenses. £60,000, and the security of the land for ten miles on each side of the line. As to the other £60,000, we should have the payment in our own hands, for we now pay the United States £25,000 for the transmission of mails to Canada, a service which would be transferred to left our shores, and which we are the projected line. We should save £25,000 a-year on the Cunard contract, by Halifax being more than five hundred miles nearer our shores than New York, and we should receive from the United States at least reach its destination. At any rate,  $\pounds 20,000$  per annum for the trans- let the work be begun. We think mission of their mails by the railway; so that, provided the Provincial Governments meet their engagement, which there can be no reason to doubt their ability or willingness to do, the mother country would be supremacy on the American contiten thousand a-year richer for this nent, than anything that a bountiful guarantee upon their hands than Providence has hitherto given us the without it, even if the railway were means of accomplishing.

A golden opportunity now offers itself of completing this great work ; public attention is drawn to the locality. The whole nation must feel the necessity for it; the anxiety which pervades us all as to the safe arrival of the army that has just told is supplied with every appliance that can make it formidable to our enemies, would be considerably allayed if we were certain that it could with ease, and without risk, we have shown that it can be ac-complished without cost to this country; and we believe that, independently of military considerations, it would tend more to establish our

### THE CONVULSIONS OF AMERICA.

talked, and read much about Ame- war; for previous insults from the ica of late, must feel that English same quarter still remain unatoned opinions on the subject, as rendered for : and now that we have, at enorby the tone of our press, have been mous cost, and with patient and qualified by the medium that trans- self-denying efforts, anassed an mits them. Nobody in private life armament which adequately repre-talks about "our Transatlantic kins-men," -- nobody desires to claim should have no objection to employ peculiar ties with the performers in it in administering s sharp chastise-the absurd and barbarous dances ment to the vaing orious people who which the American nation executes have so often cheaply defied us, round its idols of the hour, any more Sentiments, conciliatory even to than with the worshippers of Mum-bo Jumbo. (Our conversation on the topic is not silly or sentimental. We do not speak of the least san-the heart of the motion. It would be guinary of civil wars as "the terrible and fratricidal struggle which is drenching America with blood." It is not a fact, as is sometimes as-It is not a fact, as is sometimes as-serted in print and public speeches, versation of intelligent Englishmen. that every Englishman worthy of When they read the speeches of the name deplores the separation American public men, and the arti-between North and South. The cles of American newspapers, they view commonly taken by English-feel only scorn for the blind fol-men, who do not on that account lowers to whom such blind guides consider themselves unworthy of the are possible. They are unable to name, is, that every day tends to see anything peculiarly tragical in justify the judgment and policy of the fact that half-a-million of men the South in withdrawing from a have been brought together in arms system, the results of which are to hurl big words at each other system, the results of which are to hurl big words at each other what we contemptuously witness, across a river. Nor do we see any-We do not desire above all things thing in the circumstance that Amethat the struggle should be at once rica was first colonised from our own that the struggle should be at once rica was nest colonized from our own concluded, no matter how; because shores, to induce us to treat with a conclusion which would leave the extraordinary indulgence the com-South at the mercy of a vindic- posite population with whose man-tive, unfair, and ungenerous enemy, ners, cactoms, and character, we have would gratify nobody. We do not so little in common. What truth can lament over the unexampled display there be in the plea of relationship of weakness made by the great Re- as an inducement to conceal our public, because we knew that such real sentiments, when we so loudly weakness existed and it was not for derided our own follow-subjects of weakness existed, and it was not for derided our own fellow-subjects of the interest of truth nor of the world the Irish Brigade, who went forth the interest of truth nor of the world the Irish Brigade, who went forth that it should any longer be dis-guised, or allowed to vaunt itself as ridiculous? And wby should we matchless force. Nor do we, as a conceal our contempt when absurdi-people, desire to accept any slight, ties far more mischievous, and on shifty pretence of reparation for the an immensely extended scale, are recent ruffiantly outrage, which may committed by those whom twad-be held by some among us, to whom dling sentimentalists term "our honour is but a fantastic name, to American cousins"?

EVERYBODY who has thought, absolve us from the necessity of impossible for the national vanity of America, hungry as it is, to extract any nourishment from what is expressed on the subject in the con-versation of intelligent Englishmen.

118

1862.]

he necessity of coults from the main unatoned e have, at enorh patient and amassed an equately repref /England, we sharp chastiseious people who ply defied us. tory even to acifio even to tly ascribed to real origin in n. It would be national vanity as it is, to exit from what is ject in the conent Englishmen. he speeches of n, and the artiewspapers, they the blind folch blind guides are unable to arly tragical in million of men ogether in arms at each other do we see anytance that Amed from our own s to treat with ence the comth whose manaracter, we have What truth can of relationship to conceal our n we so loudly llow-subjects of who went forth nake themselves vhy should we t when absurdiievous, and on ded scale, are twadwhom term " our If asked these hard things to explain, I own I am wholly unable; And hold the attempt the more vain. When I think of the Building of Babel. The primitive world to lay bare Philologists try, but I doubt it : As none of them chanced to be there, It's clear they know nothing about it. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll. What Adam in Eden might speak, Could not be the tongue of his mother; It may have been Gaelic or Greek; It must have been something or other. It may have been Senscrit or Zend, Chaldaic, Assyrian, Arabic: It may have had joints without end,

Or it may have been monosyllable. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

But why should we puzzle our brains With Etymological folly?

The prize wouldn't prove worth the pains, Or help us a bit to be jolly.

For if we in twenty strange tongues Could call for a beef-steak and bottle,

By dint of mere learning and lungs, They wouldn't be nearer our throttle. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

I've ranged, without drinking a drop, The realms of the dry Mithridates:

I've studied Grimm, Burnou', and Bopp, Till patience cried " Ohe jam satis."

Max Müller completed my plan, And, leave of the subject now taking,

As wise as when first I began, I end with a head that is aching. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

The speech of Old England for me, Which serves us on every occasion! Henceforth, like our soil, let it be Exempted from foreign invasion. It answers for friendship and love, And all sorts of feeling and thinking; And, lastly, all doubt to remove— It answers for singing and drinking. Toroddle, toroddle, toroll.

#### THE DEFENCE OF CANADA.

THE storm which lately threatened us from the far West, has blown over. We are not going to have war with America about the question of the Trent. But the question of the Trent never would have arisen, had not the feelings of the American people and Government been very hostile to England, and there is nothing to show that the American Government and people are at all reconciled to as by the manner of its solution. The evidence, on the contrary, is all the The Americans have other way. been coerced into an act of justice, which they performed with the worst possible grace; and we are frankly assured that the time is coming, when they mean to take ample vengeance for present humiliations. It appears, then, that a war with the Federal States of America is only deferred. If not imminent, it is pretty sure to come sooner or later. The point, therefore, for us to determine, in the meanwhile, is-How shall we prepare for such a contingency, and conduct the war when it comes?

There are two modes of carrying on war with America-one aggressive, the other defensive. We shall probably adopt both. We shall assail their harbours, burn their fleets, destroy their commerce, and keep their whole seaboard in a state of constant alarm; and we shall give employment by these means to no inconsiderable portion of the half million of men whom they boast to have under arms. But we shall have a defensive war likewise to provide for, on the side of Canada. How shall we best effect that purpose? This is a question which cannot be rightly answered unless we possess some knowledge of what has occurred in that part of the world already; for it is not less true of wars in America than of wars elsewhere, that, making due allowance for change of time and

circumstances, they almost always repeat themselves. We propose, therefore, in the present paper, to preface our suggestions, in regard to the future, with a brief sketch of the various contests which have already taken place, in and for the mastery of Oanada.

Before the breaking out of the seven years' war, which occurred in 1754-5, the American provinces which now acknowledge the sway of Queen Victoria were, with one or two exceptions, dependent upon. France. Cape Breton, with the whole of what is now called New Brunswick, formed their extreme limits on the east; and they stretched away westward by Lake Champlain, through Lake Ontario to Niagara, whence they held out their hands by the Ohio river towards New Orleans. In contradistinction to this arrangement, Nova Scotia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, were English settlements; of which both the dignity, and, as it was assumed, the material interests, were endangered by this bold attempt on the part of their rivals to hem them in, by connecting Lake Erie with the Mississippi.

There had been little amity between the English and French settlers at any time, and now the encroachments of the latter upon their hunting-grounds, stirred the indignation of the former to a high degree. Frequent skirmishes went on between them, till at last the Cabinet of St. James's determined to bring matters to an issue, and to strike in that quarter with all the force of the Empire. Accordingly, General Braddock, carrying with him 2000 regular troops, sailed from England, and in February 1755 arrived in America.

General Braddock called together the provincial governors at Alexandria in Virginia, and arranged with them a plan of campaign. It

228

almost always 's propose, therepaper, to preface egard to the fuetch of the varihave already or the mastery of

ing out of the hich occurred in rican provinces edge the sway of re, with one or lependent upon eton, with the now called New their extreme and they ist; stward by Lake Lake Ontario to ey held out their o river towards contradistinction nt, Nova Scotia, V York, Pennsyld Virginia, were ; of which both it was assumed, sts, were endanattempt on the to hem them in, e Erie with the

little amity besh and French and now the enlatter upon their stirred the inmer to a high deirmishes went on at last the Cabinet ermined to bring ie, and to striko ith all the force ccordingly, Geneing with him 2000 ed from England, 1755 arrived in

k called together vernors at Alexia, and arranged of campaign. It was settled that the enemy should be assailed on four distinct lines at the same time. First, that Brad-dock himself, with 2000 of the best of the troops, provincial as well as regular, should march against Fort Du Quesue on the Ohio; second, that two regiments should be detached by the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, and by Lake Oncida to Oswego, a British post on Lake Ontario, whence they were to fall on the newly-crected French fort at Niagara; third, that a corps of provincials should blockade Crown Point on Lake Chemplain; and, lastly, that the disposable troops from Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, about 2000 in number, should attack the French settlements in the Bay of Fundy, particularly Fort Beau Sejour, on the isthmus connecting the peninsula of Nova Scotia with the continent, where Fort Cumberland now stands.

It is not our intention to describe the operations which followed. General Braddock, as is well known, failed. He had 226 miles to traverse through the primeval forest, in which a full month, all but two days, was expended; and being attacked at disadvantage, just as Fort Du Quesne became visible, he was defeated and killed. The operation against Fort Niagara came to nothing, and the blockade of Crown Point, though vigorously attempted, broke down. On the side of the Bay of Fundy alone success attended the British arms. There Fort Beau Sejour fell after a brief bom-bardment, and the French were removed from every point whence they could seriously annoy, or even threaten, the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. We shall be glad, however, if our readers can bear in mind how this campaign was conducted, in order that, when the proper time comes, they may be able to follow such reasoning as the circumstances of the case seem to suggest.

The year 1756 was not remarkable on the side of the English for plans more wisely arranged or more vigorously carried into effect. Re-

inforcements of troops were indeed sent from Europe, and in the month of July Lord Lowdon ar-rived to command them. But his arrangements for the campaign seemed to be pretty much what those of his predecessors had been, only on a more limited scale. He determined to act upon two instead of upon four lines; to resume with one corps the abandoned attack on Fort Niagara, and to establish the supremacy of the English on Lake Ontario; while with the other ho possessed himself of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, both of them on Lake Champlain. The total strength of the army assembled for these purposes at Albany was 16,000 men, of which 6000 were allotted to the attack on Fort Niagara, the remainder to the operations on Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

Early made aware of the danger which threatened, the French general took vigorous steps to avert it. Ho strengthened his works at Niagara and Crown Point, and formed an intrenched camp at Ticonderoga. Not content with this, he equipped a flotilla on Lake Ontario, and determined to anticipate the English by assuming the initiative. Lord Lowdon had made choice of Oswego as the point where the depot for the left column of his army should be established. It could be reached with comparative facility from Albany by the Mohawk river and Lake Oncida, and by the river Onondaga, which flows out of Lake Oncida into Lake Ontario. Indeed, there was safe water-carriage almost all the way, a distance of 160 miles, both for troops and From Oswego, however, stores. Niagara could be approached only by navigating the broad waters of Lake Ontario, for which purpose vessels of a larger size than mere bateaux would be required. Hence, before putting his columns in motion, Lord Lowdon sent forward a body of artificers under the escort of 1400 troops, with directions to strengthen the works at Oswego, to afford protection to the stores

as they came in, and to build, with as little delay as possible, such a flotilla as might be trusted on the lake at all seasons.

It is never safe in war to select a base which shall lie between your own headquarters and the army of the enemy. The Marquis de Montcalm, Governor-General of Canada, saw that Lord Lowdon had committed this mistake, and took advantage of it. At Frontignac, now called Toronto, he embarked 3000 excellent troops, and on the 10th of August appeared off Oswego, his lighter vessels being protected by two sloops, one of sixteen, the other of twelve guns. To land and invest the place was the work of a few hours, and on the 14th it surrendered. There was an immediate end to the campaign. The vessels of war and of transport, which the English were building, fell into the enemy's hands; so did all the provisions and stores which during the summer had been accumulated. Lord Lowdon, therefore, despaired of success against either Niagara or Crown Point, and, leaving garrisons in his own advanced posts at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, he withdrew into winter quarters in and about Albany.

It will be seen that in both of these campaigns Canada was threatened after precisely the same fashion. The object of the invaders was to gain the command of Lake Ontario, while at the same time they moved upon Montreal by the route of Lakes George and Champlain. In 1757 a new scheme was devised. Lord Lowdon received instructions from home to act everywhere else on the defensive, while, with all the force which he could collect, he endeavoured to reduce Cape Breton. Sixteen line-of-battle ships and eight frigates accordingly assembled at Halifax, for the purpose of transporting to Cape Bre-ton an army of 10,000 men. But, before the expedition could sail, intelligence was received of the arrival at Louisburg of a supe-rior French fleet; and at the

same time such an account was given of the strength and preparations of the garrison, that Lord . Lowdon despaired, with the force at his disposal, of being able to reduce it. The projected invasion of Cape Breton was therefore abandoned, 'and the army again broke up. But the campaign was not abortive merely. The enemy, taking advantage of the exposed condition of the frontier, moved upon Fort William Henry. It was gallantly defended for a while, but surrendered on the 9th of August by capitulation; after which Montcalm, made aware of Lord Lowdon's return to Albany, blew up the works, and fell back again to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

Dissatistied, as they had every reason to be, with the mismanagement exhibited in these proceedings, the British Government superseded Lord Lowdon, and gave the command of the army, already on the spot, to Major-General Abercrombie. He was directed, with 15,000 men, of whom 6500 were regular troops, to resume the attack on Orown Point and Ticonderoga; while a second corps, 7000 strong, and entirely composed of provincials, should move, as General Braddock had done, on Fort Du-Quesne. At the same time, a third division from England, having General Amberst at its head, was to reduce Cape Breton, assisted in that operation by a fleet of twenty-two ships of the line and fifteen frigates. All these instructions seem to have been issued early in 1758. But there was no locomotion in those days either on land or water by steam, and fleets took months to accomplish voyages which are now calculated by weeks. As, therefore, on this as on former occasions, the march of the several corps was to be simultaneous - as, indeed, success in one operation was expected to be coincident with, or at all events necessary to, success in all - neither General Abercrombie nor General Forbes, the latter commanding the force which was di-

280

n account was th and preparason, that Lord . with the force f being able to ojected invasion therefore abanmy again broke paign was not he enemy, takhe exposed conier, moved upon y. It was gala while, but surh of August by which Montf Lord Lowdon's ew up the works, to Crown Point

they had every the mismanagethese proceedovernment supern, and gave the rmy, already on r-General Abers directed, with whom 6500 were resume the atoint and Ticoncond corps, 7000 ly composed of move, as General ne, on Fort Dume time, a third land, having Geits head, was to n, assisted in that et of twenty-two d fifteen frigates. ons seem to have in 1758. But omotion in those nd or water by took months to s which are now eks. As, thereformer occasions, several corps was ous — as, indeed, peration was excident with, or at ry to, success in eral Abercrombio es, the latter come which was di-

rected against Fort Du Quesne, began to move till General Amherst reached the seens of action. This he appears to have done about the middle of May. He brought with him 11,000 good troops, and sailing from Halifax on the 28th, he anchored on the 2d of June in Gabarus Bay, Cape Breton.

1862.].

General Amherst carried all before him. Wolfe, who commanded the brigade which first made good its lauding, soon effected the in-vestment of Louisburg. More than one hundred boats were indeed lost while conveying troops and stores to the shore, and a garrison of 3000 men, supported by 2500 seamen, offered a stout resistance; but on the 26th of July the place capitulated. The capitulation included, not the whole of Cape Breton only, but Prince Edward Island into the bargain, and both have continued ever since dependent upon the British Orown. Neither were General Abercrombie's efforts, though foiled in their main object, altogether He passed his corps on fruitless. the 5th of July down Lake George in 1035 boats, which he had assembled at the point where Fort William Henry formerly stood, and, driving in the enemy's pickets, made preparations to carry Ticon-deroga by assault. It was a strong position on the neck of land lying between the waters of Lake George and the river, which in its course opens out to form Lake Champlain, and was covered by intrenchments, having a line of abattis laid down in front of them. Just where the waters meet, stood a small square fort with bastions, serving the purposes of a keep to the other works. Without, as it would appear, having paused to reconnoitre these intrenchments, General Abercrombie sent his troops against them in six columns of attack, of which the consequence was, that his people got into confusion, and were repulsed with the loss of nearly 2000 mer He immediately withdrew to the head of Lake George, where, amid the ruins of what had once been ral Abercrombie, and returned to

Fort William Henry, he began to intrench himself. But he did not remain entirely on the defensive. Intrusting 8000 men to Colonel Bradstreet, an enterprising and able officer, he sent them to execute a plan which the Colonel had devised. They passed by the Mohawk river and Lake Oneida to Osvrego, whence, having provided themselves with a sufficiency of boats and canoes, they crossed the lake unobserved, and landed on the 25th of August close to Fort Frontignae. This they inmediately invested, and on the 27th made themselves masters of the place. It was, however, too much in advance of the English lines to be permanently retained; and so Bradstreet, after loading with stores all the vessels which he could find, of which not fewer than nine carried from eighteen to eight guns respectively, partially rnined the fortifications, and recrossed the lake to Oswego,

Alarmed and disappointed by the failure before Ticonderoga, General Amherst left sufficient garrisons at Louisburg and Halifax, and set off with five of his most effective bat-talions to join General Abercrom-bie. Had he proceeded by sea to New York, there might yet have been time, before winter set in to netione the director but distant retrieve the disaster; but, distrust-ing the winds which had kept him a formight between Cape Breton and Boston, he made up his mind to disembark at the latter place. The distance from Boston to Albany is only 165 miles; but not only were there in those days no roads through the forest, but it does not appear that the country had ever been surveyed. General Amherst accordingly found that he had undertaken a very difficult task. He made his way slowly, with much labour and fatigue to his men, and reached Fort William Henry only on the 5th of October, too late in the senson to commence operations with any hope of bringing them to a successful issue.

He left his battalions with Gene-

Albany, where in due time information came in of the complete success of General Forbes. That officer had marched from Philadelphia, threaded the forest in the track which Braddock's army had cleared, and after a sharp action in which his advancedguard suffered severely, debouched in front of Fort du Quesne. The French governor, not considering himself strong enough to sustain a slege, evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by the English. These repaired and enlarged the works, and leaving a garrison, called it Fort Pitt, the name which it still retains.

The capture of Fort Du Quesne was important only so far as it redeemed to some extent the tarnished lustre of the British arms, and relieved the colonists of Maryland and Virginia from the vicinity of neighbours who had long kept them uneasy. Had Abercrombie carried Ticonderoga, establishing at the same time his ascendancy on Lake Ontario, the front of Canada would have been a good deal exposed; but neither achievement, however complete in itself, could have vied in importance with the conquest of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island. The loss of these settlements cut off, during six months in the year, all communication be-tween France and her American settlements. No French fleet could longer find shelter in the Bay of Fundy, and the St. Lawrence was as completely closed against navigation then as it is now, except in seasons unnaturally mild, from the middle of December up to the middle of May. Nor was this all. There was no reason why the tide of conquest should stop at Fort Beau Se-The whole of New Brunsjour. wick lay open to invasion, and through it, when overrun, a road might be constructed, which should lead an invading force to the Lower St. Lawrence. It does not appear, indeed, that the value of the conquest presented itself in this point of view to the authorities either at home or abroad; but they equally

saw that a good base was established for a combined operation of the fleet and army in Lower Canada; and the Government made its preparations during winter to turn it to account.

The plan of campaign for 1759 was formed upon a grand scale. It was settled that upon four separate lines the enemy should be assailed. Away upon the extreme left, a force was to assemble at Fort Du Quesno for the reduction of all the posts which the French had established in order to keep open the commu-nications between Lake Erie and the The expedition which had Ohio, been arranged in 1755 against Niagara was to be renewed. Once more Ticonderoga and Crown Point were to be assailed from Albany, and an attempt made to penetrate by Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, while a powerful armament, despatched from England, should make its way up that river, and endeavour to take possession of Quebec itself. Once more we must ask our readers to stop and consider the scope and tendency of these arrangements. The operations from Fort Dn Quesne were rather local than imperial; they sought no higher object than to clear away certain hornets' nests which trou-bled the English trappers, and kept the advanced colonists of Maryland and Virginia uneasy. The rest were manifestly aimed at the conquest of French America; and though, in the circumstances which then existed, the most remote of the three, that directed against Niagara, may be regarded as superfluous, even in this case there was something like a definite end to serve. The capture of Fort Niagara, it was assumed, would isolato the whole of the enemy's settlements on Lake Erie, besides contributing to establish for the English the command of the navigation of Lake Ontario. No doubt the command of Lake Ontario, and of all the lakes, must have fallen as a matter of course to the power which, being already mistress of the provinces to

so was establishoperation of the Lower Canada; nt made its prenter to tuin it to

mpaign for 1759 a grand scale. It pon four separato hould be assailed. streme left, a force t Fort Du Quesno of all the posts h had established open the commu-Lake Erie and the dition which had 1755 against Niarenewed. Once and Crown Point iled from Albany, made to penetrate in to the St. Lawowerful armament, England, should p that river, and ake possession of nce more we must to stop and consider ndency of these aro operations from were rather local they sought no an to clear away nests which troutrappers, and kept lonists of Maryland uneasy. The rest aimed at the conoh America; and ircumstances which e most remote of directed against regarded as superthis case there was a definite end to ture of Fort Niaumed, would isolate enemy's settlements besides contributing the English the navigation of Lake oubt the command io, and of all the fallen as a matter power which, being of the provinces to 1862.]

the south of the St. Lawrence, should have reduced to subjection those lying to the north of the same line. But we are writing about times when strategy was not so well un-derstood as it is now; and to threaten an enemy on many points at once was considered more artistic than to strike boldly and in force at his capital. Hence the expedi-tion against Niagara, though in point of fact a mistake, had some show of reason in its favour; which reason, curiously enough, has operated ever since, and may perhaps ope-rate again, whenever the Federal States shall make up their minds to go in for the conquest of Canada.

It is not necessary to narrate in detail the progress of these several enterprises. That on the extreme left succeeded with scarcely any loss. The French evacuated all their posts up to Detroit, and concentrated thereby a respectable field force, with which they endeavoured to interrupt the siege of Niagara. But Niagars, which had been approach-ed as before by the Mohawk river, Lake Oneida, and across Lake On-tario from Oswego, was already in-vested as early as the 4th of July, and on the 24th the army which advanced to its relief sustained a defeat. Next day the place, with its garrison of 600 men, surrender-ed, and the immediate object of the left succeeded with scarcely any loss. ed, and the immediate object of the enterprise was achieved. Yet no results conducive to the final success of the campaign appear to have followed. The enemy, masters of Frontignac, now Toronto, were still masters of the navigation of Lake Ontario. They even attempted from that post to surprise Oswego, and the troops which had been left there to guard the depôts of the Niagara column. Though repulsed, they made good their retreat, and continued to be formidable. two corps of the invading army was everywhere clear, when twenty-wasted their strength on isolated en- two sail of line - of - battle ships, terprises, leaving the thira to break thirty-five frigates, and a multitude itself against natural obstacles, of transports, having on board 8000 which it never ought to have en- troops, went round to the month countered, and which it proved quite of the St. Lawrence to strike at incapable of overcoming.

The Defence of Canada.

General Amherst conducted in person the corps of which we have last spoken. At the head of 11,000 men, he followed the same route which all who served before him in that part of the country had taken, and landed on the 22d of July, where Abercombie had formerly done, within a mile or two of the position of Ticonderoga. The French, whose total force did not exceed 3500 men, withdrew from their lines in the night, leaving a garrison of 400 good troops in the keep. But these were too valuable to be thrown away, so on the 26th the keep was likewise abandoned. Even Crown Point the Marquis de Even Crown Font the marquis ge Montealm did not consider defen-sible, and on the 4th of Angust it likewise fell. There, however, General Amberst's triumphs ended. He was inferior on the lake in armed vessels to the enemy. He applied himself to building such vessels, and strengthening the works at Grown Point, which gave him at Grown Point, which gave him full occupation till the middle of October; when the weather broke, and a succession of adverse winds hindered him from following up his successes. The consequence was, that, after being baffled in two at-tempts to reach Isle au Noix, he brought the campaign to a close by quartering his troops at Crown Point, Fort William Henry, Fort Edward, and Albany; and returned himself to New York, where he arrived on the 11th of December.

Meanwhile the expedition from England, of which General Wolfe was at the head, was playing its part in the great game. It quitted England as early as the middle of February, and arrived off Louisburg on the 2d of April; but finding the harbour still frozen, the fleet bore t, and away, and took shelter in Halifax. Thus There it waited till the navigation Quebeo.

16

VOL. XCI.

a

positions which the Marquis de in the neighbourhood of the Jacques Montcalm had made, and the force at his disposal wherewith to meet the threatened danger. His whole army including militia, did not exceed 20,000 men. With about 2000 he held what we should now call Toronto; with 3500 he observed Lake Champlain; 1500 occupied Thus ended the campaign of Montreal; and 2000 posted them- 1759, the fifth since the commence-selves on the north of the St. Law- ment of the war; in every one of rence, about twenty miles above Quebec, between the Jacques Cartier river and the Pointe aux Trembles. As to Niagara, he left it with its ordinary small garrison, scarcely perhaps expecting that it would be attacked, and little concerned as to the issues. Ten thousand he kept with himself for the protection of Quebec, which could not, as he calculated, after such a distribution of his force, be approached with safety to the invaders except from below. We need not go over the particulars of the operations which fol-lowed. Wolfe, thwarted in his endeavour to pass the Montmorenci river, appears to have been at his wits' end, till a fortunate accident brought to his knowledge the unguarded state of a pass above the town, by which the heights of Abraham could be reached. How he landed his troops and marched them up the south bank of the river, while a portion of the fleet sailed past the enemy's batteries ---how he re-embarked, and fell down the stream again in boats, landing in Wolfe's Cove, and scaling the steep bank - history has recorded. It was an enterprise which ought to have resulted in his total destruction. Had Montcalm kept within his lines till the corps from Jacques Carties river showed itself in rear of the English, nothing could have saved them. But Montcalm's impetuosity overcame his prudence. He engaged his adversary in a battle of musketry, and was defeated, his own life and that of Wolfe being sacrificed at the call of duty. In consequence of this defeat, the man, was indeed a proceeding dic-French army broke up into two tated by all the rules of war; but bodies: the stronger of the two, General Amherst's eccentric move-

Look now for a moment at the dis- chiefly provincials, joined the corps Cartier river, which thus became formidable; while 1000 men, all of them regulars, withdrew into Quebec. The battle was fought on the 13th of September, and on the 18th the city, with its garrison, surrendered on capitulation. Thus ended the campaign of

ment of the war; in every one of which, except the last, the same plans of attack had been followed, without any results proportionate to the losses sustained. No doubt the fate of Ticonderoga and Crown Point deprived the French of two valuable outposts, and the capture of Niagara left the head of Lake Ontario free, besides supplying the captors with a building - yard, in which a flotilla might be fitted out. But both the lake and the river were as yet untouched, and as long as these remained in the hands of the French Canadians, Canada itself might be considered tolerably safe. The fall of Quebec, however, proved a heavy blow; it entirely changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy's position was turned on its left flank, and a new and readier means of penetrating into the country was opened to the assailants. Indeed, the fate of Canada may be said to have been decided by the fight on the heights of Abraham, assuming always that the French should prove unable to retrieve the disaster from Europe. This, as we need scarcely stop to observe, they failed to do; and so, in 1760, Montreal surrendered, and the entire province submitted to the British Crown.

If we had space at our disposal," and it were worth while to dwell at any length upon affairs of such old date, nothing could be more easy than to point out the exceeding unskilfulness with which, on both sides, the campaign of 1760 was conducted. To bring up from Quebec to Montreal every disposable

234

joined the corps d of the Jacques ch thus became 1000 men, all withdrew into e was fought on nber, and on the ith its garrison, ulation.

campaign of e e the commencein every one of lust, the same d been followed, its proportionate ined. No doubt eroga and Crown e French of two and the capture he head of Lake les supplying the building - yard, in ight be fitted out. ke and the river ched, and as long in the hauds of dians, Canada itonsidered tolerably Quebec, however, blow; it entirely ct of affairs. The was turned on its new and readier ing into the coun-to the assailants. of Canada may be in decided by the ghts of Abraham, that the French ble to retrieve the cope. This, as we p to observe, they so, in 1760, Montand the entire d to the British

ce at our disposal, h while to dwell at affairs of such old ald be more easy the exceeding unwhich, on both ign of 1760 was ring up from Queevery disposable a proceeding dicrules of war; but s eccentric movement with the main body of his in those old days invaded. It was army, first from Albany, to Oswego, next to impossible to remove troops then from Oswego across Lake On and stores to any distance inland, tario, then down the rapids of the St. except by water, the country being Lawrence, by Long Sault and Lake destitute of roads, and overspread St. Louis, ought to have ended in by primeral forests. Indians, and his destruction. It was not only men as little encumbered as Indias uncalled for as it was perilous, but it necessarily retarded, even when successful, the attainment of the object which it was meant to subserve. In the then state of the war, a direct movement by Lake Champlain was all that could be necessary in connection with the ascent from Quebec. The route from thence to Montreal was far shorter and more direct; the natural obstacles to be overcome were much less formidable, and to 14,000 men whom he had at his disposal the enemy could have opposed scarcely 4000; whereas, by carrying 10,000 men round by Lake Ontario, he not only exposed them to the danger of 230 miles of difficult navigation, but laid them open to be attacked in flank while struggling in the rapids, and their communications to be cut off both from above and from below. Fortune favoured him, however, and his only loss was occasioned by the upsetting of sixty boats between Lake Francis and Lake St. Louis ; while his subsidi-ary column, under Colonel Haviland, though barely 3200 strong, made its way from Lake Champlain by the Isle au Noix to Fort St. John. The enemy evacuated both works as Colonel Haviland approached. They had vainly endeavoured to arrest the progress of the flotilla from Quebec: they now came in both from the Three Rivers and from Sorel, two points, of which they had been especially jealous - the former, because it crossed the line of march from Quebec ; the latter, because it guarded the Richelieu river and Lake Champlain - and, shutting themselves up in the Island of Montreal, awaited their doom. It could not be averted, and they laid down their arms.

readers to observe by what process, secretly fitted out, one of which and along what lines, Canada was was to fall upon Montreal by the

ans, could alone pass through them till, by prodigious labour, paths had been cleared and depôts established, which it was found always difficult, and often impossible, to defend. Hence the object of both beligerents was to keep and retain the command of the Lakes, and especially of Lake Champlain, which formed at once the advanced covering and the weakness of Montreal. No doubt the English, had they earlier succeeded in establishing a superiority there and on Lake Ontario, would have still found the St. Lawrence, with its strong current and many rapids, a serious obstacle ; but from the day in which they made themselves masters of Quebec, rapids and current, looking to the fact that the sea was open to them, ceased to be of importance. It was not, therefore, by the vigour and skill of their front-attacks that they made themselves masters of Canada; and a glance at the con-tests which have since taken place in that part of the world, will show that front-attacks upon Canada from the south have never led to any but imperfect and temporary successes.

Fifteen years elapsed, after Ca-nada became a British province, before the possibility of defending it against an enemy who should approach from what are now called the United States, was put to the proof. In 1775, soon after the first American Congress met, the insurgent government determined to take advantage of the favourable position of its affairs, and to carry the war into Canada. The province was then destitute of troops. Only one weak battalion held it, and the militia no one as yet thought of calling out. While, therefore, General Gage suffered a state of block-Once more we must ask our ade in Boston, two expeditions were

old route of Lake Champlain, while vey his troops, and crossed immedi-the other, passing by sea to the ately. The regular garrison of Que-mouth of the Kenebec river, was to bec consisted at that moment of cross the ridge between New Eng- only one company of infantry, but land and Canada, and to descend the Schaudiere river, which runs into the St. Lawrence nearly opposite to Quebec.

236

.The American corps to be employed against Montreal amounted to about 3000 men. It was led by General Montgomery, and did its work well. Sir Guy Carleton, who commanded on the other side, had small means at his disposal, and he appears not to have managed them very judiciously. Instead of keeping his regular troops, in number about 500, as a nucleus round which the militia might gather, he pushed them to the front, and lost them almost entirely in the unim-portant post of Fort St. John and Chambly, which he was unwise enough to defend. Thwarted in an attempt to relieve the former, he threw a garrison of militiamen into Fort Sorel, but the garrison dispersed as the enemy drew on, and the fort was occupied. There speedily followed upon this the surrender of Montreal itself, and of eleven British vessels which had taken shelter there, General Carleton escaping with difficulty in a boat by night, and passing the American batteries with muffled oars. Meanwhile General Arnold, at the head of 1200 men, passed, as was proposed, to the mouth of the Kene-bec, and there embarked upon an enterprise such as no other armed body ever undertook before, or has ever undertaken since. For six weeks he and his men were in the swampy forest; for four they never saw a hut nor encountered a human being. The Kenebec, which they ascended, is rapid and full of shoals; the Schaudiere, which they had to descend, was even more rapid and Two-thirds of Arnold's rocky. people refused to go on, and with less than 400 he arrived at last on the 3d of November in sight of the St. Lawrence. He touched the stream at Point Levi, found or collected there boats snongh to con- pared for a regular campaign. They

the marines and seamen of a sloop of war lying in the river strengthened it, and the inhabitants likewise taking np arms, Sir Guy Carle-ton found himself at the head of 1500 or 1600 men. Though the arrival of Arnold, therefore, greatly surprised him, he never lost heart, but made preparations to defend the town to the last extremity.

While this was going on, General Montgomery established garrisons in Montreal and Fort St. John; after which he descended the St. Lawrence with the remainder of his corps, in order to unite himself with Arnold. The junction took place on the 5th of December ; and with such means as they could com-mand, amounting to six field-guns and five small mortars, the American generals pressed the siege. It made no progress ; and the season of the year rendering a continuous operation next to impossible, they determined to try the effect of an escal-Two false attacks on the ade. fronts facing the heights of Abra-ham were intended to draw off the attention of the garrison from the lower town, which was to be entered, by Arnold and the column under his, orders, between the St. Charles and the heights - by Montgomery and his division, between the St. Lawrence and the precipices of Cape Diamond. We cannot account for this selection of the points of real attack, inasmuch as the occupation of the lower town does not necessarily imply the fall of the upper, whereas he who is master of the upper town has the lower at his mercy. But whatever the hopes of the assailants might be, and on whatever data founded, they came to nothing. Both aseaults were repulsed; General Montgom-ery being killed while cheering on the one, General Arnold being disabled by a severe wound while conducting the other.

The Americans were not pre-

crossed immediarrison of Queat moment of f infantry, but men of a sloop river strengthababitants like-Sir Guy Carleat the head of Though the herefore, greatly ever lost beart, ions to defend xtremity.

ing on, General ished garrisons St. John ; after the St. Lawmainder of his ite himself with tion took place mber ; and with ey could com-o six field-guns rs, the American siege. It made he season of the ontinuous operasible, they deterfect of an escalattacks on the neights of Abrad to draw off ne garrison from ch was to be enand the column between the St. ights - by Montdivision, between nd the precipices We cannot action of the points smuch as the ocower town does ply the fall of he who is master has the lower ut whatever the ilants might be, lata founded, they Both aseaults eneral Montgomwhile cheering on Arnold being diswound while con-

were not pre-campaign. They

had made a rush at Canada, hoping United States and British North to surprise it. They were destitute of means for a prolonged contest, even if no reinforcements should be sent from England. General Ar-nold, indeed, continued the blockade of Quebee throughout the winter, and early in the spring had his numbers raised to 3000 men. Montreal, St. John, and Chambly were at the same time occupied by 4000, and strenuous efforts were made to enlist the inhabitants, French as well as English, on the side of the Re-volution. But in this the Americans failed; and the arrival on the 6th of May of a squadron of English men-of-war in the St. Lawrence, and of three brigades of infantry, with artillery, at once decided their line of action. Arnold withdrew from before Quebec. Montreal, Chambly and Fort St. John were evacuated, and Canada became again, what it has ever since continued to be, a loyal British province.

It is a fact ourious in itself, and strongly illustrative of the peculiar temperament of the American people, that they have never been able to divest themselves of the persuasion that they have only to raise the banner of the stars and stripes in Canada, in order to insure the cooperation in their favour of at least a large majority of its inhabitants. Strong in this conviction, they sent Montgomery and Arnold to add the provinces north of the St. Lawrence to those which, in the south, had themselves independent. declared And the same fatuity led them, in 1812, to count upon the subjection of Canada as the necessary result of its invasion. It would appear, too, as if they had carefully studied the operations of the English generals half a century earlier, and done their best to repeat them, even to their blunders. But before we proceen to sketch with a rapid pen the progress of a war of which the true Lawrence, from the Lake of a Thouhistory is yet to be written, it may sand Isles downward to Montreal, be well if we endeavour to convey the intelligent observer will not, to the mind of the reader some- we think, find it very difficult to folthing like a distinct idea of the low the thread of our story. locale upon which it was waged.

America, though clearly settled by the treaty of severance, seems in 1812 to have become a good deal obscured. On the east and southeast, Nature has sufficiently sketched her own map; but the waving line which now passes from St. Andrew's Bay to the Grand Falls of the St. John, and from the Grand Falls southward, and thence we ward at a right angle to Lake St. Francis in the St. Lawrence, had then no existence. Men knew that the State of Massachusetts belonged to the Union, but where Lower Canada began, and Massachusetts or Maine ended, was by no means so certain. Lake Champlain, however, was undeniably a State lake, except on its northern shore, and there England had a post a few miles distant from the American St. Albans, while the St. Lawrence was in all its course English, from its exit out of Lake Ontario to its mouth. Above this outfall the limits of the two commonwealths were plain enough. The great lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior they shared between them; and the rivers which connect these, the Niagara between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, the St. Clair between Lake Huron and Lake Erie, were, as well as the St. Mary, which flows out of Lake Su-perior into Lake Huron, their welldefined frontiers, far up into the west. Any good map will show where, upon these lakes and rivers, such places as Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Plattsburg, Sacketts Harbour, Sandy Point, Oswego, Fort Niagara, and Buffalo stand, on one side; and Joseph's Point, Michilimackinac, Amherstburg, Sandwich, Long Point, York (now called Toronto), Kingston, and many more, on the other. Having mastered these, as well as the names of other places and positions on either bank of the St.

Though little concerned in the pre-The boundary-line between the sent paper with the causes in which

Tave-

the rupture between Great Britain and America originated in 1812, we may perhaps be allowed to state that, throughout the long struggle of this country with revolutionary France, America gave all her sympathies to the latter power. She carried on, at the same time, a brisk trade between France and her colonies --as long as France retained any colonies; and was not always careful to confine her imports to harmless colonial produce. This necessarily subjected American vessels to search. and from time to time, when contraband of war was found in them, to seizure. The consequence thence arising became aggravated a hundred-fold, when Napoleon, by his Berlin and Milan Decrees, tempted England to make reprisals, and to prohibit all intercourse between neutral vessels and French ports. There accompanied this a rather free-andeasy custom of taking out of American ships men whom the visiting officers believed to be deserters from the English navy. Remonstrances and complaints ensued, to which no attention was paid, and America in the end declared war. It is past dispute that she anticipated at that time the speedy dissolution of the British Empire, which she resolved to help forward by taking possession of Canada.

The plan of campaign, arranged at Washington long before the declaration of war was issued, embraced three objects -- the subjugation of Amherstburg at the head of Lake Erie, the occupation of the Niagara district, and the capture of Montreal. Under the pretext of watching some bostile Indians, 2500 men had been thrown forward to the neighbourhood of Amherstburg early in the summer; about 6300 were put in motion towards the Niagara frontier as soon as circumstances would allow; while 7000 received orders to assemble at Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, which they did later in the season.

Of British regular troops there were at this time in the provinces

while 1500 were spread over Upper Canada. These latter, divided among Kingston, Toronto or York, the Niagara frontier, and Amherstburg, could show but a feeble front anywhere; and they were further weakened by having a detachment stationed in Joseph's Island, at the head of Lake Huron.

The naval preparations on both sides were inconsiderable enough. On Lake Optario the Americans had one brig, the English one ship of 300 tons, with three smaller vessels. On Lake Eric the Americans had one armed brig and three schooners; the English had nothing.

Notwithstanding the advantages in preparation enjoyed by the Americans, the English were the first in this war to strike a blow. The officer in command at Isle Joseph no sooner heard of the declaration of hostilities, than he embarked his detachment in open boats, passed over to the island of Michilimackinac, a distance of forty miles, and, assisted by some Canadian voya-geurs and Indians, compelled the American garrison, numbering sixty men, to lay down its arms. The conquest was not unimportant, because Michilimackinac stood directly in the way of a brisk trade which the Americans carried on through Lake Huron from Detroit; and the English arms acquired, over and above, the prestige of an opening triamph.

Meanwhile the American corps destined for the invasion of Amherstburg took the field. It had assembled at Detroit, on the river of the same name, as early as the 5th of July; and on the 12th it crossed to Sandwich, and moved upon Amherstburg town. The garrison of that place consisted of 450 men, of whom 300 were militia. It was further strengthened by the presence of 150 Indians, and had its advanced posts at the river Auxcanards, a small stream which interposes between Sandwich and Amherstburg, and falls into the Detroit. This stream the Americans not more than 4500, of whom 3000 never succeeded in passing. They garrisoned Quebec and Montreal, skirmished with the English from

238

# [Feb-

pread over Uplatter, divided bronto or York. , and Amherstt a feeble front y were further a detachment s Island, at the

rations on both derable enough. the Americans glish one ship of e smaller vessels. mericans had one e schooners; the

the advantages red by the Amewere the first in a blow. The l at Isle Joseph the declaration he embarked his n boats, passed of Michilimackforty miles, and, Canadian voyas, compelled the numbering sixty its arms. The unimportant, benac stood directly risk trade which ried on through Detroit; and the uired, over and e of an opening

American corps invasion of Ame field. It had oit, on the river as early as the on the 12th it ich, and moved town. The gare consisted of 450 were militia. It gthened by the dians, and had its ; the river Auxream which interndwich and Amlls into the Den the Americans in passing. They he English from

their own bank, and once or twice tilities, which both sides affected to approached the bridge, without ven- deplore. He accordingly arranged turing upon it; while the English, an armistice along the entire fron-detaching their Indians, some mili- tier, till reference should be made tia, and a few regular troops, fell to Washington; and General Brock, upon the enemy's communications, greatly to his own disgust, found and cut them off. Alarmed as well himself included in it. At the same as inconvenienced by the stoppage time, it is fair to add that Brock's of their provisions, the Americans retreated on the 7th of August, and, contenting themselves with send- He had under his orders barely 1200 ing 500 men to act against the English detachment, returned with their were regular troops. The Amerimain body to Detroit.

commanded in Upper Canada, embarked 300 men, of whom 260 were pled him. He could not have remilitia, at Long Point on Lake Erie. tained Fort Niagara after it fell, He had previously forwarded two except by shutting up within its weak parties, numbering between walls 300 or 400 men, and with the them 160 men, and he arrived at handful which remained he could Amherstburg with the others while have done nothing. Though he these operations were yet in pro- chafed, therefore, and though his gress. He immediately assumed friends complained, the conduct of the offensive, and establishing a battery at Sandwich, which fired across the river at Detroit, he passed the stream with 300 regular infantry, 400 militia, 600 Indians, and there were levies to be called out 80 artillerymen, and invested the and drilled; nor was the force at place on the opposite front. He had Brock's disposal such as to warrant completed his preparations for as his converting defensive into offensive completed his preparations for as insconverting detensive into onesive saulting the fort, when the Ameri-can general hung out a white flag. While the armistice lasted, and The place surrendered, and 2500 for a week or two after its close, troops and 30 pieces of cannon fell the English and Americans looked into the hands of the victors.

Leaving a garrison in Detroit, he hastened back to the Niagara frontier, where he arrived on the 24th of August. His purpose was to attack, from Fort George, Fort Niagara on the American side of the river; but he was prevented from carrying the project into effect; for, just as his plans were completed, intelligence arrived of the establishment tion of Louistown, in observa-of an armistice. Sir George Pre- The Unbinet at Washington vost, it appeared, had been made ing rejected Sir George Prevost's aware of the repeal of their Orders advances, hostilities recommenced; in Council by the British Govern- and in the night of the 11th of Ocment; and as the injustice of these tober the Americans made a move. Orders stood foremost in the list of They pushed 250 men from Louisgrievances of which the Americans town across the river, which was complained, he naturally concluded there about a quarter of a mile in that the Washington Cabinet, when width, and immediately sent back informed that the grievance had the boats to bring up a second diviceased, would willingly suspend hos- sion. The officer in command at

projected enterprise against Fort Niagara was bold even to rashness. men, of whom less than one-balf cans faced him with 6500; and suc-Meanwhile General Brock, who cess itself, had he even succeeded against such odds, must have crip-Sir George Prevost was not in this instance open to censure. Delay is everything in a war purely defensive, especially in this instance, where

> at one another from opposite sides of the Niagara river. Of the Americans, 1100 were at Fort Niagara, 3200 at Louistown, and 2000 between Black Rock and Buffalo. The British troops occupied Forts Erie and George, at opposite extremities of their line, keeping four companies (two of the 49th regiments, two of the

Queenstown had two companies, Red House. The fugitives escaped, with two pieces of cannon, on the brow of a hill which overlooks the town, and commands the river. The other two companies he had placed in the town itself, and these became immediately engaged with the Ame-ricans on the beach. The sound of firing was heard at Fort George, and General Brock galloped off to the point of danger. Just as he arrived, a second American division touched the shore, and fearing lest the two companies in the town should be overpowered, he caused those on the hill to descend to their assistance. It was an unfortunate movement, for the enemy had already landed 500 men higher up the stream, who, observing that the hill was bare, ran forward and seized it. General Brock instantly put himself at the head of a portion of his people, and endeavoured to retake the hill, but was killed in the attempt. The British troops fell back to the edge of the ridge, where one detachment after another from Fort Erie arrived to support them; and General Sheaffe, on whom the command had devolved, led them forward to the charge. The Americans broke and fled; 71 officers and 858 pon-commissioned officers and men laid down their arms; the remainder escaped in the boats.

The superiority of British over American troops was marked throughout this affair. The assailants were defeated, and many of their boats sunk, chiefly, as the American general reported, because he could not, by threats or entreaties, prevail npon the 2000 men who looked on from the further bank to cross the Niagara, and come to the assistance of their comrades.

One more attempt was made by the Americans to penetrate into the Niagara district above the Falls. Four thousand men from Louistown, Black Rock, and Buffalo, were upon the lakes, as England was employed on this service, but they never afterwards able to overtake. accomplished nothing. Their ad Hostilities were scarcely begun, vanced -guard, which, on the night when Commodore Chauncey arived of the 28th of November, embarked at Sacketts Harbour, where, in the in ten boats, was attacked and over- course of the summer, he either powered at a landing-place called built, or fitted for war purposes, six

leaving thirty prisoners behind them, and the army forthwith broke up, and retired into winter-quarters.

Nothing could be more feeble or out of place than these two attempts. They were ill-arranged, and worse executed. Indeed, it is hard to say what objects they could be interfied to serve, unless it were, that, by drawing away the bulk of the troops from Lower Canada, they might render more easy the proposed occu-pation of Montreal. But on that enterprise the enemy never ven-tured. Their corps of 7000 men lay idle at Plattsburg till the 15th of November, and made no attempt, when it did move, to penetrate beyond the village of Champlain. Threatened there by a British brigade of 900 men, and having a patrol, which had felt its way as far as the bridge over the Lacolle, driven in by a picket of Canadian voya-geurs and militia, the Americans precipitately retired, and soon afterwards went into winter-quarters.

It is worthy of remark, that all this while the regular troops and provincials in Canada, waged, so to speak, a war with America on their own account. In London a serious rupture with the United States seems scarcely to have been contemplated, till tidings arrived of the rejection of the proposed armistice at Washington; nor was any formal declaration of war issued by England till the beginning of 1813. No preparations had, therefore, been made to meet the invasion when it came. The inland waters were left unguarded, the ordinary peace garrisons occupied the principal posts on shore; yet these peace garrisons, supported by gallant and loyal mi-litia, repelled the invaders at every point. The Americans, on the other hand, long bent upon a particular purpose, got such a start of Eugland

itives escaped, behind them, ith broke up, quarters.

nore feeble or two attempts. ed, and worse is hard to say ld be intended were, that, by s of the troops hey might renroposed occu-But on that never ven-7000 men lay i the 15th of no attempt, to penetrate of Champlain. a British briand having a its way as far Lacolle, driven anadian voyahe Americans nd soon after-

-quarters. mark, that all ar troops and waged, so to nerica on their ondon a seri-United States been contemrrived of the osed armistice as any formal sued by Engof 1813. No herefore, been rasion when it ters were left ry peace garrincipal posts eace garrisons, and loyal miaders at every , on the other a particular rt of Eugland England was to overtake. rcely begun, uncey arived where, in the er, he either purposes, six

1862.1

schooners. These, added to the brig, Brownstown. Here Colonel Procraised the American naval force to tor, who commanded in this quar-more than an equality with that of ter, joined at the head of 500 men, their rivals, who could still count chiefly militis, and 450 Indians. on only one ship and three smaller He attacked the Americans on the vessels. At the same time, a navy 22d, who gave way and fied, leaving yard was established, at Presqu'ile, 500 prisoners in his hands. The total on Lake Erie, whence two brigs loss to the English was 152 killed and were in due time turned out, to re- wounded. inforce the squadron which already dominated there. Immense advan- Colonel Proctor did not consider tages these, had the enemy known bimself strong enough to hold his how to turn them to account! But, ground. He fell back, therefore, how to turn them to account | But, ground. He fell back, therefore, happily for England, the absence of to Detroit, and ultimately to Sandmilitary knowledge, on the part of wich. He was not very vigorously the Americans, more than compen- pursued ; indeed, the enemy con-sated for their superior activity and tented themselves with removing skill in naval affairs. Hence the their headquarters from Sandusky campaign of 1813 proved as little to the river Miamis, on the banks

Assembling one corps at Sandusky, joined by the Indians within a mile at the western end of Lake Erie, and a half of the fort, but he missed they were to employ it in the re-taking of Detroit and the reduction skill in the management of details. of Amherstburg. A second, col- He unwisely divided his little army, lected at Sacketts Harbour, was in throwing himself astride upon the the first instance to occupy Kings- Miamis, and had thus two distinct ton and Toronto, after which it was operations to carry on at the same to proceed against Forts George and time. He was attacked simultane-Erie in the Niagara district, in co- ously on both sides, and, though operation with a subsidiary force victorious in the battle, found himwhich should assemble at Buffalo, self at its close under the necessity The third operation was to be di- of abandoning his enterprise. He rected from Lake Champlain against returned to Sandwich, where he Montreal, being aided by the de- remained till the 1st of August, scent of the victorious troops from when he made a fresh attempt on Lake Ontario by the St. Lawrence. an American post at the mouth of The total number of men to be en- the Sandusky river. This time he ployed in these various enterprises was reckoned at 30,000, though it scarcely appears that anything approaching to that number ever came ing lost in killed and wounded ninetyunder fire. Operations began very six men. early in the direction of the Am- It was an unfortunate enterprise herstburg district. The English altogether. It cost some valuable headquarters were then in Detroit, and they had a post at Frenchtown, it interfered with a plan which had forty-five miles in advance of it. already been matured for an attack On the 18th of January the Ameri- from Long Point on Presqu'ile, cans advanced against that picket, and upon the two brigs which were which retired to a place called in process of construction there, in

Though successful in this affair, campeign of 1813 proved as note to the river Miamis, of the banks decisive against Canada as that of of which they erected a fort for the 1812, though it opened with a protection of their stores. Colonel greater show of energy, and brought Proctor was tempted to strike a increased numbers into the field on blow at that fort, by embarking both sides. 1000 men at Amherstburg, and The Americans proposed to act directing 1200 Indians to join him this year upon three, or, to speak by land. He succeeded in ascend-more correctly, upon four lines, ing the Miamis unopposed; he was Assembling one corps at Sandusky, joined by the Indians within a mile met with a decided check. Repulsed in an attempt to escalade the works, he retreated again to Sandwich, hav-

lives, and wasted precious time; for

difficulties of communicating with overtook the boats, and captured Amheratburg from below were in-creased fourfold. The consequence with not quite 500 troops, and as was, that when, by the junction of many Indians, determined to make the corps from Long Point, the force a stand. He was attacked by 5000 at Amherstburg was raised to 1000 British and 3500 irregular troops, britism and 3000 irregular troops, the very strength of the garrison, straitened both for provisions and annunition, became its weak-ness. I'or at the period of which we are writing, the Amherstburg district, thinly peopled and desti-tute of roads, carried on its inter-course with the lower sattlements course with the lower settlements, and brought in all its supplies, by water. The appearance of the enemy's squadron, therefore, off the harbour, struck Proctor and his people with dismay. They pressed forward the completion of a ship of war which had long been on the stocks, and sent her out, manned by a few seamen and 150 soldiers, to raise the blockade. She engaged the Americans, who were in every respect superior, and, together with one or two smaller vessels, fell into their hands.

242

The complete command of the lake being thus acquired, the Americans were in a condition to bring up their troops by the Sandusky and Miamis rivers to the neighbourhood of the town of Amherstburg. They greatly exceeded Proctor's corps in numbers, and could boast, among other things, of a mounted regiment 1200 strong. There remained, therefore, for Proctor no other resource than to evacuate both Detroit and Amherstburg, and to retire up the valley of the not till they had burnt a ship up-Thames in the direction of the on the stocks, with which it was Moravian settlement, and of Ancaster. now district; it was then little better and did not venture to pursue : on than a wilderness, without houses, the contrary, they changed their without cultivation, without roads. plan, took ship on the 8th of May, The few stores which the English and arrived the same evening off possessed — their provisions, bag- the Four-mile Creek, close to the gage, and spare ammunition — they mouth of the Niagara river. The

which a detachment from Amherst-burg was to have joined. The brigs along the woody banks, became got to sea before the Amherstburg weaker and weaker every day. On division recovered itself, and the the 4th of October the Americans Americans, overpowered and driven off. He retreated to Ancaster, which he reached on the 17th, with only 204 rank and file, all that remained to him of his original force.

Thus far success attended the They were masters of invaders. the forts at Detroit and Amherstburg, and of the Amherstburg territory as far as the head of the valley of the Thames. But they were not brought thereby nearer to the subjugation of Canada; that must be effected by operations farther to the east; and in the month of April, when the navigation of Lake Ontario becomes free, these operations began. Six thousand men were collected at Sacketts Harbour, with a squadron, consisting of a ship, a brig, and eleven schooners. The object of this armament was to seize Toronto and Kingston, while yet the frozen state of the St. Lawrence prevented their being reinforced from below; and it was partially effected. On the 25th, 2000 men landed close to Toronto, which the English garrison, 300 regular troops, as many militiamen, and forty Indians, did not consider themselves in sufficient force to defend. They retired. therefore, towards Kingston, after a short contest, in which they lost 130 killed and wounded; though intended to reinforce the English The valley of the Thames is squadron on the lake. The Americomparatively a flourishing cans likewise had suffered severely, conveyed by boat up the stream, troops being landed, the flotilla re-

## [Feb.

which marched banks, became every day. On the Americans and captured **Dolonel** Proctor, troops, and as nined to make tacked by 5000 red and driven to Ancaster, the 17th, with file, all that of his original

attended the ere masters of and Amherstmherstburg terhe head of the But they nes. hereby nearer to Canada; that by operations t; and in the hen the navigaio becomes free, gan. Six thouected at Sacketts quadron, consistorig, and eleven ject of this arize Toronto and the frozen state e prevented their om below; and fected. On the landed close to e Eoglish gartroops, as many rty Indians, did selves in suffid. They retired, Kingston, after a which they lost ounded; though ournt a ship upb which it was ce the English ke. The Amerisuffered severely, e to pursue : on changed their the 8th of May, same evening off ek, close to the gara river. The d, the flotilla returned to Sacketts Harbour, between Colonel Sir John Harvey, who prowhich place and Niagara it con- posed that, instead of waiting to tinued to ply till the 26th, when receive an attack on Burlington the whole corps was brought up. Heights, the English should make Two schooners only remained below a hight attack upon the enemy. to cruise off Kingston, and to observe the movements of the English.

1862.]

The Niagara frontier was held at this time by 1800 regular British troops, 500 militla, and forty In-dians. Of these, 1000 regular troops, 300 of the militia, and all the Indians, were in and about Fort George; so that there remained for the defence of the rest of the line, including the garrison of Fort Erie, only 800 regulars and 200 militia. The enemy's force consisted of 7000 men, divided into three brigades; and on the 27th of May the whole were ferried across the river, under cover of the fire from Fort Niagara, and from their own flotilla mounting fifty-six guns. General Vincent, who commanded in this quarter, offered a stout resistance to their disembarkation, but was forced to retreat with the loss of 450 men. He fell back by Queenstown and Beaver Dam to Burlington Heights, at the head of Lake Ontario, calling in at the same time his detachments from Fort Erie and the Ohippeway. The junction of these raised his available strength to 1600 bayonets; but his condition was extremely critical. In his front lay a superior force, well supplied and flushed with success. He had no reserves on which to retire, nor any hope of support from Toronto, of the fate of which he was aware. There needed but common hardihood and a little judgment on the part of the invaders to secure his destruction; but these were want-The American general, ining. stead of falling upon Vincent with his entire corps, was content to detach two brigades of infantry, his light guns, and a regiment of supplies; and at last, on the 1st cavalry in pursuit, while, with the of October, they took ship and remaining brigade, he halted to take sailed away. About 1500 militia possession of the various defensible from the State of New York were posts which the English had aban- left to garrison Fort George and doned. There was in General Vin- Fort Niagara; the rest, amounting cent's little army a gallant soldier, to 6000 of all arms, proceeded first

This was done on the night of the 5th June at Stony Creek, to which the Americans had advanced; and so complete was the success of the enterprise, that both of the American brigadiers, with 123 officers and men, and four pieces of cannon, fe'l into the hands of the assailants. The remainder fled in confusion, making no halt till they reached For-ty-mile Creek, eleven miles from the scene of action.

The enormous extent of the American lakes never comes before us more strikingly than when we read of the military operations that were carried on along their shores, and over the surface of their waters. Though the superiority of the enemy on Lake Ontario was at this time decided, we find an English squadron sailing from Kingston with 280 troops on bourd, and arriving unmolested at Forty-mile Creek, three days after the Ameri-can fugitives had established themselves there. The gunboats and armed schooners which escorted the bateaux opened fire upon the enemy, and drove them from their encampment. Immediately the troops landed. They joined General Vincent's column, and the whole set out in pursuit of the Americans, who fell back upon Fort George. There they made a stand with a view to call in the detachments which they had established at Fort Erie and along the Chippeway. But all courage seemed to have deserted them. They made no aggres-sive movement. They permitted the English, whom the arrival of a fresh regiment from Lower Canada had greatly encouraged, to close in upon them, and to straiten their to Oswego, and by-and by to Sacketts ber, 8000 men approached the Harbour.

Meanwhile the corps which had assembled on Lake Champlain took the field. It consisted of 7000 in-fantry, 250 cavalry, and 10 guns; and it advanced across the lake by Plattsburg to Chateaugay - Fourcorners, where it arrived on the 8th of October. It was evident from this arrangement that the Ameri-can general intended to move by the mouth of the Chateaugay river, and to attempt the passage of the St. Lawrence above the Ohine rapids at Lake St. Louis. This was a judicious plan-too much dependent, however, on the success of the column from Lake Ontario, which, be it remembered, was to descend the St. Lawrence from the lake, and to co-operate in the projected attack on Montreal. But it was feebly carried into effect. A small force, consisting entirely of Provincials (it did not exceed 1000 muskets, including 170 Indians), took post about twenty-four miles from the Four-corners, on the road by which the enemy must advance; and the enemy, although they attacked it with all their strength on the 26th, made no impression. Immediately the American general lost heart. He retired to the Four corners, where he halted only to take breath, and on the 11th of November withdrew to Plattsburg. He there broke up his army, and put it into winter the descent of the St. Lawrence till quarters.

While this was going on, the English from the Niagara frontier, and the Americans from Sacketts Harbour, both put themselves in mo-The former, apprehensive for tion. the safety of Kingston, sent down two weak regiments to reinforce the garrison; the latter took ship and steered for the British waters. They appear to have hesitated in their course of action, whether to delay the descent of the St. Lawrence all they should have possessed themselves of Kingston, or to leave Kingston behind and descend Apprehensive of an attack in the the St. Lawrence at once. They rear, and anxious to save the wreck finally decided upon the latter of Proctor's corps, the Niagara di-

source of the river. They established their depôt of stores and provisions on the American side, where also the troops landed, leaving the boats to pass Fort Weilington empty. Fort Weilington stands upon the English bank, and commands the navigation; but by muffling their oars the boatmen managed, nnder cover of night, to elude observation, and on the 8th the troops reembarked at Ogdensburg. It was a wild project, taken up, as it ap-pears to us, in imitation of General Amherst's lucky hazard in 1780, and it ended in complete failure. The rapids proved too dangerous to be faced with loaded boats : the troops landed and re-embarked repeatedly. About 800 men of the garrison of Kingston hung upon their rear, and on the 11th overtook and engaged two brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and six guns. The battle was fought at the head of the Long Eault, at a place called Chrysalis Farm, and ended in the discomfi-ture of the Americans. The English lost 180 officers and men - the Americans 339, besides 100 taken prisoners. They retired to their boats during the night, and, descending the river four miles, were landed on the American side. From that moment all hope of success abandoned them. They continued they reached the month of the Salmon river, which falls into the St. Lawrence on the right bank. Up that stream, for about seven miles,

they pushed their flotilla, when they finally disembarked, and, after remaining idle till February 1814, burnt their boats and retreated to Plattsburg and Burlington.

We must now cast our eyes back for a moment to the Amherstburg district, and take account of the effect produced along the Niagara frontier by the tidings which came in of the disasters there sustained. course; and, on the 5th of Novem- vision fell back from Fort George

| Feb.

af

rei tic Pi ce ed pi co no ho th lit

far

wa Ca rib

Si

as Ce col for

by

for

m

wi aD

ed

CAT

of

and

su

an 80 do

bu

wł

me

Bı

88

Va

w

tie

in

be

th

A

m

W

tł

b

a

tl

8

fe

244

hed the y estaband prode, where ving the on empty. pon the inds the og their d, ander observaroops re-It was as it ap-General n 1780, failure. erous to ts: the ked reof the z upon h overades of cavalry, le was e Long brysalis iscomfie Eng. a — the taken ) their nd, dewere From success ntinued nce till le Salhe St. . Up miles, h they emainburnt Plattsback

stburg f the agara came ained. h the wreck ra dieorge

1862.]

after the departure of the American defeat attended the enemy through-regular army, and resumed its posi- out. Their march from Champiain tion on Burlington Heights. Here by Four-corners, to the mouth of Proctor joined it; and early in De- the Chateaugay river, was judici-cember the English sgain approach- ous. They avoided thereby the ob-ed Fort George. The American structions of Fort St. John and the ed Fort George. The American structions of Fort St. John and the pickets being driven in, the garrison, Isle aux Noix, while at the mouth consisting entirely of militia, did of Chateaugay they secured a har-not consider itself competent's to bour for the boats which were to hold the fort. It retreated across convey them across the St. Law-the Niagara, though not till the rence. But their inability to over-little town of Newark, with all the come the opposition of a mere farm-houses and buildings near, had handful of Provincials between been wantonly burnt down. This Four-corners and the Chateaugay, was a oruel act in the dead of a besides proving how deficient they Canadian winter, and it was ter- still were in discipline, entirely de-Canadian winter, and it was ter- still were in discipline, entirely de-ribly avenged. Lieutenant-General ranged a plan which depended for Sir Gordon Drummond, who had its execution on the timely arrival assumed the command in Upper of the column from Lake Ontario. Canada, passed the Niagara in two As to that movement, it was from columns, and, falling at night on the first to last a false movement. It fort of the same name, entered it was undertaken without proper un-by a gate which had been left open derstanding with the Lake Chamfor the relief of the sentries. He plain corps; it began too late, and made himself master of the place lay exposed — a fatal error — to be with the loss of only 11 men killed impeded by attacks in the rear. On and wounded; his prisoners amount- the whole, the generalship of the ed to 400, and he took 27 pieces of Americans was as contemptible as cannon. At the same time a body the want of steadiness, not to say of of Indians broke into Louistown courage, was conspicuous in their and set it on fire; while a few days men. On the other hand, the mis-subsequently — viz., on the 30th takes committed by the English and 31st of December - Black Rock were numerous enough. They perand Buffalo were likewise burnt mitted the enemy to establish a down. These were sharp reprisals, superiority over them, both on Lake but they had their effect; after Erie and on Lake Ontario. They which the army went into canton- fought actions on these waters with ments at Fort Niagara, St. David's, ships ill-manned and ill-equipped, Burlington Heights, and Toronto.

as little to the permanent ad- Harbour from Kingston, which, had vantage of the invaders as that it been vigorously pushed, could which preceded it. With the excep- have hardly failed of success. The tion of the passage of the Niagara best excuse to be made for them in May, and the defeat in Octo- is this, that they had an enormous ber of Proctor's feeble corps in frontier to defend with very inade-the Amberstburg territory, the quate means, and that the mother Americans executed no single move- country was too busy with its great ment with vigour; and the little war in Europe to pay the neces-which they gained by the former of sary attention to its little war in these operations, their subsequent America. But a change in this re-blandering threw away. The night-spect was at hand. action at Stony Creek saved the We come now to the campaign Niagara district, and the retreat of of 1814, which was entered upon the enemy from Fort George en- by the American Government with abled the English to establish a views less pretentious than had footing for themselves across the heretofore been entertained. Ex-river. Lower down, disaster and perience seems to have taught them

and were defeated; and they mis-Thus ended the campaign of 1813, managed an attack upon Sacketts

that, among the population of the district should have time to as-Canadus, they had no allies, and semble. The force in question that, without some assistance from consisted of three battalions of rewithin, the subjugation of the coun- gular infantry, a troop of dragoons, try was beyond their means. They determined, therefore, to limit their tia, and as many Indians. A fourth exertions to three objects — to retain battalion, with 300 militia, were at their hold upon Amherstburg ; to re- the other extremity of the line, take the island of Michillmackinse, diwided between Forts George and so important to their trade on Lakes Niagara. Erie and Michigan; and to capture Major. and destroy Kingston. With a view manded here, drew together all exto facilitate the accomplishment of cept the garrisons of Fort George these purposes, they considered it and Fort Niagara, and advanced to necessary to make a feint on the the Ohippeway river, on the north-Niagara territory, and to threaten ern bank of which he took up a Montreal; which they did after u position. It was an extremely fashion, and with such results, as it good one, interposing between Fort head be our business presently to Frie and Fort George. For the shall be our business presently to Erie and Fort George; for the

cans remained in quiet possession, Street Creek, about a mile and a without any attempt on the part of half in advance of it, where he esthe English to disturb them. It tablished his outposts. These the was not so on Isle Michilimackinac. enemy drove in on the 4th, after In spite of the enemy's superiority which they crossed, and encamped on both lakes, 65 soldiers and 25 opposite to the English on the seamen, with a supply of provisions southern bank of the Chippeway. and ammunition, were conveyed General Riall, who had under his from Toronto to Lske Simcoe, and orders about 2000 men, with three from Lake Simcoe to Nottawassaga pieces of cannon, considered him-Creek, on Lake Huron. Thence self strong enough to fight a battle. they crossed in open boats. After He therefore passed the Chippeway a voyage of twenty five days, they on the 5th, attacked the enemy, and reached the island on the 18th of was repulsed with a loss of 500 men. May; and on the 4th of August He retreated immediately to the 900 American troops from Detroit Twenty-mile Creek, on Lake Onarrived, to accept, as was imagined, o, reinforcing, as he passed, the the surrender of the garrison. But garrisons of Fort George and Fort the garrison, instead of laying down Niagara. His intention was to make its arms, attacked and defeated the a stand on Burlington Heights, where invading force, and followed the fu- he expected to be joined by a batgitizes so sharply, that they boarded talion from Toronto. The enemy,

tier, two brigades of American troops way, in order to protect the apcrossed from Buffalo and Black proach of a convoy of provisions Rock, and landed, the one about a which they expected to be landed mile above, the other about the at the mouth of that river. Meansame distance below, Fort Erie. while Riall, being joined by the To the extreme astonishment of promised reinforcements, resumed all concerned, the fort made no de- the offensive, and advanced to a fence, though it had been suffi- place called Fifteen-Mile Creek, ciently provided to hold out till the wondering that he was not op.

a detachment of artillery, 300 mill-

Mujor-General Riall, who comdescribe. In the Amberstburg district no right angles a little way above the hostilities occurred. The Ameri- Falls; and there was a rivulet, called

a couple of schooners before the however, did not follow him up anchors could be raised, and took further than Queenstown. They them. moved cautiously likewise, and on Meanwhile, on the Niagara fron- the 24th returned to the Chippeforce allotted for the defence of the posed. Here intelligence reached

bim of deta dire high half to mar ing at grou and whi For thro ia t tack nex whi gari addi Wue losi cam pose aud man to whi the bod fort Gor rive nor 89ıł men Que Lun bad then WAS and ed who offic brin rive and Wea thes did moo half gav Eng two T

## [Feb.

1862.]

0 88ention of regoone, milifourth ere at line, e and

comli exleorge ced to northup a emely Fort r the ira at ve the called ind a he esse the after amped n the peway. er his three himbattle. peway y, and 0 men. o the e Ond, the | Fort ) make where a batenemy, m up They nd on bippehe apvisions landed Meanby the eaumed to a Creek,

t op eached The Defence of Canada.

bim of the retrogressive movement action which occurred during the of the enemy, and he immediately war, detached 900 men in observation, line 3200 men, with seven guns; directing them to occupy certain the Americans showed between high grounds about a mile and a hulf from the Chippeway, and close to the Fulls of Niagara. These marched all night, and, in the morning of the 25th, took up a position at Lundy's Lane, on the highest ground of the Queenstown hill, and at right angles with the road evident, moreover, from the bold-which passes from Fort Erie to ness of their advance, and by the Fort George. Nothing occurred resolute manner in which they met Fort George. Nothing occurred resolute manner in which they met throughout the day; but about five the charge of the English, that the in the evening the English were at- Americans were beginning to astacked, first by a single brigade, and next by the whole American army, which, since its passage of the Niagara, had been reinforced by two additional brigades. The action was fierce; but the English were losing ground, when General Riall came up. He saw that he was op-posed by very superior numbers, and he directed the officer in command of the corps of observation to retire into Queenstown, towards which place also, instead of towards the heights, the steps of the main body were turned. By great good fortune, Lieutenant - General Sir Gordon Drummond, who had arrived at Fort Ningara the same morning from Toronto, with the 89th regiment and some detachments, landed at this moment in Queenstown. He pushed forward to Lundy's Lane, halted the troops who had begun their retreat, and formed them on the crest of the hill. It was now six o'clock in the evening, and 1800 British bayonets, supported by five guns, were opposed to the whole American army. Mounted officers galloped off in hot haste to bring up Riali's division, which arrived at last about ten o'clock, weary and spent with a nine-hours' march. Wearied as they were, however, these gallant men, 1250 in number, did excellent service. It was bright moonlight, and the battle raged till half past eleven, when the enemy gave way, and retreated, leaving the English musters of the field and of two pieces of cannon.

The English brought into 7000 and 8000, and were greatly superior in artillery. The loss was pretty equal on both sides, though heaviest on that of the victors, who had 878 officers and men placed hors de combat, as against 854 on the part of the vanquished. It was Americans were beginning to as-sume the character of good troops. And this was again evinced on two subsequent occasions : first, when Sir Gordon Drummond, attempting to carry Fort Erie by esculade, was repulsed; and again at a sortle in force made by the garrison, in which 609 British, and 510 American officers and men, were killed and wounded. The general result of the cumpaign in this quarter war, however, a failure. On the 5th of November the Americans evacuated Fort Erie, and retired across the Niagara. On the 10th of December the British troops along that frontier went into winter quarters.

While these things were going on, an American division, 5000 strong, moved from Plattsburg, with no cther view than to distract the attention of the English, and to alarm them for Montreul. It advanced as far as Champlain town on the Chaizie close to the frontier, and was opposed on the left by the British garrison of Isle aux Noix, by a fortified mill on the Lacolle river in the centre, and by a strong picket on the Burtonville road on the right. On the 12th of March the enemy endeavored to take the mill, bat without success, sacrificing 154 officers and men, while the loss of the English did not exceed 64.

Satisfied with this demonstration, the Americans moved off from the Montreal frontier towards Sacketts Harbour. They left garrisons at Plattsburg, Burlington, and Vernes-three posts in which a flotil-This was by far the sharpest la was constructed for the defence

of Lake Champlain. But partly be- ten gunboate, carrying among them cause what was intended for a feint eighty-six heavy guns, and manned on Niagara had taken a serious by 983 first-rate seamen. The turn, partly because England, re-launching of a new vessel on the lieved from her war with France, 26th of August at Isle aux Noix was pouring her Peninsular regi- raised the British squadron to one ments into Canada, the projected ship, one brig, two slowps, and attack on Kingston never took twelve gunboats. The whole were place. On the contrary the garri- superior in numbers of cannon to son at Kingston began to act on the the enemy, for they carried among offensive. On the 4th of May, them 91; but their crews were the offensive. On the 4th of May, 1000 soldiers, supported by 200 seamen, took ship, and landed on the 6th, under the guns of Oswego. The place was stormed and taken, and such stores as had been collected there were destroyed. But the American loss in this respect was not heavy, for they had very prudently formed their principal magazine on Lake Oneida. The expedition cannot be said, however, to have been entirely abortive, be-cause it contributed to divert the attention of the enemy from measures of offence to those of defence merely. But, in truth, the tide Having despatched one of the was by this time turning strong in brigades, which reached him from favour of Canada, which, with a the Garonne, to secure Kingston little more of prudence on the part and the Niagara frontier, Sir George of her naval, and of hardihood and Prevost, the commander-in-chief in judgment in her military, com-British North America, moved from mander-in-chief, might, and ought the camp which he had formed to, have come out of the struggle near Montreal. He began his everywhere triumphant.

made by both parties to increase driving in the enemy's outposts, their squadrons on Lake Ontario took possession of the town of and Lake Champlain. On all the Champlain on the Chaizie. other lakee, Erie, Michigan, and American general, Macomb, had Huron, the Americans had a de- but a single brigade of regular cided superiority; but on Ontario, troops under his orders. With the belligerent forces were by this these he fell back to Plattsburg, the time equalised, and the enemy natu- heights above which were already rally conceived that the English surmounted with a few field-works, would be induced, by their supe- all of them incapable of a protracted rior military efficiency, to strike at defence. the source of the naval strength of Prevost had arrived at the opinion America hy destroying Sacketts Har- that a victory by land would serve bour. With a view to protect that no purpose, unless the American point, troops were called in from all flotilia should in the first instance quarters, and Lake Champlain was be destroyed. He was so far corleft, as has just been explained, to reot, that, though victorious over be defended by weak garrisons at the troops encamped at Plattsburg, Plattsburg and other posts. The he would have found it impossible American squadron on Lake Cham- to cross the lake and to advance

offscourings both of the Royal Navy and of the transport service, supplemented by French Canadians and soldiers. The new ship, more-over, the Confiance, was abso-lutely in the builder's hands, and her powder carried in lighters alongside when she quitted the stocks to go into action; and her commander, the commodore of the little fleet, seems to have been entirely wanting in that calm thought which is even more necessary than courage to direct a great battle either by land or sea.

march with 11,000 men on the 1st Great exertions had of late been of September, and on the 3d, after The Unfortunately Sir George plain consisted of one ship, one upon Sacketts Harbour, the Ameri-brig, one sloop, one schooner, and cans retaining their superiority on

the Wro on Am still that tent vict hav Am had don arri the peat this ing tion The two muo not para flotil der heig to b para he t on t the her Ame resul one, they. mand ticipa main with Sir nerall this tion the ti of it to as could succes been Not reach tilla la Prevo no inf ence, But VOL.

186

## Feb.

them nned The the Noix one and were n to nong ) the loyal vice, dians noreabsoand hters the her the ı enught than oattle the from gston eorge ef in from rmed his e 1st after posts, n of The had gular With g, the read**y** orks. acted eorge inion serve rican tance corover burg, sible ance meriy on 1862.]

the waters; but he was entire;) deniably frustrated the whole plan arrive in sight of these works till till then suffered disgrace. the 6th, and then he halted. Re- stopped his columns on the 11th not Captain Downie hurry his pre- went into quarters at Isle aux Noix, parations, and sweep the American Chambly, and Laprairie, and beparations. Indeed, he did more : America. he took advantage of a fair wind on the 11th, and, rushing on with statement of facts, that the war mand of the lake, which it was an- frontiers, the Americans were beat-ticipated they would establish, re- en. They established themselves,

nerally blamed as the sole cause of balance this, they lost Fort Niagara this disaster. We have no inten- and the island of Michilimackinac, tion to become his advocates; but which were not given up till hosti-the truth is, that he was the cause lities ceased. More curious still, of it only in part. It is a mistake as showing how weary they had to assume that the American flotilla become of the contest, not one of could not have engaged the English the wrongs complained of as the successfully, had the British army cause of the quarrel was so much been in possession of the heights, as taken into consideration when Not a gun from the heights could the quarrel ended. The claims of reach the anchorage where the flo- neutrals to free navigation, immutilla lay. The success of Sir George nity from search at sea, the right Prevost could therefore have had of affording an asylum to deserters no influence, except a moral influ- — these points were all left pre-ence, favourable to Captain Downie. cisely where they stood when the But Captain Downie's defeat 20- war began. Had it not been, in-VOL. XCI.

wrong in assuming that an action of the campaign. For the sake of on shore would be profitless till the effect, Sir George ought, even on American flotilla was defeated; and the 11th, to have stormed the still more mistaken if he conceived enemy's works; for the sake of that a victory at sea was to any ex- effect, he ought to have achieved tent necessary in order to insure a that easy conquest long before the victory on shore. Nothing could sails of the British squadron became have prevented him from driving the visible in the distance; but he American general out of his works could have done no more. He had he moved up, as he might have managed, however, to tarnish the done, on the 5th. But he did, not honour of troops which had never He peated messages were sent after when moving to the attack, broke this to Captain Downie, demand- up his position before the enemy, ing when he would be in a condi- and retreated harassed by their tion to advance from Isle aux Noix. riflemen through the woods. No The enemy's squadron lay about more was attempted that year. The two miles from Plattsburg, in com- victors of the Peninsula, out of munication with their army. Could humour with their commander, factilla aside, while the troops, un- fore an opportunity could be af-der Sir George Prevost, stormed the forded them of wiping off their heights? Downie suffered himself shame, preliminaries of peace were to be chafed, and hurried his pre- signed between Great Britain and

It will be seen from this plain the Confiance, which far outsailed into which statement of facts, that the war the Confiance, which far outsailed into which she nngenerously en-her consorts, engaged the whole tered in 1812 brought to America American fleet single-handed. The neither profit nor honour. In al-results are well known. One by most all the encounters which oc-one, ns the British vessels came up, curred between her troops and they were disabled, and the com- those of England on the Canadian mend of the lake which it may approximate the American fleet ticipated they would establish, re-mained more decidedly than ever with the Americans. Sir George Prevost has been ge-end of the war; but to counter-they established themselves, no doubt, in 1813, in the Amherst-burg district, and kept it till the end of the war; but to counter-

deed, for Sir George Prevost's blun- regard to Lake Ontario : there was dering, and the disastrous issues of no position along its northern the New Orleans expedition, the shore, not even Kingston, whi Americans themselves must have could compare half a century ago been forced to acknowledge that in point of convenience with Sac-a war with England is the least ketts Harbour. With respect to hopeful game that the United States can play. The defeat at New Or-leans was indeed a fair defeat: we owe it to the rash impetuosity of Sir Edward Pakenham, who died like a gallant soldier in the field; and to the incapacity of Sir John Keane, who lived many years afterwards, and contrived to flounder into a peerage. But Sir George Prevost's mishap was an outrage on British honour, as uncalled for as ever befell. Had he attacked Plattsburg on the 6th or 7th, there is no telling what the effect might have been; and having failed to do this, at least he ought to have carried it on the 11th. His refusal to ao so, and still more his precipitate re- States should have achieved an treat, probably saved a few hun-dred lives at the time, but it sacrificed, what would have been cheaply purchased at the expense of five thousand lives, the halo of victory which up to that moment had surrounded the English colours, and amid the full radiance of which it was especially desirable that this American war should end.

On the other hand, there is no denying that, in the naval struggle for the command of the lakes, the Americans had the advantage the preliminaries of peace were throughout. England could make no head against them on Lakes Erie and Huron. On Lake Champlain she suffered a defeat; and on Ontario, no more can be said than that by great exertion she managed to bring up her own strength at last to a level with that of the enemy. This is not to be dangered, were never absolutely in-wondered at. The Canadian shores terrupted. We permitted ourselves of the Upper Lakes were very thinly to be wronged on the boundary inhabited half a century ago. Even question, and took no notice of the This is not to be the Amherstburg district between deceit practised upon us when it Lake Erie and Lake Huron, had was discovered. We forbore from scarcely begun to be cleared; and demanding redress for the outrages to establish navy-yards where there of American sympathisers in 1837; are neither towns nor roads, nor and even the gross violation of law the means of feeding workmen, is and right, in the seizure of Isle St.

ketts Harbour. With respect to Lake Champlain, it was throughout an American lake, and afforded facilitics for building and equipping fleets which were denied to a power possessing but a single harbour, that of Isle aux Noix, at its extremity. Besides, the Americans had everything on the spot — timber, iron, artificers, guns, stores — the latter secured on Lake Oneida, whence they could easily be trans-ported to other lakes as required; whereas England, when she took seriously to ship-building, was obliged to send out all, even the frames of the vessels themselves, piecemeal from Europe. The marvel, therefore, is, not that the United ascendancy on these inland waters, but that the ascendancy should have been so far from decided, and that so little should have been made of it in promoting the great objects of the war. Canada was never conquered, nor in any danger of being conquered. How would the case stand now? How would it have stood had the Federal Government refused to do justice in the matter of the Trent?

Between December 1814, when signed at Ghent, and December 1861, when the ultimatum of the British Government reached Washington, forty-seven years had run their course. During that extend-ed interval, the friendly relations of Great Britain with the United States, though more than once ensimply impossible. So likewise in Juan, we refrained from chastising.

18 Th par it 1 the me Cai Wi DOW Las the to the The fron The exte and to flou beco can As t gran and till exce num indu The chief to 1 nada Neith ful In o ties the have ceed throu the about carrie of La again river is mu ly bee bank less fronti the Beauh called third, from ing, a Sault.

eb.

78.8

ern 5 Ja

igo

18.Cto

out aciing wer our,

tre-

had ber,

the

eida. ans-

red; took

was

the

lves,

marnited

an ters,

hould

, and

been great

Was

anger would

would Gov-

ce in

when

were

ember

f the

Wash-

run xtend-

ations

Inited

e enly in-

selves

indary

of the hen it from trages

1837; of law

le St. tising.

This continued forbecrance on our tached canals, at Farrand's Point, part was probably a mistake, but the Platte, Iroquois, and the Gait sufficed in the meanwhile to keep lopa Rapids. After these the navithe peace; and peace brought im- gation is safe through the Thousand mense physical advantages, both to Islands into Lake Ontario, with Canada and the United States. capacity enough to float anything With respect to Canada, there is which shall not exceed 136 feet in now a belt on both sides of the St. length, 44 in beam, and 9 feet Lawrence, and along the shores of draught. Now, though works like the lakes, which has long ceased, these tend greatly to develop the to the extent of 1000 miles, to be resources of the diatricts through the wilderness which it was in 1812. which they pass, and to facilitate The forest has largely disappeared the commerce of the Far West with from The Niagara district exhibits an not, when considering the military extensive breadth of cultivation; position of Canada itself, count too and Toronto, though it has ceased much upon them. It has been asto be the capital of a province, sumed, and doubtless correctly, flourishes. Kingston likewise has that they present a channel through become a respectable town, and which gun - busts, and even smallcan boast of an excellent harbour. class frigates, might pass. Indeed, As to Lower Canada, crowds of emi- we have heard it gravely argued, grants, both from Great Britain that from this time forth no speand Ireland, have poured into it; cial preparation will be necessary till now, the British settlers as far in order to insure to England the exceed the French habitants in command of the lakes; because, in number as they surpass them in the event of war, her squadrons industry and strength of character. which blockade the American coasts The population of Montreal alone, can detach force enough to sweep chiefly English and Irish, has grown from these inland waters every hosto 100,000; and that of both Ca- tile pennant. But they who reason nadas reaches well nigh to 3,000,000. thus, forget that no dependence Neither has the prosecution of use- can be placed upon a series of In order to surmount the difficul- within fifteen miles of an enemy's ties in navigation presented by frontier. A few bags of gunthe St. Lawrence, various canals powder judiciously applied in a have been dug. The first, as we pro- dark night, a few hours' work the island of Montreal, and is situation by guile or violence, would about two miles in length. It break up the whole channel. Nor carries vessels clear of the rapids can we derive much comfort from of La Chine, and brings them out turning our eyes towards the Rideau again into the quiet waters of the Canal, much as it was at one time river above these rapids. The next counted upon. It forms a safe and is much longer, and has unfortunate- ready communication between Kingly been cut on the right or American sion ( )d the town of Ottawa; but bank of the river, at a distance of vessels seeking to ascend from Monless than fifteen miles from the treal to Ottawa must follow the ing, and avoids thereby the Long possible, for the most part, to sur-Sault. Beyond this are short de- mount. Indeed, it was this defect in

the Amherstburg territory. Canada and with Europe, we must ceed npwards from Quebec, passes with pick and spade by men who through the southern extremity of have won a brief command of the frontier. It clears the cascades and course of the Ottawa river, which, the Oidars, and, extending from besides being both circuitous and Beauharnais to Hungry Bay, is rapid, is here and there beset by called the Beauharnais Canal. A shallows, such as the merchant third, the Cornwall Canal, stretches steamers plying between the Atlan-from Cornwall to Dickenson's Land- tic and Lake Ontario find it imthe Rideau Canal, rendering it com- ought to have been, and never paratively useless for purposes of would have been, had not Sir trade, which led to the construction Robert Peel sent to negotiate with of the canals just enumerated. It our slippery cousins a nobleman, diswould never do, therefore, to trust posed, if not by personal interests, to navigation of this sort, assuming without doubt by timidity, to sacri-the command of the lakes to be as fice everything in the future to preimportant now to the defence of sent peace. The State of Maine, Canada as it was half a century ago. of which the north boundary was In like manner the railways which marked on the map accepted by have been constructed on the same Franklin in 1785 at the 44th degree principle as the canals will scarcely of latitude, was stretched down in suffice, in Lower Canada, to multiply a tongue by Lord Ashburton to the our military resources by facilitat- 45th degree, and the State now ining the movement of troops. The terposes for sixty geographical miles Grand Trunk, which runs all the between two portions of British way from Riviere du Loups to Lake territory, wellnigh isolating both. Huron, is carried as far as Montreal on the right bank of the St. Law- free from all apprehension of agrence, never keeping farther than gressive war on our parts, have sixty, and approaching where it is gone on spreading cultivation northnearest within ten miles of the wards, and connecting by many frontier. How are you to defend a lines of rail their great commercial line thus exposed, throughout an towns with Lakes Erie and Ontario, extent, as the hird flies, of 250 miles and with the Canadian frontier. -and how could you, being unable They have lines from Portland, to defend, venture to make use of Boston, Rhode Island, London, and it, after hostilities began, for the New York-all of which join the transport of troops and stores from Canadian Grand Trunk, or, to speak the coast to the interior?

252

Treaty has been to render a thou- miles within their own frontier. sand times more difficult than it They have a line of their own ought to be military communica- which communicates with these, tion between Canada and the skirting the frontier as far as Ogmother country, and between one densburg, and which at Champlain portion of British America and an- is not more than 30 miles distant other. From the month of Decem- from Montreal. And more vexaber, when the navigation of the St. tious still, they have got possession, Lawrence closes, till the month of by virtue of the Ashburton Treaty, May, when it opens again, the only of the fort at Rouse's Point, which ports in North America accessible we built as on our own territory, beto English men-of-war, and trans- fore railways existed, in order to ports, are Halifax in Nova Scotia, command the approaches to Monand St. John in New Brunswick. treal by Lake Champlain. It will Now, such is the position of these be seen that their facilities of attack, ports relatively to Quebec, that in the event of a new war, are by though, as the bird flies, the nearest these means greatly increased since of them is within 300 miles of that 1814, for any number of troops city, you could not construct a may be moved by these various railroad between them, which would lines; and so long as the lines conbe at all safe, except on a detour tinue open, an army operating in of upwards of 600 miles; and even front of them can be supplied as then you must arrive at last on well and almost as speedily from a point where your line shall con- Boston and New . vrk as from nect itself with the Grand Trunk, magazines formed, as of old, at and thus be brought within ten Plattsburg and Oswego.

Meanwhile the United States, e coast to the interior? more correctly, are joined by it at Again, the effect of the Ashburton a place called Mooer, about three

miles of the frontier. This never We confess that the prospect of

[Feb.

18

W

OU

do

ha

W

wł de

ma Bu

the

to

the

pai

per

to

if

cee

fed

am

800

Ca

em

SOI

is i the

pap

Gei

will

that

fast the

Can

bab

and

time

best

reas

larg

force

than

for if t

begi

there

shou

The

88 f both

saila

lines

forw

view

to di

best

neces

\*

H Fed 1862.]

eb.

Ter

Sir

ith

dis-

sts,

cri-

ore-

ine,

Was by

gree

in

the in-

niles

itish

ates,

ag-

1878

orth-

Dany

rcial

ario,

tier.

land,

and

the

peak

it at

three

ntier.

own

these,

Og-

plain

stant

vexa-

ssion,

eaty.

which

y, be-

r to

Mon-

will

tack,

e by

since

roops

arious

con-

ed as

from

from

d, at

ect of

war in December last did not seri- one from Washington to Detroit, at ously alarm us. Men enough, we the top of Lake Erie; another from doubt not, the Americans could New York to Buffalo, at the bottom have got together. Indeed, there of the same lake; possibly a third was a rumour in circulation, to to Sacketts Harbour, with a view to which, however, we gave little cre- the reduction of Kingston; and a dence, that they had collected as fourth from Boston to Rouse's Point, many as 20,000 close to the frontier. But to collect men and to move This last we may safely put down them are two different things, and at not less than 100,000 men, while to feed and provide for them, after the other three may number 25,000 they are fairly launched into a campaign, is a third matter, which inex- strenuous exertions will have been perienced persons will find it easier made to build and launch such a to talk about than to settle. Still, if the Federals should by chance succeed, either in conquering the Confederates or in separating from them amicably, then we have every reason to expect that the Washington Cabinet will find it necessary to seek employment for its enormous army somewhere away from home. Nor is it difficult, if we may judge from the tone of the American newspapers, to guess in what direction General M'Lellan and his troops Assume then, will be turned. that a new quarrel is likely to be fastened upon England, and that the long - cherished idea of annexing Canada is resumed. How is it probable that the attack will be made, and by what means may we, while time and opportunity are afforded, best provide against the emergency?

We take it for granted that the Federal Government will for many reasons direct against Canada the largest amount of its disposable force which it can command. Less than 200,000 men would not suffice for so grave an undertaking; and if there really be, when hostilities begin, half a million under arms, there is no reason why 300,000 should not enter on the campaign.\* The probabilities are likewise, that as far as the altered condition of both countries may allow, the assailants will advance by the same lines as in 1813. They will push forward three, perhaps four columns, wisdom in the theory, that colonies,

at the bottom of Lake Champlain. respectively. Previously to all this, number of war vessels as shall give them the command of Lake Ontario -an object which, unless we be beforehand with them, there is ncthing to prevent them from effecting. Grant all this to be done, and well done, what follows? While Amherstburg and Niagara are both invaded, and Kingston invested, the larger army at Rouse's Point separates into two masses, one of which will threaten, and, if the opportunity serve, attack Montreal in front; while the other crosses the St. Lawrence opposite to Cornwall, and takes the city in reverse.

We assume that the officer who shall direct these operations has acquired in his contests with the Confederates some knowledge of the art of war. He will have learned, for example, that it is necessary, in conducting offensive operations, to keep open the communications of his own army with its rear, and having 25,000 men to spare, he will doubtless employ them on this service. They will watch Nova Scotia and New Brunswick from their own portion of the valley of St. John, and be ready, as occasion shall arise, either to repel an aggressive movement, or to make one. All this may not come to pass, nor even a portion of it, but all is undoubtedly upon the cards. What is England required to do in anticipation of it?

There may be both justice and

\* It will be seen that we look at this matter from a purely American point of view. That the Federal States will have 500,000 men, or anything like that force, to draw on when their present troubles cease, we entirely disbelieve. But it is hest to prepare for the worst, and the measures which we recommend are just as necessary against 100,000 invaders as against 300,000.

253

The Defence of Canada.

as soon as they acquire the rights of plement the regular garrison, which self government, should be called the mother country supplies, with a fence in war. Like other general ed militia. She has all the machirules, however, this admits of ex- nery ready, though for lack of use ceptions, and the case of British it has got out of gear : and she North America must to a certain must restore it to working order, extent be regarded as exceptional. Perhaps England should not be effort may occasion. We believe taxed to keep soldiers continually that a militia in Canada alone at the Cape of Good Hope, in the Australasian group, or even in the West India Islands. Every one of drain upon the industry of the these colonies is rich enough to maintain such armed force as it requires in time of peace, because they are all sufficiently guarded by distance, or by the naval supremacy of the mother country, from the andden attacks of regular armies. But British North America is differently circumstanced. It stands face to face with a power which, in the appliances of modern science and in the courage and endurance of its people, is a match for the most military of European nations. An American army, when it first takes the field, may be little better than a rabble; but give it the experience of a year or two, and it becomes able to hold its own against the best troops in the world. So our people found half a century ago, and so, if the storm which we are now contemplating do not burst till 1863, our people may find again. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the Imperial Government is bound to garrison British North America in time of peace, and to rinder it all the support which can be spared when war arises. The Imperial Government may likewise, in our opinion, be expected to share in the expense constructing such permanent of works as prudence may suggest, and for this reason, that there are ten chances to one that war with the Federal States, when it occurs, will arise not out of colonial but out of Imperial questions. On the other hand, British North America cannot expect — we are sure that she does not expect - to be defended altogether by the mother country. She must out of her own resources sup-

[Feb.

upon to provide for their own de- numerous, stout, and well - disciplin- " no matter what inconvenience the could be raised to the amount of 150,000 men, without any serious country. Of this mass, 50,000 might easily be called out at a time, and kept under arms for three months. At the end of three months a second batch, to the like extent, should take their places, and thus in the course of a single summer we should be able to show a force of 100,000 disciplined soldiers in case of need. In winter all might drill, as our own Volunteers drill at home, at odd hours, in halls and under sheds, by squads and companies. With 150,000 provincials thus prepared, and 10,000 or 15,000 British troops behind them, Canada might safely, according to our view of the subject, defy the world in arms.

> The same rule which we apply to Canada we should apply to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is not exacting too much from these provinces to require that they shall each supply 10,000 or 15,000 effective militia, which, supported by 5000 regular troops, will render them competent to play their parts in any game to which they may be called.

> The American colonies will naturally look to the mother country for arms and stores. We do not think that they ought to accept these things as free gifts. They are rich enough to purchase their own materiel, as well as to clothe, pay, and feed their own troops when embodied. But if unable to bear the heavy expense of a first equipment, it seems to us that they cannot scruple to share it with the mother country, or at all events to take upon themselves the burden of keeping up the stock when it has once been supplied. In like man-

ne

de

al

th

81

ra

fo

th

be

of

8

CC

di

ed

th

st

ri

E

in

la

W

fir

th

fro

ba

83

th

bŀ

m

ex

St

bi

sid

88

in

A

be

in

m

pa Fo

A

88

8.9

the

th

the

sh

ha

on

the

no

mo

th

10

801

be

flo

1862.]

th a iplin- ' achiuse i she rder, the lieve alone nt of rious the 0,000 time, three onths tent, thus mmer force s in night drill halls and ovin-0 or them, g to the oly to New It is these shall effecby them n any d. DAuntry o not these rich matéand em· r the ment, annot other take

n of has man-

ner they will be expected, if not to the larger frigates when they come indefray, certainly to share the cost of to smooth water. all such public works as shall serve the double purpose of commercial these a line of railway, which shall and military communication. railway from Quebeo to Montreal, for example, is on the wrong side of signed, we consider this project as the river. In time of peace it may of doubtful value. Not that we be convenient enough; in the event of war it would become useless. If a second line ca the left bank be considered indispensable, the Canadian Governments should be required to provide a fair proportion of the funds necessary to make it. And still more, should competent authorities arrive at the conclusion that Egland's readiest mode of obtaining and keeping command of the lakes is to construct a new canal, which, embracing and enlarging the first of those now in use, shall pass thence into the Ottawa Canal, and from the Ottawa Canal to Kingston

harbour, then must Canada, as well as the mother country, be taxed for the completion of it, though possibly the heavier portion of the expense may fall upon England. Such a work, executed sufficiently in rear of the St. Lawrence to prevent the possibility of molestation from the other side, would for all military as well as commercial purposes throw the inland waters of America and the Atlantic into one. It would then be easy for Great Britain to crowd into Lake Ontario such a fleet as must render competition on the part of the United States hopeless. For, in spite of all their skill, the Americans could never build as fast as our gunboats and frigates could ascend from the seaboard, while the door would always be open to them to return for the blockade of the enemy's coasts, as soon as they should have destroyed the enemy's harbours and captured their flotilla on the lakes. It is obvious that the sort of canal of which we are now speaking, must be rendered more capacious in every respect than the most convenient of those importance; but a country like Canow in use; though for an unrea: nada will never be defended at all, sonable depth there can be no need, nnless it be defended by armies in because stores and guns can be the field. Indeed, the attempt to

It has been suggested to add to The connect Halifax and St. John with Quebec. For reasons elsewhere asare disposed to make much of the physical obstacles presented elsewhere than through the valley of the St. John by the face of the country in New Brunswick. Of whatever nature these may be, skill, industry, and capital can overcome them; but your railway, when constructed, must either end at Riviere du Loups, whence it will run for thirty miles within ten miles of the frontier, or it will carry you to some point lower down the St. Lawrence, where the river is wide, and in winter generally impassable. Moreover, in reaching the opposite bank, you will tind no railway to take you up, but the prospect of a march of two hundred miles over a country intersected with torrents, and otherwise difficult. On the whole, we incline to think that, till our line of frontier is rectified, the construction of a railway between the St. John and the St. Lawrence would, so far as military operations are concerned, oney thrown away. We must be be content, therefore, for a while, to consider New Brunswick and Neva Scotia as a flauking bastion or ravelin thrown out from Canada, which, though it be cut off from ready communication with the body of the place, is not therefore useless.

We come now to another point, which is equally worthy of attention. Should any new fortifications be thrown up in Canada? and if thrown up, where shall we place them? We confess ourselves little which depends to any great extent upon fortified places. Here and there, as in the Austrian Quadrila-teral, these may be of the utmost floated on rafts or barges in rear of cover the frontier, or even the most

exposed points in it, by forts, or tremely difficult by detached works exposed points in it, by forts, or other enclosed works, must lead only to discomfiture. You could not garrison a dozen or two of such places except by weakening too much your field force, while each, as the enemy passed it by, would be lost to ycu. The best army in the world, however, if it is to act in separate comps and over an extend. separate corps, and over an extend-ed area, requires here and there a place d'armes, round which its levies may gather, and on which, in case of disaster, its fragments may retire. This rule, which holds good everywhere, is especially applicable to the state of a country with a frontier so extensive and exposed as that of Canada.

If it be the use of history to read the future in the past, then the plan of campaign which we sketched out for the Americans in 1863 is that which they will probably fol-low. Canada will be invaded again, as she has been repeatedly invaded before, by Amherstburg, Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal: we must provide, therefore, for every possible contingency in each of these direc-tions. Possibly Quebec itself may be threatened, even at the com-mencement of the war; but we certainly do not consider the contingency probable. For though it be indisputable that the power which holds Quebec holds the gate of Canada against all comers, no Federal leader, even if he could the enemy under its walls. command the passage of the river, With respect again to Kingston, would throw himself in these days as the approaches to the harbour upon Quebec, till he should have are already fortified, nothing more barred out the population of Canada seems necessary than to strengthen West from coming to its relief. For the existing works, and, perhaps, to our present purpose, therefore, it enlarge them. We are aware of the will suffice to look to the old lines obstacles presented to this by the of attack, and see if we can render surrender, some time ago, of all them safe to ourselves and difficult crown lands to the local govern-of empiries to the energy of emprise to the enemy.

the difficulty of the scheme, but r move these dwellings, their owners deny its impossibility. Montreal is must be prepared, on an emergency, too extensive, and lies too much in to destroy them; while fresh bat-a hollow, to be enclosed within teries are erected wherever their walls and ditches; but you may action seems to be required. Be-render the approaches to it ex- youd this, however, it seems un-

judiciously placed, especially by the construction of a strong têle-de-pont on the right bank of the river, and by planting on the hill which overlooks the town on the left a redoubt or citadel. But you must do more than this. On the first tidings of war, an attempt must be made to take possession of the fort at Rouse's Point. The occupation of this, and of the forts at Isle aux Noix, St. John, and Chambly, would block the way long enough to try the patience of the assailants; and when these places fall, if fall they must, you have still your tête-de-pont to maintain, with the broad and rapid St. Lawrence behind it. It is possible that, even by these means, you will not be able to save Montreal from bombardment; but, assuming your military canal to have been completed, or that you have ships enough on Lake Ontario to hinder the descent of bateaux from Sackett's Harbour, we really do not see how the enemy are to cross the St. Lawrence in the face of a few batteries judiciously plant-ed. Everything will of course depend upon your power to prevent the laying of a bridge. Should the canals be still where they now are, and Lake Ontario in the enemy's possession, Montreal can hardly be saved, unless you he in force enough to fight a general action, and defeat

ment, and by the encroachments It may well appear at first sight subsequently made upon the line impossible to provide effectually for c free by private dwellings. But the defence of Montreal. We admit is it be considered too expensive to

neces be a Uppe and as to dange this admi both There Fort in th geuer them But burg positio dered make tion o ble, at diffion Loo territo treat in the of th would an ar for the from . from onto a thus be cal po remove as a p of the to affor might come b county. as hold of raj the ext called 1 and the therefor ment w as muc enable without capable men. ing bet the con the An cessful

necessary to go. be attacked, except by water, till from its place of landing. Upper Canada shall have fallen ; and if you so distribute its defences as to render a landing difficult and dangerous, you have done all in this quarter which circumstances The case is different admit of. both in Amherstburg and Niagara. There such places as Sandwich and Fort Dalhousie would simply be in the way. They might tempt a general to throw a few men into them whom he would certainly lose. But in the rear both of Amherstburg and the Niagara there are positions which, if taken up and rendered as strong as the skill of man can make them, would render the subjugation of these districts, if not impossible, at all events very tedious and very difficult.

Looking first to the Amherstburg territory, we find that the only re-treat left open to Colonel Proctor in the last war was up the valley of the Thames. The same line would certainly be chosen now by an army worsted on the frontier; for the Grand Trunk Railway runs from Amherstburg to London, and from London by Hamilton to Toronto and Kingston. London itself thus becomes an important strategical point, being at once sufficiently removed from the border to serve as a place of muster for the militia of the district, and sufficiently near to afford security to the corps which might have engaged and been overcome by an invading army in Essex county. It is important, likewise, as holding the key to the only door of rapid communication between the extreme west of what may be called the settled portions of Canada and the Atlantic. It appears to us, therefore, that the Imperial Government will do well to take possession of as much land in this quarter as may enable our engineers to construct, without delay, an intrenched camp capable of being defended by 5000 men. With such a camp interposing between them and a march down the country, it is not probable that the American colume, even if suc- and places of strength to which cessful in the first instance, will corps, worsted in a first encounter,

Kingston cannot ever venture more than a few miles

For the same reasons, and because the material facilities of the ground are even more striking, we would suggest the construction of a second intrenched camp of similar dimensions on Burlington Heights. These heights, it will be remembered, constituted the point d'appui on which, during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, the troops told off for the protection of the Niagara district always rallied after some temporary reverse. The town of Hamilton is now connected with them, and they command both its harbour, which is good, and the Grand Trunk Ruilway. Five thousand men thrown into an intrenched camp in this position would hold at bay any number of invaders, till time should have been afforded to call out the whole strength of the province.

We have alluded elsewhere to the possibility of an attempt by coupde-main on Quebec. Not that we consider such an occurrence at all likely to happen. An American general would scarcely venture, with New Brunswick on his flank, to march by the uncleared portions of Maine, only that he right fight his way up to a broad river, through a district so well peopled and so warlike as St. Francis. But in war even possibilities must be guarded against. Quebec is strong already; its strength will be increased by surrounding the detached towers which now crown the Heights of Abraham with solid earthworks; and by looking to that exposed corner of the lower town, by which, during the war of the Revolution, Arnold had wellnigh entered. This being done, and care taken to have the magazines and arsenals well filled, we need not entertain the smallest apprehension for Quebec; and so long as Quebec remains in possession of British troops, the permanent conquest of Canada by the Americans will remain to be effected.

Having thus provided points at which the local militia may collect,

257

ks

he

nt

nd

er-

bt

re

of

de

at

of

UX

ıld

try

nd

ey

de-

ad

it.

680

.ve

ut,

to

1011

rio

unr

lly

to

ace

nt-

de-

ent

the

re,

by's

be

hgh

eat

on, bur

ore

nen

to

the

the

all

rn-

nts

ine

But

to

ers

сy,

at-

eir

Beun-

may retire, the military authorities sess themselves of the line, and destroy on the spot must select some posi- it; and unless you are prepared to tion where the grand army, which support your patrols with an army, they propose to employ in active the patrols can offer no resistance operations shall assemble. Such a which shall be effectual against supeposition ought to be central, so that rior numbers. support may be conveulently sent But though we may withdraw our from it to either flack, without, divisions for a time from the dishowever, too much weakening the tricts to the South of the St. Lawforce which is kept in hand, to act rence, it does not therefore follow wherever the enemy may show himself in greatest strength. It is not for us to indicate where the position should be. Enough is done when the enemy be so ill advised as to we point out that it ought not to be too distant either from Montreal them down, they will show good or from Quebec, and that it should fight for their hearths and homes be chosen with a special eye to the against his detachments. But this railways, canals, roads, and other is not all. The armies of New lines of communication which, when Brunswick and of Nova Scotia will manœuvring begins, can be made not be idle. Leaving a sufficient available.

This plan of ours may, perhaps, be objected to as implying the the provinces, the remainder will abandonment of all those valuable act upon the enemy's communicacounties which lie on the right bank tions, eluding or fighting the corps of the St. Lawrence, and, still more, of the Grand Trunk Railway between Quebec and Montreal. Why not endeavour, in the first instance, to retain your hold upon these counties? and if that be impossible, why give up the railway without a struggle? Our answer is, that it would be imprudent at the opening of a campaign to commit a young army to a general action with such a river as the St. Lawrence in its rear; and that, in order to nurse such an army, and render it effective, you must leave many outlying provinces to Canadian territory. take care of themselves. With respect, again, to the Grand Trunk Railway, it has elsewhere been shown that, with an enterprising enemy in our front, it becomes useless to us as soon as hostilities begin. bravery of the troops. But assum-A chain, be its length what it may, ing these to be equal, we think the is only as strong as its weakest link ; odds are in favour of our own counand a railway which runs for thirty miles within ten, miles of a hostile be completed in time, from the seafrontier, can scarcely be made use of in war for the conveyance of troops. As to patrolling these thirty miles, either on foot or by detached England of 1863 will probably teach cars, that expedient could serve no the Federals a lesson which they are possible purpose. The first effort not likely to forget for many years made by the enemy will be to pos-

that they are ahandoned. Each county has its own local militia these will all turn out; and should weaken himself in order to put number, say 2000 regular troops and 8000 or 10,000 militia, to guard of observation which watches them, and breaking up every line of rail to which they can gain access. If successful here, success will soon attend the British arms elsewhere. The heavy columns in front of Montreal will find it necessary to retire, The British army will cross the St. Lawrence in pursuit, and the campaign is just as likely to end by establishing a new frontier for Canada, with Portland on one flank, and Lake Ontario on the other, as by leaving the enemy in permanent possession of a mile of

We give these speculations for what they are worth. The results of a war so waged must, of course, depend upon the military genius of the leaders on either side, and the trymen. Indeed, if the proposed canal . board to Lake Ontario, and the flying corps, which is to harass the American coasts, do its duty, the war with afterwards.

## Feb. stroy ed to tance supedis-Law-Each hould as to put good nomes this New a will facient troops guard will unica-corps them, of rail so. If soon where. Mont-retire. ie St. ipaign lishing Port-ontario enemy aile of s for results course, nius of ad the assumak the conn-l canal . a canal he sea-flying Ameri-hr with y teach hey are years

