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STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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An address by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Montreal Reform Club, on April 29, 1950

The central political problem of our time is the relationip between the free Western world and the U.S.S.R. This question
under constant public discussion, in the press, on platforms
at unofficial conferences, open and private. You may be sure
that the government is giving full and continual attention to
problem, anxious on the one hand to support any reasonable
towards a settlement and on the other to avoid any action that
eves no other purpose than appeasement.

At the end of the war we had some reason to believe that relations with the Russians might develop along normal friendly mels. We were all heartened by the magnificent achievements of war-time alliance, and the tremendous co-operative effort from it and West alike which had crushed the Germans led us to believe twe could enjoy equally spectacular but more constructive efforts meacetime co-operation. There is a moving and eloquent ression of this hope in a paragraph from Robert Sherwood's k on Roosevelt and Hopkins, a paragraph which in the light of it has happened has a grim poignancy.

"We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace - and, by 'we', I mean all of us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and far-seeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine."

This hope has had to be deferred - and I use the term for deliberately because I do not think we have had to abandon it ecause the U.S.S.R. in a most deliberate and calculating manner ected the co-operation of the war-time period and set out upon lew course of action.

I think the Russians made their deliberate choice to ect co-operation with the West for a number of reasons. One of springs from the Communist theory upon which their state is ed. Their leaders have taught them that the Russian revolution merely the beginning of a world revolution and that for this son conflict between the Soviet State and the rest of the world inevitable. They therefore set their people to work preparing for sconflict. At the same time, I think that they were influenced expansionist traditions which go far back in the history of Soviet

icy. They had a choice to make in 1945 between co-operating with rest of us in rebuilding the world or alternatively seizing trol of as great an area as possible. They made the latter choice. It was the line of their influence as far away from Moscow as they all manage, and ever since they have been vigorously engaged trying the one hand to extend that line and on the other hand to shut rest of us out from behind it. They have been influenced also a third motive - the fear that co-operation with the West might in the gradual infiltration of Western ideas and news through to ir own people. This would be a development which the Soviet tatorship could not easily contemplate.

The political results of this decision by the U.S.S.R. are too familiar. They are to be seen on every hand in the great itical problems of the post-war period which remain unsettled. It is are to be seen in the Soviet Union's attempt to frustrate all mon efforts for the restoration of peace and prosperity. It is y with the greatest difficulty, for example, that we have been to make use of the United Nations, and in any circumstances where interests of the U.S.S.R. are involved and where the Russians make their veto effective, we are not able to make use of the ted Nations at all. Similar efforts have been made to forestall economic revival of Western Europe by aid from this continent. attempt to organize that aid through United Nations machinery was cost completely defeated. When an alternative plan - the Marshall in - was developed by the Government of the United States in a sy far-seeing, statesmanlike policy, the U.S.S.R. did its best to event that policy having effect. On every political front, therefore, we have to deal not only with the complex problem of the postperiod but also with the deliberate efforts of the Russian munist government to prevent us from solving these problems.

The cultural and social consequences of Soviet policy in reign affairs since the war are equally dangerous. We have seen a Russians, for example, engaged upon the task of whipping up the bological war between Communism and capitalism; one of the most bious forms of war mongering. If we have any doubt as to the sent to which this policy is deliberate, we have only to read the ritings of Soviet leaders themselves. A recent statement of viet aims was made, for example, in a special article in PRAVDA Lavrenti Beria, the head of Russia's vast internal security ganization. On the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, he wrote follows:

"Stalin has laid down a programme of action for Communists. They must (1) exploit all differences and contradictions in the bourgeois camp; (2) take concrete action to unite the working classes of the economically advanced countries with the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent nations; (3) complete the struggle for unity of the trade union movement; (4) take active measures to bring together the proletariat and the small peasants; (5) support Soviet rule and disrupt the interventionist machinations of imperialism against the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the base of revolutionary movement in all countries."

This is a programme for stirring up trouble in this untry and elsewhere in the Western World. It is being carried in many ways - by the Cominform, by Communist parties in all western states, and often by secret agents, as we have seen in own country. The Communist parties of the Western states have been finally unmasked - indeed have unmasked themselves - as ank and avowed adjuncts of the Soviet Communist parties, and we witnessed the strange spectacle of political leaders in Western

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tes announcing publicly that they would never defend their intry against the Russians, that on the contrary they would welcome arrival of Soviet invaders.

A further social consequence of Soviet policy since the war that we live in an atmosphere in which facts are continually and tematically distorted and falsified. The leaders of the Russian the feel, for example, that they must continually tell their own ople and as many of ours as they can persuade to listen, that the intries of the West are corrupt, semi-feudal societies in which ital injustice and inequalities amongst the classes are prevalent. The that it is well as the could be no greater misrepresentation of the best than this. We know that in all the democracies of the West a heral levelling-up process has been going on. To a greater or ser degree in every Western community the larger inequalities in some and privilege are being removed and systematic efforts are ing made to distribute purchasing power as equally as possible in community; at the same time retaining the economic incentive it lies at the base of our way of life. We do not pretend for a ment that we have achieved or are even trying to achieve a complete ality of economic status - but we are eliminating the extremes wealth and poverty and we have gone a long way towards creating hality of economic opportunity. As far as we can see from informality of economic opportunity. As far as we can see from informality is taking place there. A new class structure is emerging thin the Soviet State. There is a new ruling class in Russia which so privileges which you would not for a moment think of conceding any of your Members of Parliament or Cabinet Ministers or senior vil servants. The Army is a privileged group, and we find that thin the Army there is an officer class with a status which we have are for instance four classes on Russian river steamers, and a lowest of these classes, the hard class, has a hardness to ich we would not subject even our most humble traveller.

There are signs also that other forms of discrimination we emerged in the Soviet Union. There are evidences, for example, privilege on the basis of race. The Great Russians are taking place of leadership in the Soviet State. It is against the law be a Zionist in the U.S.S.R. In other fields we find the right higher learning is becoming more and more the privilege of the verning class. It is no longer true that Soviet education is free compulsory for all. In February, 1947, a number of amendments are made to the Soviet Constitution. Article 121 concerning fication decreed that only primary education should be free and appulsory. The grades above that require tuition fees which are platively high for the average family. Relatively, education in United Kingdom or Canada is far more democratic today than it in the U.S.S.R.

It is interesting also to notice the way in which ferences in income have gradually appeared and increased. In dition to actual income differences, we must add the perquisites fich go with better jobs - automobiles, chauffeurs, good apartments, see vacations, and so on. The Communists claim this is just a asse of Communism, but in fact the new class is becoming self-petuating because it can accumulate wealth, property and ivileges and pass them on to their children.

We are continually being misled also about labour in the viet State which is supposed to be a state organized primarily the workers. No trade unions in Canada would for a moment cept the status which has been assigned to trade unions in the S.S.R. They have been transformed into an instrument for

ansmitting to the workers government decisions of conditions out work and pay. Piece work payment is now the normal condition the Soviet Union. What our workers denounce as the "speed up" the factories is glorified in the U.S.S.R. under the name of the akhanovite Movement. Piece work and the "speed up" are labour nditions which we regard as completely out of date.

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Another example of wilful distortion which we hear from viet sources is about colonialism. Anyone who knows anything about e West realizes that a great transformation is taking place in e status of colonial peoples. The colonial empires of the 19th ntury are rapidly being transformed into free self-governing munities, and a whole new era has been opened in the relationships tween industrialized nations and the economically less developed rts of the world. The communists, however, continue to talk out capitalist imperialism, at the same time masking behind the on Curtain one of the most vicious imperialist regimes that has er been known in history. To Moscow, freedom in a foreign munist state can never mean freedom from Russian domination.

Still another aspect of the problems which arise in our ltural relations with the U.S.S.R. is the cynical use which is de by the leaders of the Soviet Union of well-meaning but often sguided people in other lands as instruments of their propaganda. The often these people act from highly idealistic motives and cept uncritically the account which the Russians themselves give conditions in their own country. The closest example we have this sort of activity is, of course, the campaign which is now ing carried on by the Canadian Peace Congress. Many of the mbers of this movement may be inspired by high motives, but I nder if they ever stop to think of the full implication of the lings which they are led to do. Let us take for example the cent visit to the Soviet Union of the leader of the Canadian ace Congress, Dr. James Endicott. I have before me two excerpts om Soviet newspapers giving quotations of statements about mada which Dr. Endicott made in Moscow during March. I will read to these statements. They are as follows:

Canada and America, everything is different. Instead of new apartment houses, aerodromes and military bases are built there. The headlines of the newspapers shout about war. Thousands of dirty booklets praise the future war, war looks out from the paintings of painters and from the films." (Pioneerskaya Pravda, March 31, 1950)

March 31, 1950)

2. "If a Canadian invites friends to his home and if moreover he refers in a positive manner to the Soviet Union, noting, for example, that great care is taken of children in the Soviet Union, then the police have the right to declare that this is 'defence of communism' and to drive this Canadian out onto the street and seal off his apartment. He will not even be able to complain about these actions by the police in court." (Report of Press Conference published in all Moscow papers, March 9, 1950)

man, who, professing honest motives and high ideals, goes amongst rangers and maligns his country with this kind of falsehood is neath contempt. In a communist society he would also be beneath ground.

The process of misrepresenting and distorting the facts thin the Soviet Union is made more efficient by the systematic evention of personal contacts across the iron curtain. It is

rtually impossible for a private citizen of the U.S.S.R. to leave s country and we know from experience that the Soviet authorities ill even separate man and wife and compel divorce rather than let e of their citizens join the other partner of a marriage outside soviet Union.

There are many other examples of this cultural iron curtain this social savagery. At the last session of the Assembly of the nited Nations a delegate of the United States gave a documented count of systematic efforts which had been made by Americans both public deprivate in the post-war period to arrange contacts between rericans and Russians. Suggestions had been made for exchanges of sudents, for visits to the United States by prominent scientists and tists. Efforts had been made to induce the Red Army Choir or the saian ballet to visit this continent. None of these efforts bore ruit. The normal methods by which peoples grow to know each other and trust each other by personal contacts are systematically revented. In the immediate post-war period, we ourselves tried a small way to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. by exchanging nformation about techniques in the North country. We made available one unclassified information about agricultural and other techniques he Canada and received some interesting information in return. But con after the war, the curtain was rung down in Moscow on our forts to establish even the minimum-contact between-civilized tates.

Having made this analysis of the situation we must now sk ourselves what we can do about it. We may at first be tempted to think that we should retaliate in kind. I doubt, however, whether his is the proper approach for us. Ours is a free society and even if we wanted to, we would find it difficult to apply adequate restrictions because they would be contrary to the principles by hich we live. I am sure that it is in the interests of our society that we should have only those regulations which are necessary for the security of the state and no more.

Since we cannot and will not follow the Russians in their forts to widen and strengthen the iron curtain, we must look for ther more constructive and hopeful courses of action. I do not aggest that any of them will pay immediate dividends, but I am sure here are a number of things which we can do. We can in the first lace recall continually to our minds and to our confidence the warm-earted, lovable, hospitable, courageous Russian people whom we ame to know during the war and with whom I am sure we can settle are differences once it is possible to make adequate contacts with them. We must also continue our efforts to resolve the problems that divide the Government of the U.S.S.R. from the governments of the free democracies. We must continue these efforts by every possible method of negotiation, conference, public or private discussion, meetings at any level, low, middle or high. In the sentime however, we must refuse to be led astray by empty words of those who talk of peace but who make no other proposal for the senting it except to recommend that we unilaterally disarm.

It is also necessary for us to proceed as rapidly as possible with the development of the North Atlantic Alliance. So ar, we have been primarily concerned with the defensive military transpendents under the treaty, and it has been right and proper that it first concern should be with our ability to resist aggression. In the long run, however, we shall have to make the treaty into something a great deal more basic than simply a military alliance. It members of the North Atlantic group are pledged by the Treaty, and especially by Article 2, to broaden the basis of their association, to co-operation in the solution of economic problems. In the long

n, our ability to stand fast against the attacks of international immunism will depend on our success in strengthening the economic desocial fabric of the free world. I hope that the North Atlantic reaty will become a powerful instrument for this purpose. I in glad that its members will have the opportunity to consider the rowing responsibilities and commitments of the alliance when the option of the

Finally, we in the West must be confident in the strength advalidity of our system of government, in the value of our own sciety and in our ability so to develop and adjust our way of life lat we can meet the challenge of our times. We must be confident is in the long-term strength of our position, firmer now than it is in 1945 and growing firmer year by year as the dividends begin come to hand from such great constructive policies as the arshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty.

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