

DEVELOPMENT OF CONSULAR OPERATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
1940 to 1972

A Study
by
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and
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Foreward to Research Paper on Canadian
Consular Operations in the U.S.A.

Canada now operates 15 consular missions in the United States, with a total staff of some 400 individuals, costing approximately \$10 million per year. How and why this extensive network of Canadian representation originated, and the needs it was designed to meet, are matters of some interest in themselves. Of equal value is the light which such knowledge casts on and the perspective in which it places Canada's consular operations as they exist in the United States today.

Special studies are hardly necessary to establish the desirability of all Canadian consulates being responsive to a broad range of Canadian Government interests in the United States. Nevertheless the study has brought to light multiple instances of why offices devoted to one aspect of the consular function, be it immigration, trade promotion, information, or consular services in the narrow sense, are less desirable and effective than offices which carry out a broad range of consular functions.

The study does indicate that the Canadian consular system in the United States has grown in a somewhat haphazard manner, often in response to the specialized interests of single Departments. Posts have been established in cities which might have been less than the best choice in terms of all Canadian interests. It is also clear that it is difficult to close a post when one department decides to move its resources elsewhere. However, this does not appear to present major problems. Rather the degree to which posts today recognize and react to the totality of Canadian Government interests in their territory is the aspect of the

Canadian consular operations in the U.S.A. which needs emphasis. In particular, one might note the very real effort being made by all Departments represented at consular posts in the United States to co-operate fully in the achievement of the Canadian Government's objectives. This has gone hand in hand with an increasing realization that great danger exists in too rigidly segmenting post activities. Trade promotion cannot be separated from information; the tourism and immigration programmes are supportive of one another; all departments have an interest in an active general relations programme. In emphasizing a number of historic and continuing departmental conflicts of some real significance, the study throws into sharp relief the general spirit of co-operation which has characterized consular operations in the U.S.A. in recent years. Particularly worthy of note is the degree to which the Trade Commissioner Service and Manpower & Immigration have been prepared to assist the Department of External Affairs in the field of information, administration, and consular services.

Mr. W. R. Young is responsible for most of this study which he prepared in the summer of 1971. Miss E. McAllister produced the sections dealing with the opening of our new posts in Atlanta, Georgia, and San Juan, Puerto Rico; the effects of austerity; and the impact of integration on the consulates in the U.S.A.

History of Consulates in the U.S.A.

By W.R. Young

INTRODUCTION

The absence of direction in the approach of the Canadian Government to the question of establishing its offices in the United States has been a notable feature of Canadian representation. Until 1947, no system set up in accordance with an enunciated policy regulated the opening of Canadian bureaus in the United States, as government departments, actual and proposed, opened offices in response to various pressures without attempting to coordinate their efforts. New offices which existed to serve only the immediate needs of their respective Ottawa departments frequently were closed soon after opening. A paucity of long-run planning characterized the appearance and disappearance of these unrelated and restricted operations.

Apart from the Canadian Legation (The Canadian Embassy after 1943) which was established in Washington in 1927, the first Canadian representatives were immigration officers who were maintained by various departments (Agriculture, Interior, Immigration and Colonization, and latterly Mines and Resources). During the flood tide of migration into Canada in the early decades of this century, there were twenty-two such offices in the U.S.A. The Department of Mines and Resources, however, under the impact of the Depression reduced its immigration offices to four (New York City; Fairfield, Maine; Malone, New York; and Seattle, Washington) by the late 1930's. The war in 1939 furthered this attrition to the extent that the sole remaining representatives of the oldest Canadian service in the United States in 1943 were the two officers staffing an office in Seattle, Washington. It was expected that when offices re-opened in the post-war period, their functions would be assimilated by a comprehensive consular and diplomatic system.¹

A third wave of new and unplanned Canadian Government offices in the United States resulted from the proliferation of governmental contacts after war began in 1939. These posts were established by a variety of Ottawa departments and included the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives in Washington, the Canadian Shipping Board in Washington, Censorship Liaison Officers in New York and Washington, the National Research Council in Washington, the RCMP Liaison Officer in Washington, the Wartime Information Board in Washington and New York, and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board in Washington. Also, the army set up recruiting centres in Detroit, Buffalo, St. Paul, Bangor and Seattle.²

The operations of the Department of Trade and Commerce in the United States have always remained in a state of flux. The Trade Commissioner Service grew after 1886 when the Department of Trade and Commerce appointed honorary commercial agents and then professional trade representatives the world over, but only a single trade commissioner was sent to the U.S.A., to Chicago in 1905, and that office succumbed to a 1906 decision that its returns did not justify the expense. A second trade office was not opened until 1921 when the Bureau of Canadian Information in New York, established in 1919, was converted into a Trade Commissioner's post. This decision accompanied the resolution of the Union Government to create more offices in the United States as a means of increasing Canadian trade. An unsympathetic response from the Liberal Government of 1921 terminated this policy, and consequently, New York remained the sole trade post in the entire United States. The Department of Trade and Commerce obtained permission to open another office in San Francisco in 1929, but closed it after only a few months of operation. Trade officers were sent to Los Angeles and Chicago in 1939 to relieve the pressure on New York, the office responsible for all trade promotion in the U.S.A., and although Trade and Commerce wanted to close them, these three offices survived until consular offices were opened respectively in 1952, 1947 and 1943. Trade Commissioners either closed

up shop, as in the case of Los Angeles and Chicago, or took charge of the trade section of their consular successor, as in New York.

After the war, the system of Canadian consulates across the United States grew during four different periods of expansion. The establishment of consulates in Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, and Boston during the first years, 1947 and 1948, was guided largely by a report in 1947 by Leslie Chance. These years were followed by inactivity during a period of tightened government spending in the late forties and early fifties. A second era of consular growth beginning in 1952, lasted through the following year. After tours and reports by Edmond Turcotte, Consul General in Chicago, and Hector Allard of the Consular Division, consular establishments were opened in New Orleans, Los Angeles and Seattle. Another longer quiescent period followed until 1961, when, without any comprehensive review of requirements by External Affairs, the Department of Trade and Commerce opened consulates in Cleveland and Philadelphia after a review of the U.S. market in 1961. The final period of consular growth, beginning in 1968, witnessed new consulates in San Juan, Minneapolis, Buffalo, Dallas and Atlanta. In the case of Atlanta at least, opened in 1972, efforts were made to take into account the full range of Canadian Government interests in the Southeastern United States. While the post does not provide an ideal solution to the consular problems created by the large number of Canadians living in or visiting Florida, nonetheless, it might properly be said a careful weighing of the departmental interests involved took place in the planning of this post. In 1972, as well, interdepartmentally agreed objectives were prepared for all consulates in the United States. The basic theme of these objectives was that each post should be responsive to the full range of Canadian Government interests in the United States. By 1972 it was clear, therefore, that

consular posts in the United States were becoming much less creatures of their founding departments and more instruments for helping to manage the complex Canada/U.S.A. relationship.

THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSULAR SYSTEM

Prior to 1947, offices in the United States appeared and disappeared according to the whim of the departments concerned. First, twenty-two immigration offices opened and then gradually declined in numbers until only a single office remained by 1943. Trade and Commerce erratically set up offices in cities where the department believed trade promotion activities demanded a Trade Commissioner, but the only consistent feature of these offices is they all closed within a few months, or at the most, a few years. Likewise, the Department of External Affairs opened its consular offices in the United States at New York and at Portland without first devising a long-term programme.⁸ The haste with which the New York consulate was established, combined with the awkward situations which developed, exemplified this fact.

By 1942, Canadian wartime activities in New York had increased to the extent that the desire of the Wartime Information Board to open an office in New York accompanied a proposal from External Affairs to establish a Consulate General to coordinate Canadian representation. Information Board officials believed that their office would be regarded only as a temporary propaganda agency unless it were combined with an established governmental service. In supporting the proposal of the Information Board, the Department of External Affairs noted that although the Consulate could not take over all functions exercised by the British on behalf of Canada in New York, the office could relieve both the British Consulate General and the Canadian Legation in Washington of many consular activities.³

Immediately after the Department of External Affairs had analysed the operation of the Wartime Information Board, officers prepared the required telegrams asking for the approval of the government of the U.K. and the U.S.A. Also, the Department consulted the Canada Legation in Washington, the Deputy Minister of Transport, the Commissioner of Customs, and the Director of Immigration for their advice and assistance in transferring to the Canadian Consul General those functions related to their services which previously had been performed by the British Consul General.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced in the House of Commons on April 9, 1943, that an Order creating a Consulate General in New York had been passed, and he remarked that the Canadian Government had decided to open a Consulate General due to the pressure of the war which resulted in a great increase in Canadian activities.⁴ There was, he said, a need for a central agency of the government in New York to direct and administer all Canadian departmental officers who performed duties in that city. The newly-appointed Consul General, Hugh Day Scully, formerly Commissioner of Customs for the Department of National Revenue, would supervise the Canadian Government Trade Commissioner and the New York Office of the Wartime Information Board, and regular External Affairs officers would perform consular services. The jurisdiction of the new Consulate General included the State of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, but not the counties of Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Ocean or Salem.⁵

Although New York was the third consulate established by the Canadian Government, it was the first to carry out consular tasks, and

the Department, therefore, had to construct consular instructions. The Consul General, it appears, opened his office without formal written instructions from Ottawa since the Department, unprepared for the opening, had not had time to compile them.⁶ They sent K.B. Bingay to New York to investigate the work performed by the Trade Commissioner and the British Consulate General and to draw up a list of matters upon which the Consulate would need written direction. Miss Bingay subsequently prepared a series of five memoranda outlining the duties expected of the consular officers. The Department recommended, on her return, that printed instructions not be issued for the guidance of the consuls, but instead, a series of numbered circulars be issued on the subjects raised in her memoranda. These circulars would later be amended and incorporated into permanent printed Canadian Consular Instructions.⁷

Another case in point was the episode involving the office at Portland, Maine, whereby a reaction to the pressure of events again revealed a lack of foresight on the part of External Affairs.

Near the end of the war, the question of opening a second consulate in the United States suddenly faced the unprepared Department of External Affairs. The British had maintained a Vice-Consulate in Portland, Maine, to satisfy the needs of both British and Canadian tankers which discharged their oil cargoes into a pipeline extant between Portland and Montreal, but as the war concluded, the British decided to close their office.⁹ Canadian interests in Portland were still extensive enough to cause the Deputy Minister of Transport and the Montreal Board of Trade, at the instigation of the oil companies, to urge External Affairs to continue representation in Portland. Departmental officers were not particularly pleased with this situation.¹⁰ Lester Pearson, the

Canadian Ambassador in Washington, protested that Canadian representation in Portland was unjustified, and led to the embarrassing anomaly of maintaining an office in a secondary city before opening others in more important centres.¹¹

The Department, however, bowed to the exigency "...in view of the necessity of not leaving the active Canadian shipping interests at Portland unattended to..." and sent an officer to Portland.¹² The Under-Secretary had already suggested to Mr. Pearson that one possible solution which would satisfy both the oil companies and the Department would be the appointment of an honorary consul. The wisdom of this suggestion was confirmed by the report of the temporary consul in Portland who advised his superiors that there was not sufficient business in that city to justify a permanent Canadian officer. He recommended that the best and least costly method of maintaining the requisite representative would be to appoint a local citizen as an honorary vice-consul. The Department agreed and A.A. LaFleur, Attorney-at-Law, was appointed Honorary Vice Consul for Canada at Portland on March 24, 1947.¹³

Needless to say the haphazard and unplanned nature of the growth of Canadian representation in the United States was satisfactory to few officers of the Canadian Government, particularly those from the Department of External Affairs. Further, Canadian officials believed that the continued representation of Canada in the United States by British diplomats was unsound. The first reason for their conclusion was founded on the logic that it was both needless and undesirable to place an unjustifiable burden of Canadian work on the United Kingdom Consular officers.¹⁴ Canada was rich enough to take care of her citizens,

and Britain was having wartime and postwar financial problems.

A second and more important cause of dissatisfaction with the system was the inadequacy of British representation of Canada in the U.S. This sentiment, based on the nationalism of the Canadian diplomatic staff and not on complaints about the quality of the work performed by the British, was not a new reason for expanding Canadian offices abroad. Immigration officials, prior to the Great War, had complained constantly about the problems of stirring up British foreign officers enthusiasm for encouraging emigration to Canada. Similarly, the Canadians responsible for the establishment of the Trade Commissioner service were spurred into expanding their offices abroad because of the problems involved in having the British promote trade for Canada.¹⁵ This situation prompted knowledgeable Canadian civil servants to advocate the expansion of Canadian diplomatic and consular functions.¹⁶

In 1942, the Trade Commissioner in Los Angeles reported to Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, that, "as a Canadian," he was not satisfied with the continued British representation of Canada in the United States, and moreover, he discovered most other Canadians living in and visiting the United States shared his feelings. The British, he believed, while doing a good job were not "...equipped to do the job as well as we could do it ourselves."¹⁷ Lester Pearson, Minister-Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, reported to Ottawa in 1944 that when he addressed a meeting of the U.K. Consuls in the United States they asked questions about Canada, the Commonwealth and dominion status:

...almost pathetic and not a little humiliating to me as a Canadian, to have them ask me questions - many of them very elementary questions - about my country so that they would

be in a position to deal with enquiries about Canada which they received... Some of these men - and they seemed to me to be very good men - who are representing us in this way have never been inside Canada and naturally know very little about it... I think /our use of British Consuls/ is one of the worst examples of our reluctance to accept the full responsibilities of the status about which we boast...¹⁸

Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, replied to Pearson's observations by remarking that the Canadian record of representation in the United States "...is not one of which we can be particularly proud and the sooner we start to rectify it the better."¹⁹ Two of the most important personages who would shape Canada's foreign policies for fifteen years reflected the Canadian feeling that no longer could Canada allow so many of her daily contacts with her nearest and most powerful neighbour be conducted by proxy.

This first and paramount reason for the desire to establish consulates in the U.S., therefore, was allied to the view that Canadian consular posts would give the Americans a more accurate impression of Canada.

On his tour of the United States, the head of the Consular Division of the Department of External Affairs, Leslie G. Chance, emphasized in 1947 the importance of the dissemination of information about Canada as a reason for the expansion of a consular service across the U.S.:

There is an immense job of education to be done here. The ignorance of our place in the world which one encounters on every hand is little short of shocking. Perhaps it is our own fault... Nonetheless, it is a bit staggering to find so little comprehension of such elementary facts as Canadian political independence of the United Kingdom. Friendship there is in abundance, pressed down and running over, but that we are a people in our own right is still, I fear, only faintly discerned... I am becoming progressively convinced as I go along that the Commonwealth position all round would be greatly strengthened by the appearance of Canadian consuls in special United States cities.²⁰

Under-Secretary Pearson concurred with these opinions when in sending them to the Secretary, Louis St. Laurent, he noted that "...the prevailing American confusion and ignorance as to our world place and independence are deepened and the whole Commonwealth position is obscured by representation which is not in accordance with present day facts."²¹

Even after several consulates had been set up in 1952, such thinking in the Department was cause to urge the expansion of the consular system. Hector Allard of the Consular Division reported to the Under-Secretary after a tour of the United States that the Americans were very interested in Canada, and willing to be informed, but the degree of American ignorance about Canada was "astounding."²²

Both before and after the war, officials also believed, with good reason, that an expansion of a Canadian consular system in the U.S. consulates would soon be encumbered with a large amount of work to perform. The Trade Commissioner in New York reported that prior to the establishment of the Consulate-General he already was performing consular duties involving stranded Canadians, immigration, succession duty, information, and the issuance of labour permits.²³ Likewise, the Commissioner of the Los Angeles office reported in 1942 that he was called upon to perform many tasks associated more with a consulate than with a trade commission, and that the volume of consular and trade business staggered the ability of his staff to cope.²⁴ The Consul General in New York, Hugh Day Scully, reported in 1944 that he believed the opening of Canadian consulates in the United States would multiply by many times the number of inquiries formerly handled by British consulates on behalf of Canada.²⁵ Scully emphasized that the nature of the business would not be strictly consular

(issuing passports, certifying documents, etc.), but would also involve more representational and information functions by heads of post. From his experience, Scully remarked that the head would,

...be in constant demand as a circulating medium for Canada. Various representative business organizations, some of them quite highly specialized - service clubs - women's clubs - churches - schools and from time to time colleges and universities make demands on him for attendance at meetings and other functions... In addition, there are large public gatherings and many cocktail parties, etc. Many of them result in contacts that should be followed up, for example, with newspaper men or writers for opinion-forming journals.²⁶

The need for consulates as commercial trade promotion centres, however, was disputed among the members of the Department of External Affairs during the 1940's and 1950's. Although trade traditionally constituted one of the major functions of a consul, H.D. Scully, N.Y. Consul General, felt that,

...because the average American businessman, whether importer or exporter, has such a full knowledge of the trading possibilities of Canada that he regards Canadian territory pretty much as he would a large section of his own country; he for the most part, is capable of conducting his own business direct... For example, practically all the big Canadian paper mills have their own selling agencies in New York or elsewhere in the States... They need very little, if any, help from the Canadian Government such as a Trade Commissioner Service can supply. This is true also of the nickel, aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, and grain businesses and to a considerable extent applied to the lumber and allied industries.

Scully suggested, therefore, that the handling of trade enquiries could be taken care of by a member of the consular staff who should send reports to a senior trade man in New York. Business relations would not be established by the local consulate, but by a general trade reporter with a roving commission who would secure information and make connections for both the Canadian Government and Canadian private businesses. This

proposal was not approved by the entire Department. One member wrote a rebuttal to Scully's arguments noting that this scheme would result in "...breaking up the Trade and Commerce Relationship", a disaster in a period of short staffing in which only the Trade Commissioners had the experience to be appointed to External Affairs posts. The success of a consular service built on a Trade and Commerce foundation, therefore, depended on the ready and willing cooperation by that Department. J.E. Read, Legal Adviser to the Department and later a Justice of the International Court, believed that Scully was opposed to the relationship which had been established between External and Trade and Commerce. He did not "...fully appreciate it and, at any rate, he is subconsciously resisting any movements or developments which would be acceptable to Trade and Commerce." Accordingly, Read proposed that the second-in-command at large posts such as New York should be Trade and Commerce officers and not regular consular officials from External Affairs.²⁷

In summary, several reasons motivated the determination to expand representation in the United States. Firstly, there was a desire to remove the burden of work performed on Canada's behalf by the British consulates. A separate but allied need for Canadian offices could be found in the nationalism of the officials who wanted Canada to assume the responsibilities of self-sufficient nationhood and, thereby, correct the lingering but false image of Canada as a colony in the eyes of the Americans. A final, though not unanimously accepted reason for Canadian consular expansion, was the desire to assume most of the trade responsibilities of the Trade Commissioner Service.

PLANS FOR CONSULAR EXPANSION - 1940-1947

For the aforementioned reasons as well as departmental recognition that an unplanned expansion of the consular service could prove disastrous for Canada's image in the eyes of the Americans, External Affairs prepared three plans between 1940 and 1947 for directing the development of consular representation in the United States.²⁸ The third scheme of 1947, the proposal finally adopted, is important as it provides a reference for the consideration of subsequent departmental modifications of the consular system.

The first comprehensive plan for the opening of Canadian consular offices in the United States was prepared on July 13, 1940, by Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.²⁹ It was prompted by the exigencies of the wartime situation, namely, the desire of the RCMP to impose wartime passport restrictions on Americans visiting Canada after October 1, 1940. Consulates proposed in this plan appear to have been envisaged merely as small offices to be used solely for the issuance of passports and visas. The examination and recommendations were based on the British consular organization in the United States combined with advice given by the Director of the Canadian Government Travel Bureau on the chief locations of the origin of Canadian tourist traffic. The plan, however, was quietly dropped, and no supporting letters or documents in the External Affairs files indicate the reasons.³⁰

Keenleyside's plan proposed a hierarchical organization of consular offices in the United States.³¹ The Senior Consul General, also the Minister in Washington, would occupy the apex of the system and exercise full control over all the consulates. The next tier was to consist of four consular districts headed by consuls general who would

be given charge of several consulates and vice-consulates. The Consulate General in New York would deal with problems from New England and oversee the work of the Consulate in Boston, and implicitly the Vice Consulate at Portland, Maine, a Vice Consulate at Philadelphia, and another Vice Consulate at Buffalo. The Consul General in Washington, D.C. would have jurisdiction over the states of West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and all States south or east of those named. He would also supervise a Vice Consulate in Atlanta. The Consulate General located in Chicago would be responsible for the Mid-Western States and be in charge of Consulates at Detroit, and Minneapolis, and Vice-Consulates at St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Houston, Duluth and Bismark. The fourth Consulate General, at Seattle, would be responsible for the San Francisco and Los Angeles Consulates and the Vice Consulates at Portland, Ore., Helena, and Salt Lake City.

Although the first proposal for consulates appears to have been made under the pressures created by the wartime situation, the second was constructed under different conditions. To begin with, the need for more consulates in the United States was obvious, and in 1944, R.M. Macdonnell noted that "...the department should regard this as a problem to be solved within the next year or two and should lay plans to have personnel available."³² Moreover, Norman Robertson was under pressure from L.B. Pearson in March 1944 to take some measure to inject more Canadian direction into the handling of consular business in the United States. Robertson, the Under-Secretary, replied to Pearson by stating that a review of the situation was underway within the department and that it would "...conclude with specific recommendations. When these are in we

will go into the question in what I hope will be a practical and positive fashion."³³ Subsequently, Robertson set the inquiry underway. He canvassed the Consul General in New York to discover the sort of work performed by the only Canadian Consulate performing the full range of consular and representational duties.³⁴ The Department further requested that the Canadian Embassy in Washington conduct a survey of the amount of work done on Canada's behalf by the British consuls, and it also asked the Department of Trade and Commerce, Commercial Intelligence Service, to provide information on the work of the Trade Commissioners so that External could discover what kind of trade work the consuls should perform.³⁵

A proposal for the establishment of consular offices in the United States was finally sent to the Under-Secretary on July 7, 1944, by R.M. Macdonnell. In his preamble, Macdonnell set out the general reasons for Canada's expanding the consular service as:

- (1) The importance of Canada's relations with the United States.
- (2) The misunderstanding generated by continued UK representation.
- (3) The unjustifiable burden which Canada was throwing on the UK.
- (4) Canada's status had "increased materially during the war."³⁶

For reasons involving personnel and geographical considerations, Macdonnell further declared the most urgent demand for offices to be in Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Seattle, and either San Francisco or Los Angeles.³⁷

Consular offices, the report noted, should have the same rank as the corresponding British office unless there were a good reason for the British to have a Consulate of superior status. Also, staff was to be provided by both External Affairs and Trade and Commerce in a manner such

that "...where the work of a consular office is predominantly commercial, the senior officer should be selected from the Commercial Intelligence Service with a Consul or Vice-Consul from External Affairs, whereas the reverse would apply if commercial problems were of a secondary interest." The timetable proposed for implementing the arrangements spanned two years and involved opening two Consulates over 1945 and 1946, unless Trade and Commerce could make an equal number of staff available for the new offices, in which case all six would be manned by 1946.

The proposal was subjected to some criticism. For example, J.E. Read, Legal Adviser to the Department, remarked that there was, in his estimation, no good reason for Canada to accept the "...old and now defunct comic strip 'Keeping up with the Joneses' as the model upon which External Affairs should be based... It seems to me to be a silly argument to say that because the British Foreign Office, after nearly two centuries of experience, have managed to boost their consular estimates up to a given level, the Canadian Department of External Affairs should start where the Foreign Office left off."³⁹

The major concern, however, was associated with the relationship which the establishment of a consular system would imply between External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. Read believed that Trade and Commerce should furnish most of the personnel required for staffing the American consulates since that department possessed a large list of senior and experienced officials suitable for this work.⁴⁰ It was "...idle to talk about manufacturing consuls general out of persons in other departments of the government other than Trade and Commerce."⁴¹ W.D. Matthews, commenting on the Trade aspects of consulates, addressed himself to the objections of the Consul General in New York to the independence of the

Trade personnel.

These objections could be removed, he said, if all general instructions to a post from either External or Trade and Commerce were sent to the head of the office and not to the senior employee of the department concerned. Also, a result would be a greater degree of integration between the work of the two departments in all consulates abroad.⁴²

Nevertheless, once the proposal had been advanced in 1944, nothing further was done to implement it. The Department, prior to 1947, consequently was subjected to pressure from both private interests and from Members of Parliament to expand its consular representation in the U.S., but it replied to its correspondents that the wartime and post-war shortage of personnel necessarily delayed an expansion.⁴³ The ad hoc nature of the opening of the Vice-Consulate at Portland and the continuing pressure on the Trade Commissioners to perform consular duties prompted L.B. Pearson, Canadian Ambassador in Washington, to reiterate his feelings on the matter to the Under-Secretary, Norman Robertson.⁴⁴

He urged:

...as a matter of first importance that we plan now consular representation in this country and that we should not, as we appear to be doing, allow it to develop according to circumstances. Surely the difficulties regarding personnel to which the Department repeatedly alludes do not prevent the working out of a carefully considered and practicable plan for Canadian consular representation... we cannot keep urging it indefinitely as an excuse. I cannot really believe that it has been impossible for us to secure suitable men during the last twelve months for consular posts...⁴⁵

Notwithstanding Pearson's repeated emphasis on the need for a consular system in the United States nothing was done until January 6, 1947, when the consular activities of the Department were taken over from the Diplomatic Division by the newly-born Consular Division.⁴⁶ The

responsibilities of the Division were defined as follows:

The Consular Division is responsible for the proper conduct of all consular matters; for the instruction of Foreign Service and Consular Officers in consular duties when serving at home and their direction in such duties when serving abroad; in concert with the Personnel Division for the recruitment of consular officers as necessary; for recommendations concerning the expansion of the Canadian Consular Service and the formulation of policies related thereto.

One of the first projects undertaken by Leslie Chance, Head of the new division, was a study of the situation with regard to the establishment of consulates in the United States. Some urgency was attached to this question at the interdepartmental meeting on March 13, 1947, because Trade and Commerce had notified the Department of External Affairs of their desire to withdraw the officers from both Chicago and Los Angeles within three months.⁴⁸ This followed on the heels of a statement by the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong, who wrote to Under-Secretary Pearson that:

In general, I have felt for some time that it was doubtful whether we should expand our consular representation outside New York except on the basis of a plan which contemplated the assumption within a fairly short period of time by Canadian officers of consular functions throughout the whole continental United States. If we are not prepared to do this, my inclination would be to leave matters as they are for the present. The post in New York is of a special character because of the unrivalled importance of that city. The opening of a new post in Los Angeles is not justified on similar grounds.⁴⁹

Wrong, accordingly, suggested in March 1947 that the Canadians carry out another systematic survey of the amount and nature of business performed by the British consuls on Canada's behalf. Leslie Chance, in return, proposed meeting the consuls at the British Consular Conference scheduled for April 1947 in order to discuss Canadian problems, to increase the Canadians' knowledge of consular service, and to dispel the rumours

circulating in diplomatic establishments regarding the intentions of the Canadian Government regarding consular development.⁵⁰

As well as proposing the survey, Wrong also proposed the sending of a senior officer to the seats of the United Kingdom consulates in the United States to spend a few days with each going through files and discussing the possibilities of establishing a Canadian office directly.⁵¹ Pearson approved all the proposals and presented a memorandum to this effect to the Minister, L. St. Laurent. His tentative estimation was that for Canada to gain adequate representation throughout the U.S., eight consulates would be required. The immediate programme, he felt, should contemplate the establishment of four of the eight.⁵²

Chance undertook a tour of the various cities in the U.S. which were considered to be likely sites for Canadian consulates, and reported in length to the Under-Secretary in Ottawa on the possibilities of each place.⁵³ In each city, Chance visited the British and, if available, the Canadian offices. In mid-trip he concluded that, "what so far impresses me most is not the need for consular activities in the strict sense, but for representational and educational information."⁵⁴ This conclusion gained emphasis by his observation that the detailed routine consular work performed by the British on Canadian account had been greatly exaggerated in the minds of the Canadians, but all other reasons motivating the proposed consular programme remained valid.

In his report, Chance concluded that the reason Canadians should assume more consular duties was not due to an expansion of the traditional consular functions, trade promotion or tourism, but rather:

- (1) The "degree of humiliation and even resentment of Canadians" at continued British representation.
- (2) Although the work imposed on the British was not as great

as the Canadians had previously thought, it was still heavy, particularly in regard to representational duties for the head of post.

- (3) A great amount of work to be done would become evident on establishment of a system due to the changing nature of the consular duties with greater emphasis on tasks apart from "consular" chores.
- (4) The need for information and improvement of Canada's image.
- (5) A consular system would help Canadians preserve their identity in the U.S.

Chance, therefore recommended an immediate start on a programme aimed at "...the ultimate assumption of all Canadian representation in the United States by Canada."⁵⁵ In an interesting concluding paragraph, he emphasized the importance of the proper choice of personnel in charge of the consulates, and admonished the Department that Canada should follow the advice, "'Don't do it at all unless you are going to do it right.' Canada does not need to vie with the United Kingdom, still less try to outshine it, but it would be lamentable if we suffered by comparison."⁵⁶

Unlike Keenleyside's and Macdonnell's recommendations, Chance's proposal began immediately to wend its way to Cabinet.⁵⁷ Once External Affairs received the appropriations to pay for establishing four consulates, Pearson, "...anxious to proceed with the least possible delay" reminded his minister of the proposals and asked him to submit the matter to Council immediately.⁵⁸ It was, and St. Laurent approved Pearson's report of August 22 in which the Under-Secretary noted that U.S. approval was already being sought to open Chicago and San Francisco on November 1, 1947 and January 1, 1948, respectively.

At the same time, External was also advising the British Foreign Office of the Canadian decision and making arrangements for the transfer of duties.⁵⁹ B.G. Sivertz of the Consular Division had already been authorized to proceed in advance to Chicago and then to San Francisco to organize the offices so that the Department could avoid the "...rather haphazard methods which we are sometimes compelled to follow in opening offices abroad..."⁶⁰ With the receipt of the concurrence of the British Foreign Office and the American Secretary of State, the system was ready to be launched.

The various plans for opening offices in the United States culminated in the 1947 decision to proceed with the establishment of consulates in selected locations. The final plan had several features in common with both of the preceding recommendations. It recognized, like the 1940 proposal, that some centres were more important than others and, therefore, should be set up as Consulates General with a degree of supervision over other centres in their regions.⁶¹ Again the 1947 plan advocated reasons apart from consular functions, trade, and tourist promotion as being important in governing the establishment of a system. Apart from these similarities, however, unlike both the 1940 and the 1944 programmes which recognized the connection between consular matters and trade, the 1947 proposal virtually ignored this relationship and made no mention of the role of Department of Trade and Commerce in its recommendations. One possible reason for this omission was Chance's belief, expressed in his report on Seattle, that,

"So far as trade is concerned, there is so much a thorough inter-locking of interests that no government intervention is necessary or probably even desirable. There will always be a great and growing number of minor trade enquiries, but big affairs will be dealt with direct through individuals and companies as well as such organizations such as ... (the) Chamber of Commerce..."⁶²

THE EARLY YEARS, 1947-52

After Leslie Chance prepared his plans in July, 1947, External Affairs set in motion the machinery for opening new Canadian offices across the United States and rearranging the responsibilities of New York, but Chance's programme, when carried into practice, was modified after the first few consulates opened. In some cases, guided by Chance's and Allard's recommendations, External Affairs could refuse to open offices in cities where forces were at work pressuring them. In other situations, however, especially following 1954, External Affairs could not withstand the pressure to open new offices.⁶³ The Department, by not keeping its programme for expansion up-dated, lost the ability to take the initiative when proposals were made.

The first post war career consulate office opened in Chicago in 1947.⁶⁴ Leslie Chance, after his visit there, believed that a Consulate General was urgently needed because:

- (1) The anti-British atmosphere which was generated and promoted by the Chicago Tribune damaged the Canadian image in the eyes of the Americans.
- (2) "Far more important government representation is necessary to our prestige."
- (3) The Canadian tendency to lose their distinctiveness as Canadians would be diminished by a Canadian office.⁶⁵

In accordance with a decision of the Department, the Consulate General opened November 1, 1947, under the direction of Edmond Turcotte, former editor of "Le Canada".⁶⁶ From its establishment to 1955, the

Consulate General retained a non-trade character by concerning itself mainly with the countering of the anti-Canada and anti-British campaign of Colonel McCormick, owner of the Chicago Tribune, and with a certain amount of travel promotion.⁶⁷

Hector Allard, Head of Consular Division, stated in 1952 that in view of the importance of trade with the United States and the size of Chicago, it was surprising that only one assistant trade commissioner had just been stationed there earlier that year. The appointment of Douglas Cole, a former Trade Commissioner, to succeed Turcotte partly compensated for the lack of trade representation.⁶⁸ The appointment of a Trade and Commerce officer, F.H. Palmer as Consul General in 1955 gave the post a stronger trade orientation although he reported to External Affairs for the general operation of the Consulate General.

Leslie Chance's 1947 recommendations in favour of a Consulate in Detroit were less wholehearted than his pronouncements on Chicago, San Francisco or Boston. He believed that:

- (1) There was no need to provide ordinary "consular" services at Detroit because Canadians in Michigan were so close to home.
- (2) The need for representation existed in Detroit as it did everywhere else in the United States, and that if the principle of Canadian representation was accepted, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this area must not be neglected."
- (3) It should be considered whether a consulate would not be better situated further from the boundary, since more Canadians would use "consular" (passport, etc)

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- (3) It should be considered whether a consulate would not be better situated further from the boundary, since more Canadians would use "consular" (passport, etc)

services, and the information work would be more productive.

(4) Prestige for Canada was a possible reason for setting up the post.

A 1955 memorandum outlining the justification for each consulate cited the amount of consular work originating from the Canadian population in Michigan and Ohio as a factor in the selection of Detroit. Chance, on the other hand, specifically noted the unimportance of Canadian work in the British consulates in both Buffalo and Detroit.⁶⁹

The 1947 report suggested that a consulate in the East Central area, specifically Cleveland, should be opened only after offices in Boston and Los Angeles. Following Chance's recommendation, the Minister, Louis St. Laurent, wrote to Paul Martin, then Minister of National Health and Welfare, to ascertain his preferences among Cleveland, Buffalo, and Detroit. Martin's reply in favour of Detroit pushed that city so much higher in the Department's priorities that an office opened there on April 1, 1948, before either the Consulate General in San Francisco or the Consulate in Boston.⁷⁰

The small amount of consular work performed at Detroit soon gave rise to suspicions within the Department that the selection of that city had been an error. The Head of Consular Division, Chance, told the Detroit Consul that this post was the least busy of the new offices in the United States and remarked further that

...when Detroit was selected as a site for a consulate, I had...my own personal doubts about it. However, the decision was taken at high level that Detroit was the place, against my admittedly diffident advice that it

would be better to cover the central border regions from a post further back from which representation over a wider area would be easier. I personally had in mind Cleveland....⁷¹

Such sentiments were reiterated in a 1950 review of the consular system which remarked that all choices of location except Detroit were justified.⁷² The feeling grew to the point that in 1951 the administration of the post was turned over to the Department of Trade and Commerce.⁷³

With the appointment of B.C. Butler as Consul and Trade Commissioner, the character of the post changed. Butler told the Consular Conference in 1952 that the major objective of his office was trade promotion, and a report delivered in 1954 confirmed that Detroit spent a much larger proportion of its time on basic selling work and tried to aid Canadian manufacturers more actively in a much more aggressively commercial fashion than previously.⁷⁴

In his 1947 report, Chance recognized that the amount of work performed for Canada by Britain in California had been greatly exaggerated, but nonetheless, recommended a Consulate General in San Francisco for the following reasons:

- (1) Canadian representation was needed on the West Coast, and the leading city of San Francisco was the best choice.
- (2) Great Britain and Australia both maintained Consulates General in that city.
- (3) The obviously large amount of representational work for an officer to perform.
- (4) More vigorous trade promotion in that area could be undertaken by a junior trade officer and vice consul under the direction of the senior officer in Los Angeles.⁷⁵

San Francisco, therefore, became the third city in which a consular office was opened when, after a delay of six months, the Consulate General under Harry A. Scott, former Commercial Counsellor in Washington, opened July 2, 1948.⁷⁶ Scott wrote to the Embassy shortly after he arrived inquiring whether his responsibility extended to Alaska and Hawaii or whether he should leave these States in the hands of the British consuls.⁷⁷ External replied that no extension of the jurisdiction of the Consul General was contemplated. Scott's early reports indicated that he found San Francisco a fertile area for contacts, and that his work included a wide range of activities.⁷⁸ After Scott left, the staff was gradually depleted by reason of the spending cutbacks in 1949, and consequently, Hector Allard, Head of Consular Division, reported in 1952 that without reinforcements they could not cope with all the varied types of work they were called upon to perform.⁷⁹

After his tour of American cities in 1947, Leslie Chance commented that although a Consulate in Boston was not urgently required to deal with the pressure on the British of shipping or other consular services, there was a definite lack of Canadian flavour in the services provided. He emphasized that it was ... "the representational aspect of a Canadian office which is most important in Boston". He first inclined towards establishing a consulate general in Boston to accommodate this need, but later he changed his mind and in his final report he opted for a consulate.⁸⁰ In addition to Chance's recommendations, the 1955 consular review suggested that the following were important factors influencing the decision to open an office in Boston:

- (1) the large Canadian, especially French-Canadian, population

and direction in many matters." The consul would be communicating with the Department on administration, with the Consul General on non-urgent policy questions, and with the Consul General and Ambassador on urgent policy considerations.⁸³

Instructions notwithstanding, a major question confronting the Department in 1949 concerned the Boston Consulate's relationship with New York and the status of the Boston office. Leslie Chance, at Ambassador Hume Wrong's urging, asked the Under-Secretary in 1949 to allow his division to sever Boston from New York's territory and supervision, as the original plan to give the Consulates General extra responsibility in order to justify emoluments had not succeeded. The supervision of Boston by New York was a fiction and, therefore, the plan ought to be ended in theory as well as in practice. Consequently, the Letter of Instructions issued to K.A. Greene in 1950 specified that henceforth Boston was on its own.⁸⁴ Immediately after the separation, Newton tried to convince Ambassador Hume Wrong that the status of Boston should be raised to a Consulate General. Leslie Chance, he noted, originally proposed a Consulate General and the importance of Boston as a centre of Canadian influence and representation merited the higher designation.⁸⁵ The Ambassador supported this request, but it was vetoed both by Leslie Chance and by H.O. Moran.⁸⁶ When Newton resigned as Consul in Boston, the Department reconsidered the matter and named his successor, J.A. Strong, Consul General, in the Instructions dated April 27, 1951.⁸⁷

After the consular programme of External Affairs began in 1947, the Department felt that the member of the Embassy staff supervising the Consulates should be appointed as consul. Hume Wrong recommended Lorne H. Lavigne, and with Leslie Chance's concurrence, a consulate was established

in the Embassy with jurisdiction in the District of Columbia.⁸⁸ In order to make the area under New York less unwieldy, it was suggested in March 1950 that the consular district of Washington be increased to include Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware. This suggestion was implemented shortly afterwards.⁸⁹

Similarly the Department's 1947 consular programme affected other existing offices. New York, immediately affected by the 1947 plan, lost the lonely distinction as the sole Canadian career consulate in the U.S., and moreover, its jurisdiction was enlarged in order that all areas of the U.S. could be assigned to a Canadian Consulate General. Its former area, the same as the British Consulate General, expanded on March 18, 1948, and thus included many new states.⁹⁰

With ~~the~~ opening of a consulate in Boston October 13, 1948, New York had exercised only nominal authority over Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. It was decided late in 1950 that K.A. Greene, formerly High Commissioner in Australia and New York's Consul General in 1950, would not be responsible for those States assigned to Boston. About the same time, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia and Maryland were taken from New York's jurisdiction and placed in a consular district directed from Washington, D.C.

The establishment of a consular system also had repercussions for the Canadian Honorary Vice-Consul at Portland, A.A. Lafleur. The 1948 Letter of Instructions to the Consul at Boston placed Portland under his supervision. The Department equivocally stated that even though Lafleur performed his duties in a satisfactory manner, he had never been fully instructed in his work. The Boston consulate, therefore, was requested to assess the importance of the Vice-Consulate, although the cost of the post

was ... "quite insignificant and it may well be that the services performed are more than worth the expenditure involved."⁹¹

When the Honorary Vice Consul became Attorney General for the State of Maine in 1951 and wanted to resign, the question of closing this post arose. Departmental opinion on the need for such an honorary office diverged. For example, Leslie Chance urged the Under-Secretary to accept Lafleur's resignation and close the Portland office since many places much more important than Portland wanted honorary offices.⁹² On the other hand, Mr. Beaulieu, the Boston Vice-Consul, investigated and discovered that information, shipping, and assistance for Canadians in distress justified keeping the office open. K.P. Kirkwood of Consular Division recommended that Lafleur be asked to retain his position providing he could serve concurrently as Attorney-General and Honorary Vice-Consul.⁹³

At this time much consideration was being directed to enquiries to be made of the United Kingdom authorities in determining whether the closing of the Honorary Vice-Consulate in Portland would cause them any particular inconvenience. In addition, the question of whether or not the existence of the post should be extended beyond a six month to a one year period was to be considered in the light of the reply from the U.K. authorities as it was believed that the views of U.K. officials in Boston would be of value in formulating a policy for the post at Portland.⁹⁴

Mr. J.L. Delisle met with Mr. Cyril Toy, the United Kingdom Consul in Boston, and asked him if he was in a position to give an idea of the amount of work British interests in the State of Maine represented for the Canadian consular agent in Portland. Mr. Roy claimed that United Kingdom interests in the area were negligible, and any assistance required by British subjects, or whatever, were always handled by the U.K. Consulate

General in Boston. Consequently, Mr. Delisle was instructed that in appraising the usefulness of Canadian consular representation in Portland there was no need to make allowance for any interests the U.K. might have in that area, and therefore, the usefulness of the Canadian Vice-Consulate could be decided upon solely in relation to Canadian interests.

After discussing the matter with Mr. La Fleur and reviewing the Annual Report for the Portland post, Mr. Delisle decided that there was enough business in Portland and the whole State of Maine to warrant the maintenance of the office. He also pointed out that the Portland office played a very important role in looking after Canadians requesting assistance for any difficulty of a consular nature encountered with the United States authorities. In support of this he remarked that having a consular agent on the spot saved a good deal of time, proceedings, and expenses, both to the Consulate General and to the Canadian citizens concerned.⁹⁵

In the following years, little was done to change the status of the post in Portland. In 1959, however, Mr. Archibald Day answered a query on a matter of Honorary Vice-Consuls in the U.S. posed by the Boston Consulate General, and in so doing, introduced the subject of the efficacy of the Portland post. He did so in relation to the Annual Report of Activities submitted by Mr. La Fleur in January 1959. Mr. Day stated in part:

In spite of the eloquence of Mr. La Fleur's report we are not fully convinced that present day circumstances correspond very closely with the situation some ten years ago when this office in Portland was fairly busy largely, so far as we can understand, because of the number of ships of Canadian registry calling at Portland, Maine...⁹⁶

The Boston Consulate General replied that it would be inadvisable to close the Vice Consulate as the service of Mr. La Fleur was satisfactory, and his presence in Portland obviated the necessity of officers from Boston having to make visits there to perform services connected with shipping.

Furthermore, on December 14, 1959, the Consul General from Boston visited Portland and reported that although Canadian shipping into the port has diminished almost to nothing, Mr. La Fleur was providing a useful "answering" service and was helpful in introducing him, the Consul General, to Maine personages and audiences. He therefore recommended that no change be made for another 6 or 12 months.⁹⁷

In any case, apart from the annual report, there was no communication between Ottawa and Mr. La Fleur, and his activities were considered to be of marginal value. The USSEA felt that his information functions could be discharged easily and more effectively by the Boston Consulate General, and in view of these facts and economy measures being enforced by the Canadian government, the USSEA reached the tentative conclusion that Mr. La Fleur's appointment be terminated. On October 5, 1962, the Minister accepted the resignation of the Honorary Vice Consul at Portland, Maine, Mr. A.A. La Fleur.⁹⁸

THE PAUSE, 1949-1952

Once the first four offices opened in 1948, the Consular Division of External Affairs contemplated no slowdown in their plans for setting up more Canadian consulates in the United States. The arrangements for the long-delayed Los Angeles office and another in New Orleans were almost complete. Austerity measures facing the Department in 1949, however, by forcing a postponement of the implementation of the consular programme, caused a delay which allowed External Affairs to study the new consular system and to evaluate its development.⁹⁹

An important modification brought about by experience occurred when the Department recognized that the proposed hierarchical arrangement of the consulates under the supervision of the Consulates General had not worked. This principle, therefore, was abandoned in 1950 when Boston was formally removed from the consular supervision of the Consulate General in New York. From that time all posts would be in the direct line of authority from the Department and the Ambassador in Washington. Removal of the hierarchy also made the distinction between consulates and consulates general much more tenuous and subjective and, therefore, made the Department a target for campaigns by the Consuls in Boston and Detroit who desired to have their posts raised to an equality of status with the others, all consulates general.

A second group of problems with the new consular system arose from the difficulty of having the two departments, External Affairs and Trade and Commerce, concurrently supervising different aspects of several posts. Leslie Chance recognized this duality as a problem for his Division, and subsequently asked the Under-Secretary in 1949 "...what should be the policy

of the Government of Canada toward the integration (be it gradual or otherwise) of all Canadian Government activities abroad into one service?"¹⁰⁰ The problem moved from the abstract to the concrete when, in 1951, Trade and Commerce wanted to split the State of New York into two parts and, for trade purposes, attach the western half onto the jurisdiction of the Detroit Consulate. The Consul General in New York, K.A. Greene, complained to the Under-Secretary that, "I have always tried to emphasize the fact that the Consulate General in New York is Canada rather than a collection of Canadian Departments..."¹⁰¹ He remarked that splitting the district would destroy this effort and create confusion. This observation availed little. A.D.P. Heeney replied that for trade purposes, western New York would be served by Detroit.¹⁰²

A third consideration as soon as the consulates began operations was the advisability of establishing more consular offices in border locations. This question stemmed from the Department of External Affairs' dissatisfaction with the work of the Detroit office, and translated itself into a belief that consulates should not be opened in border areas. The Department consequently, warily approached Seattle, Buffalo, and Minneapolis as consular sites. Leslie Chance told the Under-Secretary in 1948 that:

I want, however, to give a word of warning. We have now had a consulate open in Detroit since the first of April The amount of work now being done at the Detroit office seems to indicate that these border points are not the best from our standpoint. People are inclined to do their business without any consular intervention and to not feel any need for it ...¹⁰³

Finally, after a few consulates had been established, the Department had to find the best method of dealing with pressures to open more. Officials stationed in their new posts requested a reduction in their territory to make their jurisdiction more manageable.¹⁰⁴ The Consuls General knew of

the Department's intention to open consular offices in Los Angeles and New Orleans which would thereby redistribute the burden, and attempted to hurry the process.¹⁰⁵

It is obvious, reported H.M. Wrong in 1949, Ambassador to Washington, that "...we shall have to extend our consular service in the United States if we are going to provide an effective service covering the whole country. At present, it is still necessary for us to employ the service of British consuls in cities that are remote for our own establishments."¹⁰⁶ The Department, aware of the problem, told the officials in their instructions that the large areas serviced by each office was a consideration in all further plans.¹⁰⁷

The choice of some cities and not others for posts subjected the Department to agitation by "neglected" areas. Prominent businessmen from Seattle, a city ignored in the first expansion, wrote to External Affairs urging that their home city be included in any future growth.¹⁰⁸ At this time, the Department listened favourably to such demands. Leslie Chance believed that although External ought not to pay inordinate attention to the Board of Trade:

...my own opinion is that we shall not be able to withstand the enthusiasm of these people... . The opening of a Consulate at Los Angeles in the first of the year will almost certainly set off another campaign for recognition by Seattle. Since so large a part of our consular representation in the United States is based around the idea of good will, I think we shall have to be careful not to slight these tremendous enthusiasts up in the northwest corner ...¹⁰⁹

Although Seattle's proximity to the border diminished Chance's enthusiasm, his cognizance of public opinion and his rationale for consular expansion were important in shaping his attitudes towards consular expansion, there and elsewhere.

In summary, the financial cutbacks of 1949 prompted a reassessment

of consular requirements. The original recommendations called for the immediate establishment of four consulates with four more to follow almost immediately. Although austerity delayed the programmes from opening the last four offices, a more important effect of the stringency was the change in the departmental justification for new offices. When the austerity mentality took over, the Department required a different rationale for its office abroad. "To impress a certain type of critic", Leslie Chance wrote to the Consuls General in San Francisco and Chicago, they would have to justify their existence; practical trade and tourism benefits to Canada rather than expensive cultural relations provided the best means:

We have to recognize that those consular establishments are expensive and should have what is now euphemistically called "readjustments"; we should be unlikely to escape our share of the inquiry, if not indeed criticism. Thus, I think we ought to be able to show in fairly practical terms the value of the work we are doing. It is, of course, not easy to do so since inevitably we work largely in an atmosphere of intangibles. Nevertheless, apart from the aspects of general consular assistance to Canadians, there are those of trade promotion and tourism, not forgetting the encouragement of permanent summer residences, in which it is possible to show concrete results...

THE SECOND EXPANSION - 1952-1953

Recognizing that various modifications affecting the original consular programme had occurred, the Department of External Affairs carried out partial reassessments of its consular requirements in both 1949 and 1952 to determine any implications on the number of offices required in the U.S. Leslie Chance suggested the first re-evaluation should take the form of a tour through the Southern U.S. by Edmond Turcotte, Consul General in Chicago. Once approved by Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador, the tour went ahead. Turcotte began his five-week junket in September, 1949, and visited possible consular sites; Houston, Dallas and New Orleans as well as San Antonio, Beaumont, St. Louis, Kansas City and Baton Rouge. Turcotte's report strongly recommended the immediate opening of a post in the Southern States, preferably at New Orleans.¹¹¹

The second reassessment of the consular requirements was made by Hector Allard in 1952 when he toured, inter alia, possible sites for increased consular representation on the West Coast.¹¹² This tour was prompted by the desire of the Under-Secretary not to establish new posts without weighing the merits of all possible sites. The Under-Secretary asked the Canadian Ambassador also to give his views on possible sites such as Miami, Cleveland and Minneapolis since "...there seems to be a clear indication that we are faced with the necessity of giving serious consideration to the matter of opening consular posts in the U.S."¹¹³ Ambassador Wrong agreed that Canada needed more consulates, especially where other offices had been closing down in Seattle and Los Angeles. The Ambassador also remarked that he favoured "...trying to rough out a pattern of expansion" and suggested an arrangement of offices in the United States similar to the British, but "...adapted to our own needs."¹¹⁴

Allard's report after his tour, the first reassessment of the goals of Canadian consular expansion since Chance's 1947 recommendations, gave the reasons why he believed the Department should maintain interest in a consular system in the United States. These were:

- (1) The increasing national awareness of expatriate Canadians and their desire for distinctively Canadian and not British consular offices;
- (2) American interest in and ignorance of Canada compounded by the inadequacy of Canadian measures to cope with this problem;

The rationale underlying this advocacy of renewed consular expansion, therefore, differed little from the reasons given by Leslie Chance for the establishment of consulates in the first place. Allard recommended that:

...while it would be childish to want to ape Britain, our interests in the western part of the United States are greater than theirs and following this tour one is forced to conclude that Canada should have, in each place (Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles) offices of equal rank and as adequately staffed as those of Great Britain...¹¹⁵

Accordingly, Allard asked the Department to consider the establishment of a consulate or a consulate general in Seattle, a consulate general in Los Angeles, and increasing San Francisco's depleted staff to full strength. The Department accepted both his and Turcotte's reports, and moved towards setting up consulates in the locations selected.

Although New Orleans had not been visited by Leslie Chance on his 1947 tour, his reservations about opening posts near the border with Canada brought that city to his attention in 1948. Turcotte's recommendations in 1949 further emphasized the need for a Canadian Consulate on the Gulf Coast at New Orleans rather than at either Houston or Dallas. He thought New Orleans to be the best location because:

- (1) The industry and population of the Southern States was growing rapidly and Canada should establish some sort of representation in that strategic region;
- (2) "Although Houston and Dallas are both centres of important wealth and, therefore, excellent distributive centres, they are more or less confined to their own radius, however wide, whereas the interests of New Orleans as a distributive centre apparently extends beyond the normal area of a large city to take in distant points...;"
- (3) New Orleans possessed a larger port facility than Houston;
- (4) The British used New Orleans as their main trade office in the South;
- (5) New Orleans was interested in foreign trade and aware of its importance;
- (6) The city served as an important contact area for distributing information to Latin America;
- (7) Businessmen and politicians of New Orleans wanted a consulate and applied pressure on the Department;
- (8) Francophone cultural contacts could be cultivated.¹¹⁶

Ottawa also considered the need for reducing the immense territory under the jurisdiction of Chicago and New York as cause for opening a post in the southern states.¹¹⁷

Immediately after Turcotte's tour, a memorandum was submitted to the Minister recommending a consulate general at New Orleans, and in October of 1951, an interdepartmental meeting of Trade and Commerce and External Affairs resulted in the decision to open a consulate in New Orleans under the direction of Gerald A. Newman, Consul and Trade Commissioner. Trade and Commerce agreed to meet all the expenses, and External undertook not to raise the status of the post to a consulate general and appoint their own man as head for at least two years.

The Minister of External Affairs agreed, and due to the initiative and direction supplied by Trade and Commerce, New Orleans opened on January 21, 1952. A memorandum written by Jules Leger shortly

after this expansion indicates that if External Affairs officers had proposed the office, it would have been tied into a prior and more general review of consular matters. Since Trade and Commerce were administering the post, External Affairs acquiesced in the Trade and Commerce decision, and thereafter regarded New Orleans as a trade office.¹¹⁹

Although the office had been set up as a consulate, agitation to raise its status began almost immediately. Hector Allard, while on the eastern lap of his 1952 tour, suggested that a consulate general was appropriate since all other major nations in New Orleans maintained offices of that status. In June 1953, W.F. Bull of the Department of Trade and Commerce told an interdepartmental meeting that "...the position of these two senior officers (the heads of post in New Orleans and Detroit) was made somewhat uncomfortable by the fact that their posts are the only ones in the United States not ranked as Consulates General." Americans doing business with these two consulates often believed this inferior designation hinted at officials of minor importance.¹²¹

A memorandum was subsequently prepared and passed on by both the Establishments and Organization Division and the Consular Division asking for the approval of the Minister for the proposal. The Ambassador wrote on April 30, 1954, to ask that both Detroit and New Orleans be made consulates general, but the matter had been complicated by the extension of the Heads of Posts regulations to Consuls General. Action was then delayed while Trade and Commerce considered the financial difficulties that this might cause. Since External was willing to allow Mr. Newman to have the title, but could not at that time provide the perquisites of a consul general, Mr. English of the Trade Commissioner Service eventually accepted that offer. The memorandum to this effect was sent to Mr. Mackay, Assistant Under-Secretary, August 16, 1954.¹²²

Mackay recommended a raise in status to the Minister November 4, 1954, and shortly thereafter, the consulate in New Orleans was raised to a Consulate-General in January 1955. External Affairs took over the administration of the post from Trade and Commerce on April 1, 1956, by appointing their officer, William G. Stark, the Consul General.

The developing pressures in favour of a Canadian consulate in Los Angeles provide a complicated but illustrative and typical example of the process of decision making by which consular openings were authorized. The first proposals for an office in Los Angeles were made in R.M. Macdonnell's abortive consular program in 1944. Later, M.J. Coldwell, CCF, MP, suggested to the Minister of Trade and Commerce in 1945 that many California residents of Canadian origin thought the Trade post ought to be made a consulate.¹²³ L.B. Pearson, Canadian Ambassador in Washington, added his voice to this request in 1946.¹²⁴ Furthermore, the amount of consular work performed by the Trade Commissioner made Los Angeles a prime choice when Leslie Chance made his 1947 tour to determine consular locations. Indeed, the impending withdrawal of the Trade Commissioner from Los Angeles led External Affairs to propose the establishment of a consulate before Chance filed his final report. Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, vigorously protested this suggestion, and the need for a post in Los Angeles was analysed along with the other centres visited by Chance in 1947.

In his report, Chance had concluded that a Consulate in Southern California ought to be one of the first offices opened after the Consulates General at Chicago and San Francisco. The jump in the priority of Detroit, however, pushed Los Angeles further down the list of preferred offices. Reasons for Chance's pronouncement in favour of a Los Angeles office were:

- (1) not the need for consular protection in the ordinary sense since the volume of Canadian work performed by the British was not onerous;
- (2) the considerable amount of non-consular representation performed by the Canadian Trade Commissioner;
- (3) the need to keep close contact with the university and cultural community in that region "here as elsewhere, I am sure, our most fruitful field."¹²⁵

Shortly after this report was submitted, G.R. Heasman, Director of the Trade Commissioner Service, told External Affairs that his Department no longer urgently wanted to close their operation and would maintain a Los Angeles office as late as November 1948, although they "...were only keeping it open in the hope that you would take it over at an early date."¹²⁶ Taking advantage of their year's grace, External set a date early in 1949 to establish a Los Angeles consulate and prepared the plans. Financial cutbacks and resultant staffing problems, however, delayed the date for the new operation for an indefinite period, although the trade office still remained open.¹²⁷ The plans lay dormant until Trade and Commerce notified External Affairs in August, 1952, that they were closing their office/ⁱⁿDecember 1952, or in the spring of 1953.

In response to Hector Allard's request that the consulate open when Trade and Commerce moved out, the Under-Secretary urged that the general question of consular representation be studied before any action was taken, a review which was promoted by the divergence of opinion in the Department. The Ambassador in Washington had asked that Seattle take precedence over Los Angeles if only one office were to be established.

He believed that a vice-consul in Los Angeles responsible to the Consul General in San Francisco would satisfy consular requirements in Southern California, but Wilgress, on the other hand, remarked that "...the susceptibilities of Los Angeles will be offended even if we make Los Angeles a separate consulate when San Francisco is a Consulate General." Robert H. Winters, Minister of Mines and Resources wrote to the Minister, L.B. Pearson, asking that some sort of office be maintained in Los Angeles so that there would be a home for the Canadian Government Travel Service.¹²⁸ Since a thorough review of the consulates on the West Coast appeared to be the best resolution of the conflicting opinions, Allard was despatched in the fall of 1952.

Unable to wait for a report from Allard, the Department commenced the process of establishing the offices while he was away. Immediately, a memorandum was approved by the Minister authorizing the Department to provide money for the Seattle and Los Angeles posts in the 1953 estimates. By the time Allard filed his report in December 1952 urging immediate establishment of the two posts, the Cabinet had already approved a submission by External Affairs authorizing an office in Los Angeles.¹²⁹

Leslie Chance, the former Head of the Consular Division, was appointed as the first Consul General for a territory comprised of Southern California counties and a few states.¹³⁰ The Canadian Government Travel Bureau paid a former employee of the Trade Commissioner's office to maintain a tourist information service attached to the consulate. Also, a Trade Commissioner was sent to Los Angeles, and the trade office was "re-opened" by J.D. Howe in the summer of 1954.¹³¹

The establishment of a Canadian consulate in Seattle on October 1, 1953, within a week of the opening of the Los Angeles post was accompanied by many of the same pressures. A Consulate General in the Pacific Northwest had been actively considered by Leslie Chance on his 1947 tour. He reported that although a large amount of routine work was not performed by the British Consul, and despite the unimportance of trade considerations, there was a need for a Canadian office to disseminate information. Chance noted particularly the pride of Seattle and the pressure exerted by local businessmen for the selection of their city. Since greater representation than the existing immigration office was required, he recommended a consular office.¹³² The unsatisfactory experience with Detroit, however, made External Affairs reluctant to establish another consulate near the border, and Chance likewise became less enthusiastic in his advocacy of a Seattle post.¹³³

All the same, agitation on the part of Seattle increased in 1950 and continued through 1952. The San Francisco Consul General reported increasing pressure for a consulate from the Seattle Board of Trade.¹³⁴ In addition, the British consular officials in Seattle told the Canadians that since closure of the Immigration Office in 1951, they handled the inquiries directed to their office, and it caused some difficulty as this Canadian work totalled 40% of the duties of the British Office.¹³⁵ Various officials in the Department, including Hector Allard and Hume Wrong, also lobbied to have a consulate in Seattle made the first priority for any office opened in the West.¹³⁶

Finally, a memorandum accepted by Under-Secretary Wilgress and submitted to the Minister on October 7, 1952, authorized new offices in both Los Angeles and Seattle. After reading this recommendation, L.B. Pearson deferred raising the question of Seattle in the Cabinet, even though he had gained approval for the Los Angeles post. The Department finally

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authorized the Seattle consulate when it found enough money remained in the 1953 estimates to open the office. The Consulate General opened October 1, 1953, with C. Norman Senior as Consul General with jurisdiction in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Alaska.

RESULTS AND REANALYSIS - 1953 to 1961

The Department of External Affairs, by 1953, had moved a long distance in the establishment of a consular system in six years. Six Consulates General, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles, and Seattle, had sprouted across the U.S. Two Consulates at New Orleans and Detroit, an Honorary Vice-Consulate at Portland, Maine, and the Consular Division of the Embassy in Washington completed the list of Canadian offices. The consular offices were responsible for the following territories:

- New York - New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey;
- Chicago - North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky;
- Boston - Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island;
- Detroit - Michigan, Ohio;
- New Orleans - North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama;
- San Francisco- California (except 10 southern counties), Nevada (except Clark County), Utah, Colorado, Wyoming and the Territory of Hawaii;
- Los Angeles - California (10 southern counties of Santa Barbara, San Bernardino, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, Xera, Imperial and San Luis Obispo), Nevada (Clark Co. only), Arizona, New Mexico;
- Washington - District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Delaware;
- Seattle - Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and the Territory of Alaska.

These consular boundaries remained in effect for eight years as no further offices were opened until 1961.

This long period of stability in the consular structure offered the Department of External Affairs a second opportunity to consolidate knowledge

and experience for use in future planning. The Department, however, did not use this time to formulate new programmes which would enable it to react to expansionary pressures in a comprehensive manner. Although W.G. Stark of Consular Division made a tour of the U.S. posts in 1954, and a re-evaluation of the consular system was carried out jointly with Trade and Commerce in 1956, these two re-assessments, unlike those of 1947 or 1952, dealt mainly with the priorities assigned to various consular functions and not with a systematic scheme for expansion. Also, while various consular conferences gathered officers together to provide a forum for discussion of consular problems, meetings which gave the Department in Ottawa a grasp on consular activities and the operations of the Posts, they were not used to formulate a programme.

During the years after 1953, the need for modifications of the original 1947 and the 1952 reappraisals grew. Various cities, noticing Canada's expanding consular system, began to campaign for a Canadian consulate. The Houston Chamber of Commerce, feeling neglected because an office had been opened in New Orleans, was quick to point out its opinion of the anomaly of a Gulf Coast office.¹³⁷ In the same vein, the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce wrote to External Affairs in an effort to impress upon the Department the commercial importance of that city and the resultant need for a consulate, honorary or otherwise.¹³⁸ Lionel Conacher asked L.B. Pearson, in 1952, to consider the possibility of a Canadian consulate in Miami to assist Canadian tourists in Florida.¹³⁹ The Miami Chamber of Commerce soon repeated this suggestion to Gerald A. Newman, the Canadian Consul at New Orleans.¹⁴⁰ Californians living in Santa Monica approached the Consul in Los Angeles to offer free accommodation if the government would authorize a vice-consulate

there to promote tourism. Businessmen in both Cincinnati and Cleveland began to pressure the Canadian Government in 1957 and 1959 for a consular post. Finally, a bank in Phoenix, Arizona, enquired in 1960 about any plans to open an office there.¹⁴¹

The requests for career consulates elicited little response from the Department; only letters advising that no office would be opened in their city.¹⁴² Most letters received the reply that offices would not be opened in the "...foreseeable future."¹⁴³ To a suggestion from Miami that Canada appoint an honorary consul there, the Department offered "... no hope whatever."¹⁴⁴ T.F.M. Newton replied to a request from Santa Monica for a Vice Consulate that the Department had no personnel available "...in view of more urgent commitments elsewhere."¹⁴⁵ The Cincinnati representation resulted in a statement that the city would be kept in mind in future planning.¹⁴⁶

Though it did not undertake a comprehensive review of consular requirements in the United States, the Department of External Affairs did consider several proposals for new offices.¹⁴⁷ For example, a memorandum to the Ministers, submitted in the fall of 1955, suggested Minneapolis as a possible site for a new consulate. The Department thought that this city merited consideration since "...this is the one remaining 'gateway' area in which we have no consular representation."¹⁴⁸ Leslie Chance's reservations about the efficacy of consulates along the border appear to have been forgotten. Nevertheless, the Minister, L.B. Pearson, vetoed any expansion at that time as the U.S. State Department was engaged in the reduction of U.S. consular representation in Canada.

A partial review of consular requirements based on the opinion of various departmental divisions, but not on any comprehensive reassessment, was carried out in 1954. It included a recommendation from both R.A. Mackay and

A.D.P. Heeneey that Texas was expanding so rapidly in its industrial capacity that the Canadian Government would soon find it desirable to establish representation there.¹⁴⁹ The Information Division also believed that the Southern United States should be given more attention than Northern areas since residents of cities such as Minneapolis, in comparison with those of Houston, had a reasonably complete knowledge of Canada. This division also suggested Miami as a site, because a consulate there could coincide with the new emphasis of the Department on relations with Latin America.

Eventually, Marcel Cadieux asked for a second review of the rationale behind the choice of the respective posts, and consequently a history of the decisions was conducted in the spring of 1959. This study neither made any observations nor formed any conclusions on the subject of the relative merits of various locations for new consular posts.¹⁵⁰

Ambassador Heeneey, while favouring an expansion, suggested in 1954 that if objections to new offices arose, the matter should be left aside for a year or longer. The British also reported in the same year that they were not pressed by the amount of Canadian work in any of their consulates. W.G. Stark, the author of the review, concluded that due to the department's desire to keep down its 1956 estimates and the inability of the members of the Department to agree on a location, consular expansion ought to be deferred and no recommendations made to the Minister.¹⁵¹

One of the more important modifications affecting the consular system from 1953 to 1961, was the change in the rationale for future expansion. Both within and outside the Department, commercial and economic reasons for consular sites were increasingly emphasized - considerations which had been relatively minor factors in the 1947 study of consular requirements. The overt nationalism

and emphasis on culture was submerged in the later studies, and replaced by less emotional and more pragmatic reasoning.¹⁵³

A source of the increasing consideration for economic factors in establishing consulates was the growing interest of the Department of Trade and Commerce. In 1955, for example, that Department despatched to Cleveland the Consul in Detroit, M.J. Vechsler, to investigate the economic feasibility of opening an office there. At that time, however, he concluded that "...local ambition has more to do with the desire for a consulate or trade commissioner's office at Cleveland than either geography, potential consular activity, or potential trade development."¹⁵⁴

EXPANSION AGAIN - 1961

The third period of adding to the roster of Canadian consulates in the United States commenced in 1961. It was not initiated by the Department of External Affairs which at that time had no list of cities to which priority for consulates ought to be given, but by the Department of Trade and Commerce which had taken the initiative only once before in setting up the consulate at New Orleans.¹⁵⁵ Though they did not present comprehensive proposals when they opened their office in Philadelphia in 1961, Trade and Commerce soon issued a report which listed their priorities for new Trade Commissioner offices in the United States. They studied particularly the relative ~~merits~~ ^{desirability} of Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Kansas City, Minneapolis, St. Paul, San Francisco, and St. Louis as potential posts. Statistically, they studied the merits of all these cities with a view to determining those best suited to the promotion of Canadian exports.¹⁵⁶ As the Department of External Affairs possessed no plans based on a survey of Canadian needs in the United States apart from trade, that Department acquiesced in the plans of Trade and Commerce for the expansion of Canadian representation in the United States.

An office in Philadelphia had never been given serious consideration by the Department of External Affairs prior to the proposal by Trade and Commerce for a Trade Commissioner's Post in 1961. The Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce wrote to the Under-Secretary requesting concurrence in establishing such an office stating that:

This Department is convinced that the vital importance to Canada of trade with the United States, the urgent need to take every positive action to reduce our imbalance with that country and the encouraging prospects for increasing our exports to the American market require an increase in the number of our trade offices within the United States.¹⁵⁷

As the Minister of Trade and Commerce had approved and directed that steps be taken to open the post, his Department formally requested the assistance

of the Department of External Affairs "...in order that we may achieve our goal", since "...the new post of course will have to have consular status." The Deputy-Minister of Trade remarked that External Affairs should provide a junior officer to handle the non-trade activities, and since "...you are not inclined to provide a head of mission though granted authority ..." Trade and Commerce would supply the Consul in charge.

External Affairs immediately informed the Ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, who very strongly expressed the countering opinion that the establishment of any office "...should be related to the situation, commercial and otherwise, throughout the United States". He also urged that before a trade officer was sent to Philadelphia, other districts for which consulates had been contemplated should be studied again for their relative advantages. A restricted study of Philadelphia alone would "...not repeat not be able to make the wider assessment which I believe is the business-like way to deal with this matter." Heeney further pointed out that "...if an office is opened for commercial purposes, it will inevitably have to cope with other Canadian business as well. The public make little or no repeat no distinction on the basis of the official in charge or the sign on the door or the nomenclature in the phone book. A Canadian office, once it is opened, will have to and should, I believe, do all the business suitable to a consulate." If the Department concurred in the proposal to open a consulate in Philadelphia, Heeney further suggested that it should be under the authority of the New York Consulate General.¹⁵⁹

At an interdepartmental meeting on February 22, 1961, Trade and Commerce consented to Heeney's preference that the new office be opened as a consulate and not a consulate general, but the new post was to be kept separate from New York in order that subordination would not "...derogate from the status of the incumbent." For the first time, the Department of External Affairs agreed to limit its consular

district to a smaller area than the trade district in order to allow the office to concentrate on trade matters.¹⁶⁰

Immediately, Heeney replied to these arrangements by reiterating his "obstinate" opinion that action should not be taken without further weighing the other factors and locations. In the same telegram, however, he agreed to the allocation of a different trade and consular territory to any office opened in Philadelphia.¹⁶¹

The memorandum expressing the Department's concurrence was submitted to the Minister of External Affairs March 23, and Treasury Board approval for a "Trade Office in Philadelphia" was granted April 6, 1961, on the basis of Philadelphia's importance for trade, and the ineffective nature of the service offered by the New York staff.¹⁶² The justification for granting this new trade office consular status stemmed from "...the requirements of diplomatic protocol. Such designation is the minimum requirement for diplomatic accreditation, and such an arrangement, by giving the staff immunity from legal proceedings as well as import privileges will enhance the effectiveness of the office's operations."¹⁶³

The arrangements for setting up the Philadelphia consulate proceeded, and Wiley Millyard, the Consul and Trade Commissioner, opened the office June 5, 1961. The Consulate General in New York continued to manage most consular business for Pennsylvania and Delaware, the consular territory of the new office, for a short period after the office opened.¹⁶⁴

The proposal to open an office in Cleveland exposed conflicting interests between Trade and Commerce and External Affairs. In a 1955 study of the consular requirements of Cleveland for Trade and Commerce, the Detroit Trade Commissioner recommended against establishing an office there.¹⁶⁵ External Affairs concurred in this assessment two years later when a 1957 review of Cleveland as a possible consular site noted that a post there would lead to duplication of effort since Detroit had jurisdiction in only Michigan and Ohio while other Consulates General were responsible for much larger areas.¹⁶⁶

Previous studies notwithstanding, in 1961, officials of the Department of Trade and Commerce changed their mind about the status of Cleveland. Their justification for the change was that the State of Ohio contained 11 of the first hundred most important urban industrial markets in the United States, and they were close to the industrial centre of Canada. Ohio, therefore, had "...special potential for promoting the sale of Canadian industrial materials and component parts" as well as consumer goods. They also cited a report from their Detroit consulate in which the Consul remarked that:

It has long been felt...that the State of Ohio should be served from an office in Cleveland.... It is a place where we should be firmly entrenched before pushing our 'frontier'...further south and east.... For the Detroit office to serve these areas alone is not to serve them well.... Our view is that it has prior claim over any other suggested post.¹⁶⁷

The Trade Commissioner Service concluded, therefore, that the next Canadian "trade commissioner post" should be set up there and asked for consultations with External Affairs in order to determine its consular designation.¹⁶⁸ The Consular Division commented upon this proposal and reiterated their 1957 contention that the central border area was already well-covered by consular offices at Chicago and Detroit, and that the northeastern states possessed sufficient consulates at Boston, Washington, New York and Philadelphia, all close to each other.¹⁶⁹

Ambassador Heeney, upon hearing of the Trade and Commerce consular review, wrote that, in his view, the next consulate should be opened in the south at Houston for commercial, information, immigration and public relations reasons.¹⁷⁰ When specifically questioned about his opinion on establishing a consulate at Cleveland, Heeney noted "...that it was of the utmost importance that any further Canadian office in the United States be established on the basis of overall governmental purposes and not repeat not from any one departmental point of view

solely."¹⁷¹ He based this contention on precedent since "...by and large this has been the practice in the past although experience has been spotty and sometimes one interest has proved paramount."¹⁷²

In view of the "...delicacy of the matter vis-à-vis Trade and Commerce," External advocated setting up an interdepartmental committee to study the opening of an office in Cleveland. A canvass of all other departments which might possibly have an interest in an office in Ohio revealed that none had interest in a Cleveland post.¹⁷³ The possibility of establishing Cleveland as a trade office alone without consular status was discussed with the Trade and Commerce officials, but it was considered that this would be a retrogressive step inconsistent with the policy of establishing integrated offices which had been followed for a number of years and which was strongly supported by the Ambassador in Washington. Heeney had said that:

I am profoundly convinced that our commercial interests in this country can best be served when not repeat not only the officer of T and C but also those from External Affairs and other departments regard Canadian trading interests as a primary responsibility; by the same token, commercial officers should be willing to share office duties not repeat not strictly related to trade. Any other policy, in my judgment, is wasteful and stupid.¹⁷⁴

Consular Division consequently prepared a Memorandum for the Minister which laid out these facts and noted that this office would be set up on the same basis as the Philadelphia operation the year before.¹⁷⁵ When Howard Green, the Minister, agreed to the proposal that he submit a joint memorandum to Cabinet, the document was prepared and signed April 16, 1962. As an economy measure, however, the Cabinet deferred action for six months on June 28, 1962, and when the question arose again in November, 1962, External decided they could not find a junior officer, and therefore decided that "...now is not the time for us to expand."¹⁷⁶

James Roberts, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce re-submitted the proposal in October, 1963, in the form of a draft memorandum to the Ministers and invited renewed discussions on the question of a consulate in Cleveland.¹⁷⁷

External began their consultative process by asking the new Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Charles Ritchie, for his opinion. In their telex they noted that:

At the time of the original submission in 1962 we saw no imperative need for the opening of a new consulate in Cleveland and our views had not materially changed.¹⁷⁸

Ritchie replied that:

I find my views parallel to those of Mr. Heeney...I would be inclined to favour opening office in Texas...I would agree to any decision reached in Ottawa by interested departments.¹⁷⁹

A memorandum to Cabinet dated January 9, 1964, cited the imbalance of trade with the United States as the justification for the office in Cleveland. The post would be staffed and supervised by Trade and Commerce personnel; the only External Affairs officer being a vice-consul for consular and information work.¹⁸⁰ The Cabinet approved the submission on April 9, 1964, and the post opened in the fall.

The opening of three recent posts in Dallas, Buffalo and Minneapolis, indicated the extent to which trade was a factor in the opening of new consulates. Commercial considerations were paramount in the selection of these cities.

From the very beginning, there was no question about the fact that the Dallas Consulate, opened September 13, 1967, was to operate strictly for purposes of trade, and responsibilities within the Consulate were allocated accordingly. In a Memorandum to Cabinet, June 12, 1967, it was stated that the

office would perform all consular functions, but it was not intended that the office would undertake any information work, and all administrative and clerical staff was provided by Trade and Commerce.¹⁸¹

After the Consulate was in operation, External Affairs took a more or less ad hoc approach to its affairs and responsibilities. Moreover, Trade and Commerce was reluctant to deviate from its original plans and refused to become involved in even a minimal amount of information work.

In 1968, Trade and Commerce requested a consular officer and support staff in view of the growing demand for additional assistance and the inability of Trade and Commerce to provide any more officers. External Affairs subsequently informed the Dallas Consulate that due to strict establishment limitations, the allowance for more positions in either 1968 or 1969 would not be possible.

Similarly, the establishment of consulates in both Minneapolis and Buffalo was precipitated largely by trade considerations.¹⁸² It was believed that the Buffalo trade post would service the Ontario and Quebec regions while the Minneapolis post would service the Western Ontario and Prairie regions.

It is interesting to note the different rationale for the placing of a post at Buffalo in 1969 as compared to the reasons given by Leslie Chance in May, 1947. He stated then that the real need was for education and representation as an indication of Canada emerging as a strong and individual member of the family of nations. On the other hand, reasons given in 1969 for the new posts were not so vague, and, indeed, involved quantifiable values in support of recommendations.

At this stage in the development of the consular system, it appeared as though only Trade and Commerce was capable of providing the concrete reasons for expansion. Thus the new offices were superficially dissimilar in many respects

to the traditional concept of a consulate, and apparently divorced in nature from anything earlier reports from External Affairs had envisaged. Nonetheless, it has not proved possible for consulates to operate strictly as "trade posts" or "commercial offices". The very existence of a consular office results in demands for consular services by Canadians and in the growth of an information programme for example. Moreover, with the integrated operation of government offices abroad departments posting officers abroad to carry out new programmes naturally station them in existing consulates. The result has been a gradual broadening in the range of functions carried out at a post. The consulate in Dallas, for example, which was originally conceived as a trade post has taken on a much broader range of functions in the consular services and information fields than originally envisaged: an immigration section opened in early 1973 and External Affairs had plans afoot to establish an information section. As a result the term "commercial office" could no longer be said to aptly describe Dallas.

The broadening of function process has also been visible at the consulate in San Juan even though there has been no addition of officers from Departments other than Industry, Trade & Commerce.

The first step taken towards opening a post in San Juan came through Trade & Commerce initiative in the latter part of 1965. A comprehensive survey touching on the low volume of trade with the Dominican Republic, the sensitive political situation, and the remote prospects of improvement seemed to indicate the cost of maintaining a commercial section in the Embassy in Santo Domingo was not warranted. Puerto Rico, on the other hand, a commonwealth of the United States, was exempt from U.S. federal tax and yet because of its special status enjoyed free trade. Furthermore, it granted a generous tax holiday to corporations establishing there and

labour was especially cheap. Thus Puerto Rico had become the economic centre of the Caribbean. There seemed to be grounds for transferring the trade office from Santo Domingo to San Juan. On November 23, 1967, representatives of Trade and Commerce, Consular Division, Latin American Division, and U.S.A. Division met in the office of Mr. Burbridge, Head of U.S.A. Division, to discuss the transfer.

Mr. McEachern of Trade and Commerce explained that his Department "could no longer justify an office costing \$60,000 in Santo Domingo, a \$5,000,000 export market. A trade office in a 20 million dollar market, Puerto Rico, could be justified and useful. As only a reallocation of resources was concerned, it would be easy to justify to the Treasury Board. He suggested the new post be given consular status similar to that granted in Dallas, i.e. it would have jurisdiction for, and engage in, purely responsive information work in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico only until such time as External Affairs was in a position to post an officer for this work."¹⁸³

On August 20, 1968, Mr. Marcel Cadieux, USSEA, sent the Minister, Mr. Sharp, a joint Memorandum to Cabinet to be signed by himself and "by Mr. Pepin and prepared in the Department of Trade and Commerce seeking approval to open a Consulate in Puerto Rico to be staffed by Trade and Commerce by redeployment of the commercial element of the Embassy in Santo Domingo." In the accompanying letter he noted that a senior locally-engaged Commercial officer would be left in Santo Domingo with a Trade and Commerce paid locally-engaged stenographer. The move would also "provide consular representation in an area now served only by our Consulate General in New York or with the assistance of the British Consulate in Puerto Rico".¹⁸⁴ His misgivings were those that had been voiced by External throughout. "We have some misgivings about the implications of this exercise for our own activities because

although we have been unable to obtain Treasury Board approval for the resources needed to open 5 new posts....we nevertheless find ourselves in a position of sponsoring the opening of a new post by another Department." Despite the perennial problem of a difference in priority arising between External and Trade and Commerce, M. Cadieux ended in saying it would be reasonable to concur in this proposal.

Cabinet approval for the opening of the Canadian Consulate was granted on September 19, 1968.

The Consulate-General in New York agreed to retain responsibility for the San Juan consular jurisdiction but due to a limitation of resources, personnel and experience in that area, they had little to do with Puerto Rican consular activities. With the appointment of Mr. Fairweather as Vice-Consul and Trade Commissioner on May 15, 1969 it was proposed that the Consulate in Puerto Rico assume responsibility for all consular services.¹⁸⁵ It was finally decided on January 13, 1970, that it was "no longer necessary for New York to have consular responsibility for Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands".¹⁸⁶

The austerity programme imposed by the government in 1969 led to the closing of the Embassy in Santo Domingo in late 1969. The consular responsibility for Santo Domingo was shared by the Consulates in Puerto Rico and Venezuela. The resident Consuls in those centres were officially appointed "Canadian Consuls with jurisdiction in the Dominican Republic,"¹⁸⁷ by the PCO on January 19, 1971

The post did not neglect its consular activities. The new Canadian Consul, and External FSO, Glen Shortliffe, wrote in 1971,

As you know Industry, Trade and Commerce opened this post three years ago and I do not know whether we would meet the definition of an External Affairs post or not...the way the workload evolved here, I would describe this post as neither 'External' nor 'Industry, Trade and Commerce', but as a Canadian Government post serving the interests of several departments with primary emphasis on the commercial and economic functions.¹⁸⁸

Mr. Goldschlag, Director General of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote to Mr. Shortliffe after a visit to Puerto Rico in late 1971.

"As to your responsibility in the Dominican Republic I was impressed by the general satisfaction which I detected among members of the Canadian community with the quality of consular services and other assistance which you and your colleagues are providing."¹⁸⁹

Thus it would seem the Consulate at Puerto Rico is a fairly well balanced post in its responsibilities and activities.

The opening of a Consulate-General in Atlanta, although the major push came from the Trade Commissioner Service indicated a new spirit of cooperation in the conduct of Canada's consular operations in the United States.

In 1967, Industry, Trade and Commerce was already tentatively considering Atlanta as a possible site for a Canadian Consulate to serve the Southeastern United States. However, it was not until 1970 that they informed the Department of External Affairs of their definite plans to transfer the commercial section of the New Orleans Consulate General to Atlanta. Industry, Trade, and Commerce felt Canadian economic interests would be more effectively served in Atlanta "as it is a major distribution centre for the American Southeast; in economic terms it is one of the

fastest growing cities in the States, and being geographically central to the territory it could more efficiently serve Canada's trading interests". It was said Canadian investment in Atlanta amounted to \$100 million and Canadian annual exports to \$750 million.

Although Atlanta ranked low in terms of External Affairs relative priority, they endorsed the I.T. & C. preference for a more central and economically viable location. For consular services and information matters, it appeared to afford some minor improvement over New Orleans. However, a post in Miami or Jacksonville might have been preferable to service the needs of over "50,000 resident Canadians and an additional 60,000-strong seasonal population. Most of the consular inquiries handled by New Orleans originated in Florida, e.g. in February of 1970, 51% of all inquiries and 74% in March".¹⁹⁰ The British Consulate in Miami assumed the often demanding task of attending to the immediate or urgent consular problems of Canadian citizens in that area. Atlanta, from a Florida perspective is really little improvement over New Orleans. In April of 1972 Cabinet took the decision to open a Consulate-General in Atlanta. The new post was operational by September of the same year although no Consul General had yet been appointed.

The opening of Atlanta did not enable External Affairs "to close down New Orleans, which continues to serve as our bicultural window on a francophone area in the United States."¹⁹¹ While the prime objective in the Atlanta mission is trade promotion, the post provides a full range of consular services for Canadians. It also conducts an information programme, "including cultural activities designed to emphasize Canadian distinctness and to create a favourable knowledge of Canada in official, business and

and educational circles as well as the public generally." It is thus a Consulate-General in the full sense of the word and not only a trade promotion office.¹⁹² Atlanta's territory for trade promotion activities includes the states of: Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina and Tennessee while its territory for consular services includes Florida, Tennessee, North and South Carolina, and Georgia.

At a meeting to discuss the opening of Atlanta, attended by the various departments concerned "the need for adequate personnel to carry out consular duties especially when the AS-5 officer was absent was noted. The Industry, Trade & Commerce representatives agreed that Foreign Trade Officers would assume functions in the consular and administrative field."¹⁹³

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AUSTERITY

In June, 1968 the Canadian electorate renewed the mandate of the Liberal Party and endorsed the leadership of Pierre Trudeau. Soon after he became Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau announced that a thorough review of foreign policy was to be undertaken for, "Canadians were seeking a new role and a new foreign policy based on a fresh appraisal of this rapidly changing world and on a realistic assessment of Canada's potential."¹⁹⁴

Two explicit sources to effect the change were,

- 1) the White Paper on Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy for Canadians, published July, 1970 and
- 2) the austerity programme instituted in April, 1968.

Essentially the theme of the White Paper was that Canada's foreign policy was to be an extrapolation of domestic policy whose highest priority was national unity. National unity being the ultimate goal, emphasis on bilingualism and biculturalism naturally ensued and was expressed in foreign policy by increased diplomatic relations with francophone countries. Although the Paper conceptually patterned foreign policy in the 1970's on six national aims,¹⁹⁵ there was "little doubt that extra emphasis had been placed on economic growth.." and in a press conference Mr. Sharp stated flatly that "the priorities are clearly set out. Economic growth takes precedence."¹⁹⁶ Although there was no specific paper on it, our relationship with the United States....(would) continue to have heavy impact on Canada, with political, economic, and social implications"¹⁹⁷ and there was no doubt that it constituted a challenge to our

separate identity. This situation was to be "controlled" by seeking counterweights to U.S. dominance, i.e. actively pursuing trade diversification and technological co-operation with other developed countries. The emphasis on increasing ties with francophone countries and attempting to find counterbalances abroad to the United States made any strengthening of the Department of External Affairs' activities in the United States appear unwarranted. Indeed, it seemed more in keeping with the spirit of the times to reduce them.

The government began implementing policy which reflected the changing emphasis articulated in the 1970 White Paper even before it was published. The austerity measures, initiated in August, 1969 made clear where the government's priorities lay a year prior to the White Paper.

When asking for programme review material for 1969-70, External predicted a "very restricted approach to planning". This was confirmed when in April the Cabinet directed departments and agencies "to prepare their Programme Review submissions in accordance with certain guidelines. The guideline for 1969-70 of the Department were to be maintained at current years level."¹⁹⁸ The freeze meant cutbacks to absorb the costs resulting from wage, price and rent increases to the tune of \$2.5 million.

Although eighteen positions were requested (three FSO's and fifteen others) "as a high priority requirement for the efficient functioning of the United States Division and posts in the United States",¹⁹⁹ the following positions were deleted in 1969-70:

Chicago - a Clerk - 4 transferred to Los Angeles to fill a vacant position.

Cleveland - an Administrative Officer.

Los Angeles - an information FSO.

New York - an information clerk.

Philadelphia - an Administrative Officer.

The freeze became a deep-freeze for the 1970-71 fiscal year. In advising posts on the preparation of their programme review for 1970-71 the Department said, "Budgetary forecast is extremely austere and indicates few if any personnel resources likely to be available for 1970-71. To accomplish more important objectives it may be necessary to re-organize our resources by reducing less important programmes. Since re-organization may not be an acceptable solution some requirements for additional personnel will have to be made at the expense of some other post or area."²⁰⁰

The forecasts and rumours of impending austerity that were rampant in the ranks of the civil service in the summer of 1969 were realized on August 13, 1969 with what the Toronto Telegram called the "anti-inflation shocker". On that date, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that, in order to keep costs within that fiscal year's spending level, the civil service was to be cut by 10% or 25,000 jobs. Although normal attrition through retirements, resignations, etc. would account for most of the cut, Trudeau admitted layoffs would be "inevitable" because "normal attrition didn't always happen in the right places."²⁰¹

Cabinet's guidelines restricted the Department's budget to the same level as for the fiscal year 1969-70. Inflationary expenditure (rents, wages, etc.) were again not taken into consideration, thus to have maintained its existing strength, External Affairs would have needed an increase of "a non-available" \$7.5 million. Consequently, "significant economies" were in order. Mr. Sharp was very encouraging in writing, "This situation faces us with the challenge and opportunity to emerge with

a stronger and more effective organization!"²⁰²

For the Department of External Affairs, this culminated in the November announcement of the closure of seven missions: Phnom Penh, Vientianne, Berlin, Nicosia, Santo Domingo, Quito, and Montevideo; withdrawal of External employees from five others - Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Milan, Chicago, and Seattle; and the postponement of the opening of three others. Personnel and expense cutbacks affected virtually every post. External expended much time that fall evaluating personnel for cuts and relocation and programmes for cancellation or reduction. Sixty-seven FSO's were affected by austerity measures. Eleven were demoted; thirteen were seconded or transferred to other departments or agencies; two "retired prematurely", four were completely laid off; and the rest were relocated within the department.²⁰³ In all, over two hundred employees were deployed from abroad. However, in accordance with the new government's priorities fifty-six man-years were allocated for the opening of five posts in francophone countries, thirty-one for strengthening those whose primary function was aid administration and ten for bilingualism. Presumably, funding for these came from the re-allocation of resources.

In the United States Division, a complete and detailed review of programme and expenditure plans resulted in a total withdrawal of External Affairs personnel in Seattle and Chicago, and cutbacks in Boston, New York, Washington, and Los Angeles, totalling 44 Canada-based and locally-engaged.

SEATTLE

The United States Division had felt cutbacks were imminent and had prepared proposals in the summer of '69 for that eventuality. Although in March Seattle had urgently requested two locally-engaged clerks to handle the increased demand for information, cultural, and administrative activities, it was felt that the entire External component could be eliminated in Seattle because its consular area could be served from San Francisco. It had a high operational cost and its raison d'être, the Columbia River Development no longer required vigilance. With withdrawal the following positions were lost:

- 2 FSO's (1 Head of Post, 1 Consul)
- 1 AS (Consular/Administration)
- 1 ST (Secretary to Head of Post)
- 1 CR (Registry and Accounts)

With all External personnel withdrawn, the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce personnel were obliged to assume responsibility for consular work. A new passport office in Vancouver was to take care of the demand created by "Vancouverites" travelling to Seattle instead of waiting for Ottawa to fill their applications. Other non-urgent passport work was shifted to San Francisco.²⁰⁴ The withdrawal put an end to information work in that area.

Termination of the information programme was a misjudgement, for by the early part of 1972, IT&C personnel were desperate for another FSO to handle the need and demand for information services.

The need for consular/information work generated by the Columbia River Development was "replaced" by "Skagit Valley flooding from a higher Ross Dam, the Point Roberts contention, Canadian and American fishing boat violations of the other country's territory, varying attitudes

toward international Law of the Sea, increased oil tanker traffic through the San Juan Straits, etc." The Consul felt these demanded an information programme to explain the Canadian position to business men and opinion molders in that area. Furthermore, there was a heavy demand for informational services. "Although the information programme of this Consulate was discontinued at the end of 1969, we still receive an average of 200 letters per month requesting general informational material or films, or specific details and sources on a variety of subjects. This is in addition to the stream of immigration-oriented enquiries which average about 350 per month. We have not been able to accept most of the speaking invitations which have been extended and when we have accepted, we find it quickly generates additional requests."²⁰⁵

As will be seen, the information programme bore the brunt of the austerity measures.

CHICAGO

By process of elimination, Chicago, primarily a trade office, was chosen as the second victim for the abbatoir. Lost were:

- 2 AS's (1 Information and Public Relations,
1 Consular and Administration)
- 1 ST (Secretary to the Head of Post, IT&C)
- 1 CR (Registry and Accounts)

It was felt that External went from one extreme to the other in Chicago; "Before withdrawal," one IT&C official stated, "External had too many locally-engaged support staff numbering more than ten including the chauffeur and cooks for the Consulate." This staff apparently did the majority of the consular work. Upon withdrawal, IT&C officials assumed

all consular responsibility "with no funds and no training". Although non-urgent passport work was transferred to Detroit, the IT&C official felt that most passport applications were "urgent" and thus kept IT&C people quite occupied. The withdrawal engendered "many complaints from the public. Why did the second largest city in the United States have its consular complement reduced when lesser posts retained those facilities?" The business community could not understand why Chicago's facilities were reduced when trade-wise, it was second in importance to New York. Libraries and educational institutions throughout the mid-west were appalled by the discontinuation of the Information programme that they perennially planned into their programmes and curriculae. From cutbacks in Chicago, it would appear that our public relations with a large and important area of the United States certainly suffered.

LOS ANGELES

The "manpower adjustments" in Los Angeles again revoked the information programme and saw a reduction in consular staff. Lost were:

1 AS (senior AS, carried out Information Programme)

1 CR (junior AS, did consular work)

In February of that year, the Department of Manpower & Immigration announced the closing of its offices in Denver and Los Angeles. This, of course, brought concern to the Consul General in Los Angeles who was losing staff. However, it was decided that the Manpower & Immigration Officer in San Francisco would fly to Los Angeles twice a week, thus assuming most of the increased workload.

All these cuts, it must be remembered, came after almost two years of "freeze" and at all posts midst an increase in demand for consular, passport, and information services. These services being responsive meant that the remaining staff were extremely hard-pressed trying to compensate for the lost personnel. Posts which suffered no actual cuts were nevertheless working under strained conditions as their staff had not increased proportionately with the demand for services. Dallas, for instance, was and had been for two years in urgent need of a clerk/typist to perform consular and information work, and in view of the rate of increase in demand felt they would shortly need an AS3. The Consulate in Philadelphia had lost an AS5 in the freeze of 1968. The Consul wrote in 1969 that "Philadelphia is an important cultural and educational centre and is one of four or five major opinion forming centres in the United States. As such, the post needs an information officer."²⁰⁶ In the case of San Francisco, the staff shouldered most of the work previously handled in Seattle. Detroit handled passport work from Chicago and information work from Cleveland. Both handled as well natural "inflation" at their post without an increase in staff. To say the least, all posts were working to capacity.

NEW ORLEANS

New Orleans lost a Canadian-based stenographer - 1 ST.

BOSTON

Boston lost an FSO whose duties centered on the Information and Cultural programmes, as well as a secretary to the Head of Post. In

November, 1970 the Vice Consul wrote the Inspection Service a letter regarding the oppressive demand for services. "It had been the practice here to catch up on sundry clerical work, to review, to replenish our supply of stenciled form letters (etc.) during (the slack period after August). However, because of the recent cut-back in staff resulting in extra time-consuming clerical work, it has been impossible to complete even our immediate consular duties."²⁰⁷ Due to its location, the Consulate was burdened with a most significant volume of Customs and Immigration inquiries. "Even though we are merely a form-dispensing office for Immigration applications, and we have both Customs and Immigration information offices in New York to which we refer most of those enquiries, we still find ourselves answering between 300 and 500 Immigration enquiries and sometimes over 700 Customs enquiries every month. Enquirers object to and are stubborn about being referred to another office for information; and Canadians visiting in this area especially, expect to have their Customs enquiries answered by us. We make every effort to satisfy the latter group.

"In addition, we find some of the non-immigrant entry enquiries can be involved and time-consuming--for example, entry of non-Canadian university professors to work temporarily at Canadian universities; employees of U.S. firms going to Canada on temporary assignment; entry of entertainers; and the procedures involved in processing applications for persons in Special Categories. Although we have an Immigration Manual at our disposal, we do not have the time to study it and its amendments thoroughly."²⁰⁸

NEW YORK

The Consul-General in New York wrote with regard to the '68-69 freeze that he was delighted and hoped that it would engender a reconsideration of real and long-term goals. "However, (consular) work can be measured precisely in a statistical table and if we do not have adequate staff to operate that section the essential work done by it will suffer damage that will reflect on the public image of this office and Canada in general.

The following valuable table will give you an indication of the way in which the work in that section has multiplied over the past few years and continues to multiply in a steady progression:

	1965	1966	1967	1968	% Increase Over 1965
Passports Issued	1,076	1,086	1,261	1,472	36.1
Passports Renewed	896	889	1,059	1,010	12.7
Birth Registrations	244	398	293	368	50.5
Telephone Calls In & Out	9,969	25,857	35,148	36,347	367.5
Visitors	12,612	16,787	26,839	18,448	47.0
Correspondence - In	3,787	6,289	6,443	7,310	99.1
Correspondence - Out	6,182	11,723	12,266	13,374	118.2

The above indicated workload has been given to exactly the same number of persons in the consular section in 1968 as was the case in 1965."²⁰⁹ His letter and table exemplify the point made earlier in this regard. It also illustrates the "condition" of the mission before austerity. On July 3, he wrote requesting the promised clerical consular/visa position

and an additional clerk to satiate the demand which was "taxing present staff almost beyond endurance." He said if the additional position was not made available, a re-allocation from the Information Division to the Consular Division would be ~~unavailable~~ and "unsatisfactory". On July 39, GWU informed him that "the following position has been deleted from your establishment:- CR2 (Information)." This shock must have been only a drop in the bucket in comparison to the mutilation incurred once austerity was launched. New York lost:

- 1 FSO-6 (Information Division)
- 1 AS-5 (Consular Division)
- 1 ST (Consular Division)
- 2 CR (Information Division and Administration)

Information activities, of course, were greatly affected by the loss of the FSO and two clerks. The Information section had had three officers - lost was the Press Officer. This was a curious choice considering that New York is the headquarters of the wire services and material reaching every newspaper in the country originates there. Network centres for both radio and television are there as well as most of the influential magazines of news, academia, and fashion.

Consular Division in losing a clerk found its personnel working "flat out". The processing of Special Category Visas is especially taxing. They receive a minimum of 5,000/year all of which require at least three telegrams as well as an interview. Complaints from the public regarding the quality of service were caused by a "personality" problem rather than by lack of expedience or efficiency. That "problem" has been eliminated and the Special Category Visas will soon be handled by Manpower & Immigration.

AUSTERITY AND THE INFORMATION PROGRAMME

The information programme in the United States was the focus of austerity measures at every post. As was shown, if a post did not lose

personnel in charge of information, they were not granted personnel for vacant positions - positions that had been frozen up to two years earlier. In February of 1969, Mr. Lionel Chevrier, Head of a Task Force on Information in our Consulates in the United States found "wherever I went I found that staff working in information fields seem to be struggling constantly to keep their heads above water rather than carrying out a well-thought-out programme in a confident and effective manner".²¹⁰

It is ironical that concurrent to the austerity programme, The Report of the Task Force on Government Information was published. As recognized by the Task Force,

Canada has a variety of special publics, not only with the country but outside our borders as well, and the more skillfully we tell these foreign publics about ourselves the better we serve ourselves...(as) Sir Stephen Tallents wrote, 'No civilized country today can afford either to neglect the projection of its national personality or to resign its projection to others.'²¹¹

Objectives met, but were the means questionable?

Although austerity was never officially terminated, fiscal restraints were relaxed after 1970-71. In 1971 the 10% personnel cutback was shelved and hiring was resumed. The Department expenditures for 1970-71 reached \$76,543,000 and were estimated to reach \$96,337,000 in the fiscal year 1971-72 and \$109,376,000 for fiscal year 1972-73.²¹³ The freeze was lifted largely to accommodate innovations within the Department in response to certain recommendations in the White Paper.

INTEGRATION

One of the key recommendations of the White Paper on Foreign Policy was that, "in order to keep abreast of the rapid evaluation of events, the Government needed a strong and flexible organization for carrying out its reshaped foreign policy and thus it decided there should be maximum integration in its foreign operations that would effectively contribute to the achievement of national objectives".

Those responsibilities included advice to the Government through the Secretary of State for External Affairs on:

- the formulation of policy
- the harmonisation of plans and programmes
- the allocation of resources
- the implementation of foreign operations
- policies for the management of personnel.

These items, together with the evaluation and review of the entire management function were to constitute the principal elements of a comprehensive approach to the management of foreign operations.²¹³

The first concrete move towards integration of External Affairs, Industry, Trade and Commerce, and Manpower and Immigration came in April 1971 when the ICER integrated the administrative and support services of these departments. Heads of Post are now selected by ICER instead of the three departments separately. The degree of "eventual integration of the present departments will depend on the outcome of current bargaining with inter-departmental committees; the vested interests that have to be reconciled are impressive".

ICER has worked towards greater integration in the planning of foreign operations by working towards the development of a country planning and programming system:

"The system which was designed included as components the definition of country policies, country plans, programmes, budgets and evaluation reviews. The system was intended

- i) to facilitate the formulation of Canadian policies and objectives vis-à-vis individual countries;
- ii) to facilitate setting of priorities by the Government, the determination of resource requirements and the allocation of resources;
- iii) to allow, where possible, for the selection of programmes from amongst a range of alternatives; and
- iv) to facilitate the regular evaluation of foreign operations.

One of the major steps in developing this system was the formulation of interdepartmentally-agreed Statements of Country Objectives for each of the country units. Statement of Country Objectives are a "translation of Canada's national interests and goals into objectives for the organisational unit abroad at the level at which it is practical to frame plans and programmes, estimate specific resource requirements and assign specific responsibility for execution".²¹⁴ These are drafted interdepartmentally in Ottawa, External Affairs Area Directors assuming the responsibility of producing "agreed and coordinated statements of country objectives."

The country plans forecast the methods for achieving the country objectives and determines the costs in terms of money and human resources. Initially prepared at the post, it describes the significant local factors having effect on the achievement of objectives as well as probable programme costs in relation to anticipated results. "From the alternative courses of action proposed in the Plan and in the light of the priorities determined and resources made available as a result of inter-

departmental and Treasury Board consideration (comes) the approved Country Programme"²¹⁵.

If the Country Programming approach is successful in achieving its objectives in the United States, then GWU will concurrently be achieving its long-standing goals of making the now fifteen consular posts in the United States representative of the Canadian Government, not just one particular department or priority, and responsive to all of the needs and objectives of the Canadian Government and people.

The actual Statement of Objectives depended on the "outcome of Cabinet's consideration of the central issues in Canada-United States relations" as well as the completion of a review of information policy in the United States and the outcome of consideration that was being given to the deployment of immigration officers at additional posts. However, five specific guidelines were agreed upon at that time by all departments concerned. The guidelines stated that the consular missions in the United States were to "become responsive to the full spectrum of Canadian objectives vis-a-vis the United States". Congruent with the ICER guidelines set out for all posts abroad "the programmes of the individual posts (should) be tailored to the specific demands deriving from the size and character of their territory". The third programme of "General Relations", ie. "Analyse/represent" (study the regional environment and get the Canadian viewpoint across) on a continuous and systematic basis was called for. By definition, this programme was to be carried out not only in support of the specific programmes currently receiving emphasis at the posts, but also in relation to all fields which are of interest to the Canadian Government. The official Canadian effort in the territory of the post must be planned and executed as an integral whole. In this

respect, the growing need for an intelligent scrutiny of the scene and for a coordinated representational endeavour should be self-evident. On specific developments of national importance it is considered that, although lacking the broader approach possible in Washington, the posts are able to provide useful perspectives deriving from their intimate knowledge of the local scene.

The information programme in the United States received great emphasis - posts were instructed to "enhance to the fullest extent possible their contribution to the appreciation in the United States of Canada's interest, views and concerns". Information work was no longer to be responsive, but was to be planned and programmed towards calculated goals. Hopefully, if this is taken at all seriously the recommendations of the Chevrier Report and the Task Force on Information will be given consideration. An organized and efficient information programme is not going to just happen.

The guidelines repeatedly emphasized that Consulates were to (a) support all areas of interest to the Canadian Government and (b) to plan and execute all efforts "as an integrated whole". The fifth guideline was more explicit: "The full range of consular services as described in the Consular Manual should be provided"; that is, Article 5 of the Vienna Convention should be adhered to. As I.T. & C. approved of the letter and its guidelines, it should represent a major coup for External Affairs. It would appear that the long battle to have our Consulates be consular missions and not just trade posts was finally won - at least on paper.

Integration II

In order to determine how integration is progressing in the field, so to speak, the researcher conducted several short yet informative

interviews with personnel at posts or recently from posts in the United States. The problems incurred by American posts are precisely those earlier mentioned in the ICER memo. Additionally, however, there are problems that cast a shadow of doubt on the sincerity of the battle for the development of all-round consular posts and for integration. The most salient problem in this regard is the lack of direction from Ottawa. Posts found that if problems with integration were encountered and Ottawa consulted, the usual reply was to solve the problem at the post. Without guidance and firm direction from Ottawa, integration cannot develop.

Conclusion

After two years of disruption, attempts are being made to put the pieces back together in our Consulates in the United States. Because of the haphazard history of their development, this task is arduous for those involved. It is difficult to rationalize operations that have long lacked firm direction as to priorities and governmental direction as opposed to departmental objectives, without considerable organic change. One thing is clear: our U.S. consulates have been the subject of a plethora of reports, studies, and missions. The answers do not lie in further studies which would only repeat the conclusions and recommendations contained in the past reports. Hommage has been paid to these recommendations which essentially called for an injection of direction and coordination into operations abroad through the PPBS and in moves towards integration. Like good laws, in order to be effective there must be enforcement. The foundation has been laid for the development of a dynamic consular system in the United States. Our missions are to be in essence mini-Embassies responsive to the full spectrum of Canadian objectives vis-a-vis the United States. "The official Canadian effort in the territory of a post will be planned and executed as a whole." We have had the directives,

now what is needed is concerted action towards those ends. Perhaps before going any further the point should be made that a dynamic system of Canadian consular representation is essential to our relationship with the United States.

We must proceed on decisions already ratified by the various departments involved. The Vienna Convention has been accepted as an articulation of consular functions. External Affairs has accepted responsibility for support and administrative staff. We must therefore abide by those decisions; in other words, we should put External people into posts to take on External's responsibilities. Other departments have expressed a willingness to share those responsibilities but cannot be expected, given the present state of integration, to impede achievement of their own objectives to do so. Consequently if the Department of External Affairs' objectives are to be satisfactorily carried out it must shoulder its responsibilities. That departments should continue to work in competition is inconceivable, for it has been clearly shown that all objectives are interrelated - information, cultural and consular functions are integral components in the promotion of trade, tourism, immigration and harmonious international relations. Departments have readily realized this and it would be in their interest to support External's bids to the Treasury Board for additional staff in the United States.

CONCLUSION

The evidence available from historical research into the establishment of a Canadian consular system in the United States indicates that the Department of External Affairs lost the initiative in formulating criteria against which the requirements for consular offices could be measured. Indeed, the history of the establishment of consulates appears to have been circular. The Department reacted to circumstances until 1947 at which time a plan for expansion was adopted, but the programme was neither adhered to nor reformed in anticipation of future events, and by 1954 the Department was once again reacting to exigencies.

By 1947, officials of the Department realized that they would not serve Canadian interests by opening consulates without reference to a scheme aimed at furthering Canadian goals, and therefore, they sent Leslie Chance, Head of the Consular Division, to examine possible locations for consulates with a view to their need for Canadian representatives. Subsequently, and in accordance with the scheme which was devised by Chance and presented to the Department in 1947, four consulates were set up. Following this, the Department and the Under-Secretary exhibited some commitment to a continuing reassessment by despatching Edmond Turcotte, Consul General in Chicago, and Hector Allard, Head of the Consular Division, to re-evaluate possible sites in 1949 and 1952. In consequence of their recommendations, new offices were opened in New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Seattle.

These reassessments, however, were the last conclusive efforts made by External Affairs for some time in the preparation of criteria by which posts should be established or discontinued, as the case may be. Neither a partial re-evaluation by W.G. Stark in 1954, nor the preparations made for the four by the Under-Secretary in 1956, dealt with the criteria against which the need for any proposed consulate

could be judged. The manner in which the Department of External Affairs operated from 1952 onwards was founded on a vague feeling about possible sites based on experience, but not in pursuance of a programme which evaluated sites in terms of national goals and consular criteria.

The inevitable followed. When the Department of Trade and Commerce initiated proposals to establish posts at Philadelphia, San Juan, Cleveland, Buffalo and Dallas, officials of External Affairs, even if they opposed these locations, could not present reasoned and viable alternatives to either their Minister or the Cabinet. Consequently, they could adopt only delay/^{ing}tactics and reactive measures when confronted with Trade and Commerce proposals.

An explanation for the failure of External Affairs officials to adopt a programme can be found in the changing rationale employed to justify consular expansion. When consulates were first established pursuant to the 1947 proposals, trade considerations definitely were of secondary importance. Leslie Chance had stated in his proposal that he believed Canadian and American businessmen ^{maintained} sufficiently close contact so as not to be in need of consular offices for trade promotion. Accordingly, cultural, educational, informational, prestige, representational, and consular needs governed his selection of sites. As soon as the External Affairs budget came under close scrutiny during the belt-tightening of 1949, however, the Department rapidly discovered that cultural and other reasons for consular establishments were too vague to satisfy the department's critics, but they found that trade and tourist promotion constituted a satisfactory defence. Although, External Affairs still considered cultural reasons to be the prime criteria to address in the expansion of the consular system, it outwardly presented the commercial

defence as justification for their proposals. This prevarication exposed the Department to the arguments of both economic interest groups in the United States and the Department of Trade and Commerce that consulates be located on solely economic grounds.

This pressure which began in 1951 when Trade & Commerce established their first consulate in New Orleans and continued through the 1950's by Chambers of Commerce, did not have its full impact until 1961, a year of economic upset. At that time the importance of trade promotion through consulates became paramount and seemingly the *raison d'etre* of consular expansion. For example, both Philadelphia, 1961, and Cleveland, 1964, were conceptualized as trade offices first, and as consulates second by the Department of Trade and Commerce. External Affairs had advocated against the establishment of offices at those sites, but as its officials had neither established nor authoritative criteria by which to advance national goals, their hesitations with regard to these two offices were overcome.

In a similar manner, the last five offices, San Juan, Minneapolis, Dallas, Buffalo and Atlanta were sited and opened almost entirely in relation to trade. All the arguments stated in the earlier reports of External Affairs, both for and against the above locations, succumbed to recommendations proffered by Trade and Commerce for aforementioned reasons. However in the opening of Atlanta a new spirit was afoot. Although the selection of site was left largely to Industry, Trade & Commerce, the post was provided from the beginning with a set of interdepartmentally agreed objectives and it was assumed the post would carry out a broad range of consular functions although major emphasis would be on trade promotion.

In the future it appeared as though new consulates would be opened only when the scope and intensity of Canadian interest in an area required general on-the-spot Canadian Government representation.

PART II

Introduction

This annex gives a brief description of the three main administrative problems involved in providing consular services in the United States during the last 30 years.

The first concerned the granting of consular status and commissions to officers from departments other than External Affairs. This was settled with regard to Trade Commissioners in 1947, but arose again in 1967 over the status of Travel Bureau representatives, as well as representatives of Manpower and Immigration.

The second set of problems concerned the relationship of non-External Affairs officers and staff abroad to the Head of Post. This usually manifested itself as whether Trade Commissioners followed the instructions of and reported to and through the Head of Post.

The third continuing set of difficulties arose over the designation of posts as Consulates or Consulate Generals when posts were not opened to meet External Affairs priorities and functions. Attempts made to clarify the differences between Consulates and Consulates General between 1967 and 1969 achieved little progress.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSULATES

The Department of Trade and Commerce had been involved in performing consular work in the United States before any Canadian consular offices opened. For example, the Trade Commissioner in Los Angeles reported in 1941 that he approached a Consul in functions and representative duties although he was legally nothing of the sort.¹ Concerning status, the Minister of Trade and Commerce had already vetoed a 1933 suggestion that trade commissioners be made consuls to rectify the discrepancy between actual and theoretical responsibility. H.H. Stevens thought that as a Consul, a trade commissioner might get "a glorified idea of his position" and might forget his first responsibility for trade, business and making contacts between Canadian business houses and prospective customers.²

While they did not sanction the Trade offices becoming Consulates the earliest External Affairs consular proposals envisioned prospective Canadian Consulates taking the trade offices under their authority and exercising commercial responsibilities.³ This was done when the New York Consulate General opened in 1943. The responsibility for the operations of the trade commissioner was divided. As Consul he reported to the Consul General but as trade commissioner he reported directly to the Department of Trade and Commerce. With regard to the bulk of his activities, trade promotion, his relationship with his Ottawa Department would not be materially changed.

The Consul General in New York objected to this system. He remarked that while trade men should be given consular appointments to increase trade "they would operate and sign as members of the Consular staff. They could, in exceptionally urgent matters, report directly to Trade and Commerce, otherwise, all the work and reports should go through

the Department of External Affairs... If we set up further consular offices in the United States now with the division in responsibility and management, it would add to the difficulties of merging the two departments later and will be out of line with standard practice of the other trading nations."⁴

R.M. MacDonnell proposed, in 1944, that where posts performed primarily commercial work, the senior appointee would be an officer from the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Junior man from External Affairs.⁵ W.D. Matthews agreed but remarked that the Departmental origin of Heads of Post should remain flexible so that they would fit the fluctuating importance of relative functions.⁶ In his remarks J.E. Read thought that since Trade and Commerce possessed a long list of experienced officials they should carry the bulk of the staffing.⁷ It was, believed Read, "idle to talk about manufacturing Consuls General out of persons in other departments of the Government other than Trade and Commerce. Our success in developing a Consular service depends on the ready and willing cooperation on the part of Trade and Commerce..."

The Consul General in New York complained in 1944 about the failure of his trade officers and the Department of Trade and Commerce to keep him properly informed. R.M. MacDonnell commented that "eventually all correspondence from either External Affairs or Trade and Commerce to offices abroad will have to be sent to the Head of the office and not to the senior employee of the Department concerned in the office... I think that point will have to be established that, irrespective of the service to which the head of the office is attached, he should be subject to instructions from either Department in Ottawa in its relative field and

should report to each department."⁸

One of the basic motivations behind the Canadian consular system, established in 1947, was the desire of the Department of Trade and Commerce to withdraw its officers from Los Angeles and Chicago. The trade officers at New York were also to be withdrawn in 1947 because of the extensive cost in relation to work performed.⁹ The problem of how to provide Travel Information at Canadian consular offices, faced the Department after the first offices opened. Leslie Chance, recognizing a Consulate could not escape dealing with tourist enquiries, but that separate travel bureaux would be too expensive, recommended stationing an assistant in each Consulate.¹⁰ Trained and guided for the Consul General by the Travel Bureau, the assistant would be for administrative purposes and paid for by the Department of External Affairs.

Where the Trade and Commerce activities required a senior officer, External Affairs accepted him as the senior consular officer at the post. "Obviously", believed W.D. Matthews, "in his consular functions, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Chief of our Diplomatic Mission in the same country as would be an officer of the Department of External Affairs."¹¹

Members of the Department of External Affairs assessed in 1949 the need to have trade commissioners appointed Consuls. Leslie Chance formulated his ideas on the Department's policy towards integrating Canadian services abroad. There were reasons, he felt, why trade commissioners ought to be granted Consular status. He argued that:

- 1) They were performing passport duties.
- 2) They performed duties under the Citizenship Act.

- 3) For the most part, they were the only Canadian representatives in their area.
- 4) They could not, even if they wished, escape the general inquiries falling to a Consul's lot but they could not perform normal consular acts for want of authority.
- 5) It was believed their prestige would be enhanced by status in accordance with accepted international practice.¹²

In a complementary report, W.D. Matthews agreed with the suggestion that all Trade Commissioners should have consular status (except where only one Canadian officer was stationed at a post and the consular function might fall on a local clerk if the Consul were away).¹³ A.R. Menzies of American Division, however, disagreed and argued that selective consular appointments of Trade Commissioners should not "automatically be obligating ourselves to clothe all Trade Commissioners with consular status. If this point would be fully understood by Trade and Commerce, we would not be under pressure to make all Consuls automatically, if, in the individual case, it appeared for political reasons to delay such an appointment for a time."¹⁴

The more cautious approach to the question of trade commissioners as consuls was adopted. A memorandum to the Minister in August, 1949, pointed out to him that the appointment of "some trade commissioners as consuls might expose us to pressure from the Department of Trade and Commerce to appoint all trade commissioners abroad as consuls." The Under-Secretary, however, tried to prevent such an occurrence by emphasizing

in his discussions with Trade and Commerce that "the decision to make any of their posts consulates must depend on political considerations in each case as well as the acceptability of their nominee to us."¹⁵ Since he made it clear that the "proposal cannot be considered to create a precedent" he did not anticipate any unreasonable pressure from that Department.

While there appeared to be some inclination by External Affairs' officials to accept trade commissioners as consuls, the Department of Trade and Commerce was clearly not accepted as an equal partner in consular administration. The Department was asked to participate in the first consular conference in 1949 but was not consulted on the desirability of holding the meeting. Other Departments outside the Department of External Affairs were not asked to assist in the definition of consular responsibilities to be included in the 1949 to 1953 Letters of Instruction. Trade and Commerce complaints about the overwhelming nature of consular work received little sympathy. External's reply was to "take the smooth with the rough" if they wanted trade offices operated as Consulates.¹⁶ When George Heasman, Head of the Trade Commissioner Service complained about his men in Detroit and New Orleans being called to Washington in 1953, Leslie Chance commented that Heasman's attitude was a "very sorry" approach since "the Ambassador is the senior representative of the Government of Canada in the United States and in consequence can call any servant of the Government of Canada to Washington when he considers his presence there is necessary."¹⁷

The Letter of Instruction to the Consuls or Consuls General defined the place of the trade representative in the consular structure.

The Trade Commissioner was:

"appointed by the Department of Trade and Commerce and is attached to the Consulate General with the rank of Consul, but as a member of the staff of the Post he is under the superintendence and guidance of the Consul General. He receives his instructions, of course, from the Department of Trade and Commerce but he may also receive instructions from time to time from the Head of Post. His reports on trade and economic questions are submitted direct to the Department of Trade and Commerce, but it is also his duty to advise the Head of Post on these questions and to provide the Head of Post with such reports as the latter may request in order that the consular and commercial activities of the Post may be coordinated."¹⁸

The Trade Commissioner, however, was only one of the other Canadian representatives in the various cities with whom the Consul had contact. In similar fashion, he was to supervise the activities of the National Film Board and Travel Bureau.

The year after the Minister had agreed to appointing some Trade Commissioners as Consuls, M.W. MacKenzie, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce raised the question of "clothing independent Trade Commissioner posts with Consular status." Such a designation had been approved for several posts and all Trade offices abroad were to disappear shortly after 1949. MacKenzie suggested that the head of a post primarily concerned with trade be named a "Commercial Consul".

The Deputy Minister argued in favour of such designation on the grounds that it would maintain in the minds of manufacturers and exporters that they were really dealing with one who understood their problem. The title would "give the individual Foreign Service Officers an improved status in some countries, while at the same time indicating a measure of responsibility to the Consular Division of External Affairs

over matters of a specific consular nature..." The new classification would take away the impression that "the officers are first and foremost Consuls, and their trade work secondary..."¹⁹

Although Leslie Chance objected to this designation as making Canada "more than a little ridiculous", the 1950 Interdepartmental Committee on Coordination and Administration agreed to the establishment of the title. The committee postulated that:

- (a) All Canadian Consular posts, irrespective of the department of government by which they are manned will be designated "Consulate General of Canada," or "Consulate of Canada" as may be appropriate.
- (b) All Foreign Service Officers, whether of the Department of Trade and Commerce or the Department of External Affairs, when serving at a Consular post will be provided with consular commissions appointing them as "Consul General"...(etc.). Recognition by the receiving country will be requested in accordance with these designations.
- (c) Foreign Service Officers, Department of Trade and Commerce, at consular posts will sign correspondence on trade matters (except that to a foreign government) as "Commercial Consul General"...(etc.). These officers will sign all other (consular) correspondence (including that to a foreign government dealing with trade matters) as "Consul General"...(etc.). In addressing their own Department they will use the style "Commercial Consul General", etc.

The Department of Trade and Commerce maintained in 1951 offices of three different categories abroad each with a different degree of consular operations. The first type were ordinary trade commissioners offices carrying out unofficially non-trade work such as answering inquiries. Some trade offices had been specifically authorized to issue passports and visas. Such operations received all routine instructions and requests for information from the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. The

third variety of Trade Commissioners were formally appointed Consuls and were responsible, "for the full range of duties laid down for the consular work of all missions; receive all instructions and requests for consular information sent to missions and are expected to carry out the range of consular work of a mission ..."²⁰

External Affairs had to define its relationship with government Travel Bureau representatives abroad shortly after consulates opened. Canadian offices in the U.S. could not escape tourist inquiries and therefore, had to be in a position to deal with them. Travel bureaus, however, with their need for a prime ground floor location, were too expensive to be established all across the U.S. Leslie Chance proposed, in 1947, that a Travel Bureau trained assistant be attached to, and paid for, by the External Affairs consulates to care for tourist promotion. By 1952, New York, had a separate Travel Bureau office operating independently and a further separate office was to be established in Los Angeles.

Not content with having officers named Consuls and several posts made Consulates, the Department of Trade and Commerce pushed for higher status for New Orleans and Detroit, its posts in the United States. The Department admitted in 1951 that establishing Trade Commissioners Offices as Consulates offered "no great advantage from a strictly trade promotional view point," but a consular designation gave the incumbent "an improved status particularly if he is called upon to perform consular functions."²¹

Shortly after New Orleans in January 21, 1952 opened, Hector Allard of External Affairs made a tour of the post and recommended that since all other major nations had Consulates General in New Orleans, Canada

should consider changing the status of its post. The Department of Trade and Commerce picked up this proposal and asked that both Trade and Commerce posts (Detroit and New Orleans) become Consulates General.

This request precipitated an Interdepartmental meeting in June 1954. Dana Wilgress, the Under-Secretary, reviewed the qualifications for consular status. Wilgress explained that particular conditions which he did not define determined whether a post would be made a Consulate or Consulate General and reiterated the determination of External Affairs to keep control of consular operations. This was in keeping with accepted international practice. Although staff shortages might dictate that other departments' officers may head consular offices during the period of expansion, ultimately External Affairs would want control of all offices. Trade and Commerce men would soon no longer be allowed to head posts even where trade interests were paramount.

Mr. Bull, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, asked again that Detroit and New Orleans be made Consulates General because of the success of their trade work; the seniority of the trade heads of post, and their uncomfortable position as the only Consulates in the Canadian system. The junior status that the office was getting was objected to not for the lack of the title but because the "designation indicated that the offices were of minor importance which was contrary to the facts and might well impede the work they were trying to do."

The situation ended in a compromise. Wilgress agreed to raise New Orleans' status because its situation fit the unspecified measures used to determine the office's designation. External, however, would want to rethink the situation in a year and possibly take over the post.

Detroit, on the other hand, had no qualification for a Consulate General. Bull accepted this compromise but pointed out that Canada should avoid situations by which a man is called a Consul when he is a Trade Agent and only does consular work attracted to his office by reason of his designation.²²

This issue lingered on. The terms of the compromise were not implemented since Consuls General came under the Heads of Posts Regulations and the Department of Trade and Commerce wanted to investigate the financial and administrative aspects before New Orleans became a Consulate General.²³ Arnold Heeney, the Ambassador in Washington re-opened the Detroit case when in 1954 he pointed out that any reasons for deferring higher status for either post had disappeared.²⁴ Ottawa again considered upgrading both posts but agreed only to make New Orleans a Consulate General if Trade and Commerce agreed to the Head of Post getting the title without its prerequisites.²⁵

Again deferred, failure to change his consular status provoked the New Orleans Consul Gerald A. Newman to complain. He was embarrassed by his designation. He needed the change, he said, in order to compare with the Latin Americans or the British and French (who had objected to him, as consul, becoming Dean of the Consular Corps). When Trade and Commerce withdrew from New Orleans and W.G. Stark of External Affairs was appointed in 1956, the post was made a Consulate General.

The sole remaining Consul, concurrently head of post, M.J. Vechsler in Detroit used his reports to urge that he also be made a Consul General. Status reasons became the major consideration in his argument. An elevation of his office would lead to more status and have a beneficial

effect for his work. The average American businessman did not understand a Trade Commissioner and associated a Consulate with an honorific position. Only a Consulate General was recognized as a truly prestigious office.

The Department of Trade and Commerce officers gradually increased their activities in the operation of the consulates after 1953. Some members of the Department of External Affairs proposed considering jointly all appointments of Heads of Post and their chief assistants. The External Affairs appointees were also posted to Trade and Commerce in Ottawa to be briefed before their departure abroad.²⁶ In the Letter of Instructions to the Consul General in Los Angeles in 1957, External Affairs instructed their head of post to do "everything in your power to assist the Trade Commissioner in the development of markets for Canadian products and to foster the economic interests of Canada generally."²⁷

Confusion over the degree of responsibility for the Head of Post of one Department for the actions of the officers of the other Department in his post resulted in some discussions in 1961. Consular Division held the opinion that correspondence ought to go to the Head of Post not to the officers of the Departments concerned. A Vice-Consul should only report direct to his Department concerning minor administrative matters, all other correspondence should be signed by the Head of Post who would be responsible for the work of the Vice-Consul. Inspection Services protested that his latter suggestion would give Trade and Commerce power over External Affairs work which the other Department would not concede in return. Signing letters implied responsibility. It would give a Head of Post grounds for intervening in the other Department's work even though he might not be technically competent in that field, and ultimately not responsible. Arthur Andrew urged that the fairest approach would be

to "place the External Affairs Officer in precisely the same relationship to the senior officer as a Trade and Commerce officer would occupy if the positions were reversed." The only offices where External Affairs would expect a Trade and Commerce man to accept responsibility for its work would be posts where External paid the Head of Mission allowance to the Trade appointee.²⁸

American Division disagreed with Andrew's argument and pointed out that although:

the appointment of a Trade and Commerce officer as head of a Consular post may indicate that the primary concern of the post is trade promotion, this does not, in our view, warrant fragmentation of responsibility for the work of the post. The Consul General or Consul must, it seems to us be prepared and required to assume full responsibility no matter what his parent department may be.²⁹

If the Trade and Commerce heads of posts were not certain of their responsibilities and the delegation of their authority, they should receive a Letter of Instructions when appointed.

The increase of Trade and Commerce personnel in the consulates in the United States led to friction among the staff. The New York Consul General complained in 1952 that "interdepartmental relations at the senior level were anything but smooth".³⁰ Contrary to the Instructions which ultimately vested a post's authority in the Consul or Consul General the Trade staff regarded themselves "as an independent unit and were not willing to co-operate with the Consul General." External Affairs officers believed that closer integration of Commercial and External operations could increase efficiently and reduce expenses. In many cases, however, personality differences between commercial and External personnel prevented such integration.³¹

The officers at many posts were aware of the need for consultations between sections and kept each other in touch with their problems. At the same time, however, as an External Affairs Consul General reported he was "conscious of the fact that there are officials representing the Government Departments operating in my area of jurisdiction who have no responsibility to this office or to me."³² Still not defined was the degree to which general meetings should be held; activities directly supervised. To help solve such problems, the Ambassador in Washington urged in 1962 the establishment of closer connections between departments. He urged that new Letters of Instruction should be issued containing a paragraph urging all Canadian officials in the United States to be kept abreast of important policy considerations beyond the purely departmental which should be borne in mind at all times in the conduct of their affairs. Heeney sent letters to all Heads of Consular Posts in the United States making them aware of this area of their responsibility.³³

The Department of External Affairs continued throughout the 1960's its re-assessment of the requirements for a Consulate or Consulate General. A memorandum prepared in 1960 by Consular Division explained that a Consulate General was "generally recognized as having in its territory a larger geographical area with a much larger population than does a Consulate."³⁴ Furthermore a Consulate General could have in its territory a number of Consulates or vice-Consulates, which would be responsible to the Consulat General. The Consul General would be considerably senior in status to such consuls or vice-Consuls.

When the Department of Trade and Commerce proposed opening a new office in Philadelphia in 1961, it confronted the Department of

External Affairs with the necessity of setting out the difference between Consulates and Consulates General. A letter from the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce specified that the post "of course" would have consular status although he preferred the office as a consulate general. The administrative and financial responsibilities would be assumed by Trade and Commerce. The External Affairs' responsibility consisted of supplying a junior officer and a clerk to handle non-trade and consular work.

The Under-Secretary, Norman Robertson, agreed with the opening and also with the suggestion that the trade territory be larger than the consular territory.³⁵ Any proposal to give the new post the rank of Consulate General was vetoed by the Ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney who proposed instead that New York have supervisory responsibility for the new office.³⁶ In Ottawa, External Affairs did not accept Heeney's suggestion since it would "derogate from the status of the incumbent and give the office the same status as Detroit."³⁷ The submission to Cabinet cited the reason for granting consular status as a result of the "requirements of diplomatic protocol, such designation is the minimum requirement for diplomatic accreditation and such an arrangement, by giving the staff immunity from legal procedures, as well as import privileges will enhance the effectiveness of the office's operations."³⁸

Where Trade and Commerce proposed opening another office in Cleveland in 1962, External Affairs objected because of its proximity to the five offices in the mid-west.

The Department of Trade and Commerce suggested that if a new office were established for trade considerations, their department could approach the Treasury Board for authority to incur the extra costs for a

consulate general (i.e. pay for the Heads of Posts Regulations). This would overcome the lower status disadvantage of many consular heads of trade posts abroad. The Department of External Affairs replied that this delegation of authority would represent an abdication of External's responsibility. The establishment and maintenance of consular and diplomatic missions abroad was an External Affairs/also/told Trade and Commerce that no trained consular staff were available for any new posts. Trade and Commerce argued that it could provide its own trained officers for consular work until External Affairs could send adequate staff.

When the consulate in Cleveland was opened, the submission to the Cabinet remarked that "since consular status is necessary for the effectiveness of the new office"; the Department of External Affairs agreed to that designation and the office was to be operated on the same scale as offices in Detroit and Philadelphia.

The office would "perform all the usual consular functions" but because it was established primarily for trade considerations, a Trade and Commerce officer would be in charge "subject to consultations from time to time." The Department of Trade and Commerce would be responsible for administration and financing and would provide the administrative and clerical staff.³⁹

Paul Bridle examined the questions of how to reconcile Trade and Commerce posts with the traditional consular performance of a range of functions and of how to co-ordinate Canadian government activities throughout the U.S. The limiting of consular areas of the trade posts while extending their trade responsibilities created a situation in which trade posts performed a minimal amount of consular functions and became special purpose

offices. It appears that Bridle envisaged any offices opened solely for trade or information purposes to be consulates. Those consulates either existing or proposed could be raised to consulates general if it could be established that they performed public relations and representational functions as well as trade promotion.⁴⁰

Bridle stated that interdepartmental cooperation between External Affairs and Trade and Commerce would remain the key to smooth functioning of the posts. Particularly these two departments, but also the National Film Board, the Canadian Travel Bureau and the Department of Manpower and Immigration would require close cooperation between the Consulate General and their representatives. There was no legal basis for the assertion of the local authority of a consular head of post, although this was accepted without question by the other departments. Bridle recommended that a committee on coordination of information could be established by a Head of Post.

A new aspect of coordination encountered by Bridle was the question of representatives abroad apart from External Affairs or Trade and Commerce being granted consular status. The Travel Bureau, Department of Defence Production and the Department of Manpower and Immigration all wanted consular status for their representatives abroad. Bridle cautioned that care should be exercised in extending diplomatic or consular status to other departments' representatives not attached to the Embassy itself. Bridle recommended that the desire of the Department of Immigration's request be studied in the light of (a) the extent to which the U.S. government has granted consular status to such personnel; (b) the policy of the U.S. of having consular officials outside the consular city; (c) the likely reaction of U.S. authorities; (d) the need for consular status and

(e) the practice of giving duty free liquor and cigarettes.

The next interdepartmental question which faced External Affairs and Trade and Commerce was opening the post in Dallas in 1967. External had few objections to the Trade and Commerce Proposal and in the submission to Cabinet agreed that "since consular status is necessary for the effectiveness of the new office...it should have designation as a Consulate and be operated on the same scale and in the same manner as the Canadian Consulates in Philadelphia and Cleveland."⁴¹ The sole reason cited for the post in the Cabinet memorandum was "the importance to Canada of trade with the United States, and the opportunities which exist for the expansion of Canadian exports to the South and West Central area..."⁴²

The appearance in several posts of "Immigration Information Officers," without advance warning, precipitated a flurry amongst External Affairs personnel. The Canadian Ambassador regretted the failure of consultation and hoped External had studied the implication of this action.⁴³ U.S.A. Division proposed a pre-posting programme while Consular Division suggested such officers be briefed by their Department in Ottawa on their particular objectives in the context of government policy.⁴⁴

Interdepartmental relations with the Department of Trade and Commerce rose again when Trade and Commerce proposed new offices at San Juan, Minneapolis and Rochester (1969); Atlanta or Miami and St. Louis (1970-71). External Affairs had no objections to opening the posts and were sympathetic to the need to provide support staff although they did not approve any personnel increase. As in Philadelphia and Dallas, External agreed that Post territories need not have the same consular and trade district (Rochester would have a consular district of only one county).

The Departments thought as undesirable, either the opening satellite offices who would forward consular work to another post, or the setting up trade offices rather than consulates. Trade and Commerce, therefore, agreed in the submission to Cabinet to perform consular functions at these posts until the work load justifies the stationing of an External Affairs representative.⁴⁵

The Minister of Trade and Commerce, Robert Winters, asked Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in January 1968 to consider consular status for Travel Bureau personnel in the United States. Winters did not want them to have to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act or to have Canadian non-compliance with the U.S. Act.⁴⁶ To Martin's reply that the "complex subject of consular status" for Travel offices should be discussed,⁴⁷ Winters again reiterated that the important work of the travel offices meant "it is only just and equitable that they should have consular status."⁴⁸ Travel Bureau staff could only be construed as "consular" under Article 5(b) and (c) of the Vienna Convention, which included as consular activities, furthering commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations and ascertaining by lawful means the commercial etc., aspects of the receiving state. If granted consular status, however, Travel Bureau staff, like Immigration representatives must be prepared to undertake the full range of consular functions if called upon to do so.⁴⁹ By giving consular status to all the Departments' representatives, U.S.A. Division believed Canada would "be eroding the status of consular officers and lessening their ability to discharge their representational duties."⁵⁰ This problem remained unsolved.

The Treasury Board in 1968 refused to consider raising the status

of any post from Consulate to Consulate General and forced External Affairs and Trade and Commerce to distinguish between the two types of post.⁵¹

The Department of Trade and Commerce prepared a paper distinguishing between the two types basing its classification on the size and scope of the operations, the representational nature of the Consul General's duties and the size of the municipality. The paper argued that "when the responsibility is concerned with political or trade matters, the importance of the representational function of the trade officer is important" in determining the office's status. Trade and Commerce argued, therefore, the trade importance of Detroit warranted a Consulate General since in current practice most independent non-Embassy posts had become Consulates Generals.⁵² Commercial Policy Division of External Affairs believed that such a change would beneficially increase prestige, would lead to increased contacts, and would facilitate trade promotion in the U.S.A.⁵³ The real need could only be determined by comparing the rank of Canada's offices with those of other countries in the same cities.

The Senior Planning Staff of the Department produced a paper in February, 1969 which set out a distinction between the Consulates and Consulates General. This paper argued that basing the distinction on the "importance" of the post blurred the issue of whether Canadian interests would benefit from a higher designation enough to warrant the extra expense. Where "all other countries" maintained Consulates General Canada should not set up a Consulate even if business did not warrant a higher status. The scope and range of the activities of a post, rather than its designation should determine the application of criteria to Heads of Post. Some Consulates had a higher representational activity than some embassies. When trade promotion, cultural relations or 'consular'

activities were important enough to be regarded as 'politically' significant they should determine the designation as Consulate or Consulate General.

The report maintained that:

In the case of consular posts in the United States whose activities are oriented primarily towards trade promotion, the prestige of the office can be of great importance in facilitating the contact with members of the business community which he is expected to maintain.

The report concluded, however, that seldom would the "political" significance of an office be clear cut. Circumstances might demand a higher office at a particular time despite the limited objectives of the post.⁵⁴ The Senior Committee of the Department considered the criteria for determining an office's status. The Committee concluded that:

"given the trend worldwide towards the more exalted designation, Canadian practice should be to designate its consular posts as Consulates-General unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."

Offices could be set up as Consulates General but later staffed by officers of lower rank.⁵⁵

In its criticism of the Report, U.S.A. Division put forward the argument that it was not the importance of the objectives of the office (i.e. the amount of trade) but rather what resources had to be expended-- "If we can meet our objectives with consulates we have no need for Consulates General", but if Consulates General were needed, they should be established.

The Division used this argument in commenting upon the status of the new 1969 proposals for Industry, Trade and Commerce posts in Minneapolis and Buffalo. Industry, Trade and Commerce wanted both posts to have status as consulates General for trade promotion purposes. An arrangement of tiers of inter-connecting branch offices established according to need

should be considered as an alternative. A consulate would operate as a branch of the Consulate General and provide a range of activities, but could call upon its parent office for help as need arose. An office of the Canadian Trade Commissioner could provide an Industry, Trade and Commerce representative of consular rank with jurisdiction to perform trade functions only. The third office, a Consular Agency, would provide consular services only with a minimum of information work. By locating the agencies in travel offices, the head of the office could be made a Vice-Consul.⁵⁶

In another critique of the Industry, Trade and Commerce 1969 proposals, the Central Planning Staff concluded these represented "no more than a genuflect" in the direction of stating objectives and analyzing alternatives. The market size of the regions did not indicate prime importance. The staff believes that Canada should not feel bound to send Consuls General to the United States merely because we have found it necessary for purposes of trade promotion, to establish Consulates-General in Europe, when the value of Canadian exports in the Europe is considerably less than that in the United States.

It took less effort to drum up American trade and, therefore, the Department of Trade and Commerce over-emphasized comparative trade figures when contemplating the establishment of new posts.⁵⁷

The personnel withdrawal from the United States in 1969 due to the government's austerity programme affected the ability of External Affairs to provide the full range of activities at their posts. Industry, Trade and Commerce staffs at Seattle and Chicago would still be required to perform consular duties, since it would be impractical to

do otherwise. Both Chicago and Seattle were detention centres for jailed Canadians awaiting deportation and the demand for "consular" services there would not subside. Again the Division suggested that Trade Offices alone without consular status might not be a disadvantage. The suggestion that such offices needed to be made Consulates General was "fallacious, if not in fact foolish", since "the performance of a particular task is more directly related to the person performing the task than to his status."⁵⁸

The establishment cuts in External Affairs' staff contrasted with the Industry, Trade and Commerce proposals to open consulates in Minneapolis and Buffalo to promote more Canadian exports. These two Consulates were to "provide the normal range of consular services"⁵⁹ and would be totally paid for by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

Departmental opposition by External Affairs escalated to the Ministerial level when Mitchell Sharp refused to sign the submission to Cabinet authorizing the new posts. He was concerned about the interpretation that would be placed upon the opening of these two offices at a time when we are withdrawing support from other offices both in the United States and abroad. On November 7, 1969, he wrote to Mr. Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce:

"It seems to me that if the Government is going to be credible in its announced intentions of curtailing expenditures, it should subject all its existing expenditures in the foreign field to a very close scrutiny before expanding any operations. Unless there has been a big change in the meantime, I am inclined to think on the basis of my experience when I was Minister of Trade and Commerce that there are Trade Commissioner offices abroad whose operations could be terminated or curtailed without any significant effect upon Canadian trade promotion!"⁶⁰

Jean-Luc Pepin replied that his department had certainly considered such financial questions before recommending opening the U.S. posts. In fact, they had closed down posts in Liverpool, Belfast and Santo Domingo to provide resources to open the U.S. operations. In concluding his letter Pepin remarked that:

"I would like to further remind you that the Government's priorities and the allocation of resources to meet these priorities have been recognized by an increase in the trade and development programme of my Department." 61

The Under-Secretary, Marcel Cadieux, summarized the situation for the Minister in a memorandum on November 18, 1969. The tone of Pepin's letter believed Cadieux showed great reluctance to delay the opening of the Buffalo and Minneapolis posts. In a meeting, Mr. Sharp should explain that "this Department is not opposed in principle to the Department of Trade and Commerce proposals to open new consulates, primarily oriented to trade and industrial promotion, but that we have certain reservations on the appropriateness of proceeding at this particular time in view of the Government's austerity programme."

In considering the programme, the Government had decided to open the diplomatic posts, unlike the posts in the United States. External Affairs experience indicated that the Department "will inevitably be called upon to provide some assistance from our own resources". There was always a demand for information and "consular" services "which the public has a right to expect."

Ambassador Ritchie urged postponing the opening of new missions in the United States until Canada had made a detailed study of objectives. It was also his view that "any decisions about the use of available

resources should reflect a careful assessment of the importance which informational, cultural and consular activities have for the promotion of Canadian trade and investment. Ritchie believed that the "trade promotion activities of a consulate should not be divorced from the other functions normally associated with it." Anything which contributed to a favourable Canadian image assisted the sale of Canadian products, thus a trade promotion post in the United States to be fully effective, must be in a position to perform not only purely trade functions but consular, informational and representational activities which are mutually supporting in a very practical way. External Affairs' cutbacks meant the additional services could not be performed and this would nullify much of their overall effectiveness.

In additional paragraphs, Mr. Cadieux summarized the arguments of Guy Smith, the Consul General in New York. The new office would create a previously non-existent demand; non-trade work could not be handled by Industry, Trade and Commerce; Canadian firms should be urged to stand on their own feet. Cadieux also pointed out that opening new offices could compound difficulties of the reorganization that was recommended by either the Task Force on Foreign Operations or by the Task Force Report on Information.

The conclusion which Mr. Cadieux recommended to his Minister was that the evidence showed the Government was "not in possession of the facts which would enable it to make rational decisions on the allocation of its resources abroad," and would be unable to do so for several months. Mr. Sharp could therefore suggest a compromise of only opening a Minneapolis office if Mr. Pepin insisted on opening a post. The arguments for not establishing a Buffalo post were stronger than those in favour.

In the meeting between Sharp and Pepin, November 28, 1969, Mr. Warren, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, "skillfully argued the narrower trade promotion case for new posts at Buffalo and Minneapolis", and urged Mr. Sharp to allow a quick opening to promote effective trade work. Sharp admitted the validity of many of Warren's arguments and said he would not oppose Mr. Pepin's proposal "too strongly".⁶³

The Cabinet approved the Buffalo and Minneapolis opening and arrangements began in February 1970 and these were subsequently opened in the first half of 1970. Also in early 1970, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce began pressing for a new consulate in Atlanta. The trade area served by the existing post in New Orleans would be divided up between the new Atlanta post and Dallas. At the time of the writing on this history, interdepartmental discussions through ICER were discussing the merit of this proposal.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSULAR FUNCTIONS

In theory, the Department of External Affairs has always expected its consulates in the United States to perform a wide range of duties. Generally, these tasks include public relations, trade promotion, customs and immigration work, economic and political reporting, representational activities, "Consular" duties such as issuing passports, and shipping chores. Practically, priorities deliberately or haphazardly assigned to duties have changed over time or differed simultaneously from city to city. In spite of this, the Department has always insisted that no single consular function could assume such an overriding importance that it obscured the primary responsibility of all consular officers to serve Canadian citizens abroad or detract from its representation of all Canadian government interests in the United States.

Two forces constantly challenged this theory of consular functions. Officers of the Department of External Affairs have never agreed on priorities assigned to conflicting demands on the Consuls' time. Secondly, from the inception of the consular system a strong extra-departmental force, the Department of Trade and Commerce pushed to assign priority to Consuls' responsibility for trade promotion. The Information Division of External Affairs and the Trade Commissioner Service have constantly worked at cross purposes and minimized the practical value of each others' actions. The success of Trade and Commerce after 1956 in assigning their criteria for consular duties has almost identified trade promotion with the totality of Canadian interests in the United States. Activities of Canadian Consulates have included

information, consular work and trade in New York in 1942, since the first office opened in the U.S. Disseminating information for the Wartime Information Board was the primary purpose of the new Canadian Consulate General. The office was also to perform such consular tasks as issuing passports, authenticating documents, answering questions arising from wartime legislation and providing Canadian nationals with assistance.¹ Once opened, the Consulate General absorbed under its jurisdiction the separate Trade Commissioner's office and the Trade Commissioners were concurrently appointed consuls and vice-consuls.

After a Year's operation, the New York Consul General, Hugh Day Scully assessed the development of post activities. Reviewing the nature of consular duties, Scully emphasized the representational aspects of his work. In this broadly defined category, he included public relations and information work in schools, clubs, churches as well as making contacts at social engagements. Traditional consular activity, issuing passports, ~~naturalization~~ and immigration papers, kept the office busy, but Scully hoped that along with the customs and military work these chores would diminish after the war. Tourist and trade enquiries increased greatly after the Consulate General had taken over the Trade Commissioner's office and were answered by letter accompanied by relevant government literature. The other functions were more important than indicated because of the trade staff's methods of calculating the amount of work performed. They reported every telephone call. Scully reported that:

"It seems convincingly clear that New York, has never been an export trade promotion office to the same extent as some of the offices in Great Britain or other parts of the world. As indicated above it has first of all been an information center on all Canadian matters. This type of work, together with the time demands of special long term activities such as those involved for example, in the New York World's Fair of a few years ago, have combined to reduce the amount of effort the Trade Commissioner can devote to purely trade promotional work to a marked degree.

The value of a New York trade office lay not in the U.S.-Canada trade promoted but in the entrepôt trade generated by Canada in New York for destinations other than the U.S., particularly for Latin America. The U.S.-Canadian trade attributed to the Commissioner in New York was inaccurate for as well as being an estimate, many sales would have been affected by direct contact between the American buyer and Canadian seller. Measured against the total volume of Canada-U.S. trade, the amount directly promoted in New York (\$1,180,000 in 1942 and \$457,000 in 1943) did not justify the maintenance of an office. A senior roving representative acting as a general reporter and source of information could accomplish more useful trade promotion or information than a salesman interested in individual transactions. In such a setup, a junior man would best be able to cope with specific inquiries about Canadian exports while general trade inquiries could be handled by some ordinary member of the consular staff.²

These comments by Scully on the New York operations were part of the study for the 1944 proposals to establish a Canadian consular system in the U.S. In this External Affairs evaluated the hypothetical functions of such a consular system. The Canadian Ambassador in Washington believing any Consulates would absorb the existing Trade Offices in the U.S. assumed prospective consulates would have a commercial function. Contradicting Scully, an Embassy memorandum³ remarked that in fact "after the war the main job of the Canadian consular service in the United States will be to protect and promote Canadian economic interests in the United States ... The commercial responsibilities of a consular office are discharged in two ways: by sending reports to Ottawa and by giving direct assistance to Canadian citizens and business organizations in connection with their trade with the United States." A Canadian consular

office should also supply United States firms with information on Canadian products, aid in organizing Canadian Chambers of Commerce in its city and guard against the infringement of the rights of Canadian citizens in trade matters.

The Embassy's 1944 memorandum de-emphasized the active public relations role of the consulate. The author of the memorandum believed that "no active campaign would be as important as public relations work which a Canadian consular service in the United States can do as a product of routine duties in which officers would meet the American public." Two other branches of consular public relations would be answering inquiries about Canada by newspapermen and giving public speeches.

Other consular activities described in the Embassy's memorandum included taking care of Canadians abroad. The large number of permanent Canadian residents in the United States should be kept in contact with Canadian affairs and temporary visitors would apply to a consulate for various forms of assistance. The remainder of a consuls' time would involve: tourist promotion, reporting on regional aspects of American opinion, care of visiting Canadian warships and generally, the maintenance of a "Canadian centre" of culture and information.^{3a}

The actual consular proposal of 1944 by R.M. Macdonnell acknowledged all these functions. Since consular chores, trade promotion and general enquiries affected the public relations of Canada in the U.S. and gave this job some special character, all officers should be qualified for effective public relations work. If a consulate's work was predominantly commercial, he recommended that a Trade and Commerce representative be appointed head of the post. Macdonnell, however,

accepted H.D. Scully's assessment that a trade officer's place in New York was better suited to general rather than specific trade promotion.⁴ In his comments, W.D. Matthews agreed that since the relative importance of the work of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce would vary from time to time in any city, the selection of the senior man should remain flexible.⁵

The Department of Trade and Commerce as well as External Affairs by 1947 emphasized the trade promotion aspects of consular work less. George Heasman, Director of the Trade and Commerce foreign service, reported that year that the commercial output of his offices in Chicago and Los Angeles had diminished so greatly that the consular chores of dispensing tourist and press information and speaking to American clubs occupied their time. His Department was considering closing down both offices in the U.S. and urged External Affairs quickly to open consulates in these cities to preserve Canadian prestige.⁶

The priorities assigned to consular duties by Leslie Chance, Head of Consular Division, in his 1947 recommendations for a Canadian consular system in the United States confirmed the decline of trade. Chance pointed out to the Under-Secretary, that the services provided for Canada by the British offices in the United States would expand beyond the strictly "consular" once Canadian consulates opened their doors. Since Americans seldom had any great appreciation of the limitations of consular function and responsibility, a foreign government office was expected to be "the repository of all information on the life of its own country... It is not possible to measure the results which may accrue in trade, business or otherwise from consular representation -

there is simply no yardstick of the amount of bread which, being cast upon the waters, returns after many days."

Chance amplified his contention by explaining that the development of career diplomatic service brought a marked change in the nature of consular responsibility. It was "no longer possible to regard a consul as one who merely sits in his office and deals with matters which are brought to him." In the United States, he could not escape representational duties even if he tried. The "pitch had been set" by both the United Kingdom and Australia and if Canada were not going to accept an inferior position she needed worthy representation by officers in the U.S.

Chance's emphasis on public relations and representation by consulates grew out of his belief that their primary justification was the need to dispel Americans' ignorance of Canada. Any Canadian representation in the United States which did not recognize this problem of "ignorance, misconception and confusion, would fall short...." of serving its purpose. On the other hand, Canadians in the United States needed only minimal consular protection in the ordinary sense since they were under no serious disabilities when they travelled or moved there. Trade relations were so close it seemed probable "that important events could only be influenced at a high level of representation." Consulates could stimulate tourist travel to some extent although these combined functions could prove difficult if only because Travel Bureaux required ground floor space too expensive to hire for the whole consulate.⁷

In his 1952 review of consular needs, the new Head of Consular Division, Hector Allard, retained both Chance's justification for

Canadian offices in the United States and Chance's conception of consulates' activities with minor modifications. The enhanced interest of the United States in Canada believed Allard, should not be left to vegetate in continued ignorance. Accordingly, his report to the Under-Secretary advocated that Canada start a long-range programme in the various media to disseminate information especially in the western United States. Such a programme should, however, not only cover public relations but also commercial matters and tourist information. Allard believed Canada's consulates would have to compete vigorously to prevent a loss of trade markets to other trade nations.⁸

After the Department of External Affairs opened its consulates in Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco and Boston, it supplied guidance to the newly appointed Consuls (General) laying out the priority of their duties. Letters setting out general guidelines were issued in 1947 and 1948 emphasizing consular chores, information work and trade in that order. L.B. Pearson wrote to H.A. Scott, the Consul General in San Francisco to tell him that his main responsibility would be:

to encourage Canadian trade and travel to Canada, to maintain Registers of Canadians living under your jurisdiction who may wish to so Register, to distribute information matter, to deal with applications for Immigration and temporary entry to Canada, to prepare political and commercial reports, to issue travel documents and grant visas, to assist destitute Canadians, to prepare and endorse documents, to conduct correspondence, to maintain records and accounts and to perform other related duties as may be related or prescribed.

Scott should also emphasize public relations by keeping in mind at all times that:

the principal function of the Consulate General of which you are in charge is the promotion and cementing of the traditionally close and friendly relations which have for so long prevailed between the people of Canada and the

United States. You will, however, have observed that there is much misconception among the people of the United States, concerning Canada and its government, culture and people. It will, therefore, be your constant concern so to act that so far as possible this misconception may be dispelled.

The Department also told the consuls that they would discover that the opening of Canadian consulates:

inevitably involves a considerable volume of business which falls in the ordinary way within the scope of the Department of Trade and Commerce at Ottawa. It is the intention that, to the fullest extent which is possible, Canadian Consuls should perform duties which would normally fall to Trade Commissioners at point where the Department of Trade and Commerce is not itself represented. 10

The Department superseded short personal letters by an official Letter of Instructions routinely transmitted to the newly-appointed head of each consular post from 1949 to 1956. The Letters, creations of the combined efforts of Consular, Information, Personnel, Protocol, American, Defence Liaison and Economic Divisions as well as the Embassy in Washington, were reviewed from time to time but the content remained substantially similar.

The Letter consisted of various sections titled:

I. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL.

II. CONSULAR MATTERS

- a) Consular Representation in the United States.
- b) Responsibility of the Consul General within his Territory and his Relations with the Embassy.
- c) The Daily Work of the Establishment.
- d) The Administration of the Consulate General.
- e) Consular Colleagues.
- f) Formal Calls on State and Civic Functionaries.
- g) Relations with British Consular offices.
- h) Rights and Privileges.
- i) Visits of His Majesty's Canadian Ships.
- j) Commissions and Exequatur.

III. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INFORMATION

IV. REPORTING FROM THE POST

V. RELATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BRANCHES

As to the priority of various functions, the Letter advised in the "Consular Matters" section that:

The efficient conduct of consular business is the primary task of a consular post. The first duty of the consul is the protection of the interests of his own nationals residing in or visiting his territory; other responsibilities which have in more recent time accrued to consuls should never be permitted to obscure this first and essential consular function.

The Department, however, believed that representational duties as well as consular activities should assume precedence over other activities.¹¹ Hume Wrong interpreted the "Consular Matters" paragraph as placing the emphasis on

"the efficient conduct of ordinary consular business, but it is apparent that a chief responsibility of the Consul General personally is the range of duties covered by that vague term "representation" I do not know whether it is feasible to devise some appropriate formula indicating the general line that he should follow in New York in this respect. 12

The Letter of Instructions underwent modifications in 1953 and 1954 in despatches drafted for the guidance of the heads of the new posts in Seattle, Los Angeles and Detroit. John English of the Department of Trade and Commerce requested the consular matters section be amended to include references to trade and commercial matters, particularly where no Trade Commissioner joined the consular staff. R.A. MacKay, Assistant Under-Secretary, asked the Embassy in Washington to review the Letters of Instruction and to concur in incorporating the change since "Even in those posts where there are no officers of the Department of Trade and Commerce this element of the national interest

should not be neglected entirely."¹³

The first duty of a consul is the protection of the interests of his own nationals residing in or visiting his territory. The promotion of these interests (including trade) ranks second only to the protection of Canadian interests. Indeed both are interrelated. At present you have not the special staff required to promote trade in your area. You should do what you can, however, in this direction without prejudice to your other consular duties. With this in mind, your Consulate-General is being listed in the Department of Trade and Commerce's publication "Foreign Trade." This may bring some trade enquiries...."

The Head of American Division, however, mildly objected to the draft on the ground that the Consular Instructions already covered trade functions. Consular officers in the U.S. already possessed instructions dated 15th March 1948 from the Department of Trade and Commerce. According to this circular "In trade matters the Department of Trade and Commerce only will give directions. However, the Department of External Affairs may, from time to time, ask for reports on certain general commercial questions." ¹⁴ American Division implied no further advice was necessary.

This amendment aimed at reinforcing a Consul's flagging ambition in the area of consular activity in which he lacked expertise and was most likely to neglect. Letters to Los Angeles and Seattle, posts completely staffed by External, contained the warning to keep an eye on trade promotion.¹⁵ In contrast, in Detroit where the head of post came from Trade and Commerce, the Letter contained the contrary caveat. It reminded the new Consul that he was to protect Canadian interests in his territory and remember:

The promotion of these interests (including trade) ranks second only to the protection of Canadian interests. At present you have a staff specially trained and equipped to promote trade in your area, but in spite of the emphasis which you will no doubt wish to place on this aspect of your work, care should be taken not to let this prejudice your attention to other consular duties. In the conduct of other aspects of the consular work of your office, you

will be guided by circular consular documents and consular instructions... 16

When William Stark was appointed New Orleans Consul General in 1955, Economic Division of External omitted this warning since

...in view of his long career as trade commissioner for the Department of Trade and Commerce, it is felt that it would be unnecessary for any comments as to the trade work at the post to be included (in a letter of instructions).¹⁷

Similarly, because there was a Trade and Commerce representative in Boston the economic section was omitted in both 1953 and 1954.¹⁸

Another modification in the Letters of Instruction appeared in 1953 in the section "Purpose of a Consulate (General)". As originally written from 1949 to 1953, this second paragraph in the letter stated that the purpose of a Consulate in the United States was:

to further the national interests of Canada. The four main ways by which this purpose can be achieved are:

- (a) by providing protection and assistance to Canadian citizens resident in or passing through the territory under the Consul General's jurisdiction and by providing consular services in respect of Canada to United States and other citizens in the territory;
- (b) by providing a medium for liaison with municipal state and federal authorities for the territory;
- (c) by transmitting to the Canadian Government information concerning matters of mutual interest to Canada and the United States and, when desirable by explaining Canadian government policy on these matters; and
- (d) by serving as a focus of the Canadian Government's representation and activity in the area under the Consul-General's jurisdiction. 19

The most notable omission in this paragraph, the failure to mention trade promotion as even a general area of consular responsibility, was rectified in 1953 when the Department prepared the new letters for

Seattle and Los Angeles. The modified paragraph stated that the purpose of a Consulate or Consulate General was:

to further the national interests of Canada. The five main ways by which this purpose can be achieved are:

- (a) by providing protection and assistance to Canadian citizens resident in or passing through the territory under the Consul General's jurisdiction and by providing consular services in respect of Canada to United States and other citizens in the territory;
- (b) by promoting and protecting Canadian trade interests; [sic]
- (c) by providing a medium for liaison with municipal state and federal authorities in the territory;
- (d) by transmitting to the Canadian Government information concerning matters of interest to Canada and the United States and, when desirable, by explaining Canadian Government policy on these matters; and
- (e) by serving as focus by Canadian Government representation and activity in the area under your jurisdiction. 20

Logically, if the Department had followed its policy of including caution to External Affairs representatives and omitting it from letters addressed to Trade and Commerce appointees the section should have been omitted from the letter to Detroit and added to those in other posts. The new wording, however, was listed among enumerated activities in Detroit but omitted from the letter sent to Boston the same year. 21

Apart from these two general sections, the remainder of the Letter of Instructions gave a more detailed explication of the Department's expectations. The 1949-1950 Letters in the "Consular Matters" section advised the consuls of their responsibilities in regard to various necessary odds and ends: the efficient administration of the Consulate;

observation of formal calls on consular colleagues and civic or state functionaries, as well as maintaining harmonious relations with the British and caring for Royal Canadian Navy ships on official visits. A revision of these activities in a letter to Honourable Ray Lawson²² in 1953 included the post's security arrangements and matters pertaining to Canadian Merchant Shipping.²³ Detroit, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle and New Orleans received similar instructions and amendments except that the Navy and shipping material was omitted from the instructions to inland consulates. The letter to the Consul General in Boston in 1954 specifically added immigration and citizenship to the list enumerated in this section.²⁴

All the letters transmitted to U.S. posts contained the third section. "Public Relations and Information", three pages of specific advice on the methods of performing such chores. The Consul General, "Canada's principle public relations representative," took charge of carrying out these duties and exploiting Americans' goodwill and interest in Canada. In several of the letters, a general introduction to this section advised the consuls that "information work of course is not an end in itself; yours should be designed to further the other general objectives outlined in this letter... Because of the importance of information work in promoting the general objectives of your mission, you should assess with care the opportunities open to you for creating favourable and informed public opinion and decide how the limited time and staff available to you for this work can bring the greatest returns." To encourage the officer with no departmental interest in information work,

his instructions advised the Trade and Commerce Consul in Detroit that through his staff's daily contact with the public, they gained:

excellent opportunities to advance the objectives of Canadian information policy abroad set forth in circular document No. B79/53. Your predecessors in Detroit used these opportunities to good advantage to try to ensure that a public already well disposed toward Canada was also well informed about Canada. They maintained a high level of information activity considering the resources at their disposal. You will no doubt find that the problem of how to make the most profitable use of the limited time and staff available for information work will continue to be a troublesome but interesting one. 26

Specific advice on information methods directed the consular offices to keep in close contact with media men in the magazines, news services, radio and television stations, publishing houses and motion picture studios. Arranging visits to Canada by newsmen could provide the Canadian government with "a direct channel by which we can convey information about Canada to regions of the United States."²⁷ New York, Chicago and Los Angeles were given special emphasis with regard to media management.²⁸ Various techniques of information work involved for example, the distribution of photographs and photo releases, as well as transcriptions of U.S.C. International Service programs, publications and handbooks, and films from the National Film Board. Each Consulate was to maintain a small library with information for facilitating educational-cultural relations. Travelling exhibits of Canadian art could be collected for use by the posts. The speech making activities of the Consul General were left to his discretion except for ambassadorial consultation on policy addresses.²⁹

The fourth general responsibility of a consulate, reporting from the post, though retained as a duty, was downplayed in importance.

The Department told the Consuls that most news material was:

normally available to us in Canadian newspapers and such metropolitan papers as the New York Times which reach the Department daily... Since the Embassy reports comprehensively on developments in the United States, reports from your post would be most useful if related to these General Embassy reports. 30

The Consulates, however, could submit political reports on State legislation affecting Canada, official state views on Canada-U.S. relations, local developments not covered by the press and views of influential persons. Economic reporting on local aspects of such topics as; influential local attitudes towards important international trade, U.S. Customs, trucking-in-bond was also welcomed. Current economic issues were frequently specified as objects for consular investigation, i.e. oil and gas, exports, the St. Lawrence Seaway, Japan's accession to GATT. New York's economic primacy allowed some relaxation of the bias against economic reporting but the Department still warned the Consul General that there was such a "vast mass of subjects suggests the danger of spreading too thin whatever resources are available in the Consulate General for economic and financial reporting."³¹

In theory, Letters of Instructions guided the activities of officials in the United States, but in practice, this inclusive and general description of duties allowed the head of a post to follow his predilections and to create an amalgam of activities best suited to his interests. The Department of External Affairs accepted this divergence from its ideal. A 'Summary of Discussions on Consular Questions' held in Washington in 1956 mentioned that the nature of consular duties meshed to such an extent that "much of the work done under the heading 'Information' could also be

classified under 'Commercial' or 'Representational'.³²

This interconnection of the Consuls' chores led to difficulties assigning tasks' priorities. Frequently, Ottawa officials could not help them. When Douglas Cole, the new Consul General in Chicago, asked for advice on subjects for his reports in 1950, A.F.W. Plumptre of Economic Division explained the difficulty of giving:

exact advice and I am not in a position to send you a sample of what we want, because our wants differ so widely from time to time and place to place. I think the main thing to keep your eye on are news of special interest to Canadians in the Chicago area and to certain news items about Canada. 33

The Department recognized that Cole's practical difficulties arose from the need to establish priorities for work because of limited time available.

On the other hand, establishing:

a firm order of priority for these tasks is well-nigh impossible. In any case, no consulate could operate efficiently on the basis of any priorities established in theory to apply to all consulates; priorities obviously have to be adjusted to meet the circumstances obtaining at any given time in any one particular consulate. 34

The Department tried to be helpful without being too restrictive and peremptory. Hume Wrong, for example, objected to the first draft of the Letter of Instructions to K.A. Greene in 1949 because on several points "the draft struck me as conveying a note of exhortation or admonition which I should find mildly irritating if it were addressed to me." Writing the first draft of the letter to K.A. Greene in 1949, Leslie Chance shied away from any concrete description of the representational aspects of consular work. He felt experienced diplomats understood that side of the work better than any other.³⁵

To keep track of consulates' activities, the Department of External Affairs asked for occasional reports and sporadically called consular conferences after 1949. The first report, called for in 1948

to help the Department justify the expenditures on the consulates, asked the consuls to describe their actual as well as their ideal duties. As for the practical and tangible results, T.F.M. Newton, the Consul in Boston commented that his daily effort set in motion:

a wide variety of services, and, it is to be hoped, produces a consequent harvest of goodwill. Frequently when the consequent harvest seems to be only [sic] goodwill, that result is nevertheless productive of subsequent tangible benefit or sets up a chain reaction which leads to it.

Such a demand for the measurement of visible and immediate results, therefore, meant the measurement of only one portion of a consulate's service and frequently "only the portion which is routine and minor."³⁶

Newton isolated the most notable difference of Consulates from Embassies. It was the close contact with the general public. Metaphorically, a consulate was not only the shop window:

but also the shop behind the window. It not only advertises attractive wares, but it transacts business through salesmen who are in constant personal contact with a foreign public.

The services provided in Boston were for visiting and resident Canadians, non-U.S. nationals and Americans.

This service aspect of a consulate affected almost its whole operation: its geographical location, its decor, the appearance and attitude of its personnel, and its image in the public mind. The unawareness of Ottawa headquarters of this most important part of consular work, hindered the ability of the Consulate to render personal assistance. Ottawa set up 'systems procedures' and 'administrative returns' by which time was "taken from work normally to be considered the primary reason for the post's establishment."³⁷

Other consulates assessed their primary duties differently. J.J. Hurley of Detroit considered consular services, "the least important but they must be courteously performed."³⁸ Harry Scott, Consul General in San Francisco, not stressing the primacy of services nonetheless reported that they kept his staff busy. Edmond Turcotte omitted consular assistance altogether as a consideration in his 1949 letter.³⁹ Consular business in his office taxed the ability of both staff and facilities to cope⁴⁰ reported K.A. Greene in 1951.

In as much as trade activities of a consulate were concerned, once again the Consuls in the United States disagreed. Newton in Boston considered that posts with Trade Commissioners performed one function with concretely measurable results (for example, his post was directly responsible for a \$10,000,000 order for Canadian timber. A trade officer in the U.S. advised American commodity buyers of the Canadian supplies and vice versa, in addition to publicity work and assisting touring businessmen. Harry Scott in San Francisco downgraded these concrete aspects of the trade promotion function in the United States because of proximity to Canada. His trade programme consisted of providing information and trade public relations. Hurley in Detroit believed that at his post trade promotion should have high priority but Turcotte, in his preoccupation with information work ignored it altogether.

All the 1949 consular reports agreed on the importance of the public relations aspect of consular work. Newton believed information work could create a pre-disposition later expressed more concretely in a visit to Canada or orders for Canadian products. The profitable field of publicity

offered "endless possibilities for fruitful work, and is only limited in scope by the time, initiative, and resources available." Public relations office work included answering general information requests, disseminating literature to visitors, researching replies to detailed enquiries, as well as assisting prospective tourists. The actual exposition of methods of public relations resembled the list set out in the Consular Instructions.

The other Consuls repeated expositions of actual and potential public relations chores similar to Newton's. J.J. Hurley in Detroit and Harry Scott in San Francisco stressed his efforts at making contacts in the universities and schools. Scott also tried to stimulate further newspaper editorial comment on Canada, to the exclusion of all other consular activities. Edmond Turcotte of Chicago examined the problems of dissemination of information to the American mass public as well as to specialized interest groups. In his 1951 assessment, the New York Consul General emphasized the important role of the National Film Board and Travel Service representatives abroad in explaining Canada to Americans. K.A. Greene in New York also most actively expanded the representational aspect of information and public relations work. Greene's methods included: business meetings at the offices of the Consulate General; calls in the offices of officials and businessmen; luncheons, cocktail parties; dinner parties; clubs and other entertainment.

The Consuls disagreed with the Department's efforts to restrict their political and economic reporting. T.F.M. Newton, for example, believed that local studies on topics beyond those suggested by the Embassy and the Department could be useful. Area reporting could amplify information on

certain topics and assist the men who would participate in international negotiations by providing extra information.⁴¹

Another series of reports prepared in 1954 for discussion at a conference of officials outlined the consulates' work. The emphasis on consular (passport etc) duties of the 1949 reports shifted to a variety of duties which varied from post to post. The tendency for the consulates to stress different duties according to local circumstances and personnel had become much more pronounced.

Only the newly-opened Seattle Consulate General emphasized that the primacy of strictly consular functions operated to the detriment of some other duties. Many Consulates delegated the routine consular work to a chief clerk since its problems were "resolved immediately and do not in the main encroach on policy" (Chicago report).⁴² Specific questions, however, caused consulates trouble such as with U.S. immigration regulations and single entry visas to Canada and were dealt with by higher officials. The New York consuls spent much time carrying out diverse business regarding customs, provincial matters, marriage, and shipping.

Information work still occupied as much of the consuls' time and concern in 1954 as in 1949. The New Orleans Consul dealt with the perennial challenge of educating American goodwill based on ignorance. Only New York maintained a special information section and performed the whole range of Canadian information work. Canada still failed, said New York, to establish systematic means of reaching the youthful public in the primary and secondary schools. In Chicago, the intensive propaganda efforts centred in the city itself and occupied 80% of the Consul General's time in public relations work. Demands for speaking engagements had become

a problem for senior staff at Detroit. Public Relations techniques included greater use of television and radio programming especially taped CBC services for radio. Lacking money, the Department could achieve only modest success without undue time-consuming efforts. Detroit and Boston reported difficulties in getting their news releases and other stories about Canada placed in the local press.

It was clear by 1954 that trade promotion received a different priority in the Trade and Commerce posts than in the other External Affairs' consulates. Recognizing the greater emphasis on his trade duties, the New Orleans Consul spent his time on trade work originating from the perimeter areas of his jurisdiction. His experience indicated that Canadians should spend their efforts selling consumer goods to border areas, especially New York, and promote raw materials exports in the South. Most of the Detroit Consul's work concerned care and promotion of the commercial interests of Canadian firms and individuals. He also remarked that because of the

...close contact between most Canadian producers of raw materials and their United States customers, a large dollar share of Canada's exports move into this territory without any direct assistance being rendered by this Consulate. Base metals and products of the forest are the two prime examples of this type of movement. In the case of food products, however, the Canadian trade officers can do some concrete selling work.... Much of the trade work of a Consulate in the United States, however, consists of rendering services to Canadian businessmen which cannot always be measured in dollars.

Trade officers helped Canadian secondary manufacturers break into the United States market as well as assisting American firms to set up Canadian branch plants.

The volume of commercial activities fluctuated in the consular areas. New York's importance remained international with entrepôt sales and trade fairs. In Chicago despite the supervision of the Consul General, the work remained answering questions, not assisting Americans find Canadian sources of supply. Boston reported increasing requests for branch plant information and export assistance.

Many posts submitted few economic or political reports (New Orleans, Chicago and Boston). Consulates, New York complained, could not properly answer requests or submit useful reports because they did not receive Embassy reports on current economic or political projects. Potentially San Francisco believed it could submit useful reports, but Seattle was the only post which performed direct reporting services. Located in the heart of activities of concern, Seattle prepared reports on oil and natural gas supplies to the Pacific northwest, international fisheries and the use of international rivers, especially the Columbia River.

The office administration of the consulate, the final consular chore had been almost ignored in reports previous to 1954. New Orleans, New York, Chicago, Detroit and Boston mentioned their responsibilities in travel arrangements, leave, attendance, pay allowances, registry and communications, the preparation of accounts and ordering of supplies. New York suggested consultations with Ottawa and the other posts to encourage efficiency.

The 1954 reports, therefore, differed from 1949 submissions because of:

- (a) the decline in priority in the personal service aspect of "consular" activity in all posts but Seattle.
- (b) the predominant emphasis on trade in 2 posts (New Orleans and Detroit).
- (c) the inclusion of administration.

Information duties in both the 1949 and 1954 retained their high precedence among consular function, but appeared, like all other responsibilities to receive a different interpretation in the various posts.

To complement written reports, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong, suggested in 1948 that the Canadian Consuls, like the British, meet to discuss their problems. Accordingly, L.G. Chance began preparations for the meeting. T.F.M. Newton conceived the value of conference coming from:

The discussion of procedural problems, relation of each to the Embassy and to Ottawa, trade problems and trade promotion, and the exchange of views on handling the individual difficulties/than from the high level economic /other and political seminars.

The proposed 1948 agenda included, at Ambassador Wrong's insistence, a discussion of the Consulates' relationship to trade promotion.⁴³

Chance promoted other discussions on the place in the consulate of the Department of Immigration, the Canadian Government Travel Bureau, the National Film Board and the Customs Department.⁴⁴ Newton reported that trade matters occupies,⁴⁵

"at least one-third of our time, and personally, I am sure I would profit by a greater allowance of time for treatment of this subject."

The conference spent half days on topical problems (Commonwealth; NATO; Newfoundland & confederation and the St. Lawrence seaway), on the discussion of trade promotion and shipping, on purely consular work, on the place of consulates in economic and political reporting, information work, (films, tourists), and on Immigration and Customs.⁴⁶

The successive conferences reveal the growing importance of Consular Trade activities. A second consular conference, in May 1950, similarly spent half days on economic and trade matters, information and publicity and split a morning session between consular and administrative problems and reporting. In the third conference held in 1952, the time allotted to Trade and Commerce increased to a whole day while information the international situation, were discussed in half-days and consular problems, administrative problems were given a quarter of a day. The 1954 conference followed a similar pattern of increasing emphasis on trade.⁴⁷ The recognition by the Department of Trade and Commerce of consular work caused problems in assigning priorities to activities. For years trade representatives abroad had maintained quasi-consular representation in the absence of an External Affairs post. In any post, Trade and Commerce maintained adequate assistance should be given by either Department when the other was hard-pressed with work not its own. The original trade or diplomatic reason for opening the post was not displaced as its function, if mutually recognized.⁴⁸ E.W.T. Gill of External Affairs remarked that Trade and Commerce believed "External Affairs officers regarded trade as something below their dignity and they were not willing to devote any time to the activity." Trade and Commerce complained frequently about over-

working its staff on External Affairs matters in Trade and Commerce consulates.

A.D.P. Heeney, the Under Secretary, replied to the 1951 complaint by reiterating that Trade and Commerce:

must take the rough with the smooth if they wish to have the establishment in Sao Paulo (the origin of T & C's complaint) operated as a Consulate and their officers to enjoy the status of consuls in that place. They must realize that there may be times at which consular activities temporarily have to be given precedence over those of trade.

Heeney also pointed out that in some External Affairs' posts, immigration or trade assumed such importance that External Affairs' activities had to take a back seat. There did not seem to be, concluded Heeney, "a due realization in Trade and Commerce that a consulate must inevitably represent all the Departments of the Canadian Government."⁴⁹ In defence, Dr. MacKay replied that "it was more a question of other duties crowding out trade than a lack of interest in trade matters."⁵⁰ Hector Allard, Head of Consular Division, reported that New York, Chicago, New Orleans and Detroit did not neglect trade promotion because the Head of the post was a Trade Commissioner or former Commercial Counsellor. Since Boston also had a junior trade man attached to the consulate, the chief area of neglect, he concluded, could only be the Pacific Coast where Trade and Commerce had posted no trade specialists. It was hard, believed Allard, to understand how

Consuls General who have had no previous training in trade promotion and have no member of their staff who is an expert in trade matters...could be accused of regarding trade as something below their dignity and that they are not willing to devote any time to that activity.... I feel certain that their only reason for not devoting more time to trade promotion work is first the lack of an expert in their, post, their own personal lack of knowledge of trade matters and consequently the impossibility to expect our Consulates General to do more than they are doing now with the staff they now have."

Commenting on this memorandum, E.A. Côté of American Division remarked that the time had come to re-examine the purposes of the consular service. Trade promotion was historically an essential of that service but it was not so defined in the Canadian Consular Instructions.⁵¹

Other officers from External Affairs saw a different aspect of the question. A 1952 memorandum from Consular Division remarked that it was illogical:

to expect that Trade Commissioners should neglect their own duties in order to attend to matters which are strictly our concern. It would seem that for the efficient operation of the consular service it should be, to as great a degree as possible, composed of members of this Department. If our foreign service expands through the appointment of Trade Commissioners as Consuls, it will become increasingly difficult for us to direct the operation of the consular service when the posts abroad are not manned by External Affairs personnel.

Trade Commissioners were located where External Affairs would like representation in order better to perform its own representational functions.⁵²

External Affairs began to use the Trade and Commerce theory of Consular functions (see page 24) against the other Department. In a 1954 letter to John English, the Director of the Trade Commissioner Service, the Under-Secretary, Jules Léger, acknowledged the right of a trade officer in a consulate to call upon the Head of Post for assistance. The Head of Post was instructed to remember that the advancement of Canada's commercial interest was part of his job. Extending this principle, said the Under-Secretary, meant that -

While undermanning continues to be a problem in both services the Head of Post must be able to call upon the Trade Officer for help in work that is not strictly commercial in order that the post may accomplish the duties given to it. Where non-commercial officers are overworked the Head of Post will

have to consult with the commercial officer to see if extra jobs can be taken on. 53

Finally, the difficulty of assigning cross-departmental priorities to activities resulted in a thorough examination of consular responsibilities. This examination began in 1955 and involved officials at the highest levels and culminated in a proposed tour of all US establishments in 1956 by the Deputy Minister of the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Under-Secretary. The tour was cancelled but the review resulted in a joint directive by the Deputy Ministers to all posts setting up priorities for their activities.

The study began in the summer of 1955 under the direction of Max Wershof, Assistant Under-Secretary. Several intra-departmental meetings in Ottawa in August 1955 considered the work of the consulates, their importance to External Affairs, and their relationship to Trade and Commerce (including the possibility of making them all T & C's responsibility).⁵⁴

Information Division objected to any delegation of External Affairs control over the consulates. The U.S. was Canada's first information target. Since the Consulates' information work was important the Division concluded that External Affairs would need "all the control we now have over the consulates." If External relinquished control over any consulates, Information Division chose Detroit, Los Angeles and New Orleans in that order.⁵⁵

Recognizing work priorities were necessary for consulates in the United States, American Division felt, however that "it is not easy to state categorically that any one External Affairs function of a Consulate General has priority over another." The Head of the Division concluded that "fundamentally a consulate is a public service office

where our own citizens and those of other countries may expect and receive assistance." From Ottawa, such activities might "appear picayune but, in reality, should all other activities be curtailed, the consular services rendered would justify the existence of the office." In the remaining hours, representational work was the most valuable. The head of post by virtue of his office opened most doors. His representational work set the tone for the rest of the staff especially External personnel who carried out most of these duties. Neither information work nor political or economic reporting were as useful.⁵⁶ A Consul General responsible to External Affairs had a broader conception of the representative role and duties than one responsible to Trade and Commerce. In addition, an External Affairs man would less likely neglect commercial work than a commercial man forget External work.⁵⁷

Consular division's contribution to the review recognized varying work priorities but reiterated that all Consulates "have in common as one of their primary and basic functions the provision of consular services" to Canadian citizens and the population at large. Because of their public nature the quality of the services both established and maintained the post's reputation. This reputation as well as the usefulness of the posts also depended on the representational activities of the Head of Post. Consular Division believed that "over-emphasis on trade functions might well lead to misunderstanding in the United States of the nature of official Canadian representation abroad. The effectiveness of the posts as trade promotion springboards has not yet been proved."⁵⁸

This preliminary 1955 review concluded that Ottawa officials needed "a clarification of the priorities being accorded, and which should

be accorded, by each consulate to each of these activities." Max Wershof could not find any "general policy stating what we want most from consulates... in our/and (it) is not understood in the Department in Ottawa." The Department's allotment of responsibility for the consulates to several divisions partly explained the confusion. In continuing the study, Wershof recommended that the Department send a small team to the various consulates to study their substantive activities. This team should include an Assistant Under-Secretary, the Head of Information Division, representatives of the Embassy and the Department of Trade and Commerce.⁵⁹

In the second stage of the review, the Under-Secretary asked the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to describe his Department's policy on commercial representation in the United States. W.F. Bull pointed out in reply that his Department felt strongly that more strenuous efforts should be made to increase Canadian trade by increasing commercial representation in the United States. The Consuls General in New York and Chicago ought to be officers with commercial backgrounds and interests. Bull also agreed that he, Mr. Leger (the Under-Secretary), as well as their chief assistants responsible for consular affairs should go on tour.

As a basis for the tour discussions, the consulates completed a survey of their activities in March, 1956. The results emphasized the diverse ways which consular officials expended their efforts. The Consul General in Seattle, for example, spent none of his working hours on "consular" chores while such work took up 40% of the time of his counterpart in New Orleans and 60 to 65% of the time of all the Detroit staff.⁶⁰ As for commercial work, the Trade and Commerce Consul General in New Orleans

used only 15% of his own time on trade work but the External Affairs Consul General in Los Angeles passed 45% of his time in commercial activities. Information work, important in theory, gained little practical emphasis. The Consul General in Seattle set up no information programme while the operations in San Francisco, New Orleans and Los Angeles took up only between 5 and 15% of the total consular time. Only in the Trade and Commerce consulate in Detroit did the staff do any large amount of information work (35%). Although reporting occupied 33% of the Consul General's time in Seattle 10% in New Orleans and 15% in Los Angeles, the other posts generally reported only on request. Variations in the hours for representational activities went from 18% in Seattle; 20% in New Orleans; 20% in San Francisco; and 65% in Los Angeles).

After studying these reports, the Head of Consular Division, Paul Malone, concluded that the weight of "inescapable" work, consular and administrative, was heavier than anticipated, especially in Chicago and New York. With the exception of New York, Chicago and Detroit, trade activities were not as important as they should have been. Boston, for example, placed trade third in its consular priorities. In New Orleans, because of the burden of work on External Affairs' personnel, the Trade officer shouldered their jobs and neglected his own. The reports also indicated to Malone the great demand for consuls' time at representational social activities. The Chicago Consul General's club bills for February, 1956 totalled \$277.61 while in New York about 100 invitations for social engagements were received for each day.⁶¹

These assessments complete, the Under-Secretary visited the Consulate General in New York and the Embassy in Washington in April 1956.

He was accompanied by Max Wershof, the Heads of Information and Consular Divisions, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, the Director of the Trade Commissioner Service, and the Head of the Trade and Commerce U.S.A. Desk. On his return, Mr. Léger reported to the Minister, L.B. Pearson, that he arrived back with an "increased appreciation of the complexity of Canadian consular operations in the United States and the necessity of organizing our resources as effectively as possible." The Trade and Commerce group were "particularly impressed" by the varied demand apart from trade on the consulates. The External Affairs officials, on the other hand, "obtained a better understanding of what Trade and Commerce hopes to accomplish in trade promotion in the United States through the Consulates."62

Substantively the 1956 discussions proposed an order of priority for consular activities which raised the place of trade promotion higher than before. The New York discussions decided consular duties should be given the following priority:

- 1) Consular - not that it is the most important, but because it is the primary functional necessity.
- 2) Commercial - Trade promotion is the main objective of Consulates in the United States. It should stand high in all our offices, irrespective of whether the head of post is from Trade and Commerce or External.
- 3) Information - an important work for the development of Canadian-United States relations.
- 4) Representation - a duty inherent to the position depending on the initiative of each officer. Speech - making comprises a large part of representation. Though a burden, it is important and must be treated with discrimination.
- 5) Regional Reporting—Generally speaking little reporting has been done by the consulates but there is definitely a place for such activities..... 63

The discussions put forward a theory to assist the consular officers in understanding the priorities. Functions were divided into "passive" and "active" groups. For the "passive" activities, imposed by virtue of a consulate's existence and public demands, no priority could be established. Inquiries were answered as they arrived. After coping with "passive" work, the consulate should devote its time to the active tasks involving initiative by the office. For this time, priorities could be assigned. The consulates were to emphasize firstly commercial and secondly on information activities. Apart from responding passively to requests, there would remain:

"in the commercial (active) field the taking of positive initiatives to increase the movement of Canadian goods into the United States. This should stand high in all consulates, whether the Head of Post is from one or the other Department. Similarly, it is important for consulates to take "active" ~~steps~~ or initiatives through information work to foster a better understanding and appreciation of Canada." 64

Both the Secretary of State for External Affairs L.B. Pearson and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, C.D. Howe approved recommendations which were distributed as guidelines to the Canadian posts in the U.S. 65

Specifically, the tour report recommended:

- 1) Posting T & C officers in External prior to going abroad and vice versa.
- 2) Each post have at least one officer from both Departments.
- 3) More information material and trained staff be available for the guidance and maintenance of this function.
- 4) More guidance be given to consular officers in their performance of representational duties to avoid consuls being used as "speakers" for amusement speeches.
- 5) Reports from consulates on major regional issues should be encouraged.
- 6) More manpower should be provided.

7) A tour of all consulates should be undertaken.

After the distribution of the report of the Washington discussions, the Department of External Affairs began to consider implementing the recommendations.⁶⁶ At the same time, preparations were made and the posts' appraisals of the Washington discussions were requested for the proposed fall tour of all U.S. offices by the Under-Secretary and a small inter-departmental group. Various interested Ottawa divisions (Establishment and Organization; Defence Liaison; Finance Division; American; Information) were asked for their advice on the scope of the investigation.⁶⁷ The Under-Secretary cancelled his tour, scheduled for November 1956.

In formally establishing a consulate's functions after 1956, the Department of External Affairs replaced the long Letter of Instructions both by a shorter, general and personal letter to new appointees and by a Post Book of circular instructions detailing the more specific aspects of consular duties. The short letter to D. Leo Dolan, the new Los Angeles Consul General in 1957, provided an example of this new style used in New York, Seattle and Boston. His letter included a paragraph setting out the reasons for the original establishment of his post in 1953 copied from the second paragraph of the Letter of Instructions sent in 1953. In the spirit of the 1956 Tour Report, the Department instructed the new head of post that his consular services should:

reflect the importance to Canada of our relations with the United States. Many of its activities may by nature be described as passive. Most of the consular work, for instance, would fall within this category, even though it is the function of prime importance in any consulate. Similarly, a part of the information work is passive in the sense that it is done in answer to enquiries. However, there remains a wide field in which the Consulate General may move and should move on its own initiative toward the benefit of the interests of Canada in the United States.

The rest of this paragraph specifically referred the officer to the Summary of discussions held in Washington for guidance. The letter, on the other hand, told Dolan that "the priorities referred to in the Summary were intended to apply to the Consulate as a whole and not necessarily to the Head of Post." The Consul General's own time could emphasize the representational side of consular work since his contacts would "provide the post with a favourable climate for its activities."

The Consul General retained responsibility for the work of other Departments. Immigration work had taken on a new importance and the Consul General was instructed to develop an interest in and knowledge of immigrant promotion and problems. The Trade Commissioner although directly under his Department in Ottawa, nonetheless still fell under the Consul General's authority. The Under-Secretary expected the External Head of Post to emphasize

the desirability of your doing everything that lies within your power to assist the Trade Commissioner in the development of markets for Canadian products and to foster the economic interests of Canada generally.

Where no trade specialist was assigned all staff members would have to be "familiar with these matters and deal with them to the best of their ability." ⁶⁸ Information work became almost totally a responsive duty. Due to the economic stringency of 1957, the Department had difficulty in obtaining approval for expensive information initiatives. Reporting, still last on the list, should be undertaken on the Ambassador's initiative. ⁶⁹

The proposed 1958 Consular conference led to the next general evaluation of duties. In their reports, the heads of post reported on specific problems with the exception of the Consul in Detroit, M.J. Vechsler, who complained of overwork by External duties in his primarily trade post.

He told his Ottawa superior that the:

Pressure from Department of External Affairs, more particularly and especially from the Information Division whose requests are seemingly of an unending nature, despite the lack of provision of personnel or means for fulfillment in another important matter affecting this post.

The statement of the two Deputy Ministers regarding the 'active' and passive aspects of information work needed "restatement and understanding", said Vechsler, since "the impression being conveyed...is that information work is the end-all and be-all of a Consulate's activity."⁷⁰

The other consulates emphasized the importance of educational work among the Americans or public relations as a trade promotional technique, but in Los Angeles D. Leo Dolan believed Ottawa had an erroneous conception that the U.S. posts could secure space in metropolitan papers for Canadian news. Far from being interested in 'serious' news, the Los Angeles papers were:

more concerned with murder, divorce and the extra-curricular love life of the movie stars. If the Governor-General assassinated the Prime Minister tomorrow and the leader of the Opposition, filled with remorse, jumped into the Ottawa river from the Chaudiere Bridge, we might get front page space in the Los Angeles newspapers! 71 72

The New Orleans Consul General suggested the 1958 conference place less emphasis on trade than the preceding meeting in 1954. The earlier conference he complained, "took on more of the aspect of a Trade and Commerce gathering than an External one." External's requirements (political, cultural, information and administrative) merited, he believed "at least an equal emphasis" during the conference as the trade discussions.⁷³

In general, however, the 1958 conference organizers minimized the problems of joint administration of the Canadian consulates. The

Honourable
conference speech notes for the Sydney Smith, Secretary of State for
External Affairs, included a comment that

It might be appropriate to remark on the excellent standard of cooperation which prevails between the Department of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce in the United States. To those members of the conference who are External Affairs personnel, it might be useful to emphasize that their job in consular offices in the United States lies as much in the Trade and Commerce as in the consular field. 74

The agenda of the 1958 conference included a half-day of discussion on Canadian American affairs; a day and half's discussion on trade (½ day more than before), a day on information, and half days on consular and administrative matters.

No thorough review of consular functions occurred from 1956 until 1962. Although various short assessments by the External Affairs divisions indicated the Department's ideas, Allan Anderson of American Division commented in 1958 that from the point of view of the

Government as a whole trade promotion ranks high but all or most of the missions are well staffed by Trade and Commerce. The head of mission should, and doubtless does cooperate fully with his commercial officers, whenever it is necessary and information and representation have some direct influence on trade. Apart from that, trade promotion belongs rather to Trade and Commerce than to us. 75

In another report M.J. Vechsler, Consul in Detroit, again remarked on the large amount of time required for External Affairs's information, representation, and reporting in his essentially 'trade' post. His trade activities, common to all the U.S. posts, included market analysis, trade publicity, organizing trade missions to Canada, branch plant enquiries (considered to be very important by Trade and Commerce), studies of the effect of U.S. Ownership on the promotion of Canadian subsidiaries' exports, selling to U.S. procurement agencies and economic reporting. An

inspection team in New Orleans in 1960 reported that although post activities only minutely involved reporting, this latter function could prove more useful. New Orleans rather than Washington, for example, could efficiently study the segregation issue or the Cuban trade question.⁷⁶

The important priority of trade functions in consular work became most evident during the 1961 and 1962 discussions preceding the establishment of the new offices in Philadelphia and Cleveland. The struggle between the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of External Affairs over the preferred locations in the United States demonstrated how entrenched trade had become in the new consular priorities established in 1956 (the last consulates established had been Seattle and Los Angeles in 1954). James A. Roberts, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, informed the Under-Secretary in February, 1961 that the trade activities of his Department in the United States required more offices. Philadelphia was the choice location since "no area is likely to be as rewarding to the trade promotional activity of a single new post as Philadelphia." The following year the same reasoning prompted Trade and Commerce's suggestion of a Cleveland post.⁷⁷

External Affairs, on the otherhand, preferred a southern location for new offices to serve a greater variety of Canadian needs.⁷⁸ A.D.P. Heeney, the Ambassador in Washington, challenged the assumption of the Department of Trade and Commerce that trade was the primary reason for establishing Canadian offices abroad. He replied to the Trade and Commerce "quote conclusion unquote" that to him it was "of the utmost importance that any further Canadian offices in U.S.A. be established

on basis of need for all governmental purposes, and not repeat not from any one departmental point of view solely."

Heeney based his argument on the Department of External Affairs' traditional approach to consular matters; public service was most important and all functions ought to be considered in deciding on a location. He emphasized that Canadian offices in the U.S.A.

Whatever they are called, are bound to have certain demands made upon them. This is implicit in the existence of any office with a Canadian designation.

The "standard" functions they were called upon to perform had always been commercial (including import as well as export intelligence) information on virtually an unlimited range of other Canadian subjects all the way from government policy to "demographic and geographic data for individuals, organizations, schools, miscellaneous lectures." Heeney included as activities; representation, press, TV and radio relations "inevitable in any community where an office is set up", immigration and "consular" problems as well as "a variety of other functions which will vary according to the nature of the community." The whole nature of the Canadian experience with consulates demonstrated conclusively that "in some degree those in charge of any Canadian government office whatever its quote priority unquote function would have to deal with all of these things willy-nilly."

Since trade was only one activity which had to be considered in opening a consulate, Heeney urged that:

the proper course in deciding upon where next to open in USA is to feed into the Interdepartmental computer the product not only of the trade promotion survey but all comparable assessments from the other points of view as well.

In order to maintain a balanced approach, all Canadian officers had to remember that Canadian interests would best be served when:

External Affairs and other departments regard Canadian trading interests as a primary responsibility; by the same token, commercial officers should be willing to share office duties not strictly related to trade. Any other policy in my judgement, is wasteful and stupid. 79

This argument remained the basis of Ambassador Heenev's opposition to Trade and Commerce plans in both Philadelphia in 1961 and Cleveland in 1962. He dispatched a "Dear Jim" letter in 1962 to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce and explained that he believed "all posts in this country (USA) are offices of the Government of Canada, their commercial functions, forming part, only part, albeit a most important part of their responsibilities." ⁸⁰ At the same time, Heenev transmitted a letter to the Under-Secretary as well as to all the Canadian posts in the U.S. which stated that:

In general the object of all establishments in this country as elsewhere abroad, is to advance and protect the national interest of Canada. This is true whatever the chief function of the office. For every effort should be made to ensure that officials of all government departments and agencies serving in this country are aware of the proper relationship between the Embassy and all other Canadian offices and officials serving outside of Washington. 81

The battle against the trade function assuming such a priority that it prevailed in deciding the location of the consulates, was lost in 1961 and 1962. External Affairs, despite the Ambassador's objections acquiesced in establishing consulates in both Cleveland and Philadelphia. ⁸²

In March 1965, a Liaison Team was appointed to go to the United States and to study the role of Canadian Consulates. It included the Head of U.S.A. Division (P.A. Bridle); The Minister in the Canadian

Embassy (G.P. Kidd); Head of Information Division (J.A. McCordick), Head of Personnel Operations (C. Hardey); Head of Consular Division (H.F. Clark); and Director of Trade Commissioner Service (A.P. Bissonnet).

The Bridle Report of 1965 totally dismissed the public service aspect of 'consular' functions as worthy of any priority. Instead, Bridle equated trade and information work as the two principal activities of the consulates. Bridle, unlike the 1956 Liaison Team left aside the priority question and emphasized the interrelationship of these two activities. Trade created good public relations and the information programmes created a suitable climate for effective trade promotion. Trade campaigns had become more important over the years because of the vigorous and imaginative manner of the promotion effort. Information work, on the other hand, lagged in applying both staff and resources, and passively responded to inquiries except for N.F.B. distribution (the most successful aspect of information work).

The Report recommended that the Department allocate more resources to information work particularly since "the Department regards the U.S. as the most important single foreign country" for disseminating information. Different information potential existed in different consulates and officers should understand and analyze it before setting up the programme. Each office should set up a library and be able to provide information on daily events in Canada to guide their local press.

The 1965 Liaison Team realized that the Department issued a largely proforma invitation to submit political and economic reports, and gave little encouragement beyond the suggestion in a Letter of Instructions. The team recommended that the consulates report on local disputes likely

to become significant in Canada-US terms, as well as on reception of Canadian developments in the U.S. Media, and prepared speeches by consular officers.

The Bridle Report closely followed the 1954, and 1956 reviews in its perception of Consular activities and its recommendations for increased programmes. The most important contribution of the Bridle Report to understanding Canadian representation in the U.S., came from its insistence on the integration of all Canadian activities in the United States to produce a public relations impact on Americans in the broadest sense.

After Paul Bridle's 1965 tour, the posts commented on his evaluation of duties. The Head of the Commercial Section in Los Angeles, F.B. Clark reported that the Consulates felt they were neglected by External Affairs. The main failure by Ottawa, he believed lay in the unused potential for information work.⁸³ The Canadian Consul General in Seattle, Campbell Moodie, corroborated this assessment and welcomed Bridle's recommendations for a more intensive information programme in the United States. Trade promotion, he said "must be given the highest priority but I was pleased to see the emphasis being put on improving our information programme. In my opinion we will achieve most lasting rewards by working with the schools at all levels..."⁸⁴ A letter from the Detroit Consul also affirmed the same opinion that trade promotion had outpaced the information programme. The Consul, H.S. Hay, pointed out that although Detroit primarily promoted trade, it had great public relations potential if given the opportunity.⁸⁵

In a 1967 paper on consular activities, the Consul General in New York revived the distinction between "active" and "passive" consular functions. His passive work could not be controlled. In fact the "consular division" of his office handled more people and its operation had more influence in creating a Canadian image than any other section. He suggested that Canada could service such "passive" operations without opening new consulates but by setting up sub-offices when needed. Even trade reasons for opening new consular offices had dubious merit since existing Canadian offices in the United States covered a market with potential beyond the ability of Canadian firms to exploit thoroughly. Once a trade office opened, it had to be committed to provide "all types of strictly consular services that, evidence to the contrary, are not really needed or that can be handled adequately by existing offices." By not opening, extraneous work could be controlled.⁸⁶

The "active" work of the consulate resulted from the officers' initiative in commercial, economic and financial work, as well as public relations activities. Commercially, Consul General believed that many Canadian exporters/^{were}so close to American markets that they should not need the same assistance. Again, he urged reconsideration and better use of existing facilities rather than expansion. The indecisive nature of Canadian objectives in the United States led to the consulates' problems planning their public relations programmes. An information campaign could not prevent Americans from taking Canada "for granted" since most of them were too busy learning about themselves and the world to think about Canada unless serious trouble developed. Public relations must be based on the knowledge that money was inadequate. Immigration campaigns should be carefully assessed for although they provided

measurable results, they also could attract the least desirable migrants. More subtle propaganda than the tourist type could be undertaken in the schools and universities; any speaking engagements but those to service clubs; T.V. time for Canadian visitors, art exhibits and press work.

With the proposed opening on the new offices in Minneapolis in 1969 and Buffalo, the problem of consular work arose again. The impetus to the formation of both these posts came from Trade and Commerce who wished to establish Trade Promotion posts in these American cities. There had been little consideration of the consular work to be done. But Trade and Commerce wished these posts to have consular status, and U.S.A. Division had provided for the sending of an officer to handle information and consular work in Minneapolis, although it would be difficult for External to provide the resources.⁸⁷

A memorandum on this subject for the Minister signed by M. Cadieux, agreed "our experience is that External Affairs will inevitably be called upon to provide some assistance from our own resources. As soon as a consulate is opened, there is always a demand for information and a wide range of consular service (which the public has a right to expect) and which will create demands on the resources of our Department".⁸⁸ External Affairs had been forced to close seven missions and to withdraw External Affairs personnel from five other posts, in its effort to meet the Government's expenditure guidelines.

Mr. Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, refused to sign the Memorandum to Cabinet authorizing these new openings, because he felt concerned that "the interpretation that will be placed upon the opening of two offices at a time when we are withdrawing support from

other offices in the United States and abroad."⁸⁹

Thus the cost and the necessity of providing consular services by the External Affairs, became the reason for opposition to the opening of these posts during 1969-70 austerity programmes. However, the Cabinet approved the Buffalo and Minneapolis openings and the posts were established in 1970.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1873-74 First non-resident Immigration Agents in the U.S.
- 1877 Resident agents at Detroit and Duluth.
- 1903 22 resident agents in the U.S.
- 1905 Trade Commissioner sent to Chicago.
- 1906 Trade Commissioner withdrawn from Chicago.
- 1921 Conversion of Bureau of Canadian Information in the U.S. into a Trade Office.
- 1929 Opening and closing of a Trade Post in San Francisco.
- 1939 Trade Offices opened in Los Angeles and Chicago.
- 1939 Seven Immigration Offices remained in the U.S.
- 1939-1945 Government offices set up in U.S. (Washington) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shipping Board, Information Board, Censorship Liaison, RCMP, Prices and Trade Board.
- 1940 First consular programme proposed by H.L. Keenleyside.
- 1942 Consulate General proposed in New York, Sept. 19, 1942.
- 1943 Immigration Office left in Seattle.
- 1943 Canadian Legation becomes Canadian Embassy.
- 1943 Consulate-General in New York approved April 8, 1943 under authority of War Measures Act and opened later that year.
- 1944 July 7, 1944 second consular programme proposed by R.M. MacDonnell after agitation by L.B. Pearson.
- 1945 In October British asked Canada to assume vice-consulate at Portland, Maine.
- 1946 J.S. Foote, sent as temporary vice-consul to Portland.
- 1947 March 24, 1947, A.A. LaFleur appointed honorary Canadian Vice-Consul.
- 1947 January 6, 1947; Consular Division established.
- 1947 March 13, 1947, Trade and Commerce notified External they were closing their offices in Los Angeles and Chicago.

- 1947 April; Leslie Chance met British Consuls at Washington and undertook a tour of the U.S. to determine needs.
- 1947 July 2; Leslie Chance submitted his report.
- 1947 August 14; Cabinet authorized four posts.
- 1947 November 1; Consulate-General established in Chicago under Edmond Turcotte.
- 1947 Consulate set up in Embassy with jurisdiction in District of Columbia.
- 1948 March 18; New York's jurisdiction expanded.
- 1948 April 1; Opening of Detroit Consulate.
- 1948 July 2; Opening of Consulate General in San Francisco under H.A. Scott, of External formerly Commercial Consular in Washington.
- 1948 October 13; Consulate opened in Boston under T.F.M. Newton of External Affairs.
- 1949 September, Edmond Turcotte, Consul General in Chicago recommended a Consulate in New Orleans, and a Memorandum submitted to the Minister.
- 1949 Trade Section established in Boston.
- 1950 Boston and Detroit freed from supervision by New York and Chicago.
- Washington D.C.'s territory increased to include Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware.
- 1951 Detroit turned over to Trade and Commerce, B.C. Butler appointed Consul and Trade Commissioner.
- 1951 A.A. LeFleur was persuaded to remain as honorary Vice Consul in Portland, Maine.
- 1951 June; B.C. Butler of Trade and Commerce made a tour of the southern U.S.
- 1951 October, Trade and Commerce decided to open a Consulate in New Orleans and External Affairs agreed.
- 1952 January 21; Consulate opened in New Orleans under Gerald A. Newman, Trade Commissioner and Consul.

1952 Assistant Trade Commissioner appointed to Chicago.

1952 Immigration closed office in Seattle.

1953 April 1; Consulate-General opened in Los Angeles with H.G. Chance, Consul-General - Travel Bureau employee retained from opening.

1953 October 1; Consulate-General opened in Seattle.

1954 Summer; Trade section set up in Los Angeles Consulate-General.

1954 Tour by W.G. Stark.

1955 Chicago under F.H. Palmer, Trade and Commerce, although External responsible for general administration.

1955 January; G.A. Newman given title but no perquisites of Consul-General.

1956 Proposed tour by liaison team.

1956 April; W.G. Stark of External Affairs took over New Orleans from Trade and Commerce.

1961 February; proposed office in Philadelphia.

1961 June 5; office opened in Philadelphia.

1964 April; Cabinet approved opening a Consulate in Cleveland; office opened that fall.

1965 Bridle Report.

1967 June 1967; Cabinet approved opening a Consulate in Dallas; office opened late summer.

1968 October - Consulate opened in San Juan.

1970 March; Consulates opened in Buffalo and Minneapolis.

1972 April; Cabinet approved Consulate-General to be opened in fall.

PART I

Footnotes

1. Canadian Representatives Abroad, Gordon Skilling, Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1945, page 33.

(Some of Skilling's assertions conflict with information contained in Departmental files. In such cases the files were deemed correct).

9323 - B - 40C Vol. I, L.B. Pearson to N.A. Robertson, May 26, 1944.

2. Skilling, op. Cit. p. 293

The Department of External Affairs was not immune to the wartime pressure to increase its official Canadian consular representation. For example, consular rank was conferred on the Charges d'Affaires in both Paris and Tokyo as a result of fighting in Europe and Asia. Further, the necessity of maintaining relations with Greenland and St. Pierre, temporarily separated from their parent states, led to the establishment of consulates on those islands. These two offices, the Department emphasized, were set up purely on a contingency basis ... "to meet special requirements with no definite decision...taken on the general question of establishing a Canadian Consular Service." Consular regulations had not been written and the consular officers did not engage in normal consular activities, but instead acted as liaison officers between the Canadian and local governments in an effort to cope with the unprecedented situation.

3. Such activities included issuing passports, authenticating documents, accepting declarations of intent to maintain Canadian domicile, answering inquiries regarding wartime legislation, providing Canadian nationals with assistance, and handling all the strictly non-commercial matters formerly attended to by the New York Trade Commissioner's Office.

4. File 9323-A-40C.

Two Privy Council Orders passed on April 8, 1943, P.C. #2899 and P.C. #2900 granted the Department the authority to establish consular posts. The former order stated in part that Canadian representatives be empowered to exercise functions which hitherto had been performed by British diplomatic and consular officers. The latter order granted the specific authority for the opening of a Consulate-General in New York.

5. This Jurisdiction was the same as that of the British Consulate General.

6. File 11336-18-40. Despatch from the SSEA (Hugh Keenleyside) to the Legation in Washington, April 9, 1943.
7. File 9323-A-40C. Report of Meeting on April 21, 1943 - also, copies of various instructions as they were prepared.

John Read, the Departmental Legal Adviser, wrote to the departments concerned asking for their assistance in preparing the instructions which were drafted throughout the spring of 1943, and sent to New York when finalized.

8. The British believed that their business in Portland was not of sufficient quantity to warrant a consulate there.
9. File 8310-B-40. Letter from the Deputy Minister of Transport to the USSEA, Nov. 17, 1945 to N.A. Robertson, Dec. 7, 1945.

File 8310-B-40. Memorandum for M. Beaudry from R.M. Macdonnel, October 31, 1945.

Departmental officers knew they could scarcely refuse the British request to take over the responsibilities of the Portland office, but they doubted their ability to operate such an office. All shipping matters were still dealt with by British consuls, and Canadians had no experience in the requisite techniques of administration. The Department refused also to retain the service of the British Vice Consul as that would evoke the image that Canada still laboured under vestiges of her former colonial position.

10. Although the establishment of a Consulate was mandatory due to the importance of New York city, Canada lacked diplomatic representation outside of Washington and New York. Canadian consular work was performed officially by the Consul General in New York, and unofficially by the Trade Commissioners in Chicago and Los Angeles. Apart from this very limited representation, reliance was placed upon British consulates which represented Canadian interests on the basis of the legal position of Canadian citizens as British subjects. Frequently, those British Consulates spending a large proportion of time administering Canadian matters would employ a Canadian as a Vice Consul.
11. File 8310-B-40. N.A. Robertson to L.B. Pearson, December 12, 1945.
12. The allocation of an officer to Portland was considered to be only an interim move while a thorough investigation was made of the possibility of spending a permanent consulate there.
13. File 8310-B-40. Memorandum of November 29, 1949, 1945 - N.A. Robertson; J.D. Foote to USSEA, February 16, 1946.
14. Some British Consulates near the Canadian border reported that in 1944 up to 75% of their work was performed on behalf of Canadians.
15. Skilling, ob. cit., page 5.
16. Skilling, ob. cit., page 40.
17. File 9323-B-40 Vol. I, R.C. Butter to Hugh Keenleyside, March 7, 1942.
18. File 9323-B-40C Vol. I, L.B. Pearson to N.A. Robertson, March 7, 1944.
Pearson went further in other statements wherein he claimed the United States could hardly understand fully our independent position within the British Commonwealth of Nations when the British administered the foreign affairs in the United States of so proximate a neighbour.
19. File 9323-B-40C Vol. I, N.A. Robertson to L.B. Pearson, March 9, 1944.
20. File 9323-B-40 Vol. I, Leslie Chance to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, L.B. Pearson, May 28, 1947.
21. File 9323-B-40 Vol I - L.B. Pearson to L. St. Laurent, July 2, 1947.
22. File 9323-B-5-40 H. Allard to USSEA, December 26, 1952.
23. File 9323-A-40C, Vol I, Memorandum of K.A. Bingway, April 17, 1943.
24. File 9323-B-40C Vol II, L.B. Pearson, Ambassador to the U.S., to N.A. Robertson, USSEA, January 5, 1946.

Lester Pearson, commenting on the consular work performed by the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Los Angeles, noted that an important report made by the officer in charge there was not forwarded to the Department of External Affairs or the Canadian Embassy in Washington. This lack of co-ordination between those who were de facto performing consular functions and the department responsible for these activities

showed, declared Pearson, the unsatisfactory nature of the system existing in 1946.

25. File 9323-B-40C, Vol I, Hugh D. Scully to L.B. Pearson, July 26, 1944.
26. File #9323-B-40C Vol I, Hugh D. Scully to L.B. Pearson, July 26, 1944.
27. File 9323-B-40C, Memorandum, July 6, 1944.
28. Although never implemented, the first two schemes proposed in 1940 and 1944, are indicators of departmental attitudes underlying the opening of offices, duties, and proposed locations.
29. There is no indication of who ordered the study or its terms of reference, but it was prepared hastily as travellers had to be dealt with immediately upon the enactment of the regulations.
30. File 9323-B-40C Report "Canadian Consulates in the U.S.A." by H.L.K., July 13, 1940. Contained therein is the full proposal.

31. This proposal was in contradiction to the desire of the Department of External Affairs to increase the prestige of consular offices by associating the Trade Commissioners with the Consulate General.
32. File 9323-B-40C. R.M. Macdonnell to E.D. McGreer, January 24, 1944.
33. For an exposition of Pearson's reasons, see the preceding section of this paper, and see also File 9323-B-40C, Pearson to Robertson, March 7, 1944 and also Pearson to Robertson, June 7, 1944.

For Robertson's reply, see File 9323-B-40C, Robertson to Pearson, March 9, 1944.

34. The Consul General in New York had recommended the placing of an agent at Buffalo as the British Consul whose jurisdiction included Upper New York State continually referred problems from that area to the New York Consulate General.

File 9323-B-40C Vol. I, Hugh D. Scully to N.A. Robertson, January 20, 1944.

Furthermore, the Department was concerned with the division of time between routine consular work and general representational functions.

File 9323-B-40C, Scully to Robertson, June 14, 1944 and File 9323-4-40C, SSEA to Consulate General, New York, June 12, 1944.

35. File 9323-B-40C, R.M. Macdonnell to C.M. Croft of the Commercial Intelligence Service, June 3, 1944.

Ibid. R.M. Macdonnell to L.B. Pearson, April 3, 1944.

Pearson to Robertson, June 7, 1943. Pearson evinced surprise at the outcome of the canvass of British Consuls; so little of their work was on the behalf of Canada.

36. The four major categories of duties which Macdonnell indicated a consulate could undertake: consular chores, trade promotion, answering general inquiries and public relations, indicate that his conception included a view of the consulate as a generally representational bureau and not just a trade office or a passport-processing agency. He emphasized that officers, particularly the heads of post, were responsible for creating a sympathetic conception of Canada through their public speaking and representational work.
37. As stated earlier, the New York Consulate General had already recommended that Buffalo be considered for an office. In addition, the survey of British Consulates showed that much Canadian consular work originated in Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Cleveland, St. Paul and Miami. Furthermore, many were considering the possibility of opening an office in New Orleans by reason of the French tradition and culture in that area.

38. It was proposed that Consulates General be established at all six localities unless circumstances dictated a more modest beginning as consulates with eventual elevation to the status of Consulates General.
39. File 9323-B-400, Memorandum from J.E. Read, July 6, 1944.

Read advised that Buffalo, Detroit, and Seattle ought to be consulates and not consulates general, although Macdonnell's report was flexible on this matter.

In commenting on the status of the offices, Read made the interesting point, which has been reiterated by consular administrators since, that, once established, it would be easier to raise a consulate to a consulate general than to lower a consulate general to the status of a consulate. He carried his caution in designating the dignity of the proposed offices as far as advising that even Los Angeles and Chicago should be set up as consulates since Trade and Commerce had discovered that "there is nothing to do in Chicago", and had sent a "not very senior officer there" just to keep the office open.

40. Some attention was given to the establishment of honorary consulates as a means of alleviating the staffing problems.
41. Read believed that cordial relations would be destroyed if appointments were made from departments other than Trade or External Affairs.
42. File 9323-B-40C Vol. I, W.D. Macdonnell to N.A. Robertson, July 15, 1944.
43. File 9323-B-40C Vol. I, Allan Arscott, President of the Bank of Commerce to J.W. Ilsley, May 28, 1945. M.J. Coldwell to J.A. Mackimmon, September 20, 1945. D.F. Brown, M.P., to Hume Wrong, March 18, 1946.
44. File 923-B-40C, Vol. I, J.E. Read to A.E. Arscott, May 31, 1945.
45. File 9323-B-40C L.B. Pearson to N.A. Robertson, January 5, 1946.

46. File 9323-A-496 Vol II, Memorandum "Organization and Functions of the Consular Division" prepared by Leslie Chance, November 28, 1947, for the Minister's Book.

After the war, the growth of representation abroad, the passage of the Canadian Citizenship Act, the revival of immigration, and the increasing need of Canadian citizens for aid in their travels, all made evident the necessity of a separate division.

47. File 9323-A-40C Vol. II, Ibid.

The division was made specifically responsible for issuance and control of Canadian passports, granting and rejecting visas and insofar as the Department of External Affairs was concerned, for dealing with the questions of citizenship, immigration, deportation, repatriation, relief of distressed Canadian abroad, travel control, merchant seamen, war graves, pensions of Canadian ex-servicemen and their dependents, the protection of the interests of Canadians abroad, "and all other matters which are normally and by international usage the concern and responsibility of a consular service. The division was also empowered to draft and to issue regulations and instructions dealing with the matters set out above and to ensure that such regulations and instructions were kept current. One section of the division was to supervise offices and the setting up of new establishments abroad; another to deal with general policy questions, and a third with passports and visas.

48. File 9323-B-40C Vol. II, Minutes of the Interdepartmental Meeting, March 17, 1947.

Withdrawal by Trade and Commerce would terminate a Canadian presence in those cities.

49. File 9323-B-6-40 H.H. Wrong to L.B. Pearson, January 11, 1947.

50. File 9323-B-40C Vol. II, Memorandum from L. Chance to the Personnel Officer, March 5, 1947.

51. File 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Hume Wrong to L.B. Pearson, March 11, 1947.

52. File 9323-B-40C Vol. II, Memorandum for the Minister from L.B. Pearson, April 14, 1947.

53. Chance visited Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, Buffalo, Detroit, Chicago, Seattle, Portland, (Oregon), San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Norfolk (Virginia).

54. File 9323-B-40C Vol. II, L.G. Chance to W.L. MacDermot, May 19, 1947.

55. Chance proposed founding his system on a hierarchical arrangement similar to that in Keenleyside's 1940 scheme. The existing Consulate-General in New York would be jointed by two others, first at Chicago and then at San Francisco, the two "obvious centres" from which Canadian representation in the mid-West and Pacific Coast should radiate. Thereafter, other offices would be opened presently at Los Angeles, Boston and Seattle, and later still, additional consulates in Cleveland and New Orleans.

56. File 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Memorandum to the USSEA from Leslie Chance, July 2, 1947.

57. File 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Memorandum to the Minister by L.B. Pearson, July 2, 1947.

L.B. Pearson submitted the proposal to Louis St. Laurent the same day it was presented to him and he reiterated the immediacy of the need for a "distinct Canadian flavour" in the consular system while concurring fully with Chance's recommendations.

58. File 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Memorandum from Pearson to St. Laurent, August 8, 1947. See also the same file for a summary of the Cabinet decision of August 14, 1947.

The Cabinet approved of the opening of the four offices on August 14, 1947.

59. Locations for the two other posts for which funds were available had not been designated although Pearson believed they would probably be consulates in Boston and Los Angeles.

60. File 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Telegram from Canadian Ambassador to SSEA, September 23, 1947. Same file - copy letter F.T.A. Ashton-Gwathin to John W. Holmes, September 29, 1947.

61. File 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum dated November 29, 1948.

In amplifying this proposal in 1948, Chance remarked that Detroit and Boston were to have been subsidiary respectively to Chicago and New York.

62. File 9323-B-40, Vol. II, The report of Leslie Chance on his visit to Seattle, June 2, 1947.

63. This was due mainly to the fact that External Affairs did not have a set plan of consular priorities.
64. An immediate impetus arose in 1947 when the Department of Trade and Commerce signified the imminent withdrawal of their officer in Chicago.

A memorandum of 1955 stated that a reason for External opening an office there was the trade factor, but this obviously ^{was} unjustified in view of previous considerations and actions.

(9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum by G.R. Harman).

65. The establishment of a Consulate-General had been recommended by L.B. Pearson in 1945 when he urged External Affairs to take over the Trade Commissioner's office.

(9323-B-40, Vol. II, Report of L.G. Chance on Chicago, 1947.

66. The jurisdiction of the Consulate General included: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Mississippi. Michigan and Ohio almost immediately came under the direction of the consul in Detroit.

67. 10137-B-40, Vols. I and II.

68. The new Consul General's report of 1954 indicated that his major concern was still centered around information work.

69. 9323-B-40C, Vol. II, Leslie Chance's report on Detroit and 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum by G.R. Harman, June 21, 1955.

70. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum to the Chief Administrative Officer from Leslie Chance, November 6, 1947, and Escott Reid to L.B. Pearson, December 2, 1947. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, L.B. Pearson to M.W. Mackenzie, December 12, 1947.

The first Consul, James H. Hurley, an External Affairs Officer, was placed under the "aegis of the Consulate General at Chicago" in accordance with Chance's recommendations that there be three Consulates-General to serve as administrative centres for the consular system.

71. 9323-AP40, L.G. Chance to J. Hurley, June 14, 1949.

72. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum, March 7, 1950.

73. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum for M. Cadieux from J. Dave, Consular Division May 21, 1959.

74. 9323-AP-40, Vols. II and III for reports of the Detroit Consulate in 1952 and 1954 respectively.
75. 9323-B-40, Vol. II, report on the visit of Leslie Chance to San Francisco June 12, 1947.
76. San Francisco jurisdiction: Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico.

77. File 10137-40 H.A. Scott to Embassy, July 15, 1948.

78. Examples of his workload included: representational chores which he could not adequately perform due to the size of the jurisdiction; daily office administration and consular duties; trade promotion; trade and tourist inquiries; cultural and educational work; and press relations.

79. File 11559-40 Allard's report on San Francisco, December, 1952.

80. File 9323-B-40, Vol. II, Chance's report from Boston, May 11, 1947.

81. File 9323-B-1-40, Memorandum for Pearson from L.Chance, October 11, 1947.

Pearson, USSEA, concurred, and when he received an editorial of the Boston Globe, he commented that, "I think this should be next along with Los Angeles and after Chicago and San Francisco."

82. File 10137-C-40, T.F.M. Newton to USSEA, July 18, 1950.

Further, the jurisdiction of Boston included Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island.

83. File 9323-B-1-40, Memorandum for T.H.M. Newton, September 25, 1948, and File 4900-B-13-40, Post Book Copy of Instructions, 1958.

The immediate concerns of the Boston consul consisted mainly of representational tasks. Newton, indulging his information training, spent much of his time visiting Canadian societies in Boston and making speeches to various local groups. Although he also investigated some economic matters, he requested the appointment to Boston of someone with commercial expertise. A trade section of the consulate under a Trade Commissioner, although established in 1949, never received its full complement of staff.

84. File 10137-D-40, Memorandum from L.G. Chance to A.D.P. Heeney, November 29, 1949.

85. File 10137-C-40, T.F.M. Newton to H. Wrong, December 20, 1949.

86. File 10137-C-40, Wrong to Chance, December 28, 1949. Chance to Wrong, January 5, 1950; Moran to Wrong, January 28, 1950.

87. File 4900-B-13-40, Vol. I, Letter of Instructions, J.A. Strong, April 27, 1951.

88. File 9323-B-40, Vol. II, Wrong to Pearson, October 6, 1947, and Chance to MacDermott, October 14, 1947.

89. File 10137-D-40, Memorandum from L.G. Chance to USSEA, November 29, 1949.

90. File 5100-AB-40, Copy PCO No. 1208, March 18, 1949.

These new states were: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.

91. 9323-B-1-40, Letter of Instructions, T.F.M. Newton, September 25, 1948.
92. 8310-B-40, L.G.Chance to USSEA, August 13, 1951.
93. 8310-B-40, Memorandum by K.P.I. Kirkwood to the USSEA, July 20, 1951.

94. 8310-B-40 Memorandum by F. Leger, August 15, 1951.

Mr. Leger remarked that it would not be advisable to close the Portland post for at least another year.

95. 8310-B-40 Memorandum from Canadian Consul General, Boston, January 28, 1952.

96. 9323-AL-5-40, to Canadian Consul General, Boston, March 5, 1959.

Some attention was given to the value received from Mr. La Fleur's services for \$1500 annual payment made to him.

97. 8310-B-40 Letter to USSEA from Consul General, Boston, December 22, 1959.

98. 9323-AL-5-40.

99. 4900-B-9-40 SSEA to Douglas Cole, November 7, 1950.

The system which existed from 1949 to 1952, although it adhered in many ways to Leslie Chance's original proposals, had been modified in its implementation. The Department itself formally recognized the provisional nature of the consular programme of 1948 by noting Letters of Instruction to newly appointed Consuls that matters had not reached a permanent condition and areas and jurisdictions would change as new posts were opened.

100. 9423-B-40, Vol. III, L.G. Chance to USSEA, June 1, 1949.

Chance noted that immigration as well as trade could be classed as a consular activity.

101. 9232-B-40, Vol. III, K.A. Greene to Escott Reid, December 5, 1951.

102. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, A.D.P. Heeney to K.A. Greene, December 18, 1951.

103. 10137-G-40 Memorandum from L.G. Chance to acting USSEA, December 15, 1948.

104. The demands of a large territory were felt most keenly by the Consulates General in New York, San Francisco, and Chicago.

105. 9323-B-40 Vol. III, K.A. Greene to Escott Reid, December 5, 1951.

106. 9323-B-40 Vol. III, H.H. Wrong to Edmond Turcotte, May 17, 1949
107. 4900-B-8-40, Draft letter of Instruction for K.A. Greene in New York, N.Y., (in either 1949 or 1950)
108. 9323-B-40, Vol. II, Manager of the Foreign Trade Department of the Seattle Board of Trade to L.G. Chance, 1949.
109. 10137-G-40, L.G. Chance to H.A. Scott, October 16, 1948.

Chance believed that there was much work to be done in the Seattle area.
110. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, L.G. Chance to E. Turcotte, N.D., Spring of 1949.

See also L.G. Chance to H.A. Scott, June 1, 1949.
111. 9323-B-40 Vol III, L.G. Chance to Wrong, May 3, 1949; Wrong to Chance, May 17, 1949.
112. Mr. Allard was the new head of the Consular Division.
113. 10137 - F - 40, Jules Leger to Consular Division, August 27, 1952, and despatched from the USSEA to the Canadian Ambassador, Washington, September 15, 1952.
114. 10137-F-40, Despatch from H.H. Wrong to USSEA, October 4, 1952
115. 11559-40, Reports of Allard's tour attached to a Memorandum for the USSEA from Hector Allard, December 26, 1952.
116. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Report on Turcotte's tour, 1949.
117. 10137-40, Memorandum, April 8, 1950
118. 9323-AP-40, Vol. I, Memorandum for the Minister, December 22, 1949.

Establishment of a Consulate in New Orleans had been deferred by reason of financial restrictions.

A summary of the decision to open a Consulate in New Orleans is found on file 9323-B-40, Vol. III, in a memorandum by T.H.W. Read, September 22, 1954. It was based on documents on file 10137-E-40 which was unavailable for this report.
119. 10137-F-40, Jules Leger to Consular Division, August 27, 1952.
120. The original proposal for the status of New Orleans as a Consulate General originated in the memorandum to the Minister in 1949.
121. 9323-AP-40 Minutes of the Interdepartmental Meeting of June 25, 1953.

122. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum by T.H.W. Read, History of the Establishment of the Consulate General in New Orleans, September 22, 1954.
123. 9323-B-40, Vol. II, M.J.W. Coldwell to J.A. Mackinon, September 20, 1945.
124. 9323-B-40, Pearson to Robertson January 5, 1946.
125. 10137-F-40 Vol. I, Report by L.G. Chance on Los Angeles, June 12, 1947.
126. 10137-F-40 Vol. I, G.R. Heasman to L.G. Chance, November 17, 1947.
127. 10137-F-40, H.O. Moran to M.W. Mackenzie, February 1, 1949.
128. 10137-F-40, Robert H. Winters to L.B. Pearson, September 25, 1952.
129. 10137-F-40 Memorandum to Protocol Division from E.W.T. Gill, December 27, 1952.

Formal steps to secure U.S. agreement were not taken until after Allard presented his recommendations.

130. The counties were: San Luis Obispo, Kern, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, Imperial, the states of Arizona and New Mexico as well as Clark County, Nevada.

The office operated under the acting Consul General, W.K. Wardroper until Chance took charge on September 25, 1953.

131. 10137-F-40, L.G. Chance to J.H. English, June 21, 1954.
132. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Report by Leslie Chance on Seattle, June 2, 1947.
Chance made a further recommendation of the same nature on October 8, 1948 (10137-F-40)
133. 10137-G-40 Memorandum from L.G. Chance to acting USSEA, December 15, 1948.
134. 10137-G-40, Despatch of C.N. Senior to USSEA, April 1, 1952.
135. 10137-G-40 Memorandum to Ambassador, August 18, 1952.
136. 10137-G-40, Memorandum for the USSEA from Hector Allard, August 27, 1952,
and 10137-C-40, Despatch from H. Wrong to SSEA, October 4, 1952.
137. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Floyd Martin, Houston Chamber of Commerce, to D. Cole, Consul General in Chicago, January 18, 1952.
138. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Hugh Hester, Vice-President of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce to the SSEA, March 17, 1952.

139. 9323-B-40, L. Conacher to L.B. Pearson, April 25, 1952.
140. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, E.T. Desmond to G.A. Newman, N.D., January 1953.
9323-B-40, Vol. III, G.A. Newman to Hector Allard, April 30, 1953.
The British also had reported that in Miami 75% of the work involved visiting Canadians.
141. 9323-B-40C, Vol. III, Despatch from W.K. Wardroper, Los Angeles Consulate General to USSEA, June 30, 1953; F.L. MenDez to Minister of the Department of External Affairs, July 10, 1957; Irwin Kuhn, Director of the Cleveland World Trade Association to A.D.P. Heeney, July 8, 1957.
142. It is interesting to note that all the requests, regardless of their merit, did not stimulate a review of consular requirements.
143. 9323-B-40C, Hector Allard to G.A. Newman, December 29, 1952.
144. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Hector Allard to G.A. Newman, April 9, 1953.
145. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, T.F.M. Newton to D. Leo Dolan, Director of the Canadian Government Travel Bureau, July 30, 1953.
146. 9323-B-40, T.P. Malone to F.L. MenDez, July 24, 1957.
147. Three cities which the Department had in mind as locations for consulates were St. Paul Minneapolis, Miami, and Houston.
148. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum for the Minister prepared by R.M. Macdonnell, September 2, 1953.
149. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum by J.H.W. Read, September 23, 1954; W.G. Stark to Associate USSEA, October 1, 1954.
150. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, from Dave to Marcel Cadieux, May 21, 1959.
151. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum for the Associate USSEA, from W.G. Stark, October 1, 1954.
152. The 1949 report of Edmond Turcotte, written during a period of tight money, emphasized economics in his choice of New Orleans but Hector Allard, in his later report of 1952, reiterated the nationalistic, representational, and cultural justifications for the selection of new sites.
153. Indeed, after 1953, economic considerations were the major levers used by American interest groups, particularly the Chambers of Commerce, to pay a consular office and of the Canadian government. Cleveland, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Phoenix, and Miami, all used this argument in the presentation to the Department of External Affairs.

Furthermore, among the officials of External Affairs, economics played the most important role in the consideration of Houston as a consular possibility.

154. 9323-B-40, M.J. Vechslor to J.H. English, Director, Trade Commissioner Service, March 31, 1955.
155. In that case, however, External Affairs had been actively considering an office in that location before Trade and Commerce made their proposal.
156. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Report titled Extension of Trade Commissioner Posts in the United States, attached to a letter from T.R.G. Fletcher, Director of the Trade Commissioner Service, to the USSEA, February 23, 1962.
157. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, James A. Roberts to N.A. Robertson, February 13, 1961.

The choice of Philadelphia by Trade and Commerce rested on that city's potential as a market for Canadian exports in the field of industrial components.

158. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Ibid.
159. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex to External from Heeney, February 13, 1961. This opinion was strongly concurred in by H. Scott, Consul General in New York (Scott to External, March 6, 1961).
160. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex to Heeney from the Consular Division of External Affairs, February 23, 1961.
161. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex from Heeney to External Affairs, March 3, 1961.
162. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum to Cabinet, from D.M. Fleming, (President of the Treasury Board), April 6, 1961.
163. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum to Cabinet from D.M. Fleming, April 6, 1961.

The Cabinet did not approve the submission until April 10, 1961, although Trade and Commerce had signed a lease for the office on April 1.

164. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Despatch from USSEA to the Consulate General, New York, June 7, 1961.

The new office in Philadelphia was not prepared to manage consular affairs for a short time after its establishment.

165. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, M.J. Vechster to John H. English, March 31, 1955.
166. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum prepared by B.A. Hicks for W.D. Matthews, August 21, 1957.
167. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, T.M. Burns to D.M. Cornett, March 14, 1962.
168. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, T.R.G. Fletcher, Director, Trade Commissioner Service, to E.N.T. Gill, February 23, 1962.
169. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex to Ambassador, Washington, from the Consular Division, February 28, 1962.

This Division also stated that there was no need for a consular office at Cleveland for purely External Affairs purposes.

170. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Despatch from Heeney to USSEA, December 20, 1961.
171. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex from Heeney to External Affairs, March 2, 1962.
172. 9323-B-40, Heeney to James A. Roberts, March 5, 1962.

Heeney was not entirely opposed to Cleveland as long as all factors were considered. Heeney also wrote to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce expressing the hope that any inter-departmental differences would not be submitted to the Cabinet because of the procedural delay and the emphasis upon the "departmental divergence."

173. The other departments were: Labour, the Canadian Government Travel Bureau, Immigration, the Film Commissioner, and the Department of Defence Production.
174. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex from Heeney to External Affairs, March 2, 1962.
175. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Memorandum for the Minister, signed by N.A. Robertson, April 5, 1962.
176. 9323-B-40, Note by Marcel Cadieux to the USSEA, November 27, 1962.
177. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, James Roberts to N.A. Robertson, October 3, 1963.
178. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, Telex from External Affairs to Washington, October 31, 1963.
179. 9323-B-40, Vol. III, C.S.A. Ritchie to External Affairs, November 5, 1963.
180. File 2-1-CLE-Vol. I, Memorandum to Cabinet, January 9, 1964.

FOOTNOTES

181. The jurisdiction of the Dallas Consulate was: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and New Mexico, and for consular purposes only, Texas. The consular activity was to be purely responsive (Letter to New Orleans, October 24, 1967 from USSEA).
182. Memorandum to Cabinet, October 21, 1969.
183. File 1-1-3 SAN Memo. Burbridge re meeting in Operations Division, Personnel Service Division, No. 27, 1967.
184. 5-1-3-GUS-SAN Memorandum for the Minister
185. 3-7-1-SAN Memo from J.M. Cook, Personnel Operations to Consular Division, GWU. May 28, 1969.
186. 3-7-1-SAN Memo from Canadian Embassy in Washington to USSEA January 13, 1970.
187. 3-7-1-SAN Privy Council Office Appointment, January 19, 1971.
188. 5-1-3-GWU-SAN Letter from Shortliffe to Director General of Bureau of Western Hemisphere, Klaus Goldschlag, December 24, 1971.

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189. 5-1-3-GWU/SAN Letter from Mr. K. Goldschlag to Mr. G. Shortliffe, January 7, 1972.
190. 5-1-3 GWU Vol. 1 Memo: Langille to PDA, March 10, 1971.
191. 5-1-3 GWU Memo: Mr. Goldschlag to PDA, March 1, 1971. The main purpose of keeping External Affairs representation in New Orleans is to counteract Quebec, whose activities in Louisiana revolved around presenting itself through the Quebec Office in Lafayette as the sole spokesman for the French-speaking elements in Canada.
192. Letter to Mr. Pierre Asselin, Consul General, New Orleans, from GWU May 11, 1972.
193. 1-1-3 ATA Minutes of a meeting to discuss arrangements for the opening of Atlanta, May 12, 1972.
194. Thomson and Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, (Toronto), 1971, p. 2
195. Sovereignty and Independence, Peace and Security, Social Justice, Quality of Life, Harmonious Natural Environment and Economic Growth, see Foreign Policy for Canadians (Queens Printer, Ottawa: 1970), pp 14-16.

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196. Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: 1972), p. 183.
197. Op. Cit., Foreign Policy for Canadians, p. 23
198. 5-1-3-GUS-Vol. 2 Department of External Affairs Estimates 1969-70.
199. 5-1-3-GUS-Vol. 1, U.S.A. Division Annual Programme Review, Statement of the Senior Committee, March, 1968.
200. Ibid, External Affairs to Embassy, Washington, March 14, 1969.
201. Richard Jackson "Deep Freeze Is On", Ottawa Journal, August 19, 1969, p. 1.
202. 5-1-3-GUS-Vol. 2 Telegram Sharp IT BRU November 7, 1969
203. Information from an interview with Head of Staffing Section.
204. 20-1-2-USA-3 (Vol. 4) GUS to PIN, March 2, 1970.
205. Letter from David Laughton, Consul General, Seattle to D.B. Hicks, Information Division, April 2, 1972.

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208. Ibid.
209. 5-1-3-X-NYK Canadian Consulate General, New York to USSEA,
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Canadian Consular posts in the United States on Information
Service, (Feb., 1969), p. 7
211. The Report of the Task Force on Government Information To Know
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212. Estimates for the Fiscal Year ending March 31, 1973 (Information
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