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**SOME ACCOUNT**  
**OF THE PUBLIC LIFE**  
**OF THE LATE**  
**SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART.**

*A. H. La Fontaine*

*à son usage*

*L. Col. Tucker*

SOME ACCOUNT

OF THE PUBLIC LIFE

OF THE LATE

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART.

PARTICULARLY OF HIS SERVICES

IN

THE CANADAS;

INCLUDING

A REPLY TO THE STRICTURES

ON HIS

MILITARY CHARACTER,

CONTAINED

IN AN ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

FOR OCTOBER, 1822.

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“Either this is envy in you, folly, or mistaking; the very stream of his life, and the business he hath helmed, must upon a warranted need give him a better proclamation. Let him be but testimonied in his own bringings forth, and he shall appear a statesman and a soldier. Therefore you speak unskilfully; or if your knowledge be more, it is much darkened in your malice.”

MEASURE FOR MEASURE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND;

AND

T. EGERTON, WHITEHALL.

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1823.

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## ERRATA.

Page 6, line 5, *for* 28th *read* 25th.

93, line 20; and Appendix, p. 65, l. 4, *for* Aids-de-Camp, *read* Aides-de-Camp.

142, lines 7 and 23, *for* Simpson's Inn, *read* Sampson's Inn.

145, line 8; p. 146, l. 4; and Appendix, p. 80, l. 9, *for* Aid-de-Camp, *read* Aide-de-Camp.  
Appendix, p. 81, line 26, *for* the Prevost, *read* the Provost.

———— p. 99, l. 4, *for* order, *read* ardour.

# SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE LATE LIEUT.-GENERAL

SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART.

*&c. &c.*

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THE character and conduct of individuals in high and responsible situations, will naturally and necessarily be the subject of free and open discussion. The conduct of a soldier is more particularly exposed to this scrutiny. His success or his failure is a matter of such powerful interest to his country, that he generally receives even more than his full measure of approbation or of blame. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of forming a correct judgment on the merits of military operations, there is perhaps no subject upon which public opinion expresses itself so quickly and so decidedly. Disappointed in the sanguine hopes which they had entertained, and mortified by the consciousness of defeat, the public too frequently imagine cause for censure, and without a competent knowledge of the facts necessary to enable them to form a sound and satisfactory judgment, unhesitatingly condemn those who have perhaps

passed in their service a long life of anxiety and labour. But while, in the moment of irritation, they are thus disposed to impugn the conduct of their military servants, they are no less ready, on more deliberate inquiry, and a fuller understanding of the facts, to grant them a candid and generous acquittal. These observations are peculiarly applicable to the case of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, who, after having devoted to his country thirty-five of the best years of his life; after having distinguished himself in many gallant actions; and after having preserved to the crown of Great Britain some of its most valuable foreign possessions, was called upon, at the close of his honourable career, to answer charges which vitally affected his reputation, and which he was prevented by death from fully and clearly refuting.

Painful as it was to the friends of Sir George Prevost to allow a single stain to rest upon the memory of so brave and distinguished a soldier, more especially when they possessed the means of removing every doubt as to his conduct, they yet considered an appeal to the candour and justice of his country as unnecessary. The violent prejudices which at one period existed against the late Commander of the Forces in the Canadas were gradually wearing away; his memory had been honored by a just tribute

of his Sovereign's regret and approbation; and the scenes in which he had been so conspicuous an actor, had ceased to be a matter of general interest. Under these circumstances, the relatives of Sir George Prevost would confidently have entrusted his reputation to the unprejudiced judgment of posterity, had they not seen, with equal regret and indignation, a late attempt to revive the almost exploded calumnies and misrepresentations of which he had been the victim. That the Quarterly Review\* should have lent its pages to an attack like this, will, upon the perusal of the present volume, excite the surprise of every candid person; and it is chiefly for the purpose of correcting the misstatements into which the Reviewer has been led, that the following pages are presented to the public.

Before entering more particularly upon the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct, so wantonly attacked in the article above alluded to, it may not be thought improper briefly to advert to his father's services and to his own early history. From his military career, previous to his appointment to the chief command in British North America, it will clearly appear that he was not without reason selected by his

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\* Vide the Quarterly Review for ~~October~~, 1822, p. 405.

Majesty's Government for the discharge of that important trust.

Major-General Augustin Prevost, the father of the late Sir George Prevost, was by birth a citizen of Geneva: he entered the British service as a Cornet in the Earl of Albemarle's regiment of Horse Guards, and was present at the battle of Fontenoy, where he was wounded.

Having attained the rank of Major in the 60th regiment in 1759, he had the honor of serving under General Wolfe, and received a severe wound in the head, whilst gallantly forcing a landing, twenty miles above Quebec, under the immediate command of General Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester. Upon the reduction of Canada, Major Prevost was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and served with reputation at the capture of Martinique and the Havannah. In 1775, he was appointed to the command in East Florida, and, in 1778, he eminently distinguished himself by his defence of Savannah, against the attack of a very superior force of French and Americans, under the Comte d'Estaing and General Lincoln. The garrison consisted of only 2,300 men, while the force of the besiegers amounted to 8,000, supported by a fleet of twenty-two sail of the line. Such, however, was the determined energy of Major-General Prevost, and of the British soldiers and

sailors under his command, that the enemy were compelled to abandon the enterprize, after thirty-three days' close siege.\*

In 1780, Major-General Prevost, after having served twenty-two years in North America and the West Indies, returned to England, to enjoy the pleasing consciousness of having always discharged his duty with zeal and effect. His health was much impaired by a long residence in climates unfavorable to an European constitution, and, on the 6th May, 1786, he died, at Greenhill Grove, near Barnet, in the sixty-third year of his age.

In 1765, Major-General Prevost married, at Lausanne, a daughter of M. Grand, of that place;† and, on her husband's departure to America, Mrs. Prevost accompanied him thither. George, their eldest son, was born while General Prevost was stationed in the province of New Jersey, on the 19th May, 1767. Being designed by his father for the military profession, he was

\* Vide Beatson's "Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv, p. 518, Appendix, No. I.

† Mr. Gibbon to Mr. Holroyd.—"Let me tell you a piece of Lausanne news. Nanette Grand is married to Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost. Grand wrote to me; and by the next post I congratulated both father and daughter. There is exactness for you.—*Beriton*, Oct. 31st, 1765." Vide Gibbon's *Miscellaneous Works*, vol. i. p. 439.

placed with that view at Lochée's academy, at Chelsea, and his education was finished at Colmar, on the continent. He obtained his first commission in the 60th regiment, and being removed upon promotion to the 28th foot, he joined that corps at Gibraltar in 1784. He obtained his majority in 1790, and early in 1791, he took the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at Antigua. In March, 1794, he was promoted to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 60th, and, in 1795, he proceeded to Demerara, and from thence to St. Vincent's, at that time attacked by the French. He was there actively employed in suppressing the Carib insurrection, and in resisting the French invasion, and at the storming of the Vigie he commanded a column. In October, 1795, he was ordered to Dominica, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Madden in the command of the troops in that island; but in January, 1796, he resumed the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at St. Vincent's, where he was twice severely wounded in successfully resisting the enemy's progress towards the capital of the colony, after the defeat of Major-General Stewart at Colony. In consequence of his wounds, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost obtained leave to return to England. The sense which the inhabitants of St. Vincent's entertained of his services was warmly expressed

in an address from the Council and House of Representatives in that island.\*

On his arrival in England, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost was appointed Inspecting Field Officer. In January, 1798, he obtained the rank of Colonel, and proceeded in the same year to the West Indies as Brigadier-General. In 1798, he was removed from the command of the troops at Barbadoes to St. Lucie, as Commandant, where he was afterwards appointed Lieutenant-Governor, in compliance with a request from the inhabitants.†

Brigadier-General Prevost continued to perform the duties of Governor of St. Lucie until the peace of 1802, when that colony was restored to the French. The address which he received from the inhabitants of the island on his departure, fully evinces the popularity which he had acquired;‡ while the letters addressed to him, and to Colonel Brownrigg, Secretary to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, by Sir Thomas Trigge, at that time Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, satisfactorily prove that he merited the confidence reposed in him by Government.§

\* See Appendix, No. II.

† Vide Letter from the Duke of Portland, Appen. No. III.

‡ Vide Appendix, No. IV.

§ Vide Appendix, No. V.

In July, Brigadier-General Prevost arrived in England, when the government of Dominica was immediately offered to him by Lord Hobart. Having accepted the appointment, he embarked for that island in the following November, and landed there on the 25th of December, 1802.

In the following year, he volunteered his services on the expedition against St. Lucie and Tobago, and served as second in command under Lieutenant-General Grenfield, who in his general order, after the capture of Morne Fortunée, thus mentions his conduct upon that occasion:—

“To the cool and determined conduct of Brigadier-general Prevost and Brigadier-General Brereton, who led the two columns of attack, may be attributed the success of the action; but to Brigadier-General Prevost it must be acknowledged, that to his counsel and arrangements the Commander of the forces attributes the glory of the day.”\*

The important services of Brigadier-General Prevost upon this expedition, received numerous tributes of approbation from distinguished military characters;† and even the French

\* Vide accounts of the capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. VI.

† Vide extracts from letters, Appendix, No. VII.

Commander could not refrain from expressing the esteem and admiration with which he regarded his generous enemy.\* Upon the successful termination of this affair, Brigadier-General Prevost returned to his Government at Dominica, where nothing worthy of notice occurred until the 22d February, 1805, when an unexpected attack was made by a French squadron from Rochefort. The result of that attack was highly creditable to the valour and military talents of the Governor, who after having, with the few troops under his command, disputed inch by inch the landing of the French force, amounting to 4,000 men, and covered by an overwhelming fire from the ships, succeeded in effecting a retreat to the fort of Prince Rupert. The French Commander in Chief, after vainly summoning him to surrender, reembarked the whole of his troops, and sailed to Guadaloupe.†

The terms in which H. R. H. the Commander in Chief was pleased to express his sense of General Prevost's conduct upon this occasion, were highly gratifying to his feelings.‡ In consequence of his gallant and successful defence

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\* Vide Appendix, No. VIII.

† Vide account of this expedition from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. IX. Also the public despatches and letters, No. X.

‡ Vide letter from H. R. H. the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, Appendix, No. XI.

of the Colony, General Prevost received a communication from the Speaker of the House of Assembly,\* conveying to him the thanks of that body, and informing him that a Thousand Guineas had been voted by them for the purchase of a sword and a service of plate, to be presented to him in testimony of their gratitude and approbation.† A similar testimonial to the conduct of General Prevost upon this occasion was given by the Patriotic Fund, who voted him a sword of the value of one hundred pounds, and a piece of plate, of the value of two hundred pounds, “for the distinguished gallantry and military talents which he had displayed.”‡ From the West India Planters and Merchants General Prevost likewise received a piece of plate to the value of three hundred guineas.§

In July, 1805, General Prevost returned to England.|| Soon after his arrival he was created a Baronet, and was subsequently appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Portsmouth.

In February, 1808, he was selected to com-

\* Vide Appendix, No. XII.

† Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XIII.

‡ Vide the resolutions, and the letter of the chairman to general Prevost, Appendix, No. XIV.

§ Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XV.

|| Vide extract from the Dominica Journal, Appendix, No. XVI.

mand a brigade destined to reinforce Nova Scotia, where he succeeded Sir John Wentworth as Governor, and in December, 1808, he left Halifax, in order to assist in the reduction of Martinique. The expedition sailed from Barbadoes on the 28th of January, 1809, and on the 30th, the troops were landed on the island of Martinique. Sir George Prevost was second in command under General Sir George Beckwith, and to him the management of all the active operations was confided. The result of this expedition was, that the French troops were driven into Fort Bourbon, where they held out until the 24th of February, when the surrender of that fort completed the conquest of the island.\*

Upon the conclusion of this short but brilliant campaign, Sir George Prevost passed a few days at Dominica, where he was received with many demonstrations of joy. Addresses were upon this occasion presented to him by the House of Assembly of Dominica, and by the merchants and inhabitants of St. Christophers.†

In the month of April the army returned to Halifax, and from this period until his appointment to the chief civil and military command in

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\* Vide the public despatches, and letters from Lord Castle-reagh, Appendix, No. XVII.

† Vide the addresses and answer, Appendix, No. XVIII.

British North America, in 1811, upon the resignation of Sir James Craig, Sir George Prevost remained in Nova Scotia, esteemed and beloved by all ranks of the inhabitants. On his departure for his new government, he received the most gratifying addresses from the inhabitants of Halifax,\* and from the clergy of Nova Scotia, &c. &c.†

Upon the arrival of Sir George Prevost at Quebec in 1811, he found much dissatisfaction and discontent existing in the Lower Province. The inhabitants were divided into two parties, termed the English and the Canadian, and the feelings of hostility with which they viewed each other, had unfortunately not been allayed by the policy which the late Governor in Chief, Sir James Craig, had thought it necessary to adopt during his administration. To such a degree had this party spirit been carried, and so doubtful had he been of the disposition of the Canadians, that it had been thought inexpedient to call out the militia, lest they should make an improper use of the arms to be intrusted to them. Under these circumstances, it was evidently the duty of Sir George Prevost to conciliate, by every means in his power, the confidence and affection of the Canadians, more particularly as in case

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\* Vide Appendix, No. XIX.

† Vide Appendix, No. XX.

of hostilities with America, it would have been impossible to preserve Lower Canada without the cordial support of its inhabitants. Sir George Prevost therefore did not hesitate to adopt a system which the true interest of the Province seemed so imperiously to require. He anxiously endeavoured to unite the two adverse parties, and to soothe the irritation which not only threatened the tranquillity of his government, but even the safety of the colony itself. In the distribution of the patronage which he enjoyed, he resolved to be guided solely by a consideration of the public good, and when offices became vacant, he bestowed them, with a due regard to the merits of the individuals, indifferently upon the English and the Canadians.

The beneficial effects of these measures became every day more apparent. The Governor in Chief speedily acquired the confidence of all ranks of people, who submitted with cheerfulness to the privations and sacrifices which they were soon afterwards called upon to endure. In numerous instances he received from the inhabitants, both collectively and individually, the strongest proofs of their zeal; and he had the satisfaction of seeing them united in their attachment to his government, at a time when the preservation of the colony depended upon such feelings.

Having thus given a brief sketch of the situ-

ation in which the Governor in Chief found the Province of Lower Canada upon his arrival, and of the views and objects which he entertained respecting it, we shall proceed to point out the conduct which he pursued; when, from the aspect of affairs, it became evident that hostilities with America could not be long delayed. No sooner had Sir George Prevost assumed the chief command of the Canadas, than he became sensible of the necessity of placing those provinces in the most efficient state of defence; and he therefore applied himself with the utmost vigour and vigilance to call forth all their resources. It is difficult to believe that the unwearied exertions of Sir George Prevost, with a view to this important object, should have been altogether unknown to the writer in the Quarterly Review. But supposing him to have been ignorant of them, yet without access to the private and confidential correspondence which took place between Sir George Prevost and his Majesty's Government, or to the communications which passed between him and the officers under his command, it was impossible that the Reviewer could form a correct opinion upon the subject. And yet he has not hesitated boldly to assert, that "in the winters of 1811 and 1812, although the designs upon the Canadas were openly avowed in the American Congress, except the embodying of the militia of the Lower

Province, Sir George Prevost made *not the slightest preparation for defence.*"\* The following statement will show the degree of credit to which this assertion of the Reviewer is entitled.

In the month of September, 1811, Sir George Prevost arrived in Canada, and in the same month, proceeding from Quebec to the district of Montreal, he inspected the different forts and military positions in that neighbourhood, and on the American frontier. Soon after his return to Quebec in the November following, he communicated confidentially with the Adjutant-General of the forces in England, upon the apprehended hostilities with America. In December he proposed to Lord Liverpool, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the raising a corps of Fencibles, from the Glengarry settlement in Upper Canada; and in his correspondence with Admiral Sawyer, who commanded on the Halifax station, he requested that a ship of war might be sent, on the opening of the navigation, to the St. Lawrence. In the month of February, 1812, another communication was made to the Secretary of State's Office, in which Sir George Prevost expressed a hope, that the proceedings in Washington would justify him, in making preparations to repel the

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\* Vide Review, page 413.

threatened attack. Those preparations had been commenced as early as November, 1811, by forwarding arms and ammunition to the Upper Province. During the winter of 1811 and 1812, and the spring of the latter year, frequent communications passed between the Commander of the forces and Major-General Brock, who commanded in Upper Canada, respecting the preparations which would be necessary in the event of a war. It was proposed to reinforce Amherstburgh, and Fort George; and supplies of provisions, cavalry-arms, accoutrements and money, were directed to be conveyed to Upper Canada. Accoutrements and clothing for the militia in the Canadas, were requested from the British Government. Another schooner was directed to be built, to increase our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Gray, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, was despatched to the Upper Province, in order to assist in forwarding these defensive preparations; and Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, was directed to proceed to Amherstburgh, to inspect the works of that fort, which the Commander of the forces had ordered to be put in a tenable state. The propriety of strengthening and fortifying York was submitted to Government; and the commanding engineer was directed to make the repairs, which his report on the different forts and posts in Upper Canada, had

stated to be necessary. In addition to these measures, a reinforcement from the 41st regiment, and five companies of the Newfoundland Fencibles, left Quebec in the month of May for the Upper Province.

On the 31st March, Sir George Prevost addressed a private and confidential letter to Major-General Brock, in which his sentiments respecting the approaching war, and the policy to be adopted in meeting it, were clearly detailed. One passage in this letter merits a more particular notice, since it is highly important, not only as repelling the accusation of the Reviewer respecting the want of preparation for the war, but also as containing an answer to another charge, which will afterwards be noticed. The paragraph in the letter is as follows: " You are nevertheless to persevere in your preparations for defence, and in such arrangements as may, upon a change in the state of affairs, enable you to employ any disposeable part of your force *offensively* against the common enemy."

Independently of all these various communications with the officer commanding in Upper Canada, respecting the measures to be pursued in the event of war, and of the supplies of men, arms, money, stores, and provisions, which, with a view to that event, had been afforded to Upper Canada; much correspondence had previously taken place, and many difficulties had been re-

moved with regard to the supply and transport of the Indian presents to the Upper Province, upon the due furnishing of which very materially depended the support which we might expect to receive from the Indians, in case of a rupture with America.

From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from official documents, it is evident, that even in contemplation of hostilities, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far as rested with him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence, consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requisitions of Major-General Brock which the Commander of the forces had the power to grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever given by that invaluable officer, that any measure, either suggested by himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for the preservation of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked, had been overlooked or neglected. The same vigilant foresight will be found to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the first mea-

sures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an application to the legislature of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, for an act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of the people, such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the Canadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May, 1812, a sum exceeding 60,000*l.* was placed at his disposal for the militia service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bachelors, between the age of eighteen and twenty-five years, for three months in the year; and in case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and most efficient class of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to remain for three months, unless the then state of affairs should render it

expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Canadian voltigeurs, under the command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between 300 and 400 men, had likewise been raised and disciplined; and 400 recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been assembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Canada. The advantages arising from thus embodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may be confidently asserted, materially contributed to the preservation of the Canadas.

The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular

troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different passes and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship informed Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made upon *the first intimation* of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire approbation."

After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened

hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau de Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.\* The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional

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\* Vide Quarterly Review, p. 413.

security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was *occupied and fortified*; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence, that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the enemy.

The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post,

has been considerably lessened\* since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or principal barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it.

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\* Review, p. 413.

Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did *not* do, by way of preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer proceeds to point out what *was* done by him after the commencement of hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes the remarks to which we have already adverted.\*

In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it.

The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, with-

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\* Review, p. 413.

out any sacrifice of national honor, so easily concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred. It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces. Under these circumstances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and si-

tuation to form a correct judgment on the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for embodying the militia had only been recently passed; and the population, which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficulties neither depressed nor discouraged the ardent and active spirit of Sir George Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America, Quebec should be the object of primary consideration; yet the defence of the whole line of frontier between the Canadas and the United States, occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a distance of more

than 900 miles, every part of which he determined to dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power.

It was in pursuance of the defensive line of policy which had been so wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own resources, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instructions to those in command under him, to abstain from any unnecessary and uncalled for act of hostility upon the American territory. Notwithstanding these general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might attempt, by attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Americans.

The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon the offensive, whenever circumstances were such as would justify their departure from the

defensive system. Of these circumstances they were the best judges. That this was the light in which Sir George Prevost's instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line of policy which had been adopted :

“ The account received, first through a mercantile channel, and soon after repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion, offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's, the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from attempting any essential service connected in any degree with their future security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communication, was limited to the reduction of Fort Niagara, which could be battered at any future period, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to defensive measures.”

That Captain Roberts, the commanding officer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there cannot be a doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the

slightest degree to his having acted contrary to his orders. The approval of his conduct in general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George Prevost considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions whatever they might have been, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting them.

It however clearly appears by the above letter, that Captain Roberts acted altogether from the orders he received from Major-General Brock, who was fully aware, as it has been already shewn, of the sentiments of Sir George Prevost, and who did not hesitate to give Captain Roberts the discretionary order, which led to the attack and capture of the fort.

It will be seen from the preceding pages, that the approaching hostilities with America had been the subject of frequent communication between Sir George Prevost and Major-general Brock, for several months *prior to the commencement* of the war; and that, in more than one letter to which reference has been made, the precautions necessary to be taken, and the system and line of defence to be adopted in the event of war, had been clearly and distinctly pointed out. Possessed then, as Sir George Prevost knew General Brock to be, of his sentiments on this subject, and aware that he would receive from the North West company, from whom he had himself derived the information,

the earliest intelligence of the actual declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that event reached Quebec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to Major-General Brock from the Adjutant-General, communicating the information; and as soon as the important arrangements respecting the Lower Province, and particularly those for the defence of Quebec had been completed, Sir George Prevost proceeded to Montreal. Upon his receiving at that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Washington, with an official notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on 7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock. This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston; and in both these letters every instruction and information which Sir George Prevost's situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General. That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the month was owing to circumstances over which Sir George Prevost had no control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock received the despatches several days before he set

off to join the army opposed to General Hull, although the Reviewer\* gives his readers to understand that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture.

The above statement will afford a full and satisfactory answer to the misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,† and to the unwarrantable insinuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were wanting to assertions in which the writer has directly contradicted himself. The Reviewer states, “ that Sir George Prevost sent no instructions whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war :”—and further, “ that he, General Brock, was only restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, *by the perplexity of his situation, in being left without orders.*” It is singular that the writer should have forgotten, that only five pages before, he had stated‡ that “ *on the receipt of the intelligence of the American declaration of war, Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province immediately despatched DISCRETIONARY orders to the British officer in charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either *offensively* or otherwise against the enemy at Michilimachinac, as he should find advisable.*” If General Brock was justified in giving

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\* Review, p. 414.

† Ibid. p. 413.

‡ Ibid. p. 409.

these discretionary orders to act offensively as circumstances might require, it follows that he must have considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers, that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he should pursue.

The Reviewer's insinuation, that Sir G. Prevost sent no instructions to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war, with the intention of leaving that officer to act on his own responsibility, cannot be passed over in silence. It has been already proved, by incontrovertible facts, that the contemptible motives thus attributed to the Commander of the forces, could not possibly have existed in his mind; and the attempt to impute to him a conduct so dishonorable ought therefore to be marked with the severest reprobation. No two persons could more sincerely respect and esteem each other than these gallant and high-minded individuals. Sir George Prevost had early evinced his opinion of General Brock's merits and talents, in a private communication to him of the 22d Jan. 1812, several months before the war; and the reply of General Brock to that communication, was sufficient evidence of the sentiments he entertained towards the Commander, under whom he expressed himself to be so desirous of serving.

Indeed, the utmost confidence and cordiality prevailed between these officers, as is amply manifested in the correspondence before referred to; and wherever a difference of opinion did exist, General Brock never hesitated to yield to what he expressed and considered the superior knowledge and experience of the Commander in Chief.

The conduct of Sir George Prevost in his communications with General Brock, after receiving intelligence of the war, was not attended with any of those consequences which the Reviewer has asserted. Upon this head General Brock's correspondence with the Commander of the forces is conclusive.

The first letter from that officer, after the receipt of the intelligence of the war, is dated the 3d July, at Fort George; the extract from which, already given, is a convincing proof, that whatever might have been his intention in moving from York to Fort George, he was not restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara by any deficiency of instructions from the Commander of the Forces.

The next letter from General Brock is from Fort George, dated 12th July, and states that the enemy were constructing batteries at the different points of the frontier; that he was making exertions to counteract their views; and that the arrival, that morning, of the Royal

George and the vessels under convoy, bringing various pieces of ordnance, would give him a decided superiority. Not a single word is said in this despatch of any wish or intention on the part of the Major-General to invade the American territory. Major-General Brock's next letter of the 20th July states, that the enemy had evidently diminished his force, and appeared to have no intention of making an immediate attack. This letter also communicated the intelligence of General Hull's invasion of the Province. It likewise contained details of General Brock's means of defensive warfare, and expressed some apprehension for the fate of the troops under his command, should the communication be cut off between Kingston and Montreal; which apprehension was entertained by him on the supposition, as he stated, that "*the slender means possessed by Sir G. Prevost would not admit of diminution, and consequently that he could not look for reinforcements.*" The same letter acknowledged the receipt of the Adjutant General's communication from Quebec, of 25th June, of the declaration of war. In the succeeding despatch from General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, dated 26th July, from Fort George, that officer writes as follows: "I have not deemed it of sufficient importance to commence active operations on this line by an attack on Fort Niagara; it can be demolished,

when found necessary, in half an hour, and *there my means of annoyance would cease. To enable the militia to acquire some degree of discipline, without interruption, is of far greater consequence than such a conquest.*"

The next letter from the Major-General, dated from York, the 28th July, principally relates to the approaching meeting of the legislature, and mentions his intention of detaching a force for the relief of Amherstburg. A letter from the same place, written on the following day, communicates the surrender of Michilimachinac, and particularly acknowledges the receipt of Sir George Prevost's despatches of the 7th and 10th July, written *after the declaration of war*, and before alluded to. General Brock also states his intention of embarking immediately in the Prince Regent, (the vessel which had been built and equipped since the month of March preceding), for Fort George, from whence he should speedily return to York. On the 4th August, a short letter was addressed by General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, from York, principally upon the proceeding of the legislature, regarding the militia laws, and on the following day he set off for Amherstburg, from whence he did not return until after the glorious termination of Hull's invasion. It was, therefore, from a consideration of the nature of his resources, and of the necessity of maturing and

husbanding them, and from a conviction that Niagara would easily fall whenever he should be inclined to attack it, and not from any doubt arising from want of instructions, that General Brock abandoned the attempt.

It was in further pursuance of the line of policy adopted at the commencement of the war, that Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of despatches from Mr. Foster, acquainting him with the proposed repeal of the Orders in Council by the British Government, immediately opened a communication with Major-General Dearborn, commanding the American forces on the frontier of Lower Canada, for the purpose of concluding an armistice, until the Congress should determine upon the proposals transmitted to them by Mr. Foster. An armistice of about three weeks did accordingly take place; and whatever might be the advantage arising from it to the American commanders and their troops, from the time and opportunity it afforded them of increasing their means of attacking the Canadas, it is obvious that the cessation of hostilities was of far more importance to Sir George Prevost, by enabling him to mature his preparations for defence. In fact, at the very time the armistice was negotiating, a regiment had arrived in the river from the West Indies; and after the conclusion, and during the continuance of it, considerable rein-

forcements of men and supplies were forwarded to Upper Canada, where they arrived before the resuming of hostilities, and materially contributed towards defeating the attempts which the enemy afterwards made to invade that province.

Intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice was despatched to General Brock on the 12th August, by Brigade-Major Sheckleton, and must have reached him at Amherstburg before he left that place for Fort George, where he arrived the 6th September; but, whatever may have been General Brock's opinion of the policy of the measure, we do not find in his letter of the 7th September to Sir George Prevost, that the receipt of that intelligence had at all interfered with any intention he had previously entertained of "sweeping" (according to the Reviewer's assertion) "the Niagara line of the American garrisons, which he knew were then unprepared for vigorous resistance."\* In fact, as that letter states, the armistice was to terminate the *next day*; and so far was General Brock from being in a situation to act offensively, that he states his expectation of an almost immediate attack, and of his having sent to Amherstburg to Colonel Proctor, as well as to Colonel Vincent at Kingston, for reinforcements, to enable him to meet it; expressing at

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\* Review, p. 410.

the same time his hope, that if he could continue to maintain his position for six weeks longer, the campaign would terminate in a manner little expected in the United States.

Upon the expiration of the armistice, Sir George Prevost resolved to continue, for a time at least, and until his resources would better enable him to pursue a contrary line of conduct, the same defensive system which he had previously determined upon; and which he had been originally induced to adopt, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed at the commencement of hostilities, and of the war having been undertaken, on the part of the United States, so much in opposition to the opinions and wishes of a considerable portion of its population. In a private letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, of the 2d August, 1812, upon the subject of the proposed armistice, he particularly refers to the opinion of Mr. Foster, respecting the policy of the defensive system. "Mr. Foster," he says, "submits the propriety of our abstaining from an invasion of the United States' territory, *as only in such event could the American government be empowered to order the militia out of the States.*" As a further ground for this line of conduct, and a confirmation of the propriety of his own opinion in adopting it, he quotes in a subsequent communication to Ge-

neral Brock, of 30th August, 1812, the opinion of his Majesty's Government on the subject. "The King's Government having most unequivocally expressed to me their desire to preserve peace with the United States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole disposable force of the country, the great interests committed to them in Europe, I have endeavoured to be instrumental in the accomplishment of those views; but I consider it most fortunate to have been enabled to do so without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you *men, money, and stores of every kind.*" It cannot be matter of surprise that Sir George Prevost should persevere in his defensive system, even after the termination of the armistice, and when from the manner in which the Government of the United States had received the communication of the repeal of the Orders in Council, it was evident that they meant to continue the war for other objects; for it ought to be considered, that up to that period, the only reinforcements of troops received by him were the 103d, nearly a boy-regiment, and the first battalion of the Royals from the West Indies, the latter incomplete, from the capture of part of their numbers, on board of one of the transports, by an American frigate. In consequence, however, of this addition to the force in the Lower Province, Sir

George Prevost was enabled immediately to strengthen the army in Upper Canada, by detachments from the 49th regiment, Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, and Royal Veterans; but it must be evident that the total accession of strength in both Provinces was not sufficient to warrant a departure from a system, which had been adopted after the fullest deliberation, and upon a just calculation of the means necessary to meet the American warfare. The grounds of Sir George Prevost's opinion on this head had been stated to General Brock, in his letters to him of the 7th and 10th July, before referred to; and as a further confirmation of the necessity of adhering to it, in his communication to General Brock, of the 17th September, Sir George Prevost acquaints him, that in his last despatches from Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th July, 1812, he is told by him, "That his Majesty's Government trusts he will be enabled to suspend, with perfect safety, all extraordinary preparations for defence, which he may have been induced to make, in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States."—As this opinion of the British Government was evidently founded upon their belief, that the revocation of the Orders in Council would either prevent war, if not declared, or lead to an immediate peace, had hos-

tilities commenced, it was plain that no further reinforcements could be expected to be even ordered from England, until accounts should arrive there of the reception which the intelligence of the revocation of the Orders in Council had met with from the Government of the United States. As this could not well be before the end of September, there was not the slightest prospect of any addition being afforded to the force in the Canadas before the ensuing year; and it was therefore certain, that the Commander of the forces would until that period be completely left to his own resources for the defence of those Provinces.

To husband those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of Montreal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent insecurity to the Provinces which he was defending, Sir George Prevost continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his successor, General Sheaffe, the necessity of adhering to a defensive system; nor does it ap-

pear from any part of the correspondence between these officers and Sir George Prevost, that they had any particular object in view, which that policy restrained them from pursuing. Previous to the armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his reasons, which were evidently independent of the consideration of any instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive operations against the American frontier; and subsequent to the capture of Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of inadequate objects.

The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that

moment; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and *aware of the policy of permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not CONTEMPLATE any IMMEDIATE ATTACK.*" Two strong inferences naturally arise from this letter—the one, that General Brock must have considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not *positive*, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but *discretionary*; the other, that General Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their homes,

would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy, they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with

which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,\* something more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 regular troops which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the prisoners, whose numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were constantly arriving. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at, that Major-General Sheaffe should not have listened to the suggestions of any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful, to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the Reviewer's sagacious opinion, "Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops!"

Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the critic against General Sheaffe and Sir George Prevost as *lovers of armistices*, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and prudence in General Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the advantages gained by the gallant and able conduct of his lamented predecessor, and strengthened and confirmed at Queenstown by him-

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\* Review, p. 411.

self. General Sheaffe was, therefore, wisely contented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to invade the Province; and, anxious to secure its future preservation, he willingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all conversant with military subjects, that to those who are carrying on a defensive warfare, which their inferiority of force and means of every description has obliged them to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be infinitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was fully aware of the importance of this measure to the safety of the province, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, since he was in daily expectation of receiving supplies of clothing, and other articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were also on their way to him; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and materially contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expedient in the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the purpose of affor-

ing time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over to the enemy's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last tribute of respect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and permitted him to leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil government.

It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious officer, although it was adopted without any reference to, and without the consent or approbation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit to characterize the armistice\* as one for which no reason, civil or military, was ever assigned; whereas it was notorious to the army employed on the Niagara line that General Sheaffe was influenced in this

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\* Review, p. 411.

step by the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately communicated by him to Sir George Prevost. If any thing further were necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has thought fit so groundlessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged, although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his Majesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declaration of war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, "The instructions given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sherbrooke, cautioning them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent."

In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the general principles upon which Sir George Prevost intended to conduct the operations of the war, by making the defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, "I have it in command

from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence."

In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds—"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's

despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."

Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"\* of Sir George Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians

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\* Review, p. 414.

a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been *discretionary* instead of *positive*. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in possession of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's detachment at the Moravian village.

Having thus briefly adverted to the principal occurrences of the first campaign in Upper Canada, it becomes necessary to say a few words with regard to those of the Lower Pro-

vince, during the same period; and which, being under the *immediate direction of Sir George Prevost*, the Reviewer has thought proper to characterize as *utterly insignificant*.\* Almost immediately after intelligence of the war had arrived at Quebec, Sir George Prevost repaired to Montreal, for the purpose of providing for the defence of that frontier; and having established a cordon of troops in the situations most exposed to attack, between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu rivers, consisting of all the flank companies of the 49th and 100th regiments, together with three battalions of embodied militia, and one of Canadian voltigeurs, which last four corps had been raised and disciplined previous to the war, he returned to Quebec, in order to meet the Provincial Parliament. The legislature had been summoned, principally, for the purpose of obtaining from them an act authorizing the circulation of army bills, a measure to which from his deserved popularity with that body, they did not hesitate to accede, and without which, from the want of specie, it would scarcely have been possible to carry on the public service. To many of the arrangements and measures of Sir George Prevost, for reinforcing and strengthening Upper Canada, as

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\* Review, p. 411.

well as for guarding the approaches to the Lower Province, reference has already been made. The whole summer had been unceasingly employed in these important objects, and the greatest exertions had been made to transport and convey to Kingston, by the tedious route of the St. Lawrence, against the current, and along a frontier much exposed to the enemy, the various supplies which the exigencies of the Upper Province demanded; all of which, by the judicious and able arrangements made by him for that purpose, arrived safe and without loss, or with very inconsiderable molestation.

In the month of August Sir George Prevost again repaired to Montreal, in order that he might be ready to take the field, should the movements of General Dearborn, who commanded the enemy's forces on that frontier, indicate any intention of attacking our line of defence, which had been entrusted to the charge of Major-General de Rottenburg. General Dearborn having, on the 16th November, advanced from Plattsburg to Champlain town, close upon our frontier line, thereby threatening the front of Major-General de Rottenburg's position, Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of this intelligence, crossed the St. Lawrence with a considerable proportion of the force then at Montreal, in order to strengthen the point thus threatened, and established his head-quarters at

Chambly, where he remained for several weeks. Whether this movement on the part of General Dearborn was made in the expectation of finding that no effectual resistance would be offered by the Canadian population to his further advance into the Province, or with the view of preventing the sending of reinforcements from the Lower to the Upper Province, he was equally disappointed in both these objects. The able measures adopted by Sir George Prevost in the disposition of the regular troops, as well as of the militia, who displayed the most ardent spirit of loyalty, and the most resolute determination to repel every attempt of the enemy to invade the Colony, induced the American Commander in Chief to abandon any further intention of advancing. After pushing forward a few reconnoitring parties which were invariably forced to retreat without effecting their object, he was ultimately compelled, by the advanced season of the year, to close the campaign, and to put the army into winter quarters.

The result of the first campaign was highly honorable to the military talents of the Commander of the forces. The enemy, notwithstanding their superior resources, were foiled in every attempt which they made to invade the Provinces, with the loss in one instance of the whole of their army, together with the Commander; while, in the other, their troops suffered

a total defeat, attended with the capture of a General Officer, and upwards of 700 men.

But while thus engaged in his military duties, Sir George Prevost was not unmindful of the importance of our naval superiority upon the Lakes, though in this as in every other part of his conduct, he has fallen under the indiscriminate censure of the Quarterly Reviewer,\* who has accused him of neglecting to preserve the naval ascendancy which we enjoyed on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at the commencement of the contest.

As early as the month of December, 1811, as appears from a letter addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Brock, he had directed his attention towards our marine on Lake Erie, and had given directions for the building of a schooner at Amherstburg. Our force on the Lake, at that period, consisted of the ship Queen Charlotte, and Hunter schooner, both of which were armed and actually employed. The Americans possessed at the same period a brig, the Detroit, and a sloop, the former a very fine vessel, and in readiness for any service, although then laid up at Presque Isle. During the whole of the campaign of 1812, our vessels navigated the Lake without any attempt on the part of the enemy to interrupt them, and materially contri-

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\* Review, p. 414.

buted to the success of our arms in that quarter, by the countenance and protection afforded by them to the garrison at Amherstburg, and by the transportation from Fort Erie of such stores, provisions, and supplies as were indispensable for the security of the former post. In direct variance with the Reviewer's assertion,\* that "*not one effort* was made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine at that period;" it is a remarkable fact that the schooner, Lady Prevost, which he had ordered to be built in *December*, 1811, was launched and fitted out, and was actually employed on the Lake within a month after the declaration of war, and essentially assisted in the transport of the arms, provisions, &c. before mentioned, during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Of the force which the enemy then possessed on this Lake, consisting of the Detroit and a schooner, the former fell into our possession upon the surrender of General Hull with his army; and, although she was recaptured in the October following, under circumstances which, considering the superiority of the enemy, reflected no discredit upon the officer commanding her, and the men under him, she made no accession to their strength, as she was burnt the day afterwards by our troops, and the Caledonia, a private vessel, cap-

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\* Review, p. 415.

tured with her, was rendered a mere wreck by the fire from our fort and batteries. On Lake Erie, therefore, during the whole of the campaign of 1812, our naval ascendancy was decisive; to strengthen and preserve which, the efforts of Sir George Prevost materially contributed. On Lake Ontario, our superiority, as well at the commencement of hostilities, as long prior and subsequent to that period, was still more apparent and efficient. In March, 1812, our force on that Lake consisted of the Royal George ship of 24 guns, the brig *Moira* of 16 guns, and two schooners; whilst that of the enemy was composed of a single brig laid up at Sackett's Harbour. But the importance of maintaining this great superiority over the enemy was not lost sight of by Sir George Prevost. As early as January, 1812, Captain Gray, an able officer of the Quarter-Master-General's department, under which the marine was placed, was despatched to York for the purpose, amongst other services, of consulting with Major-General Brock, upon the best means of preserving the ascendancy which we possessed upon Lake Ontario. In consequence of Captain Gray's suggestion, the building of a very fine schooner, called the *Prince Regent*, was commenced at York in the following March, which was launched, equipped, and employed upon the Lake in conveying supplies of great importance on the 3d

July, immediately after notice of the declaration of war had been received in Upper Canada. This fact furnishes a full contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer,\* that “after slumbering away the summer and autumn without one effort to increase our marine in amount or efficiency, Sir George Prevost suddenly awoke, in the depth of winter, to a sense of the condition to which his supineness had reduced the British cause, and the building of two frigates commenced with convulsive activity.” That Sir George Prevost, with so decided a naval ascendancy on both Lakes at the commencement of the war, should not have thought himself justified in any extraordinary exertions to increase that ascendancy, is not to be wondered, at when it is considered, that for every purpose of the defensive system which he had adopted, the British force upon the Lakes was amply sufficient, and that Government would not have approved, in the then state of affairs, of the expense which such a measure must unavoidably have occasioned. Aware, however, as Sir George Prevost was of the important advantages which the dominion of the Lakes afforded for the preservation of the Canadas, he had, both long before, and immediately after the commencement of the war, called the attention of His Majesty’s Government to that subject. He

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\* Review, p. 413.

had also in his communication with General Brock, and particularly by the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General, invited his consideration of the same matter. It certainly affords a strong proof of the conviction of that gallant and able officer, that our force on those waters needed no extraordinary exertion at that time to increase it beyond what had been already made; that, excepting in his letter before referred to, of 2d December, 1811, he never once mentioned the subject of our marine in his various different communications with Sir George Prevost, respecting the means of defending the Upper Province, until in his despatch of the 11th October, 1812, he acquainted the Commander of the forces with the recapture of the brig *Detroit* by the enemy. Previous, however, to this period, and as soon as Sir George Prevost had reason to suppose from the refusal of the American Government to accede to the Armistice, or to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council a sufficient ground for pacification, that the war would be continued, and that renewed efforts would be made for the invasion of the Canadas, he had strongly represented to His Majesty's Government the absolute necessity of experienced officers and able seamen being sent to him, to enable him to preserve the ascendancy which our marine then enjoyed. In a letter addressed to General Brock,

on the 19th October, 1812, he authorized that officer to take whatever measures he might deem necessary for the accomplishment of the same object, without further reference to himself. It was not ascertained, until towards the end of October, that any extraordinary exertions were making by the enemy to equip and fit out a squadron at Sackett's Harbour. The arrival of Commodore Chauncey, with a number of shipwrights and seamen, making their intentions evident, Captain Gray, of the Quarter-Master-General's department, was sent to Kingston, to direct the laying down of the keels of two frigates, the one at that place, and the other at York; and in the month of December, more than 120 shipwrights, together with 30 seamen, engaged at Quebec, arrived in the Upper Province, and the building of the two frigates immediately commenced. In the same month, directions were given for the building of a ship, of the dimensions and tonnage of the Queen Charlotte, together with several gun-boats at Amherstburg, on Lake Erie. During the whole of the summer after the declaration of war, the superiority of our fleet on Lake Ontario, had enabled us uninterruptedly to transport from Kingston to York and Fort George, all the supplies of stores, provisions, and reinforcements of men, necessary for the defence of Upper Canada; nor was it until the month of

November, when those services had been completed, and our vessels were on the point of being laid up for the winter, that with all the great advantages which they derived from the immediate vicinity of their resources, particularly of officers and men, seconded by the strenuous exertions which they made, the Americans were able to do more than to fit out the *Oneida*, a vessel perfectly ready for any service at the commencement of the war, and six small schooners, carrying one or two heavy guns each. With this force they ventured out for the first time on the Lake in the beginning of November, under the command of Commodore Chauncey; and availing themselves of the absence of the *Moira* brig, and our three schooners, at the head of the Lake, to make on the 11th an ineffectual attack upon the *Royal George*, under the batteries of Kingston, they retired to Sackett's Harbour, without attempting to interrupt our vessels on their return to Kingston; nor did they again shew themselves upon the Lake until the following year. Up to the month of November, therefore, which may be called the conclusion of the first campaign, as far as respected our means of defending the Province, our ascendancy on Lake Ontario had been preserved. To this object, the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, by the building of the *Prince Regent*, and the supply of officers and

men furnished to our marine after the commencement of the war, essentially contributed. The superior advantages enjoyed by the enemy, in being able to obtain shipwrights and seamen to an unlimited amount, together with the proximity of all their means for the building and equipment of vessels, had enabled them to launch a frigate at Sackett's Harbour, before the end of the year 1812, and to fit out a squadron, which at the commencement of 1813, gave them a temporary ascendancy on Lake Ontario, before officers and seamen could be sent to Canada from England. This ascendancy on their part was, however, of short duration, for we shall find in pursuing this subject, that the measures planned by Sir George Prevost during the summer of 1812, and carried into effect during the autumn and winter, were such as in their consequence secured to us a full equality, and occasionally the superiority on that Lake, during the two remaining campaigns. Of the nature and extent of the exertions thus made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine on Lake Ontario, the Reviewer has himself furnished the most abundant proof. "Such," he says, "were the zeal and exertions of Sir James Yeo and his followers on their arrival at Kingston, that before the end of May they were prepared to take the Lake with the British fleet,\* now composed of two

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\* Review, p. 418.

ships of 24 and 22 guns, a brig of 14, and two schooners of 12 and 10 guns."

Sir James Yeo did not arrive at Quebec with his seamen, until the 5th May, and it was not until after the 16th that he reached Kingston; to which place Sir George Prevost had accompanied him from Montreal. The state of forwardness in which he then found the fleet was such, that he was enabled to complete its equipment, and actually to set sail on the 27th of the same month, within little more than a week after his arrival at Kingston. The previous exertion requisite to accomplish the building of the *Wolfe*, a ship carrying 24 guns, the altering and refitting the brig *Moira*, and the making of the various repairs and alterations in the other vessels, while at the same time a ship of a large class had been built at York, and was nearly ready to be launched in April, and a ship and several gun-boats were in a state of great forwardness at Amherstburg, may be easily conjectured; particularly, when it is considered that the stores and supplies of almost every description, necessary for the armament and equipment of these vessels, had been transported to the Upper Province from Quebec and Montreal, the greater part of them during the winter, and through roads before deemed impassable for many of the heavy articles required. These difficulties were, however, soon sur-

mounted by the energetic measures of Sir George Prevost; and he had the satisfaction to find on his arrival at Kingston, that the important object of having a fleet ready to take the Lake as early as it was probable that officers and seamen could be sent from England to command and man it, had been accomplished. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival, as already mentioned, not more than ten days were requisite to put the squadron into a complete state of equipment, and from the period of its appearance on the Lake, the enemy ceased to enjoy the temporary ascendancy which their superior resources of men and supplies had enabled them, during the preceding month, to acquire. The Reviewer has confidently asserted, that these exertions to increase our marine ought to have been earlier made; and that had they been so made, our ascendancy on the Lake would have been retained, and York, together with the ship which was there building, might have been saved. The answer to this has already been partly given. Any extraordinary exertions to increase a marine so decidedly superior to that of the enemy, before the probable continuation of the war was clearly ascertained, and before any steps were taken by the Americans to rival us in that respect, would not have been justified, by the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was then placed. It was not until the beginning of

September, that the termination of the armistice manifested the intention of the American Government to continue the war, nor were any effectual steps taken by them for a material increase of their naval forces at Sackett's Harbour, until the month of October following, when Commodore Chauncey and his seamen arrived at that place. It is evident, therefore, that except in the construction of new vessels, and the forwarding of the supplies necessary for their equipment, nothing further could have been done at that period, to enable us to keep pace with the exertions of the enemy; and that without officers and men, who could not be expected before the spring, any number or description of vessels must have been useless.

Sir George Prevost, soon after the declaration of war, had called the attention of Government, as well as that of the Admiral on the Halifax station, to this subject. He had, therefore, every reason to expect that either from England or from Halifax, he should early in the year receive officers and seamen sufficient to fit out and man a fleet equal at least, if not superior, to any that the enemy might at that time be able to prepare. In this expectation Sir George Prevost was not disappointed; and although the Admiral on the Halifax station had only been able to afford to his strong solicitations on this head, Lieutenants Barclay and Fennis, to act

as captains, and four petty officers for lieutenants, who arrived over land from New Brunswick at the end of April, this small supply of able and spirited officers being immediately despatched to Kingston, materially contributed, by their active services, to put the Fleet into the forward condition in which it was found by Sir James Yeo on his arrival.

Notwithstanding the active measures which were thus taken by Sir George Prevost to maintain our ascendancy upon the Lakes, the Quarterly Reviewer has thought proper to observe, that it is perfectly inconceivable how any man, in Sir George Prevost's situation, could have been so infatuated, as to disregard the importance of maintaining his superiority. The gross injustice of this charge will be best proved by citing the words of Sir George Prevost himself, in a letter of the 3rd February, 1813, addressed to General Sheaffe. "The extreme anxiety I experienced respecting the naval force to be employed on Lake Ontario, in the spring of this year, has rendered the proceedings in the dock-yards at Kingston and York, subjects highly interesting to me. You may therefore suppose I shall expect to find the exertions at both these places to have fully corresponded with the magnitude of the object and the difficulties surmounted in forwarding from hence the numerous supplies required for that service."

Much has been said by the Reviewer upon the incompetency of the person commanding, and of the other officers belonging to our Provincial marine on Lake Ontario.\* Whatever might have been the want of energy and enterprise on the part of Earle, in the instance to which the critic has alluded, and the circumstances of which he has greatly exaggerated, Sir George Prevost did not think it incumbent upon him, on that account, to deprive himself of the services of that officer, who was acknowledged to be a tried and skilful navigator of the Lake, at a period when those services were particularly required for the transport of the various supplies destined for the upper parts of the Province. He was, therefore, retained in the command, not only as being highly useful for the purposes for which he was wanted, but because no person could then be found adequate to supply his place. That the captain of the *Tartarus* sloop of war, then at Quebec, needed but a hint from Sir George Prevost† to proceed with his crew to Lake Ontario, and supersede Earle and his feeble followers, may well be doubted, when we consider the state of the squadron to which he belonged, and the services required from it at the commencement of the war. Whether such a plan was beyond Sir

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\* Review, p. 414.

† Ibid. p. 415.

George's *capacity*,\* may be left for the reader to determine. Had he, however, adopted it, he would certainly have evinced a great want of consistency and judgment. He was, at that period, in the act of negotiating with General Dearborn for the armistice, which afterwards took place, with the reasonable expectation that the revocation of the Orders in Council would lead to a return of peace between Great Britain and America. Our force at that time on Lake Ontario was so decidedly superior, not only to what the enemy possessed on those waters, but to any which they could hope for several months to fit out, that an addition, either to its amount or efficiency, seemed to be uncalled for and unnecessary. Offensive operations of any description, on our part, were not in contemplation; and to every purpose of defensive warfare our means on the Lake were amply competent. To have deprived the Admiral, on the Halifax station, of the services of the *Tartarus*, when every ship was required by him for the protection of our trade from the numerous cruizers of the enemy, without any adequate object in view, would have been altogether unjustifiable on the part of Sir George Prevost. Whether, if the captain and seamen of the *Tartarus* had been sent to Lake Ontario, the enemy's flotilla, pre-

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\* Review, p. 415.

paring at Sackett's Harbour,\* could have been destroyed; or whether, if ship-carpenters had, at the commencement of the war, been sent to Kingston, we could have built as rapidly as the enemy, cannot be proved, as neither course was attempted: nor is it material to the present discussion that it should be proved; the only question being, whether Sir George Prevost, in the then state of affairs, ought to have adopted either measure. From the preceding statement, it appears that he would not have been warranted in so doing. The observation of the Reviewer,† that the common-place attempt to hire, at Quebec, sailors for the Lake at one-half the wages which merchants were giving at the same moment, was the only exertion used to strengthen our flotilla, would not merit notice, if it were not for the purpose of exposing the writer's disingenuousness and want of candour. He must have known, when he made the assertion, that the merchants at Quebec hire their sailors for what is called the run-home (to England), and that for this purpose double and triple the amount of the common wages is frequently given; one-half, therefore, of that amount for a permanency, and on the Lake establishment, which held out many advantages to the men, was, as it proved, a sufficient inducement for

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\* Review, p. 415.

† Ibid.

them to enter into that service, and as many of the description required as could be found at Quebec, were procured by active and intelligent officers sent for that purpose. To these were added some valuable and experienced seamen from two transports then in the river St. Lawrence; and this supply of seamen, together with an additional number of shipwrights and other workmen, was during the winter forwarded to Kingston and York.

The situation of York for the building of one of the frigates laid down in December, as before stated, has been censured by the Reviewer,\* as holding out to the enemy an invitation to destroy it, from the defenceless state of that fort. Long before the first certain intelligence had been received by Sir George Prevost, of the building of a new ship at Sackett's Harbour, or of the fitting out of their flotilla there, Captain Gray, as already mentioned, one of the most intelligent officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department, had been sent to the Upper Province, to ascertain the fittest situation for the construction of new vessels, whenever such a measure should become necessary. It was in consequence of the communication which that officer had with Major-General Brock, who had the highest confidence in his abilities, that it

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\* Review, pp. 415, 416.

was decided that one ship should be built at York and the other at Kingston. Both places were alike exposed to attack from their unfortified state. York was certainly the weakest, although General Brock had recommended that place as the fittest and most secure, if strengthened, for a naval dock-yard on Lake Ontario. In determining to build at both places, it was thought most prudent not to run the hazard of losing both vessels from the possibility of a successful attempt of the enemy to destroy them, should they both be constructed at either of those places. The most effectual measures, on the part of Sir George Prevost and of those acting under him in the Upper Province, were taken to strengthen and fortify both York and Kingston, and it was expected that the enemy would be repelled in any attack upon either. It was not doubted, but that if York should be attacked and taken, the ship which was building there, might be, as she in fact was, destroyed, and thus be prevented from increasing the strength of the enemy, whilst Kingston might in the mean time be made too strong to occasion any fear for the safety of the fleet in that port. The result shewed the wisdom of this determination, and the capture of York, which considering the overwhelming force of the enemy, was not to be prevented, evidently preserved Kingston.

The only advantage which the Americans derived in this attack, as respected our marine, was the destruction of the new ship, and the capture of an inconsiderable quantity of stores designed for her, together with the Gloucester schooner, then lying a mere hulk, under repairs for a transport. It may in this place be proper briefly to notice another assertion of the Reviewer, respecting our marine—that the enemy commanded the waters of Lake Champlain\* with a flotilla, before the British Commander in Chief had directed the construction of a single gun-boat to oppose them. That this should have been the fact, will not appear at all remarkable, when it is known that the waters of that Lake belong exclusively to the Americans, who enjoyed the most abundant means and resources for fitting out a fleet, from the number of vessels constantly navigating it for the purposes of trade. It was only necessary to arm and equip some of the vessels of that description, and their command of the water would be undisputed. At the commencement of the war, and for some time afterwards, we neither did nor could possess any force capable of meeting them; but that this subject was not viewed with indifference by Sir George Prevost, notwithstanding the

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\* Review, p. 412.

variety of other and more important concerns which commanded his attention, may be inferred from the fact, that in June, 1813, in less than twelve months after the commencement of the war, our force of gun-boats on the Richelieu river, communicating with Lake Champlain, was such, that in conjunction with our troops at Isle aux Noix, they were sufficient for the capture of two fine schooners of the enemy, each carrying 11 guns, and 45 men. To have attempted to create any other force, except gun-boats, for the purpose of defending the Richelieu, would, when no offensive operations were contemplated, have been an useless waste of those means which were required and employed for the increase of our marine on the other Lakes.

These observations upon Sir George Prevost's conduct with respect to our marine on the Lakes, may be concluded by a reference to the opinion of the public bodies in Upper Canada, with regard to the exertions of the Commander of the forces, in preserving our naval ascendancy on those waters.

These documents afford a strong proof of the sentiments almost universally entertained on this head, by persons most capable, from their knowledge of, and interest in the subject, of appreciating the merits of Sir George Prevost's exertions.

In the address of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada,\* in answer to the President's speech at the opening of the Provincial Parliament, 27th February, 1813, they say, "We learn, with the highest satisfaction, that the most vigorous measures have been adopted under the direction of the Commander of the forces, and are now in operation, to strengthen the Provincial Marine, and preserve the superiority of the Lakes so essential to the prosperity of this Province." The same expressions occur in the address of the Legislative Council, and in March following, on Sir George Prevost's arrival in Upper Canada, the House of Assembly and town of York addressed him in similar terms.

The campaign of 1813 opened, on the part of the Americans, with the attack and capture of York. The squadron under Commander Chauncey employed on this expedition, after landing part of the force at the Niagara frontier, returned to Sackett's Harbour, from whence it again sailed towards the end of May, with another strong force collected from that place and its neighbourhood, for the purpose of uniting with the troops on the Niagara frontier, in an attack upon Fort George. In this attack, which took place on the 27th May, the overwhelming numbers of the enemy prevailed, and the small

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\* Vide the Addresses in the Appendix, No. XXI.

but gallant band of about 1,500 men, under Brigadier-General Vincent, which had, for more than two hours, opposed nearly 5,000 of the Americans, after evacuating Fort George, spiking the guns, and destroying the ammunition, retreated towards the head of the Lake, General Vincent having first called in all the detachments from the different Posts on that frontier.

The enemy, pursuing his advantages, pushed forwards a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 infantry and cavalry, with nine pieces of artillery, to attack the position which General Vincent occupied at Burlington. Previous, however, to their reaching that point, a well-concerted, daring, and spirited attack was made upon their camp in the night, by a party of General Vincent's force, and under his command, which proved completely successful as a surprise, and Generals Winder and Chandler, the two senior officers, together with 100 prisoners, and four field-pieces being taken, the enemy, after destroying their stores and provisions, &c. precipitately retreated, until they joined the main body of their army. While these operations were proceeding, the most active measures were taking at Kingston to fit out and equip a fleet which might be able to dispute with the enemy the temporary ascendancy which they had gained on the Lake; but whatever efforts might be made to construct vessels and prepare

them for service, it must be obvious that no advantage could be derived from any number or description of vessels without officers and seamen. The only reinforcement which up to this period, the end of April, Sir George Prevost had been able to obtain from the Admiral commanding on the Halifax station, consisted of the three lieutenants, and four petty officers, whose arrival at Kingston has been already mentioned, and whose active services had very much accelerated the equipment of our squadron before Sir James Yeo took the command of it. Previous to the arrival of Sir George Prevost at that place in May, his extreme anxiety respecting the naval force preparing on both Lakes, had induced him, during the depth of winter, to proceed in the month of February, from the Lower Province to Kingston, York, and Fort George, where his presence must have essentially contributed to impart increased activity to the preparations then making for the opening of the next campaign. The zeal and energy thus displayed by him in his indefatigable endeavours to promote the public service, although justly appreciated by the inhabitants of both provinces, could not protect him from the unfounded accusations of the Reviewer,\* who informs his readers that Sir George Prevost had

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\* Review, p. 417.

excited the expectations of the Canadian public, “that he had designed an attack upon Sackett’s Harbour, where the shipping was known to be very indifferently protected, by marching over the ice, which was stronger at that time than had been known for many years.”—And that “the anxious inhabitants of the Provinces who had witnessed his previous inactivity, with gloomy foreboding, were again doomed to be disappointed.” What the opinion of the inhabitants of the Provinces was, with regard to Sir George Prevost’s “*previous inactivity*,” has clearly been shewn from the different addresses presented to him at the period alluded to.

That Sackett’s Harbour could at that time, or at any other period of the winter, have been attacked with the smallest prospect of success, may be confidently denied. So far from the shipping, which by the Reviewer’s\* own showing, was a formidable squadron, commanded by an experienced officer, and manned by more than 500 able seamen, being, as he has asserted, indifferently protected, the enemy had constructed batteries for their defence, and it was known that a very considerable force had been assembled at that post, and in its neighbourhood, in order to be ready for embarkation as soon as the season would permit the fleet to

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\* Review, p. 411.

take the Lake. To have attempted with the small force which then garrisoned Kingston, and which was scarcely sufficient for its defence, an expedition against an enemy's position, capable of a determined resistance, when it is considered that the troops would have been obliged to march several miles over the ice before they could reach the American territory, from whence they would still have been 15 miles distant from the object of their attack, and exposed during the whole of their approach to the concealed fire of the enemy's troops in the woods, would have been, under the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was placed, with regard to his resources for defending Kingston, the Key, as it has been termed, to the Lower Province, little short of madness. Nothing but a determination to attach blame to the conduct of Sir George Prevost could have induced the Reviewer to hazard so groundless and unmilitary a stricture. That Sir George was alive to the importance of attacking this place, and of destroying the means there possessed by the enemy for increasing their marine, and for carrying on from thence their offensive operations, will appear evident from the measure which will be immediately adverted to, and which has drawn upon the Commander of the forces the acrimonious censure of the Reviewer.

· In December, 1812, Sir George Prevost, aware

of the importance of strengthening himself against the threatened attempts upon the Canadas, in the interval which would elapse before any reinforcements could by possibility arrive from Europe, had directed Lieutenant-General Sir John Sherbrooke, and Major-General Smyth, to make arrangements for forwarding to him, during the winter, by land, the 104th regiment, then in New Brunswick. This arduous march, which had not before been attempted, and which was thought extremely hazardous, if not altogether impracticable, was effected in the month of March without the loss of a single man, and by the end of April six companies of that regiment arrived at Kingston. This accession to the strength of that garrison enabled Sir George Prevost, who, as already stated, reached Kingston with Sir James Yeo about the middle of May, to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the sailing of the American fleet for the head of the Lake, to attempt a diversion in favour of the points threatened by the enemy on the Niagara frontier. The expedition against Sackett's Harbour was accordingly resolved upon, the moment the absence of the enemy's squadron was ascertained. The circumstances which attended this expedition, have been misrepresented in the most extraordinary manner by the Quarterly Reviewer,\* who, instead of ascribing the failure

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\* Review, pp. 418, 419, 420.

of the enterprise to its real and natural causes, as given in the official report of Colonel Baynes,\* and which will now be more particularly detailed, has not scrupled to attribute that failure to the indecision and misconduct of the Commander of the forces. As the whole force, which could be mustered for this service, hardly exceeded 700 men, consisting of the greater part of the garrison of Kingston, it must be obvious that means so inadequate could justify an attempt to carry Sackett's Harbour only by surprise. This, in fact, was the sole object in view; and the troops being embarked, together with two field-pieces, on board of our squadron, sailed in the evening of the 27th May, under the immediate command of Colonel, now Major-General Baynes. Sanguine hopes were entertained of reaching the enemy's post in the course of the night, when the surprise would have been complete, and our success infallible; but owing to light and baffling winds, it was not until between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, the 28th, that our fleet was able to approach within 12 or 15 miles of Sackett's Harbour. Previously to this, and as soon as our squadron had been discovered from the port, alarm-guns had been fired, and boats were seen filled with armed men,

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\* Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. XXII.

continually passing down the shores of the Lake, from Oswego towards Sackett's Harbour, to assist in its defence. In the mean time, the troops on board the fleet were held in readiness for landing in the boats, as soon as the vessels should have approached sufficiently near to the shore for that purpose, as well as for insuring their co-operation in the attack. At this period, unfortunately, the wind, which had been rather fair, though light, altogether failed, and shortly afterwards the breeze came almost immediately from the point which the fleet was endeavouring to approach. To have attempted a landing in boats, at the distance of fifteen miles from the object of attack, would have been a most tedious and hazardous undertaking, exposed, as the men must have been, to the fire of musketry and field-pieces from the shore, and to the direct *enfilade* of all the heavy cannon in the enemy's forts and batteries. The day was too far advanced to leave any hope of completing the service before dark; and without the efficient co-operation of the fleet, which, from the state of the wind, could not be obtained, the most gallant exertions of the troops, as was afterwards proved, would have been ineffectual. From these circumstances, it was the unanimous opinion of the principal officers of the expedition under Colonel Baynes, who, together with Sir James Yeo, had been consulted by him as to the expediency of persevering in the en-

terprise, that the attempt should be abandoned, and orders were accordingly given for the return of the squadron to Kingston. The incident of the surrender of the cavalry officer and his party, which is stated by the Reviewer with his usual incorrectness, did certainly lead to the determination, which was subsequently taken, of persisting in the expedition; but it was the information obtained from those persons, with regard to the force of the enemy, and their means of defence, which principally influenced that determination. It appearing probable, from the state of the wind, which towards evening again became favourable for approaching Sackett's Harbour, that the men might be brought under cover of the night to the point of attack, in which they would be supported by the active co-operation of the fleet, it was resolved to make the attack at day-break the following morning. In order to favour the belief that we had abandoned the attempt, the ships' heads were kept towards Kingston until the evening commenced, when the squadron stood in for the shore. The troops were in the boats at ten o'clock, and confident hopes were indulged that, on the approach to the landing at day-break, they would be assisted by the artillery, and receive the effectual support and co-operation of the fleet, which was judged most essential to the success of the undertaking. The landing took

place as was intended, nearly at day-break ; and, considering the local impediments, was effected in a style highly creditable to the military skill of Colonel Baynes. Notwithstanding the want of our artillery, which being on board of a schooner, towed by the boats of the squadron, was still at a considerable distance, and the state of the wind, which prevented the squadron from approaching the shore, our troops, after landing and taking possession of one of their field-pieces and a tumbril, had, by a spirited advance, driven the enemy before them, at the point of the bayonet, through the woods, which were most obstinately maintained by them, and had forced them to retire towards their works and loop-holed barracks. But these works were found to be of such strength, as to render it next to impossible for our small force, unprovided with heavy cannon, to make any impression upon them. The men had been now engaged for several hours, and had sustained a considerable loss. It was at this period that Sir George Prevost, who had landed shortly after the troops, and who had followed their course and progress, came up with the main body engaged with the enemy ; and it was then that he received from the officer commanding the expedition, the report of the manner in which the enemy had been driven towards their works and loop-holed barracks, and of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of

forcing them without the aid of our artillery and the co-operation of our fleet. The former, with all the exertions made in towing the schooner, had not been landed; and the latter, from the state of the wind, could not approach sufficiently near for their guns to bear upon the enemy's batteries.

The Commander of the forces then, for the first time, interfered, so as to give any orders respecting the expedition. Though there was scarcely a hope of success, yet he determined not to abandon the enterprise whilst a possibility of attaining his object remained. He accordingly directed Colonel Baynes to concentrate his scattered force, and to advance upon the enemy, who were posted in considerable numbers in front of and behind their loop-holed barracks. Not more than from 300 to 400 men could be assembled for this last attack. It was, however, made by this small band with intrepid gallantry. The enemy, though superior in numbers, were driven from their position, and forced to take shelter in the town; but in the further attempt to approach the works, our troops were met by such a galling and destructive fire of grape and musketry, both in front and flank, that they were compelled to abandon a contest to which their numbers were so unequal. The force of the enemy, at this period, consisted, by their own acknowledgment, exclusive of their killed and wounded, of

upwards of 1,100 men, including 142 artillerymen. They were strongly posted in Fort Tompkins, armed with heavy guns, and in their block-houses and loop-holed barracks, the very situation which renders the youngest American recruit (a marksman from his youth), more than a match for the most experienced veteran. Our force was reduced to nearly one-third of its effective strength from the casualties of the field, and from the absence of those who had withdrawn to the rear with the wounded and prisoners. We possessed not a single field-piece, the artillery not having yet been landed. Colonel Young had retired from exhaustion, in consequence of previous illness. All the other field-officers, one excepted, were wounded, together with most of the captains and subalterns. Captain Mulcaster commanding the gun-boat, made every exertion in his power; but there was no hope of assistance from the fleet, in consequence of the state of the wind. Under such circumstances, that so small a band, exhausted by previous exertion, should have attacked and carried Fort Tompkins, the block-houses, and the remaining loop-holed barracks of the enemy, so numerously defended as they were, might probably be expected by such experienced warriors as the Quarterly Reviewer, and those upon whose authority he relies; but it was apparent to every officer and man who was pre-

sent, that success was impossible. Such being the conviction of the Commander of the forces, who had witnessed with feelings of poignant regret the last gallant though unavailing exertions of his troops, he reluctantly ordered their reembarkation, which was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest precipitation, the enemy not attempting to offer the least molestation. This expedition, though certainly attended with a considerable loss on our part, was not unproductive of advantage to us, or of damage and serious inconvenience to our adversaries. Their apprehensions of the result of the last attack, ignorant as they were of the trifling force by which it was made, induced them to set fire to their new ship and naval arsenal; and although, afterwards, when their fear subsided, from a more perfect knowledge of the state of our force, they succeeded in extinguishing the fire on board the ship, before it had got to any height, yet, by their own acknowledgment, they lost their arsenal, with a large quantity of valuable stores; while one field-piece, and upwards of 200 prisoners were brought away, together with some camp-equipage, and another field-piece was rendered useless. Their loss, also, in killed and wounded was, by their own admission, upwards of 150 men. From this detail of facts, to the truth of which there are abundant living witnesses to vouch, it must be ob-

vious that the main object of the expedition failed principally from the smallness of our numbers, compared with the superior force of the enemy; from the want of our artillery, which could not be landed in time; and particularly from the little assistance which, from the state of the wind, the squadron could afford in taking off the fire of the forts. So far from nearly *two days* being lost, as the Reviewer has stated,\* it is notorious to every person who was employed in that expedition, that the fleet sailed on the evening of the 27th May from Kingston, and did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour until the morning of the 28th, when the intended attack was prevented solely by the impossibility of approaching the shore from the state of the wind, and that it did in fact take place on the following morning, the 29th, within 24 hours after the fleet had appeared off the place. It is a fact equally well known to every person engaged in this enterprise, that Sir George Prevost did not take the personal command of it, in the sense in which the Reviewer† would have it understood. That he accompanied the expedition was never denied, or attempted to be concealed. His zealous and anxious feelings prompted him to that measure, to prevent any delay in the contemplated service, should a reference to him become

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\* Review, p. 419.

† Review, p. 418.

necessary. It is freely admitted, that when present he could not divest himself of his authority, or responsibility as Commander of the forces. But independently of its being contrary to all military usage, for the Governor in Chief and Commander of the forces in British North America, to assume the immediate command\* of so inconsiderable a force, no instance of his interference took place until the period of the last attack, which certainly produced the greatest damage that the enemy sustained. The order to retreat was neither precipitate,† nor one which the gallant officers “believed with difficulty.”‡ They were all convinced, not excepting the naval commander, Sir James Yeo, that it was impossible longer to contend with any prospect of success, and with our diminished means, against

\* Review, p. 420.

† There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer’s assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedition, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a refusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops.

‡ Review, p. 419.

the superior numbers and resources of the enemy. It may indeed be confidently asserted, in direct opposition to the Reviewer's statement, that although "the troops withdrew to their boats in disappointment," at their not having been able to accomplish their object, they felt no disgrace in retiring from a contest which they had so long and so bravely supported; nor did either officers or men experience any indignation or shame at a retreat which, after the most gallant, though unavailing exertions, they knew to be indispensable for their own preservation. It may here be observed, that the situation of our troops at the time of the retreat was most critical. At that very period, a reinforcement of 600 men, under Colonel Tuttle, reached Sackett's Harbour. With the overwhelming superiority which this accession to their force gave the enemy, it is obvious that with very moderate pretensions to either skill or enterprise, they might have opposed most formidable obstacles to our re-embarkation. A further perseverance in the attack on our part, or the least delay in the retreat, would probably have ended in the capture or destruction of the whole of our troops. Fortunately, the coolness and deliberation with which that measure was executed, served to deceive the enemy with regard to our numbers and losses; and the re-embarkation being effected without opposition, the troops re-

turned the same day to Kingston with the field-piece, camp-equipage, and prisoners which they had taken.

On the following morning the American squadron, which had been recalled from the head of the Lake to the assistance of Sackett's Harbour, appeared off Kingston, and it was a most fortunate circumstance that they did not fall in with our fleet, encumbered as it was with troops and wounded men. One material advantage immediately accrued from this expedition, by the recall of the enemy's fleet to Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost lost not a moment in availing himself of the opportunity of their being in port, to embark the 49th regiment on board the squadron, and to despatch it to the head of the Lake to reinforce Brigadier-General Vincent, who was then hard pressed by the enemy, and to whose small force that regiment proved an important accession of strength at a very critical period. Sir James Yeo accordingly sailed with, and safely landed them, and from that time our full equality at least, if not our ascendancy, was established on Lake Ontario.

In reviewing the events that took place during the campaign of 1813, it will be necessary to notice the operations on the Detroit frontier, and on Lake Erie, more especially as the Commander of the forces has been accused of ne-

glecting the representations of Colonel Procter, who commanded in that quarter.

The battle of Frenchtown, in which the Americans were totally defeated, and their General captured, was highly creditable to the talents of Colonel Procter, who certainly, until the retreat from Amherstburgh, was entitled to the reputation of a zealous and active officer.

It is said by the Quarterly Reviewer, that at this period Colonel Procter was positively restrained by Sir George Prevost from any offensive operations. The nature of the instructions given by the Commander of the forces to that officer has been already shewn; and will further appear by a reference to the letters\* of Sir George Prevost to Colonel, now become Brigadier-General Procter, in answer to the despatches received from him, announcing the different operations which had taken place in the Michigan territory. These operations, though not always attended with success on the part of General Procter, and though they occasioned a considerable diminution of his small force from his repeated losses, were yet favourably viewed by Sir George Prevost, who, as it appears from the correspondence already referred to, was always disposed to give him full credit for his exertions,

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\* Vide Appendix, No. XXIII.

and to put the most favourable construction upon his failures. That Sir George Prevost was fully aware of the importance of General Procter's position, and of the necessity of strengthening it by every means in his power, will now be shewn by the testimony of General Procter himself.

The letters of that officer fully prove, in contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer, who has attributed to the Commander of the forces, the neglect (if any took place) in forwarding to him the reinforcements which he had so strongly solicited, that no such neglect is imputable to Sir George Prevost.

As early as the month of March, 1813, a confidential letter was addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Procter, upon the subject of the reinforcements he had solicited, and Captain M'Douall, one of the Commander of the forces' Aids-de-camp, was sent for the purpose of ascertaining General Procter's wants, and the best mode of relieving them. In the correspondence between the Commander of the forces and General Vincent, the situation of General Procter was constantly alluded to, and the former officer was desired to pay his particular attention to the subject. On the 20th June, Sir George Prevost acquainted General Procter that General de Rottenburg, who had been appointed to the command of the forces serving in Upper

Canada, had received his directions to push on the remainder of the 41st regiment, from the head of Lake Ontario to Amherstburgh. And in his subsequent letters to General Procter, of the 11th and 12th July, after stating that his wants of money, clothing, &c. had been supplied as far as lay in the power of the Commander of the forces, and that those articles were then on their passage to him, he informed him that the whole of the 41st regiment were either on their way, or would be with him before that letter could arrive. This assurance was given by Sir George Prevost, in the full confidence that the orders which he had sent to the officer commanding in Upper Canada, for the immediate forwarding of the remainder of that regiment to Amherstburgh, had been complied with. That they were not complied with as early as Sir George Prevost intended they should be, was owing to circumstances over which the Commander of the forces had no control. The force under Major-General de Rottenburg, from which the 41st regiment was to be detached, was then before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and resources, and he was very unwilling to weaken it by sending off the remainder of that regiment, until other reinforcements which were on their way to him should arrive. It appears, however, by his letter to Sir George Prevost, of 9th July, 1813, that he had, on the 6th of that month,

sent forward 120 men of that regiment to Long Point, in order that thence they might be transported by means of the fleet to Amherstburgh, and that it was his intention to send the remainder of the regiment to General Procter, as soon as the Royals, then daily expected, should arrive. In a subsequent letter from Sir George Prevost to Major-General de Rottenburg, dated 23d' July, 1813, in which his high opinion of General Procter's merits and conduct is pointedly expressed, he says, "I trust the reinforcements and supplies, which, in consequence of my orders to you, must be near him," &c.

From these letters it is evident that it was Sir George Prevost's intention that General Procter should be reinforced to the extent he had required, and that the commanding officers in Upper Canada, who from the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed at the time, thought themselves justified, as they really were, in so doing, were the persons who delayed the forwarding of such reinforcements.

That to this cause the delay was attributed by General Procter himself, is unequivocally proved by his correspondence respecting it with the Commander of the forces. The letter to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1813, to which the Reviewer has referred,\* commences

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\* Review, p. 425.

in a way little to be expected, from the extract which that writer has given from it. He says, "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th ult. and *am fully sensible* that this district has received a due share of your Excellency's attention. I beg to add, that *if I had received from the Line* the reinforcements *which you had directed should be sent*, I should by this time," &c.

It must not be forgotten that this letter was before the Reviewer, and that he must therefore have designedly suppressed that portion of it, which completely exonerates Sir George Prevost from any charge of neglect.

In General Procter's next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 11th July, he says, "I beg leave to add, that we are fully confident of every *aid from your Excellency*, and of the fortunate result of the contest, *if we are allowed the benefit of your consideration of us*; but I am unfortunately so situated, that your best intentions towards me are of no avail. If the means were afforded me, and which were no more than what your Excellency has repeatedly directed, &c."—In his next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 13th July, he says, "The reinforcements which have been reluctantly afforded me, *notwithstanding your Excellency's intentions*, have been so sparingly and tardily sent me, as in a considerable degree to defeat the purpose of

their being sent. I have no hopes of any aid from the *centre division*, where our situation is little understood, or has ever been a secondary consideration.”—These extracts clearly shew that General Procter ascribed the delay in forwarding to him the remainder of the 41st regiment, not to the Commander of the forces, but to General de Rottenburg, who then commanded the centre division in Upper Canada.

Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was quoting, he has had the hardihood to say, “that although Sir George Prevost fully acknowledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the reinforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered *above five weeks* to elapse before he *despatched* the small amount of regular troops, &c.”\*

Now it appears from General de Rottenburg’s letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 41st, *had been despatched* to Amherstburgh on the 6th July; and by a return made to the Military Secretary’s Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter’s army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th Au-

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\* Vide Review, p. 426.

gust, 1813, it further appears, that up to the *10th August*, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, with nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, *had arrived at that post*, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provincial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly requested, by General Procter, in his correspondence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him.

It may here be observed, that General Procter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical situation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Amherstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rottenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to Ge-

neral Procter, without injury to the more important service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier.

Having thus proved that, as far as depended upon Sir George Prevost, General Procter's requisitions, of every description, had been complied with, we now proceed to shew that he did not neglect our marine on Lake Erie.

The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, has not hesitated to say, "that in the whole course of that vacillation and error, which unhappily distinguished the administration of Sir George Prevost,\* his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant and palpable, in the circumstances which led to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie." These censures, unfounded as they are, may perhaps be thought to require a more particular and detailed reply.

To the exertions made by Sir George Prevost, both before the war and after its commencement, to preserve our naval ascendancy on Lake Erie, we have already had occasion to refer. From these statements it will appear, that, independently of the new schooner, *Lady Prevost*, launched, armed, equipped, and upon the Lake, before the month of August, 1812, the *Detroit*, a ship to carry 18 guns, which the Reviewer would have his readers believe was only *laid*

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\* Review, p. 427.

down after Captain Barclay's arrival at Amherstburgh in June,\* had been commenced building before the month of March preceding, together with several gun-boats. The latter were launched in April. The ship was, in fact, in a state of considerable forwardness, when Captain Barclay assumed the command on the Lake. Upon the declaration of war, we had only one ship and a schooner on Lake Erie; and, within little more than a year afterwards, our fleet there consisted of two ships, a brig, a schooner, and two small vessels. In order properly to appreciate the efforts made for the construction and armament of this squadron, it must be borne in mind that the whole of the supplies necessary for that purpose, with the exception perhaps of the timber alone, were to be transported from the Lower to the Upper Province, by the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, and from thence to Lake Erie, where the superiority of our marine enabled us to convey them to Amherstburgh. As the efficiency of this squadron necessarily depended upon the number and discipline of the crews with which it was manned, the subject of a supply of able seamen, for that service, early engaged the attention of Sir George Prevost. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival at Kingston, and the appointment by him of Captain Barclay, to

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\* Review, p. 425.

take the naval command on Lake Erie, the Commander of the forces urgently requested Sir James to supply that officer with a greater number of seamen than he was disposed, from his own wants, to allow him. As the obtaining the naval ascendancy, on Lake Ontario, was a primary consideration, and as the seamen whom Sir James Yeo brought with him were not sufficient adequately to man his own ships, Captain Barclay was obliged to proceed with a very scanty supply of men. The Commander of the forces was in hopes that there might be other opportunities of increasing Captain Barclay's force, and that, in the mean time, the reinforcements which he intended, and immediately afterwards directed, should be sent to General Procter, would enable him to spare a sufficient number of soldiers for the use of the squadron on Lake Erie, until Captain Barclay's wants could be more efficiently supplied. The first letter from Captain Barclay, upon the subject of these wants, was addressed to Brigadier-General Vincent, who then commanded on the Niagara frontier, and was dated 17th June, 1813. The principal object of that letter was to obtain a reinforcement of troops for General Procter, in order to enable him to co-operate with Captain Barclay, in an attack upon the enemy's naval establishment at Presqu' isle, and in that letter he expressly states that he was making an application for seamen to

Sir James Yeo. This communication was forwarded to the Commander of the forces by General Vincent, with an intimation that he should immediately push forward the remainder of the 41st regiment, (a company of the regiment having been sent by him the preceding month) in order to assist in the proposed attack upon the enemy's fleet. Before the above letter either was or could be received by Sir George Prevost, he had appointed Major-General de Rottenburg to the command of the forces in Upper Canada, and had given him particular directions for supplying General Procter's wants, and for immediately despatching to him the remainder of the 41st regiment. The Reviewer has asserted,\* that " Captain Barclay stated the wants of his squadron in men, stores, and guns, with the same truth and earnestness as General Procter had repeatedly expressed; but the *only reply* of Sir George Prevost, to his statements, was a cold and general promise, in a letter to General Procter, that some petty officers and seamen, for Lake Erie, should be sent forward on the first opportunity."

Captain Barclay's wants were particularly detailed by him to the Commander of the forces, in the only letter he addressed to him on the subject, dated Long Point, 16th July, 1813.

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\* Review, p. 427.

The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Sir George Prevost, on the 21st of the same month, he having the day before sent an extract from it, with a strong letter of representation upon the subject, to Lord Bathurst. In this letter to Captain Barclay, Sir George Prevost states, that he is fully aware of all that officer's difficulties, and that he should endeavour to relieve his wants, as far as was in his power, explaining to him the reasons which prevented him from so doing to the extent required. He repeats, also, what he had before said to General Procter, that Captain Barclay must endeavour to obtain his naval stores from the enemy, but that being satisfied that such a measure could not be effected without an addition to his present strength, he had strongly pressed upon Sir James Yeo the necessity of immediately sending forward to him a supply of petty officers and seamen, and that he (Sir J. Yeo), had assured the Commander of the forces that he would do so without delay: that he had also given positive directions for the remainder of the 41st regiment to be sent to General Procter, and hoped that the arrival of these reinforcements would afford the timely means of attempting something against the enemy's flotilla, before it should be in a state to venture out upon the Lake.—With this assurance from Sir James Yeo, that seamen and officers should be supplied to Captain Barclay, and

in the hope that his repeated orders for the reinforcement of General Procter, with the remainder of the 41st regiment, had been complied with, Sir George Prevost might with justice point out to Captain Barclay the necessity of supplying his further wants from the enemy's resources,\* more especially as General Procter had repeatedly declared that a supply of troops alone would be sufficient to enable him to succeed in an attack upon Presqu' isle.

Subsequent to Captain Barclay's letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 16th July, all further representations respecting the supply of seamen for Lake Erie, were made by General Procter, in his letters to Sir George Prevost. The several answers to these representations the Reviewer has not thought proper to notice, contenting himself with giving a partial and immaterial extract from Sir George Prevost's letter to General Procter, of the 22nd August, evidently for the purpose of introducing what he is pleased to term a *taunt*, but which was in fact neither designed as such by Sir George, nor so considered by the gallant Captain Barclay. After stating that General Procter had, in his letter of the 18th August, 1813, announced to the Commander of the forces, that the Detroit was launched, and that, if he had seamen, a few hours

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\* Review, p. 427.

would place that district in security, the Reviewer adds, "but instead of replying to this application, with *an immediate reinforcement of seamen*, the Commander-in-chief answered it as usual, on the 22nd of August, with mere promises."

Without dwelling upon the Reviewer's error in supposing that Sir George Prevost, who had no control whatever over the seamen belonging to the squadron on Lake Ontario, who were exclusively under the orders of Sir James Yeo, could by any possibility immediately have sent forward to Captain Barclay the reinforcement of seamen required, we shall shew that Sir George Prevost's answer to the application was not one of *mere promises*, but that the reinforcement required, and which had been previously provided by him, was then actually on its way to its destination. Within two days after the date of the letter of the Commander of the forces to Captain Barclay before referred to, he acquainted General Procter that Sir James Yeo had assured him, that as many petty officers and seamen as could be spared, should be forwarded to Captain Barclay without delay, but that he, Sir George Prevost, much feared they would, as to numbers, fall short of his expectations. That he was, however, endeavouring to obtain a further supply from Quebec, which he meant should be exclusively appropriated for the ser-

vice of Lake Erie. This letter, which was an answer to that of General Procter, of the date of 13th July,\* referred to by the Reviewer, has been altogether suppressed by him, as well as the material fact that almost immediately after the letter of 13th July was written, General Procter relinquished the intended expedition against Presqu'isle, although 120 men of the 41st had been sent forward to Long Point, to be there taken on board by Captain Barclay for that purpose, and employed the whole of his disposable force in an unsuccessful expedition to Forts Meigs and Sandusky, by which proceeding that force was considerably diminished. In his answer of the 22d to General Procter's letter of the 18th August, before referred to, an extract from which is given in the note, Sir George Prevost expressed his opinion of that expedition, and stated the measures he was taking to remedy the inconveniences which might arise from it.† After mentioning the reinforcements

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\* Review, p. 427.

† "I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat.

"You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division."

which he intended to send forward to General Procter, he informed him, that, of the three troop-ships which had arrived at Quebec with De Meuron's regiment, two had conveyed to Halifax 500 American prisoners of war, and the third, the Dover, had been laid up *in consequence of his having directed three-fourths of the officers and seamen to be landed and sent forward for the naval service on the Lakes*; and that he had the satisfaction to inform General Procter, that the first Lieutenant of that ship, with 50 or 60 seamen, were then at Kingston, from whence they were to be forwarded, without delay, to Amherstburgh. This circumstance Sir George Prevost requested might be made known to Captain Barclay. This portion of the letter, which so clearly shews the exertions Sir George Prevost had made, and was then making, to send a supply of seamen to Lake Erie, the Reviewer, with the whole letter before him, has thought proper to omit, and in lieu of it, to insert as the only reply given by Sir George Prevost to General Procter's request for further assistance, a passage in the letter\* which was evidently meant as a compliment to the bravery of General Procter's troops, and an encouragement to him to persevere under the difficulties of his situation, assured, as he must have been, that every en-

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\* Review, p. 428.

deavour was making to relieve him. On the 26th August, four days after the date of the last letter, the Military Secretary informed General Procter that Colonel Talbot had been sent to the head of the Lake to await the arrival of the seamen mentioned in his letter of the 25th, and to forward them to Amherstburgh with all possible despatch. He was further informed, that 12 24lb. carronades for the new ship, the Detroit, were expected in the fleet at Burlington Bay, and General Procter was desired to request Captain Barclay, on his arrival at Long Point, to send off an express to the officer commanding at Burlington Heights, to say when he would be ready to receive them on board. In this letter, the Military Secretary, Captain Freer says, "His Excellency trusts, that upon the arrival of the seamen, Captain Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy."

From all that has been stated upon this subject, it must satisfactorily appear, that every exertion in the power of Sir George Prevost was made by him to supply the wants of Captain Barclay and the squadron, both with seamen and stores, and that at the very period when the action was fought, more men were on their way to him.

The truth of the Reviewer's assertion, that the conduct of Sir George Prevost contributed to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie,

will be best ascertained by a reference to Captain Barclay himself; and the following letter from that officer to the present Sir George Prevost, will clearly shew how unwarrantably the character of the Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been attacked on this occasion.

*“ Edinburgh, 14th January, 1823.*

“ Sir,

“ I have had the honor to receive a letter from Miss Prevost, acquainting me that the family of the late Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost are preparing a pamphlet, in vindication of his memory and conduct, so ungenerously and cruelly aspersed in the *Quarterly Review* for October, 1822, and appealing to me for the truth or falsehood of that portion of the article, which attributes the defeat and capture of His Majesty's squadron on Lake Erie, then under my command, to the imbecility of his conduct, and general inattention to our necessities.

“ I most deeply lament that an article so ungenerous and severe, should have been written, when the object of its hostility has been so long in his grave, which must not only lacerate most deeply the feelings of his family, but which also tends to open again a controversy which I had hoped was at rest.

“ Agitated, however, as the question again is, by this anonymous publication; appealed to as I am for its truth or falsehood, I declare that as

far as relates to Lake Erie, nothing can be more false and groundless. So contrary indeed is the fact, that I can say, the only communication which was made by me direct to the Commander of the forces, and which I was only induced to make by the extreme urgency of the case, was answered by his ordering a reinforcement of seamen from Quebec, and which I am confident would have been larger, *had it been possible to have waited* for them.

“ It is also but justice in me to declare, that I ever considered his peremptory order\* to risk a battle, (which, however, did not arrive till after the battle was over,) arose from his firm conviction of the paramount necessity of a strenuous exertion on the part of the navy for the preservation of the post, and from a generous desire on his part, to share with me the responsibility of a measure so hazardous, should the issue prove unsuccessful.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

R. H. BARCLAY.

“ *Sir George Prevost, Bart.*  
*Oriel College, Oxford.*”

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\* The order here alluded to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had

The subjoined extract of a letter from Sir James Yeo to Sir George Prevost, will also shew that the Naval Commander on the Lakes entertained a very different opinion on this subject from the Reviewer.

*“ Kingston, 23d March, 1814.*

“ Dear Sir,

“ I have had the honor of your Excellency’s letter of the 14th inst.

“ It is impossible any person can be more truly sensible of your Excellency’s unremitting attention and assiduity to every thing connected with the naval department in this country than myself, &c.

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I have the honour to remain,

With the highest respect,

Dear Sir,

Your Excellency’s

Most obedient servant,

JAMES LUCAS YEO.”

With regard to the naval action on Lake Erie, we shall only observe, that it certainly was not lost from the want of skill or courage on the

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reached Sir George Prevost. This letter was written in contemplation of the necessity of General Procter retiring from Amherstburgh, in consequence of the difficulties of his situation, in which case it was thought advisable that an action should be risked.

part of the officers and men of our squadron. The decided superiority of the enemy in their weight of metal and seamen, gave them an advantage which the bravest efforts of our squadron, directed and encouraged by the distinguished gallantry and conduct of their Commander, were insufficient to resist. The causes of the disastrous result of that action are best told, in the words of the sentence of the Court-martial upon Captain Barclay and his officers, which will be found in the Appendix.\* The situation of General Procter was such, after this disaster, as to render it indispensable for him to take the most prompt and energetic measures for withdrawing his troops from posts which were no longer tenable, and to join the main body of the army on the Niagara frontier, to whose force he knew his men would prove a seasonable and powerful accession. Upon this disastrous retreat it is unnecessary to dwell. It must, however, be remarked, that from the sentence of the Court-martial upon General Procter, and the subsequent remarks upon that sentence by order of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, it certainly appears that General Procter did not avail himself, with sufficient energy and activity of the period which elapsed between the loss of our fleet and the action at the Mora-

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\* Vide Appendix, No. XXIV.

vian village, to effect the important object of retiring with his troops to a place of safety.

However meritorious had been the conduct of General Procter, and of the troops serving under him previous to his retreat from Amherstburgh, it was not possible for Sir George Prevost to avoid noticing in the public orders, which announced to the army the capture of the greater part of those troops at the Moravian town, what appeared to him the disgraceful circumstances with which the affair had been attended. Although General Procter might feel hurt by the reflections thus passed upon his conduct, yet the Commander of the forces, in consideration of his former services, was unwilling to make that conduct the subject of public investigation, until His Majesty's Government, to whom General Procter's explanation had been submitted, should determine upon the course to be pursued. It was in obedience to their orders that General Procter was at length put upon his trial.\*

That the charges against General Procter could only rest upon the events of the retreat which he was accused of misconducting, and that "a long period of arduous services and neglected representations"† could form *no part of*

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\* Vide the Proceedings of the Court-martial, Appendix, No. XXV.

† Review, p. 432.

*such charges*, must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence would lead us to suppose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he concludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reader to determine.

The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured, General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Burlington Heights, a measure which the information received by that officer of the extent of General Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy, seemed to render indispensable.

The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he

passed rapidly along to Kingston, where he arrived on the 12th October. In the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports had reached, and who had also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action, had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at Burlington, induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might wait for instructions from General de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in Upper Canada.

General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road, immediately sent to General Vincent, directing him, in his despatch of the 10th October, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which, in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated; and it appears from General Vincent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in answer to it, that

he had no immediate intention of retreating from the position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had been carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communicating the orders he had sent to General Vincent in consequence of that intelligence, Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rottenburg of the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried into execution.

On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated, General de Rottenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the Staff-Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the directions to General Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling back on Kingston, was false and scandalous. As soon as it was thus ascertained at head-quarters at Montreal, what the real nature of General Procter's disaster was, the Commander of the forces having also reason to believe, from the information transmitted to him by General de Rottenburg, that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, instructions, dated the 29th October, were sent

to that officer, directing him to prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which were accordingly sent from General de Rottenburg to General Vincent to that effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara frontier.

From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's *not retreating* to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.

Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.

There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's state-

ments,\* of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat; of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.

It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable.

In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,† “ that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the *subordinate commanders* and troops,

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\* Review, pp. 433, 434.

† Ibid, pp. 438, 439.

presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."

In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were ALL obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the enemy were beaten.

The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with

the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine on the *Richelieu*, which had been increased by the capture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the *Wasp* sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer par-

ticularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every respect successful.

The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was the consequence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to Lieutenant-General Drummond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th, the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the *express orders and directions of Sir George Prevost*; a fact established by his despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th November, 1813.

The foresight of the Commander of the forces in providing this force to watch the enemy, and his judgment in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel Morrison to command it, led beyond all doubt,

to the defeat which General Boyd received at Chrystler's farm, and ultimately, by the interruptions thus occasioned to General Wilkinson's plans, to the safety of Lower Canada. That the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost might in some degree have contributed to the success which attended Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry's defence of his position at Chateaugay, the Reviewer seems most unwillingly to admit, while at the same time he imputes to him the base and unworthy attempt of endeavouring to assume to himself the merit which on that occasion was alone due to Colonel De Salaberry.

In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he bestows upon the officer immediately commanding, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.\*

The checks thus received by the forces under Generals Wilkinson and Hampton, from Lieut.-

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\* Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI.

Colonel Morrison, and Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, were, without doubt, no inconsiderable causes of their repulse in the attempt upon Lower Canada; but it was also the duty of the Reviewer to have noticed the prompt and judicious measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, as soon as he had ascertained that General Wilkinson was descending the St. Lawrence to attack Montreal, for the defence of that place, by calling out the whole militia of the district, and by collecting all his disposable force at La Chine, where he commanded in person. The formidable defences which he had prepared both at Coteau du Lac, and at the Cedars, together with the imposing force of militia which had been assembled at a very short notice, must have convinced General Wilkinson that he could not hope to make any impression upon a people who shewed so much zeal and alacrity in defending themselves, and who were commanded by one who possessed their entire confidence and affection. Under these circumstances, and from the opposition already experienced to his attempt, the American Commander resolved to abandon it as impracticable, more particularly as he found himself without support from General Hampton, who had retired towards Lake Champlain.

In detailing the events of the campaign of 1814, the Reviewer has again not scrupled, in

his account of Captain Pring's expedition to Vergennes, to distort the truth, for the purpose of attaching the blame of this failure to Sir George Prevost. So far from the Commander of the forces refusing to Captain Pring the assistance of the troops stationed at Isle aux Noix, as the Reviewer asserts,\* a strong detachment of the marines then in garrison at that post, was embarked on board of his squadron, and the despatch to Lord Bathurst from Sir George Prevost, of the 18th of May, 1814,† proves that this expedition was planned and directed by the Commander of the forces, and probably failed from the circumstance alone of Captain Pring being prevented by baffling winds for four days from reaching his destination, before the enemy had time to mature their preparations for defence.

A similar degree of incorrectness prevails in the Reviewer's statements with regard to the force retained by Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada. That Lower Canada, in the middle of April, 1814,‡ had nothing to dread, may be confidently denied. On the 22d and 30th March, two attempts had been made by General Wilkinson to penetrate into that Province by the

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\* Review, p. 440.

† Vide Extracts in the Appendix, No. XXVII.

‡ Review, p. 441.

Montreal frontier, and in the latter instance, in considerable force. Though he was repulsed in both cases, and in the latter with severe loss, he still continued to keep a considerable body of men on the frontier line, from which he did not withdraw until towards the middle of May.\* Sackett's Harbour, instead of being weakly garrisoned, had been strengthened by two regiments from General Wilkinson's army, besides other reinforcements; and our fleet on Lake Ontario was so far from being at that period ready for sea, that it was not until the 14th of April, that the two ships, which were to constitute its principal strength, had been launched, nor was our squadron in a situation to take the Lake until the beginning of May. The only reinforcements which, up to this period in 1814, and even until the beginning of June, had arrived in Lower Canada, were the 2d battalion of the 8th regiment, which the foresight of the Commander of the forces had induced him to draw in the depth of winter by land from New Brunswick, whence they arrived in the month of March, together with 200 picked seamen from Admiral Griffiths for the fleet on Lake Ontario, without a single accident. This regiment is enumerated by the Reviewer amongst his nine regular regiments of infantry, with three squadrons of dragoons, six

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\* Review, pp. 440, 441.

strong battalions of militia, and a numerous *division* of artillery, the *whole* of which he has untruly asserted, were crowded together in inactivity at Chambly, behind a strong frontier, without an enemy to oppose them;\* adding, that although reinforcements were daily arriving or expected, not a man was sent to strengthen the inadequate force on the Niagara frontier, until the middle of July, when only two of the Peninsular regiments were reluctantly yielded for that service. Of the nine regular regiments of infantry, of which the Reviewer speaks, one was De Meuron's foreign corps, another the Canadian Fencibles, a third a battalion of Marines, a fourth the Canadian Voltigeurs, militia-men, subject to militia law, and whose force at the utmost was 450 men. Of the real regular regiments, viz. the 8th, 13th, 16th, 49th, and 70th, the 16th did not arrive until June, together with two companies of artillery. This regiment was almost immediately stationed at Montreal, where it remained the whole of July, and in August was despatched to Upper Canada. The 70th garrisoned Quebec, with a portion of artillery, and a small corps, composed of the recruits of the other regiments in the Province. The 13th was in advance at St. John, and La Cole Mill, and the battalion of marines garrisoned Isle aux

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\* Review, p. 441.

Noix. Of the six battalions of embodied militia, one was at La Prairie, and another, if not two of the others, at different parts of the frontier; the Voltigeurs were also in advance, and part of the Canadian fencibles were at Coteau du Lac. From this statement, made out from documents, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, it will appear that the troops under Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province, which were barely adequate to its defence, in lieu of being all assembled at Chambly, were stationed in different parts of the Province, where their services were most required, and that they did not at any time, collectively form the camp of instruction of which the Reviewer speaks. Previous even to the 1st of May, when the Reviewer has stated that Sir James Yeo was ready with his fleet for any operation, no part of this force could, consistently with the safety of Lower Canada, have been despatched for the reinforcement of General Drummond. Still less could a sufficient portion of it have been spared, to have enabled that officer, with any prospect of success, to attempt an attack on Sackett's Harbour. General Drummond was, in fact, aware that, from the period of the first attack on that place, in May, 1813, the enemy had been indefatigable in fortifying it, and that it was at all times guarded by a large body of regular troops and militia, together with a number of able and experienced

seamen. Nothing, therefore, short of the full co-operation of a superior fleet, and a large body of troops, could have afforded him a well-grounded expectation of succeeding. General Drummond well knew that, up to May, 1814, and for some time afterwards, no force of this description could be spared from the Lower Province. However desirable he might have thought it, to destroy the naval depôt at Sackett's Harbour, he knew that no adequate means were within his power, or that of the Commander of the forces; and until, by fresh reinforcements from England, those means should be acquired, he was obliged to content himself with operations compatible with his resources. We accordingly find that, as soon as the fleet was in readiness to take the Lake, General Drummond, in consequence of the previous communication which had taken place between Sir George Prevost and himself, undertook the expedition against Oswego, which terminated in the capture of that place, together with a quantity of stores, provisions, and ordnance, most of which being designed for the squadron at Sackett's Harbour, must have materially delayed its equipment. Of this enterprise the Reviewer has thought proper to say nothing, because he knew that it might in a great degree be attributed to the measures of Sir George Prevost. For a similar reason he has altogether omitted to notice the extraordinary

and energetic measures which had been adopted by the Commander of the forces, for relieving Michilimachinac, and affording to that garrison an important reinforcement of troops, seamen, and provisions, under the command of an able and experienced officer, who afterwards gave ample proofs of his courage and talents in his successful defence of that post against a powerful attack of the enemy. The reinforcement of that distant position, whilst the enemy were in possession of the whole of the Michigan territory, and by a route never before attempted, reflected the greatest credit upon the Commander of the forces who directed, and upon Lieutenant Colonel M'Douall, who executed, this arduous enterprise, which was highly important in its consequences as respected our Indian allies, and the safety of the Upper Province. Independently of this reinforcement to the troops in Upper Canada, we shall find that Sir George Prevost continued mindful of Lieutenant-General Drummond's situation, and desirous of assisting him, as soon as the means of doing so were placed within his power. It has been already shewn, that out of the force which the Commander of the forces possessed for the defence of Lower Canada, and of which the Reviewer has given so incorrect a statement, the 2nd battalion of the 8th arrived from New Brunswick in March, and the 16th with two compa-

nies of artillery in June. It was not until the month of July that the next reinforcements, consisting of the 90th regiment, from the West Indies, and the 6th and 82nd from the army under the Duke of Wellington, reached Montreal. These three regiments were immediately sent forward to the Niagara frontier. The despatch to the Secretary of State, announcing the arrival of these troops, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the reasons which had hitherto prevented Sir George Prevost from strengthening General Drummond's force in the Upper Province. In the beginning of June, and previously to the arrival of these reinforcements, Sir James Yeo had retired into port after blockading Sackett's Harbour; and from that period, until October, the enemy had the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Our operations in Upper Canada were, therefore, necessarily confined to the defensive; and although the superior numbers of the enemy gave them at times an advantage over us, and occasioned a considerable loss of valuable lives, the efforts made by the Commander of the forces, to supply these losses, enabled General Drummond successfully to maintain the contest, and to prevent the Americans from gaining any permanent footing in the Province. Upon the arrival of the Nova Scotia Fencibles, a battalion of the Royals, and the 97th regiment towards the end of July, the latter regiment was imme-

diately sent to Kingston, and Sir George Prevost continued to make every exertion to reinforce the army on the Niagara frontier.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the much misrepresented affair of Plattsburg, the orders under which Sir George Prevost acted, and the plan of operations proposed upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington's army, it will be necessary to expose the perverted statement with which the Quarterly Reviewer has introduced his account of this expedition. "In *June* and *July*," he says, "a numerous fleet arrived in the St. Lawrence from Bourdeaux, with the flower of the Duke of Wellington's army."\* Now connecting this paragraph with the one that follows soon afterwards—"that the Peninsular troops were suffered to ascend no higher than the ill-fated camp of Chambly, where they were detained *during the whole month of August*"†—it is evident that the Reviewer meant his readers to believe that the brigades, under Generals Robinson, Brisbane, Power, and Kempt, had arrived in Canada in June and July, so as to enable Sir George Prevost to assemble them for any service at Chambly by the beginning of August, and yet that he kept them the whole of that month unemployed. It appears, however, from Sir George

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\* Review, p. 442.

† Ibid. p. 443.

Prevost's despatches to Lord Bathurst, dated 28th June, 1814, that the only part of the Duke of Wellington's army, which arrived in June, were the 6th and 82nd regiments. The transports having those regiments on board passed Quebec for Montreal, about the 26th of that month, but did not reach the latter place until the first or second week in July, from whence they were immediately pushed forward to reinforce Lieutenant-General Drummond on the Niagara frontier. The brigade under Major-General Power, which was accompanied by Major-General Brisbane, did not arrive at Quebec until late in July; indeed so late, that Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst announcing their arrival, states, that they would scarcely be able to arrive at Montreal, with every exertion, before the *20th of August*. The two last brigades, under Generals Kempt and Robinson, arrived still later; and Sir George Prevost's despatch of the 5th August, 1814, announcing their approach to Quebec, stated that it would be impossible, with every exertion, to collect the whole force, viz. all the brigades in the neighbourhood of Montreal, *before the end of that month*. In fact, it was not until towards the end of August, that two of the brigades above mentioned were assembled at Chambly, and in the neighbourhood; the other brigade, under Major-General Kempt, being stationed partly at

Montreal, and partly in advance towards Kingston, in order to be in readiness for the service for which it was designed, whenever our ascendancy on Lake Ontario should be required.

In his next observations, the Reviewer has confounded both dates and facts, in order to make it appear that Sir George Prevost knew not how to dispose of the succours which had reached him; with which, in the Reviewer's opinion,\* he ought instantly to have made a rapid movement towards Lake Ontario, for the purpose of attacking Sackett's Harbour; an attempt which, it is stated, should have been made whilst Sir James Yeo was blockading that place, instead of wasting some of the most valuable months of the summer in the camp at Chambly:† and further, that the march of General Izzard to Sackett's Harbour, with 3,000 or 4,000 regular troops, was a proof that the American Government felt (although our Commander did not), that all objects on the frontier were insignificant, in comparison with the protection of the numerous squadron which was blockaded in their ports on Lake Ontario.

Unfortunately for the Reviewer's consistency, he had previously stated, that in consequence of Commodore Chauncey having prepared two new frigates for sea, Sir James Yeo disconti-

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\* Review, p. 443.

† Ibid.

nued his blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and retired to Kingston, to await the equipment of the *St. Lawrence*, and that during the months of *August* and *September*, *Chauncey held the Lake*.

General Izzard was despatched to Sackett's Harbour about the *end of August*, or *1st of September*, and consequently the American Government, from the Reviewer's own shewing, could not at that time have any apprehensions for their *numerous squadron*, blockaded in *their Port on Lake Ontario*. So far indeed from the American squadron being at this time in danger, Kingston, and Sir James Yeo's numerous squadron, were actually at the period of General Izzard's march to Sackett's Harbour, most rigorously blockaded by Chauncey, and so continued for nearly six weeks afterwards. Sackett's Harbour was in fact only blockaded by Sir James Yeo, from the beginning of May to the beginning of June, at which latter period he relinquished the blockade, and did not make his appearance on the Lake until the middle of October following.

It has been already shewn what Sir George Prevost's force really consisted of, in the Lower Province, during the period of this blockade, and until the month of July, when the first reinforcements from France reached him. These reinforcements were immediately sent to the Upper

Province. It is consequently most evident that he did not then possess the means of attacking Sackett's Harbour, and that after the blockade had ceased, tenfold the means he possessed would not have sufficed for the service, without the co-operation of the fleet.\*

It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts, which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake.

It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably influenced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was directed to be employed. The circumstances under which the war had been commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground of

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\* As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII.

war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the Government and people of Great Britain. The efforts, however, which they were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government from furnishing any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the talents, zeal, and energy of their Commander, for the defence of the country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, however, as the peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's Government resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to retaliate upon America her unjust aggressions, and to carry the war into such parts of her territory as might prove most assailable. In consequence of this determination, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississippi were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from Bourdeaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said, "The object of your operations will be, First, To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His Majesty's

possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and *Lake Champlain*, come under the first description."—"Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champlain, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, *always, however, taking care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance*"—"At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the American territory, *as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command.*" It must be evident to every person in the least acquainted with the territories of America bordering upon the Canadas, that none of the objects of offensive warfare contemplated in the foregoing despatch could be undertaken without the aid and co-operation of a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Majesty's Government might be aware of the impossibility of complying with the views and wishes above described, until the naval ascendancy should be secured on Lakes Ontario and Champlain; Sir George Prevost, in his despatch

to Lord Bathurst, of the 12th July, before referred to, expresses his opinion on this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received from Sir James Yeo, and the officer commanding our naval forces on the Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readiness before the middle of September.

Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed. The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's

consideration. The enemy had at that time a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depôt at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to cooperate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depôt at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not assailable in any other quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were.

The State of Vermont on the east shore of the Lake might, indeed, have been entered from St. Amand, and our townships on that frontier, without the assistance of our squadron. But

independently of there not being any object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it advisable, it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly passing by that route from the United States into Canada; a fact which is not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy which Sir George Prevost pursued during the American warfare. As the destruction of the enemy's naval depôt on Lake Champlain was then the only operation contemplated by His Majesty's Government, which could be undertaken with any prospect of success, Sir George Prevost with a view to that object, had, immediately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd June, above referred to, used every possible exertion to accelerate the building of the new ship at Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed to be employed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir George Prevost's correspondence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly called the particular attention of that officer to

the manning of the squadron for Lake Champlain.\* In addition to this, his correspondence with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that object.

The *Confiance* was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first brigade of troops quartered at Chambly; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Having here received information that General Izard had suddenly quitted his position at Champlain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had established a footing on the Niagara frontier, and was pressing upon Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to cooperate,) in the hope by this movement of check-

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\* The extract from a letter addressed by Sir James Yeo, to Sir George Prevost, given in the Appendix, No. XXIX. will shew his opinion of the manner in which the Lake Champlain Squadron was manned.

ing General Izzard's progress, and of thus making a diversion in favour of General Drummond. Our troops accordingly crossed the frontier line, and on the 3d of September took possession of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simpson's Inn, about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superintended the building of the *Confiance*, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his services peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly and unexpectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval force on the *Richelieu*, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the 3rd September, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to superintend the equipment of the new ship. On the 5th of September, the day on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter assured the Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate with the army in less than forty-eight hours; that he had correctly ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet; and that in consequence he

entertained no apprehensions of the result of an action. Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day, the 6th September, the army advanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified position on the crest of the hills.

No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked;\* but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to have daylight, as the movement was to be made through so thick and in-

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\* The following is the Reviewer's mode of stating this:—  
 "Had the Commander-in-Chief suffered these works to be assaulted *as was eagerly proposed to him* on the same evening, there is no question but they must have fallen with scarcely an effort before a single brigade."—p. 445.

tricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried.

As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough reconnoitring of the enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he commu-

nicated the enemy's force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter\* dated the 7th September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aide-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major Fulton's statement† on this subject, shews most clearly the views which Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours. Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication, although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his

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\* Vide the whole of this Correspondence in the Appendix, No. XXX.

† This statement and those of the General and other officers, subsequently referred to, all of which are under the hand, and many of them attested by the oaths of the parties, contain the facts relative to the expedition against Plattsburg, to which those officers would have been ready to depose before a Court-Martial.

being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, "that his ship was *not ready, and that until she should be, it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy;*" and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be assumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any assistance in his approaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous attack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of which we may be assured that he had not a doubt,

Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might

soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke *before the fleet had made its appearance, and before the scaling of their guns was heard.* It seems by the time on shore to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confidence had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the com-

mencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops, which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on the Lake, and from the enemy, Major-General Brisbane's brigade had formed, and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power should have passed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of the works which were the object of attack. Unfortunately, during this period, and whilst the

two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction, by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were counter-marched, but before they could recover the right direction, full three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost—an invaluable portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On approaching the ford, it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the assault. Major Cochrane was therefore despatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the fleet having at that time surrendered, Sir George Prevost most reluctantly gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts, and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he considered his paramount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing

through the wood to the enemy's position. Under these circumstances, General Robinson felt himself bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the attack.

Having thus given a full and correct statement of the circumstances which attended the enterprise against Plattsburg, it is necessary to notice the animadversions which have been made upon the military character of Sir George Prevost, in consequence of the unfortunate result of that expedition. In no instance has the conduct of Sir George Prevost been attacked with more virulence and injustice, than by the writer in the *Quarterly Review*, whose representations are, as the reader must already have perceived, in the highest degree incorrect.

The charges which have been brought forward by the Reviewer and by others are, that Sir George Prevost improperly urged Captain Downie into action before his ship was adequately prepared; that he disregarded the signal for the supposed co-operation between the army and the fleet, as solemnly agreed upon by himself and Captain Downie, and neglected to assault the fort when our fleet was engaged with the enemy; and lastly, that he did not, after the defeat of our squadron, persist in his attack upon the fort, by which it is pretended, that our fleet might still have been saved.

With regard to the accusation, that Captain

Downie was prematurely hurried, against his better judgment, into an unequal contest with the enemy, the correspondence between that officer and Sir George Prevost already referred to, fully negatives any such supposition. The co-operation of the fleet being deemed essentially necessary to the success of the land-forces, Sir George Prevost was naturally anxious that Captain Downie should be prepared as early as possible to meet the enemy. It has been seen, that upon the 7th of September, Captain Downie informed the Commander of the forces, that it would take a day or two at least, before the *Confiance* would be in an efficient state, and that the engagement did not take place till the 11th, four days after the above communication. So far was Sir George Prevost from attempting by "taunt and inuendo"\* improperly to hurry the fleet into action, that in his letter to Captain Downie, of the 9th of September, he says, "I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from delay, *as I am well convinced you have done every thing in your power to accelerate the armament and equipment of your squadron*, and I am also satisfied that nothing will prevent its coming off Plattsburg the moment it is ready." On the same day Captain Downie announced his intention of commencing

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\* Review, p. 446.

an attack on the enemy's squadron the ensuing morning. Up to this time, therefore, it appears that however anxious Sir George Prevost was to make an immediate attack upon Plattsburg, for which purpose the assistance of the fleet was requisite, he never urged Captain Downie to engage the enemy while unprepared, but on the contrary, expressed his confidence that the moment *the fleet was ready*, it would appear before Plattsburg.

An expression in Sir George Prevost's letter, of the 10th, has indeed been construed by the Quarterly Reviewer into a "taunt," which is supposed to have driven Captain Downie to an engagement against his cooler judgment. In that letter the Commander of the forces, after informing Captain Downie that in consequence of his communication of the 9th, the troops had been held in readiness since six in the morning to storm the enemy's works: thus continues, "I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." It must be obvious that many other causes, independent of the wind, might have prevented Captain Downie from sailing as he had intended to do on the 9th, although the state of the wind was in fact the real cause of the delay. In consequence of the despatch used in equipping his ship, articles

might have been overlooked or omitted, which at the last moment only might have been discovered to be indispensably necessary; accidents might have happened to different parts of the squadron in their progress, and even the reinforcements of soldiers from the 39th, although they had been immediately ordered upon his requisition, might not, from various circumstances, have been supplied in time. All, or any of these causes might, as they naturally did, suggest themselves to the mind of the Commander of the forces, and his anxiety to be correctly informed upon the subject, as naturally induced him to express himself to Captain Downie in the terms above stated. It is in the highest degree improbable, that Captain Downie could for a moment construe those expressions in an unfavourable sense. But whatever might have been his impression, it is evident, that a letter written on the 10th, could not have influenced the determination which he took on the 9th, of engaging the enemy the following morning.

Nor will the assertion, that Sir George Prevost disregarded the supposed signal of co-operation, and neglected to attack the fort according to his promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruction of the enemy's fleet being the primary object of the expedition, and until that was effected,

the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George Prevost resolved not to assault the fort until he was satisfied that our squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the forces, nor any one in our army allowed themselves to entertain a single doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to assault the enemy's works simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action, and that Captain Downie was aware of that determination, appears from the correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on the part of the Commander of the forces to support, assist, or co-operate with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George Prevost had satisfied himself by personal observation, and by the most accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anchored out of range of the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that officer any hope or promise of assistance was consequently out of the question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same time, or

before the fort was assaulted, but of no consequence whatever to Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the naval Commander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his intention of making nearly a simultaneous attack, *as part of his own plan of operations*, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had been in readiness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the time when the fleets should engage, but there is not the *slightest* ground for believing that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as importing an agreement to assist him by a simultaneous attack on shore, he would certainly have answered that communication, and have availed himself of the services of Captain Watson, who was left with him for that purpose, to express to the Commander of the forces his reliance on the promised aid, and his assurance that it was the

state of the wind alone, which had prevented him from appearing with the fleet on the morning of the 10th, as he had intended. At the time when this letter was written by the Commander of the forces, he was ignorant of the causes which had delayed the fleet, and he was ignorant, likewise, of Captain Downie's further intentions, with regard to the time when he would be prepared to attack the enemy's squadron. Had Captain Downie, therefore, relied, in the slightest degree, on the co-operation of the land forces, he would have informed Sir George Prevost of the exact time when he contemplated an engagement, that the troops on shore might be prepared to second his efforts. No reply, however, was despatched by him to the Commander of the forces, who thus remained in uncertainty with regard to the actual state and condition of the squadron, and the intentions of its commander. Captain Watson, whose directions were to proceed immediately to head-quarters, with intelligence of the sailing of the squadron, should not Captain Downie have previously despatched him, did not arrive until after the fleet had made its appearance. It has, indeed, been asserted, by the Quarterly Reviewer, that the scaling of the guns of our squadron was to be the signal for the advance of the columns of attack. This misstatement appears to have arisen out of the evidence which was given before the Court-Martial

on Captain Pring; for in no other place is any allusion to such a fact to be discovered. The error of that statement, which, without doubt, was unintentional, is manifest. The signal in question is said to have been concerted with Major Coore on the 10th, when, in fact, no interview or communication whatever took place between him and Captain Downie on that day; and that no such signal was mentioned to the former on the 8th, the day on which he *did* see Captain Downie, is a fact to which the Major (now Colonel Coore) is ready to bear witness. In all probability Captain Watson, who was with Captain Downie on the 10th, was the person who was mistaken for Major Coore, and to him Captain Downie might have communicated his intention of scaling his guns, previous to rounding Cumberland Head, in order to announce to the Commander of the forces the approach of the squadron. Whatever may have been the nature of Captain Downie's communication by Captain Watson, it is certain that it never reached Sir George Prevost.

It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection or support to our squadron, much less that there existed any "solemn agreement" to that effect.

It must also be evident, from the previous statement, that the attack on shore did actually take place at the commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th, and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the Reviewer\* himself must have known, is usual, by an order *to cook*, when the time will admit.† It has also been shewn, that early on the morning of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the forces on shore to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the *Confiance* began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the assault. Our batteries;

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\* Review, p. 446.

† In the celebrated action between our fleet, commanded by Lord Howe, and that of the French, on the 1st of June, 1794, whilst they were in sight of each other, and preparing for action, the order was given for our men to go to breakfast. See Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 272—307.

as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the *Confiance*. Until confidently assured that the fleets would engage (and many circumstances might have intervened to prevent it even after the appearance of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately ordered to take their position for the assault.

Although our naval official accounts of the transaction state the engagement to have lasted for two hours and a half, that is from eight o'clock in the morning until half-past ten, when the *Confiance* struck, the American naval account, which is corroborated by the testimony of all who witnessed the action from the shore, represents the engagement to have terminated in about an hour and a half. The American account also corresponds with the statements of our officers on shore, that our fleet did not round Cumberland Head until between eight and nine o'clock, before which time all the statements of persons on shore agree in admitting that the action did not begin on the part of our fleet. With regard to the period when the engagement terminated, all the accounts appear to coincide. It has already been shewn, that notwithstanding the un-

fortunate mistake of the attacking columns taking a wrong route, they had at that very period forced the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the vicinity of the enemy's works, and prepared to make an instant assault, and that the unexpected result of the naval action was the sole cause which induced Sir George Prevost to countermand that assault. It now remains to explain more fully the reasons of the Commander of the forces for giving those orders, which will afford an answer to the last charge brought against him.

It has been often and confidently asserted, that both the enemy's squadron and our own were within reach of the guns of the works. It is not, therefore, surprising that an unfavourable impression should have been made upon the minds of many persons with regard to the policy of not persevering in an attack, which might, under such circumstances, have led to the recovery of our own fleet, or the destruction of that of the enemy. The fact of the relative situation of the two squadrons and of the enemy's works, has, like most of the other facts connected with this expedition, been grossly misrepresented. Had an opportunity been offered by a public investigation of the transaction, it could and would have been satisfactorily proved, that neither of the fleets was within the range of the enemy's guns from any part of their works, and

that their own squadron was anchored more than a mile and a half from the shore.

The grounds of the Reviewer's statement upon this subject it is impossible to ascertain; but, in opposition to what he affirms\* on the testimony of Captain Pring, and "*numerous other eye-witnesses,*" it can be proved by testimony from on board the *Confiance*, as well as by officers without number on shore, that she was taken possession of within half an hour after she struck; and it can also be proved, in opposition to the decided opinion of the number of officers, who are stated to have visited Plattsburg after the peace, that the anchorage of the American squadron was not within range of the forts.

The evidence of the greater part of the General Officers accompanying the expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action; of the commanding officer, and others of the Artillery; of naval men on board of our fleet, and of various other persons on shore, could and would have been produced upon the trial of the question, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed his squadron in such a situation, that by

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\* Review, p. 448.

possibility they could be annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident intention of Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would in such a case have fallen? That he was aware of the danger to which his squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the circumstance before adverted to, of his having moved further into the Bay from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander thus took, was one in which, according to his judgment, he could not have been annoyed by the fall of the works on shore, an event for which he was prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was entertained by Captain Hensley, of the American brig, *Eagle*, who had himself reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anchored, and which upon his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently out of the range of the guns from the shore. If any thing more were wanting in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject. The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the Ameri-

can Naval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person.

*“ Portsmouth, New Hampshire,  
July 3, 1815.*

“ Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday; the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not been received, or it assuredly should have been attended to.

In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on the 11th September, 1814.

I am, with much respect,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) J. MACDONOUGH.”

“ *Cadwr. Colden, Esq.*”

*“ City of New York, June 15, 1815.*

“ Sir,

I should have replied earlier to your letter of the 26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a mass of communications on the subject of the army.

With respect to the distance of the American squadron from the batteries at Plattsburg, I will

state that it is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I know from a fruitless attempt made to elevate our guns so as to bear on the British squadron during the action of the 11th of September last. No guns, however, were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach. This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the *Confiance*—her heaviest metal falling several hundred yards short of the shore when closely engaged with our vessels.

With a hope that this reply will be satisfactory, I subscribe myself,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) ALEX. MACOMB."

*" Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."*

*" New York, August 1, 1815.*

" Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the distance of the American squadron from the batteries of Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it is my decided opinion that the American squadron was upwards of three thousand yards dis-

tant from the batteries, being confirmed in that belief from observations made on the actual range of the heaviest guns of the British ship, *Confiance*, when fired towards the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five hundred yards.

With respectful consideration,

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) ALEX. MACOMB."

*" To Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."*

If therefore our squadron could not have been recovered, or that of the enemy annoyed or injured by the capture of their works on shore, it may be asked, what advantages could have resulted from persevering in the attack? It has been already shewn that the primary object of this expedition was the destruction of the enemy's flotilla on the Lake. Had that object been accomplished, Plattsburg might have been occupied by our troops, and from thence, with the assistance of our squadron, they might have been transported to other parts of the Lake for the further annoyance of the enemy. The loss of our squadron, however, immediately rendered all these important operations impracticable. Without the assistance of a fleet, nothing beyond the occupation of Plattsburg could have been accomplished. That Plattsburg would have fallen, neither the Commander of the forces, nor

a man under him, could have entertained a doubt. The enemy were indeed strongly entrenched, and under works, which afforded complete shelter to several thousand expert marksmen, from whose fire our troops must have suffered most severely; but granting, that after a considerable loss, we had carried the enemy's works, what adequate advantages should we have gained? To retain Plattsburg was not possible without the assistance of a fleet, which would have been necessary to the provisioning of our army; a retreat, therefore, after destroying all we could not carry away, would have been indispensable. Such was, however, the state of the season and of the weather, that 24 hours delay in retiring with our troops to Canada, would not only have made such a measure dangerous, from the advance of the enemy in every direction, but would have rendered the conveyance of our ordnance and stores exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The militia of the state of New York and Vermont were turning out, and rapidly increasing in numbers; and although in the open field our troops would justly have despised them, they would have proved most formidable in the woods, and hanging upon the flank and rear of a retreating army. Sir George Prevost knew that he had only to give the word, and that his gallant troops would accomplish

all his wishes,\* but he knew at the same time how useless the acquisition would be, and how costly the sacrifice at which it was probable it would be made. He was also bound to bear in mind the instructions of His Majesty's Government, with regard to the committal of the force under him, so necessary for the preservation of the Provinces entrusted to his care.

He therefore wisely determined to retreat, whilst retreat was practicable, and whilst it could be effected with the least possible loss. The order was accordingly given for that purpose, and such was the energy and promptitude of the execution, that the retreat was conducted without the smallest molestation from the enemy, who, in fact, were not aware of it until it was nearly completed. Notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the roads, from the rains which were falling, not a gun was left behind; and, although the subject has been much exaggerated, yet in fact only a very small quantity

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\* Notwithstanding the opinion entertained by Sir George Prevost and the army regarding the probable fall of Plattsburg, it must be recollected that failure was possible, and that nearly at this very period we had been disappointed in our attempts both upon Baltimore and New Orleans. The opinion of the Americans themselves upon this subject, will be found well expressed in an extract from a Burlington paper (State of Vermont) of that period, given in the Appendix, No. XXXI.

of provisions and stores, together with *fifteen* wounded men in hospital, was left to the enemy. Of deserters, the utmost amount was under 300 men, which was the consequence, not as has been falsely asserted, of the *retreat*,\* but of the *advance*, many of them having deserted upon our entry, and as we afterwards penetrated into the American territory; a consequence which almost invariably attended every attack upon their frontier, and was most strongly manifested in Colonel Scott's expedition, in December, 1813, against part of General Wilkinson's army, when, out of a force of not more than 500 men, he lost upwards of 90 by desertion.

The exaggerated account of this retreat having induced his Majesty's government to call upon Sir George Prevost for a more particular detail of the losses attending it, it appears, by Sir George Prevost's reply to Lord Bathurst's despatch on the subject, together with the documents accompanying it, that the whole loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, from the time of the army entering the American territory, until it was withdrawn, did not amount to 500 men. This affords a complete answer to one of the Reviewer's concluding mis-statements, that when Sir George Prevost wrote the despatch from Montreal, though dated at Platts-

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\* Review, p. 447.

burg,\* “ he knew that the desertion of 800 men had attended his shameful defeat.”

The unfortunate loss of our fleet, and the consequent withdrawing of our troops from the American territory, afforded an opportunity to the party opposed to Sir George Prevost’s civil administration in Canada, of which they immediately and eagerly availed themselves, of circulating the most unfounded statements, and the most exaggerated accounts, with respect to both those transactions. These were industriously transmitted to England by a private ship belonging to one of Sir George Prevost’s most violent opponents, and upon their arrival, and in the absence of any official accounts of the transactions to which they referred, they created a general belief that the disastrous result of the naval action had been occasioned by a want of co-operation from the shore; that the retreat had been conducted in a precipitate and disgraceful manner; that a severe loss of men, guns, stores, and provisions, had been the consequence of it; and that the whole army was indignant at the conduct of their commander. The arrival of Sir George Prevost’s despatches, together with the explanations afforded, as well by them as by the person to whom they had been given in charge, could not fail to undeceive His Ma-

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\* Review, p. 448.

jesty's Government on this subject, and to convince them of the grossness of the misrepresentations which had gone forth. Had not some expressions in Sir James Yeo's letter, accompanying the account of the naval action, been construed into charges against Sir George Prevost, which, in justice to him, as well as to the public, it was deemed proper to call upon him to answer, there cannot be a doubt but that the further management of the war in the Canadas would still have been entrusted to the Commander who had hitherto so successfully conducted it. Even if the subsequent conduct of Sir James Yeo did not afford ample proof of the fact, there is not wanting other evidence to shew that the letter in question was written by him under the irritation of the moment, and in consequence of Captain Pring's communication to him of the result of the naval action, but without any intention of making a charge against Sir George Prevost, and without the most distant idea that it could be so construed. Sir James Yeo must have possessed too honourable a mind to become a guest in Sir George Prevost's family, and to partake of his attention and hospitality, had he for a moment supposed that his public letter, on the subject of the naval action at Plattsburg, could have been construed into a formal accusation. Had he really meant it as such, he would most undoubtedly, in a manly and open

manner, have communicated the proceeding he had adopted to the party accused; and, under such circumstances, would, no less certainly, have refused the kindness and attention of the person of whom he had publicly expressed so unfavourable an opinion. That this must have been the case may further be inferred, from the circumstance that, although Sir George Prevost was recalled to answer the charges, amounting to three in number, supposed to be contained in Sir James Yeo's letter, it was not until more than four months after both these officers arrived in England, that the precise charges upon which he was to take his trial, were officially communicated to him, and which charges differed materially from those in Sir James Yeo's letter. Whether, under these circumstances, Sir James Yeo would have supported the charges, had the investigation taken place, cannot now be determined; but a confident appeal may be made to the intelligent reader, whether, upon the facts disclosed in these pages being made known, such an attempt must not have utterly failed.

With regard to the naval action on Lake Champlain, we are unwilling to say more than may be necessary for the vindication of the character and conduct of Sir George Prevost. The real causes of the disastrous result of that affair, were such as particularly belong to naval actions, and which, when they do occur, must

materially influence the issue of the conflict. It is not a little remarkable, that the naval Court-martial on Captain Pring and his officers, should have overlooked or disregarded these causes; and it is greatly to be regretted, that they should have thought themselves justified in ascribing the disaster to the conduct of Sir George Prevost, and in passing so severe a censure upon an officer of another service, of whose orders and instructions they must necessarily have been ignorant, and who was neither present to defend himself, nor amenable to their jurisdiction. It is clear that it was Captain Downie's intention, on going into action, to lay his own ship, in the size and strength of which he seemed to place great confidence, along side of the American Commodore; but the unfortunate failure of the wind, before he could accomplish this object, obliged him to anchor at a distance of more than half a mile from his opponent; the same circumstance also induced Captain Pring, in the *Linnet*, to take his situation still farther from the enemy. But even this disadvantage would probably not have been attended with the consequences which afterwards ensued, had Captain Downie's invaluable life been spared, and had all under him done their duty. The *Finch*, in going into action, grounded out of the line of fire, and was shortly afterwards taken possession of by the enemy. The gun-boats, when the action commenced, were considerably

distant from the enemy's line, and slowly pulling up in apparent confusion. The Chub, very shortly after the action, having her cables shot away, drifted into the enemy's line, and was obliged to surrender. The Confiance, it would thus appear, being left nearly alone to bear the brunt of the whole action; the greater part of the enemy's fire being directed against her; the two schooners gone, and the gun-boats, with the exception of two or three, taking no part in the contest, it is not to be wondered at, that against such fearful odds, the men could not be kept to their guns, and that, notwithstanding the exertions and bravery of the officers, she was compelled to surrender. The real causes of the disaster must, therefore, be sought for in the unfavourable circumstances under which the action commenced; in the squadron's not taking the station which Captain Downie had designed they should; in the early loss of that officer; the grounding of the Finch; the surrender of the Chub, and the desertion of the gun-boats—circumstances more than sufficient to count for the capture of our squadron, without having recourse to a reason which the gallant Downie would have scorned to assign, and which we have already shewn to be without the slightest foundation—namely, the want of a co-operation from the army. Had even the gun-boats done their duty, the result of the action

might, and probably would, have been widely different, as the men on board of the *Confiance* assigned it as one reason for their refusing to stand to their guns, that the gun-boats keeping at a distance, the whole fire of the enemy was directed against the *Confiance*. The Commander of these gun-boats, it is to be observed, was so sensible of his own misconduct, that he shortly after the action, made his escape from Kingston, and was not afterwards heard of. The removal of Captain Fisher from the command of the Lake Champlain squadron, precisely at the period when it was about to be employed in the service before mentioned, was particularly unfortunate; and it was no less so that his zealous offer to Captain Downie, to serve under him in command of the gun-boats, could not be accepted by that officer.

In the month of March, 1815, Sir George Prevost received the despatch communicating to him the Prince Regent's pleasure, that he should return to England to answer the charges preferred against him by Sir James Yeo, and a commission was, at the same time, transmitted to Lieutenant-General Drummond, revoking the appointment of Sir George Prevost as Governor-in-Chief and Commander of the forces in the Canadas, and authorizing General Drummond to assume, provisionally, the chief civil and mili-

tary command of those Provinces. By this measure, Sir George Prevost was compelled either to remain for six weeks, until the navigation of the St. Lawrence should be open—a private individual in the country over which he had so lately presided as its chief magistrate, and exposed to the observations of all who had been hostile to his measures,—or to encounter at a most inclement season the fatigue and dangers of a journey, to be performed, frequently on foot, through the wilderness to New Brunswick. His high and honourable feelings did not permit him to hesitate for a moment as to the course which it was his duty to pursue, and he immediately quitted his government. It was no inconsiderable consolation to him, under circumstances like these, to know that he carried with him on his departure the regret and the good wishes of the inhabitants of Canada, which were manifested, not only by the different addresses and letters\* which were presented to him upon this occasion, but in a still more striking manner, by the terms of a vote of the House of Representatives, who proposed to present to their late Governor-General a service of plate of the value of 5,000*l.* This munificent act, though honoured with the approbation of the Prince Regent, was

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\* Vide Appendix, No. XXXII.

not carried into effect, in consequence of a refusal to accede to it on the part of the legislative council.\*

On the arrival of Sir George Prevost in England, in the month of May, 1815, it was evident that his constitution had suffered a fatal injury. His health had yielded to the excessive fatigues of his journey to New Brunswick, and his illness was aggravated by the delays which he experienced in urging forward the investigation which he so earnestly desired. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Court-martial was not directed to assemble before the month of January, 1816—a delay which proved fatal to his hopes. He died on the 5th January, 1816, in the 49th year of his age.†

That Sir George Prevost was a zealous, ac-

\* A further confirmation of the favourable sentiments entertained in Canada, on the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct and services, during the war, will be found in the extracts given in the Appendix, No. XXXIII. from Christie's *Memoirs of the Administration of the Government of Lower Canada*, and Bouchette's *Topographical Account of that Province*.

† Sir G. Prevost's family, at the time of his decease, consisted of his widow and three children, viz. the present Sir George Prevost and two daughters. He likewise left two brothers, Major-General Wm. Prevost, late Lieutenant-Colonel of the 67th regiment, and James Prevost, Esq. Post-Captain in the Royal Navy. A monument to the memory of her husband was erected by Lady Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, with the inscription which will be found in the Appendix, No. XXXIV.

tive, and faithful servant to his king and country, the preceding pages are amply sufficient to prove. The defence of **Dominica**, and the preservation of the **Canadas** against greatly superior forces, attested his merits as an officer, and excited the admiration of some of the first soldiers of the age. His system, upon both occasions, was necessarily a defensive one; and he has, therefore, lost much of that eclat which attaches to more active operations. But had his field of action been different, he would, doubtless, have displayed the same gallant and enterprising spirit which distinguished him on former occasions, and particularly when he led the assault on **Morne Fortunée**, in the island of **St. Lucie**. Of his total disregard of personal considerations, and of his readiness to sacrifice his own fame for the promotion of the great interests committed to him in America, there cannot be a stronger proof than that afforded by his conduct at **Plattsburg**. He must have been well aware that the capture of the works, especially after the loss of the fleet, would be considered by the public in general as a brilliant exploit, which could not fail to add to his military reputation; and he must also have foreseen the popular outcry which the resolution he adopted would occasion. But those personal feelings gave way to considerations of far greater weight in the mind of a wise, humane, and ho-

nourable soldier. Sir George Prevost had justly calculated the consequences of his probable success—a great loss of valuable lives, the immediate abandonment of his conquest, and an unavoidable and difficult retreat. Although these considerations were far from obvious, and not of a nature to be justly appreciated by the public at large, he chose, without hesitation, that line of conduct which his judgment and heart approved, and, notwithstanding his conviction that this determination would necessarily expose him to much unmerited odium, he resolutely adopted it. His subsequent recal, and premature decease, were undoubtedly the consequences of this measure; but his country will not fail, finally, to do justice to the purity of his motives, and, on an impartial review of his conduct, to rank him amongst its ablest and most faithful defenders.\*

As a civil governor, Sir George Prevost had the gratification of knowing that he was invariably esteemed and respected by the people over whom he was placed. His zeal and devotion to his duties, both in his civil and military character, were eminently conspicuous. No personal considerations, no fatigue, no dangers, ever

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\* The motives by which Sir George Prevost was actuated, upon this occasion, are forcibly expressed in his private despatch to Lord Bathurst, given in the Appendix, No. XXXV.

interfered with what he esteemed the good of the service. Over the public interests he watched with the most sedulous attention. In private life, he was remarkable for the purity of his moral character, for the generosity of his heart, and for his pleasing and conciliatory manners.

In consequence of the lamented death of Sir George Prevost, at the very period when he was on the point of substantiating, before a competent tribunal, his innocence of the charges preferred against him, the care of his honour and reputation devolved upon his widow; nor did she neglect this sacred trust. Soon after Sir George Prevost's decease, his brother, Colonel William Augustus Prevost, addressed a letter to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, in which, after stating the distressing situation in which Sir George Prevost's family were placed, he requested that an investigation of his brother's conduct might be ordered before a court of inquiry. A reference to the Judge-Advocate was made upon the subject, who was of opinion that such an inquiry could not properly be instituted. Immediately after this determination, Lady Prevost represented, by letter, to the Commander-in-Chief, the painful circumstances in which she was placed. She intreated his Royal Highness to extend his protection to herself and her family, and to procure from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent a gracious consideration

of their claims, to such marks of distinction as might be due to the memory of the deceased. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief, who assured Lady Prevost, that he would gladly do any thing calculated to alleviate her distress, but that he declined interfering with the Prince Regent on the subject, to whom he was of opinion it could only be regularly submitted by His Majesty's ministers.

A memorial was accordingly drawn up by Lady Prevost, which was submitted to the Prince Regent through the regular channel. His Royal Highness, having taken the same into consideration, was graciously pleased publicly to express the high sense entertained by him of the services of Sir George Prevost; conferring, at the same time, as a mark of his approbation, additional armorial bearings to the arms of his family.

The following grant of heraldic distinctions appeared in the London Gazette of 11th September, 1816.

*“ Whitehall, September 3rd.—His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, taking into his royal consideration the distinguished conduct and services of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Baronet, during a long period of constant active employment in situations of great trust, both military and civil, in the course of*

which his gallantry, zeal, and able conduct were particularly displayed at the conquest of the island of St. Lucie, in 1803, and of Martinique, in 1809; as also, in successfully opposing, with a small garrison, the attack made in 1805 by a numerous French force upon the island of Dominica, then under his government; and while Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the British provinces in North America, in the defence of Canada against the repeated invasions perseveringly attempted by the American forces during the late war; and His Royal Highness being desirous of evincing, in an especial manner, the sense which his Royal Highness entertains of these services, by conferring upon his family a lasting memorial of His Majesty's royal favour, hath been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to ordain that the supporters following may be borne and used by Dame Catherine Anne Prevost, widow of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, during her widowhood; viz. "On either side a grenadier of the 16th (or Bedfordshire) regiment of foot, each supporting a banner; that on the dexter side inscribed "West Indies," and that on the sinister, "Canada;" and the said supporters, together with the motto *servatum cineri*, may also be borne by Sir George Prevost, Baronet, son and heir of the said late Lieutenant-General, and by his successors in the said dig-

nity of a baronet, provided the same be first duly exemplified according to the laws of arms, and recorded in the Herald's office. And His Royal Highness hath also been pleased to command, that the said concession and especial mark of Royal favour be registered in His Majesty's College of Arms."

Whilst the impartiality of His Majesty's Government towards the servants of the public is strongly evidenced by the recal of Sir George Prevost from his command in the Canadas, under the circumstances before stated, their sense of justice is no less strongly manifested by the above grant of posthumous honours to his family, whose feelings of satisfaction were greatly heightened by the gratifying manner in which His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief was pleased to express himself upon this occasion, in the following letter.

*" Horse Guards, 17th September, 1816.*

" Madam,

" I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Ladyship's letter of the 12th inst., and to assure you that I am highly gratified to find that His Majesty's Government has adopted a measure grateful to your feelings and honorable to the memory of your late distinguished husband.

I am, Madam,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

FREDERICK."

*Lady Prevost.*

Lady Prevost having thus satisfactorily accomplished the great wish of her heart, the vindication of her husband's injured fame, was almost immediately afterwards attacked by an alarming disorder, evidently occasioned by her severe afflictions, under which, after suffering for several years, she finally sunk in 1821.\* The family of Sir George Prevost, deprived by an untimely death of one parent, and called upon to witness the calamitous state of the other, were neither able nor willing, under such circumstances, to enter into any further discussion upon the merits of their father's conduct, in reply to the anonymous attacks made upon it. They knew that in the opinion of every unprejudiced person, his military character had been fully redeemed from the obloquy cast upon it, by the high and honorable approbation bestowed upon it by his Sovereign, and they had hoped that this strong attestation to Sir George Prevost's worth would have sheltered his name from further attack or reproach. The article in the *Quarterly Review* having disappointed them in this reasonable expectation, it has become imperative upon them to prepare the present statement. Whatever were the objects and motives of the Reviewer, it is certainly not too much

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\* Lady Prevost was the eldest daughter of Major-General Phipps, of the Royal Engineers.

to say, that he has deliberately advanced charges which he knew to be unfounded. The just feelings of indignation which every page of the article in question is calculated to excite, were restrained by the persuasion alone, that it was only requisite that the real facts of the case should be made known, to rescue the memory of an honorable and gallant officer from the aspersions thus wantonly cast upon it. In the Reviewer's assertions, with regard to the preparations for the war; the care of our Provincial Marine; the orders given to the subordinate Commanders; the attack upon Sackett's Harbour; the reinforcing of General Procter's division; the neglect of Captain Barclay's demands; the successes of General Vincent, Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, and others; the disposal of the troops which arrived from Bourdeaux, and the expedition against Plattsburg; in *all* of these instances, the Reviewer has been convicted, by the most unimpeachable evidence, of shameful inaccuracy, and in many of them of gross ignorance and of wilful misrepresentation. In ascribing to the Commander of the forces in the Canadas "vacillation, indecision, and error" at the commencement of the war, it has been shewn that the Reviewer was totally ignorant of, or misconceived the grounds and motives of his policy and conduct, which in the very instances

selected by the critic for censure, received the pointed approbation of His Majesty's Government. To "the want of talent, energy, and enterprise," of which the Reviewer has not scrupled to accuse Sir George Prevost in the prosecution of the war, have been opposed the various measures in which his vigilance and foresight were conspicuous, in planning and directing those successful operations, the merit of which the Reviewer would give to the subordinate Commanders alone. To the charge of neglecting to preserve our marine ascendancy on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, which the Reviewer has styled "the most fatal and palpable error" of Sir George Prevost, and the one in which his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant," a reply has been given not only by facts, in direct contradiction to his assertions, but by the letters of the Naval Commanders on both Lakes; the one from Sir James Yeo, who commanded in chief, in strong approbation of the general attention of the Commander of the forces to the Marine service, and the other from Captain Barclay, directly asserting the falsehood of the Reviewer's statement. The true causes of the failures at Sackett's Harbour and at Plattsburg, which have been so unjustly attributed to Sir George Prevost's misconduct, have been distinctly pointed out, and the wisdom and energy

of his proceedings, upon both those expeditions, clearly established. To the Reviewer's laboured attempts throughout the whole article, to prove that Sir George Prevost was not the real defender of the Canadas, an answer has been given, by shewing, that for three campaigns those provinces were preserved, whilst he held the chief command in them, from the persevering attempts of a powerful and superior enemy, and that to his unwearied efforts, the inhabitants repeatedly expressed their firm conviction that they were mainly indebted for their safety.

The expression of concern and indignation with which the appearance of this Review was instantly met amongst all who were in any degree qualified to form a judgment upon the subject, was highly consolatory to the wounded feelings of Sir George Prevost's family. They have in particular, the greatest satisfaction in presenting to the public the two following letters, addressed to the present Sir George Prevost, by Sir Herbert Taylor, and by Earl Bathurst.

*“ Horse Guards, Nov. 15th, 1822.*

“ Sir,

“ I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, containing a statement,\* “ which the

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\* A few copies of the statements above referred to, which first appeared in the Courier of 13th Nov. 1822, were printed

“ family of the late Lieutenant-General Sir  
 “ George Prevost have felt themselves called  
 “ upon to make public, in reply to a wanton  
 “ and malignant attack which has been recently  
 “ made in an article of the Quarterly Review  
 “ upon his military character and reputation.”

“ His Royal Highness orders me to assure you, that it has not been without great concern and indignation that he has noticed the ungenerous and cowardly attack to which you advert: ungenerous, because, even if it had been borne out by facts, it was calculated to wound most deeply the feelings of respectable and amiable individuals who had not provoked it; cowardly, as being directed by an anonymous libeller against the memory of an officer whose premature death had alone deprived him of the benefit of an investigation into accusations which he was prepared to meet, with the confident expectation that he could successfully refute them. His Royal Highness’ sentiments upon the character, conduct, and services of the late Sir George Prevost, have, upon a former occasion, been conveyed to his family. Those of His Majesty’s Government, in approval of his distinguished services, his gallantry, zeal, and able

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and distributed, under the title of “ A brief Reply to the Calumnies of the last Quarterly Review, against the military character and reputation of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart.”

conduct, are recorded in a public act of His Majesty's, dated 4th September, 1816, which you have inserted in your statement. To that record His Royal Highness conceives that you may with confidence appeal for a refutation of the calumnies recently published; and having adverted to that document, so honorable to the memory of the late Sir George Prevost, His Royal Highness considers that he needs only to add, that nothing has since the date of it come to his knowledge, which can shake the opinion he then entertained in perfect unison with the sentiments therein expressed.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

H. T. TAYLOR."

*" Sir George Prevost, Bart.  
Oriel College, Oxford."*

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*" Cirencester, Nov. 13, 1822.*

*" Sir,*

*" I have had the honour of receiving your letter, inclosing a statement which you inform me that the family of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost consider themselves compelled to make public, in reply to some attack which has recently been made upon his memory.*

“ In returning the statement, I can only say that I read with the utmost regret the cruel attack which has been so unwarrantably made in the *Quarterly Review* upon your Father’s memory, and can well understand the anxiety which his family must feel to refute it as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

BATHURST.

“ *Sir George Prevost, Bart.  
Oriel College, Oxford.*”

The family of the late Sir George Prevost, justly proud of the sentiments thus expressed by such high authorities upon his character and conduct, consider any further attempt to vindicate his fame as altogether unnecessary. In sanctioning the present publication, they have been actuated solely by the pure motive of rescuing the reputation of their father from unmerited reproach. Called upon by every feeling of filial affection to expose the injustice of the cruel aspersions which have been cast upon his memory, they trust that their endeavours will not be fruitless, and that the impartial readers of these pages will be convinced that the merits of Sir George Prevost were not confined to the

private virtues which endeared him to his family and friends, but that in public life, as a Civil Governor and a Military Commander, he deserved the esteem and approbation of his country.

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## POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the foregoing sheets were sent to press, some observations have appeared in the *British Critic*, for May, 1823, upon the Civil Administration of Sir George Prevost, in Canada, which may perhaps be thought to require a brief notice. The writer of the remarks in question, after premising that the military conduct of the late Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been *sufficiently exposed* in another Journal, (the *Quarterly Review*) proceeds to assert, “ that his domestic management of the Colony was no less censurable. That finding that the Canadian party gave him most trouble, his object was to obtain a temporary popularity for his own administration, and a peaceable residence for himself, by every possible species and degree of weak concession, which he dignified with the name of conciliation. That the Catholic Bishop being at the head of the party, was honoured with a seat in the Legislative Council, received a pension of 1,500*l.* per annum, which he still enjoys, and was either overtly or tacitly confirmed in all the usurpations of power and of Government property,

(about 40,000*l.* per annum,) upon which he had ventured, whilst discouragement and *insult* (a term of which the Critic informs his readers he does not repent) were heaped upon the Protestant Bishop and his Clergy, and upon the Loyal Members of both houses, and that the just remonstrances of his Lordship in defence of the rights of his Church, and which it was his first duty to protect, were represented at home as the dictates of party spirit and political feeling."

Although the generality of most of these remarks might seem to preclude the necessity of any reply to them, yet, as the writer, in descending to particular statements, displays a gross want of information, it becomes necessary to expose his misrepresentations, in order that his censures may be rightly appreciated.

The policy of Sir George Prevost towards the Canadians, was, as the foregoing pages will shew, adopted immediately upon his assuming his government, and could not therefore be the consequence of any trouble given him by the Canadian party, from whom, on the contrary, he invariably received the most cordial support. His object in that policy was to strengthen the hands of Government, and to avail himself, as he afterwards did, of the whole resources of the country, in case it should be attacked. But that any concession whatever was made by Sir

George Prevost to effect that object is altogether untrue.

The Catholic Bishop, though his character and influence well entitled him to that distinction, was *not* honoured with a seat in the Legislative Council during the government of Sir George Prevost, nor did he receive during that period a pension of 1,500*l.* per annum. In 1775, the British Government granted to the then Catholic Bishop a pension of 200*l.* per annum. In the year 1778, a further sum of 150*l.* per annum, was given to the same Bishop for the hire of the Episcopal Palace at Quebec, for public offices. These two sums were continued to the subsequent Bishops, and constituted the only income received by them from Government, until the arrival of Sir George Prevost in Canada. During his administration, His Majesty's Government was pleased to *increase* that salary to the sum of 1,000*l.* per annum, in favour of M. de Plessis, the present Catholic Bishop, "as a testimony," to use the words of Lord Bathurst, in his despatch upon the subject, "of the sense which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent entertained of the loyalty, and good conduct of M. de Plessis, and of the other Catholic clergy of the Province."

The charge that Sir George Prevost either tacitly or overtly confirmed the Catholic bishop in all the usurpations of power and of government

property, upon which he had ventured, is so obscurely worded, that it is difficult to give it a distinct answer. The privileges and possessions of the Catholic clergy were assured to them at the period when Canada became a British province, and the present Catholic bishop is not in possession of any property, nor does he exercise any power which his predecessors have not enjoyed since that period with the knowledge and concurrence of all former governors of the Province, and of His Majesty's Government. The "accustomed dues and rights" of the Catholic clergy of Canada, are formally secured to them by the act of 14 Geo. 3. c. 83, §. 5.

To the assertion, positive in proportion to its want of proof, that the Protestant Bishop and his clergy, and the loyal members of both Houses, were treated with insult, it will be merely necessary to answer, that Sir George Prevost was incapable of treating any person, much less those of a sacred character and profession, with indignity or insult—and a confident appeal is made to the Protestant clergy of Canada, and to the loyal members of both Houses, against an insinuation as base as it is groundless.

To the critic's charge of general mismanagement in the affairs of the Colony, a reply, if any were wanting, will, it is trusted, be found, in the foregoing pages; in the approbation of His Majesty's Government of the very policy which

this writer so acrimoniously condemns, and in the highly flattering testimonials to the merits of Sir George Prevost's civil administration, which he received not only from the Canadians, but from the most respectable of the English inhabitants.

It is evident that the writer of the article in the *British Critic* has blindly adopted the prejudices and feelings of the *Quarterly Reviewer* towards Sir George Prevost, and as he appears to dwell with particular complacency upon the exposure which he imagines to have been made of that officer's military character, he is justly entitled to share in the disgrace which must attend his coadjutor's failure, and in the odium which will always attach to the anonymous traducer of departed merit.

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# APPENDIX.

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## No. I.

*Extract from Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, vol. iv. p. 518—529.*

UPON the first alarm of the enemy being on the coast, General Prevost exerted himself to the utmost, to increase and strengthen the fortifications of the town of Savannah; and was most ably seconded in his operations, by Captain James Moncrieffe of the engineers, and Captain Henry of the navy. Orders were sent to the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, who was posted with a considerable detachment of troops at Beaufort, and to Captain Christian, of his Majesty's ship *Vigilant*, to repair as soon as possible to Savannah, with the troops, ships, and galleys, then at Port Royal island. Unfortunately, the express with these orders was intercepted by some of the rebel patrols; and, previous to the arrival of a second messenger, the enemy had time to seize on the principal communications between the two places. This rendered the junction of that detachment with the garrison, upon which alone any hope of defending Savannah could be reasonably founded, a matter extremely precarious, difficult, and dangerous. Happily, however, the abilities of Colonel Maitland, and the zeal of the troops under his command, powerfully aided by the professional skill of Lieutenant Goldesborough, of the navy, who was thoroughly acquainted with the various creeks, inlets, and cuts, with which the interior navigation of this country abounds, overcame every obstacle in their way. The battery at Tybee was destroyed; the lead-

ing marks for the bar were cut down; and the little naval force there was held in readiness to run up the river Savannah, as soon as the French fleet were seen making for the mouth of it.

On the 9th, the whole of the French fleet anchored off the bar: and on the 10th, four frigates weighed and came to Tybee anchorage. M. d'Estaing had got from Charlestown, a large supply of small craft, into which he put his troops; and they proceeded into Ossabaw inlet, and made good the debarkation of their forces at Bowley, 13 miles from Savannah, under cover of four galleys. The French frigates prepared, at the same time, to advance up the river.

Captain Henry and the naval department were employed, from the 10th to the 13th, in conveying to Savannah, part of the guns and ammunition of the *Rose* and *Fowey*, in vessels which General Prevost had sent down for that purpose. On the 13th, both frigates being much lightened, sailed over the Mud-flat to Five Fathom Hole, from which the remainder of of their guns and ammunition were conveyed up to the town, which is only three miles distant. The *Comet* galley, *Keppel* brig, and some armed vessels, were so placed as to cover the passage of Colonel Maitland, with the forces under his command, from Port Royal, through Wallscut. On the 14th and 15th, the seamen completed the important business of landing the cannon and ammunition from the ships and small vessels: and they were appointed to the different batteries, under the command of Captains Henry, Brown, and Fisher, of the navy. Some masters of transports, and the master of a privateer, with their men,\* made voluntary offers of their service; as did Mr. Manley, merchant of Jamaica. Their offers were accepted; and they had their posts assigned them. The marines were incorporated with the grenadiers of the 60th regiment.

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\* Captain Watson of the *Tweed*; Tate of the *Nancy*; and Higgins of the *Betsey*.

On the 16th, the Comte d'Estaing sent a haughty letter to General Prevost, summoning him to surrender the place to his Most Christian Majesty : informing him, at the same time, that among the troops which he had the honour to command, was the detachment which had stormed the Hospital Hill at the Grenades. He begged leave to recal this to his memory; and assured him, that he gave him this notice from motives of humanity, in order to spare the shedding of human blood. General Prevost, on receiving this message, called a meeting of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Field-Officers in the garrison, who authorized him to say, that he declined surrendering on a general summons, without specific terms; but that, if such were proposed as he could with honour accept, he would then give his answer. This drew a reply from M. d'Estaing, in which he affirmed, that it was customary, not for besiegers, but for those who were besieged, to propose terms of capitulation; stated, that he had no objections to allow the General every indulgence consistent with his duty; and informed him that, as it was his intention next day to form a junction with the army of the United States of America, if his answer was not immediately ready, he *must* in future treat with General Lincoln and him. General Prevost, in return, demanded a cessation of hostilities for 24 hours; as a time absolutely necessary for deliberation, and for the discussion of various interests. Towards the evening of the 16th, the Comte d'Estaing returned an answer, in which he consented to this demand. The two armies joined on the 17th, and formed separate but contiguous encampments.

It was during this parley, that the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, consisting of upwards of 1,000 men, arrived from Beaufort. The enemy well knew, how important it would be to their interests to prevent this junction; and for that purpose, had attempted an enterprise, which proved unsuccessful, by their pilots refusing to undertake to place the French frigates in the necessary stations, for ena-

bling them to cut off Colonel Maitland's communication with Savannah. Of this circumstance the Colonel availed himself: and after undergoing immense fatigues, joined General Prevost in the evening of the 16th, with 500 men; and the remainder of his detachment arrived about noon the next day. As he found the enemy in possession of the ship-channel, the Colonel had been obliged to come round Dawfaskie, and land on the marshes; and after dragging his boats (empty) through a cut, got into the Savannah river above the French frigates, and from that came down to the town. A Council of War was held, in which it was determined to defend the place to the last extremity: and notice of this resolution was sent to the besieging Generals. To this M. d'Estaing returned an answer. Hostilities immediately recommenced: and the British tars could not refrain from giving three huzzas from their batteries. Both sides now exerted themselves with the utmost assiduity. When the town was first summoned, there were not above eight or ten guns mounted; but so indefatigable were the exertions of Captain Moncrieffe, the senior engineer in the place, in putting it in a proper state of defence, that, by adding the guns landed from the ships to those which were in store, he had, in the course of a few days, nearly 90 pieces of cannon ready to oppose to the enemy, as soon as their batteries should open. He had likewise erected many redoubts, batteries, and other works, to retard their progress. In all these operations, the soldiers and sailors, with the utmost cheerfulness, worked day and night in the face of hostile troops flushed with conquest: the enemy were greatly astonished at the activity of the garrison.

From the accounts given to M. d'Estaing, of the situation of things at Savannah, he considered his success against it as certain. He had made repeated declarations to the Americans, that, as the season of the year was so far advanced, he could not remain more than ten or fifteen days on shore, lest his fleet should be injured on such a dangerous coast. The reinforcement which the garrison had received, reduced

the besiegers to the alternative of either storming or besieging the town of Savannah. The latter plan was adopted, and they took their measures accordingly.

As it was apprehended, that the enemy's ships might come too near the town, and annoy the rear of the British lines, Captain Moncrieffe had some fire-rafts prepared, and in readiness to act against them, if they should make the attempt. It was also judged expedient, in order effectually to prevent it, to sink a number of vessels to stop up the passage. As his Majesty's ship the *Rose* was in so very bad a condition, that, by the report of shipwrights lately employed to survey her, she could not swim above two months; as her guns, ammunition, and stores, had been landed; and as her weight would keep her across the channel, when lighter vessels might shift, owing to the rapidity of the current, and to the hardness of its sandy bottom, in which they could have little hold, Captain Henry selected her as a vessel proper to be sunk. The Savannah armed ship, and four transports, were also scuttled and sunk, and by these the channel was blocked up. Above the town several smaller vessels were sunk, and a boom was laid across the river, to prevent the enemy from sending down fire-rafts among the shipping, or landing troops in the British rear. Previous to the vessels being sunk, the *Fowey*, *Keppel* brig, *Comet* galley, and *Germain* provincial armed ship, were got up to the town: and the latter having guns, was placed off *Yamairaw*, to flank the lines. While the enemy's batteries were getting ready to play against the town, three French frigates advanced up the river to *Mudflat*. One of them, having twelve-pounders, and two rebel galleys, carrying each two eighteen-pounders in their prows, anchored in *Five Fathom Hole*; from which one of the frigates sailed into the back river, with a design to cannonade the rear of the British lines. She fired a great number of shot; which, being at their utmost range, did no execution. The galleys advancing nearer, did some damage to the houses;

but a few shot now and then from the river battery, made them keep a respectable distance.

Two sallies, one of them on the 24th, commanded by Major Graham, of the 16th regiment; and another on the 27th, commanded by Major M<sup>r</sup> Arthur, of the 71st regiment; were admirably well conducted, did the enemy considerable mischief, and killed and wounded a great many of their best troops, while the loss on our side was very inconsiderable. In the first sally, Major Graham artfully drew the enemy into a snare, by which the French and the rebels fired on each other, and had near 50 men killed before the mistake was discovered.

The batteries played on every place where the enemy were perceived to be at work; and more than once obliged them to discontinue their labour. It was the 3rd of October, before they opened any of their batteries: and then, about midnight they began to bombard from nine mortars of eight and ten inches, and continued the bombardment about two hours. At day-light, their fire commenced again from the nine mortars, and also from 37 pieces of cannon from the land side, and 16 from their shipping: and in this they persisted with little variation during several days. The execution done by this heavy fire, was much less than could have been imagined. It consisted in killing a few helpless women and children, and some few negroes and horses in the town, and on the common. On the 6th, the enemy threw some carcasses into the town, which burnt one wooden house: and about 11 o'clock, the General sent a letter, by a flag of truce, to M. d'Estaing, requesting permission to send the women and children out of the place, on board of ships and down the river, under the protection of a French ship of war, until the siege should be ended. After three hours, and a deal of intermediate cannon shot and shells, an insulting answer was returned by Messrs. Lincoln and d'Estaing, in which they refused to comply with this reasonable and humane demand.

The garrison, undismayed by this brutal conduct on the part of their opponents, kept up a smart fire against them; and during the night were extremely busy in adding to their works, and in repairing such of them as had sustained damage. Thus things went on until the morning of the 9th; when, a little before day-break, after a heavy, and as usual, incessant cannonade and bombardment, the enemy attacked General Prevost's lines.

The attack being upon the left of his centre, in front of the French; and very soon after, upon his left and right. It was yet dark, and the darkness was increased by a very thick fog, which made it impossible to determine with precision, where the real attack was to be made, or how many assaults were intended. No reinforcements therefore were sent; but every thing was kept in readiness for that purpose, and the troops waited with the greatest coolness in their different posts, for the approach of the enemy. Those in the lines were prepared to charge them, wherever they should attempt to penetrate: and the General had the greatest hopes, that the fire of the field artillery, which was placed to support the advanced redoubts, would enable him, while the enemy were entangled among these, to throw them into some confusion; and, perhaps, with a good prospect of success, to order his corps de reserve to sally forth and charge them. The ground toward both his flanks, owing to its natural defects, which the utmost efforts of Captain Moncrieffe had been unable effectually to remove, was but too favourable for an enemy. On the right was a swampy hollow, by which they could approach under cover to within fifty yards of his principal works, and in some places still nearer; and there, he supposed, that the rebels would make their assault. On the left, the approach was neither so well covered, nor of so great an extent as that on the right; but as it was sufficiently large to admit troops to act, as the ground was firm and clear, and as it was near their encampment, he expected that the French regulars would make their attack there: but in

this he was mistaken. A real attack did take place there : but the principal attack, composed of the flower of the French and rebel armies, and led by the Comte d'Estaing in person, assisted by all the principal officers of both, was made upon his right. Under cover of the hollow, they advanced in three columns ; but, owing to the darkness, took a wider circuit than they needed or intended to have done, and went deeper into the bog. These circumstances prevented them from beginning the attack so soon as they had concerted ; and besides occasioning a loss of critical time, produced considerable disorder in their ranks. The attack, however, was very spirited, and for some time obstinately maintained ; particularly at a redoubt on the Ebenezer road, which was a scene of hot action, great loss, and consummate bravery. Two stand of colours were actually planted, and several of the assailants killed upon the parapet ; but they met so determined a resistance, that they could not, with all their efforts, force an entrance. It was now, that the skill and design of the defences raised by Captain Moncrieffe, were fully displayed ; for, while the conflict was still dubious and bloody, the field-pieces, from three batteries which were manned by the sailors, took them in every direction, and made such havock in their ranks, that they were thrown into confusion, and compelled to make a pause. At this critical moment, Major Glacier, of the 60th regiment, with the grenadiers of that corps and the marines, advanced rapidly from the lines ; in the most impetuous manner, charged the enemy with their fixed bayonets ; and plunging among them, into the ditches and works, drove them, in an instant, from the ditches of the redoubt, and from a battery a little to the right of it. Following up the blow, they forced them to fly, in great confusion, over the abatis, and into the swamp. On this occasion, Captain Wickham, of the 2d battalion of the 60th grenadiers, greatly distinguished himself. When the grenadiers advanced, three companies of the second battalion of the 71st regiment were ordered to sustain them : and although they were posted

at no considerable distance, and marched forward with the usual ardour of that corps, such was the rapidity with which the grenadiers had made their attack, and so precipitate was the enemy's retreat, that they could not come in for a share of the victory. One of the enemy's columns a little more to their left, in every attempt which it made to come out of the hollow, was repulsed by the brisk and well directed fire of a redoubt, where the militia were posted, aided by Hamilton's small corps of North Carolinians, who were on the right, and moved there with a field-piece to bear obliquely against it, while one of the seamen's batteries took it directly in flank. It was now day-light: but the fog was not sufficiently cleared off, to enable General Prevost to judge with any degree of certainty of the strength, disposition, or further intentions of the enemy on the right. On the left, and in the centre, the fog, with the addition of the smoke, was still impenetrably close: and a smart firing being still kept up there, the General thought it would be improper to draw from it a number of troops sufficient to make a respectable sortie. By these means, an opportunity was lost of taking complete advantage of the confusion of the enemy, by charging them in their retreat; but they did not get off without being severely cannonaded by the batteries and field-pieces, as long as they were in sight, or judged to be within reach. They were every where repulsed: and those on the left were only heard, being concealed from view by the thickness of the fog.

Lieutenant-Colonel de Porbeck, of Weissenbeck's Hessian regiment, was field-officer of the right wing: and being in the redoubt when the attack began, had an opportunity, which he well improved, of signalizing himself in a most gallant manner. It would not be doing justice to the different corps who defended the redoubt, if we neglected to mention them. They were part of the South Carolina Royalists; and the light dragoons dismounted, and commanded (by special order)

by Captain Tawse, a good and gallant officer, who nobly fell with his sword in the body of the third man he had killed with his own hand. The loss on the part of the British in this battle, consisted of one captain, and fifteen rank and file killed; one captain, three subalterns, and thirty-five rank and file wounded. The loss sustained by the enemy, as acknowledged by the French, was about a thousand or twelve hundred men killed and wounded; of these, they lost forty-four officers and seven hundred men: and the deserters, of whom there were a great many, all declared, that the loss on the part of the rebels was not less than four hundred men. Among the wounded was M. d'Estaing, (in two places) M. de Fontange, Major-General; and several others of distinction. Count Polaski, (who has been mentioned in the course of these Memoirs), a Colonel of cavalry in the rebel service, in making a desperate push at the British lines, was mortally wounded.

About ten o'clock, the enemy requested a truce, and leave to bury their dead, and carry off their wounded men. This was granted for those who lay at a distance from the lines, or out of sight of them: but those within or near the abatis were interred by the British. Their numbers were on the right, two hundred and three: on the left, twenty-eight. One hundred and sixteen prisoners, most of them mortally wounded, were delivered to the enemy. To this loss, considerable of itself, must be added, the numbers buried by them, the numbers who perished in the swamp, and many who were carried off by them when they retreated.

From this time to the 18th, nothing very material happened. Several flags of truce were sent during that period by the enemy, and a great deal of civility passed mutually between the French and British. Many apologies were made for their refusal to allow the women and children to be sent out of town: and the blame of this base conduct was laid, by a French Colonel, Compte O'Duin, entirely on the scoun-

drel Lincoln, and the Americans.\* The offer was then made with great earnestness, that the ladies and children should be received by the Chevalier du Romain, on board of the Chimere; but the answer given to it was blunt and soldierly, that what had once been refused, and that in terms of insult, was not in any circumstances deemed worth acceptance. All the French officers seemed quite ashamed of this affair. As it was with them only, that the British had any intercourse after the repulse on the 9th, the sentiments of the Americans could not be so well known. But, as the letter was signed by d'Estaing, as well as by Lincoln, their imputing this harsh, cruel, and unprecedented refusal, entirely to the brutality of the American General, may serve to shew their consciousness, that it was altogether indefensible; but is by no means sufficient to exculpate the French Commander, from his share of the blame and disgrace, inseparable from it. An author,† who is extremely partial to the American cause, endeavours to defend this measure from motives of policy: “The combined army (says he) was so confident of success, that it was suspected, that the request of sending away the women and children, proceeded from a desire of secreting the plunder lately taken from the South Carolinians, and artfully covered under the specious veil of humanity. That the Commanders were suspicious, considering the stratagem Prevost had practised after being summoned, is not strange. It was also presumed, that a refusal would expedite a surrender.” There does not seem to have been much cordiality between the French and Americans in this enterprise. M. d'Estaing would have been well pleased to have done the business without them, by summoning the place to surrender to his Most Christian Majesty. This, the latter took much amiss, as they considered themselves as principals, and the French

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\* Comte O'Duin's own expression.

† Gordon, Author of the History of the American Revolution, vol. iii. p. 328, &c.

only as auxiliaries : and for this piece of presumption, some concessions were made. When the time assigned by M. d'Estaing for this expedition had elapsed, and still more was required by the engineers, if it was expected that the garrison should be compelled to surrender by regular approaches, he became extremely impatient to bring matters to a quick decision, and urged giving the assault to the place. This measure, says Mr. Gordon, was forced on M. d'Estaing by his naval officers, who had remonstrated against his continuing to risk so valuable a fleet in its present unrepai red condition, on such a dangerous coast in the hurricane season ; and at so great a distance from the shore, that it might be surprised. These remonstrances were enforced, by the probability of their being attacked by the British fleet completely repaired, with their full complement of men, soldiers, and artillery on board, when the ships of his Most Christian Majesty were weakened, by the absence of a considerable part of their crews, artillery, and officers, employed at the siege of Savannah. These reasons had great weight with M. d'Estaing : and he prevailed on General Lincoln to storm the place without farther loss of time. The Americans seemed to think, that by a little more patience and perseverance, the town must have submitted ; as in a few days, the lines of the besiegers would have been carried quite close to the works of the besieged. Their allies, however, judged themselves to be in so critical a situation, that they acquiesced in M. d'Estaing's proposal ; for, if the French had retired to their ships, the siege must have been raised, so that there remained only one alternative for them to adopt. The repulse which they had received, was not followed by mutual accusations of want of courage or conduct in either party ; but the French, in all their conversations, spoke of the Americans with the greatest contempt.

It was not perceived until the 18th, that the enemy had raised the siege ; but, the fog clearing up in the morning of that day, it was found that they had moved off. For some

days previous to this, they had been busy in drawing off their cannon and mortars, and in embarking their sick and wounded, of whom they had a great number. General Prevost immediately detached parties in pursuit of them; but they had got to such distance before it was discovered they had retreated, that they could not overtake them: the enemy in their march having broken down all the bridges. The French embarked in Augustine creek, and the rebels crossed the river Savannah, at Zuble's ferry, and got into South Carolina. The enemy's fleet quitted the coast on the 26th October, and their frigates and galleys on the 2d of November, as soon as an exchange of prisoners had taken place. The balance of prisoners was in the enemy's favour: for while they were off this coast, on the 11th of September, his Majesty's ship, *Ariel*, of 24 guns, was taken by the French frigate, the *Amazon*, of 36 guns; and besides taking the *Experiment*, they took also the *Myrtle*, navy victualler; and *Champion*, store-ship. The last of these was a prize of considerable importance to them, for their fleet was very badly manned, their crews sickly, their ships in bad condition, short of anchors and cables, and no running rigging to reeve, but this ship afforded them a supply. She had been sent from New York, with naval stores for the ships and vessels, under the command of Captain Henry.

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## No. II.

*Address from the Council and House of Representatives  
of St. Vincents to Lieut.-Col. Prevost, p. 7.*

“ SIR,

THE Committee of His Majesty's Council, and of the Representatives of the Inhabitants of St. Vincents, deeply impressed with the many and eminent services you have rendered this colony, beg leave to offer their most grateful thanks

to you, not only on their own account, but on that of the community at large. It might be irksome to you to minutely particularize these services: the Committee, however, cannot forbear mentioning your voluntary and unsolicited return to the defence of the Colony, and to participate in a most laborious and perilous war, against an inglorious enemy. Such zeal, Sir, strongly characterizes the soldier. The happy consequences to the public cause, although unfortunate to yourself, of your late gallant attack on the enemy's advanced post, demand the warmest acknowledgments, and the universal wish that you may speedily recover from your wounds, and that our gracious Sovereign may discern, and properly reward such distinguished merit.

“ 10th March, 1796.”

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No. III.

*Letter from the Duke of Portland to Brigadier-General Prevost, p. 7.*

“ SIR,

“ Whitehall, 29th April, 1801.

“ THE satisfactory manner in which you have conducted the Administration of Public Affairs in St. Lucie, and the representations made to the King in your behalf by the Members of the Court of Appeal, have induced His Majesty to appoint you Lieutenant-Governor of that Island. I transmit to you inclosed His Majesty's Commission; and I have only to add, that I am persuaded that your conduct in the administration of your Government will continue to justify the very flattering and favorable intentions of the Court of Appeal, to contribute to the support of the respectability of your civil station.

“ I am, Sir,

“ Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

“ PORTLAND.”

## No. IV.

*Address to Brigadier-General Prevost from the Inhabitants of St. Lucie, p. 7.*

1802.

Les Habitans de l'Isle de St. Lucie, à Son Excellence Monsieur le Brigadier-Général George Prevost, Lieut.-Gouverneur de cette Isle, &c.

Monsieur le Gouverneur,

LORSQUE la paix, objet de tous les vœux, fait rentrer l'Isle de Sainte Lucie sous la domination Française, c'est un hommage bien légitime que de vous rendre au nom de tous les Colons un témoignage public de l'amour, du respect, et de la reconnoissance que votre gouvernement doux et paternel, et votre sage administration, ont fait naître dans tous les cœurs. Les avantages sans nombre dont vous avez fait jouir la Colonie, depuis que vous en avez pris le Commandement, l'attachent hautement. En effet, M. le Gouverneur, l'amour constant que vous avez manifesté pour le bien public; les soins infinies que vous avez pris pour rendre et faire rendre la justice dans un tems où toutes les loix étaient en oubli; le zèle infatigable avec lequel vous vous êtes occupé des discussions et des intérêts des Colons; votre gouvernement paternel, qui, en vous conciliant tous les esprits, à détruit les divisions qui pouvaient exciter, a fait regner l'union et la concorde parmi les habitans, et a fait renaître la confiance, et la prospérité. Enfin, votre gouvernement tutélaire, qui a fait chérir l'autorité de sa Majesté dans la vôtre, sont autant de bienfaits dont vous avez fait jouir les habitans de la Colonie, et dont ils conserveront éternellement le souvenir.

Mais il en était un plus grand que le zèle et l'amour du bien public, qui vous animaient, reservoit à la Colonie; c'est votre sollicitude paternelle qui a employé et obtenue, pour nous, de sa Majesté, qu'elle nous rendit nos loix, nos tribu-

naux, nos magistrats, c'est-à-dire, le témoignage le plus convaincant qu'elle préférerait au droit de nous traiter comme un peuple conquis, la douceur de nous adopter pour ses enfans, et de nous rendre les objets de sa tendresse. Nous en sommes tellement convaincus, M. le Gouverneur, que nos infortunes ont été adoucis, et que nous en avons ressentis les plus grands effets. Le bonheur, la tranquillité, et la prospérité dont les habitans de la Colonie ont jouis jusqu'à present, ils les tiennent de la bonté du Roi, et de votre administration paternelle, M. le Gouverneur; et si notre reconnoissance ne trouve pas d'expressions assez forte pour vous peindre aussi vivement que nous le sentons, notre admiration pour vos talens, notre vénération pour vos vertus, et notre amour profonde pour votre personne,—daignez permettre que la Colonie vous présente, comme un foible témoignage, une épée, sur la lame de laquelle seront gravé ces mots :—*La Colonie de St. Lucie reconnoissante.*

Jouissez, M. le Gouverneur, du bien que vous avez fait à la Colonie; et les vœux des Colons pour votre gloire et votre bonheur vous suivront à votre patrie.

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No. V.

*Letters from Sir Thomas Trigge, Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, p. 7.*

“ SIR,

“ I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and feel very great regret, that your state of health is such as to render your returning to England necessary, by that means depriving His Majesty and myself of your services in this country. You may rely I shall not fail to express my sentiments on this subject when I write home, as in rendering this tribute of justice to your character, I shall discharge the most pleasing and gra-

tifying part of my duty. I beg you will be pleased to signify to the council, that in consequence of your absence, I have appointed Brigadier-General G. H. Vansittart, to succeed to the civil and military command of the Island of St. Lucie, per interim, in order that he may be recognised accordingly, and take upon him the functions and authorities of that situation.

“ I have now, Sir, to take my leave, and to offer my best wishes for your welfare and happiness; entertaining the firmest hope and assurance, that you will meet on your arrival in England those marks of approbation, which in every instance you have so highly and eminently merited.

“ With sentiments of the purest esteem and regard, I have the honor to be, Sir,

“ Your most obedient and faithful humble servant,

(Signed)

THOS. TRIGGE,  
Lieut.-General.”

*Sir Thomas Trigge to Colonel Brownrigg.*

“ Sir,

“ The return of Brigadier-General Prevost to England, calls on me to express to His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, the opinion with which his conduct has impressed me, both in his civil and military capacities during his command in the island of St. Lucie, as, did I fail to point out those officers who are deserving of His Royal Highness's countenance and support, I should be as wanting in justice to the individual, as deficient in point of duty to the Commander-in-Chief.

“ I cannot but view with infinite regret Brigadier-General Prevost's departure from this country, as he has invariably conducted his command in the most satisfactory manner. The zeal and unremitting exertion which he has on every occasion shewn, and the exact attention which he has paid to the several duties of his situation, point him out as a distinguished and excellent officer, and whom it is my duty to recommend in

the strongest terms to His Majesty, and to the Commander-in-Chief.

“ I have the honor to be, Sir, &c. &c.  
 (Signed) “ THOS. TRIGGE,  
 Lieut.-General.”

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No. VI.

*Account of the Capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register for 1803, p. 8.*

“ ON the 22nd June, the island of St. Lucie was taken by General Grinfield and Commodore Head. The French Commander, General Nagues, refused to capitulate, and the expectation of approaching rains rendered it necessary to get possession of the Morne Fortunée with as little delay as possible. It was therefore determined to attack it by storm; the defence was gallant; yet, by the determined bravery of the British soldiers and seamen, the works were carried in about half an hour, not without some loss, chiefly among the officers. This conquest was of considerable importance as a naval station. The island as a colony is valuable, but the climate is unhealthy.

“ The British commanders lost no time in pursuing their victorious career; and on the 25th, they sailed for Tobago, which they reached on the 30th. It was defended by General Berthier, an officer of note in the French service; but being apprised of the number of the British, and of the gallantry they had displayed at St. Lucie, he did not think it prudent to risk an engagement. A capitulation was agreed to on the same day, upon the most liberal terms, the garrison marching out with the honours of war, and to be sent back to their native country.”—*Annual Register for 1803, p. 283.*

## No. VII.

*Extract of a Letter from Major-Gen. Grinfield relative to the expedition against St. Lucie and Tobago, p. 8.*

“IT is with real satisfaction I send you the enclosed extract from Colonel Clinton’s letter to me.”

*Extract of a Letter from Colonel Clinton to Lieutenant-General Grinfield, dated*

“*Horse Guards, 3rd Sept. 1803.*

“This despatch, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, bears testimony, in the handsomest terms, to the meritorious services of Brigadier-General Prevost; and to the zealous promptitude with which he left his government of Dominica, to fulfil your wishes. In reply, I am directed to acquaint you, that His Royal Highness is perfectly sensible of the zeal, which induced Brigadier-General Prevost to volunteer his service on the late occasion, under your command; a circumstance which redounds much to his credit; and which, on a proper opportunity, His Royal Highness will not fail to mention to His Majesty.”

*Extract of a Letter from Lord Hobart to Brigadier-General Prevost.*

“I cannot omit to congratulate you upon the complete success of the expeditions against St. Lucie and Tobago, in which you were so actively and honourably engaged; and I have the satisfaction of acquainting you, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to notice, with particular approbation, your conduct upon those services.”

## No. VIII.

*Letter to Brigadier-General Prevost from General  
Nagués, p. 9.*

“ DEPUIS la prise du Morne Fortuné, je ne cesse d'éprouver de la part du Général en Chef des égards que j'aie dû attribuer à un caractère de loyauté qui se remarque des que l'on se trouve en rapport avec le Général Grinfield.

“ Mais je n'ignore pas, Général, qu'animé des mêmes principes, je dois à vos dispositions particulières une partie des procédés généreux dont je me suis vu comblé. Avant de vous témoigner toute ma reconnoissance, laissez moi, je vous prie, m'arrêter sur un fait qui vous est personnel, je veux parler de l'humaine prévoyance que vous avez eue de placer, à votre arrivée au Morne, une Sauve Garde à l'hôpital militaire pour la sureté de nos malades. Citer un pareil trait c'est assez dire pour le Guerrier qu'il honore et distingue. Je viens maintenant, Général, aux sentimens que vous m'avez inspiré, et je vous prie de croire que je n'y mets point de réserve. Veuillez donc bien m'agréer l'hommage, et recevoir mes très humbles salutations.

(Signé)

“ NAGUES.”\*

“ Caséuge,

*le 6 Messidor, an 11.”*


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\* “ On the 9th January, 1808, died General Nagués, first Aide-de-Camp, &c. &c. His loss was strongly felt. This General had conciliated the esteem of the public by his inclination to do good, his attention to his duty, and his strict probity. Before he entered into the service of Holland, he had been Governor of St. Lucie, which he had defended as a brave soldier, and where he acquired the affection of the Planters.”—*Historical Documents and Reflections on the Government of Holland, by Louis Bonaparte*, vol. ii. p. 214.

## No. IX.

*Account of the Attack upon Dominica by a French Squadron, p. 9.*

“ IT may easily be supposed that much alarm prevailed at home, when it was known that two such formidable fleets\* of the enemy were actually at sea, and which were aggravated by reports of strong detachments of the Brest fleet having also escaped, with a view to some grand combined exertion of the enemy. Where the blow was to fall, occupied the public mind. Malta, Brazil, the British West Indies—a general junction of the whole of the combined force of the enemy, in order to cover a descent upon Ireland. In short, every possible point of annoyance or attack was warmly agitated in the public mind. At length intelligence was received on the 6th May, from the British Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the windward and leeward islands, that Dominica had been attacked on the 22nd February preceding, by a French armament of one three-decker, and four other line of battle ships, three frigates, two brigs of war, and a schooner, with about 4,000 landmen on board. Brigadier-General Prevost, the Governor of the island, immediately made the best dispositions for its defence, and opposed, with the small force under his command, the landing of the French inch by inch. At length the whole of the enemy’s force, consisting of 4,000 men, under the cover of the tremendous fire of the *Majestueux*, of 120 guns, four 74’s, and the frigates, having landed, and having made such a disposition as threatened to cut off the retreat of the Governor, and his few remaining troops from the town and fort of Prince Ruperts, and thereby reduce the whole island; General Prevost, with the

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\* From Toulon and Rochefort.

utmost promptitude and presence of mind, directed the regular force, under Captain O'Connell, to make a forced march across the island, and join him at Prince Ruperts; to which place he himself repaired attended only by his staff, and arrived in 24 hours: the troops also arriving there with their wounded, after four days continued march, through the most difficult country existing. The Governor immediately took the necessary precautions to place the fort in the best state, and his appearance was so formidable, that the French Commander-in-Chief, after having in vain summoned him to surrender, thought proper, after levying a contribution upon the inhabitants of Roseau, which town had been set on fire, in the moment of attack, and had suffered severely by the conflagration, on the 27th, to reembark his whole force; and after hovering a day or two in the bay, and about the port of Prince Ruperts, made easy sail towards Guadaloupe. Throughout the whole of this transaction, the highest praise is due to the Governor, and the British troops under his command. At one period 200 of the latter were opposed to more than 2,000 of the enemy, and under the command of the gallant Major Nunn, who unfortunately received a mortal wound in the action, and subsequently under Captain O'Connell, succeeded in withstanding them for more than two hours, and then effected their retreat, after having made much slaughter of the invaders. Nor should the militia of the island be without their due share of praise, for their exemplary bravery and steadiness. Upon the whole it may be stated, with perfect propriety, in the words of General Myers, that in this affair, had not the town of Roseau been accidentally destroyed by fire, we should have little to regret, and much in which to exult."—*Annual Register* for 1805, p. 220.

## No. X.

*Public Despatches and Letters relative to the Attack of the French upon Dominica, in 1805, p. 9.**From Lieut.-Gen. Sir William Myers to Earl Camden.**“ Barbadoes, March 9th.*

“ MY LORD,

“ I HAVE the honour to enclose to your Lordship, a copy of a despatch from Brigadier-General Prevost, dated Dominica, 1st March. The details contained therein, are so highly reputable to the Brigadier-General, and the small portion of troops employed against so numerous an enemy, that I have great satisfaction in recommending that their gallant exertions may be laid before his Majesty: the zeal and talents manifested by the Brigadier-General, upon this occasion, it is my duty to present to his royal consideration, and, at the same time, I beg to be permitted to express the high sense I entertain of the distinguished bravery of His Majesty's troops, and the militia of the colony, employed upon that service. The vigorous resistance which the enemy have experienced, and the loss which they have sustained in this attack, must evince to them, that however inferior our numbers were on this occasion, British troops are not to be hostilely approached with impunity; and had not the town of Roseau been accidentally destroyed by fire, we should have little to regret, and much to exult in. Your Lordship will perceive by the returns, that our loss in men, compared to that of the enemy, is but trifling; but I have sincerely to lament that of Major Nunn, of the 1st West India regiment, whose wound is reported to be of a dangerous kind; he is an excellent man, and a meritorious officer.

“ I am, &amp;c.

(Signed)

“ W. MYERS.”

*“ Head-quarters, Prince Ruperts,  
Dominica, March 1st.*

“ Sir,

“ About an hour before the dawn of day, on the 22nd ult. an alarm was fired at Scotshead, and soon after a cluster of ships was discovered off Roseau. As our light increased, I made out five large ships, three frigates, two brigs, and small craft, under British colours, a ship of three decks, carrying a flag at the mizen. The frigates ranged too close to Fort Young; I ordered them to be fired on, and soon after 19 large barges, full of troops, appeared coming from under the lee of the other ships, attended and protected by an armed schooner full of men, and seven other boats, carrying caronades. The English flag was lowered, and that of France hoisted. A landing was immediately attempted on my left flank, between the town of Roseau and the post of Cachecrow. The light infantry of the 1st West India regiment, were the first on the march to support Captain Serrant's company of militia, which, throughout the day, behaved with great gallantry. It was immediately supported by the grenadiers of the 46th regiment. The first boats were beat off, but the schooner and one of the brigs coming close in shore, to cover the landing, compelled our troops to occupy a better position, a defile leading to the town. At this moment I brought up the grenadiers of the St. George's regiment of militia, and soon after the remainder of the 46th, and gave over to Major Nunn these brave troops, with orders not to yield the enemy one inch of ground. Two field-pieces were brought into action for their support, under the command of Serjeant Creed, of the 46th regiment, manned by additional gunners and sailors. These guns, and a 24-pounder from Melville's battery, shook the French advancing column, by the execution they did. I sent two companies of the St. George's militia, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Constable, and a company of the 46th, to prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of the position

occupied by Major Nunn. On my return, we found the *Majestueux*, of 120 guns, lying opposite to Fort Young, pouring into the town and batteries her broadsides, followed by the other 74's and frigates, doing the same. Some artillery, several captains of merchantmen, with their sailors, and the artillery-militia, manned five 24-pounders, and three 18's at the fort, and five 24's at Melville's battery, and returned an uninterrupted fire. From the first post red-hot shot were thrown. At about ten o'clock, a. m. Major Nunn, most unfortunately for His Majesty's service, whilst faithfully executing the orders I had given, was wounded, I fear mortally. This did not discourage the brave fellows. Captain O'Connell, of the 1st West India regiment, received the command and a wound almost at the same time; however, the last circumstance could not induce him to give up the honour of the first, and he continued in the field, animating his men, and resisting the repeated charges of the enemy, until about one o'clock, when he obliged the French to retire from their advanced position with great slaughter.

“ It is impossible for me to do justice to the merit of that officer. You will, I doubt not, favourably report his conduct to His Majesty, and, at the same time, that of Captain James, who commanded the 46th, and Captain Archibald Campbell, who commanded the grenadiers of the 46th. Foiled and beat off on the left, the right flank was attempted, and a considerable force was landed near Morne Daniel. The regulars not exceeding 200, employed on the left in opposing the advance of their columns, consisting of 2,000 men, could afford me no reinforcement; I had only the right wing of the St. George's regiment of militia to oppose them, of about 100 men. They attacked with spirit, but, unfortunately, the frigates stood in so close to the shore, to protect their disembarkation, that after receiving a destructive fire, they fled back and occupied the heights of Woodbridge Estate. Then it was that a column of the enemy marched up Morne Daniel, and stormed the redoubt, defended by a small detachment, which, after an

obstinate resistance, they carried. On my left Captain O'Connell was gaining ground, notwithstanding a fresh supply of troops, and several field-pieces, which had been brought on shore by the enemy. I now observed a large column climbing the mountain to get in his rear. The town, which had been for some time in flames, was only protected by a light howitzer, and a six-pounder to the right, supported by part of the light company of St. George's regiment. The enemy's large ships in Woodbridge-bay out of the reach of my guns, my right flank gained, and my retreat to Prince Ruperts almost cut off, I determined on one attempt to keep the sovereignty of the island, which the excellent troops I had, warranted. I ordered the militia to remain at their posts, except such as were inclined to encounter more hardships and severe service; and Captain O'Connell, with the 46th under the command of Captain James, and the light company of the 1st West India regiment, were directed to make a forced march to Prince Ruperts. I then allowed the President to enter into terms for the town of Roseau; and demanded from the French general, that private property should be respected, and that no wanton or disgraceful pillage should be allowed. This done, only attended by Brigade-Major Prevost, and Deputy-Quarter-Master-General Hopley, of the militia forces, I crossed the island, and in 24 hours, with the aid of the inhabitants, and the exertions of the Caribs, I got to this garrison on the 23rd. After four days continued march, through the most difficult country, I might almost say, existing, Captain O'Connell joined me at Prince Ruperts, wounded himself, and bringing in his wounded, with a few of the royal artillery, and the precious remains of the 46th regiment, and the 1st West India light company. I had no sooner got into the fort, than I ordered cattle to be drove in, and took measures for getting a store of water from the river in the bay. I found my signals to Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, from Roseau, made soon after the enemy had landed, had been received; and that in consequence, he had

made the most judicious arrangements his garrison would allow of, for the defence of this important post. On the 25th, I received the letter of summons I have now the honour to transmit, from General of Division La Grange, and without delay, sent the reply you will find accompanying it. On the 27th the enemy's cruizers hovered about the head; however, the Centaur's tender (Vigilante) came in, and was saved by our guns. I landed Mr. Henderson, her commander, and his crew, to assist in the defence we were prepared to make. As far as can be collected, the enemy had about 4,000 men on board, and the whole of their force was compelled to disembark before they gained an inch of ground. I trust this despatch by Capt. O'Connell, to whom I beg to refer you; his services entitle him to consideration. I am much indebted to the zeal and discernment of Foot-Adjutant GERALY, who was very necessary to the execution of my orders. I cannot pass unnoticed the very soldier-like conduct of Lieut. WALLIS, of the 46th regiment, to whom I had entrusted the post of Cachearn or Scotshead; perceiving our retreat, he spiked his guns, destroyed his ammunition, and immediately commenced his march to join me at Prince Ruperts, with his detachment; nor that of Lieutenant SHAW of the same regiment, who acted as an officer of artillery, and behaved with uncommon coolness and judgment, whilst on the battery, and great presence of mind in securing the retreat of the additional gunners belonging to the 46th regiment.

“ On the 27th, after levying a contribution on Roseau, the enemy re embarked, and hovered that day and the next about this port. This morning the French fleet is seen off the south end of Guadaloupe, under easy sail. Our loss you will perceive by the returns I have the honor to transmit, was inconsiderable, when compared with that acknowledged by the enemy, which included several officers of rank, and about 300 others.

“ GEO. PREVOST.”

“ P. S. As I find I cannot spare Captain O'Connell from

the duty of this garrison, I must refer you to the Master of a Montreal vessel, who has engaged to deliver this despatch."

*“ Au Quartier-Général au Roseau,  
le 5th Ventose, An 13.*

“ Le Général de Division Lagrange, Grand Officier de la  
Légion de l’Honneur, &c. &c.

“ Monsieur le Général,

“ AVANT de commencer les opérations militaires contre le fort où vous paraissez vous être rétiré, je viens remplir une préalable autorisé et pratiqué, entre les nations civilisées.

“ Vous connoissez aussi bien, M. le Général, votre position, et peut-être même, l’inutilité d’une nouvelle éffusion de sang; vous avez dû gémir en voyant le malheureux sort de la ville de Roseau; mon premier soin en y entrant a été de donner des ordres pour arrêter l’incendie: mais par malheur le mal était déjà trop grand. Le besoin en subsistance produit toujours des effets cruels, et le résultat peut en être calculé plus positivement que celui de toute autre chose. Ne fût-ce que cette considération, elle est plus que suffisante sous la circonstance où vous vous trouvez pour accepter les conditions honorables que je suis disposé à vous accorder, et soustraire ainsi par un arrangement les habitans intéressants de cette colonie à des nouveaux malheurs presque toujours inséparable des événemens de la guerre. Veuillez, M. le Général, me faire connoître bientôt votre réponse; en attendant, recevez l’assurance de la haute considération que j’ai pour vous.

“ J’ai l’honneur de vous saluer,  
(Signed) “ LAGRANGE.”

*“ Head-Quarters, Prince Ruperts,  
Feb. 25th, 1805.*

“ Sir,

“ I have had the honour to receive your letter. My duty to my King and country is so superior to every

other consideration, that I have only to thank you for the observations you have been pleased to make on the often inevitable consequences of war. Give me leave, individually, to express the greatest gratitude for your humanity and kind treatment of my wife and children; at the same time to request a continuance thereof, not only to her and them, but towards every other object you may meet with.

“ I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ G. PREVOST.”

*Copy of a Letter from Lord Camden.*

“ Sir,

*Downing Street, 18th May, 1805.*

“ Your letter to me of the 1st of March, containing your reports to Lieut.-General Sir William Myers, of the attack made by a French squadron with a considerable body of troops on the Island of Dominica, of the gallantry with which they were opposed, and of their retreat from that Island on the 27th February has been laid before the King. I have it in command from His Majesty to express his entire satisfaction in the judicious and brave exertions which you displayed in this emergency; and you will signify to the officers and men of the Regular and Militia forces under your command, His Majesty’s entire approbation of their spirited and meritorious services.

“ I have honor to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ CAMDEN.”

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No. XI.

*Letter from His Royal Highness the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, p. 9.*

“ *Horse Guards, Nov. 26th, 1805.*

“ MY DEAR LORD,

“ I HAVE to acknowledge your lordship’s letter of yesterday, recommending Major-General Prevost to my pe-

cular protection, from the military spirit and knowledge which he displayed in the late affair with the enemy at Dominica, and I request your lordship will be persuaded of the high sense I entertain of the services and exertions of Major-General Prevost, and that I shall be happy in availing myself of any opportunity to recommend him for a mark of His Majesty's favor.

“ I remain, my dear Lord,  
 “ Yours sincerely,  
 “ FREDERICK.”

“ *To the Earl of Camden, K. G.*  
 &c. &c. &c.”

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No. XII.

*Letter from the Speaker of the House of Assembly of  
 Dominica to General Prevost, p. 10.*

“ SIR,

“ *Dominica, 17th May, 1805.*

“ I HAVE the honor of transmitting to your Excellency, by desire of the House of Assembly, a copy of their Resolutions of the 2d instant, expressive of their thanks of your late gallant defence of the colony against a French force so very superior, and appropriating the sum of 1,000 guineas for the purchase of a Sword, and a service of Plate to be presented to you in testimony of their gratitude and approbation.

It affords me a peculiar gratification to be the organ of the House on the present occasion, because I am thus furnished with an opportunity of expressing the high esteem I entertain for your Excellency's character, not only as a brave, judicious, and experienced officer, in which capacity your merit has long stood conspicuous, but as a man of strict probity, and as a Governor whose public measures have uniformly been directed by views of general utility. When I say that

it is with the deepest regret I contemplate the departure of your Excellency from this colony, I speak the language of every respectable member of the community—but you go to reap in the approbation of your Sovereign, and the applauses of your country, the well-earned reward of your unremitting vigilance and indefatigable exertions, and I am persuaded that you carry with you from hence the earnest wishes of all good men for the happiness and prosperity of yourself and your family.

“ I have the honor to be,

“ With the highest respect, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ J. LUCAS,

“ Speaker.”

*The Governor's Reply.*

“ Sir,

“ *Prince Ruperts, 3d June.*

“ You have conveyed to me, in terms most flattering, the thanks of the House of Assembly for my endeavours to save this colony from the misery of a foreign and oppressive yoke. As the organ of that body you have expressed its partial sentiments with a friendly zeal, that has made on my mind an impression not to be effaced.

Allow me, Sir, through you, to offer to the House of Assembly my unfeigned thanks for the token I have received of its partial consideration of my services. That unanimity which has been our strength, uninterrupted, may render Dominica, even in the present perilous moment,\* almost invulnerable. Whilst danger exists, I will never abandon my post; nor shall I ever cease to entertain a grateful recollection of the sentiments the occasion has called forth.

So much of the resolutions of the House as are not personal to myself, I have caused to be given out in General Orders, to the Regular and Militia Forces.

“ I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

“ G. PREVOST.”

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\* A French Squadron was in the West Indies.

## No. XIII.

*His Honor the President and Council, and the Speaker and Gentlemen of the Assembly, to His Excellency the Governor in Chief, p. 10.*

THE Board and House having come to the following Resolution of voting the sum of 1,000*l.* sterling, for the purpose of purchasing a Sword and Service of Plate to be presented to his Excellency Governor Prevost, in the name of the Colony, as a token of its gratitude for the gallant defence thereof by his Excellency on the memorable 22d February last,

Also a sum not exceeding 300*l.* sterling, for defraying the expense of a Monument to the memory of the late Major Nunn who gallantly fell on the same memorable occasion,

Also the sum of 100 guineas for the purchase of a Sword to be presented to Major O'Connell, And 300*l.* sterling to be presented to Captain James, commanding the 46th regiment, to be laid out in the purchase of a Service of Plate for the use of the officers' Mess of that regiment—request your Excellency's assent thereto, and that you will issue your warrants to the Treasurer accordingly.

T. METCALF, President.

J. LUCAS, Speaker.

*Council Chamber, 12th May, 1805.*

*House of Assembly, 15th May, 1805.*

## No. XIV.

*Resolutions of the Patriotic Club, and Letter of the Chairman to General Prevost, p. 10.*

*Patriotic Fund, Lloyd's, May 14, 1805.*

AT a Special General Meeting of the Committee held this day,

JOSEPH MARRYAT, Esq. in the Chair,

Read, from the London Gazette of the 7th of May, a letter from Lieut.-General Sir William Myers, Bart. commanding His Majesty's troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands, to Earl Camden, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, inclosing a letter from Brigadier-General Prevost, Governor of Dominica, relating to the vigorous and gallant resistance made by the troops and militia under his command, against the very superior force with which the French landed at Roseau, on the 22d of February last; his retreat to the fort at Prince Ruperts; and the resolution he expressed, in answer to the summons of General Lagrange, of defending it to the last extremity; in consequence of which the enemy abandoned the enterprise, and evacuated the Island.

Resolved,

That a Sword of the value of 100*l.*, and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 200*l.*, with appropriate inscriptions, be presented to Brigadier-General Prevost, for the distinguished gallantry and military talents he displayed on that occasion, by which the sovereignty of the Island was preserved to His Majesty's arms.

That a Sword of Fifty Pounds value, and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 100*l.*, with appropriate inscriptions, or that sum in money, at his option, be presented to Major Nunn, wounded while faithfully executing the orders of General Prevost, "Not to yield to the enemy one inch of ground."

That a Sword of 50*l.* value, and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 100*l.*, with appropriate inscriptions, or that sum in money, at his option, be presented to Captain O'Connell, whose wound did not induce him to forego the honour of the command to which he succeeded on Major Nunn being disabled; and in which he resisted the repeated charges of the enemy, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers, till he obliged them to retire with great slaughter.

That the sum of 100*l.* be presented to Captain Colin Campbell, wounded.

That the sum of 40*l.* each be given to the men whose wounds have been attended with disability or loss of limb.

That the sum of 20*l.* each be given to the other men severely wounded.

And the sum of 10*l.* each, to the men slightly wounded, including the Militia of the Island.

That Brigadier-General Prevost be requested to advise the Committee of the mode in which the Resolutions respecting himself, Major Nunn, and Captain O'Connell, can be most acceptably carried into effect—to distribute the sums voted to the men wounded, and draw for the amount—furnishing the Committee with the names of the parties, and the sums respectively paid them—and to forward to the Committee the best information he can procure respecting the families of the men killed, including the Militia of the Island, that relief may be afforded to such widows, orphans, and aged parents, as depended upon them for support.

JOSEPH MARRYAT, Chairman.

(Copy.)

“ Sir,

*London, May 15, 1805.*

“ I have the honor to inclose you the resolutions of the Committee of the Patriotic Fund, on their taking into consideration the official account of the gallant and successful defence, made by you, and the brave men under your command, against the very superior force with which the enemy invested Dominica, on the 22d February last. That the sovereignty of the Island was preserved to the British Crown, must be in a great degree ascribed, under Divine Providence, to the talents with which you conducted the military operations; to the confidence which those who served under you had in those talents; and the animation with which they were inspired by your example.

“ The primary object of this Fund being the relief of the wounded, and the families of those killed in the service of their country, the Committee, on every occasion, restrict

their votes of honorary marks of distinction for gallant conduct, to the commanding officers. This, they trust, will satisfactorily explain to those brave officers, to whose merit you bear such honorable testimony, the reason of their not being noticed in these resolutions.

“The Committee cannot but remark the very distinguished manner in which the inhabitants of Dominica have displayed those gallant exertions against the enemy, to which they so readily came forward to animate others, by contributing to this fund. The Committee trust, that in attending to the other objects of the inclosed resolutions, you will be particularly careful to recommend to their consideration, the distressed relatives which any of the Militia of the Colony may have left unprovided for. Your bills, at three days sight, on Sir Francis Baring, Bart., Chairman of the Patriotic Fund, at Lloyds, for the amount of the sums voted to the wounded men, will be immediately honored. As those who are disabled, will be invalided and sent home, the Committee submit it to your discretion, whether the gratuities to them had not better be paid them on their arrival here, under your certificate of their claims.

“You will be pleased to accompany your draft, with a letter, giving the names of the parties wounded, and the sums respectively paid to each; which the Committee leave to your judgment, according to the nature and extent of the injuries they have received, instead of waiting for further information to act upon themselves.

“I have the honor to be, Sir,

“Your most obedient humble servant,

“JOSEPH MARRYAT,  
Chairman.”

“*Brigadier-General Prevost.*”

## No. XV.

*At a General Meeting of West India Planters and Merchants, held at the London Tavern, Bishopsgate Street, May 22, 1805, p. 10.*

Resolved unanimously,

THAT the thanks of this Meeting be given to his Excellency Brigadier-General Prevost, Governor of the Island of Dominica, for the distinguished gallantry and high military talents he displayed on the 22d of February, 1805, in the defence and effectual protection of that Colony against a numerous, powerful, and unexpected force from France.

And that this resolution be communicated to General Prevost, in a letter from the Right Honorable Lord Penrhyn, the Chairman of this Meeting.

Resolved unanimously,

That this Meeting, impressed with the highest sense of the important service rendered to all the West India Colonies, by the able resistance made by General Prevost to the landing of the enemy on the 22d of February, 1805, do request that he will accept from the general body of West India Planters and Merchants, a Piece of Plate, of the value of 300 guineas, with an inscription expressive of the sense of this resolution.

Resolved unanimously,

That the thanks of this Meeting be given to the Field-Officers, Captains, and other Commissioned Officers of the Royal Artillery, the 46th regiment, the 1st West India regiment, and also to the officers of the Colonial Militia, for the gallant conduct they respectively exemplified, and the zealous co-operation they afforded on the same occasion, and that his Excellency the Governor be requested to communicate the same.

Resolved unanimously,

That his Excellency General Prevost be requested, in a letter from the Chairman, to signify to the Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of his Majesty's Regular and Militia forces at Dominica, the high sense this Meeting entertains of their services in resisting the French force on the 22d of February, 1805.

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No. XVI.

*Extract from the Dominica Journal, of Saturday, July 6th, 1805, p. 10.*

*Roseau, July 6th, 1805.*

YESTERDAY afternoon, embarked from Roseau, in the Garrison-boat, (under a salute from Fort Young and Scot's Head) for Prince Ruperts, to join his amiable family, who left town the day preceding, his Excellency Major-General George Prevost, our worthy and highly respected Governor, a gentleman who retires from his government with the pleasing gratification of the consciousness of having faithfully discharged his duty to his Sovereign, at the same time that he has, as conscientiously, studied the interests of the people, over whom he has for nearly three years most uprightly and honorably presided.

We presume not to arrogate to ourselves talents capable of becoming the panegyrists of a Prevost—we shall confine ourselves to observing that his remembrance will be ever held dear in the breast of every worthy inhabitant of this Colony; and by declaring that it is our sincere prayer that his merit may meet its due reward from our most Gracious Sovereign, and that himself and family may pass their future days in the enjoyment of every earthly felicity.

## No. XVII.

*Dispatches from Sir George Beckwith, and Letter from Lord Castlereagh, p. 11.*

*Downing-street, March 27. (180*

The following despatches have this day been received from Lieut.-General Beckwith, Commander of His Majesty's Forces in the Leeward Islands, addressed to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

*“ Martinique, Feb. 1.*

“ MY LORD,

“ IN my last, No. 42, I had the honour to report to your Lordship the sailing of the army from Carlisle Bay upon the 28th ult. I have now the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that we landed in two divisions upon the 30th; the first division, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir G. Prevost, consisting of between 6 and 7,000 men, at Bay Robert, on the windward coast, in the course of the afternoon, without opposition; and, notwithstanding the difficulties of the country, we occupied a position on the banks of the Grand Lezard River before day-break of the 31st, with a corps of nearly 4,000 men, after a night march of seven miles through a difficult country. These services were greatly facilitated by the judicious and manly conduct of Captain Beaver, of His Majesty's ship *Acasta*, who led into the Bay in a bold and officer-like manner, preceded by His Majesty's brig *Forester*, Captain Richards. The exertions and success of this measure were completely effective, two transports only striking in the narrow passage at the entrance of the Bay. Hitherto we have experienced no resistance from the militia of the country; and they manifest a disposition every where to return to their homes, in conformity to a joint proclamation by the Admiral and myself, which is obtaining a very extensive circulation. The second division of the army, consist-

ing of upwards of 3,000 men, under the command of Major-General Maitland, landed near St. Luce and Point Solomon on the morning of the 30th; but, as our communication with that corps is not yet established, I cannot enter into any details. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Prevost, with the advance in my front, will take possession of the heights of Bruno in the course of this day; and I am led to expect will there, for the first time, feel the pulse of the regular troops of the enemy. The port of Trinite, which lies beyond the line of our operations, will, by order of Captain Beaver, of the navy, be taken possession of this day, by a detachment of seamen and marines from the squadron to windward, under the command of Captain Dick, of the *Penelope*. The Admiral, with the body of the fleet and store-ships, is in the vicinity of Pigeon Island, at the entrance of Fort Royal Bay. Our operations to windward have been vigorous and effectual in point of time; and the privations of the troops have been considerable, and borne in a manner worthy of the character of British soldiers. From what has passed, I am of opinion the inhabitants of the country manifest a friendly disposition; and after the heights of Surirey shall be carried, which I expect will be strongly contested, the campaign will be reduced to the operations of a siege, and the defence of the fortress.—The services rendered by the captains and officers of the navy to windward have been great and essential, and the exertions of Captain Withers of the navy, principal agent for transports, peculiarly meritorious.

“ GEO. BECKWITH,  
Com. Forces.”

“ *Martinique, Heights of Surirey, Feb. 3.*

“ My Lord,

“ In my letter of the 1st inst. I had the honour to report, for His Majesty’s information, the progress then made in our operations against the enemy. My expectation that Lieutenant-General Sir G. Prevost would meet them upon

Morne Bruno, and that the heights of Surirey would be warmly contested, was realized in the course of the same day; and both were carried under the direction of the Lieutenant-General, with that decision and judgment which belong to this respectable officer, and much to the honour of Brigadier-General Hoghton, the officers and men of the Fusileer brigade and light battalion, engaged on that service. On the 2nd, it appeared to me to be desirable to extend to the right of our position; which was effected in a spirited manner by the King's infantry. An exertion was then made to carry the advanced redoubt; but, having soon reason to believe that it would have been acquired with a loss beyond the value of the acquisition, the troops were withdrawn; and the enemy abandoned it during the night, with another redoubt contiguous to it, with evident marks of disorder: both will be occupied and included in our position this night. Pigeon Island surrendered at discretion yesterday, which enables the shipping to enter Fort Royal Bay; all the batteries on the Case Naviere side have been destroyed and abandoned, a frigate and some other merchant-vessels burned, the lower fort abandoned, and all their troops withdrawn from Fort Royal to the principal fortress. I consider the investiture to be nearly completed, and we must now look for the operations of a siege. Time does not admit of details; but your Lordship will perceive that these operations have been effected in eight days from our quitting Barbadoes, notwithstanding heavy rains and most unfavourable weather, in which the troops have borne every species of privation in a manner worthy their character as British soldiers.

“ GEO. BECKWITH,  
Com. Forces.”

“ *Camp, Heights of Surirey,  
Martinique, Feb. 10.*

“ My Lord,

“ Having, in my communications of the 1st and 5th instant, submitted to your Lordship's consideration general

reports of the operations of the army I have the honour to command, I now beg leave to inclose the special reports of the General Officers commanding divisions, and of Brigadier-General Hoghton, whose brigade was in action upon the 1st; with separate returns of our loss upon the 1st and 2nd, which, I am inclined to believe, will terminate our operations in the field.—The lower fort, formerly Fort Edward, was taken possession of before day-break in the morning of the 8th, by Major Henderson, commanding the Royal York Rangers, with that regiment, without resistance, and we now occupy that work. St. Pierre surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, of the 46th, the day before yesterday; and I have not yet received the details. In the course of all these services, where the co-operation of the navy was practicable, the greatest exertions have been made by the Rear-admiral; and the important advantages rendered on shore by that excellent officer, Commodore Cockburn, in the reduction of Pigeon Island, and the landing cannon, mortars, and ammunition at Point Negroe, and conveying them to the several batteries on that side, have been of the highest importance to the King's service.

“ GEO. BECKWITH,  
Com. Forces.”

“ *Martinique, Heights of Surirey, Feb. 2.*

“ Sir,

“ In conformity with your orders, I disembarked on the 30th ult. with the Fuzileer brigade of the 1st division of the army, at Malgre Tout, in the Bay Robert, at four o'clock, p. m. and proceeded from thence to De Manceau's estate, where I arrived late, in consequence of the difficulties of the country, and the unfavourable state of the roads for the movement of cannon. Before the dawn of the next day, I reached Papin's, and proceeded from thence with the advance, composed of the Royal Fusileer regiment, and the grenadier

company of the 1st West India regiment. The enemy retiring before me, I reached the heights of De Bork's estate towards evening, where I was joined at day-light on the 1st inst. by Brigadier-General Hoghton, with the 23rd regiment and the light infantry battalion, under the command of Major Campbell, of the Royal West India Rangers. I lost no time after this junction, and pushed forwards the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Pakenham, with the Royal Fusileers, to possess himself of Morne Bruno; this movement I supported by the light infantry battalion, under Brigadier-General Hoghton, who was ordered, after uniting the two corps, to proceed to force the heights of Desfourneaux, whilst I held the Royal Welsh Fusileers in reserve, to strengthen such points of attack as might require it. On my coming on the heights of Surirey, I had innumerable proofs of the valour and judgment of the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Pakenham, of the excellence of the Fusileer brigade, and of the spirited and judicious exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis, and Majors Pearson and Ostley, of the 23rd or Royal Welsh Fusileers; also of the bravery of Major Campbell and the light infantry battalion; all of which have enabled me to retain this valuable position without artillery, within 300 yards of the enemy's intrenched camp, covered with guns. The officers belonging to my staff distinguished themselves by their zeal and activity during the heat of the action. I have to lament the loss of Captain Taylor, Acting Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, who was severely wounded whilst rendering effectual services to his country.—I cannot omit acknowledging, that to Lieutenant Hobbs, of the Royal Engineers, I am indebted for the rapidity of our movements, and ultimate success, from his acquaintance with this country, which enabled him to guide and direct our movements.

“GEO. PREVOST,  
Lieut.-Gen.”

(Private.)

“ *Downing-street, May 25th, 1809.*

“ Dear Sir,

“ I beg to congratulate you on the successful termination of the operations in Martinique, in which you bore so distinguished a part. I hope that this will find you safely returned to Nova Scotia, without having suffered in your health from your West India campaign.

“ I remain, dear Sir,

“ Your faithful and obedient servant,

“ CASTLEREAGH.”

“ *Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Prevost,*  
*&c. &c. &c.*”

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 No. XVIII.

*Addresses presented to Sir George Prevost, on his Arrival at the Islands of Dominica and St. Christopher, p. 11.*

*To His Excellency Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Prevost, Bart.*  
*&c. &c. &c.*

“ MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

“ WE, His Majesty’s loyal subjects, the Members of the House of Assembly of the Island of Dominica, avail ourselves of the occasion of your Excellency’s visit to your late government, to repeat to you the assurances of the high esteem which we have ever entertained for the character of your Excellency, and to express our most grateful sense of the unabated zeal which your Excellency has evinced, on every occasion, to promote the welfare and prosperity of this colony, as well as to add glory to the arms of your country.

“ With every anniversary of the 22nd February, will the services rendered by your Excellency recur to our memory,

not only from the gallantry displayed by your Excellency upon that occasion, when opposed to so superior a force, but for your subsequent exertions in favour of the unfortunate sufferers by the fire, to which may be chiefly attributed the relief afforded them by the mother country.

“ We beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the brilliant result of the operations against the enemy’s most important colonial possession, and by which, an opportunity has been afforded you, of acquiring fresh laurels, in addition to those which already grace your Excellency.

“ We most heartily and sincerely wish your Excellency a prosperous and pleasant passage to your government, and we anticipate that reward which awaits you (ever most pleasing to a soldier)—the approbation of your sovereign.

“ JNO. HY. HOBSON,  
Speaker.”

“ *House of Assembly,*  
*15th March, 1809.*”

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*Reply of Sir George Prevost.*

“ Mr. Speaker, and

“ Gentlemen of the House of Assembly,

“ I feel flattered by your expressions of personal consideration, and highly gratified that my exertions in favour of the sufferers on the memorable 22d of February, 1805, were attended by some success.

“ I thank you for your congratulations on the favourable termination of a short, but brilliant campaign.

“ GEORGE PREVOST.”

“ *Government-House, 15th*  
*March, 1809.*”

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*To His Excellency Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Prevost, Bart.*  
*&c. &c. &c.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ We the merchants and inhabitants of this His Majesty’s Island of Saint Christopher, beg leave to approach

your Excellency with the warmest congratulations on your arrival in this colony; and to assure your Excellency that could any circumstance enhance the satisfaction we receive upon this occasion, it must proceed from the happy contemplation of the recent success which has crowned the exertions to which you have so pre-eminently contributed in the reduction of the Island of Martinique to His Majesty's arms: a conquest which has at once given additional splendour to the British name, and added another signal example of your merit, perseverance, and intrepidity.

“ Although pre-eminent as your Excellency is viewed, by every class of your heroic brothers in arms, we cannot, however, but assure your Excellency, that the high and general estimation which every inhabitant of the sister colony (hitherto entrusted to your command), feels toward you, (and which colony you so gallantly defended against a superior force), contributes most powerfully to endear you to every individual of this island, in the united character of a brave soldier and a good citizen.

“ We trust your Excellency's stay amongst us will be protracted for a time equal to the wishes of this community, who anxiously express the most ardent desire of offering to your Excellency every testimony of the high consideration they entertain of you, and the brave soldiers under your command.

“ A great and good King, who can appreciate merit and bestow reward, will add stability to our expressions, and pronounce to the world, by his commendations, that we have not presumed to announce your merits, but from the truest heralds of your fame—men who have shared your dangers and received your smiles—the British soldiery.”

“ *Basseterre, March 21st, 1809.*”

*Reply of Sir George Prevost.*

*To the Merchants and Inhabitants of the Island of  
St. Christopher.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ Highly flattered as I feel by the address of the merchants and inhabitants of His Majesty’s Island of St. Christopher; the gratification I derive from this testimony of their consideration, increases my very sincere regret that the interest of the public service deprives me of the opportunity of indulging my private feelings in making a longer stay than my duty will in the present instance permit;—I shall ever most eagerly and joyfully avail myself of every occasion of testifying to this island, my sincerest and best wishes for its welfare and prosperity.

(Signed)

“ GEORGE PREVOST.”

“ *Basseterre, March 21st, 1809.*”

No. XIX.

*Address from the Inhabitants of Halifax, p. 12.*

*To His Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. &c. &c. &c.*

“ SIR,

“ YOUR Excellency intending shortly to leave this Province, the inhabitants of Halifax cannot omit expressing to you their unfeigned regret on the occasion, and, at the same time, testifying their gratitude for the many real benefits which the province has derived from your short administration of the government.

“ We have often been induced to come forward to manifest our esteem for many valuable and respectable characters, who have filled high stations in this country, for it has been our good fortune to have had many men of tried worth at the head of the civil, naval, and military departments here; but

believe us, Sir, we use not the language of flattery, when we say, that we have never felt more sincere regret, than for your departure from us.

“ Equity has been the ruling principle of your administration, and the most unremitting attention to public business its invariable practice: your indefatigable zeal carried you into the most remote parts of the province, and you became early acquainted with our situation and our wants. The confidence with which you inspired the legislative body, induced them to provide ample supplies for the different branches of the public service. The wisdom with which they have been appropriated, equals the liberality with which they were granted, and must produce extensive and permanent benefits to the country at large.

“ Your ears have been open to the petitioners of every class, and your ready attention to their wants and their claims, has left no cause for complaint. With the sentiments of affectionate and respectful regard which you have excited in our breasts—while we deplore our loss, we cannot but derive consolation from the justly merited honours that cause your removal.

“ We consider your appointment to the supreme command of British North America, as an earnest of the blessing which His Majesty’s subjects, on the western side of the Atlantic, are to enjoy under the government of the august personage, the anniversary of whose birth we this day assemble to commemorate. At this critical period, when the prejudices and misguided councils of a neighbouring nation render it not improbable that we may be called upon to defend the invaluable privileges of Englishmen, it must be a source of satisfaction to every loyal subject, that His Royal Highness, in the name of our venerable sovereign, has entrusted the defence of these colonies to an officer, who has so frequently proved himself worthy of commanding British colonies. May he ever, Sir, be thus influenced in his nominations to offices of great trust and high responsibility, by the merit of those on

whom they are to be conferred. We thank you for your condescension in permitting your portrait to be taken and left with us. It will be a perpetual memorial of a personage, whose public conduct and private virtues have been so beneficial and endearing to His Majesty's subjects in this province.

“ You go, Sir, to a more exalted station ; but you cannot go where you will be more beloved or respected. In taking our leave of you, permit us to assure you of our warmest wishes, that every blessing may be yours, and every happiness attend your amiable and exemplary lady, and each individual of your excellent family.

“ *Halifax, 12th August, 1811.*”

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No. XX.

*Addresses from the Clergy of Nova Scotia, &c. &c. to Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. &c. &c. p. 12.*

“ SIR,

“ ALTHOUGH the clergy of the established church of Nova Scotia most cordially join in the general tribute of respect, which is now offered to your Excellency ; and very largely share in the sincere regret, so universally excited by your intended departure from this province ; the important benefits which you have rendered to the sacred objects of our profession, by your Excellency's exertions in their behalf, impel us to a more particular expression of our gratitude, and our grief.

“ Your Excellency has a claim upon the best acknowledgments we can offer, for every mark of respect to our office, and every condescending attention to ourselves, that

we could receive at your hands; accompanied by continual endeavours to promote the cause of literature and religion in this colony.

“ Through your Excellency’s attentive kindness, and your representations to the throne, the most benevolent assistance has been extended to our churches, and in every part of the province they are now receiving improvement and enlargement. While our dutiful and affectionate gratitude is directed towards the royal source of these great benefits, we cannot be wanting in warm and grateful respect, for the channel through which they have been obtained.

“ Nor are we under less obligation, for the uniform and exemplary attention of your Excellency, and your family, to the public and private duties of religion. You will permit us, Sir, though duly sensible of your other numerous and distinguished merits, to consider this among the brightest ornaments of your character. It supplies us with most gratifying evidence, to an important truth, that the ablest and best servants to their King and country, must be sought among those who are most faithful to their God.

“ Feeling as we do the extensive and peculiar benefits of your Excellency’s residence among us, it is impossible that we should not have the deepest regret for your departure. But it will be our duty to seek for alleviation for our sorrow, in grateful recollection of the benefits we have already received, and in humble hope that the influence of your example will remain, when we can no longer enjoy the advantages of your presence. We have unfeigned satisfaction also, in the increased honours, and more extensive command, to which you are called, by the discerning favour of your Prince; and we shall have much comfort in reflecting, that although your Excellency will be advanced from the particular charge of this province, we shall still have the happiness of being under your general government.

“ Permit us to assure you, Sir, that our sincerely affectionate respect and esteem will ever follow you; and that

our fervent prayers are now offered, and will be long continued, for every blessing to yourself and family; for every honour you can now enjoy; and for unfading glory when all the honours of the world shall have passed away."

" *Halifax, Aug. 15th, 1811.*"

*His Excellency's Reply.*

" I received with sentiments of peculiar satisfaction, the address of the Right Reverend the Bishop and the clergy of Nova Scotia.

" My fervency in that important cause they especially promote, renders their favourable consideration of my government, an act at once gratifying for the past, and encouraging for the future, under whatever situation my sovereign's commands may place me. I am well aware, that if our revered and pious King could investigate the course of my administration in this province, there is no part of it which would ensure me his royal favour, equal to the testimony with which I am honoured in this address.

" GEORGE PREVOST."

" *Government House,  
15th August.*"

*Halifax, August 19.*

The following addresses were presented to his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. last week.

*The Address of the Council to his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. Lieut.-Governor of Nova-Scotia, &c. &c. &c.*

" Sir,

" His Majesty's Council cannot take leave of your Excellency at this Board, without an expression of those sentiments which they cordially feel upon the painful eve of your departure.

" The general regret of the province upon this occasion,

pervading every class, and flowing from the purest of sources, must afford you, Sir, the most satisfactory evidence, that you have lived here in the hearts of His Majesty's subjects;—and that you have well merited the affection they manifest: to us who have had the honour of a closer communication with your Excellency, and have, thus, become intimately acquainted with your talents and your virtues, you have been more perfectly known;—by us, you will of course be doubly regretted.

“ We early discovered your vigilance, and energetic zeal for the good of the province,—your acute discernment of its best interests,—your perseverance in the pursuit of every object that could lead to its welfare,—and your unwearied attention to its minutest concerns;—we soon discovered that excellent understanding, which has so well fitted you to govern, and that integrity and independence, which have rendered your government so beloved, and so respectable.

“ It is, however, to these talents and virtues, that we are to impute our present loss;—the discerning mind of our excellent Prince has called you to a higher appointment, and our fellow subjects of a sister colony will have the satisfaction of receiving that boon, with which we are now parting;—we have a consolation, however, in reflecting, that we are still to remain within the influence of your valued abilities, and that we may feel the effects of their spirited exertions, in a contiguous, and more extensive quarter of the British empire;—wherever your duties, civil or military, may call you, to the cabinet as a statesman, or to the field as a soldier, we are confident you will deserve well of your country, and justify, to the fullest extent, the very high opinion upon which your preferment has been founded.

As your council,—with whom you have ever advised, upon terms of the most unreserved candour and harmony,—as your friends,—with whom you have ever associated, upon terms of the most affectionate condescension; we, Sir, with feelings of the purest regret,—and with the sincerest wishes for the

welfare of yourself and your family,—earnestly bid you farewell.”

*Answer.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ The expressions of general esteem and approbation, with which I have been honoured, concurring with the sentiments of His Majesty’s Council, is a circumstance peculiarly gratifying to me. You, gentlemen, are intimately acquainted with the principles upon which my conduct has been founded, others can only judge from the effects produced by the measures pursued during my administration.

“ If my endeavours in the public service have been successful, I may ascribe much of that success to the able assistance I have received from you.

“ Your advice, ever springing from a perfect knowledge of the true interests of the province, a due regard to the just rights of the people, and a zealous attachment to His Majesty’s person and government, has enabled me to accomplish objects of much promise to the future prosperity of this province.

“ Having expressed the obligations I feel on public ground, I am not the less sensible of those of a personal nature.

“ I shall ever reflect with satisfaction on the happy state of our intercourse during the period of my administration.—It is, therefore, with feelings of the sincerest regard, I repeat your farewell.

“ GEORGE PREVOST.”

“ *Government House,*  
16th Aug. 1811.”

*To his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. Lieut.-Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over His Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia, &c. &c. &c.*

“ We the undersigned representatives for the county and townships within the county of Hants, as well for our-

selves as our constituents : the clergy and magistrates in the same county, beg leave to address your Excellency upon your departure from this government.

“ We have recently heard with mingled joy and concern, that His Majesty has raised you to the distinguished, but well-merited favour of being appointed Governor-General of the British Provinces in North America, and that your Excellency will immediately proceed to your government. Upon this occasion we cannot forbear expressing our grateful sense of your wise and mild administration.

“ The ardour manifested by your Excellency, in promoting the true interests of this province, has made a deep impression upon the minds of the people of this happy and highly-favoured colony.

“ Under your government, Sir, though a short one, the agriculture, commerce, and fisheries of the province have rapidly increased; religion has been cherished, schools established, extensive roads of communication with the capital opened and improved, the militia organized and disciplined, and under the most salutary regulations rendered efficient.

“ The inhabitants of the county of Hants, deeply impressed with a sense of the benefits they have received, will ever retain a grateful recollection of them, and while they lament the departure of your Excellency from this government, are made happy by the consideration that your Excellency has experienced an additional mark of the Royal favour.

“ We earnestly pray that your Excellency, Lady Prevost and family, may have a pleasant voyage, and arrive in safety at the seat of your government, and be attended throughout life with the choicest blessings of Providence.

[Signed by the Representatives, Magistrates, Clergy, and other principal Inhabitants.]

“ *Windsor, 13th August, 1811.*”

*Reply.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ With feelings of satisfaction and gratitude, I return you my best thanks for the warm assurance of your regard, so kindly manifested in your address upon my departure.

“ Your high approbation of my measures I shall ever retain as an additional pledge of the general esteem of this province, which it has been my ambition to acquire; and, believe me, that among those of His Majesty’s subjects, who have favoured me with their good opinion and good wishes, I feel much pleasure in receiving the affectionate address of the flourishing county of Hants.

“ GEORGE PREVOST.

“ *Government House,*  
16th Aug. 1811.”

*To His Excellency Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. Lieut.-Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over His Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia, and its Dependencies, &c. &c. &c.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ The magistrates and militia officers of King’s County, humbly intreat, that they may be allowed to offer their assurance of high respect and unfeigned esteem to your Excellency, on your departure from Nova Scotia. Your Excellency’s unwearied attention to the welfare and best interest of this province, have engaged admiration, and given you a strong claim to our gratitude; while the wisdom, mildness, and firmness of your administration have commanded general confidence; and such are your military talents, that, though storms have been hovering around us, and threatened to burst over our heads, with dependence on Divine protection, we have felt secure, while our armed force was under your direction.

“ The virtues of your character have endeared you to the

inhabitants of Nova Scotia, and we cannot but feel regret at your departure: but a higher and more important station requires your talents and abilities; and we beg leave to congratulate you on the flattering testimony you have received of royal favour and approbation.

“ Permit us to say, that we shall ever feel a lively interest in every thing that regards your Excellency, and that the name of Sir George Prevost will ever be dear and honoured among us.

“ To Lady Prevost we beg leave to tender our best respects, and sincere wishes, for her future happiness.

“ May a pleasant passage await you, and may you continue to receive, from our gracious Sovereign, those rewards which your services so justly entitle you to.

[Signed by the Magistrates, Clergy,  
Militia Officers, and other principal  
Inhabitants.]

“ *August 15th, 1811.*”

*Reply.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ Feeling a sincere regard for every class of people within this happy colony, I need not say that your kind address cannot but add to my gratification.

“ I have made it my study to become acquainted with every part of the Province, with its views, its resources, and its advantages; but of your county I have had the satisfaction to obtain a more particular knowledge.

“ The high state of its cultivation, and the agricultural benefits attending it, should make you proud of the land on which you live.

“ Permit me, in return for your cordial address, to express my sincere wishes that your prosperity may continue, and that you may long live a free and happy people, under the best of governments.

“ **GEORGE PREVOST.**”

“ *Government House,  
16th Aug. 1811.*”

## No. XXI.\*

*Address from the House of Assembly of Upper Canada to Sir George Prevost, March 1813, p. 75.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ WE, his Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of Upper Canada in Provincial Parliament assembled, beg leave to congratulate your Excellency on your arrival in this Province, and to express the unfeigned satisfaction it affords us in as much as it is an additional proof of the high interest your Excellency takes in the general welfare of this colony.

“ We should be wanting to the sovereign, under whose paternal care we have so long lived, to our country and to ourselves, were we to neglect to offer to your Excellency at this time, the sentiments of gratitude with which we feel inspired for the marks of your attention manifested in providing clothing for a considerable portion of the loyal and brave militia of this Province, as well as for the active and vigorous exertions which have been made, and are now making for strengthening our marine force upon the Lakes, which will enable us to secure and preserve that superiority upon that favourite element to which Great Britain is indebted for her prosperity and glory; and on which our safety so materially depends.

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\* These addresses are extracted from a work, entitled, “ the Canadian Inspector,” published at Montreal, in 1815, for the express purpose of noticing and confuting the assertions made by the author of the letters under the signature of Veritas, respecting the measures of Sir George Prevost, in the prosecution of the war. Upon the authority of these letters the Quarterly Reviewer has mainly relied, and has had the boldness to declare, that “ *no reply was ever attempted to be made to the statements contained in them, or doubt ever expressed in the Provinces of their correctness.*”—Review, p. 408.

“ Emerging from a state of infancy, the inhabitants of this province have been enabled, by the aid afforded them by your Excellency in his Majesty’s regular forces, to defeat the designs of the enemy ; although his numbers have been in every instance so superior.

“ To suppose your Excellency will not continue to extend every assistance to us in this emergency, would be the height of incredulity, after the testimony we have already witnessed of your vigilance and affectionate solicitude for our preservation. It would be superfluous, therefore, to suggest how much we stand in need of the fostering hand of our mother country—to be directed by the wisdom of your Excellency, in order that we may maintain the laws and constitution so dear to us, and which it is our sincere hope we may transmit unimpaired to our posterity.

“ We hesitate not to say, that the energy your Excellency may exercise towards the attainment of this great end, will be zealously seconded by the people of this Province, and that their efforts under the influence of an omnipotent power, and the devotion of your Excellency’s military skill, will be eventually successful.

“ ALLAN M’LEAN,  
Speaker.”

*Address from the Inhabitants of York to Sir George Prevost.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ We the Magistrates and other inhabitants of the town of York, are happy in having an opportunity of paying that respect, which we owe to your Excellency, and of offering our most sincere thanks and acknowledgments for the attention you have been pleased to shew to this province.

“ The pride and pleasure which we feel from the behaviour of our gallant militia, is greatly heightened when we consider that their conduct is honoured with your approbation, and that you are pleased to testify your sense of their services in ordering clothing for a considerable proportion of

their number; an act of benevolence and humanity which will make a deep and lasting impression on their minds; and stimulate them to preserve that high character which they have already acquired.

“ But we should, indeed, be much wanting to your Excellency, as well as to ourselves, if we did not on this occasion, with gratitude acknowledge the obligation which this province lies under to the valour and discipline of his Majesty’s regular forces, whose courage and conduct, on the most trying emergencies, have done honour to the name and to the character of a British soldier.

“ We are particularly gratified, and offer our most sincere thanks and acknowledgments for the vigorous exertions which have been made, and are still carrying on towards the strengthening our provincial marine, by order of your Excellency, fully convinced that to maintain a superiority upon the Lakes is an object of the first importance to this Province.

“ Thankful for that success which has hitherto crowned his Majesty’s arms under your command, we earnestly beg for its continuance, entertaining the pleasing hope, that by our own conduct, and the exertions of our brave defenders, we, in this Colony, by the blessing of God, may long remain under the protection of our parent State, a free, brave, and loyal people.

“ THOMAS SCOTT,  
Chairman.”

*Address from the Inhabitants of Kingston to Sir George Prevost.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ We, his Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Magistrates, Officers of the Militia, and other inhabitants of the town of Kingston, and other parts of the Midland District, beg leave respectfully to express the high sense we entertain of your Excellency’s watchful care for the safety

of this Province, which has led you at this inclement season to undertake a toilsome journey of many hundred miles for the purpose of visiting and inspecting its extensive frontiers. Your presence, Sir, cannot but diffuse fresh energy in all classes of his Majesty's subjects, and encourage them to continue their zealous co-operation in the common cause; and we trust that under the judicious arrangement which has been made by your Excellency's orders, Divine Providence will continue to crown our exertions in defence of the Province against his Majesty's enemies with the same success by which they have been hitherto happily distinguished.

“ *Kingston, March 7, 1813.*”

*Address from the Inhabitants of the Eastern District of Upper Canada to Sir George Prevost.*

“ To his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Knight and Baronet, Captain General, &c. &c. &c. The loyal address of the Inhabitants of the Eastern District.

“ We, his Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects, inhabitants of the Eastern District of Upper Canada, beg leave to present to your Excellency our unfeigned, and heartfelt congratulations on your safe return from your long and fatiguing journey to the upper parts of this Province, which your ardent zeal for the service of your king and country, and paternal solicitude for the security of this portion of his Majesty's dominions only could induce you to undertake.

“ We thank heaven for having preserved your Excellency's person from all the dangers to which you have been exposed, not only from the enemy in the long line of frontiers through which you had to pass, but from the contagious diseases, which rage through many parts of these Provinces, and other dangers incidental to a journey of upwards of a thousand miles in a country like this, still destitute of inns, and proper accommodations for travellers, and at the most inclement season of the year.

“ So illustrious an example of despising danger and sacrificing personal ease and comfort, exhibited by the representative of our beloved sovereign, both cheers and animates us to bear with resignation our individual privations in the glorious cause in which we have to struggle. We now experience the truth which we have so often heard with wonder from others, that your Excellency’s prudence carries with it an irresistible attraction and confidence among all classes of people, wherever you go. We should consider it criminal to complain of the hardships to which the present state of warfare has subjected us, in common with all our fellow-subjects in this Province; perfectly convinced, as we are, of your Excellency’s earnest wish and readiness to alleviate our sufferings as much as lies in your power.

“ The auspicious event which, in the late brilliant success of His Majesty’s arms at Ogdensburg, so closely followed the arrival of your Excellency in Upper Canada, flatters us with the hope that this will be but one of the happy consequences of your visit. We cannot express to your Excellency in terms sufficiently strong, our satisfaction in thus having an opportunity of teaching the enemy that their repeated insults, and wanton attacks upon our shores, are not to be borne with impunity.

“ To your Excellency’s active and fertile mind we look up with much confidence for the vigorous and energetic measures, to prosecute a war, into which the insidious policy of a faithless and inveterate enemy has involved our country and ourselves, and in which are feared every thing which can render life desirable at stake.

“ We are determined to stand or fall by the parent country, and to defend the crown and dignity of our revered sovereign, our families and our properties, with the last drop of our blood. We know that justice is on our side, and we trust that the God of battles will continue to favour our cause as he has hitherto done. Indeed we do not allow ourselves to entertain the smallest doubt of a glorious termination of

the contest under your Excellency's government and Heaven's protection.

*“ Glengary, March 8, 1813.”*

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No. XXII.

*Official Report of Col. Baynes, p. 81.*

Extract of a Letter from Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst, dated Head-Quarters, Kingston, June 1, 1813.

“ ALTHOUGH as your Lordship will perceive by the report of Colonel Baynes, which I have the honour herewith to transmit, the expedition has not been attended with the complete success which was expected from it, I have great satisfaction in informing your Lordship that the courage and patience of the small band of troops employed on this occasion, under circumstances of peculiar hardship and privation, have been exceeded only by their intrepid conduct in the field, forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet through a thickly wooded country, affording constant shelter and strong positions to the enemy; but not a single spot of cleared ground favourable to the operations of disciplined soldiers.”

*“ Kingston, May 30, 1813.”*

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to report to your Excellency, that in conformity to an arranged plan of operations with Commodore Sir James Yeo, the fleet of boats assembled astern of his ship, at 10 o'clock in the night of the 28th inst., with the troops placed under my command, and led by a gun-boat under the direction of Captain Mulcaster, Royal Navy, proceeded towards Sackett's Harbour in the order prescribed to the troops, in case the detachment was obliged

to march in column, viz. the Grenadier Company, 100th, with one section of the Royal Scots, two Companies of the 8th, or King's, four of the 104th, two of the Canadian Voltigeurs. Two six-pounders, with their gunners, and a Company of Glengary Light Infantry, were embarked on board a light schooner, which was proposed to be towed under the direction of Officers of the Navy, so as to insure the guns being landed in time to support the advance of the troops. Although the night was dark with rain, the boats assembled in the vicinity of Sackett's Harbour, by one o'clock, in compact and regular order; and in this position it was intended to remain until the day broke, in the hope of effecting a landing before the enemy could be prepared to line the woods with troops which surround the coast; but unfortunately, a strong current drifted the boats considerably, while the darkness of the night and ignorance of the coast, prevented them from recovering the proper station until the day dawned, when the whole pulled for the point of debarkation. It was my intention to have landed in the cove formed by Horse Island, but on approaching it, we discovered that the enemy were fully prepared by a very heavy fire of musketry, from the surrounding woods which were filled with Infantry, supported with a field-piece. I directed the boats to pull round to the other side of the Island, where a landing was effected in good order and with little loss, although executed in the face of a corps formed with a field-piece in the wood, and under the enfilade of a heavy gun of the enemy's principal battery. The advance was led by the Grenadiers of the 100th regiment, with undaunted gallantry which no obstacle could arrest; a narrow causeway, in many places under water, not more than four feet wide, and about four hundred paces in length, which connected the Island with the mainland, was occupied by the enemy in great force with a six-pounder. It was forced and carried in the most spirited manner, and the gun taken before a second discharge could be made from it: a tumbril, with a few rounds of ammuni-

tion was found; but, unfortunately, the artillerymen were still behind, the schooner not having been able to get up in time: and the troops were exposed to so heavy and galling a fire, from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up. At this spot two paths led in opposite directions round the hill. I directed Colonel Young, of the King's regiment, with half of the detachment to penetrate by the left, and Major Drummond, of the 104th, to force the path by the right, which proved to be more open and was less occupied by the enemy. On the left the wood was very thick, and was most obstinately maintained by the enemy. The gun-boat which had covered our landing, afforded material aid by firing into the woods; but the American soldier, secure behind a tree, was only to be dislodged by the bayonet. The spirited advance of a section produced the flight of hundreds; from this observation all firing was directed to cease, and the detachment being formed in as regular order as the nature of the ground would admit, pushed forward through the wood upon the enemy, who although greatly superior in numbers, and supported by field-pieces, and a heavy fire from their fort, fled with precipitation to their block-house and fort, abandoning one of their guns. The division under Colonel Young was joined in the charge by that under Major Drummond, which was executed with such spirit and promptness, that many of the enemy fell in their inclosed barracks, which were set on fire by our troops. At this point the further energies of the troops became unavailing. Their block-house and stockaded battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them—the fire of the gun-boats proved inefficient to attain that end—light and adverse winds continued, and our large vessels were still far off. The enemy turned the heavy ordnance of the battery to the interior defence of his post. He had set fire to the store-house in the vicinity of the fort. Seeing no object within our reach to attain that could compensate for the loss we were momen-

tarily sustaining, from the heavy fire of the enemy's cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position on the crest of the hill we had charged from. From this position we were ordered to reembark, which was performed at our leisure, and in perfect order, the enemy not presuming to show a single soldier without the limit of his fortress. Your Excellency having been a witness of the zeal and ardent courage of every soldier in the field, it is unnecessary in me to assure your Excellency—that but one sentiment animated every breast—that of discharging to the utmost of their power their duty to their King and country; but one sentiment of regret and mortification prevailed, in being obliged to quit a beaten enemy, whom a small band of British soldiers had driven before them for three hours, through a country abounding in strong positions of defence, but not offering a single spot of cleared ground favourable for the operation of disciplined troops, without having fully accomplished the duty we were ordered to perform. The two divisions of the detachment were ably commanded by Colonel Young, of the King's, and Major Drummond of the 104th. The detachment of the King's and Major Evans nobly sustained the high and established character of that distinguished corps; and Captain Burke availed himself of the ample field afforded him in leading the advance to display the intrepidity of British Grenadiers. The detachment of the 104th, under Major Moodie, Captain M'Pherson's company of Glengary Light Infantry, and two companies of Canadian Voltigeurs, under Major Herriot, all of them levies of the British Provinces of North America, evinced most striking proofs of their loyalty, steadiness, and courage. The detachment of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment behaved with great gallantry. Your Excellency will lament the loss of that active and intelligent officer, Captain Gray, acting Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, who fell close to the enemy's work while reconnoitring it, in the hope to discover some opening to favour an assault. Commodore Sir James Yeo conducted

the fleet of boats in the attack, and accompanying the advance of the troops directed the co-operation of the gun-boats. I feel most grateful for your Excellency's kind consideration in allowing your Aids-de-Camp, Majors Coore and Fulton, to accompany me in the field; and to these officers for the able assistance they afforded me.

“ I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) “ EDWARD BAYNES.

“ Colonel Glengary Light Infantry  
Commanding.”

“ *To His Excellency Lieut.-General  
Sir George Prevost, Bart., &c.*”

*Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in an attack on  
Sackett's Harbour, on the 29th of May.*

Total.—1 General Staff, 3 Serjeants, 44 Rank and File killed. 3 Majors, 3 Captains, 5 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 7 Serjeants, 2 Drummers, 172 Rank and File, 2 Gunners wounded. 2 Captains, 1 Ensign, 13 Rank and File wounded and missing.

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No. XXIII.

*Extracts of Letters from Sir George Prevost to Brigadier-General Procter, p. 92.*

(Private.)

“ *Castle of St. Lewis, Quebec,  
9th February, 1813.*

“ SIR,

“ I HAVE received your despatch of the 25th ult. addressed to Major-General Sheaffe, reporting the glorious result of an attack, you had very judiciously deemed it expedient to make on the 22d, on a division of General Harri-

son's army advancing from the river Raisin, upon Sandwich, commanded by Brigadier-General Winchester.

“ In congratulating you upon so honourable an event, and in expressing my entire approbation of the zeal and spirit which you have evinced on the arduous command committed to you, I cannot fail to notice the intrepidity manifested by Colonel St. George, and the other officers and men, regulars and militia, serving under your immediate command.

“ Your singular judgment and decisive conduct in the affair of French Town, shall be pourtrayed for the gracious consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and I will not fail in repeating your warm recommendation of Lieutenant M'Lean, who is acting as your Brigade-Major.

“ I earnestly recommend upon all occasions a strict adherence to the control and restraint of our allies the Indians, that we may be enabled to repel the charges which have not unfrequently, though always falsely, been brought against our Government for resorting to the employment of them.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ GEORGE PREVOST.”

“ *To Brigadier-General Procter, Detroit.*”

“ *Kingston, 14th June, 1813.*

“ Sir,

“ I HAVE had the honour of your different letters, of the 14th of May, by Lieut.-Colonel Boucherville, containing the report of your successful resistance to the attack of the enemy, on the 5th of that month, and must heartily congratulate you upon the skill and bravery so invariably displayed by yourself and the troops under your command, and which have led to so fortunate a result; I have also to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, of the 10th inst. and beg leave to assure you that I have not been unmindful of your situation and wants. Brigadier-General Vincent has received directions, and I have reason to think he has already adopted measures for supplying them as far as lies in his

power. And whenever the Indian goods, which are now on their way from Quebec, shall have reached this post, they shall be forwarded to you without delay. As you have not acknowledged the receipt of my instructions, transmitted to you by desire, by Major-General Sheaffe, to avail yourself of any favourable opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy for the attack upon York, by endeavouring to annoy their settlements upon Lake Erie, I fear his letter has not reached you. The arrival of Captain Barclay, who, I trust, with a small reinforcement of seamen, is with you long before this, will, I hope, enable you to place your Marine on such a footing as to check any attempts of the enemy, to gain a superiority on Lake Erie. I am very solicitous to receive from you a correct statement of the whole of your Marine establishment, and what is wanted to render it complete.

“ I have, &c.

(Signed) “ GEORGE PREVOST.”

“ *To Brigadier-General Procter, Detroit.*”

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No. XXIV.

*Sentence of the Court-martial on Captain Barclay, p. 112.*

THAT the capture of His Majesty's late squadron was caused by the very defective means Captain Barclay possessed to equip them on Lake Erie; the want of a sufficient number of able seamen, whom he had repeatedly and earnestly requested of Sir James Yeo to be sent to him; the very great superiority of the enemy to the British squadron; and the unfortunate early fall of the superior officers in the action. That it appeared that the greatest exertions had been made by Captain Barclay, in equipping and getting into order the vessels under his command; that he was fully justified, under the existing circumstances, in bringing the enemy to action; that the judgment and gallantry of Captain

Barclay in taking his squadron into action, and during the contest, were highly conspicuous, and entitled him to the highest praise; and that the whole of the other officers and men of His Majesty's late squadron conducted themselves in the most gallant manner; and did adjudge the said Captain Robert Heriot Barclay, his surviving officers and men, to be most fully and honourably acquitted.—Rear-Admiral Foote, President.

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No. XXV.\*

*Court-martial on General Procter, p. 113.*

*Horse Guards, 9th September, 1815.*

AT a General Court-martial, held at *Montreal*, in Upper Canada, on the 21st December, 1814, and continued by ad-

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\* Since this work went to press, a positive contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that *Sir George Prevost attempted to affix a stigma upon the personal character of General Procter, which he was afterwards obliged to abandon, with a declaration of regret that it was ever made*, has been received from the Judge-Advocate who officiated at the above trial, and who is now resident in Canada. From this information it appears, that so far from the fifth charge being abandoned, the Judge-Advocate in his reply, although he adverted to the partial failure of the proof in support of that charge, still asserted that there came out in evidence strong grounds for making it. In answer to the Reviewer's misrepresentations as to the delay in assembling the Court-martial, it appears from the same information that such delay was unavoidable. General Procter's letter, in explanation of the retreat of the right division, was not received until late in November, 1813. It was, of course, transmitted to England, that His Majesty's Government might judge of the necessity of an investigation. When General Procter applied for this investigation, he was told that this was the case; and also, what he must have known, that at all events, no such investigation could then take place, as the principal witnesses, both for and against him, were then prisoners in the state of Kentucky. The first orders of the Government for the assembling of the Court-martial were not received in Canada until the 28th of May,

journments to the 28th January, 1815, *Major-General Henry Procter*, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 41st Regiment, was arraigned upon the undermentioned charges, viz.

1st, “ *That the said Major-General Procter, being entrusted with the Command of the Right Division of the Army serving in the Canadas, and the retreat of the said Division from the Western Parts of Upper Canada having become unavoidable from the loss of the Fleet on Lake Erie, on the 10th September, 1813, did not, immediately after the loss of the Fleet was known by him, make the Military arrangements best calculated for promptly effecting such retreat, and unnecessarily delayed to commence the same until the Evening of the 27th of the said Month, on which Day the Enemy had landed in considerable force within a short distance of Sandwich, the Head-Quarters of the said Division, such Conduct on the part of the said Major-General Procter, endangering the safety of the Troops under his Command, by exposing them to be attacked by a force far superior to them, being contrary to his Duty as an Officer, prejudicial to good Order and Military Discipline, and contrary to the Articles of War.*”

2d. “ *That the said Major-General Procter, after commencing the retreat of the said Division on the said 27th September, although he had reason to believe that the Enemy would immediately follow it with very superior numbers, and endeavour to harass and impede its March, did not use due expedition, or take the proper*

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1814. They were immediately notified to General Procter. The officers of the 41st were still prisoners, though they were shortly to be exchanged, but the exigencies of the war gave such employment to all the officers of proper rank to form such a Court-martial, as well as to many material witnesses, that it was impossible, without sacrificing the interests of the service to comply with General Procter's applications for the assembling of the Court.

- “ measures for conducting the said Retreat, having  
“ encumbered the said Division with large quantities of  
“ useless Baggage, having unnecessarily halted the  
“ Troops for several whole Days, and having omitted  
“ to destroy the Bridges over which the Enemy would  
“ be obliged to pass, thereby affording them the oppor-  
“ tunity to come up with the said Division, such con-  
“ duct betraying great professional incapacity on the  
“ part of the said Major-General Procter, being con-  
“ trary to his Duty as an Officer, prejudicial to good  
“ Order and Military Discipline, and contrary to the  
“ Articles of War.”
- 3d. “ That the said Major-General Procter did not take  
“ the necessary measures for affording security to the  
“ Boats, Waggons, and Carts, laden with the Ammu-  
“ nition, Stores, and Provisions, required for the Troops  
“ on their retreat, and allowed the said Boats, Wag-  
“ gons, and Carts, on the 4th and 5th October, 1813,  
“ to remain in the rear of the said Division, whereby  
“ the whole, or the greater part of the said Ammu-  
“ nition, Stores, and Provisions, either fell into the  
“ Enemy’s hands, or were destroyed to prevent their  
“ capture, and the Troops were without Provisions for  
“ a whole day previous to their being attacked on the  
“ said 5th of October; such conduct on the part of the  
“ said Major-General Procter being contrary to his  
“ duty as an Officer, prejudicial to good Order and  
“ Military Discipline, and contrary to the Articles of  
“ War.”
- 4th. “ That the said Major-General Procter having as-  
“ sured the Indian Chiefs in Council at Amherstburgh,  
“ as an inducement to them and their Warriors to ac-  
“ company the said Division on its retreat, that on their  
“ arrival at Chatham, they should find the Forks of  
“ the Thames fortified, did nevertheless neglect to for-  
“ tify the same; that he also neglected to occupy the

“ *Heights above the Moravian Village, although he had previously removed his Ordnance, with the exception of one six-pounder, to that position, where, by throwing up works he might have awaited the attack of the Enemy and engaged them to great advantage; and that after the intelligence had reached him of the approach of the Enemy on the Morning of the said 5th of October, he halted the said Division, notwithstanding it was within two miles of the said Village, and formed it in a situation highly unfavourable for receiving the Attack which afterwards took place, such conduct manifesting great professional incapacity on the part of the said Major-General Procter, being contrary to his Duty as an Officer, prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, and contrary to the Articles of War.*”

5th. “ *That the said Major-General Procter did not on the said 5th day of October, either prior to, or subsequent to, the Attack by the Enemy on the said Division on that day make the Military dispositions best adapted to meet or to resist the said Attack, and that during the Action, and after the Troops had given way, he did not make any effectual attempt in his own person, or otherwise, to rally or encourage them, or to co-operate with and support the Indians who were engaged with the enemy on the right, the said Major-General Procter having quitted the Field soon after the Action commenced, such Conduct on the part of Major-General Procter betraying great professional incapacity, tending to the defeat and dishonour of His Majesty's Arms, to the sacrifice of the Division of the Army committed to his charge, being in violation of his Duty, and unbecoming and disgraceful to his Character as an Officer, prejudicial to good Order and Military Discipline, and contrary to the Articles of War.*”

Upon which Charges the Court came to the following decision :—

“ The Court having duly weighed and considered the evidence adduced, as well in support of the Charges, as in support of the Defence, is of Opinion.”

“ That the Prisoner, *Major-General Henry Procter*, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 41st Regiment, is *not Guilty* of any part of the *First Charge*; and the Court doth therefore *wholly acquit* him, the said *Major-General Procter*, of the same.”

“ On the *Second Charge*, the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Guilty* of the following part thereof, *that he did not take the proper measures for conducting the Retreat*; but the Court is of Opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Not Guilty* of any other part of the said Charge, and doth therefore *acquit* him of the same.”

“ On the *Third Charge* the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Guilty* of that part thereof in which it is charged, *that the said Major General Procter did not take the necessary measures for affording security to the Boats, Waggon, and Carts, laden with the Ammunition, Stores, and Provisions, required for the Troops on their retreat*; but the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Not Guilty* of any part of the remainder of the said Charge, and doth therefore *acquit* him of the remainder thereof.”

“ On the *Fourth Charge* the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Guilty* of that part thereof, in which it is charged *that he neglected to occupy the heights above the Moravian Village, although he had previously removed his Ordnance, with the exception of one Six Pounder, to that position, where, by throwing up Works he might have awaited the attack of the Enemy, and engaged them to great advantage*;—and that after the intelligence had reached him of the approach of the Enemy on the Morning of the said 5th October, he halted the said Division, notwithstanding it was within two miles of the said Village, and formed it in a situa-

*tion highly unfavourable for receiving the attack, which afterwards took place;—but the Court is of opinion, that the said Major-General Procter is Not Guilty of any part of the remainder of the said charge, and doth therefore acquit him of the remainder thereof.”*

“ On the *Fifth Charge* the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Guilty* of that part thereof, in which it is charged *that he did not on the said 5th day of October, either prior to or subsequent to, the attack by the Enemy on the said Division on that day, make the Military dispositions best adapted to meet or to resist the said attack; but the Court is of opinion, that that part thereof, in which it is charged that during the Action, and after the Troops had given way, he did not make any effectual attempt in his own person or otherwise, to rally or encourage them, or to co-operate with and support the Indians who were engaged with the Enemy on the right,* has not been proved, and the Court doth therefore *acquit* him, the said *Major-General Procter* of the same;—and the Court is of opinion, that the said *Major-General Procter* is *Not Guilty* of any part of the remainder of the said Charge, and doth therefore *fully and honourably acquit* him of the same.”

“ Upon the whole, the Court is of opinion, that the prisoner, *Major-General Procter*, has in many instances during the retreat, and in the disposition of the Force under his Command, been erroneous in judgment, and in some, deficient in those energetic and active exertions, which the extraordinary difficulties of his situation so particularly required.”

“ The Court doth therefore adjudge him, the said *Major-General Procter*, *to be publicly reprimanded, and to be suspended from Rank and Pay, for the period of Six Calendar Months.*”

“ But as to any defect or reproach, with regard to the personal conduct of *Major-General Procter*, during the action on the 5th of October, the Court *most fully and honourably acquits* the said *Major-General Procter.*”

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to confirm the Finding of the Court, on the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th Charges.

With respect to the *Second* Charge it appeared to His Royal Highness to be a matter of surprise that the Court should find the prisoner *Guilty* of the offence alleged against him, while they at the same time *Acquit* him of all the facts upon which that Charge is founded;—and yet, that in the summing up of their Finding upon the whole of the Charges, they should ascribe the offences of which the prisoner has been found Guilty, to Error in Judgment, and pass a Sentence totally inapplicable to their own finding of Guilt, which can alone be ascribed to the Court having been induced, by a reference to the general good character and conduct of *Major-General Procter*, to forget, through a humane, but mistaken lenity, what was due from them to the Service.

Under all the circumstances of the case, however, and particularly those which render it impossible to have recourse to the otherwise expedient measure of re-assembling the Court, for the revisal of their proceedings, the Prince Regent has been pleased to acquiesce in, and confirm so much of the Sentence as adjudges the prisoner to be *publicly reprimanded*, and in carrying the same into execution, His Royal Highness has directed the General Officer commanding in Canada, to convey to *Major-General Procter*, His Royal Highness's high disapprobation of his conduct, together with the expression of His Royal Highness's regret, that any officer of the length of service, and of the exalted rank which he has attained, should be so extremely wanting in professional knowledge, and so deficient in those active and energetic qualities, which must be required of every officer, but especially of one in the responsible situation in which the *Major-General* was placed.

His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief directs that the foregoing Charges preferred against *Major-General Proc-*

*ter*, together with the Finding and Sentence of the Court, and the Prince Regent's pleasure thereon, shall be entered in the General Order Book, and read at the Head of every Regiment in His Majesty's Service.

By Command of His Royal Highness,  
The Commander-in-Chief,  
HARRY CALVERT,  
Adjutant-General.

No. XXVI.

*p. 122.*

*Adjutant-General's Office,  
Head Quarters, Quebec, 26th March, 1814.*

GENERAL ORDERS,

HIS Excellency the Governor-in-Chief and Commander of the Forces feels the highest gratification in obeying the Commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, transmitted in a letter from the Right Hon. the Earl Bathurst, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, of which the following is a Copy, and which His Excellency directs to be published in General Orders, and read at the Head of all Corps in this Command :

“ His Royal Highness has observed with the greatest satisfaction the skill and gallantry so conspicuously displayed by the officers and men who composed the detachment of troops opposed to General Hampton's army. By the resistance which they successfully made to an enemy so vastly disproportionate, the confidence of the enemy has been lowered, their plans disconcerted, and the safety of that part of the Canadian frontier ensured. It gives His Royal Highness peculiar pleasure to find, that His Majesty's Canadian subjects have at length had the opportunity (which His Royal Highness has been long anxious should be afforded

them) of refuting, by their own brilliant exertions in defence of their country, that calumnious charge of disaffection and disloyalty with which the enemy prefaced his first invasion of the Province.

“ To Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, in particular, and to all the officers and men under his command in general, you will not fail to express His Royal Highness’s Most Gracious Approbation of their meritorious and distinguished services. His Royal Highness has commanded me to forward to you by the first safe opportunity, the Colours which you have solicited for the embodied Battalions of the Militia, feeling that they have evinced an ability and disposition to secure them from insult, which gives them the best title to such a mark of distinction.

“ By His Excellency’s Command,

EDWARD BAYNES,  
Adjutant-General, N. A.”

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No. XXVII.

*Extract from Sir George Prevost’s Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated 18th May, 1814, p. 135.*

“ THE principal objects in the attack upon Oswego, being to cripple the resources of the enemy, in fitting out their squadron, and particularly their new ship at Sackett’s Harbour, their guns and stores of every description being drawn from the former post, and thus to delay, if not altogether to prevent, the sailing of the fleet, I determined to pursue the same policy on Lake Champlain, and therefore directed Captain Pring to proceed with his squadron, on board of which I had placed a strong detachment of the 1st battalion of the marines, towards Vergennes, for the purpose, if practicable, of destroying the new vessels lately launched there, and of

intercepting and capturing the stores and supplies for their armament and equipment. Captain Pring accordingly sailed on the 9th, and with the force mentioned in the margin, having been prevented by contrary winds from reaching his destination until the 14th instant, he found, on arriving off Otter Creek, the enemy so fully prepared to receive him, their vessels so strongly defended by batteries, and a considerable body of troops, that after a cannonading with some effect from his gun-boats, he judged it most advisable to abandon his intended plan of attacking them, and return to Isle aux Noix.

“ The appearance of our squadron on the Lake has been productive of great confusion and alarm at Burlington, and other places, along its shores, and the whole of the population appeared to be turned out for their defence.”

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### No. XXVIII.

*Extract of a Letter from Major-General Sir James Kempt to Sir George Prevost, respecting the intended Attack upon Sackett's Harbour, dated*

“ SIR,

“ Kingston, 18th Sept. 1814.

“ WITH all due deference to your Excellency's superior judgment, it appears to me, that an operation of this magnitude, and *probable duration*, should not be undertaken without the most ample means, and at the very best season of the year; that not less than 8,000 infantry, with a strong efficient corps of artillery and engineers, should be employed on this service; that Watertown and Brownville should be occupied in force by strong corps of observation, capable of covering the operations; that there should be an intermediate rendezvous for the assembly of the troops and stores, between this and the place of debarkation; and, that above

all, we should have the *decided superiority* on the Lake, before the service is undertaken.

“ I have the honour to be, with great respect,

“ Your Excellency’s most obedient

“ And most humble servant,

“ JAMES KEMPT.

Lieut.-Gen.”

No. XXIX.

*Extract of a Letter from Sir J. L. Yeo to Sir George Prevost, dated 29th Aug. 1814, p. 141.*

“ I HAVE this day received a correct statement of all the officers and men belonging to the establishment on Lake Champlain.

“ I enclose your Excellency a scale of the complement of each vessel, agreeable to the Admiralty order, by which you will perceive that, after each complement is complete, there will remain 97 seamen over and above. Your Excellency must be aware, that when this squadron proceeds up the Lake, I shall be under the necessity of taking the seamen out of the gun-boats; neither will the number of seamen we have in this country, afford a sufficient number of men to man the gun-boats on Lake Champlain, independent of the ships.”

No. XXX.

*Correspondence between Sir George Prevost and Capt. Downie, p. 145.*

“ *Head-Quarters, Plattsburg,*

*Wednesday, 7 a. m. 7th Sept. 1814.*

“ SIR,

“ THE enemy’s force in the Bay consists of a ship, inferior to the *Confiance*, a brig, a large schooner, a sloop, and seven or eight gun-boats. When the gun-boats are

manned, the remaining craft appear to have but few men left on board. If you feel that the vessels under your command are equal to a contest with those I have described, you will find the present moment offers many advantages which may not again occur.

“ As my ulterior movements depend on your decision, you will have the goodness to favour me with it, with all possible promptitude.

“ In the event of your coming forward immediately, you will furnish conveyance for the two 8-inch mortars, ordered from Isle aux Noix, with their stores, provided you can do so, without delaying the sailing of your squadron.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ G. PREVOST.”

“ To Captain Downie, &c.”

“ *H. M. S. Confiance, off La Cole,*

“ Sir,

7th Sept. 4 p. m. 1814.

“ I have the honour of your Excellency's letter of this morning.

“ I am aware of the comparative force of the two squadrons, and am thus far on my way to find the enemy, conceiving that the moment I can put this ship into a state for action, I shall be able to meet them.

“ The *Confiance* at this moment is in such a state, as to require at least a day\* or two to make her efficient before the enemy; but with all the exertion I can use, it will probably be that time at least, before it will be possible to get her up to Chazy, where I shall be happy to receive any further communication from your Excellency.

“ I have the honour to be, Sir,

“ Your most obedient servant,

“ *His Excellency Lieut.-Gen.*

“ GEO. DOWNIE.”

*Sir G. Prevost, Bart. &c. &c.*”

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\* The action was fought on the 11th.

*“ Head-Quarters, Plattsburg,  
Thursday Morning, 8th Sept. 1814.*

“ Sir,

“ I have just received your reply to my communication of yesterday.

“ As it is of the highest importance the ship, vessels, and gun-boats, under your command, should commence a co-operation with the division of the army, now occupying Plattsburg, I have sent my Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, with this letter, in order that you may obtain from him correct information of the disposition made by the enemy of his naval force in this bay.

“ I only wait for your arrival to proceed against General Macomb’s last position, on the south bank of the Saranac. Your share in the operation, in the first instance, will be to destroy or capture the enemy’s squadron, if it should wait for a contest, and afterwards co-operate with this division of the army; but if it should run away, or get out of your reach, we must meet here to consult on ulterior movements.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ G. PREVOST.”

*“ H. M. S. Confiance, off Point au Fer,  
8th Sept. 1814.*

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour of your Excellency’s letter of this day, and have to state, that I am advancing with the squadron to Chazy as fast as the wind and weather will allow.

“ In the letter I did myself the honour to address to you yesterday, I stated to your Excellency, that this ship was not ready—she is not ready now; and until she is ready, it is my duty not to hazard the squadron before an enemy, who will even then be considerably superior in force.

“ I purpose remaining at Chazy until I find myself enabled

to move, which I trust will be very shortly, it depending on my guns being ready.

“ I have the honour to be, Sir,

“ Your most obedient servant,

“ GEO. DOWNIE.”

“ *His Excellency Sir Geo. Prevost,*  
*Bart. &c. &c. &c.*”

“ *Head-Quarters, Plattsburg,*  
*Friday, 9th Sept. 1814.*

“ Sir,

“ In consequence of your communication of yesterday's date, I have postponed moving on the enemy's position, on the south bank of the Saranac, until your squadron is in a sufficient state of preparation to co-operate with this division of the army.

“ I need not dwell, with you, on the evils resulting to both services from delay, as I am well convinced you have done every thing that was in your power to accelerate the armament and equipment of your squadron, and I am also satisfied nothing will prevent its coming off Plattsburg the moment it is ready.

“ I am happy to inform you, that I find from desertiers, who have come over from the enemy, that the American fleet is inefficiently manned, and that a few days ago, after the arrival of the new brig, they sent on shore for the prisoners of all descriptions, in charge of the Prevost, to make up a crew for that vessel.

“ I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

“ G. PREVOST.”

“ P. S. Captain Watson, of the Provincial Cavalry, is desired to remain at Little Chazy until you are preparing to get under weigh, when he is instantly to return to this place with the intelligence.”

*“ H. M. S. Confiance, off Chazy,  
9th Sept. 1814.*

“ Sir,

“ I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency, that it is my intention to weigh and proceed with the squadron, from this anchorage, about midnight, in the expectation of rounding into the bay of Plattsburg about dawn of day, and commencing an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if they shall be found anchored in a position that will afford any chance of success.

“ I rely on any assistance it may be in your power to give.

“ In manning the flotilla and ships, we are many short. I have made application to the officer commanding at Chazy, for a company of the 39th regiment to make up.

“ I have the honour to be, Sir,

“ Your most obedient servant,

“ GEO. DOWNIE.”

“ *His Excellency Sir Geo. Prevost,  
Bart. &c. &c. &c.*”

“ P. S. I have just this moment received your letter of this day, to which the preceding is, I think, a sufficient answer.

“ G. D.”

*“ Head-Quarters, Plattsburg,  
Saturday Morning, 10th Sept. 1814.*

“ Sir,

“ I received, at twelve last night, your letter, acquainting me with your determination to get under weigh, about that time, in the expectation of rounding Cumberland Head at dawn of day; in consequence, the troops have been held in readiness, since six o'clock this morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay. I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind,

and I shall rejoice to learn from you, that my expectations have been frustrated by no other cause.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “ G. PREVOST.”

“ *To Capt. Downie, &c. &c. &c.*”

No. XXXI.

*Extract from Vermont Paper, dated Burlington, Sept. 1814, p. 168.*

“ THE articles in your paper of last week, republished from the Montreal papers, are interesting, as they evince the spirit of our Canada neighbours, and the high hopes they had entertained from their late expedition.

“ That the result is not such as they could have wished we believe, but that its failure should be ascribed entirely to the misconduct of Gov. Prevost is wholly unaccountable. It is not our business or desire to shield Gov. Prevost from the censure of his subjects, but after the decision of the contest between the hostile fleets, we can perceive no object of national importance which could have justified the further operations of the army.

“ It is possible that an army of 12,000 men might have carried the works at Plattsburg, but the positive assertions on this subject betray great ignorance of our resources, and the spirit of our people. Grant, that after much hard fighting, and the loss of many valuable lives, they had succeeded in taking the forts, do they suppose they could have retained them against all the forces we can bring against them? If they do, we can only say, that they are grossly mistaken.

“ Do they suppose that an army of 12,000 men can march through a country, every county of which contains more than that number of souls; or do they suppose their progress would not be obstructed?

“ A large proportion of our citizens are opposed to the present war, and from principles the most noble and virtuous. They will not, under existing circumstances, consent to aid in offensive operations against their neighbours. But let no one suppose their love of peace will destroy their love of country, and that they can make war upon us without danger. We will not willingly molest them, but they must not disturb us. He is unworthy any country who would not protect his own from invasion; and we are happy to know that this country is inhabited by men who need no additional inducement to protect their rights and privileges at every hazard.

“ PEOPLE.”

“ *Messrs. Hinchley and Fish.*”

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No. XXXII.

*An Extract from the Address of the House of Assembly, at the opening of the Session, 30th Jan. 1815, to His Excellency Sir George Prevost, p. 176.*

“ THE operations contemplated on the shores of Lake Champlain, we are led to believe, by our confidence in your Excellency’s judgment, were planned in consequence of wise combinations, and our proximity to the scene of action has enabled us to acquire a perfect conviction, that they were frustrated by causes beyond your Excellency’s control. We are equally convinced that the failure of our naval means rendered necessary at the very onset, an immediate abandonment of the enterprize.

“ The protecting hand of His Majesty’s government has been agreeably felt in the reinforcements received by your Excellency, for the diminution of the pressure of the war on the inhabitants of this province. The testimony which your Excellency is pleased to bear to the zeal and alacrity with which their services have been rendered, cannot but be more

flattering to their feelings and demands through their representatives, their warmest acknowledgments. It is under your Excellency's wise and just administration that their character and conduct have been justly appreciated; and whatever merit their services may be entitled to, a large portion of it is unquestionably due to your Excellency, whose well founded confidence in them, has enabled them, by those services, to testify their faithful, loyal, and patriotic adherence to His Majesty: of which, under your Excellency's administration, they hope many opportunities, during a long time to come, will be afforded them to give additional proofs."

*Extract from an Address from the House of Assembly of Lower Canada, to Sir Geo. Prevost, 20th March, 1815.*

" We take this opportunity of repeating the expression of our sentiments of gratitude to your Excellency, for having, by your prudence, by the wisdom of your measures, and by your ability, preserved to the empire these important provinces, and for the paternal solicitude with which your Excellency has watched over the welfare of His Majesty's subjects, and to pray your Excellency to rest assured, that those benefits will ever remain deeply engraven on the hearts of the Canadians."

*Extract from the Resolutions of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada, 21st March, 1815.*

" According to order, the resolutions of the Committee of the whole House, to consider whether it would be expedient to give to his Excellency the Governor-in-Chief, some mark of gratitude for his distinguished services in this province, were reported to the House, agreed to, and ordered to be engrossed.

" The said resolutions are as follows:

" Resolved,

" That this House entertains the highest veneration and respect, for the character of his Excellency Sir George

Prevost, Governor-in-Chief, whose administration, under circumstances of peculiar novelty and difficulty, stands highly distinguished for energy, wisdom, and ability.

“ Resolved,

“ That this House, representing the people of this province, anxiously desirous of expressing their gratitude to his Excellency, for having, under Providence, rescued us from the danger of subjugation to our late foe, have, and do hereby, give and grant a service of plate not exceeding five thousand pounds, sterling, to his Excellency, as a testimonial of the high sense this House entertains of his Excellency’s distinguished talents, wisdom, and abilities.

“ Resolved,

“ That for the better carrying into execution the object this House has in view, for the purchase of the service of plate for his Excellency, the Speaker of this House be authorized to give directions to such persons, in England, as may be best able to execute the same, and that when so completed, the said service be presented to his Excellency the Governor-in-Chief, in the name and on the behalf of the Commons of His Majesty’s province of Lower Canada.

“ Resolved,

“ That an humble address be presented to his Excellency the Governor-in-Chief, to communicate the above resolutions, humbly praying that his Excellency will be graciously pleased to advance a sum not exceeding five thousand pounds sterling, to the order of the Speaker of this House, for the object stated in the above resolutions; and that this House doth engage, and hereby pledges itself to make good the said advance the next ensuing session of this provincial parliament.”

*Extract from the Speech of the Speaker of the House of Assembly, on presenting the Money Bills to the Governor-in-Chief, 23rd March, 1815.*

“ Superior to prejudices which had but too generally prevailed, your Excellency has derived from the devotion of that brave and loyal, yet unjustly calumniated people, resources sufficient for disconcerting the plans of conquest, devised by a foe at once numerous and elate with confidence. Reinforcements were subsequently received; and the blood of the sons of Canada has flowed mingled with that of the brave soldiers sent to its defence. Multiplied proofs of the efficacious and powerful protection of the mother country, and of the inviolable loyalty of the people of this province, strengthen their claim to the preservation and free exercise of all the benefits which are secured to them by their existing constitution and laws.”

*Addresses to Sir Geo. Prevost, from the Inhabitants of Quebec and Montreal, 31st March.*

*To His Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief, in and over the Provinces of Lower Canada, &c. &c. &c.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ We the inhabitants of the city of Quebec, most respectfully approach your Excellency, at the moment of your departure for England, to express the sentiments which we entertain, of a most profound regard for your Excellency’s person and character, and a lively gratitude for the benefits, which, in common with our fellow subjects throughout the province, we have derived from your Excellency’s administration.

“ At the period of your Excellency’s arrival in this country, on the eve of a war with America, you found the majority of its inhabitants irritated by the unfortunate effects of misunderstandings of a long duration. Your Excellency, consult-

ing only the general welfare by a strict adherence to justice and a well-timed confidence, soon allayed every discontent, and rallied the whole population for the common defence. Under the happy influence of harmony thus restored, the militia was assembled and trained, and an exhausted treasury replenished. The additional means which you thereby derived from the colony committed to your particular care, enabled your Excellency to extend the handful of British troops at your disposal, to the most distant parts of the Upper Province, where the long meditated attacks of the enemy were met at the onset, and his forces repeatedly overthrown with disgrace—the happy precursor of the fate which awaited all his attempts on this province.

“ If the smallness of the regular army with which your Excellency was left to withstand the whole efforts of the United States for two years, and the insufficiency of the naval force on the Lakes, have exposed His Majesty’s arms to some reverses, it is nevertheless, true, that under the auspices of your Excellency, the British arms have acquired new laurels, amidst circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, unprecedented in European warfare; the name of the people of this country has been rendered illustrious, and a vast extent of territory protected from the ravages of war and preserved to the empire.

“ Your Excellency’s name and services will ever be held in veneration and grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of Quebec. The whole province has assured you of its gratitude; and the imperishable evidences of your Excellency’s merits, though they could not appease, will easily overcome your enemies.

“ May your Excellency’s voyage be prosperous, and its results correspond with your wishes. The citizens of Quebec will hail the day of your Excellency’s return to your government, rewarded with the full approbation of a gracious Prince, as one of the happiest in the annals of Canada.

[Signed by 1420 persons.]

“ *Quebec, 31st March, 1815.*”

To which his Excellency was pleased to return the following Answer :

*To the Inhabitants of the City of Quebec.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ I thank you for those sentiments of kindness which now, as at all times, I have had the gratification to receive from the inhabitants of the city of Quebec. It is at the moment of separation that such expressions appeal most forcibly to the heart.

“ If under the authority which His Majesty has deemed proper to place in my hands, you have been prosperous and happy, the objects of all my exertions, and my most earnest solicitude has been attained.

“ The time I have spent in your society has taught me at once to appreciate its worth, and to regret the loss of it; and, be assured, the testimony of regard you have now given me, will be treasured up among recollections the most grateful to my feelings.”

On Monday last, at twelve o'clock, the Address of the Citizens of Montreal was presented to his Excellency Sir George Prevost, by their Deputies, J. M. Mondelêt and John M'Donald, Esquires, which Address is as follows :

*To his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief, in and over the Province of Lower Canada, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and their Dependencies, Vice-Admiral of the same, Lieutenant-General and Commander of all His Majesty's Forces in the said Provinces, and in the Islands of Newfoundland, Prince Edward, Cape Breton, and Bermuda, &c. &c. &c.*

“ May it please your Excellency,

“ We His Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects, inhabitants of the city of Montreal and the neighbouring Pa-

ishes, have learnt with extreme regret that your Excellency is unexpectedly about to leave this province.

“ We hasten, before your Excellency separates yourself from us, to convey to your Excellency the expression of our sorrow for your departure, of our gratitude for the benefits conferred on us, in common with our fellow subjects, by your Excellency’s administration, and our ardent wish that your Excellency’s absence from this province may be of short duration.

“ These sentiments are naturally produced in our minds by the recollection of the public and private virtues which have been displayed by your Excellency in your exalted station, and by the advantages we have experienced from your Excellency’s wisdom and justice in peace, and your protecting care in war.

“ In your Excellency’s civil administration, we have seen conspicuously evinced an anxious desire to dispense equal justice to His Majesty’s subjects, to obliterate unjust and impolitic distinctions between the inhabitants of this province, of different origin, and to unite them as members of one community with the same rights and interests, for the promotion of their common welfare. Influenced by this wise and just policy, your Excellency has been enabled to form a correct estimate of the character and disposition of the population of Canada : and, by reposing in the loyalty and bravery of His Majesty’s Canadian subjects that confidence which they fully merited, your Excellency has afforded practical evidence of their devoted attachment to His Majesty’s government, and their capacity to yield it effectual support.

“ While exposed to the pressure of the late unjust and unprovoked war waged by the United States of America against His Majesty, we experienced the security derived from your Excellency’s indefatigable exertions for the defence of this Province, and have reason to ascribe its preservation, as well as that of the Upper Province, to the judicious distri-

bution and arrangement of the Public Force made by your Excellency, by which the attempts of the enemy were frustrated, and the honourable character, with the rights and advantages of British subjects has been secured to the Inhabitants of the Canadas.

“ Having the greatest confidence in the skill and judgment of your Excellency, and being fully convinced of the ability and prudence with which your Excellency has discharged the military as well as civil duties of your high office, we anticipate, from the investigation for which your Excellency is preparing, a result honourable to your Excellency’s character, by which your well-earned reputation will be confirmed, the voice of calumny and detraction silenced, and your Excellency’s merits conclusively established. We persuade ourselves also that the important services rendered in this country by your Excellency to His Majesty’s Government will be duly appreciated by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, of whose discernment and justice we have had so many proofs, and will procure for your Excellency deserved approbation, and the high rewards reserved for distinguished merit.

“ We shall not cease to take the warmest interest in the fortunes of your Excellency; and in expressing our ardent wishes for your prosperity and that of your family, we join in the general sentiment of the country, whose affection and unalterable attachment your Excellency will carry with you, and whose greatest felicity would be experienced in the speedy return of your Excellency to resume the reins of Government.”

(Signed by 1510 persons.)

His Excellency was pleased to make the following answer :  
*To the Inhabitants of the City of Montreal, and the neighbouring Parishes.*

“ Gentlemen,

“ The alacrity with which you have hastened to prevent the distance of your residence from being an obstacle to the expression of your kind wishes on my sudden and unexpected departure, gives to them all the additional value of eager sincerity.

“ Your good will is to me a most acceptable offering : and as I am now content if your good opinion of my services during my Administration is proportioned to my desire to promote your welfare, so shall I ever be ambitious that your estimate of my exertions may be found as correct as the favourable judgment which I early formed of His Majesty’s subjects in Canada, which experience has now fully justified.”

*Letter from M. de Salaberry to Sir George Prevost.*

A son Excellence Sir George Prevost, &c. &c.

Qu’il plaise à votre Excellence,

Me permettre d’écrire, puisque je ne peux sortir. J’en suis empêché par une maladie opiniâtre et apparemment dangereuse, puisqu’encore hier j’ai tombé sans connaissance sur le plancher. Je suis bien peiné d’être privé par les accidens d’aller vous rendre mes respects, avant que vous vous laissiez.

Sir George, vous portez pour vous justifier—Quoi ! une justification de vous ! Qui pouvait s’y attendre ? Mais s’il en faut une, la voici d’un mot : **LE CANADA EST ENCORE A L’ANGLETERRE.** Cela repond à tout. Le résultat est tout, il est frappant, il est grand. Voilà *un fait*, celui-là : on ne peut le nier. Devant lui doivent disparaître les vaines paroles, les accusations sophistiques ; sous lui doivent succomber les efforts de la malveillance, l’envie, les passions haineuses ;

mais le mérite et la vertu sont sujets à la persécution. Vous en triompherez glorieusement : j'ose vous le prédire avec assurance, et je la souhaite du profond de mon cœur, comme je souhaite aussi tous les bonheurs pour vous, Sir George, et pour ce qui vous est cl. ér. Avec ces vrais sentimens, et ceux du plus grand respect, j'ai l'honneur de me souscrire,

Mon Général,

De votre Excellence,

Le très-humble, très-obéissant

Et très devoué serviteur,

L. de SALABERRY, Col. M. Quebec.

*A Beauport, 28 Mars, 1815.*

P. S. Oui, les Canadas sont encore à l'Angleterre, mais n'y serraient plus sans un effort persévérant de prudence, d'activité, de patience courageuse, et d'habilité consommée, dans un commandement et un genre de guerre aussi difficiles, dont la conduite exige un art tant particulier. Voilà ce qu'avoueront tous ceux qui ont de vraies connaissances de la nature de ces pays de situations si extraordinaires, à des prodigieuses distances, à travers des forêts immenses.

Ce ne sont pas des guerres *d'Europe*, où sous un beau ciel et dans des riches plaines cultivées, toutes les parties d'armées se touchent, où sont toujours à-portée, de se donner la main, dans des localités rapprochées et dont les communications sont si faciles. Daignez, mon Général, traiter mes reflexions avec indulgence, puis qu'elles viennent d'un vieux et loyal soldat, qui a commencé à faire la guerre il y a précisément quarante ans cette année.

## No. XXXIII.

*Extract from Christie's Memoirs of the Administration of the Colonial Government of Lower Canada, by Sir James Henry Craig, and Sir George Prevost.*

“ THE administration of the Civil Government of Lower Canada under Sir George Prevost, was mild, equitable, and unquestionably popular among the entire mass of the Canadian population, in whose loyalty from the commencement, he placed the most implicit confidence. To their fidelity, and to the prudent and conciliating policy of this Governor, Great Britain is indebted for the preservation of the Canadas, unavoidably left destitute of money and troops at the outset of hostilities with America, by reason of the urgent demands of the war in Spain. The Provincial Legislature, by giving a currency to Army Bills and guaranteeing their redemption, effectually removed all apprehensions of a deficiency in the financial resources of the Colonial Government. The organization of a respectable force of embodied Militia, and the power delegated to the Governor, of turning out the whole of the effective male population of the Province, in cases of emergency, enabled him to withstand the efforts of the United States, during two successive campaigns, with scarcely any other resources than those derived from the Colony. They who had been partial to the preceding Administration, and who probably may have been instrumental in the arbitrary measures with which it is reproached, were, as might be expected, adverse to the policy of the present Governor, and spared no pains to represent in England the affairs of the Colony in the falsest colours. The disappointments experienced at Sackett's Harbour and Plattsburg, gave occasion to his enemies to discredit his military character: but whatever may have been his capacity as a general, (which we

leave to the judgment of military men) it must be admitted, that as a civil governor, at the head of a people irritated by arbitrary measures under the preceding Administration, he judiciously explored his way through a period of unprecedented embarrassments and danger, without a recurrence to Martial Law, or the least exertion of arbitrary power. His manners are represented by those who were familiarly acquainted with him as unassuming and social. His public speeches or addresses partook of even classical elegance. His smooth and easy temper placed him beyond the ordinary passions of men in power, and though aware of the intrigues of unprincipled and implacable enemies labouring at his destruction, and loaded with the obloquy of the press, he is known to have harboured no resentment against the former, and to have reasoned with that coolness and unconcern with respect to the latter, which can only spring from a virtuous and ingenuous mind."

*Extract from Bouchette's Topographical Account of Lower Canada, p. 121.*

"At a time when the military resources of the Province were so greatly curtailed by the most arduous continental warfare that ever Great Britain was engaged in, it is a matter of surprise that so much could have been effected with such slender means. An enemy, emboldened by possessing an ample force, and inspired by the prospect of obtaining a fertile country, long the object of inordinate desire, could only be successfully opposed by a union of the greatest energy with the most active measures; that such was presented to him is incontrovertible, and the credit of having brought them into action by unceasing perseverance, will attach to the judicious dispositions of the Governor-General, Sir George Prevost, and for his strenuous efforts in turning the enthusiasm of the people into a bulwark stronger, and more impenetrable than entrenchments or fortresses against an invader."

*The following Extract from James's Naval Memoirs, p. 411, shewing the opinion of the American Naval Commander, as to the result of the action on Lake Champlain, was intended to form a note to page 175.*

“Commodore Macdonough, taking Lieutenant Robertson, when presenting his sword, for the British Commanding Officer, spoke to him as follows:—‘You owe it, Sir, to the shameful conduct of your gun-boats and cutters, that you are performing this office to me; for, had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the Saratoga, that I could hold out no longer: and indeed, nothing induced me to keep up her colours, but seeing, from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the *Confiance*, and her unsupported situation, that she must ultimately surrender.’—Here is an acknowledgment, candid and honourable in the extreme.”

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No. XXXIV.

*Inscription on the Monument erected to the Memory of Sir George Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, p. 177.*

Sacred to the Memory  
 Of Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Baronet,  
 of Belmont, in this County,  
 Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the British  
 Forces in North America;  
 In which command, by his wise and energetic measures,  
 And with a very inferior force,  
 He preserved the Canadas to the British Crown,  
 From the repeated invasions of a powerful Enemy.  
 His Constitution at length sunk  
 Under incessant bodily and mental exertions,

In discharging the duties of that arduous station,  
 And having returned to England,  
 He died shortly afterwards in London, on the 5th Jan. 1816,  
 Aged forty-eight years ;  
 Thirty-four of which had been devoted  
 To the service of his Country.  
 He was interred near the remains of his Father,  
 Major-General Augustin Prevost,  
 At East Barnet, in Middlesex.  
 His Royal Highness the Prince Regent,  
 To evince in an especial manner the sense he entertained  
 Of his distinguished conduct and services,  
 During a long period of constant active employment,  
 In situations of great trust, both military and civil,  
 Was pleased to ordain,  
 As a lasting memorial of His Majesty's Royal favour,  
 That the names of the Countries,  
 Where his courage and abilities had been most signally  
 displayed,  
 The West Indies and Canada,  
 Should be inscribed on the banners of the supporters,  
 Granted to be borne by his Family and his descendants.  
 In Testimony of his private worth,  
 His piety, integrity, and benevolence,  
 And all those tender, domestic virtues  
 Which endeared him  
 To his Family, his Children, his Friends and Dependants,  
 As well as to prove her unfeigned love, gratitude and respect,  
 Catharine Ann Prevost,  
 His afflicted Widow,  
 Caused this Monument to be erected,  
 Anno Domini, 1818.

## No. XXXV.

*Private Despatch from Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst, p. 179.*

(Private.)

“ *Montreal, 21st Sept. 1814.*

“ My Lord,

“ IN my despatch from Plattsburg, of the 11th inst. I reported to your Lordship the unfortunate event which induced me to withdraw the troops with which I had advanced into the enemy’s territory. My reasons for that measure I can more fully explain to your Lordship in a private communication than it might be proper to do in a public letter.

“ Your Lordship must have been aware from my previous despatches, that no offensive operations could be carried on, within the enemy’s territory, for the destruction of his Naval Establishments, without naval support. Having ascertained that our flotilla was in every respect equal to the enemy’s, and having received from Captain Downie the assurance, not only of his readiness, but of his ability to co-operate with the army, I did not hesitate in advancing to Plattsburg, and confidently relying upon the successful exertions of the squadron, I made my arrangements for the assault of the enemy’s works the moment it should appear.

“ The disastrous and unlooked for result of the naval contest, by depriving me of the only means by which I could avail myself of any advantage I might gain, rendered a perseverance in the attack of the enemy’s position highly imprudent, as well as hazardous. From the state of the roads, each day’s delay at Plattsburg rendered my retreat more difficult. The enemy’s Militia was raising *en masse* around me, desertion increasing, and our supply of provisions scanty.

“ Excluded from the use of water communication, and that by roads passing through woods and over swamps,

becoming, from the state of the weather, as well as from the obstructions made by the enemy, nearly impassable—under these circumstances, I had to determine whether I should consider my own fame, by gratifying the order of the troops in persevering in the attack, or consult the more substantial interests of my country, by withdrawing the army which was yet uncrippled, for the security of these provinces; in adopting the latter measure, I feel that I have accorded with the views of His Majesty's Government, and that a contrary conduct would have been attended with immediate and imminent danger to this Province.

“ The most ample success on shore, after the loss of the fleet, could not have justified the sacrifice I must have made to obtain it. Had I failed, and such an event was possible, after the American army had been cheered by the sight of a naval victory, the destruction of a great part of our troops must have been the consequence, and with the remainder I should have had to make a precipitate and embarrassed retreat, one very different from that which I have made.

“ These are considerations which, without doubt, will have their due weight with your Lordship, and induce you, I trust, to view the measures I have adopted as those best calculated to promote, as well the honour of His Majesty's arms, as the safety of this part of his dominions.

“ I herewith transmit a comparative state of the force of the two squadrons, in order that your Lordship may be satisfied with my reasons for not discouraging a Naval Engagement, in which, if all had done their duty, I should have had a very different report to make.

“ I have the honour to be,” &c.

“ *The Right Hon. Earl Bathurst.*”