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THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT
(UNSSOD III)

May 31 - June 25, 1988

REPORT ON THE SESSION AND CANADA'S ROLE

Arms Control and Disarmament Division of
the Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Canada

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THIRD SPECIAL SESSSION
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT
(UNSSOD III)

May 31 - June 25, 1988

New York

REPORT

I ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK

ASSESSMENT

A frequently cited criterion for the success of a United Nations conference or special session is the adoption of a consensus report. Judged against this standard, the Third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), held May 31 - June 25, 1988 in New York, clearly ended in failure. However the sole purpose of such meetings is not merely to reach consensus on concluding documents. With respect to other less tangible yardsticks, such as the generally positive atmosphere, our verdict need not be as harsh.

It was apparent during the year-long preparatory process and at the month-long Special Session itself that fundamental differences of approach to the multilateral arms control and disarmament (ACD) agenda persist within and among the major regional groups. The most significant areas of disagreement included: (a) the overall orientation - most Western states favoured a pragmatic step-by-step approach whereas certain of the Non-Aligned, and to a lesser extent the East Bloc states, preferred a more political, declaratory emphasis; (b) a general tendency among the Non-Aligned to place the onus for progress on the nuclear-weapon-states and the superpowers, in particular; and (c) different approaches to the role of the UN in the broad ACD process, with some countries seeking a broader UN role, and others placing more emphasis on negotiating efforts at the bilateral and regional levels.

These differences translated into significant disagreements on specific issues such as: whether the UNSSOD I Final Document remained valid and should be reaffirmed in all its aspects, or whether it should rather be seen as a valued historical point of reference subject to modification in the light of new realities; the importance that should be attached to nuclear as opposed to conventional disarmament; the nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security; the need to bring weapons-related research and development and the qualitative development of weapons under more effective policy direction; the utility of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the pace and manner of progress towards the realization of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT); and consideration of the naval arms race and prevention of an arms race in outer space issues.

Despite these divisions, which have beset the multilateral ACD agenda for some years, the atmosphere at UNSSOD III was generally positive and, unlike UNSSOD II, largely free from vituperative and unproductive rhetoric. The major reason for the improved climate was the recent progress in the USA/Soviet bilateral ACD negotiations, highlighted by the ratification of the INF Treaty at the Moscow Summit, which coincided fortuitously with the commencement of the Special Session. Delegation statements in the opening Plenary tended to demonstrate: (a) an increasing recognition among the Non-Aligned of their responsibility in the ACD process, particularly in relation to conventional arms (some 20 million deaths have occurred as a result of conventional armed conflict in the past 40 years, mainly in the developing world), and (b) a general avoidance of unhelpful ideological rhetoric.

In view of these encouraging trends, why did UNSSOD III end in failure? There are several reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is that the fundamental differences of approach to ACD noted above remained so entrenched as to preclude a meaningful consensus on key ACD issues, despite the improved atmosphere. Such differences have long been apparent in UNGA First Committee voting and within the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

In addition, there seemed to be little sense of purpose to or urgency at UNSSOD III. Despite the active presence of many articulate NGO representatives, there was little discernible public pressure, as reflected by the lack of media interest. Even when the clock was evidently running out, many delegations preferred to reiterate national positions rather than focusing on overcoming substantive differences. Despite last-minute efforts, the strength of purpose required to forge consensus simply failed to materialize. The procedural decision to rely on prolonged informal consultations among a select few countries as the primary means of seeking consensus may also have been unwise.

The outcome of UNSSOD III suggests, furthermore, that the international community had not had sufficient time to "digest the remarkable transformation" in the superpower relationship, as recently suggested by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. He further noted there was also "insufficient appreciation of the dynamic relationship between bilateral disarmament negotiations and multilateral endeavours."

Finally, there were strong differences of view concerning the status of the UNSSOD I Final Document of 1978. Some participants refused to accept any language which, in their view, could be interpreted as constituting a derogation from the UNSSOD I Final Document. Others considered that UNSSOD III language should reflect new developments and trends and not be limited by perceptions in 1978.

OUTLOOK

The manner in which the UNSSOD III outcome is interpreted by both governments and publics will largely determine its significance for the ongoing multilateral ACD process. There is need to ensure that the natural response of frustration and disappointment does not lead to prolonged bitterness and recrimination.

It is well to remember that the Special Session was not an isolated event but rather one phase in a long-established, continuing and diversified process. With or without an agreed document, special sessions perform an invaluable communication function, not only between and among governments, but between governments and their respective publics. A special session inevitably registers the central political realities, both current and prospective, that characterize the international ACD process at a given moment.

The generally positive atmosphere which prevailed at UNSSOD III has been noted. Further, the strongly held differences of view and approach which persist within the international community were clearly registered in generally forthright, non-recriminatory ways. This "air-clearing" may, in the longer run, serve the multilateral ACD process better than would a bland, watered-down consensus document which projects a misleading impression of agreement.

A major Canadian objective will be to ensure that the UNSSOD experience leads to a broader acceptance of a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to the ACD process. Genuine progress toward a more secure and less heavily armed world hinges on such measures. This can only occur to the extent that current ACD realities (including national, regional and global positions and goals, and ongoing processes and differences) are objectively assessed and understood. There was considerable evidence at UNSSOD III that the merits of such an approach are increasingly recognized and accepted by governments from all regions and groups.

The First Committee, which Canada expects to chair at UNGA 43, will be an especially important forum for the pursuit of this broad objective. Canada should take advantage of the opportunity to encourage some fundamental rethinking within the First Committee. Its relevance to the ACD process could be enhanced by the implementation of reforms for which Canada and others have long pressed. The careful assessment of global ACD priorities should be a central task. To the extent that this question can be addressed in a satisfactory manner, problems such as the proliferation of contradictory resolutions will be more easily resolved.

For Canada, a particularly welcome development at UNSSOD III was the clear emergence of a consensus on both the vital importance of effective verification of arms control and disarmament agreements and on the need for a careful, practical study of the role of the UN in the verification of multilateral agreements. The Canada-Netherlands initiative for a UN experts study on the question gained broad support and will be pursued at UNGA 43.

More broadly, the outcome of the Special Session - especially when coupled with the failure of UNSSOD II - raises a number of basic questions: What is the relevance of the UN in the field of ACD? How can this be enhanced? Can the UN become an effective instrument for reinforcing and stimulating progress in ACD at the bilateral, regional and global levels? What is the significance of First Committee resolutions and decisions? How important is the role of consensus to the ACD process? Should UN member states strive for consensus where none exists? What is the role of a UN Special Session on Disarmament? When should a decision for a further UNSSOD be taken?

While there are no easy answers, an early and honest effort by the international community to address such questions could yield benefits and go a long way toward retrieving what will be widely seen, with considerable justification, as a disappointing UNSSOD III outcome.

Finally, there can be no doubt that, for Canada, the preparatory process for the Special Session, involving extensive consultation between government officials and actively interested NGOs and individuals, was a highly valuable process in itself. It facilitated better awareness and understanding of the range of views of concerned Canadian citizens on major ACD issues, and strengthened the ability of the Canadian Delegation at UNSSOD III to articulate Canadian positions forcefully.

II REPORT

(A) THE BEGINNING

The experience of UNSSOD I in 1978 and UNSSOD II in 1982 had a significant impact on the preparations for UNSSOD III. The First Special Session was a major international conference attended by 20 Heads of State and Government, including the Canadian Prime Minister, and 49 Foreign Ministers. The outcome was a concentrated, 25-page consensus Final Document, which has today become a central point of reference for multilateral ACD. The document included a Declaration, Programme of Action and section on "Machinery".

By contrast, UNSSOD II, also a high profile event, failed to reach agreement on the two substantive documents it set out to adopt: a review of the implementation of the recommendations of UNSSOD I, and a legally-binding comprehensive programme of disarmament, despite the very high level of public interest in the event. The failure can be explained in part by the poor international negotiating climate in 1982.

The decision to hold a "Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament" in New York, May 31 - June 25, 1988 was taken at UNGA 42 in 1987. Like its predecessors, this was to be a high-profile event attended by Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers.

As is commonly the case for major international meetings, an UNSSOD III Preparatory Committee was established by the General Assembly. A major task of the Committee was to elect a Bureau for the Special Session, decide on the allocation of working groups and their chairmen and, most importantly, adopt an agenda for and provide substantive guidance and direction to UNSSOD III.

The Preparatory Committee held two substantive meetings in New York, May 26 - June 6, 1987 and January 25 - February 5, 1988. Vice-Chairmen of the Bureau for UNSSOD III were elected as follows:

WEOG: Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway
Asian Group: Japan, Mongolia, Sri Lanka
African Group: Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Zaire
East European Group: Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Hungary, Yugoslavia
Latin American Group: Argentina, Bahamas, Uruguay

The President and Rapporteur of the General Assembly at its 42nd session, Peter Florin of GDR and Pedro Nunez-Mosquera of Cuba, respectively, continued to occupy the same positions at UNSSOD III.

The May/June 1987 meeting of the Preparatory Committee adopted a balanced and forward-looking agenda for the Special Session, despite difficulties in overcoming differing approaches. The major items of the agenda were agreed as follows:

Items 9/10: Review and appraisal of the present international situation

Assessment of the decisions of UNSSOD I and II

Item 12: Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects

Items 13/14: Disarmament machinery

UN information and educational activities

At the final meeting of the Preparatory Committee, a new Item 15: "Relationship between disarmament and development" was also added. Because of the failure of the first meeting to set a date for UNSSOD III, the decision was taken at UNGA 42, as noted above.

Despite the optimism generated as a result of progress in the bilateral USA/USSR negotiations, the final meeting of the Preparatory Committee proved a major disappointment. It failed to agree on any elaboration of the UNSSOD III agenda and simply decided to forward a non-consensus Chairman's "informal paper" containing "suggested elements for consideration" to the Special Session. The paper avoided unhelpful rhetoric, however, and provided a good basis for discussion.

More seriously, the results of the Preparatory Committee served to demonstrate the continuation of deep divisions among states and regions over a broad spectrum of ACD issues and on what the Special Session should accomplish. In retrospect the outcome was clearly a harbinger of things to come and constituted a source of serious concern to Canada for the prospects for a successful UNSSOD III.

Following a brief period of assessment, Canada decided in February 1988 to make démarches to some 45 countries in all regions urging governments to make special efforts to bring the Special Session to a successful conclusion. In particular, Canada stressed the importance of developing a co-operative approach, maintaining flexibility, seeking common ground, and avoiding polarization. While many countries professed to be more optimistic and less concerned than Canada, it soon became evident that these views were shared to a greater or lesser degree. One result of this concern was the sense of cooperation and general paucity of rhetoric which characterized the Special Session. Where the special efforts by Canada and other concerned states ultimately failed, however, was in our inability to bridge the gaps between strongly held national positions and diverse approaches to multilateral ACD.

For Canada, an important adjunct to the UNSSOD III preparatory process were consultations with interested groups and individuals representing a broad spectrum of interests. The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control held a meeting in Ottawa, April 14-16, 1988 for the specific purpose of discussing Canada's role at UNSSOD III. The entire 50-member Consultative Group was invited to join in a series of plenary and working group meetings with Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, and officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. The major themes of the meeting were based on the substantive agenda items for the Special Session. The working groups focused on these themes (Review and Assessment, Developments and Trends, Disarmament Machinery and Education) and presented reports containing a broad range of recommendations. On the final day, the Director General for International Security and Arms Control in External Affairs, David Peel, provided an initial response, noting that the majority of the recommendations were either worthy of further serious consideration or already embodied in Government policy, and that only a few contained elements which could not be incorporated in Canadian approaches at UNSSOD III. Canadian initiatives at UNSSOD III relating to the advancement of women in the disarmament process, and the establishment of a UN orientation programme for NGO representatives concerned about peace and security issues, arose as a direct consequence of NGO recommendations.

(B) THE MIDDLE

UNSSOD III commenced in grand style with higher-level representation than either UNSSOD I or UNSSOD II. Following a balanced and forward-looking statement by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, statements were delivered

by 10 Heads of Government (Mexico, Argentina, Zimbabwe (for the Non-Aligned), Cyprus, Paraguay, Gambia, Brazil, Portugal, Costa Rica, Afghanistan), one Vice President (Cuba), 13 Prime Ministers (Sweden, Japan, Ireland, India, Finland, Iceland, Trinidad/Tobago, Holy See, Turkey, Barbados, Israel, Lesotho, St. Vincent), 55 Foreign Ministers (including Canada/Clark, USA/Shultz, USSR/Shevardnadze, UK/Howe, France, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, China) and 48 Heads of Delegation from 126 Member States and 7 Observers.

The Canadian Delegation, headed by Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, included 15 Parliamentarians as observers and 20 non-government individuals as special advisers. Canada was one of only eight countries to include NGO representatives on its delegation. Also participating were Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, as Deputy Head; the Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York and Geneva, Stephen Lewis and de Montigny Marchand, respectively; officials from External Affairs and National Defence; and a representative from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The statement by the SSEA, delivered on June 13, elicited congratulations from all groups. It placed major emphasis on recent concrete ACD achievements and the need for UNSSOD III to complement and enhance that progress. Mr. Clark noted that the UN has an important role to play, but will only advance the ACD process if efforts are focused on practical approaches and the issues capable of mustering consensus. Canadian ACD priorities include step-by-step progress toward the realization of a CTBT, strengthening of the NPT, negotiation of a convention banning chemical weapons, the achievement of deep reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the recognition of the central role of verification and confidence-building measures in the ACD process. In the latter regard, the SSEA drew specific attention to a joint Canada/Netherlands proposal for a UN Experts Study on a UN role in verification.

Recent progress in ACD in the USA/USSR context, especially the ratification of the INF agreement at the Moscow Summit of May 29 - June 2, 1988, was welcomed by virtually all speakers and had a pervasive and positive impact on the atmosphere of the Special Session.

It soon became evident that the main dynamic of UNSSOD III would be played out along North/South, rather than East/West lines. The themes covered in the statement by Zimbabwean President Mugabe, on behalf of members of the Non-Aligned, were reflected in the majority of interventions by members of that group. Mr. Mugabe placed a heavy emphasis on nuclear (as opposed to conventional) weapons issues and blamed the superpowers for the arms race. Other major Non-Aligned themes included the need for follow-up to the September 1987 Disarmament and Development Conference (some advocated the establishment of a fund to transfer resources), the establishment of zones of peace and NWFZs, the total elimination of nuclear weapons, agreement on negative security assurances and criticism of nuclear cooperation with South Africa and Israel. Many also expressed support for the Six Nation initiative to establish an "integrated verification system" within the UN, which bore some similarities to the Canada/Netherlands proposal.

Western countries called attention to the importance of achieving a concise concluding document with the emphasis on progress achieved in ACD since UNSSOD I and the need to define future priorities. They also stressed the importance of practical approaches to ACD based on the development of confidence, openness and transparency, and the essential role of verification. The need for the expansion and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime based on the NPT and for conventional arms control were also major themes.

The East Bloc countries put forward a range of proposals, including the earlier Soviet concept of "a comprehensive system of international peace and security". However, anti-Western rhetoric, which had characterized East Bloc positions at UNSSOD III, was largely absent.

Working Group I (Review and Assessment):

The Committee of the Whole (COW) of the Special Session established three working groups on the substantive agenda items which were allowed one week to complete their work. Working Group I was chaired by the Bahamian Permanent Representative in New York, Ambassador Hepburn. A positive atmosphere, relatively free from polemics, prevailed. Following the general debate, during which Canada made a major substantive intervention (subsequently tabled as an official conference document), the discussion focused on the structure and substance of the working group's report to the COW. Interpretations of what constituted an appropriate balance for this report, however, varied considerably. On

the basis of interventions and intensive private consultations, the Chairman issued a "Chairman's working paper". Although the paper tended to reflect the middle ground, agreement was not reached and the document was merely forwarded to the COW as a non-consensus Chairman's report. Numerous proposed amendments (Canada submitted a paragraph revising the disarmament and development language and attempted to reinforce the paragraph on NPT), were also available for the guidance of the COW Chairman.

Working Group II (Developments and Trends):

This working group under the chairmanship of FRG CD Ambassador Von Stulpnagel was tasked with addressing the most controversial substantive items of the conference, e.g., qualitative developments and the role of technology, future nuclear arms control measures, conventional arms, non-military aspects of security, including the disarmament and development relationship, and outer space. The Chairman began by placing a balanced and pragmatic non-paper before the group and presided over the airing of highly disparate views on virtually all subjects. Since the working group was unable to agree on the text of a report for the COW, the Chairman forwarded his own non-consensus text along with a large compilation of proposals. The process performed the useful function of making clear where all delegations stood on all central and controversial issues. Canada gave particular attention to the role of technology, conventional arms and the endorsement of verification principles.

Working Group III (Machinery):

The working group met under the chairmanship of the Cameroonian Permanent Representative in New York, Ambassador Engo. The Chairman's paper constituted a distillation of views expressed throughout the week, but could not, as with Working Groups I and II, muster consensus. Canada stressed the importance of the World Disarmament Campaign, the role of women and NGOs in the ACD process, and Canada's proposed UN NGO orientation programme. The tone of the meetings was generally unpolemical.

NGO Participation:

As with the earlier Special Sessions, the UN Secretary-General invited NGOs to be part of the deliberations of UNSSOD III. NGOs were also active on the margins of the Special Session. Their participation during the designated NGO Speakers' Days (June 8-9), when they addressed the COW, and in the ongoing lobbying efforts of national delegations must be underlined. A huge presence from Japan (over 1200) was notable. The contributions of

Canadian NGOs were of uniformly high calibre. Written presentations by the Dundas Peace Research Institute, Voice of Women and Project Ploughshares stood out for their exceptional quality. The generally measured, non-acrimonious presentations by NGOs played an important role in reinforcing the positive atmosphere.

(C) THE END

The COW reconvened on June 20 to receive the non-consensus working group reports upon which a draft Chairman's Paper was to be based. In addition, a special report was presented by Mexican CD Ambassador Garcia Robles on Item 11 - Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament (CPD), recommending that UNSSOD III should request the CD to continue its negotiations on a CPD and report to UNGA 43 or, if necessary, UNGA 44.

The failure to reach agreed formulations on any substantive agenda item toward the final stages of the Special Session engendered a somewhat reflective discussion concerning what UNSSOD III should be expected to achieve. Pakistani COW Chairman Ahmad set a positive and realistic tone in characterizing the Special Session as a process which should provide direction for the future. Ambassador Roche for Canada pleaded with delegations to build on the recent progress in ACD, not to deny those areas where agreement existed, and to rise above their differences and strive to record consensus. While many other participants also stressed the need to build on progress already achieved, some placed more emphasis on the need for UNSSOD III to deal with the full range of issues and reflect legitimate differences as well as areas of agreement - thus signifying that consensus-building, in the short remaining time available, would be a difficult task.

The COW met again briefly on June 22 to receive the Chairman's "Non-Paper" which provided delegations with a suggested formulation for a concluding document. Despite some specific difficulties, Canada and many others were pleased at its pragmatic and balanced tone. The Chairman then presided over informal discussions among some two dozen selected countries (including Canada) and numerous amendments were proposed. Rather than striving for consensus, many delegations instead focused on staking out their positions.

The COW did not meet again until the final morning of the Special Session in an atmosphere of growing concern regarding the prospects for success. A revised draft Chairman's Paper was circulated. When, by evening, with large sections of the draft paper still unagreed, it had

become evident that consensus would remain elusive, the Chairman adjourned the informal COW, and at 8:00 pm called together a small group of "Friends of the Chair", including Canada, for further consultations. These continued until almost 3:00 am June 26.

With the clock running out, it was clear to all participants that this informal meeting offered the last opportunity to salvage the Special Session. Despite the general fatigue, a sense of urgency and drama prevailed. The Chairman identified the major outstanding issues (outer space, new technologies, nuclear disarmament, naval arms race, conventional disarmament, the verification study, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, disarmament and development, and non-proliferation) and wondered whether, in four hours, existing differences could be bridged.

As midnight approached, it was agreed to "stop the clock" for a limited time. However, by 2:30 am, despite considerable progress, major differences remained and the Chairman was obliged to finally call a halt. The group had not had time to overcome its differences on the "Assessment" or "Disarmament Machinery" sections of the Chairman's paper, and still failed to agree on the references to particular countries by name and the paragraphs relating to outer space, NWFZs, zones of peace, nuclear disarmament, and disarmament and development.

The final Plenary session concluded at 7:30 am June 26 with exhausted delegates expressing their disappointment. The concluding statements of several countries, however, put a positive gloss on the results. In his final statement, the President of UNSSOD III acknowledged that the points of disagreement had been reduced and the areas of agreement broadened.

Canada shared the broad sense of disappointment in the wake of almost a month of concentrated effort. One could, nevertheless, derive some comfort from the generally positive atmosphere which prevailed despite the existence of major differences of approach.

The active role of the Canadian Delegation at the Special Session deserves special mention. The Government's extensive pre-UNSSOD III preparations, including the involvement of the Consultative Group and the holding of consultations with capitals from all regions, enabled the preparation of substantive Canadian position papers, subsequently published in modified form as official conference documents, on the major agenda items. A number of Western delegations commented on their usefulness.

In addition, the size and level of expertise of the Delegation enabled Canada to play a particularly active role in the COW, its three working groups and during the informal consultations with the COW Chairman (Canada was included in them all). On specific subjects: Canada was a leading member of the small group which negotiated language on the verification study, having earlier submitted a joint paper on the subject with the Netherlands. Canada also submitted papers recommending a "UN orientation programme for NGOs in the field of Disarmament", on the subject of "UN information and educational activities" and, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, on the "Advancement of women in the disarmament process".

Looking ahead, a major objective for Canada will be to seek broader support for pragmatic and realistic approaches to ACD, building upon the UNSSOD III experience. Of more immediate concern will be to ensure that such approaches become a predominant feature of the deliberations of the First Committee which Canada expects to chair at UNGA 43. A major Canadian objective will be to translate the progress achieved on verification at UNSSOD III into a concrete UNGA resolution calling for a UN experts study on the subject.



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Fifteenth special session

PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY*

To convene at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 31 May 1988, at 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President of the General Assembly.
5. Organization of the session.
6. Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.
7. Adoption of the agenda.
8. General debate.
9. Review and appraisal of the present international situation, especially in the light of the vital objective of terminating the arms race and the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament.

* Issued in accordance with rule 16 of the rules of procedure.

10. Assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth and twelfth special sessions:
 - (a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (c) Resolutions of the General Assembly in the field of arms limitation and disarmament;
 - (d) Status of negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament in bilateral and various multilateral forums.
11. Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
12. Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects, relevant to the disarmament process, with a view to the elaboration of appropriate concrete and practical measures and, if necessary, additional principles, taking duly into account the principles and priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament.
13. Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery.
14. United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, including measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:
 - (a) World Disarmament Campaign;
 - (b) Other public information activities.
15. Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference.
16. Adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document(s) of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly.

CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT

CHAIRMAN'S DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT OF THE FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The world will soon reach the end of a most turbulent and dramatic century: a century that has enriched human life with unprecedented progress in science, technology, health, education and the means of communication. It is also a century that has endured the scourge of two world wars, entered the nuclear age, experienced countless other conflicts and has provided humanity the means for its own annihilation. While important advances have been made, the full potential of human development for a large proportion of the world's population has yet to be realized.
2. Given the interdependent nature of life on this planet, multilateral co-operation in the solution of international problems is imperative. Major stresses and strains are placing great burdens on the capacities of human society, some of which are beyond the means of any one State or group of States to resolve. In a world of growing interdependence, it is essential for the international community to stimulate and deepen awareness of the common interests of our global society and of our common interest in strengthening international peace and security.
3. As the international organization charged with the responsibilities of pursuing international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and achieving international co-operation in solving international problems, the United Nations is the universal forum for harmonizing and developing global actions towards the attainment of these common ends. In the international community's continuing search for lasting security capable of meeting the needs of present and future generations, multilateral action has an increasingly important role.
4. While concepts and perceptions of security differ, a common objective of States is national security and the maintenance of international peace and security. National concepts and perceptions have evolved in response to diverse political, military, social, economic and technological circumstances. However, the differences in the historical backgrounds, political institutions and socio-economic systems of States should not constitute insurmountable obstacles to international co-operation in the pursuit of peace and security.
5. The fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, takes place at a propitious moment. It provides an opportunity for the States Members of the United Nations to

reconcile differences and agree on actions in the field of disarmament, thereby making a substantial contribution to the achievement of lasting peace and security. The international community must act, collectively and decisively, by building upon the growing awareness that genuine international peace and security cannot be achieved in an environment that fosters an ever-growing accumulation of weapons. The time has come to break the cycle of mistrust, accumulation of arms, military rivalry and mutual fear, and to seek security for all. It is time to acknowledge fully that security is being challenged both by military and non-military threats, and to recognize that problems of a social, humanitarian, economic and ecological nature demand co-operative solutions. The promise and challenges of interdependence must be met through a universal commitment to a shared human destiny.

6. Arms limitation and disarmament constitute a crucial element in the pursuit of international peace and security. Lasting peace and global security will, however, remain elusive so long as there continue to be actions contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and so long as mutual suspicion and mistrust persist in international relations. The special importance is stressed of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

7. The international community must take co-ordinated, complementary and mutually supportive initiatives to find new ways and means to address issues of underdevelopment, to resolve international tensions and regional conflicts, and to forestall new ones. Constructive dialogue and confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing trust and easing tensions between and among States would facilitate the creation of an environment conducive to the attainment of the goal of enhanced security of all States at the lowest level of armament and armed forces.

II. ASSESSMENT

8. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted in 1978, reflected a historic consensus on the part of the international community that the halting and reversing of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the achievement of genuine disarmament were tasks of primary importance and urgency. The Final Document continues to be the principal expression of the international community's determination to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

9. At the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, held in 1982, it was not possible to further the momentum engendered in 1978. However, the

World Disarmament Campaign, which was launched at that session, has made positive contributions by informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

10. In recent years, because of efforts within the international community, positive trends have emerged in the consideration of various international issues. There have been important developments in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament efforts, the resolution of certain local conflicts and the easing of international tensions. Significant shifts have occurred in perceptions, attitudes and policies. These developments present the international community of nations with the opportunity to take a significant step towards the realization of security at progressively lower levels of armed forces and armaments.

11. The two major military Powers have expressed their shared recognition that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the very first disarmament agreement ever concluded for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons, represents a valuable initial step in the reduction of nuclear weapons. The agreement in principle by the same two States on the reduction by 50 per cent of their strategic offensive arms and their continuing efforts to conclude a treaty soon are greatly welcomed. Such a treaty would be a major achievement towards further reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. These developments, together with bilateral measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on issues relating to nuclear testing and steps to improve their mutual relations in other fields, contribute to better international relations and to the disarmament effort.

12. In the area of multilateral negotiations, the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons brought the Third Review Conference to a successful conclusion. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) continued to make a valuable contribution to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. A valuable contribution to regional security was made with the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga. At the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy resolute efforts were made to advance understanding on these issues.

13. Significant progress has been registered in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards the conclusion of a comprehensive convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. A number of issues, some of them complex, remain subject to negotiation. It is also encouraging that the recently held Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Their Destruction adopted measures designed to strengthen international norms relating to the prohibition of biological weapons.

14. There has been recognition that conventional disarmament at the global, regional and subregional levels is a vital part of the disarmament process. The questions of qualitative development, the production and use of conventional weapons as well as the issue of international arms transfers are being given more attention. In this connection, important unilateral measures have already been taken by some States, particularly China, to reduce their armed forces. Efforts are continuing in Europe where the highest concentration of armaments and armed forces exist to achieve their reduction in a mutually balanced and verifiable manner. An important step was taken towards regional disarmament by the agreement on a procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America.

15. The unprecedented convergence of views on issues related to the verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements has the potential to remove one of the most serious obstacles to the pursuit of such agreements. Since verification of compliance relates directly to the national security concerns of each State party to an agreement, it is essential to promote such forms and methods of verification and institutional frameworks as would appropriately meet the legitimate concerns of each State party and be tailored to the requirements of each agreement.

16. While confidence-building measures are not in themselves measures of disarmament, in recent years there has been an increased awareness of their importance for the enhancement of international peace and security. This in turn has facilitated the process of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. There is now wide support for greater openness, transparency and predictability in military matters. The outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has significantly contributed to strengthening co-operation and stability in the region. The Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa constitutes a valuable contribution to security in the region.

17. Beyond the progress made in various areas related to arms limitation and disarmament, there has also been growing recognition that these efforts should be pursued in a broader context of international relations, together with such issues as regional and subregional conflicts, non-military threats to international security, social and economic development, and human rights. Actions of States to resolve crucial issues in various regional contexts, within and outside the United Nations, have had a positive bearing on the overall efforts of the international community to strengthen peace and security and to promote the disarmament process. At the International Conference on Disarmament and Development the participating States highlighted the inter-relationship between disarmament, development and security.

18. These and other developments have generated an international climate that is much improved over that of the earlier years of the present decade. However, while the positive processes and developments in international relations provide a sense of strong encouragement and hope for a more secure world, they cannot obscure the fact that the general situation with regard to armaments and armed forces is far from satisfactory.

19. The levels of armament, both nuclear and conventional, have not yet been significantly reduced and qualitative advances continue to be made. Nuclear testing continues. The issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in all its aspects, remains a major preoccupation. The repeated use of chemical weapons has caused alarm. Indications of the emergence of chemical weapons in an increasing number of national arsenals gives rise to grave concern. The use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other rules of customary international law has been strongly condemned. Numerous instances of conflict fought with conventional weapons have occurred, taking a massive toll of human life and resources. Furthermore, a nuclear exchange which would have global and catastrophic effects remains a possibility. There is also a danger of extension of the arms race to outer space.

20. World military expenditures, which have doubled in the past 10 years, are now, according to some estimates, approaching a trillion dollars a year. Valuable resources urgently needed for economic and social development have been expended for military purposes. New technological developments are often directed to military requirements.

21. Efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, as well as the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, are still under way. Moreover, the question of clandestine and hostile dumping of radioactive and toxic wastes in the territory of other States has begun to give grounds for growing concern.

22. The gap between developed and developing countries has not narrowed. On the contrary, it has widened, and if early solutions are not found, there may be serious, adverse effects on international peace and security.

23. States members of the United Nations must therefore take concerted and determined actions to offset these negative possibilities by building upon and expanding the areas of convergence of views, including the widening consensus that genuine international peace and security cannot be ensured through ever-growing accumulation of weapons.

III. DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

24. In looking towards the future, the international community must heighten its sense of common purpose in halting the arms race and pursuing disarmament. Efforts should be made in all areas where differences of approach exist, with a view to reaching consensus. The international community must seize the opportunity that is before it. Solutions must be energetically sought. Building on the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, mutually complementary, bilateral, regional and global approaches are needed to address and fulfil the deep desire of peoples of the world for success in disarmament negotiations and the attainment of peace and security.

25. Nuclear disarmament remains a priority objective and represents a central task of the international community. In this context, the prevention of nuclear war is of utmost concern. Specific efforts, bilateral, regional and multilateral, should be vigorously pursued, and measures should be further strengthened to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of nuclear war.

26. The two major military Powers should be strongly encouraged to sustain and develop the momentum in their mutual relationship, to broaden their understanding in order to make progress on issues that have global implications, taking into account the interests of other nations. Their bilateral agreements to halt and reverse the arms race should facilitate multilateral action at the regional and global levels.

27. The early and significant reduction of nuclear armaments continues to be of critical importance. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which have the primary responsibility in this area, are strongly urged to conclude, at an early date and as agreed by them, an effective and verifiable treaty to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent.

28. Reaffirming the importance attached by Member States to the cessation of nuclear testing within the framework of an effective disarmament process and noting all the views expressed by Member States on the subject during its third special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of item 1 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear Test Ban". Noting the full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing, as agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States, the General Assembly invites them to take into account in those negotiations the above-mentioned views of Member States.

29. To achieve the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, global and regional efforts are encouraged on the part of all States, including those efforts aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and other measures to halt and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a non-discriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards, should be ensured.

30. The early conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be pursued.

31. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned that take into account the characteristics of each zone, constitute an important measure within the field of arm limitation and disarmament and contribute to international peace and security.

32. Profound concern has been expressed over the dangers posed to peace and security and to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of Africa by the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by South Africa. Member States, especially those with the greatest responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, are urged to take all necessary steps to facilitate the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and particularly to take steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

33. There has been general and strong support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and Member States directly concerned should continue their efforts to bring this zone into effect. The question of the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by Israel stands in the way of the realization of this objective.

34. Recognizing the importance of the early achievement of a comprehensive effectively verifiable and universal convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the General Assembly urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its efforts to conclude successfully the negotiations on such a treaty. States should contribute to the early conclusion of the convention by providing information relevant to a future chemical weapons convention. After conclusion of the negotiations all States should ensure the entry into the force of the convention through early signature and ratification.

35. All States are called upon to observe strictly the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. All States that have not become parties to it are urged to accede to and ratify this Protocol. All States are urged to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the dangerous spread of chemical weapons.

36. The Secretary-General is requested, in accordance with relevant resolutions and decisions, to carry out without delay investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules or customary international law. The importance of developing further technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports is stressed.

37. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to continue its work on the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. It is noted that the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear facilities is considered in this context.

38. In view of the concern expressed on the clandestine and hostile dumping of radioactive and toxic wastes, Member States are urged to take appropriate steps to check such practices.

39. The importance and the urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space are recognized. All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space. Recognizing the significant contribution that a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America would make to the common objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, the two negotiating parties are urged to achieve positive results as soon as possible. As the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter of universal concern, the General Assembly urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts in this area.

40. The need to achieve significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in various parts of the world, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, as essential elements of the disarmament process, is recognized. International peace and security cannot be achieved unless the questions of the qualitative development, the production and use of conventional weapons as well as all aspects, both overt and covert, of the issue of international arms transfers, are also resolutely addressed by the international community. Militarily significant States continue to have a special responsibility in this regard. Bearing in mind that different situations and aspects of the problem in diverse regions will require different approaches, proposals to achieve measures of conventional disarmament should be given serious consideration in appropriate forums, in order that mutually acceptable ways of making progress may be identified.

41. Naval forces should not be excluded from the disarmament process.

42. The importance of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament is emphasized. Noting the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament, the General Assembly recommends that the Conference should continue its negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament during the second part of its 1988 session with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly at its forty-third session, or at the latest, at its forty-fourth session if the achievement of that objective is not possible during 1988.

43. It is recognized that the application of new technologies to the development of new weapons and weapon-systems can add a further dimension to the arms race. However, it is also recognized that new and emerging technologies can have significant applications in arms limitation and disarmament, including verification. While taking into account the requirements of national security, the exercise of appropriate self-restraint in research and development directed at new weapons could do much to strengthen international peace and security. Member States are encouraged to promote international co-operation in the use of scientific and technological developments for peaceful purposes.

44. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to the parties to such agreements. In this regard, the General Assembly endorses the principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission. Multilateral aspects of the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements deserve further in-depth consideration. In this regard the General Assembly therefore requests the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in this field. It further requests the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session in 1990.

45. The group of experts would identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament, would assess the need for improvements of existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and cost aspects, and would provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in this context.

46. The process of building confidence between States is becoming ever more important. Measures in this regard would serve to reduce mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation, to facilitate the achievement of measures of arms limitation and disarmament, and to further the relaxation of international tensions. Transparency and openness in military matters, and a better flow of objective information on military capabilities, should be pursued. Constructive dialogue and confidence-building measures should be actively promoted among States, taking into account the specific characteristics or requirements of a particular region. The General Assembly endorses the guidelines for confidence-building measures drawn up by the Disarmament Commission.

47. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, and based on full respect for the Charter and other relevant provisions of international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, efforts to achieve the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic and proposals for the establishment of zones of peace in South-East Asia and in the Mediterranean region and of a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Pacific are noted.

48. Improved relations between States could facilitate consideration of moves towards reduction in military expenditures. Proposals relating to the reduction of military budgets could usefully be considered by the General Assembly. Member States are encouraged to utilize the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.

49. At the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the participating States declared that disarmament and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built. It was stated that the development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and thereby promote arms reduction and disarmament. It was further noted that a process that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security. The Member States participants of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development reaffirm their international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for purposes of socio-economic development, with a view to bridging the gap between developed and developing countries. Accordingly the States participating in that Conference stress the need to implement the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

IV. MACHINERY

50. The United Nations continues to have a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament and needs the political will of States to enable it to function effectively. As the universal organization charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations provides the broadest framework for the consideration of security issues of interest to all Member States. Therefore, the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened as it provides the best forum for all Member States to contribute actively and collectively to the consideration and resolution of all disarmament issues that have a bearing on their security. The United Nations should continue to encourage and facilitate all disarmament efforts - bilateral, regional and global.

51. In order to review and assess the results of the efforts of Member States in moving forward deliberations and negotiations on all disarmament and related issues as well as to provide a new direction and impetus for these efforts, the General Assembly should decide on convening further special sessions, as appropriate.

52. The General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies should continue to fulfil their deliberative functions. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to serve as the Main Committee dealing with disarmament and related international security questions. The Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative body, should organize its work in such a way as to allow for in-depth consideration of specific issues leading to the formulation and submission of concrete recommendations. Both the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should make the necessary improvements to the methods of their work to enable them to be more effective.

53. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean should continue its work in accordance with its mandate for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.
54. The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference should suspend its work until such time as the General Assembly may deem appropriate to reactivate it.
55. The Security Council, in line with its responsibilities envisaged under the Charter, and taking into account the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, can play an appropriate role in this regard, including matters relating to the provision of security guarantees either in the context of global or regional arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
56. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Charter, has an important role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Consideration should be given by Member States to enhancing his role in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. For example, the Secretary-General could be designated as the depositary of future multilateral disarmament agreements. The Secretary-General could also, upon invitation of participating States, represent the United Nations at disarmament negotiations outside the United Nations framework and inform the General Assembly periodically of relevant developments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament efforts.
57. In order to assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities as well as to ensure the necessary assistance and services to Member States, the status of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat should remain unchanged. In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Department's staff and resources should be maintained at the present level within the existing overall resources of the Secretariat. The universality of interest in disarmament should be reflected in the structure of the Department through effective geographical balance, including at the senior professional levels. Without prejudice to the overall geographical balance, the Department should continue its intensive efforts to increase the employment of appropriately qualified women, including at the senior professional levels.
58. The role and functions of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be strengthened with a view to enhancing the contribution that it makes to the knowledge and discussion of disarmament matters. To this end, the Board should be named the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.
59. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) should continue to conduct independent research on disarmament-related problems. Its potential for carrying out research of a specialized or highly expert nature should be further encouraged. Appropriate financial support is needed in order to ensure the continued viability and development of the Institute.

60. The World Disarmament Campaign should continue its positive contribution by informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament in a balanced, factual and objective manner. Within the framework of the Campaign, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, with the assistance of Member States, should in particular enhance the role and promote the work of the United Nations regional centres in Africa, Asia and Latin America in accordance with their mandates.

61. In order to assure the continued viability of the Campaign, Member States are again invited to continue their support and, in particular, to make voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the Campaign so that the objectives of the Campaign could be successfully carried out on a world-wide basis. Voluntary contributions made by non-governmental organizations, foundations and trusts, and other private sources are also welcome.

62. The General Assembly reaffirms its recognition of the positive role that an informed public opinion can play in the process of disarmament by promoting a constructive and realistic dialogue on issues related to disarmament. In this connection, the Assembly welcomes the support that the non-governmental organization community has extended to its fifteenth special session. With a view to achieving the widest possible dissemination of information on questions of disarmament, the Secretary-General should have greater and more substantive contacts with non-governmental organizations, including women's and youth organizations, and other audiences identified by the Campaign. The Secretary-General should also use the occasion of the annual observance of Disarmament Week for enhancing public awareness of the efforts of Member States and of the progress made in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

63. The United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme has, in the 10 years since its launching by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, made a significant and useful contribution to the development of greater expertise in disarmament issues. The programme should be continued, within the existing resources allocated to it, in accordance with guidelines approved by the Assembly and should be maintained at the level approved by the twelfth special session.

64. The Conference on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body of the international community, remains an indispensable forum in the field of disarmament. The General Assembly recommends that the Conference intensify its work on various substantive items on its agenda. The General Assembly notes that the Conference has agreed to intensify its consultations on the expansion of its membership with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1988 session that would be conveyed to the Assembly at its forty-third session.

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65. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction the active participation of Member States and non-governmental organizations. The proposals and suggestions submitted by them have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session. As a number of these proposals and suggestions, which have become an integral part of the work of the special session of the General Assembly, deserve to be studied further and more thoroughly, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made both in the plenary meetings and the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole of the Fifteenth Special Session, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of this special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its forty-third session. Some of the proposals submitted by Member States for the consideration of the special session are listed in the annex, which is an integral part of the Document of the Fifteenth Special Session.

V. CONCLUSIONS

66. During recent years, a favourable climate has developed within the international community and progress has been recorded in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The direct threat of a war, including a nuclear war, involving the nuclear-weapon States has gradually decreased, thus opening the way to greater stability and predictability. Despite this encouraging trend, however, many of the universal hopes for disarmament remain unfulfilled. The progress achieved thus far, while not extensive, can help to chart a sound and realistic future course of arms limitation and disarmament efforts on the part of the international community. The opportunity and challenge therefore exist to move forward in the remaining years of this century towards significant reductions in armaments and armed forces, leading to the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

67. The United Nations represents the focal point of the international community for fostering multilateral co-operation wherein bilateral and regional efforts can be complementary and mutually supportive in attaining the principal objectives of the United Nations, which are international peace and security, development of friendly relations among nations and the advancement of the economic and social well-being of all peoples. Accordingly, the General Assembly solemnly declares its determination to pursue genuine and lasting peace through the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and to take determined and energetic action to achieve the early and substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces in the disarmament process as set out in relevant documents of the United Nations.

Statement

Department of
External
Affairs



Discours

Ministère des
Affaires
extérieures

88/31

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

SPEECH BY THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

NEW YORK

June 13, 1988.

Secretary of State
for
External Affairs

Secrétaire d'État
aux
Affaires extérieures

Canada

Mr. President

Six years ago, at the outset of the Second Special Session on Disarmament, the President of that Assembly could correctly observe that nothing had been achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control since the First Special Session.

This year, we meet in circumstances which are vastly different. The past six years have recorded progress and achievements that will have major implications for Arms Control and Disarmament. The measure of success of this Special Session will be the extent to which our deliberations sustain further the spirit so essential to continued progress and achievement in international disarmament. We must therefore reaffirm our dedication to the success of arms control and disarmament, and pledge ourselves to advance ideas which will keep hope and progress alive.

Our efforts here can only be aided by the outcome of the recent meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

That Summit clearly demonstrated the degree of progress which has been made in East-West relations. It was the fourth such meeting between the two leaders in just over two-and-half years, an unprecedented pace for discussion and negotiation.

I was struck by how many observers of the Summit referred to the new agreements signed in Moscow on verification and testing as "minor" arms control measures. When we gathered in previous Special Sessions, the very notion of "minor" arms control agreements would indeed have sounded strange. We have come to have high expectations of this process.

It is in the vital Soviet-American relationship that much of the progress has been made since the last Special Session. Intensive negotiations between those two States in the last several years have brought new and historic achievements, most notably in the landmark INF Agreement signed in Washington last December and the agreement in principle to reduce strategic nuclear arms by fifty per cent. Those accomplishments present this Special Session with both the opportunity and the stimulus to pursue other avenues leading to greater international security and stability.

The multilateral arms control process has also had significant success in the context of East-West relations. The Stockholm Agreement, which came into effect in January 1987, has brought greater openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. Anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability covering the whole of Europe between all Members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact offer us the opportunity for more progress.

There has also been some movement forward in non-East-West forums but it has been much less spectacular. The Conference on Disarmament has made some progress on negotiations on a global convention to ban chemical weapons, but the repeated reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War only demonstrates how far we are from an effective agreement and the urgency of our obligations. There was also progress in last year's successful Disarmament and Development Conference, the endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty; the inclusion of conventional disarmament on the agenda of the United Nations and the consensus report of the UNDC on verification.

In this Special Session it is important that we take realism as our guide and apply what we have learned from our successes, and from our failures. We have learned that arms control and disarmament cannot be viewed as ends in themselves. Both have value only if they contribute to security and well-being. Most countries accept the desirability of constraining or banning weapons systems. But we cannot aspire to the reductions we seek, or the agreements necessary to sustain them, unless all States take advantage of opportunities to support those objectives.

Experience has shown that successful arms control and disarmament agreements share a number of essential qualities. The first and most obvious is enhanced security. Arms control agreements must maintain and enhance the security of all those involved in the negotiation.

There are other essential qualities as well.

One is mutual benefit. Realism in arms control demands that a successful negotiation offer something for all parties.

Negotiations must also be substantive. We must not spend our time negotiating the non-essential or the frivolous. A proliferation of arms control forums is not likely to lead to more arms control agreements unless they have clear and substantive mandates.

Arms controls agreements must also be crafted to ensure that the benefits of limits on weapons are not undone by redeployment or by qualitative improvements to remaining weapons.

A fifth, and related criterion, is non-transferability of the threat. Arms control agreements will achieve little and are unlikely to succeed if they remove the threat from one region by increasing it in another.

Finally, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. The agreement must include not only thorough verification provisions, but the substance of the agreement must be such that compliance can be effectively demonstrated.

These essential qualities are demanding.

Nonetheless our experience clearly shows that while the negotiation of agreements will not be easy, it is not impossible. An effective disarmament and arms control regime can meet these criteria only through measured and individual steps which see every contentious aspect settled. The issues on which we seek agreement vary much too widely and are too complex to allow us to behave otherwise.

Canada sees confidence-building as essential to arms control and disarmament. We regard the concepts of openness, transparency and predictability as imperative. The establishment of agreed procedures for inspections at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 is an accomplishment which stands as a precedent and model for other arms control negotiations, at bilateral or regional levels.

The principles essential to the success of confidence-building measures should be promoted on every occasion. In this regard, we urge Members of the United Nations to comply with the General Assembly recommendation on reporting annual military expenditures. Only twenty or so countries regularly comply with this recommendation. It is a small step, but we cannot hope to take larger steps without more members of this Assembly giving effect to our own recommendations.

Indeed, one of the happy consequences of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits is to broaden the responsibility for arms control. For some time, the focus of arms control discussions was to encourage the superpowers to act. Now the superpowers are acting, and the question becomes whether other States are prepared to demonstrate themselves the leadership we have asked of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is no longer enough to advocate action by others. Whether the issue is chemical weapons or adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or fidelity to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new climate involves new obligations for all of us.

Ultimately, neither arms control nor disarmament can succeed without a general will to make them succeed. The issue is fundamentally political, and this Special Session is one assembly in which political will can be cultivated and demonstrated. Increasing trust, good relations and arms reductions go together: they are mutually reinforcing.

It is not enough that the established framework of international institutions and laws must remain in place; they must as well be respected in practice by Members of the United Nations.

The strength of this institution is not the responsibility of any one group of nations; it is the responsibility of all of its members. We must all work in support of the UN and not undermine it. We cannot ask it to do the impossible. We have to set realistic goals, and we have to give it the means to achieve these goals.

In that context the frequent calls we have heard at this Special Session for a new Fund to transfer the resources saved from disarmament to development is an example of a failure to learn from past experiences. Last year the Disarmament and Development Conference issued a final document stressing the multi-dimensional nature of security. The participants rejected both a direct linkage between disarmament and development and the creation of a fund. Nations like Canada already have mechanisms for providing funds to development, as does the United Nations itself, and in many developing countries there are ample existing claims upon any resources made available through disarmament.

Just as arms control and enhanced security are not a monopoly of the superpowers, neither is disarmament limited to nuclear arms alone. The terrible consequence of military actions in the decades since the Second World War have been caused by conventional, and latterly chemical weapons. We must face this issue squarely.

No conflict or arms build-up, however small or isolated, is irrelevant or can be ignored as any of them can undermine the security of all of us.

Canada is determined to play a leading role in moving the agenda forward. Our commitment and contribution to the cause of arms control and disarmament is well established. We will use the influence we have, and make available the expertise we hold to help reduce the danger of conflict, and to reverse the build-up of arms.

Our first goal at this Special Session, therefore, should be to endorse continued adherence to a well founded and realistic approach to arms control and disarmament.

This requires that we set clear, realistic goals, and that we choose and adhere to priorities. In arms control and disarmament, priorities must be established no less than in other areas if we are to have specific landmarks against which to measure progress. This lesson is especially true for the United Nations and for its arms control activities.

This Special Session will help to keep alive the spirit of progress and achievement if it can identify and isolate those areas which command consensus and where we can agree we should concentrate our efforts. Canada has listened with interest and attention to the statements of the Special Session. We believe that a measure of agreement does exist on certain issues where Canada considers it would be worthwhile to concentrate our attention in the future.

First, deep and verifiable reductions in the arsenals of nuclear weapon must remain as the highest priority in international disarmament.

The achievement of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains a fundamental and enduring objective for Canada. The Special Session should recognize the successful efforts already made in Soviet-American negotiations in this area and endorse this full-scale stage-by-stage negotiating procedure.

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beginning last week and throughout this session, officials of the Canadian Government, on my instructions, will be calling on the Governments of all non-signatories of this Treaty, strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that the Special Session will issue a similar call. It is no longer possible to argue, as some have, that the superpowers must first reduce their own nuclear arsenals. If that was a condition preordinate, it has been met.

The focus of attention on nuclear arms should not, however, be allowed to deflect attention from the need for progress in arms reduction in the field of conventional arms. This question must be addressed with no less urgency than that attached to nuclear questions. It is in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well provide the best returns.

The negotiation of a Convention prohibiting chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance. This Session should unequivocally condemn their use. While progress has been accomplished, greater efforts must be made to conclude an effectively verifiable comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Until such an Agreement is reached, every step must be taken to prevent the transfer to other states of chemical weapons, and to follow the example of those countries which have moved to control the export of highly toxic chemicals and to institute a "Warning List" procedure for others.

The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.

Verification is essential to the Arms Control and Disarmament process. It has been a major preoccupation for Canada and we are encouraged that so many speakers in this forum share that priority.

Already, a welcome new international consensus has developed on this subject. In May, last year, the Disarmament Commission established a Working Group on Verification which Canada chaired. This year, the Working Group adopted a report which included sixteen verification principles amplifying the provisions on verification agreed at the First Special Session. I would urge all Members of the United Nations to reinforce the efforts of the Disarmament Commission and subscribe fully to these principles.

To help promote the cause of multilateralism in this field, we and the Netherlands have proposed that an in-depth study be undertaken by a United Nations Group of Experts. Such a report will advance international understanding of verification within the UN framework, and help develop an appropriate role for the Organization in this field. I ask that Members of the United Nations support this proposal.

Mr. President, in the last six years, we have shown that arms control and disarmament can work, and that it can be made part of the growing fabric of our international relations. Canada stands ready to work with member States in the pursuit of goals agreed by this Special Session. Let us continue to nourish further the cause of arms control and disarmament.



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Fifteenth special session
Agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15

REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,
ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF
TERMINATING THE ARMS RACE AND THE PRESSING NEED TO ACHIEVE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
TENTH AND TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSIONS

CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, INCLUDING QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, RELEVANT TO THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, WITH
A VIEW TO THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL
MEASURES AND, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES, TAKING DULY
INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE
FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD
OF DISARMAMENT AND OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DISARMAMENT
MACHINERY

UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD
OF DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING MEASURES TO MOBILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION
IN FAVOUR OF DISARMAMENT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF
THE ACTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

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Letter dated 27 May 1988 from the representatives of Canada and the Netherlands to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to refer to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, which will be held at United Nations Headquarters from 31 May to 25 June 1988.

We ask that the attached paper entitled "Verification and the United Nations" (see annex) be circulated as a document of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, under agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.

(Signed) D. J. ROCHE
Ambassador for Disarmament
Acting Head of Delegation
of Canada

(Signed) R. J. van SCHAİK
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands at Geneva

ANNEX

Verification and the United Nations

Paper Submitted by the Netherlands and Canada on 31 May 1988

1. Introduction

There now exists an international consensus that provisions for adequate and appropriate verification form an essential component for arms control and disarmament agreements to be effective. In addition, there is a recognition that verification serves functions that are critical to the long-term success of the entire arms control and disarmament process.

The importance of verification rests on the fact that an arms control agreement is essentially a compromise between nations in which each party to the agreement bases part or all of its national security on the undertakings of other contracting parties rather than relying exclusively on its own capabilities.

Since the benefit from an arms control agreement for each participating state derives from the compliance of the other participants in the agreement, there is a natural desire for some form of impartial assurance that all participants are fulfilling their obligations. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties are abiding by their obligations, is indispensable to the successful negotiation, conclusion and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. Expressed simply, verification is the process by which such confidence is created and maintained.

There is also growing awareness of the important role that multilateral agreements (in addition to bilateral agreements) will play in the arms control and disarmament process and, consequently, the significance that multilateral verification is likely to have in the future. However, the exact forms of this multilateral verification cannot be clear in advance of the actual negotiation of specific agreements.

It is generally recognized that the United Nations has a central role to play in the arms control and disarmament process. As the only international organization of its kind with global responsibilities, the United Nations can make an important contribution to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, deriving from its primary responsibility in the promotion of the arms control and disarmament process.

2. Historic Background

The basic idea for an international verification organization (IVO) linked to the United Nations is not new. In September 1961, for example, the USA and the USSR agreed on a set of principles for disarmament negotiations.¹ Among these principles were the following:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification."

Later, fairly detailed schemes for IVOs were advanced by both the USSR and USA as part of their general proposals in the context of discussions on general and complete disarmament (GCD).² However, in both cases, though the IVO was conceived as being global and comprehensive in terms of the scope of its functions, it nevertheless remained treaty-specific in the exercise of those functions: its powers would apply only to parties of the agreement. Moreover, the IVO was to be composed only of parties to the agreement. While the expectation at the time was that most countries of the world would participate in any GCD agreement, it is still clear

that there were serious reservations about giving an IVO linked to the United Nations any powers for monitoring global military affairs outside the legal and political context of treaty specified arms control and disarmament measures.

Toward the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, the focus of arms control and disarmament discussions shifted away from GCD towards the negotiation of specific, more narrowly focussed, agreements. For the most part discussions on verification reflected this shift and similarly focussed on provisions and mechanisms that concentrated on the precise purposes of specific treaties. Some suggestions for a broader IVO continued to be made, however, such as that by France in 1978 for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency.³

Paralleling these proposals for a comprehensive IVO linked to the United Nations were others representing a more evolutionary approach to the role of the United Nations in verification. The Netherlands, for example, put forward a proposal in 1978 and in 1982, during the First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which was intended to streamline consultations and implement verification measures in a staged approach as the number of complex multilateral arms control treaties increased.⁴ The proposed IVO was to be linked with the United Nations and develop incrementally, at first being entrusted only with the verification of a chemical weapon (CW) treaty. However, it was envisaged that such an agency would take on the verification of other future agreements as well, as the need arose.

Several comparable proposals for an IVO were put forward on the occasion of the Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.⁵ It was still the expectation that, over time, an IVO that was initially treaty-specific would serve as a stepping-stone toward the creation of a more general IVO with broader responsibilities.

During the period from the late 1960s to the 1980s, there were other developments which gave concrete expression to the concept of multilateral verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards systems, for example, provides a key model of an international mechanism for verification in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among other agreements. The current negotiations respecting the verification of a chemical weapons convention also illustrate the recognition that international verification is an important component in verifying multilateral agreements.

Until recently, the role of the United Nations was, for the most part, limited to the inclusion of references in specific arms control agreements concerning the use of the United Nations to provide assistance in verification activities upon request, most commonly involving consultations. For example, Article V of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 provides for consultation and cooperation to resolve ambiguities, which may be "undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter". Reference was also made to the use of the Security Council to resolve concerns regarding compliance (Article VI).

In 1985, however, the United Nations began a more fundamental consideration of the process of verification and its role in this field. At the fortieth session of the General Assembly, the first comprehensive resolution (40/152(o)) on verification was initiated by Canada. This resolution was adopted by consensus. Canada undertook this action as a result of a systematic examination of the subject of verification begun in the early 1980s. It was recognized by Canada that verification was and would remain a fundamental component of the arms control process concerning which there was little serious international study. Canada believed that an important first step in the establishment of an appropriate role for the United Nations was to develop a basic understanding of the verification process and the role of multilateral institutions in that process.

The two following sessions of the General Assembly adopted similar resolutions on verification by consensus. In 1987, pursuant to resolution 41/86(q), Canada chaired a working group at the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) on "Verification In All Its Aspects." In May of 1988, a UNDC working group, again under Canadian chairmanship, succeeded in concluding consideration of this subject with the adoption by consensus of a non-exhaustive list of sixteen principles that elaborate upon the principles respecting verification enunciated in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament.⁶ The work of the UNDC in 1987 and in 1988 has served to deepen the international community's understanding of the complexities of verification and its appreciation of the difficulties involved in developing a United Nations role in this context. Moreover, the list of sixteen verification principles agreed at the 1988 session of the UNDC, constitutes a new consensus and a new foundation for further work by the United Nations in this field.

There have also been other recent suggestions with respect to the United Nations role in verification. In September 1987, the USSR suggested setting up "under the aegis of the U.N. Organization a mechanism for extensive international verification of compliance with agreements to lessen international tension, limit armaments and for monitoring the military situation in conflict areas."⁷ The governments of the Group of Six Nations also proposed in their Stockholm Declaration of January 21, 1988, the establishment of an "integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear free world."

While recent proposals for the establishment of an IVO linked to the United Nations represent an increased awareness of the significance which multilateral verification can play in the international arms control and disarmament process, it is only through an evolutionary approach that any specific role for the United Nations can be developed. This process of evolution must begin with a systematic and careful examination of the constructive opportunities open to the United Nations.

3. Considerations Respecting the Role of the United Nations in Verification

In defining any United Nations role with respect to verification, a few basic considerations must be kept in mind.

Verification, by its very nature, is fundamentally a cooperative exercise involving the consent of all the parties to an agreement. When such consent is absent, monitoring activities no longer constitute arms control verification and could be viewed as an unwarranted interference in the sovereign affairs of states. This, in turn, could impede prospects for further arms control agreements and could damage the image of the United Nations itself. The United Nations must only become operationally involved in verification that is treaty-related and only with the express consent of all parties and at their request. There will not, therefore, necessarily be a direct United Nations role in all arms control agreements. It is up to the parties involved to decide whether or not to involve the United Nations or any other organization. However, the United Nations and its members could profit indirectly from information provided by the parties as well as their practical experience in devising verification provisions or in their

implementation. Parties entering into arms control agreements might, therefore, be encouraged to communicate relevant texts and to make further reports on the matter available to the United Nations. In accumulating this information, the United Nations could start to serve as a "database" or "verification information point" (VIP) to provide data and advice at the request of member states.

Verification operations by their nature must also be treaty-specific activities. Designing, negotiating and agreeing upon appropriate verification provisions for a specific agreement are intimately related to the particular arms control measures to be undertaken pursuant to that treaty. In addition, verification requires considerable specialized expertise and technology that will vary depending on the arms control measures in question.

A verification agency, which would seek to cover in one organization a number of arms control agreements, introduces serious complexities because each arms control agreement has a different set of parties that have signed and ratified it. Numerous difficulties can be envisaged, in terms of decision-making, operations and control of information, with regard to a verification agency whose duties covered a number of different agreements. At the same time, these difficulties could well make the agency unworkable.

It is also essential to have clear plans concerning the operational missions that a possible single verification organization would have to undertake. It is difficult to identify such missions if the arms control measures to be verified do not yet exist: at present, there are few multilateral agreements that would warrant the creation of an extensive United Nations verification organization for operational monitoring purposes. It would therefore be preferable to install separate arrangements for individual arms control agreements. The CW convention and the organization foreseen in the draft treaty is an example. These separate arrangements would be more effective and probably less costly than an international verification organization to cover all treaties.

Another consideration is that, at present, the United Nations has limited involvement and expertise with respect to operational aspects of verification. It is costly and time consuming to develop such expertise on a large scale. Efforts to acquire an operational verification capability should only

be undertaken when a clear requirement is identified and consent is properly provided by the parties to an arms control agreement.

The cost of any new United Nations agency must be of critical concern in this period of severe financial constraints on the United Nations. The costs for a verification organization, especially one covering a number of agreements, would be very high if the job is to be done thoroughly and properly, as it must be. It is also inappropriate during this time of constraint to further proliferate institutions within the United Nations.

These considerations lead Canada and the Netherlands to have clear reservations about proposals for the early establishment of any United Nations agency with broad operational responsibilities for verifying a number of arms control agreements. Under current international conditions, such a body does not seem to be a realistic possibility, and will not become so until the most important of these concerns have been addressed.

4. A Role for the United Nations in Verification

The general role of the United Nations in the arms control process is enunciated in the Final Document of the First Special Session (para. 114) which states:

"The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures -- unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral -- and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations."

One way that the United Nations can facilitate and encourage arms control agreements is in the field of verification.

The role of United Nations with respect to verification must be based on a considered appraisal of what is realistically feasible, both in terms of the prevailing political environment and the resources available to the United

Nations. This role must be a pragmatic one that is primarily responsive to the existing requirements of the international community and not constructed on the basis of hypothetical events. Elaborate mechanisms devised to monitor agreements which do not in fact exist as yet, for example, should be avoided. Moreover, consent of all the parties to any agreement to be monitored must remain a prerequisite to United Nations involvement as part of any verification mechanism.

In the view of Canada and the Netherlands, the United Nations could play a constructive role in verification by undertaking the following functions:

1. The development of internationally agreed goals and principles concerning arms control verification, such as through the activities in which the Disarmament Commission has been engaged.
2. The promotion of the exchange and provision of information relevant to the negotiation and the mechanics of verification, so as to function as a verification database or "verification information point" (VIP).
3. The systematic compilation and maintenance of a register of institutions and individuals with relevant expertise in the area of verification, upon whom parties to an agreement could call for services or assistance.
4. The provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to Member States and in particular their arms control negotiators, on request.
5. Assistance in the organization and conduct of review conferences for existing arms control and disarmament treaties, with the view of improving assessments of the functioning of verification systems.
6. The systematic identification, coordination, conduct and fostering of research into the process, structures, procedures and techniques of verification.

7. On a responsive basis and with the explicit consent of parties to an arms control and disarmament agreement or negotiation, assistance in the development of additional verification provisions and procedures for an existing agreement and potential involvement in the formulation and implementation of verification arrangements for a proposed agreement.

How these "information clearing-house" and "assistance and expertise" functions could be organized remains to be considered carefully. For example, would these functions be centrally located within the Department of Disarmament Affairs or dispersed throughout several parts of the United Nations? Existing structures, organizations and resources within the United Nations should be used to the maximum extent possible to undertake these functions, in view of the serious restrictions existing at present on United Nations finances. New machinery or resources are not necessarily needed, but rather a fresh look at priorities. Member States could also be asked to contribute actively to the United Nations, for example, by making information and assistance available without cost.

The foregoing functions involve a role for the United Nations in verification that is responsive to the actual needs of parties to specific negotiations and to specific agreements. The main focus of this advisory and service function of the United Nations would be to provide assistance to national negotiators and executors of arms control agreements. It might also be appropriate for the United Nations in this capacity to provide assistance to institutional actors involved in arms control negotiations, such as the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament.

What must be avoided is to have the United Nations impose itself in the field of verification or on member states, whether in bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements. The United Nations should be able to assist, on request, and to supply services in terms of information as well as, to a limited extent, manpower and machinery. In this way, the United Nations, in its best tradition of stimulating international cooperation, could develop relevant and pertinent services needed for verifying existing arms control agreements. Furthermore, its present role in the organization of review conferences, could be enhanced by better coordination and use of expertise. In short, the United Nations could provide a data and service base.

There are already resources upon which the United Nations can draw to provide advice and assistance to parties concerning verification matters. Of greatest interest as a model is the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency which verifies compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among other agreements. Also relevant is the experience of the Secretary-General in investigating allegations of CW use. Finally, United Nations peacekeeping activities, while different in fundamental ways from verification, do involve operational aspects which are or could be relevant for verification (e.g., monitoring of troop levels).

5. A Specific Proposal

It was clear from the discussions of the Disarmament Commission that the subject of verification is a complex one, involving detailed questions of policy, technology, law and cost. While the UNDC has concluded its consideration of the subject, this does not mean that the United Nations should forgo further examination of verification. On the contrary, there remains constructive work that can yet be done within the framework of the United Nations. Verification is and will remain a critical element in achieving progress in the arms control and disarmament process. Moreover, the importance of multilateral verification will undoubtedly increase in the future and the role which the United Nations could play warrants close examination.

At this stage, the avenue which seems most likely to advance international understanding of verification within the United Nations framework, as well as help develop an appropriate role for the Organization in this field, is an in-depth United Nations study by a Group of Experts. This approach has several potential advantages. First, experts would be able to bring to bear their knowledge and skills to address the subject matter in considerable detail. They would, in addition, be able to focus sufficient time on the relevant questions. This ability of a relatively small group of experts to focus on the subject should produce a thorough and useful study.

The report of the Group of Experts could become a key international document respecting the future activities of the United Nations in this area. The findings of the Group of Experts could form the basis for further action by the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission, as appropriate.

The Group of Experts would in no way duplicate the efforts of the Disarmament Commission; rather, it would build upon the work already accomplished by the Commission.

The mandate of the study would focus on the role of the United Nations in verification. As described above there have been a number of proposals respecting appropriate roles for the United Nations in this context, including those suggested by Canada and the Netherlands in this paper. The Group of Experts study would systematically identify existing and possible activities by the United Nations in multilateral verification and then review and assess each in terms of its merits and implications. The assessment would focus on the organizational, technical, operational, legal, and cost characteristics of each option. The report of the Group of Experts would provide specific recommendations regarding possible further action by the United Nations in this area.

In a time of severe financial restraint on the activities of the United Nations, we are all obliged to be extremely cautious in imposing new demands on the Organization's limited resources. In order to minimize disruptions to the budgetary process of the United Nations, it is suggested that the first meetings of the Group of Experts be held after January 1990. The report of the Group of Experts would be tabled at the 46th Session of the General Assembly in 1991. This schedule would permit the bulk of the study's costs to be drawn from the next United Nations financial biennium budget. In addition, the Secretary-General would be asked to undertake preparatory work during 1989 utilizing existing resources.

For the foregoing reasons, the Special Session may wish to consider making the following request to the Secretary-General:

"The Third Special Session on Disarmament requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts and making appropriate use of the capabilities of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in a consultant capacity, to undertake an in-depth study on the subject of the existing and possible activities of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. It further requests the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its Forty-Sixth session in 1991. The Group of Experts would identify

and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of multilateral verification, would assess the need of any additional activities or improvements of existing activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and cost aspects and would provide specific recommendations for future action by the United Nations in this context.

To minimize demands on United Nations budgetary resources arising from the foregoing recommendation, the Third Special Session on Disarmament requests that the Group of Experts hold its first meeting after January 1990. It urges the Secretary-General to undertake such preparatory work in 1989 as is feasible prior to that date, with a view to facilitating the Group of Experts meetings, drawing upon existing resources of the Secretary-General and the World Disarmament Campaign Fund."

Endnotes:

- 1) UN Document A/4879, September 20, 1961.
 - 2) See: USSR, ENDC/2, March 19, 1962 and ENDC/2/Rev.1, November 26, 1962; and USA, ENDC/30, April 18, 1962.
 - 3) France, UN Documents A/AC.187/105, February 23, 1978 and A/S-10/AC.1/7, May 30, 1978.
 - 4) Netherlands, CCD/565, March 30, 1978, UN Document A/AC.187/108, April 5, 1978; and UN Document A/S-12/22, May 27, 1982.
 - 5) See for example: Italy, UN Document A/S-12/AC.1/19, June 18, 1982; and Japan, UN Document A/S-12/AC.1/43, June 28, 1982.
 - 6) UN Document A/CN.10/1988/CRP.9, May 18, 1988.
 - 7) M.S. Gorbachev, "The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World", PRAVDA, September 17, 1987.
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COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OF THE
FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Working Group I

Agenda item 10

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
TENTH AND TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION

Working paper submitted by Canada

1. Canada regards agenda item 10 on the assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the General Assembly at its tenth and twelfth special sessions as an essential component of the work of the current third special session devoted to disarmament.
2. While it would be folly to pursue a rigid and uncritical adherence to past approaches to arms control and disarmament which ignore changing global conditions and attitudes, it would be equally impossible to set rational policy objectives for the future without a realistic appraisal of past experience. In the Canadian view, if multilateral institutions and processes are to make a productive contribution to the arms control and disarmament process, they must reflect a balanced appreciation of both past and present. The task ahead of us includes the identification of areas where greater efforts are required. However, full recognition must also be given to progress that has been achieved and efforts must be directed to encouraging and enhancing future progress.
3. The decade of the 1980s can be divided into two distinct periods from an arms control and disarmament perspective. The first half was notable for the lack of progress in this area. Since 1985, however, the pace of developments has been very encouraging, even startling in some respects. The achievements of the past few months alone are comparable to the accomplishments over the entire preceding 15 years.

4. The focus of activity has of course centred on the United States of America/Soviet negotiations. The signing of the agreement to eliminate all American and Soviet intermediate-range land-based missile systems in December 1987 constituted a landmark manifestation of progress. Although the treaty affects only about 5 per cent of the combined United States/USSR nuclear arsenals, it is the first ever to actually reduce nuclear arms by eliminating the entire category of such weapons. Furthermore, while it constitutes only one element of a larger process whose aim is to enhance security at lower levels of weapons, particularly in the European context, the treaty is of immense symbolic importance. After a long disarmament hiatus, the treaty has demonstrated that real progress is achievable and has paved the way for more significant reductions of nuclear weapons. The near-term prospect for reaching agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals has become, in consequence, a more realistic possibility.

5. A further recent event of major significance was the commencement of full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations between the United States and the USSR on nuclear-testing limitations in November 1987. The first stage concerns the development of improved verification techniques so that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty can be finally ratified. The negotiations will then turn to consideration of further limitations on the size and number of tests. Canada warmly welcomed the start of these negotiations because early ratification of the two treaties would constitute, in our view, a useful first step in moving toward the widely shared comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty objective.

6. Since the first special session devoted to disarmament of the General Assembly in 1978, there has been growing international recognition of the importance of confidence-building measures and the step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. The agreement reached at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 recognized that confidence-building measures constitute an essential precursor to complex disarmament agreements - in this case to conventional disarmament measures in Europe. Follow-up work is continuing at Vienna with the aim of outlining mandates for new East/West negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe.

7. Recent progress has not been restricted to the East/West arena. In other forums, tangible progress has been achieved at both the regional and global levels. With 138 adherents, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) enjoys the broadest political support of any international arms control and disarmament agreement. Since the first special session in 1978, which called for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 31 additional countries have become full parties to the Treaty. The Canadian Government believes that the current special session should provide a solid endorsement of the nuclear non-proliferation objective and of the Treaty as the principal instrument for its achievement.

8. In the absence of universal support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can make a useful contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation objective where they promote stability and security at both regional and international levels and command the support of the major countries of the area. Canada has voted in favour of United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. We have also supported measures which would consolidate a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In December 1986, a new nuclear-free zone was created in the South Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga. This zone further expands the geographical area officially free of nuclear weapons.
9. At the global level, significant progress has been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons within the Conference on Disarmament. While complex legal and technical details remain to be worked out, the third special session should give full recognition to the progress which has been made in this area.
10. Also in the Conference on Disarmament, the Group of Scientific Experts has made considerable progress in the past two years in developing a global seismic monitoring network, which would be required to verify an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. We are very pleased that the Canadian representative has been selected to co-ordinate a major future test of the global seismic data exchange. While much work remains to be done before a workable monitoring network which would inspire the confidence of the parties concerned can be put in place, the Group of Experts is moving in the right direction. In order to enhance the effectiveness of its work, Canada urges the fullest possible participation in the work of the Group of Experts and co-operation in promoting the Group's objectives.
11. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the most important arms control and disarmament objectives the international community has set for itself. Of the numerous existing international treaties which define the kinds of military activities that can legitimately be conducted in outer space, the most significant one is the outer space Treaty of 1967. This is the closest we have to a "constitution" for outer space. We must support the spirit and specific provisions of that treaty, including its ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
12. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 between the United States of America and the USSR is also a key element of the existing legal régime governing the role of arms in outer space. The manner of its interpretation and application is without doubt of interest to the international community as a whole. We urge strict compliance with that treaty as signed.
13. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is also an important agenda item at the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has been attempting to determine what additional international legal measures, if any, may be necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space. Some useful work has been done in clarifying the existing legal régime governing military activities in outer space and a variety of suggestions have been made for possible additional measures.

14. A further global success was the agreement achieved at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in September 1987. The Conference succeeded in eliciting a commitment by all participants to pursue both disarmament and development objectives while establishing that the relationship between the two distinct processes is based on security. The Conference was particularly notable for its acceptance of a broad definition of security as being dependent on a wide variety of factors. That should be extremely helpful in ensuring that the arms control and disarmament process is seen not as an end in itself but as one building block in the construction of security.

15. We have focused on the developments which have received particular world attention. Equally significant, if less sensational, were the successful conclusion of the Review Conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1986. Canada is especially gratified that the United Nations Disarmament Commission also succeeded in reaching agreement on a set of 16 verification principles which codify international acceptance of the essential role of verification in the arms control and disarmament process. These principles are very significant because they represent a new consensus by the international community respecting this important subject and lay a new foundation for all future activity by the United Nations in this area. Such developments constitute the important confidence-building blocks which establish the foundation for future progress. The special session should reaffirm the validity of these verification principles as adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission.

16. This special session would be remiss and out of touch with reality if it failed to take full account of the recent successes in the field of arms control and disarmament. That is not to say, however, that those areas where much greater efforts and stronger exercise of political will are required should not be overlooked. Canada shares the disappointment of many that the Conference on Disarmament has failed to reach agreement on a balanced formula for consideration, in a realistic and practical manner, of the nuclear-test ban issue.

17. In another area, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty boasts the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, it remains a major concern to Canada that a key group of countries continues to refuse to become parties. Regional disputes and tensions appear to stand behind the reluctance of some countries to become parties. However, it could be said that the failure to sign the Treaty merely enhances the distrust of the intentions of others and exacerbates these tensions. The prospect of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons could have frightening implications.

18. In the field of chemical weapons, although progress is being made in working towards a global ban on these horrific and indiscriminate agents, their use in the Gulf War, as verified by the Secretary-General, should be strongly condemned. Moreover, reports of an increasing number of countries having acquired or seeking to acquire a chemical-weapons capability should be viewed with growing concern.

19. What are the lessons that can be drawn from the past decade? For one, the successes have demonstrated that progress can only be made through a step-by-step process of negotiation. It is also evident that the prime goals of this special session will be different from those of previous special sessions on disarmament. At the first and second special sessions, the challenge was to get the arms control and disarmament process going. The opening of the third special session coincides, almost symbolically, with the Moscow Summit. The first goal of this special session will be to protect and enhance the current East/West process and build upon its gains. Although this process is finally working, it is fragile and will not benefit from unrealistic declarations or proposals. It is therefore incumbent on us all to work together to enhance the momentum of these negotiations so that they will produce even more significant results and, in turn, stimulate progress at the multilateral level.

20. It would be unrealistic to expect this special session in four short weeks to resolve problems which have plagued the international community for months and years. Nevertheless we should be able together to move closer to agreement or at least a meeting of minds on some of the difficult issues before us. We would expect the special session to build upon the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session (General Assembly resolution S-10/2). It provides the most comprehensive set of principles for disarmament adopted by the international community and as such is a landmark achievement.

21. A measure of the success of the third special session will be the degree to which it succeeds in finding common ground. That ground clearly will not materialize where firmly held national positions are ignored. Nor will the special session succeed in prescribing solutions which have long eluded consensus. Rather, it must place the emphasis on those areas where agreement is possible. In the Canadian view, it is far preferable to aim for modest gains, though by no means insignificant, than to adhere rigidly to positions which others cannot accept and which will lead inevitably to a polarization of the special session. A pragmatic approach is the route to a successful third special session.

22. The very essence of the arms control and disarmament process is a step-by-step approach based on the development of confidence and the enhancement of security. Nations will not disarm if their security is threatened; neither will they respond to disarmament timetables or processes in the absence of confidence-building measures and verification. If participants take these realities fully into account, the prospects for a successful conclusion to this special session will be enhanced.



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Working Group II
Agenda items 12 and 15

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, INCLUDING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, RELEVANT TO THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, WITH A VIEW TO THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL MEASURES AND, IF NECESSARY ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES, TAKING DULY INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Working paper submitted by Canada

Experience has demonstrated that in attempting to anticipate and shape the future, we are prone simply to extrapolate from past trends and concerns. This can lead to serious, and sometimes costly, miscalculations about future developments. Assessing the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of developments and trends relevant to the disarmament process is especially difficult because military capabilities are being rapidly transformed by the rampant pace of technological change which characterizes our age. It is precisely for this reason that our publics are increasingly and properly concerned that the application of new technologies to military purposes not occur in unthinking, uncontrolled ways. The modernization of weapons systems should not be the result of blind technological imperatives. It should be subject to clear policy guidance, designed to ensure that new technology is applied in ways which enhance and strengthen, rather than undermine, international peace and security.

In both qualitative and quantitative aspects, there are two major and distinct dimensions: the development of new weapons systems as the result of new technological applications; and the dissemination to increasing numbers of countries and regions of ever more modern and sophisticated weapons systems, as well as the capability for their production.

In the Canadian view, any realistic and constructive assessment will need to take account of the following considerations, among others:

- Existing technologies cannot be disinvented, though their applications can be constrained in ways which enhance mutual security. (This is the central function of the existing arms control and disarmament process.)
- The boundary-line between military and non-military research cannot be clearly drawn, since many technologies can have both military and civilian applications.
- Militarily-relevant technological change cannot be halted or reversed but can be redirected by deliberate policy choices. Indeed, it is policy choices and intentions rather than the nature of the technologies themselves, which primarily determine the significance of weapons systems.
- While research under military auspices can produce results that have useful non-military applications, most experience suggests strongly that this is an inefficient way of obtaining non-military benefits (partly because security considerations impede the "migration" of research results to civilian applications). The disproportionate allocation of limited research resources to military-directed research can therefore involve the indirect cost of starving the civilian economy and society of badly-needed research resources.
- The unconstrained allocation of research resources to military purposes can contribute to an "arms race mentality" not only directly by accelerating the development of new weapons systems but also through reinforcing a perception of hostile intent.
- Finally, research under military auspices can contribute directly to the arms control and disarmament process through the development of technologies for the effective and economical verification of arms control agreements.

These factors suggest the desirability of ensuring more effective policy direction over the processes which will determine the kinds of weapons systems and defences which will become available in the future. A necessary first step in this area would involve greater openness and transparency in the area of military research. This special session could usefully consider the feasibility and potential utility of a reporting system within the framework of the United Nations whereby all States would be encouraged to file and make freely available information on their current and planned military research and development. The information could include an indication of the magnitude of that effort (expenditure, number of scientists involved) and its programme objectives. A potentially useful subcategory of these reports would be an indication of the research effort devoted to arms control verification. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs would be a logical repository for such reports.

Such a measure would be directed primarily towards qualitative aspects of military developments. The quantitative dimension is also important. In this connection, it is a matter for dismay that so few countries use the existing reporting matrix for filing information on their military expenditures. At a time when there appears to be rising understanding of the benefits for security and stability of increased openness on military matters, the special session should urge all countries to make use of this reporting mechanism which is already available to us. The open exchange of this information would be an invaluable confidence-building measure. There should also be further serious consideration, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, of the feasibility of an effective register of international arms transfers.

Future developments and trends in relation to weapons systems which already exist, particularly weapons of mass destruction, are also a matter for concern.

Nuclear arsenals, as they now exist, continue to be widely regarded as constituting the most serious threat to the future of mankind. The two leading nuclear Powers in their recent agreements seem at last to have taken the first step towards real nuclear disarmament. This amounts to an epochal turning-point in the arms control and disarmament process. The momentum of that process must be maintained.

Like many others here, Canada supports the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as a fundamental arms control objective. The First Special Session foresaw such a comprehensive test ban as having value "within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". Encouragingly, this logic has been reflected in the fact of the two leading nuclear Powers having entered into negotiations on nuclear-test limits simultaneously with their negotiation of agreements to eliminate or reduce certain nuclear-weapons systems. Participants at the Third Special Session should register their support for continuance of this step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban.

For many years, a central obstacle to a comprehensive test ban was doubt that such an agreement could be adequately verified. Under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament, much useful work has been done in defining and clarifying the verification requirements for a test ban. Ongoing technological developments, particularly in the area of seismic detection, have also greatly improved the prospects for effective verification. The Conference on Disarmament must continue this work and commence as soon as feasible the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear tests.

The process of nuclear-arms reductions which has now been initiated by the two leading nuclear Powers underlines the importance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five acknowledged nuclear Powers. The fact that several countries, including several reported to have acquired or to be seeking to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability, have neither adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor placed their nuclear programmes under international safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is cause for great concern. The Third Special Session should call on such States to take early action

to adhere to the NPT and to place their nuclear programmes under full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the Canadian view, such a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation ought to be a condition for nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States.

The instances of recent chemical weapons use reinforce the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive ban on these weapons. It is encouraging that in the past two years there has been significant progress in the negotiation of such a ban at the Conference on Disarmament. This is in many ways the most technically challenging multilateral arms control negotiation ever undertaken, involving extremely complex provisions for verification. The negotiators must press on with both deliberation and haste. A treaty with carefully defined, detailed verification provisions is important in its own right and also as a model for future multilateral arms control agreements. Care must also be taken to ensure that the Treaty, when implemented, will not inhibit the legitimate peaceful activities of chemical industries, including those in developing countries.

The ambivalent implications for future strategic stability of ongoing technological developments are posed especially dramatically in the area of outer space. The issue is sometimes misleadingly posed as one of preventing the "militarization" of outer space. As a matter of reality, many of the man-made objects now in outer space are there for military purposes and in full conformity with existing international law. The issue is not one of banning all military activity in outer space but one of ensuring that such military activities as occur there enhance strategic stability and international security.

Nevertheless, in light of technological developments over the past decade and the announced policies and research efforts of some Governments, a heightened concern about the potential for outer space becoming an arena for military rivalry is entirely legitimate. Some encouragement can be derived from the fact that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is an agreed negotiating objective of the two leading space Powers. Further, at the Conference on Disarmament, many of the difficult legal and technical issues involved are being clarified.

For the future, it is essential that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty remain in force as the central legal framework for activities in outer space. It may need to be supplemented by additional legal instruments. Continued strict compliance by the USA and USSR with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as signed is also in the international interest.

The international community ought not to overlook the possibilities for turning new technologies to the advantage of the arms control and disarmament process. Canada's own PAXSAT studies suggest a considerable potential for the application of space-based remote-sensing technologies to the verification of arms control agreements. Greater attention and work should be dedicated to exploring these possibilities.

By far the most devastating and harmful consequences of military actions in past decades have resulted from the development, deployment and use of conventional

weapons. Moreover, this burden has been disproportionately borne by populations in less developed countries. It is the most disadvantaged peoples who are suffering the most today - and UNSSOD III should not lose sight of this central fact.

It is in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well have the highest dividends. It is encouraging that the States of the two major military alliances, within the framework of the CSCE process, seem about to enter formal negotiations aimed at maintaining stability at lower levels of conventional armament in Europe. Other States should consider actively the possibilities for negotiated limitations and reductions of conventional arms at a regional level, on the basis of the undiminished security of all States and with full respect for the security interests and independence of States outside military alliances.

The 1987 Conference on Disarmament and Development was a landmark event in that it registered unequivocally a more sophisticated international understanding of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of security. More specifically, it was agreed that disarmament and development are two distinct processes, each of which contributes to enhanced security and in turn benefits from it. It is important that the autonomy of these processes be preserved. Canadian policies and programmes are based firmly on the view that disarmament and development must each be pursued in its own right.

The international arms control and disarmament process has witnessed growing acceptance that effective verification provisions are an essential element of arms control agreements. The insistence on adequate verification provisions is no longer automatically seen suspiciously as an "excuse" for failure to conclude agreements. Rather, it is acknowledged as the necessary means for attaining confidence in compliance. This in turn reflects an understanding that the need for assured compliance with agreements which touch directly on the vital security interests of States is fundamental.

The broadened acceptance of the legitimacy of the requirement for effective verification has been resoundingly registered in the recent work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. After concentrated work at two sessions, the Commission successfully "reported out" on this agenda item. Canada is particularly proud to have chaired the Working Group. The co-operative and reasoned approaches by countries from all regions and political groups was essential to this achievement.

We hope that this special session will readily agree on the desirability of giving its endorsement to the outcome by incorporating the agreed 16 verification principles into our concluding document.

The United Nations must play an effective role in the multilateral arms control process, including through developing a capacity to contribute to the effective verification of multilateral agreements. In this context, the recent work of the UNDC should be seen as only the first stage, not the conclusion of international co-operation within the United Nations framework on the development of effective multilateral verification arrangements.

Delegations will be aware of the paper (A/S-15/25) which has been jointly submitted by Canada and the Netherlands on this subject. It reflects our shared view not only on the potential importance of the United Nations in the multilateral verification process but also our strong belief that the United Nations role must be elaborated and developed with special care and deliberation. It is important that no steps be taken which might have the unintentional effect of inhibiting rather than facilitating the negotiation and conclusion of effective arms control agreements. All delegations are urged to examine carefully the thoughts set out in that paper. It is hoped this will lead to a consensus among us that an expert study of the type proposed in the paper should be one of the key recommendations of this special session. Such a step would have lasting importance for the multilateral arms control and disarmament process and the role of the United Nations in it.

It is increasingly recognized that levels of armament are more a symptom than a cause of the mistrust which prevails among numerous States, hence the attention to confidence-building measures as a means of diminishing levels of mistrust. The more traditional arms control measures direct themselves towards the constraint of military capabilities. Confidence-building measures go further by attempting to provide indications of military intent. This is truly a pioneering endeavour. What is involved here are such important principles as openness, transparency and predictability.

The conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement in 1986 was a landmark in the establishment of confidence-building measures as a major international device for reducing levels of mistrust among States. This agreement is being effectively implemented. Several inspections of military exercises have already been conducted with a high degree of success. This special session could usefully commend the members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe for their success in negotiating and implementing effective confidence- and security-building measures and urge that they be maintained and further developed. States in other regions could be encouraged to consider actively the negotiation and implementation of analogous measures.

The Stockholm Agreement has indeed built confidence. So too can UNSSOD III build confidence throughout the whole international community if we assess new trends and developments in an objective manner with the aim of ensuring that future developments will strengthen - not weaken - global security.



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Agenda item 13

CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

Working paper submitted by Canada

1. Experience suggests that participants to the debate on disarmament machinery fall roughly into two distinct "camps". One holds that the present organizational arrangements are sufficient and that only the exercise of political will is needed to make progress. A second approach suggests that, while there is some merit in the first position, prospects for meaningful progress would be enhanced if procedures were updated and streamlined so that the existing institutions could operate more effectively.

2. A section entitled, "Machinery" was included in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). It recognized, in paragraph 113, that

"In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament."

3. The subject of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament - including the matter of disarmament machinery - was raised in the General Assembly. In resolution 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, the Assembly requested the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its substantive session in 1985,

"to carry out as a matter of priority a comprehensive review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States on the subject."

4. The 1985 Canadian paper submitted to the Disarmament Commission suggested that the United Nations was overextending its limited resources and should, instead, aim at accomplishing successfully a few important tasks. After a discussion of detailed steps which could be taken, Canada listed six main recommendations:

- (1) A sharper focus on top priority issues;
- (2) Strong practical support for the disarmament efforts of the Disarmament Commission, the Secretariat and related United Nations bodies which would enhance the negotiating and deliberative processes and broader public knowledge of the issues;
- (3) The removal of the procedural obstacles to negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva;
- (4) A greater sensitizing of the Security Council to the arms control and disarmament problem in the context of the broad efforts to prevent the resort to force and to create the positive political atmosphere which is needed for negotiations on arms control and disarmament;
- (5) A further development of the Secretary-General's good offices as a contribution to preventive diplomacy;
- (6) Greater attention to dealing with the tensions and sensitivities in a regional context, such as to reduce the pressure for armaments.

These reasons are still valid.

5. During the past few years, succeeding chairmen of the First Committee have attempted to improve procedures. However many countries have persisted in an unwillingness to support a consensus to the effect that an improvement in disarmament machinery is desirable.

6. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/42 N, co-sponsored by Canada, entitled "Rationalization of the work of the First Committee", in which it called for the implementation at the forty-third session of the Assembly, in 1988, of a range of measures including:

- (a) A recommendation that procedural matters should be handled by decisions rather than resolutions;
- (b) Merging of similar resolutions;
- (c) Allocation of a specified period of time during the session for discussion and consultations;
- (d) Allocation of a specific period for general debate.

Canada strongly supports these and other measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of United Nations institutions.

7. With this background in mind, the Canadian delegation to the third special session devoted to disarmament presents the following measures for the consideration of Working Group III:

- (1) A reaffirmation of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament;
- (2) A determination not to allow administrative procedures to stand in the way of substantive progress;
- (3) An endorsement of the provisions of resolution 42/42 N and a recommendation that each succeeding chairman of the First Committee continue to hold consultations with a view to refining further practices and procedures of the committee;
- (4) Strengthening the ability of the Disarmament Commission to provide in-depth, analytical consideration of a limited number of issues;
- (5) The initiation, by the Department for Disarmament Affairs, of an orientation programme designed to promote and improve the understanding of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament by the community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this same connection, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Secretary-General should be encouraged to draw upon NGO disarmament expertise whenever possible;
- (6) The continued support of the Department for Disarmament Affairs at its current level of financing and staffing;
- (7) The recommendation that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts and making appropriate use of the capabilities of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in a consultant capacity, should undertake an in-depth study on the subject of the existing and possible activities of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements.



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UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING MEASURES TO MOBILIZE WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Canada

ORIENTATION PROGRAMME FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

In his address to the General Assembly on May 31, 1988 the UN Secretary-General called for more effective ways to reach the international public in order to encourage the public's participation in the arms control and disarmament process. Consistent with this view, Canada's intervention of June 7 to Working Group III of the Special Session on Disarmament proposed that the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) develop and operate orientation programmes for representatives of non-governmental organizations. The following is an elaboration of this proposal.

There appears to be a widespread feeling that there is a need for greater public education in, and recognition of, the processes which contribute to the effective functioning of the United Nations, and of the importance of strengthening international NGO collaboration through the UN system. Such an understanding of the UN and its disarmament efforts should be complemented with an introduction to disarmament fora and mechanisms outside the UN system, such as Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations, Conventional Stability talks, the Conference on Disarmament and USA-USSR bilateral negotiations. Regional approaches to disarmament and other major issues such as verification would also form part of the programme. Also covered should be other subjects such as types of weapons including nuclear, conventional and chemical. In this way, NGO representatives will be familiarized with the full spectrum of disarmament mechanisms in the international community.

The occasion of the Third Special Session devoted to Disarmament offers an ideal opportunity for the United Nations to initiate this orientation programme designed to promote and improve the NGO community's understanding of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of other disarmament fora. This programme would have three goals. The first would be to improve understanding of the UN's role in the field of disarmament. The second would be to gain a more indepth knowledge of arms control and disarmament mechanisms and issues which are addressed in non-UN fora. The third would be to familiarize NGO representatives with the work and procedures of their own national representatives to the United Nations.

A programme organized in this fashion would lend itself to a convenient division of labour between the Department of Disarmament Affairs and the participating missions in New York. The DDA would be responsible for developing and overseeing a series of seminars and workshops. Where appropriate, the DDA would draw upon expertise made available by Member States and by individual experts. The participating Member States would be responsible for developing the component of the programme which would orient the NGO representatives to the activities of their missions and policies of their states.

In order to convey an accurate flavour to the seminars and workshops on the UN, they should be held while the First Committee and United Nations Disarmament Commission are in session. The time spent at the UN should be at least one week, and no more than two. So that participants can become actively involved in the seminars and become acquainted with their colleagues in the programme, attendance should be limited to no more than thirty at a time. Two sessions of the programme could probably be conducted consecutively during UNGA and UNDC, involving a total of 120 participants annually.

This proposal emerges from the Canadian experience running a similar programme for Canadian NGO representatives. Since 1986, Canada has brought NGO representatives to New York in order to expose them to the work of the First Committee. The programme's duration is one week and is highlighted by the following events: attendance at First Committee meetings, briefings by UN Secretariat officials and presentations by officials of other Member States. To date, the response to the programme has been most positive, with the participants expressing the common sentiment that they have gained an enhanced appreciation of the UN and its work in the field of disarmament.

Canada views this proposal as an effective means of providing for the NGO community a first-hand educational exposure to the arms control and disarmament process. It will also foster an enhanced understanding of the UN role in disarmament and the part which is, and could be played by NGOs.

Of course, many details remain to be discussed and elaborated. To that end, Canada is ready to assist with the design and implementation of the programme.



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UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING MEASURES TO MOBILIZE WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Canada

Canada views discussion of this agenda item as important to the fostering of a constructive and fruitful dialogue on disarmament among and between the international public and their respective governments. Canada applauds the Secretary-General's reaffirmation of the importance of such activities as expressed in his address of May 31, 1988 to the UNSSOD III plenary. The following are specific proposals forwarded by Canada for consideration:

1. The Department for Disarmament Affairs should undertake to develop an NGO orientation programme designed to promote and improve the NGO community's understanding of the role of the United Nations and other fora in the field of disarmament.
2. In view of the commendable work being carried out by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the field of information and education, its budget and current staffing level must be maintained.
3. The World Disarmament Campaign has suffered from a lack of firm political and financial commitment from the international community. Canada challenges other Member States to make such a commitment at the Third Special Session. If such a commitment is not forthcoming, the Special Session should call for an assessment of the continuing viability of the WDC.
4. All states should be encouraged to appoint Ambassadors for Disarmament and to institute arms control and disarmament public consultation and information programmes.

5. The UN ought to take advantage of national governmental and non-governmental organization expertise in the planning and implementation of all UN disarmament activities.

The final document of UNSSOD I called upon Member states to expand their efforts in the field of research, education and the dissemination of information concerning disarmament. Canada has responded to this call on a number of fronts, and our experience over the past decade suggests the continuing value and long-term benefits to be gained from such an investment of time and resources. We gladly welcome the opportunity to hear and contribute to other constructive proposals on this agenda item.



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Agenda items 13 and 14

CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING MEASURES TO MOBILIZE WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF DISARMAMENT

Proposals by Canada

1. Canada welcomes the attention of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will give to questions of United Nations arms control and disarmament machinery, and information and educational activities. These issues cut to the core of the place of the United Nations in the overall arms control and disarmament process. For this reason, these questions must be approached with a view to ensuring a direct and useful role for the United Nations in disarmament. This continuing effort to engage the international community in the disarmament process will produce greater stability over the long term. Such a multilateral approach will ensure that the many, and not just the few, have an active interest, and an active role in disarmament. At the same time, we must expand our visions beyond exclusively United Nations-related bodies, as national and regional disarmament bodies could prove necessary and useful in the future. In the mean time, however, we must acknowledge that the United Nations disarmament machinery requires continual fine-tuning and adjustment. The recognition of the need to reassess the functioning of United Nations machinery from time to time indicates a positive approach on our part to the role machinery plays in the arms limitation and disarmament process.

2. In this context, Canada would like to call the attention of the Working Group to the procedures of the First Committee of the General Assembly. As indicated by Canada's co-sponsorship of resolution 42/42 N on the rationalization of the work of the First Committee, Canada sees room for meaningful improvements in the procedures

by which the Committee carries out its deliberations. The implementation of the recommendations put forth in resolution 42/42 N would substantially improve the General Assembly's ability to speak in a clear and strong voice on arms control and disarmament issues. Such a strong voice is necessary if the United Nations is to be at the forefront of multilateral arms control efforts, and to provide international support and guidance for bilateral or regional efforts. In addition, the third special session should recommend that each succeeding chairman of the First Committee make it a matter of custom to hold consultations with a view to refining procedures and practices of the Committee.

3. Of further assistance to the deliberations of the United Nations would be a strengthened United Nations Disarmament Commission. As an organ charged with the responsibility of considering and making recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament, it is important that the Commission be able to carry out its mandate in a thorough, timely fashion. It is true that the Commission frequently reflects the difficult and sometimes intractable nature of some arms control and disarmament issues. This reality, however, must not inhibit its ability to direct its expertise to areas where progress may be possible. To this end, Canada proposes that the third special session consider the following measures designed to focus and improve upon the ability of the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues before it:

(a) The imposition of time-limits on subjects which have appeared for a number of years without progress being made; or

(b) The placing of an item in temporary abeyance if agreement appears remote. This will allow efforts to be concentrated on other issues promising greater potential for success.

4. While the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission are examples of United Nations machinery in need of improvement, it sometimes happens that this machinery would make a valuable contribution to disarmament if only it were made use of. Such is the case with the reporting instrument for military budgets adopted by the General Assembly in 1980. Canada has consistently reported its military budgets through this instrument, but is only one of too few Member States to do so. A firm commitment by all States at the special session to report their military budgets through the standardized international reporting instrument would instill confidence, and indicate clearly to the international community that Member States are willing to accept the principle of transparency as an important first step towards the reduction of military expenditures.

5. Canada attaches high priority to the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral forum which has significant potential to achieve real progress in the field of disarmament. We encourage the continuing negotiations taking place at the Conference and would seek to have their importance recognized by the special session.

6. The growing international consensus that adequate and appropriate verification is essential to successful arms control and disarmament agreements is an encouraging development, especially since it confirms the role accorded to verification by the Final Document of the first special session devoted to

importance of multilateralism to the disarmament process, yet is keenly aware that multilateralism carries with it a particular burden of responsibility. It is Canada's desire that this Working Group and this special session will convince all who might doubt the relevance of multilateral approaches to disarmament.

12. Of great importance to making advances in disarmament is an informed and educated public. This was recognized by both previous special sessions devoted to disarmament and the Government of Canada strongly endorses this conviction and believes it should be reaffirmed by the third special session.

13. The General Assembly at its first special session called upon Member States to expand their efforts in the field of research, education and the dissemination of information. The Government of Canada has pursued this call in a vigorous and concrete fashion, with the aim of improving the dialogue between Canadians and their Government. We believe the Canadian experience in this area is useful to recall:

(1) In August 1978, Canada created the position of Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs to demonstrate that Canada was serious in its intention to follow up the recommendations of the first special session. In 1980, the Adviser's position evolved into that of Ambassador for Disarmament, which was established to represent Canada at international arms control and disarmament conferences, and to serve as the principal point of contact between the Government and the community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

(2) In 1979, a consultative group was established, comprised of private individuals, NGO representatives and members of the academic community. The Consultative Group, under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, meets regularly with Canadian government officials to exchange views on matters of arms control and disarmament and offer recommendations.

(3) In 1980, the Disarmament Fund was established by the Department of External Affairs to assist Canadians seeking to contribute to the discussion of disarmament issues. The Fund has distributed over \$1.7 million to date to interested Canadians to hold conferences, carry out research and engage in other such activities.

(4) In 1984, the Parliament of Canada created the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Currently funded at a level of \$5 million per annum, the Institute seeks to increase knowledge and understanding of international peace and security issues from a Canadian perspective.

14. These measures, and others, reflect Canada's deep commitment to public awareness of, and participation in, disarmament issues. For this reason, Canada attaches considerable importance to similar efforts undertaken by the United Nations Secretariat.

15. From the beginning, Canada has been a strong supporter of the World Disarmament Campaign. In fact, since its inception, \$400,000 has been contributed by Canada (making it a leading financial supporter). The Canadian contribution at

the 1986/87 Pledging Conference represented 10 per cent of the total pledged. Of 55 delegations at that Conference, however, only 13 made pledges. This reflects the less than enthusiastic response of the international community to the Campaign. In light of this, Canada challenges other Member States to state definitively their position on the World Disarmament Campaign. For the Campaign to succeed, a clear statement of political and financial support is required. If that support exists, Canada will continue to help make the Campaign successful. If that support is not forthcoming, Canada believes the special session should call for an assessment of the continuing viability of the World Disarmament Campaign.

16. With respect to the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Canada seeks a strengthened role for the Department. We feel the Department should be enabled to do more, e.g., developing and operating orientation programmes for NGO representatives. These programmes would serve to improve NGO understanding of the functioning of the United Nations and its role in disarmament. The Canadian practice of sending NGO representatives to the First Committee and the special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament could be taken as an example of an approach to such an orientation programme. In the mean time, the Government of Canada will actively consider developing further programmes of the same type for the Canadian NGO community. The results and experience of these Canadian programmes will be shared with the international community in the hope that these programmes may have applications elsewhere. This proposal meets the appeal made by the Secretary-General in his address, on 31 May, to the opening meeting of the third special session:

"... for public opinion truly to have an impact on (the disarmament) process, more effective ways have to be found to reach those in the education and scientific community, the media, the arts and other walks of life so as to encourage their participation in this vitally important endeavour." (See A/S-15/PV.1.)

17. As its proposals indicate, Canada is firmly committed to a United Nations whose machinery and programmes effectively promote the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Progress towards this goal will require a realistic and dedicated approach which recognizes both the potential and the limitations of the United Nations. With the growing recognition that the security of the few cannot be had at the expense of the security of the many, we are confident that it will be the potential of the United Nations which is expressed by this Working Group, and not its limitations.



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FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda item 12

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, INCLUDING QUALITATIVE
AND QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, RELEVANT TO THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS,
WITH A VIEW TO THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE CONCRETE AND
PRACTICAL MEASURES AND, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES,
TAKING DULY INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
ESTABLISHED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Australia, Canada and New Zealand

Advancement of women in the disarmament process

1. The participation of women in the activities of the United Nations, including in the Professional category of the Secretariat, has been a matter of concern to Member States for many years. Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates as the "paramount consideration" in the employment of staff the "highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity". Due regard is also to be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. No discrimination is made in the employment provisions of the Charter between men and women. Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter, however, identifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
2. The objective of increasing the participation of women in the process of peace and disarmament has been affirmed by Member States a number of times in recent years. The 1982 Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Co-operation stated as follows (resolution 37/63, annex, part I, article 5):

Special national and international measures are necessary to increase the level of women's participation in the sphere of international relations so that women can contribute, on an equal basis with men, to national and international efforts to secure world peace ...

The 1985 Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women state, inter alia:

Universal and durable peace cannot be attained without the full and equal participation of women in international relations, particularly in decision-making concerning peace ... 1/

3. Member States of the United Nations are themselves devoting efforts to advancing the participation of women in their national societies. There is thus a correlation in the efforts of the national and international communities in moving towards the above objective.

4. The Department for Disarmament Affairs has done well in moving toward this objective. It currently has 10 out of 31 Professional positions filled by women. The Department has earned a sound reputation for the high professional quality of its work. A greater proportion of women are employed in the central services work of the Department. It is clear that the contribution of women to the cause of promoting international peace and disarmament through the Department's activities is already considerable. This third special session devoted to disarmament should commend the Department for its achievements in the disarmament process and in advancing the participation of women in United Nations activities.

5. One of the major components of the United Nations activities in disarmament is the World Disarmament Campaign. While the Campaign is working well towards accomplishing its objectives, there is scope for intensified effort to increase the participation of women in its activities.

6. The special session provides a useful opportunity to give further impetus to the objective of advancing the participation of women in the process of peace and disarmament. Consistent with the judgements and objectives of the 1982 Declaration and the 1985 Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies, it is proposed that the General Assembly call for the following:

(a) Department for Disarmament Affairs

While noting with satisfaction the positive trends in the Department with respect to the employment of women at the Professional level, to encourage the Secretary-General to intensify efforts to employ appropriately qualified women, including at senior Professional levels, in accordance with measures being undertaken to promote the advancement of women within the Secretariat;

(b) World Disarmament Campaign

(i) To invite the Secretary-General, in organizing the programmes of the World Disarmament Campaign, to place increased emphasis on the participation of women in meetings, speaking engagements and expert panels;

- (ii) To ensure the inclusion of women members when focusing on the five major constituencies on which the campaign is currently targeted (non-governmental organizations, electoral representatives, the media, educational communities and research institutes), including in the preparation of material;


(c) Other agencies

To encourage other agencies such as the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs (Branch for the Advancement of Women), the United Nations University and the University of Peace to undertake activities that will further involve women in education for peace and disarmament.

Notes

1/ Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IV.10), chap. III, sect. A, para. 235.

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