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

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
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
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THE
NAVAL POLICY
OF THE
BORDEN GOVERNMENT

SPEECH DELIVERED BY
HON. GEORGE E. FOSTER,
MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE
IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

DECEMBER 18, 1912.

THE NAVAL POLICY
OF THE
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DECEMBER 18, 1912.

Hon. GEORGE E. FOSTER (Minister of Trade and Commerce): Mr. Speaker, Canadians have, in their different legislatures and halls of debate considered many important and grave questions. The questions of responsible government, of Confederation, of industrial policy, and the great questions and problems of transportation have from time to time been under discussion in this Parliament. But I doubt if there has been any question during the whole history of legislation in what is now the Dominion of Canada which has been quite as important and freighted with quite as great results and consequences as the one we are now discussing in this House. It is not wonderful that the question now being debated has not made its appearance earlier; nor is it wonderful that, after it has made its appearance, it should increase in intensity and grow in volume, and become more urgent in its insistence upon an answer that shall be adequate and complete. It is not wonderful, I say, for in the last one hundred years peace has continuously blessed this country on its borders, and, with three exceptions, within its borders. Our people have been very busy carving out homes for themselves, exploring and connecting up the immense territory which is their heritage, finding out and trying to utilize the

most evident of its great resources, and in different ways laying the foundations of a young and strong nationality. It is not wonderful, therefore, that, engaged, absorbed in these occupations, with peace during the whole period, and protected by the army and the fleet of the mother country almost unconsciously to themselves, the question did not sooner spring into life and activity.

But, although most Canadians felt little their obligations, and seemed to prize still less the blessings under which they were living and working, there were always some, and of late an increasing number, who were conscious of obligations that had not been fulfilled, and of the exceedingly precious privileges which they were enjoying by the sacrifices of centuries, sacrifices which extended into the periods of their own lives, sacrifices not by themselves, but by the founders and the fathers of this great country and of the overseas possessions. And those who were conscious of those obligations gradually gave voice to the feeling within them. They communicated their feeling to their friends, and so the circle gradually widened until at last it found its way into the halls of legislature and into this Parliament. Once having found its way there, the question remains there to be solved, and it will stay there until it is solved aright.

It has not only vexed and troubled Canada, but it has also had its mission and its course in the sister colonies. Colony after colony, a little in advance of us, has taken up the question and has carried it more or less to successful conclusions. But the matter has gone farther. It has gone up from the halls of colonial legislatures into Imperial conferences, and it has made its way through the media of these Imperial conferences until it has reached the highest circles of political influence and political control in the course of its solution. To-day it occupies the attention of the best statesmen in the Mother Country and of the best statesmen and the most thoughtful citizens in every one of the colonies in the great Empire to which we belong.

In 1887, at the Imperial conference, there was a hesitant

beginning of things. In 1902 there was a further step taken, in 1907 a greater stride was made, but neither in 1887, nor in 1902, nor in 1907, was Canada in step or in stride with her sister colonies in the Empire. The session of 1909 brought the matter in an abstract form into this House, and, to a certain extent, in an abstract way, settled certain principles and settled them, I think, for all time. That was succeeded by the Imperial conference of 1909, in which still further progress was made. Then came the Bill which passed this House, known as the Canadian Naval Service Act. Then came the dissolution of this House, a change of parties and a change, in some respects, in the policy in reference to defence.

A Glance at the Past.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1902.

It will not be out of place for me at this stage to make a very brief, and, I hope, a quite impartial survey of the past history of the Empire defence problem in Canada, going back no farther than the 1902 conference. The result of this conference was a step forward by Cape Colony, which increased her contribution from £30,000 to £50,000 yearly; by Australia, which increased her contribution from £100,000 to £200,000 yearly; by Natal, which increased her contribution from £12,000 to £35,000 annually; by New Zealand from £20,000 to £40,000 annually, and by Newfoundland from £3,000 to £4,800 annually. But in that conference, Canada, never before having made a contribution, still persisted in her refusal. The position that she took was briefly this, that while she felt the obligation to do something for the defence of her own shores, she had hitherto done nothing except by way of perfecting, to a certain extent, her militia. At that conference she refused to go fur-

ther in reference to the utilization of a portion of the militia for Imperial purposes, but she promised, through the mouths of her representatives, that she would take up the question of naval defence in so far as respected the formation of Canadian naval cadets. 1902 passed on to 1907, but the promise that was made in 1902 by Canada in reference to the Canadian cadet service was not implemented in any form.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907.

Then came the conference of 1907. My right hon. friend the leader of the Opposition (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) remembers this as also the preceding conference, for he was present at both. The representatives were met as usual, by the statements of the Prime Minister and of the First Lord of the Admiralty. These were not begging for help as they had not been in 1902. England never has, England never will beg either her colonies or others for help, but the fact that she has not done so and will not do so is not to be taken as an excuse for not helping. It is in fact the strongest appeal that can be made to honest, loyal hearts for help. They were given a statement of the present position and it was placed up to the delegates of that Imperial conference to consider the matter and, if they thought they would like to help, to state how far that help could go. What happened? The South African states continued their contribution at £85,000 per year; Australia continued hers at £200,000 per year and undertook home duties in addition; New Zealand continued her contribution, raising it from £40,000 to £100,000 per year. When it came to Canada's turn to speak she spoke through the mouth of her Minister of Marine and Fisheries and from his lips—I am not overstating it—there came not one sound, not one syllable of either grateful and appreciative estimate of what Great Britain had done for Canada or of promise as to what Canada would do in the future. There came only the words of apology and the note of misrepresentation—the words of apology—that Canada could do nothing because she was operating a fisheries protection service

which was fairly hurdensome; she was instituting wireless stations which cost money; she was watching with eagle eye the development of the United States fleet on the lakes and feeling about as to what was necessary to protect Canada from menace and danger from that source. It was stated, which was not true, that she had made a beginning in instituting a naval cadet service. That was all Canada had to say at the conference of 1907, except that when near the close of the conference Mr. Smart moved his resolution tending to go so far at least as to pass a unanimous expression of opinion that in whatever way the legislature of any overseas dominion or state should think it well to assist by contribution, or by local defence, or in any way it pleased, they should at least come to a unanimous decision that they would all do something on these lines. Canada through the mouth of her Prime Minister, said: No, we will not pledge ourselves, we do not propose to be led away from the exercise of our proper autonomy and responsibilities at home; we do not intend to throw ourselves into the maelstrom of European conflict.

CANADIAN RESOLUTION OF 1909.

Then came the resolution of 1909, and the resolution of 1909 as it passed this Parliament affirmed certain principles. It affirmed that it was becoming more and more the duty of Canada, as she increased in population and wealth, to assume some of the duties of national defence; it affirmed that regular and periodical contributions were not, as a system, the most satisfactory solution of the problem of defence; it declared that the speedy organization of a Canadian service, in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along lines suggested by the Admiralty, was the best method for strengthening the naval supremacy of the Empire; it declared that whenever need arises—and I would like the House to keep that word in mind—that whenever need arises Canada would make any sacrifice to co-operate with the Imperial authorities in every movement to maintain the integrity and the honour

of the Empire. But, that was not the form in which the original resolution came before this House; that was not the form of the amendment which my Right Hon. friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) then the leader of the Government moved. That was a resolution which was the result of concessions on both sides for the laudable purpose, without giving away any principle, of presenting to the country, to the Empire, and to the world, a unanimous voice from this Parliament.

It has been suggested that gentlemen who voted for that resolution in 1909 are inconsistent now when they support the proposition of the Government as placed before the House, in that, the resolution cut out temporary or occasional contributions, and, in that, it declared that the policy was to build a Canadian naval service, and that the present policy of the Government contravenes both of those, and therefore that gentlemen who support the policy submitted to-day are inconsistent as compared with their action in 1909. The amendment which my Right Hon. friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) moved had in it the words: 'The payment of any stated contribution;' these words were excised and the words that were put in were 'regular and periodical contributions,' differentiating absolutely between the time of need, the period of emergency, and the settled and normal policy which should rule. If that is borne in mind all alleged inconsistency disappears and the argument founded upon it falls to the ground. Is more proof needed? My Right Hon. friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) voted for that resolution as it appears in our journals, but the other day my Right Hon. friend got up in this House and said: If there were an emergency, and I believed in that emergency, I would vote \$35,000,000; yes, four times \$35,000,000 as an emergency contribution. How could he, and be consistent, if that resolution forbids the vote of money for urgent need?

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1909.

Then came the Imperial conference of 1909. At that Imperial conference its delegates from the different overseas

dominions were met as before in exactly the same cordial, manly, British way. There was no suppliance, there was no plea for help; the circumstances of the Empire were laid before them; they were asked to consider these circumstances and to act as each thought best. But the Admiralty at that time, with the concurrence of the British Government, made a statement before the members of that Imperial conference. They outlined different methods of aid. They said that strategically considered the most effective aid that could be given was contribution of money from the overseas dominions placed in the hands of the old, the experienced Admiralty and naval authorities of Great Britain, with a thousand years of naval tradition behind them and hundreds of years accumulation of the best experience and naval science that the world could produce. They said: "If you will do that it will be the most effective way of making the Imperial fleet effective; but we know there are objections in the overseas dominions to this and, leaving that aside, the next most effective thing to do is to build naval units. And they insisted as an absolute condition with reference to the different naval units that the various overseas dominions might build—because they felt that maybe insistence would be placed on local control—that there should be one single indivisible control when war and danger and peril came. The British government made a most generous and most effective proposition. They said: If Australia would build a unit and if New Zealand would do her part as she promised to do, Great Britain would add what was necessary to make up New Zealand's unit and also assist in making up a unit for China and India. Then, if Canada would add her unit, these four units—comprising fifty-four vessels, headed by four great fighting machines—would be allotted to the unprotected Pacific coast and thus aid the Imperial fleet to the greatest possible extent.

What happened? Australia said: Yes, we will do that. And they pledged themselves, there and then, to build, and, after they had built, to maintain their unit, and during the time that that unit was building, to keep up their contribution

of £200,000 per year. New Zealand said: Yes, we will give a dreadnought, and we agree to the conditions. Great Britain was an assenting party to the other unit. What did Canada say? Canada said: We cannot do any such thing; we will not do any such thing. Mr. Speaker, to my mind the opportunity was lost then of doing the biggest, the grandest, the most effective thing that up to that period could have been done—perhaps such an opportunity may not recur for many years—for the aid of British supremacy by sea, and for the protection and security of the hundreds of millions of people who live within the Empire. Then, said the Admiralty, if you are bent on having your local fleet, and will not join the others in common action, please build nothing less than a unit, for nothing less than a unit would be effective. Canada refused to build a unit. She went to the Admiralty and said: We can expend only £400,000 per year, or maybe £600,000 per year; tell us what is most effective that can be got for that amount of money, and we will consider it. The Admiralty told them. They took a part of the advice, and came back and instituted the policy of building four cruisers and six torpedoes, without a leading or dreadnought vessel—and so, short of the unit—and dividing that ineffective force between the east and west coasts of Canada; many thousands of miles separated from each other.

That was the result of the conference of 1909, and the Naval Service Bill embodied that result in legislation in 1910.

THE MEAGRE RESULTS.

This Act of 1910 went into force, and we are all acquainted with what has been done under it. It is not necessary for me to recount that part of the history. Suffice it to say that two old vessels were bought, the Rainbow and the Nicble. They were filled with men who were not Canadians, hired by Canadian money. They have been on the coasts of Canada for now nearly two years. During that time not a Canadian has yet qualified to take service in these vessels. The number

was not then, and is not now, by any means the full complement of the two vessels. It is about the same now—after some 271 desertions in that time—as it was when they came over to Canada. Nineteen young men have been passed in one year through the naval college and are now being examined for midshipmen. Ten more are in the college at this date, and it is hoped that ten additional, making twenty in all, will be in the college on the 1st of January, 1913. Meanwhile, we have paid one and a third millions of good Canadian dollars as capital expense, and we have paid out seven hundred and eighty-eight thousands for upkeep. You have paid the money; you have the result; and you have the right to ask yourselves what has this contributed to the defence of the Empire, and how long would it be under such methods and circumstances, before twenty-six war ships could be manned by properly qualified Canadian seamen?

THE POSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

Following that policy, as carried out by hon. gentlemen opposite, came the change of Government. New men came in with some new ideas as to what should be the proper attitude for this country in the matter of naval defence. What is that policy? First, let me say this: The present leader of the Government when in opposition was asked what he would do if he were in power, and he made a statement as to what he would do, dividing it into two parts.

AS TO TEMPORARY AID.

First, he would find out as early as it was possible to do what were the present conditions and needs; and he would go to headquarters to find that out. He would not lie on the broad of his back and cogitate what was necessary, depending for information either on his party bias or on his imagination—he would go to headquarters, where alone that information could be got. And, if, after examination, he came to the conclusion that it was necessary that some quick and effective aid

should be given, he would come down to the House and recommend a money vote for that purpose. There has been no variability, neither shadow of turning in that respect, so far as the leader of this Government, is concerned.

AS TO PERMANENT POLICY.

His second course of action, as outlined, was this. That, in the meantime, as regards the permanent defence policy of this country—and I want my hon. friends to remember these two divisions and these two words, because they are inclined, in the ardour of debate, to shove one entirely out of view and to exalt the other as the only part of our policy—he would take it into most careful consideration. And he said he would link with it one other question, the importance of which and the necessity of settling which no man on that side of the House will deny, that is, if we are to embark upon a permanent policy of naval support for the supremacy of the Empire, some voice must be given to Canada as regards matters leading thereto, questions, that is, as to the foreign policy of the Empire. Does my Right Hon. friend disagree with that second condition? He has subscribed to it in this House; he is on record as subscribing to it, and I will produce that subscription and lay it before the House in the course of my remarks. The leader of the Opposition outlined a policy one part of which might result in a temporary contribution, and another part in a permanent plan being agreed upon, mutually co-operative and most effective, because it would be the result of careful inquiry and of the intermingling of mutual wisdom and counsel.

THE POSITION REAFFIRMED.

The late Administration went out of office, and my Right Hon. friend formed a Government. When asked in the House what he proposed to do in reference to the policy of naval defence, he made exactly the same answer as he had made

when leader of the Opposition. He said: I propose to go to Great Britain and ascertain, as nearly as I can, the exact state of affairs. If I find that there is a need or necessity, I will come back and ask this House for a money vote to meet that need. Then I will take up the question of permanent policy and thoroughly look into it. I will formulate that policy; but before it is made effective I will not let it lie in the mouth of any man to say that it passed the House, but that the country was not in favour of it. I will not let it lie in the mouth of any outside the Empire to say we got a vote through Parliament, but the people were not in favour of it. I will take that mature and permanent policy; I will lay it before the people, and if it is carried it will be Canada's policy, without question or without doubt.

THE PROMISE FULFILLED.

And has that been done? The answer is plainly written in the late history of Canada. My Right Hon. friend and members of his Cabinet went to Great Britain. They spent two months there, and they were not idle. They saw the officers and Lords of the Admiralty, the Premier and Cabinet of Britain, and the secret knowledge of the policy and condition of the Empire were laid before them. They not only had statistics and figures and expert advice, but, what is still more valuable, they drank in the atmosphere surrounding men whose whole lives and purpose were devoted to the grave problems of Empire, its conditions and the conditions of other countries, which is more valuable than dry statements or tabulated figures. After going through this process, my Right Hon. friend came to the conclusion that **there was a danger; that there was a need for immediate and effective help.** He came back to this Parliament and laid before it all the proofs possible, and gave to the House his own conviction as leader of the Government. He could not lay more before the House, because it is not permitted; but let no man run away with the idea that the statements contained in the memorandum of the Lords of the Admiralty which has been pre-

pared for publication, was all, or even the most important part, of the information obtained. But, Sir, from the memorandum of the British Government, and from these deeper and more intimate sources of information, he forms his own conclusions and says to this House and to the country: There is a need, and it is pressing. I recommend immediate and effective aid in the face of that need, and I do this knowing well the trust that is committed to me. I hold a little more than Canada's welfare in that trust; I hold some part of the welfare of the Empire. Whatever men say or whatever men may do, the destinies of Canada are absolutely and irrevocably bound up with the destinies of the Empire. On my knowledge as given to you, on my knowledge as possessed but which cannot be disclosed, in pursuance of the sacred trust of a privy councillor and the leader of the Government of the country, I ask Parliament to pass this vote. Has he been consistent? Has he been courageous? Has he been weighing small things in the balance, holding up the straw to see which way the wind is blowing; waving a feather to find if there is the slightest ruffle of political breezes? He marched straight to his object; he got the information, he hands the result to this Parliament and the country, and I have no doubt that this Parliament and the country will accept his version and will pass this measure.

Such then has been the policy and action of the present Government. Let me now, however, call attention to the fact that whether designedly or not, there is a disposition, upon which many individuals have already acted, to declare to the country that there is only one branch to the government's defence policy; and that is the branch of contribution; that a permanent policy has been thrown to the winds, and there is to be no Canadian naval service. This is an absolute misstatement of the Government policy.

When this measure is brought before the House, what do we find? We find hon. gentlemen opposite, as indeed is their absolute right, criticising it. We would not bring it before this House if we did not expect and invite criticism. It is

the absolute right, as well as the absolute duty, of any hon. member of this House to criticise a policy brought down and to amend it or to show wherein it can be amended, if this can be done in a fair and reasonable way. But it is also open to members on this side of the House and to the people of the country to sift and examine the objections which are made to this policy.

LIBERALS FORCED TO TAKE ADVANCED GROUND.

One effect is already apparent, a very grateful effect, and if it prove to be a permanent effect, one which is sufficient to justify the policy even though nothing else results from it. What is it? It is the forced abandonment of false positions and wrong opinions hitherto held by my Right Hon. friend and those who follow him. It is the elimination by the Right Hon. gentleman and those behind him of errors which they have tenaciously held for the last fifty years. Let me enumerate some of them.

BRITISH ALLEGIANCE SETTLED.

This policy has had the effect of eliciting from my Right Hon. friend an expression something like this:

We are British subjects, we do not want to be anything else; and that settles the whole question.

Thank Heaven. The time was when I listened to other sentiments than that. I am glad they were only vagaries of a more youthful period, the wild oats sown by disappointed men wandering in opposition. But from this time out the sentiment is not to be independence, or young nations in alliance with Britain. We are British subjects,—that and always that. The whole question is forever settled.

DELAYS ARE DANGEROUS.

Another statement that this policy has elicited from my right hon. friend is:

When increased armaments are going on we cannot afford to be idle and rest upon our own security.

My right hon. friend uttered a great truth in that pregnant statement, but, Sir, from 1902 until 1912 he neither uttered nor acted upon that sentiment. My right hon. friend said the other day that he knew every fact and figure that we know to-day—four years ago he knew it. During the last ten years a navy which, ten years ago, was absolutely negligible, has become the second great navy of the world, and that navy is within twelve hours' steaming distance of Great Britain. My Right Hon. friend knew all those years of these increasing armaments and vast works, and launched dreadnoughts, and all the scientific improvements which make a machine terrible in naval warfare. He knew it, he had the facts, he had the figures, but, Sir, he gave no hint, he uttered no words, he did nothing. I am glad that the issuance of this new policy has brought him to his senses in that respect.

Then my right hon. friend the other day, in this House and in the face of his ex-Minister of Militia and Defence, denounced the Monroe Doctrine, and declared that we could not lean upon it in self-respect or in security. Thank Heaven, another mist has been cleared away.

INDEPENDENCE REPUDIATED.

My right hon. friend said:

Any thought of separation from Britain would be a folly and a crime.

Any thought of it? Go back to the market places of Boston and the New England States and not many years ago you saw there a figure, picturesque, younger than as we now see it, standing up in the market places and declaring that things could not go on as they were, that independence was the goal of Canada and that his only cherished hope was that when it came it might come without a wrench of birth, it might fall as the ripe apple from the tree. Gone are those haunting nightmares forever. Now any sort of separation would be a folly and a crime. Thank our policy for that conversion.

A HERESY RENOUNCED.

My right hon. friend absolutely refused one unit in 1909 when so advised by the Admiralty. In 1910, when it was not a proposition by the British Government or Admiralty, but was a matter for this House, he again refused it and substituted his four cruisers and his six torpedo boat destroyers. Now he is in favour of two units—i.e., two dreadnaughts and their complements, or 26 warships in all. Speculation is permissible as to why two units. Speculation is very soon satisfied when you think of the party prescience and wisdom of my right hon. friend. He had four cruisers and six torpedo boat destroyers, but the division of these between the two coasts would be such a small plateful that he was afraid neither would be grateful for the donation. Make it two units and give each a loaded basket. But I am happy to think that at last, under the pressure of this Bill, my right hon. friend stands to a certain extent with us on this side of the House and has pledged every man of his on that side that something will be done and that the adequacy of that something is not to be measured by four cruisers and six torpedo boat destroyers, but by something far larger.

But, giving my right hon. friend credit for all those things, let me proceed now to what is not so grateful, a criticism of some points that he took up in objection. I am sure my right hon. friend does not object to criticism. He deals it out fully and unsparingly and he is willing to take it in the same fashion and measure.

SOME RHETORICAL WANDERINGS.

But before I go to his objections I want to ask my right hon. friend what he had in mind in that little verbal, rhetorical, argumentative excursion that he took before he came to mention his objections to the Bill. What were they? He declared that some one in Quebec said we owed nothing to England. Well, did he think it worth while discussing that himself? Why

did he think it worth while, in discussing the policy of this Bill, to bring that in? Does anybody here say so? Does anyone on this side of the House, does any party say so? Does it particularly matter what some un-named individual says, outside this House?

An hon. MEMBER: Rot.

Mr. FOSTER: Rot, certainly rot. He took occasion to go back to the United States civil war, and, in this serious argument, to declare that someone said that we owe England nothing, because she did not intervene in the civil war in the United States and champion the cause of the South. He launched into a very eloquent rhetorical period or two as to why that could not and should not have been done. What relation had that to the matter before the House? Why did he take it up? Why? I cannot find a reason for it. Then he said that some declared that we owe England nothing because of her blundering ruinous diplomacy with reference to this country. One ear is a little dull, but I thought I gathered the sound, and I became sure afterwards in looking at 'Hansard' that I had. 'Some one said that we owe England nothing because of her blundering and ruinous diplomacy as regards Canada.' I remember one man who said that, my Right Hon. friend himself. I am glad again that he has found new light,—

Mr. MACDONALD: Don't you remember another, your former colleague, Mr. Monk?

Mr. FOSTER: I remember many other things, but if I were to unburden on this House all that I remember, the House would weary of it. So the best I can do is to cull the choicest hits.

Now, in the objections that have been made by the other side, there have been many voices; but, after all, the utterances have been along comparatively few lines, and I think I can answer my right hon. friend and several others who have spoken on the other side of the House, without mentioning names, and without taking up time with each one.

"NEED," NOT "EMERGENCY."

But I want to ask the House to consider one thing. You use, and we use the word 'emergency.' Where did we get it? It does not appear in the resolution passed by the House. The word is not 'emergency' the word is 'need'—n-e-e-d. Whenever the need arises it is the duty of this House, and of Canada, to do whatever is possible to be done to maintain the integrity and honour of the Empire. We have narrowed, and wrongfully narrowed the question by substituting the word 'emergency,' and arguing with reference to that. What is an emergency? An emergency may be the flash of lightning which precedes destruction and death by but a moment. It may be the sound of cannon which heralds a declaration of war made overnight and when the cannon are searching close for your positions. But it may mean something different. It may mean a condition which has developed because of the grouping of powers, the promulgation of new laws with reference to armies and navies. It may mean many things. But we are quit of all discussion on that when we keep to the word in the resolution, the word 'need,' and whenever the need is demonstrated we have the right and the power to act. Who is to be the judge of the need? There you come up against a practical question.

"THERE IS NO EMERGENCY, NO DANGER."

My Right Hon. friend, the leader of the Opposition says there is no need, no emergency, no present or prospective danger. He says that. My Right Hon. friend the Prime Minister says there is a need, there is danger. There is apprehension; and to do Canada's part to relieve that I bring down this measure. Who has the right *prima facie* to be believed? Sitting with the members of the British Government, who are charged with the mighty possibilities of this great Empire, day after day counselling with them on the secret and intimate conditions that prevail, fortified by them in a memorandum which is one of the strongest that has ever been presented to

any house of parliament, and backed by the conviction of duty inspired in one who for the time being is the responsible leader of this country, the Prime Minister, reaches one conclusion.

Another gentleman who did not sit down with those ministers, who has not of late been in that intimate circle, who has not had the information and the means of knowledge of my Right Hon. friend the Prime Minister pronounces an opposite opinion. He states that four year ago he knew every fact and figure in that memorandum, but he must, I think, revise that statement when he remembers that in four years much has happened; and one thing that has happened has been the German fleet law of 1912, with its deep significance, its suggestions of perils, its terrible addition of striking force to a fleet already most formidable. So I say, *prima facie*, the people of this country will, I think, follow the judgment of my Right Hon. friend on this side of the House rather than the assertion of my Right Hon. friend on the other side.

A POLICY DUE TO THE NATIONALISTS.

My right hon. friend says further that this policy is a hybrid, bred of Tory jingoism and Nationalism. They have been together, and this is the result. I am puzzled. Suppose it was, does it make much matter if the rich fruit on the tree comes from one soil or another, is tended by one gardener or another, or by two, provided that the apple itself, in its flavour and quality, is all right? Had not my right hon. friend better savour the apple instead of chemically, or otherwise, analyzing the soils out of which it has sprung? But, I am puzzled besides. He says that this is the result of an unholy alliance between the Tories and the Nationalists. Well, I come back to his speech, and what does he say? He says that immediately the resolution of 1909 was passed dissension broke out in the Liberal-Conservative party; there were two sections, one section wanted a contribution only and no Canadian navy, the other section wanted neither contribution nor navy. If there

was a choice at all, the latter was for the Canadian service, while it utterly abhorred the contribution. If then this policy is the result of an unholy alliance between the Nationalists and the Liberal-Conservatives, after which parent does the child take its traits? Here is a measure which enacts contribution; the Nationalist damns contribution, will have none of it. How then does the right hon. gentleman argue it out that Nationalism has been triumphant when the very thing that the Nationalist abhors is embedded in the Bill and the only thing that he might look upon with favour—a Canadian service—is not included in the Bill? If that is so, whatever the antecedents may have been, the Nationalist did not prevail. So much is certain.

· WHAT THE DOCUMENT SHOWS.

My right hon. friend then goes on to say that the document shows that there is no emergency, that England is in no danger, immediate or prospective. Quoting from his own speech, he says the document shows that:

As a result of the armaments which are now going on in Europe, England has been obliged to increase the margin of security which she relies on for her own defence, by reducing her naval forces in the outlying seas. Such is the condition.

I take issue with my right hon. friend. I beg to say to him that the document discloses more than that, that his is not a full statement of what the document does disclose. Let us analyze the document. Criticism was directed, if not by my right hon. friend, then by some hon. gentleman on that side of the House, to the first clause of the document:

The Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada had invited His Majesty's Government through the Board of Admiralty to prepare a statement of the present and immediately prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire for presentation to the Canadian Parliament if the Dominion Cabinet deem it necessary.

That has been construed to mean, that my right hon. friend went to the Government of Great Britain and asked them for a document to suit his purpose. There is what he asked for and what else should he have asked for and what else, if he were

honest, could he have asked for? He asked for a statement of the present and immediate prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire. Without that how could he make up his mind? To whom should he have gone? He went to the only proper source and he asked them the one straight question that he should have asked them. Why should anyone cavil at that? Then:

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are prepared to comply and to supplement, in a form which can be made public,—

That implies that they did not give all the information which is at their disposal.

—the confidential communications and conversations which have passed between the Admiralty and ministers of the Dominion Parliament during the recent visit to the United Kingdom.

That gives force to what I stated a little while ago. The British Government could not put before this or any other House the whole information they gave to the Canadian ministers. All they could do was to supplement, within the bounds of prudence and of statesmanship, the information which they had given by what might properly be made public. Now, what does the Admiralty say?

The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and still more important moral, assistance which it is within the power of Canada to give to maintaining British naval supremacy on the high seas.

Does my right hon. friend the leader of the Opposition intimate at all, in any way, in the least, that that was made to order? I know he would not. I know that he appraises too highly the character of a British Government to think that its leader, or its members would, to the order of the overseas dominions, prepare information to suit their political policies. But, if my right hon. friend would not do that I am not so sure that all who support him are as punctilious in that regard.

The Admiralty therefore confine themselves in this statement exclusively to facts, and it is for the Dominion Government and Parliament to draw their own conclusions therefrom.

Is not that eminently just? It is the manly British way. We give you the facts, we make no plea, advance no argument; there are the facts, yours is the responsibility for acting or not upon these facts. The memorandum goes on to say:

The power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the sea, which is essential to its security, must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other naval forces of the world.

And so, without unfriendly intention, they have to speak of other powers and other groups of powers.

From this point of view the development of the German fleet during the last fifteen years is the most striking feature of the naval situation to-day.

THE NEW GERMAN NAVAL LAW.

There was no provocation—says the British Government, in this memorandum—to Germany to increase her fleet. On the other hand, there was an effort, continued for years, to retard construction, and without an arrangement, Great Britain did retard construction for four consecutive years. There was no response, but rather the German Government accelerated their building. That is an important point to be kept in view. Listen to what the British Admiralty say of the striking power brought into effect by the new German naval law passed, not four years ago, but this year:

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth Germany navy law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers, it will in the near future consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these

it is apparently proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war.

Is that not indicative of danger? Are submarines—just talk to your neighbour on the street about it—are submarines meant for far distant journeys across the ocean to foreign parts? Is the new machinery of torpedo boat destroyers meant to traverse the seas and to protect German commerce or German colonies. Read the whole of it from dreadnoughts down, and what man can fail to be struck with the fact that here—without any provocation on the part of the British Empire, it is provided in the twinkling of an eye, that four-fifths of the complete naval power of Germany is to be in a position to strike at the sound of the bell. Yet, my Right Hon. friend sees no danger, has no apprehensions, sees no emergency, and no need for any action. In the personnel of a navy, man-power counts, and the man-power of the German navy which it now 66,000 will, when this law has had its course, be 101,500. By 1920 under this law and preceding laws, the German fleet—and in this I make an unquestionable statement—will not be one whit inferior to what the British fleet is at this present moment.

Mr. BELAND: Hear, hear.

Mr. FOSTER: My hon. friend says: hear, hear, because I cannot make the statement that the German fleet would be superior to the British fleet then.

Mr. BELAND: No; I agree with my hon. friend when he stated that the German navy in 1920 might be equal to the British navy of to-day, but that is eight years away and the British navy will be doing something in the meantime.

Mr. FOSTER: It is a significant fact that in 1920 the German fleet will be equal to the present British fleet.

NEW SHIPS ARE NEEDED.

Then take another point. My right hon. friend knows, and so do all men, the disabilities under which an old railway with

stock of various ages lahours in competition with a new railway lately huilt and furnished with stock up to date and new. The very same thing takes place in regard to fleets. To-day, a portion of England's superiority in naval matters is due to the large number of pre-dreadnoughts which she possesses and which have not yet passed beyond the sge for giving effectual service; but, by 1920, many of these will have become obsolete and ineffective. Britain has much to do between the present date and 1920, to replace these by new material and thus bring the fleet up to the required standard of effectiveness and power.

I do not think I need dwell on that memorandum further, except to say that whereas in the present year Great Britain possesses 18 hattleships and hattle cruisers of the Dreadnought class, against 19 of that class possessed by the other powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures in 1914 will be 31 to 33 and in the year 1915 only 35 to 51. That introduces another element. The great European powers are building as well as Germany, and in the mutations of political power brought about by recurring influences and diplomatic alliances, who amongst the great powers knows whether his friend of to-day will not be the enemy of to-morrow; who knows to-day what possible combinations may be in store, within the next five, or six, or seven years? To-day the statesman who stands by the helm of the ship of state of this great and mighty Empire, and seeks to penetrate with what light he has the murky distant sea, is never free from the fear that a possible combination could be made within a day which would wipe out his superiority and confront him with fatal odds, in the last great struggle for the supremacy of the Empire. Any one who appreciates the position in which such a man stands; any man who values this Empire and is not utterly careless, must feel that the margin of safety must be maintained, for it is our life. And, Sir, if at any one unhappy moment, that superior combination prevails against us, all this mighty superstructure that a thousand years of blood, and brawn, and brain and soul have built up, might be shattered and the disjecta membra,

picked up by the looters of the world who have not yet left its pathways.

SHOULD GIVE MEN—NOT MONEY.

Another thing is said,—and here I include my revered friend from South Renfrew (Mr. Graham), and my gallant friend from Red Deer (Mr. Clark), with my right hon. friend the leader of the Opposition,—and they will not object to that: they like his company, and he likes their company as well. The three of them unite in declaring: 'Yours is a money contribution, without body, blood or brains. England wants, not the money, but the hearts, the brains, the hrawn of her subjects all over the world. Noble sentiment! They say we are giving three dreadnoughts, paid for by Canada, but to be equipped, maintained and manned by England. Scotchmen, and descendants of Scotchmen, they ask, are you to be told that you are not to fight for the Empire? Frenchmen, and descendants of Frenchmen, in Canada, will you stand it to be told that you are not fit to send your body as sacrifice for a cause to which you give your money? Irishmen, and descendants of Irishmen; Dutchmen, and descendants of Dutchmen; we appeal to you to rise in your might and put down this iniquitous Government that imputes to you the wish to hire others to do your work. O, ye Tory jingoes. And thus they cry from the house tops.

"O, YE LIBERAL JINGOES."

But, now I ask my right hon. friend: suppose that, according to your belief to-day, an emergency, as you call it, existed, what would you do? The right hon. gentleman has said it: he would send \$140,000,000 over to the British treasury. No blood, no bones, no brains. O, ye Liberal jingoes! We think that there is a need, we think that need cannot be quickly and efficiently met in any degree without a contribution. But at least we put our contribution in the form of fighting machines which represent Canada and which will be the finest in the Empire's fleet. Surely that is a little advance on the dollars

without the machines. O, ye Liberal jingoes! During ten years of power and great revenue returns, you have sat in your seats and slept in your beds, and yet have sent neither money nor men. O, ye Liberal jingoes! In 1899 you permitted after sundry persuasions Canadian 'dreadnoughts' (à la my hon. friend from Edmonton), to go to South Africa. Did you give them rations? Did you supply them with ammunition? You sent the volunteers, our priceless Canadian 'dreadnoughts' to the veldts of South Africa without a ration to put in their mouths, without a round of ammunition to put in their belts. And they would have been met by the Boers, and, in the picturesque language of my hon. friend from South Renfrew, would have been 'lugged off' by the Boers, unless the British taxpayer had filled their stomachs and their ammunition pouches and furnished their pay. O ye Liberal jingoes! To-day, you propose a divided force in home waters. No matter what happens in the European waters you will be absolutely unable within six years with your policy to add one single item to the force of the fleet that during that time may have to fight the supreme battle for the Empire. O, ye Liberal jingoes!

WHAT THE OTHERS HAVE DONE.

Let us look at this, not in the heated atmosphere of party debate. Let us see it as it appears to us through other atmospheres. For how many years has the South African been sending his contribution to Great Britain—his money contribution? Did you ever hear it hinted anywhere that he was a coward and a do-nothing—that he saved his own precious body, but sent his money? For twenty years, Australia has been sending her £100,000 and £200,000 until she has sent more than £2,200,000 to the British Admiralty. Yet, we have never heard it said that the Australian was a cowardly man who desired to save his own skin. New Zealand sent her dreadnought, without a man in it, or a ration in it; and in the whole course of the discussion on this theme of Empire defence you have never heard the asser-

tion made that the New Zealander is cowardly. Nor will they say of us, when they read that \$35,000,000 is, at long last, put to some purpose for the use of the Empire in providing its defence, that these Canadians, though they give their money refuse their blood. After all, such argument is proof of one thing, and one thing only,—that the men who use it have not risen to the true conception of Empire. They tell us: It is England you are sending the money to, it is England, it is Downing Street, that is spending your money. That is not true. It is the best and most efficient machinery that the Empire has that is spending the money. And the Empire is all one family. Six children, grown up men, we will say, from eighteen to thirty years old, compose one family. Two men are sent to the defence of their country; four remain at home. Do you say to the four who remain at home: You have no part or lot in this matter? One of those remaining at home provides a rifle another a kit, another gives a bible—or, perhaps, it is the mother that does that,—another gives his prayers, his hopes, his good wishes. The whole family is in it—the whole family offers joint sacrifice for the country's safety.

NOT A POLICY OF CONTRIBUTION.

The next assertion is that the Government's policy is one of contribution only; that we have abandoned the idea of a Canadian navy. We may call this a temporary policy they say, but that is not true. It is a permanent policy, they say, contribution will recur and recur and eventually become permanent. The then leader of the Opposition (Mr. Borden) before the election declared that his

Whole policy was in two parts, and he explained what they were.

My right hon. friend in introducing his Bill said:

My policy is in two parts, and I have explained them. This Bill is to cover one; the other part of my policy is to be matured and presented to the people.

In the face of all this, how can fair-minded men make the

assertion, as though it were absolutely true, that the policy of the Government is nothing but a contribution policy? Does my right hon. friend still insist on that? Because if he does I must labour with him a little longer.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I certainly concluded the policy of a Canadian navy had been abandoned by the present Administration, and that the law was to be repealed this present session.

Mr. FOSTER: My right hon. friend may be better informed than I am. I have not noticed him of late sitting in the Privy Council, although I have sometimes sat there myself.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: My hon. friend can tell me whether I am right or wrong.

Mr. FOSTER: My right hon. friend is absolutely wrong when he conveys the impression that this contribution, made upon the existence of a pressing need, is the whole of the policy of the Government.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. FOSTER: Judging by the cheers of hon. gentlemen opposite, I am inclined to think they take my word for it.

Mr. MACDONALD: Tell us all about it.

Mr. GRAHAM: Is the hon. gentleman in favour of a Canadian navy as a permanent policy?

Mr. FOSTER: Does my Right Hon. friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) or my hon. friend (Mr. Graham) expect me as a member of the Government, when the Government comes down with its temporary policy, to answer the question as to what the permanent policy will be? It is the practice of hon. gentlemen opposite to befuddle the question under consideration. My hon. friend is a master of that art, but it does not count for anything in this House. If hon. gentlemen will hold themselves in patience for a while, they will find out first that there is to be a permanent policy, and in good time they will find out what it is.

Mr. MACDONALD: Tell us what it is not.

Mr. FOSTER. My right hon. friend argues that there is to be no permanent policy because 'yon are to have negotiations for a voice in the direction of the foreign policy on which the permanent defence policy itself is based and these negotiations will take a long time.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: I understood that the negotiations which were to take place with regard to Canada's having a voice in questions of peace and war was to be a question preceding any permanent policy.

Mr. FOSTER: Well, I will put it that way. My Right Hon. friend has argued that the fact that certain questions were to be negotiated before a permanent policy was introduced was to him a proof, owing to the difficulty of coming to a settlement in that regard, that a permanent policy had been indefinitely postponed. It has not, and in the meantime we do everything that can be done to make the fleet of the Empire strong; we do more than hon. gentlemen under their policy could do, or could approach doing, within six, eight, ten or more years. We do more than that; we wipe off a long dark stain and redeem our good Canadian name. I am not uttering this simply for use of words. I have sat beside men from South Africa, from Australia, from New Zealand, from our overseas dominions and from our Empire, and I have been asked why it was, when small and comparatively poor parts of the dominions of the Empire gave aid towards the Imperial fleet that rich and prosperous Canada did not do something as well, if for nothing else than to step by the side with the others and give encouragement. More than one wet blanket has been thrown on the hopes of the best friends of the British Empire in all parts of it by Canada's delay in this respect.

THE EFFECT FOR PEACE.

I venture to say that nothing has happened in past years which has so lightened and strengthened and freshened the hearts and hopes and aspirations of Empire lovers than the

announcement that at last Canada had decided to do something. I go further and say that the announcement which was flashed across the world that Canada was taking an equal stand with the other dominions in rendering assistance to the Empire, was read with interest in the chancellery of every great power in the wide world. Now they see Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and the Malayan States ranging themselves by the side of the Empire. What does each Chancellor say as he reads that news? He says: 'Here is a new departure. We are making fleets, forging our blood and brains into machinery for war. For what? To compete with a country which has no designs upon it, in the hope that we may catch her unawares and overpower her? Our man power is as great as or a little more than hers. But look at this. South Africa with her two millions, New Zealand with her one million, Australia with her five millions, Canada with her eight millions, are ranging themselves alongside the Mother Country, and the time is not far distant when that fifteen millions will be fifty, and the time not far from that when the fifty will be one hundred millions. This vast man power will not be in one mass—would that it were—but distributed in four great corners of the universe, a tower of British Imperial strength in every corner, to watch and guard and preserve their interests, and to present a firm, able, effective, and united front to all aggressors.' Do you mean to say that this will not have an effect to discourage war and ensure peace? And this effect would have been greater if my Right Hon. friend could have fallen in line as in 1909 and given to this contribution his support and then fought, as well he knows how to fight, for the addition of a Canadian naval service as well.

Mr. GERMAN: Did the hon. gentleman say in 1900:

When we make our contribution in the way of a fixed sum and it goes from us and we are not responsible for it we have none of the inspiration arising from the growth and development of a system of future defence in our own country?

Mr. FOSTER: I am not at all sorry that my hon. friend

read that. I wish he would read my whole speech. If he does so he will find that if ever there was a non-partisan, detached discussion of a subject in this House attempted by anyone I attempted it in that discussion. All through it I gave the objections that were raised. I gave the objections of others and I valued them, as I thought, at their worth. I disagreed with many. I agreed with others, but up to a few minutes of the conclusion of my speech, I was discussing one thing and one thing only, the permanent, normal policy of defence; and I said then, as I say now, that I was not in favour of a permanent system involving yearly contributions. I stated so plainly and I stated the reasons why. But in the last of my speech I took up the other part and I said that in view of what had taken place of late we were face to face with another phase of the question, other than the defence of our own shores, namely a sudden danger and peril to the Empire itself. I said, and my Right Hon. friend knows it well, that if my Right Hon. friend would come down to this House and ask for a vote of millions of money for the emergency he would find every member on my side of the House at his back.

I must now take up the argument of my hon. friends from South Renfrew (Mr. Graham) and Red Deer (Mr. Clark), in conjunction with those of my Right Hon. friend. All of them declared that the contribution system was a cowardly one.

Mr. CLARK (Red Deer): I must protest against that statement. I never used the word cowardly myself and never heard it used on this side of the House.

Mr. FOSTER: The word was not used but they said that the contribution system was not the proper system because while it gave the money it did not give the man element, the blood, and brawn and brain, and therefore the imputation was that we paid our money to hire someone else to do what we were not brave enough to do. My Hon. friend from South Renfrew certainly treated it as an imputation of cowardice. And now may I say that I have been awfully puzzled in dealing with the argument of that hon. member,

to make up my mind as to where he was in earnest and where he was jollying.

Mr. GRAHAM: A good deal like my Hon. friend to-day.

Mr. FOSTER: Some of his most earnest words were accompanied by such a quizzical look that I came to the conclusion it was not necessary to follow them out as part of a serious argument.

MENACES THE CONSTITUTION AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

One of his assertions was that our policy would reverse the constitutional relations between us and the Old Country and put them 70 years backward.

Mr. GRAHAM: Hear, hear.

Mr. FOSTER: He says that Downing Street would expend our money that the Admiralty would purchase our ships. He says: You tell young Canada to Stand back, you shall not build ships; you shall not man them, you shall not equip them—stand back, this money is to be sent to the old land and they are to do it there. He says it interferes with responsible government. Now was he serious in making that statement?

Mr. GRAHAM: Yes, decidedly so.

Mr. FOSTER: Did he really fear that if this Bill went through and the money were expended as the Bill directs, responsible government and constitutional relations would be reversed and put back 70 or 50 years? I advise my good friend to be cautious in his answer because he will be judged by it. Was he really fearful of that or was it merely a stalking horse for the elections? If it was not a stalking horse what about the proposal of his Right Hon. leader to send \$140,000,000 over to Downing Street? Let us argue it out. If a \$35,000,000 gift will put back constitutional relations 70 years, four times that gift will put it back 280 years.

My hon. friend from Red Deer (Mr. Clark) said in effect that this policy gives sway self-government, gives away the power to spend our own money, gives up the control of expenditures. Why, he said, a king's head was cut off because he took money without the sanction of Parliament, 13 colonies left the British Empire once because of similar action. My hon. friend does not say that he did not use those expressions. He says the contribution is to be spent by the Admiralty. He also says that it is hazardous and dangerous to have Downing Street or people from Great Britain running the public works of Canada or the works of naval defence. Might I interpose here that for 100 years and more Downing Street and the Admiralty have been running works of defence for this Dominion of Canada and doing it at their own cost and charges?

But did my hon. friend ever study the Bill? He was asked by my Right Hon. leader if he had read the Bill. It was pointed out to him that he could hardly found his argument or assertions on the Bill as it was, but when he was cornered he said: Oh well, I do not think that is much of a point. But I think it is a very great point. Let us see whether it is or not. Under this Bill, which the House is asked to pass, the authorizing is done by a Canadian Act, enacted by a Canadian Parliament. The vote is passed through its three stages and made law by the Canadian Parliament. The money that is voted is expended by the Governor in Council by order of the Canadian Parliament. The construction of the battleships is carried out and the purpose for which they are required is indicated by the Canadian Parliament. The ships are to be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty by order of the Canadian Parliament, and they are to be put there for the common defence of the Empire by Act of the Canadian Parliament. And the terms and conditions are entrusted to the Government of this country in concurrence with the Government of Great Britain. Where are constitutional relations impinged upon by that enactment? Where is responsible government outraged by that enactment? But my hon. friend from Red Deer says, you are send-

ing money over to Great Britain, Canadian money, to be spent there, and the contractors will take a slice of \$3,500,000 a year out of our money. I do not place much store by that argument, and I do not think my hon. friend would have used it if he had thought about it a little longer. Wherever ships are built, companies build them and make their profit. If they did not there would be no ships at all in the world.

THE MEMBER FOR RED DEER CAUGHT NAPPING.

But I think I have caught my hon. friend from Red Deer napping. Is he not a free trader?

Mr. CLARK (Red Deer): May I point out to my hon. friend that what he has just quoted as mine is a quotation of what is being said in England about the scheme.

Mr. FOSTER: My hon. friend then does not believe any of those things? I am entitled to finish my argument however, and here is where I think I caught him napping. Is he not a free trader, a disciple of Cobden, and is not the innermost principle of free trade to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest?

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: My hon. friend is a protectionist.

Mr. FOSTER: My hon. friend (Mr. Clark, Red Deer) denies to Canadians the right to spend their money in Britain. But my hon. friend knows that if we spend it over yonder we will get an effective fighting force for \$12,000,000 less of Canadian money than if we spent it here. Is he a protectionist? That is the costliest kind of protection, the hounty. Shades of Cobden! My Free Trade friend comes out in this House of Parliament in the twentieth century and pleads to pay the twelve millions more, give the work to the people of our own country, give them a bonus and give them a hounty, he will be protectionist enough for that. Just on that point I wish to say this, and I say it in all fairness; there are some things that we can do so as to help political and industrial conditions, but

when it comes to the life of an Empire, and to the provision to be made for the vital defence of that Empire at a critical moment, it is next to criminal almost to divert any of the money, which is devoted ostensibly for that sacred purpose, into channels for the sake of industrial or other preference that you think would aid certain interests and thereby diminish the effective aid. Now, Sir, if that is true generally it is absolutely true in an emergency of this kind. Every cent of the money which is to be expended is to go to meet a pressing need, which, if not met, may end in disaster and destruction.

ENGLAND HAS NO NEED FOR MONEY.

I do not know whether it is necessary to introduce two other arguments of my hon. friend from Red Deer. I shall mention them, however. He says, this contribution is unnecessary financially. Great Britain, he says, is a rich country. Great Britain, he says, has \$2,000,000,000 invested in Canada, and we are sending her \$80,000,000 of money each year as interest on that. Now, he says, is that not enough money to be sending her? Why should we be sending her \$35,000,000 in addition? She is rich; and lo! we are sending her money. Well, I did not know before that when one party paid the interest on his mortgage, the other was under a special obligation to him, and, therefore, ought to protect him, build his fleets for him and maintain his navies for him. It seems to me that each tub must stand on its own bottom. I wish also to say what I think of that argument. Great Britain is a rich country, she does not need your money, says my hon. friend. But who is it that keeps up the fleet and the army in Great Britain at tremendous cost to keep safe the Empire and to secure peace within the Empire? It is the British taxpayer, rich and poor. It does not come out of the moneys of the banks or of the rich man specially. Everything is paid out of revenue according to men's incomes, and according to their consumption of dutiable and excise goods. Well, the incomes of some of the richest men are smaller than the incomes of

many of the only fairly well-to-do people. Anyway, it is the British taxpayer through and through, and I invite my hon. friend (Mr. Clark, Red Deer) to visit Great Britain and go through its crowded centres, its country and its cities, its broad streets, and its purlieus, and then come back here and justify to his Canadian brother any shirking of a fair part of the defence of the Empire by throwing it on to the British taxpayer.

A BADGE OF FINANCIAL AND MORAL INFERIORITY.

But my hon. friend from Red Deer says this contribution is a badge of inferiority, financially. I will not stand it, he says, neither will Red Deer stand it, nor my constituents, nor this country. He says you put a tag on me and you degrade me financially. You say I am worth only \$4.50, whilst the British taxpayer is worth \$5. He is taxed \$5 in Great Britain, you only tax me \$4.50, and only occasionally at that. I am as good and as able a man as he, says my hon. friend; it is a badge of inferiority and I will not stand it. Well, my hon. friend has been standing worse than that for some time. For the term of his life in this Dominion of Canada, his valuable life in Canada where he has done good work and good service both here and outside of this place—I willingly bear my testimony to that—for all that time he has been badged in another way. Nil. His brother whom he left on the other side has been worth \$5 yearly to the upkeep of the fleet; Red Deer citizens have been worth nothing, he has been worth nothing.

Then he says it is a badge of inferiority morally not to consecrate our money with our blood. I refuse, he says, I must have at least a little sprinkling of blood on that money, or else I am badged with inferiority.

I do not think I need labour that argument. Now, although there are others that I might mention, I am not going to pursue this side of the question any further. I want to come to something which I think is more important. I want to know whether I, as a citizen of Canada and of this Empire,

fully size up the situation, and whether I am acting under full knowledge and comprehension of the great interests which are involved. I cannot do that unless I inquire and examine and think and reflect.

THE QUESTION AT ISSUE.

What is the situation? Britain is not an aggressive nation. I say that without fear of contradiction. Her hostages are such that she dare not be aggressive. Her possessions are so great that there is no will or wish to be aggressive. Her great problem is to organize, develop and maintain what she has got. She is a defensive, peaceful nation and must so remain. That weighs with me and I feel that it counts for much. More than that; let us not be misled by a play on the word 'emergency.' It is the condition of things that we want to understand. If the conditions imply danger, present or prospective, and if the danger is one that we, as part of the Empire, are called upon to face and to make provision for, the emergency can go to one side. It is the fact I am after, it is the condition that I want to ensure myself and the country against and that I would like to see the Empire insured against.

What is the condition? There, you have Britain, the heart of the Empire, geographically placed in the North Sea, and you cannot take the heart of the Empire out of that place. You cannot change the geographical position. Great Britain to-day is the heart of the Empire. What does that mean? Stand at her ports and watch for a single month, a single year. Britain herself has only 121,000 square miles in an Empire which owns one quarter of the territory of the wide earth, 11,900,000 square miles. Britain has forty-five millions of people in an Empire which has 400 millions of people of every diversity of race, creed and class. Britain is diffused over the whole earth and the various parts of that Empire are thousands of miles distant from each other and from her. Dispersion adds to the difficulty of government, though it has advantages in some other respects.

Now, watch at these ports. Everything that is eaten, that is consumed, beyond a certain amount, everything that is necessary for her great manufacturing industries, takes ship somewhere in distant lands, traverses the long line of the ocean waterways and finds its way into her ports to feed her industries, employ her people, and add to her wealth and help to make material for distribution again to the wide world. More than that; watch what goes out. More than 3,500 million pounds worth comes in every year; more than 2,000 million pounds worth goes out every year. What goes out? Stuff that has been made, products that are necessary to the subsistence of every quarter of the world. If, for one month, the cotton trade between India and Great Britain were interrupted, Lancashire would go bankrupt. If, for a single season, the wools that come from abroad were to be kept from coming, what would become of the great woollen industries of Great Britain? If, for ten weeks, the food that comes in for her people were to be kept out, what would become of the forty-five million people of Great Britain? More than material things go out. Watch those coursing steamers, watch these channels of communication and you will see that something else is going out. The civilization of Britain, uplifting and making better those that need to be uplifted, the governmental policies, the law and justice, the moral, social and religious influences of Great Britain, everything that tends to uplift in the far distant regions of the world where her wards live, is carried far and wide on these lines of communication and, to and fro, the intercourse goes on. Suppose that for one single instant something happened. Rome had her great roads. The great roads of the British Empire are the pathless seas. If the roads to Rome had been cut off that moment Rome would have fallen. If the waterways of the Empire are blocked that moment intercourse ceases, the arteries grow flaccid, the veins grow limp, the heart beats weaker until at last it stops.

THE AWFUL PERIL.

I tell you, Mr. Speaker, and members of this House, when we come to think of all that is involved in the maintenance of those little islands in the North sea for the Empire, and, measurably, for the whole world, we must see how imperative it is that we realize the gravity of this question. If, to-morrow morning, the news were to be flashed around the world that Britain's fleet had been wiped off the sea and that Britain's communications had been absolutely blocked, that moment confusion, and disintegration would set in and the distant parts of the Empire and Canada would have no security, no confidence and no absolute lease of life. When I look at that I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that it makes me feel that this is an awfully grave and important matter. When I look at it in that way I say: Put aside for Heaven's sake, these huckstering objections. Banish the baseless fear from your heart about responsible government going to pieces or about constitutional relations being put back. Britain's ideas do not run in that line at all. If they did, ours do not and would not admit of it. But, let us feel that on the one great matter of Imperial defence, we are not a federation, we are not mere allies, but that we are all members of the same body. Does the hand quarrel with the foot because it fears that the foot will endanger its autonomy? The eye and the ear have different functions. The one strains to focalize the lines of light, the other to group the lines of sound and get the interpretation therefrom. All are members of the same body, each does its own work and the whole entity glorifies and ennobles God's greatest work in the universe. We need not fear anyone if we are able to say: There are our forces standing side by side with those of the Empire. Do not cavil whether your battleship be in St. John harbour or on the Pacific coast when the Empire's interests are in danger. Remember, that where the enemy's ships are, there will the great battle be fought and there the fateful decision made.

THE POINT OF DANGER.

Away with this idea too long held and still held in some quarters, that Canada must do nothing, lest thereby she enters into the maelstrom of European strife. Analyze that idea for a moment. From what quarter is England menaced? From Asia? No. From Africa? No. From America? No. Whence is her menace to-day? It is in Europe, and if combinations of powers, or if any one power in Europe aims a spear at her heart, that is where my shield and helm should be to ward off the pointed dart and to prevent the death-dealing thrust. Britain is powerful to-day because of her European affiliations and her European influence; she could not be as powerful anywhere else.

I saw when I was in London what was to me a most significant spectacle. It was in the fury and flame of the Balkan-Turkish war. There was a Guildhall banquet at which Prime Minister Asquith spoke; it was at a most critical time; the French Prime Minister had taken a leading part in peace negotiations; he had done all that his country could urge him to do and all that a man could do, but after all, there were cross-currents. Mr. Asquith rose in that Guildhall; he spoke as Mr. Asquith, but he spoke for Britain; he spoke for the Empire; he spoke as the representative of a great power; what he said was calm and measured, counselling holding special questions until general questions had been settled, suggesting to the chancelleries of Europe coolness and wise repression of minor differences. Next day, Sir, in every European country and all over the world the advice of Mr. Asquith was lauded, and more, it was taken, and a crisis was averted. Why had Mr. Asquith's words such power? It was because he was the head of a nation whose fleet was invincible as compared with any other. Great Britain's fleet could not make much headway against the interior of Germany or the interior of Austria, or the Himalayas—where a fleet gives a nation power is where it touches a nation which has maritime possessions and mari-

time commerce. There is the power of Britain's fleet, and to-day Britain is powerful there and through the world because of her fleet and because of that alone. But even her fleet is not sufficiently powerful to allow her to isolate herself from Europe; she must have friends in Europe, she must have allies and she must work to keep these allies so that in all combinations of power she shall not be left to herself and to her own resources alone. And so, to the man who I think inadvisedly says to Canada: don't give your money because it may tend to drag you into the vortex of European militarism and contest; to him I say: it is in Europe that the strength of Britain lies, it is there at the present outlook where she floats or sinks, lives or dies, and where our fortunes as a nation within the Empire float or sink, live or die, with her. And, Sir, every dollar we can put into the centre of the conflict, that is the place we ought to put it at this particular time in so concrete a form as to be effective.

THE LAURIER POLICY.

We have at the present moment two policies before this House; and I think I have pretty well outlined the policy of the Government and what it means. What is the policy which the Liberal party in this House place against it, and to which I wish to ask the attention of my Right Hon. friend the leader of the Opposition? There is no difference in principle between us on what we would do in case of emergency. In that my Right Hon. friend would go as far, yes, four times as far as we are going now. We offer \$35,000,000 in concrete fighting machines. He would give \$140,000,000 if necessary in cash without a ship or a man. My Right Hon. friend foreshadowed two policies, one policy in his speech and another in his resolution as to permanent aid. In his speech after declaring that certain things were disclosed by the Admiralty memorandum, he asked: What is the remedy, and he detailed it as follows: That every vessel withdrawn from outside seas to concentrate for defence in home waters. the overseas dominions should

replace by another vessel, equally as strong or stronger. He has not included that in his resolution. Does he mean that that was mere verbiage and that the resolution really includes what he meant by that, namely the two units. That opens up a number of queries. If each younger nation is to replace that which is being drawn away or is to be drawn away for concentration purposes, Canada will have nothing to replace, because we have not had on the coasts of Canada for a long period of years a protective part of the British navy. Or, does he think that all of the outside dominions should pool their interests and divide the cost pro rata for filling up these outside vacancies made by withdrawing ships to the home centre. If he does that he will find that within a few years eighty vessels and more have been withdrawn, and that Canada's share of this would be about eight-fifteenths according to population, and that would oblige us to provide forty-six vessels of war somewhere around these seas. I think my Right Hon. friend saw how untenable that was and so in the resolution he substitutes the two units.

We come now to the amendment of my Right Hon. friend which declares that. Any measure of Canadian aid to Imperial naval defence must be by ships owned, manned, maintained by Canada, to be constructed in Canada as soon as possible (that is somewhat indefinite); to be worked under the Naval Service Act of 1910 (that is divided control) to the extent of two fleet units, one on the Atlantic and one on the Pacific, and thus shall greater mobility be restored to British squadrons.

IS IT GENUINE?

Now, this is the question I ask—and it is not meant to be an impertinent question—Is this, on the part of my Right Hon. friend, a genuine policy? If so, St. Paul's conversion on his way down to Damascus was not a circumstance compared with the conversion of my Right Hon. friend on his way from his home to the Grit caucuses. He refused any approach to aid in 1902, and in 1907. He turned down the one-

unit proposal in 1909. He did not even award the contracts for the four cruisers and six torpedo boats. Yet my Right Hon. friend knew every fact and figure we now know, according to his own assertion. You knew the increase in armaments in your time,—in which Germany grew to be the great naval power she is to-day. And all these years you had full power and an over-flowing treasury. Is this a death-bed repentance? Or is it a platform to get in on? My Right Hon. friend will forgive the average man if he sees in this a device to stop indefinitely all help to the Imperial treasury for the defence of the Empire. There is no doubt at all that if my Right Hon. friend attempted to carry out his policy of two fleet units to be constructed, manned and equipped by Canada, many, many years would pass over his head and ours before one single item of aid could be given to Imperial defence. Was it for that purpose, to hinder any effective co-operation and, if possible, make a platform upon which he could overthrow the present Government? I do not want to be uncharitable, but this has all the earmarks of a rather clumsily constructed platform to meet the other fellow, and if possible, make it appear to the country to be something better than the other had offered. Was it an emergency—a political emergency policy? My Right hon. friend, I think, must take this as a not uncharitable deduction. It is when one is in power, and with full control, that he feels responsibility. But when a man is in the wide, roomy spaces of the Opposition, he can make platforms which he never intends to stand on, and he can formulate policies that he never expects to carry out.

Sir WILFRID LAURIER: My hon. friend has had a rich experience in that.

Mr. FOSTER: I have not observed my Right Hon. friend from 1883 up to the present day without being cognizant of the rich fields of ready promises that he has tilled.

A Canadian navy first, and then 'all the ships will be built in Canada,' says my Right Hon. friend. What does that mean? Does it mean that the boy is to learn to swim

before you will allow him to touch the water? Or must you have a Canadian navy first and afterwards have a complete plant in which you will build war vessels? If that is it, where are you going to build your first Canadian navy? In the Old Country?—Built by Downing street and paid for with our money? This you object to on that side of the House. But, if you mean that there shall be no Canadian navy until you can build it in this country, man and equip it in this country, then, I say that millenium is far off. Why, it is not possible; and no business man will say that it is possible for effective aid within any reasonable time.

IS IT ADEQUATE?

But, if it were possible how about its adequacy and effectiveness? You would have one fleet unit on the Pacific to protect the western sea routes and ports. Against whom would it protect you? You do not expect the Sandwich Islanders to invade Canada. New Zealand and Australia will certainly not attack you. If anyone attacks you on that side, it will be one of the great naval powers. Will your one fleet unit be an effectual protection against such a power? Why, your fleet unit would be brown paper as against the impact of a rifle ball. You would have another fleet unit on the Atlantic to protect trade routes and ports on that side. Against whom? The West Indies would not attack you, neither would any of the South American states. If anyone interferes with you there it will be one of the great naval powers. It will be impossible for you by this means to protect yourselves against such an attack. Well, then, if you do not mean that, what do you mean? Do you mean that these two units, one on the Pacific and the other on the Atlantic, will go to the British fleet and fight at the central point of that fleet's operations as soon as the Order in Council issues? If that is the idea, let me call my Right Hon. friend's attention to this point. Consider what a difference there is between wars by land and wars by sea. War by land is im-

possible without long advertising the commencement of it. But war by sea may be so secretly engineered may be so completely masked, that battle and the order for battle come within ten or twelve hours of each other. Then, for example, suppose that Germany with her mighty fleet, masked and protected as it is from aggression, backed by one of the greatest army organizations of the world, a fleet ready for instant action—if such a fleet attacks Great Britain with a coast line of two thousand miles, and in twelve hours is at the point against which she directs its operations, where will your one Atlantic squadron be? What aid will your six-weeks-distant Pacific squadron give?

Brought down to the final analysis you should do one thing or the other: Either do what is absolutely necessary to make your ports defensible against any power; or if you are going to help the British navy and save the British Empire, put your force where the British Admiralty want it. They are the judges; they are the men whose views should guide us.

WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN.

There is one other consideration, this: If you block this measure, what will happen? You cannot make your policy prevail short of a general election, and a reversal of the opinion of the people expressed on the 21st of September, 1911. That seems impossible. Hon. gentlemen may have powers which will enable them to do that, but much time will pass before anything definite will be accomplished. If that is done, and hon. gentlemen opposite come back with a majority in their party—which is not quite possible—then, the matter having been blocked for say two years, must begin anew. You make your fleet construction, tediously and lengthily, extending certainly, over a period of six or seven years, finding it impossible sooner to obtain Canadian seamen to man

it, because you have to train men as well as get them. In the event of such a contingency, and if the day of Armageddon came and caught us napping, I would like to have the consciousness that I am free from the remorse which would lie heavily upon me if I had been party to or contributed in that fatal delay.



