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
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

FINAL RECORDS (PV)

AND

WORKING PAPERS (WP)

1988



PV
AND
WP

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1989

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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OUTER SPACE**

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This volume contains the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1988 sessions relating to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It also includes plenary working papers (WP) submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during 1988 relating to the same subject. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on the outer space issue.

**PV
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PREFACE

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
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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

"The prevention of an arms race in outer space also remains an issue of great concern to the international community. I would urge that all the avenues open to you be explored to deal with the problem in all its aspects.

"I should like to stress once more the importance of concluding negotiations in the Conference on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament so that the results may be submitted to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

"I offer you my full support and best wishes for success in your efforts during the year that lies ahead. In view of the rethinking on primary issues of global concern now coming to the surface, it may well prove to be a formative year."

This concludes the message of the Secretary-General to the Conference.

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(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

The next priority area of the negotiating effort which I wish to mention is that concerning the beginning of practical and effective work on matters relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. An issue of crucial importance to the maintenance of strategic stability in a context of nuclear disarmament.

We believe that a generally sound foundation has been laid for the Conference to proceed from general considerations to talks on concrete measures. Specifically, on prohibiting anti-satellite weapons and ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. The proposal for the establishment of an international inspectorate to examine objects to be launched into outer space also remains highly topical. We would like to believe that, given the practically unanimous demand for stepping up deliberations, it will be possible to expand the mandate of the Conference committee on this issue this year.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The six heads of State and government declared their intention to be personally present at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They agreed that at SSOD-III the countries of the Six-nation Initiative should propose that the United Nations promote the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system.

The special session will take place at a crucial point in time. The INF Treaty, a possible forthcoming agreement on strategic and space weapons and continued discussions on a number of other issues are salient features of the bilateral process of disarmament.

The agreement at the Stockholm Conference in 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, and progress in negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons, illustrate a dynamic multilateral process. The breakthrough made on important aspects of the verification issue gives hope for new opportunities to conclude disarmament agreements.

At the same time, one cannot ignore the risk that multilateral disarmament diplomacy might lag behind. The bilateral thaw has improved the multilateral climate. But there are no signs that it has made the major nuclear Powers any more eager to opt for multilateral rather than bilateral solutions to disarmament issues.

Therefore, it is imperative that the special session should manage to stake out the future course of multilateral disarmament efforts.

The session must be forward-looking. It must invigorate the multilateral disarmament process. It must take into account the growing recognition that in the long run, States can achieve security only through co-operation and common efforts.

Nuclear weapons issues, conventional armaments, international transfers of conventional weapons as well as problems concerning verification are topics to be discussed. Naval disarmament and confidence-building measures deserve increased attention. Additional efforts must be made to prevent an arms race in outer space and to finally conclude the chemical weapons convention.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year's General Assembly once again requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to re-establish an ad hoc committee for that purpose.

The discussions in particular on the legal aspects of the weaponization of space which have taken place in the Ad hoc Committee during the last few years have been useful. They have made it clear that there is a need for additional legal measures in order to prevent an arms race in space effectively. It is an important task for the Conference on Disarmament to contribute to the development of international law in this regard.

Many general ideas have been put forward concerning outer space issues. However, to achieve progress one must go from generalities to specifics. It is regrettable that some delegations have shown so little interest in discussing concrete proposals.

To carry out its work the Ad hoc Committee will require information about relevant space activities. All States which have space programmes should therefore provide the Conference with information about their activities in this field. The major space Powers have a special responsibility to do so, and should take the lead.

My Government has on several occasions stated the need for the global prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. Such a ban would directly benefit the increasing number of States launching civilian satellites, and contribute to international security.

The de facto moratorium on testing of anti-satellite weapons should facilitate further progress in this field. As a first step, the CD could consider the possibility of organizing a meeting of experts of limited duration to address, for example, definitions and verification techniques relevant to anti-satellite weapons.

Work to elaborate a draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons did not advance last year.

The importance my country attaches to prohibition of the release of radioactive material through attacks on nuclear facilities is well known. Such a prohibition is, in our view, an indispensable part of a radiological weapons treaty. Thus I note with regret that so little was achieved in the Ad hoc Committee in 1987.

(Mr. Kusuma-Atmadja, Indonesia)

Great strides have been made in science and technology attesting to mankind's ingenuity and affecting every sphere of human activity. Nowhere is this use of technological prowess more apparent than in the ongoing efforts to militarize outer space, which would inevitably result in heightened strategic competition and greater mutual vulnerability and further deepen the global economic crisis. It would also critically impact on the ongoing programmes of peaceful satellite communications, especially those of States located subjacent to the geostationary orbit. Unless the major Powers adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and refrain from developing, testing and deploying space-based weapons, there is little doubt that the last frontier of human endeavour will soon turn into a new battleground. Over and above these, there is an imperative need for new and far-reaching measures. The ABM Treaty should be reinforced in the context of new technological developments, including provisions to prohibit anti-satellite weapons. The promotion of outer space activities exclusively for peaceful uses calls for substantive examination of the issues leading to effective and practical negotiation and agreements.

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(Mr. Varkonyi, Hungary)

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is for us a key issue of international security and disarmament. We share the view that outer space is a common patrimony of mankind which should be reserved for and made available to peaceful activities at the service of common interests.

We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has ample possibilities at hand to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in space and to guaranteeing peaceful activities there. So far the Committee concerned with this issue has done useful work helping us to get better acquainted with the problems involved, but now we deem it timely for the Committee to proceed

(Mr. Varkonyi, Hungary)

to elaborating concrete measures and international agreements. We would find it appropriate for the Committee to start devising a system that would guarantee the safety of satellites in orbit around the Earth, that is, the immunity necessary for their smooth operation. It would be equally useful for the Committee to consider establishing a system of verification to guarantee the peaceful character of research and activities in space.

CD/PV.438

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

It is for that reason that it is necessary to strengthen multilateral approaches, and the role of multilateral fora which are irreplaceable in this process. Here I have in mind the central role played by the United Nations, and more specifically the role of our Conference as the single multilateral negotiating body. After almost 10 years in its present constitution, and bearing in mind the long-lasting and unfavourable, rather than favourable, international circumstances in which it has conducted its deliberations, our Conference has secured continuity of dialogue. It has endeavoured to lay down a framework for the attainment of the objectives for which it was established, by carrying out, inter alia, a substantive exchange of views and very useful preparatory work. All in all, the Conference has had a positive effect and contributed to better understanding of disarmament problems and to the fostering of awareness of the need for performing the tasks entrusted to it.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the Conference has been unable even to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament, although this was one of the priorities agreed upon in the Final Document of SSOD-I. Besides, the inclusion of these issues in the agenda of the Conference as a negotiating body presupposes not only acceptance of the competence of the Conference, but also a negotiating approach in the broadest sense of the word. My delegation cannot agree with any argument denying the right of this Conference to negotiate nuclear disarmament issues as key problems of global security. The special responsibility of the major Powers is evident. It is also legitimate to expect that all countries, the nuclear Powers above all, should contribute to eliminating the nuclear danger which is equal for all.

The Yugoslav delegation deems unacceptable the marginalization of the Conference in preventing an arms race in outer space, as the development of our civilization in the coming decades will depend on the peaceful uses of outer space.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Another area in which, in the present circumstances, we should live up to the mandate given to us relates to steps to raise the level at which nuclear disarmament issues are dealt with and to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is high time, indeed, that the Conference on Disarmament reasserted its role and responsibility as a negotiating forum. In this context the Conference should proceed to substantive work in dealing, first of all, with a nuclear weapon test ban. While we understand to some extent the possibilities of a step-by-step approach to this problem in bilateral talks, the ultimate goal must remain a multilateral treaty on a comprehensive test ban. The need for a CTB is universally recognized. No arguments can be accepted for falling short of this objective. It is a political question that cannot be evaded by technical justifications, as nowhere is verification so reliable as in this field.

CD/PV.439

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(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

There is another resolution of the General Assembly which refers to another crucial aspect of our work, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We know that military programmes for outer space constitute a serious hindrance to disarmament agreements, a new threat for the future, for the survival of mankind. The Assembly declared itself "gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament".

That assertion cannot be gainsaid, and no subterfuge can conceal it. Outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and should not be the arena for an arms race, as the same resolution states, and as is obvious. Hence, by majority agreement of the Assembly, this Conference has been requested to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is a challenge we cannot shirk, a duty we must fulfil as effectively and as practically as we can.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

On agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation urges the United States and the Soviet Union to make early progress in their negotiations on defence and space. At the same time, we believe that efforts should continue in this Conference to examine fully what kind of multilateral agreements would be useful to prevent an arms race in outer space, a domain which is open to all and can affect the security of each of us. This examination should be based not on an abstract, generalized approach but on an accurate understanding of how outer space is being used in many areas.

CD/PV.440

10-11

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

But, as disarmament and the building of international security concern all peoples, no one could deny the right and the duty of all States, regardless of their political and military status and military might, to participate actively in the entire negotiating process in the field of disarmament. As was emphasized in this very room by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, His Excellency Dr. Mokhtar Kusuma-Atmadja, it is inadmissible that the vast majority of the States of the world should remain on the sidelines of effective negotiations on problems of universal interest such as nuclear disarmament or the prevention of an arms race in space.

This situation must be rectified through joint efforts, leading to a broadening of the agenda of international negotiating forums, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament as the sole United Nations negotiating forum. The United Nations must take on a focal role in the process of disarmament, in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear

disarmament, the use of space for purely peaceful purposes, the other aspects of disarmament and verification of the implementation of and compliance with the agreements that have been reached. Although the Conference on Disarmament has, in our view, played a useful role, we are still far from attaining this objective, and because of the position of certain States there are subjects of vital importance that are still taboo.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Our agenda also contains an item of contemporary and certainly future concern. This is the need to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Outer space has already been used militarily and, under present circumstances, some of those uses have contributed to stability, especially while nuclear deterrence has constituted such a pervasive aspect of our international life.

But even those who are either wary of or withhold information relating to military activities in outer space do not seem to argue in favour of the transference of the arms race on Earth into outer space.

If we are truly serious about this objective, then we should seek it directly in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations designed to ensure that an arms race in outer space never occurs.

...

It must be recognized that multilateral engagement in disarmament negotiations is essential. The consequences of marginalizing the multilateral process could be grave and have widespread effects, including upon the super-Powers.

It is clear that the super-Powers cannot achieve a ban on chemical weapons solely bilaterally, when so many other countries could manufacture those weapons.

They cannot prevent an arms race in space bilaterally when at least a dozen countries already have space capabilities.

(Mr. Sodré, Brazil)

Brazil reiterates the importance and urgency that all participants in this Conference on Disarmament - in particular nuclear-weapon States - muster the essential political will to set in motion work on the crucial items on our agenda. I have in mind, inter alia, the prompt setting up of an ad hoc Committee - empowered with a negotiating mandate - to draft a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests, an exercise which I believe we are competent to pursue without further delay to a successful conclusion. I also have in mind the need to provide the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with a specific mandate that would enable us to ensure - with the urgency that the matter requires - the utilization of that environment solely for peaceful purposes.

This was the inspiration for the words spoken by the President of my country, José Sarney, at the United Nations General Assembly in 1985, with which I would like to close this statement:

"We are at one of the many crossroads that have marked the 40-years of existence of the United Nations. The peoples are aware that concessions made to the realities of power are a one-way process. Only the united will of the majority to adopt a new attitude can remedy the scenario created by confrontation and by the mechanisms of power."

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

At the same time, it is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that a whole set of extremely difficult issues remain to be solved, the main issue being the task of making it impossible to undermine strategic stability while strategic offensive arms are being radically reduced. The key to solving this problem lies in maintaining the ABM Treaty. The instructions given by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, the President of the United States, to the Soviet and United States delegations in Geneva note the direct relationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and the preservation of the ABM Treaty: the leaders of the USSR and of the United States instructed the delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the parties, when conducting their research, development and, where required, testing permitted by the ABM Treaty, to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, and not to withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time.

At the current round of the Soviet-United States talks the Soviet side, guided by these instructions, tabled a draft "Protocol to a treaty between the USSR and the United States on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms", which is fully based on the joint Soviet-United States statement.

The Soviet Union holds a flexible position concerning the form of an agreement to observe the ABM Treaty. We have now proposed that such agreement should be recorded in the form of a protocol to the treaty on strategic offensive arms. At the same time we do not rule out the possibility of signing a protocol to the ABM Treaty on this issue. Finally, we do not object to reflecting the corresponding provisions directly in the treaty on strategic offensive arms either. However, the agreement should in any event enter into force at the same time as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, and should have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty.

In so doing - and I should like to stress this - we are not making abandonment of the SDI programme by the United States a precondition for a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms. As M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed, SDI is not on the negotiating table. The United States side has the right to carry out any programme if and in so far as it is not contrary to the ABM Treaty. But we are resolutely opposed to roundabout efforts by the United States, in a situation where the process of nuclear disarmament is taking concrete shape, to propel the arms race in other directions, especially in the direction of outer space. This would be contrary to the mutual understandings reached in Washington.

In this context we cannot fail to be concerned at the fact that, while the words of the United States side proclaim adherence to the Washington understandings, its actions appreciably depart from them, thereby blocking progress towards the resolution of the tasks entrusted to the delegations. The draft "Treaty between the USSR and the United States on certain measures to facilitate a co-operative transition to the deployment of future strategic ballistic missile defences" which it tabled at this round proposes that agreement should be reached on a transition to the deployment - I stress, deployment - of defences against ballistic missiles in space, instead of

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

observing the ABM Treaty, which is tantamount to scrapping the Treaty régime. In the United States draft the future commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty is hedged about with reservations, which give the United States a whole range of possibilities for unilaterally terminating the Treaty even during the agreed period of non-withdrawal.

I am obliged to say that the United States position also impedes agreement on reductions in strategic offensive arms. For example, it continues to evade agreement on limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles on the pretext of difficulties in verification, although the Soviet side has tabled detailed proposals on verification at the negotiations. The United States side is also holding on to what is left of its former pre-December positions on the question of sublimits for ballistic missile warheads.

As a result, the situation at the nuclear and space talks has now noticeably deteriorated. And for the time being, we must frankly inform the Conference that it is difficult to offer a very reliable forecast of how these negotiations will proceed. We hope that United States Secretary of State George Schultz's visit to Moscow in a few days will provide the necessary clarity concerning what the United States Administration intends to do and is able to do as regards the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and the observance of the ABM Treaty.

As for the Soviet side, it will continue to strive for the realization of the Washington understandings, which are in the interests not only of the USSR and the United States, but also the entire international community. The participants in the Conference can be absolutely sure of that.

The Soviet Union considers that the major task now is to ensure uninterrupted progress along all avenues leading to ridding this planet of nuclear and any other weapons of mass destruction, and decreasing the levels of military capability to limits of reasonable sufficiency.

Our approach to further action involves raising the efficiency of the whole system of disarmament negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, both within and outside the United Nations framework, on the basis of their complementarity.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Our Conference can also erect insurmountable barriers to the extension of the arms race into outer space. The Conference has thoroughly studied all aspects of this problem, and it is high time that the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space focused on practical matters. In this respect it is of major importance to ensure proper verification, leaving no loopholes for violations. As one possible solution the Soviet Union has introduced for the consideration of the Conference the idea of establishing an international outer space inspectorate. In the near future the Soviet delegation will provide new, more comprehensive observations on this issue, with practical details concerning the permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites, the conduct of inspections at agreed storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories and testing centres, as well as emergency inspections without the right of refusal should suspicion arise that an undeclared launch of a space object has been carried out.

I should like to emphasize that making its work more concrete is the only way for the Conference on Disarmament to make a substantial contribution to fulfilling the mandate spelt out by the international community - to keep outer space peaceful.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the most stringent and effective monitoring in all fields. We have proposed the creation, under the auspices of the United Nations, of machinery for broad international monitoring of compliance with agreements on reducing international tension and on arms limitation, as well as monitoring of the military situation in areas of conflict. Such machinery, to our mind, would involve the use of various forms and methods of monitoring for the purposes of collecting information and transmitting it expeditiously to the United Nations. Considering that, as we move along the road to disarmament, verification will become a most important factor in ensuring international security, we call for a comprehensive international dialogue on these issues, a substantive discussion of all existing ideas, including the important new proposals from the Six-nation Initiative, and the joint outlining of mutually acceptable ways and means of implementing them.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The prevention of an arms race in space is a problem of global significance which affects the security and development of all States. And thus, Mongolia proceeds from the need to elaborate, through negotiations, a range of practical and effective measures which would make it possible to eliminate for ever the threat that space might become an arena for military rivalry. One such measure might be the creation of a system of international monitoring of the non-deployment in space of weapons of any type, that is to say the establishment of an international inspectorate. Inspection at launching sites immediately before the launch of space objects would be the most simple and effective means of making sure that objects launched into space are not weapons and are not equipped with any types of weapon.

We would like to recall that the delegation of Mongolia, together with the delegation of your country, Comrade Chairman, submitted last year a draft of the "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects". There are other proposals made by the delegations of various States which deserve serious and immediate consideration.

Therefore, my delegation favours the rapid re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with a negotiating mandate, in keeping with the request made by the United Nations General Assembly in each of its resolutions in recent years.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

On 21 January 1988 the five heads of State or government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the first President of Tanzania issued a new declaration in Stockholm. The Stockholm Declaration has now been distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/807.

Like earlier declarations issued by the Six-nation Initiative, the Stockholm Declaration puts an emphasis on the need for nuclear disarmament and the legitimate interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the abolition of nuclear weapons. It states that the use of nuclear weapons should be explicitly prohibited by international law through a binding international agreement, and that the nuclear-weapon States have the responsibility to live up to the objective to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

The Six note the positive developments since their initiative was first launched three years ago and welcome the INF Treaty as a historic first step. The INF agreement demonstrates that given political will all obstacles can be removed, and that a reversal of the arms race is possible.

The Six urge that this first step be followed up without delay. Thus, tactical nuclear weapons should be abolished, taking into account the need for substantial reductions in conventional forces. They also urge the United States and the USSR to honour their commitment to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent as a decisive step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Six further state that space belongs to all nations, and that there is still time to prevent an arms race in outer space. They call on the parties to the ABM Treaty to abide strictly by its provisions, and reiterate their call for a complete ban on ASAT weapons. As an interim measure they propose an agreement to ban the testing of such weapons.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Outer space is an important subject on the agenda both of the bilateral and of the multilateral disarmament fora. We welcome the signs of increased common ground on the issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. For our part, we have consistently suggested that the way ahead in this area is a greater measure of predictability, so that neither side is caught by surprise by developments arising from the research in which both sides are equally involved. As Sir Geoffrey Howe has said, "Predictability brings security".

As far as the work of this Conference is concerned, in our view consideration of arms control in outer space in this forum is valuable and important. We warmly welcome the imminent re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on this item. We believe that the work of the Committee has deepened understanding of the complexity of the issues involved, and that further work of this nature remains to be undertaken within the existing mandate.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

First of all, at this meeting we will re-establish an ad hoc committee - that is, our highest form of subsidiary body - on the agenda item dealing with prevention of an arms race in outer space. My Government welcomes that decision, because we believe that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is both one of the highest priorities facing the world community and a subject fit for multilateral negotiations. But at least the latter view is not shared by all member States of this Conference, so we have found a compromise, and the ad hoc committee will be established with a non-negotiating mandate. In general terms, I think we should be grateful to those who have shown the flexibility that has enabled this consensus to be reached. The alternative, that is no work by this Conference on the outer space question, would have been depressing, to say the least.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

The programmes and action aimed at extending the arms race into space represent one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. The prevention of such a development is of vital interest to all the peoples of the world, and that places a special responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. In the view of our delegation, the Conference should contribute in a number of areas, among which I would mention in particular:

Cessation of all action or programmes for the placing of arms in space or for the use of space for military purposes;

Elaboration of regulations and measures to ensure that space is used for exclusively peaceful purposes without any military competition;

Finally, the creation within the framework of the United Nations of a special body to be used both in monitoring the application of agreements on the non-militarization of space and in the peaceful use of space as the common heritage of mankind.

Our delegation has noted with interest various proposals which have been put forward to this end concerning, in particular, the banning of anti-satellite weapons, the creation of an international inspectorate responsible for verifying objects launched into space, and others.

We welcome the agreement that has emerged on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Nevertheless, we are bound to note that this year again, and consequent upon the reservations of certain delegations, it has proved impossible to agree on an improved mandate for body. We hope that, these conditions notwithstanding, the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will be able to make substantial progress.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the idea I touched on at the beginning of my statement. At this turning-point, where there are prospects both for disarmament and for the continuation of the arms race, with all the dangers that race entails, it is high time to redouble efforts both in this forum and in others to ensure that the supreme values of common sense, reason, confidence and peace at last prevail.

Mr. de AZAMBUJA (Brazil) (speaking as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21): The Conference on Disarmament has today established the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The President of the Conference has made a statement relating to the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. The Group of 21 would like to put on record its views with respect to the mandate.

The General Assembly adopted on 22 December 1987 resolution A 42/33 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with an overwhelming majority and with one dissenting vote. The resolution requested the Conference, and I quote:

"to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

The States members of the Group of 21 are fully committed to the provisions of this resolution. They considered its adoption as an endorsement of a desire by virtually all States to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. They express their regret that it was not found possible to improve the mandate in accordance with the General Assembly resolution. Faced with a rigid stance taken by a certain delegation, the Group of 21 has nevertheless decided to demonstrate good will and to accept to work on the basis of the mandate referred to by the President. The Group underlines that, as stated by the President in connection with the adoption of the mandate, the mandate covers the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Group of 21 believes that the Committee should start working immediately in order to reach results, especially as the third special session on disarmament will convene in New York on 31 May 1988.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for his statement on behalf of his Group. I call on the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese, who will speak as Co-ordinator of the Western Group for item 5.

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy) (speaking as the Co-ordinator of the Western Group for agenda item 5): Mr. President, I would like, on behalf of the Group of Western States, to thank you and your predecessor, Ambassador Rose, for the efforts that have been made and which have enabled the Conference to take a decision for the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Since the beginning of this session the Western Group has shown interest in prompt resumption of the work of this very important item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. We therefore fully support the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee and we look forward to contributing actively, as in the past, to its work as we are convinced that there is still

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

a great deal to be accomplished within the framework of the mandate adopted. I should like to stress that it is, of course, the mandate - I repeat, the mandate - under which we shall be working, although we naturally accept the right of any delegation to express the views that it wishes in the course of our discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Co-ordinator of the Western Group for agenda item 5 for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Erendo, who will speak as Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group for item 5.

Mr. ERENDO (Mongolia) (speaking as Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group for agenda item 5) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, permit me first of all sincerely to congratulate you, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, on your assumption of the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. We wish you success in the performance of your important functions and assure you of our intention to give you every support in this.

Permit me also to express our gratitude to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, for his efficient guidance of the work of the Conference in February.

My delegation would now like to make, as Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States for agenda item 5, the following statement in connection with the decision just adopted on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Of itself, the fact of the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space cannot but evoke satisfaction. After all, prevention of the placing in space of arms of any kind is, together with the issues of curbing the arms race and of nuclear disarmament, of banning nuclear-weapon testing and of concluding a convention on the destruction of chemical weapons, the most topical problem of our time. Space has to be kept peaceful, it must be excluded from the sphere of military preparations and confrontation and transformed into an area of confidence, of active international co-operation to the benefit of all the world's States, irrespective of their degree of economic development. The single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament, can and must play its role in the attainment of this noble goal.

At the same time, one cannot but be struck by the fact that for several years the Conference's Ad hoc Committee has been without a clear, unambiguous mandate for the conduct of businesslike negotiations and has been virtually at a standstill, wasting time on sterile debates concerning problems long-since examined and reviewed, including by itself.

It is no exaggeration to say that as long ago as at the 1986 session the Ad hoc Committee defined the problems connected with preventing the transfer

(Mr. Erendo, Mongolia)

of the arms race into space, surveyed and identified the prohibitions and restrictions deriving from the existing international agreements and exposed the gaps in the legal régime for outer space.

In that connection, and without getting into an unnecessary polemic, we would refer to the results of the vote on resolution 42/33 of the United Nations General Assembly: 154 States voted in favour of that resolution, and only 1 against. It was that position which once again hindered the efforts by the majority of members of the Conference to move on at last to negotiations aimed at concrete, practical work within the framework of the Conference.

At the same time, guided by a desire to begin the practical work of the Ad hoc Committee as soon as possible, the socialist countries have felt it possible to accept the mandate that has just been approved by the Conference.

We declare once again the long-overdue need to concentrate the main attention and efforts on the discussion of the existing decisions and the future proposals aimed at the development of concrete measures for preventing an arms race in outer space and to embark without delay on negotiations.

Review of the proposals and initiatives put forward by various delegations demonstrates that the Conference has accumulated a large number of valuable ideas capable of serving as a basis for substantive talks with a view to reaching an international agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A number of proposals put forward by socialist and other countries relating to various aspects of the prevention of the deployment of weapons in space, including partial but extremely important measures leading to that end, await concrete and businesslike consideration by the Conference. We would particularly like to stress the proposal for a structured discussion of existing proposals and future initiatives.

Naturally, the position of the socialist countries on this question is flexible. We consider that our own approaches are not the only correct ones, and we are open to proposals from other delegations. We think that it is precisely this kind of approach that can promote substantive discussion of matters relating to the prevention of an arms race in space and a transition to the elaboration of multilateral agreements in this sphere.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group for agenda item 5 for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, at the outset please allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. The Federal Republic of Germany and China enjoy friendly relations in many fields. You have long-standing diplomatic experience and are familiar with the work of disarmament. I believe that under your skilful guidance the Conference on Disarmament will score further achievements. The Chinese delegation will co-operate actively with you.

(Mr. Fan, China)

I would also like to thank last month's President, Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic, for his outstanding performance as the President of the Conference on Disarmament for February.

In 1987, the General Assembly, at its forty-second session, adopted resolution 42/33 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in which it made a specific request for the CD to set up an ad hoc committee on outer space. The General Assembly "further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

However, the difference of opinions surrounding the mandate of the ad hoc committee on outer space prevented its early establishment. Ambassador Rose, our President of February, actively organized consultations on this issue. And, on that basis, Mr. President, you have made new efforts. Now all sides have finally come to an agreement and re-established the Ad hoc Committee today.

I would like to point out that in the course of consultations many delegations, especially the Group of 21, adopted a very flexible attitude on the procedural matters and thus played a positive role in facilitating its establishment. The Chinese delegation would like to express its appreciation in this regard. For its part, the Chinese delegation has all along attached great importance to item 5, namely "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In order to get down to substantive work as early as possible, the Chinese delegation can also go along with the procedure adopted for setting up the Ad hoc Committee on outer space. We hope that, following its establishment, the Ad hoc Committee can achieve further progress in the task of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Before concluding, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Taylhardat on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee. I believe that, under his dynamic leadership, new progress will be made on this important item. I would also like to say that today is International Women's Day. The ladies who are participating in the Geneva Congress of Women in Action for Disarmament, Justice and Peace came to our Conference this morning. The Chinese delegation would like to express our welcome to them. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my welcome to them and my festive greetings and congratulations to them and the women delegates of all countries as well as the women staff of the secretariat and the women interpreters.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? That does not seem to be the case.

(The President)

May I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus on the candidate proposed by the Group of 21, Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat of Venezuela. May I ask the Conference to formalize that decision?

It was so decided.

May I express, on behalf of the Conference, our congratulations to Ambassador Taylhardat for his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. In wishing him every success in discharging his important functions in that capacity, I would like to recall that it was thanks to the diplomatic skill and untiring efforts of Ambassador Taylhardat, at that time President of the Conference, that the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 5 was set up for the first time in the Conference.

I wish also to express our appreciation to Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic for his role as President for the month of February in leading the consultations which made it possible today to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee. I would also add my thanks for those who have shown compromise in their attitude. I assume that Ambassador Taylhardat would like to take the floor.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (speaking as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work for the month of March. We know your outstanding personal and professional qualities and we are sure that, under your presidency, the Conference will be able to move its work forward appreciably. For our part, we offer you our co-operation and wish you every success.

I should also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Rose, for the way in which he presided over the work of the Conference last month and for his efforts to obtain the re-establishment of the various ad hoc committees. I can particularly bear witness to the efforts he made to ensure that the ad hoc committee we are re-establishing this afternoon was re-established under your presidency. We, too, are pleased that it is under your presidency that the committee has been re-established.

I should also like to offer my thanks for the confidence that has been shown in me through my selection as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. My gratitude goes first to the Group of 21, which put me forward as its candidate for that important position, and extends to the other groups and China, which accepted and supported my candidacy.

I think that at this juncture there is no need to speak of the importance of the Ad hoc Committee, which is now entering its fourth year of operation. As you, Mr. President, have just said, it was when I was President of the Conference, in March 1985, that we were able for the first time to reach an agreement on the mandate for the Committee. Conscious of the growing

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

importance that the topic was acquiring even then and of the risk that the competition in armaments that now exists on the planet might be transferred into outer space, I spared no efforts then to find a consensus solution that would enable a start to be made on the substantive work on item 5 of our agenda. For that reason I am pleased today to have the opportunity to serve as Chairman of the Committee. That same fact, moreover, places me under an obligation to do all I can to stimulate the Committee's work.

In the three years that the Committee has been in operation, important progress has been made in the consideration of the item. That is undoubtedly due to the excellent work done by my predecessors, Ambassadors Alfarargi, of Egypt; Bayart, of Mongolia, and Pugliese, of Italy. For my part, I mean to do everything possible to follow the course already marked out by my illustrious predecessors and to try to advance as far as possible in our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Taylhardat for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

(Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canada)

We are pleased that the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has finally been re-established. Our discussion under that agenda item shows that we are well aware that we are confronted with what is potentially a completely new theatre of operations. Often, however, our recognition of this fact paradoxically goes both too far and not far enough. Too far, in the sense that the desire of some to prevent militarization before it is too late takes no account of the fact that military-related activities have been going on in outer space for the past 30 years. That is a fact that can be wished away; nor, in view of the stabilizing role of many of these activities, do I think it should be wished away. At the same time, our recognition does not go far enough. Too often, our discussions reflect neither the innovative and evolving aspects of the legal régime applicable to outer space, the elements of which are gradually being put in place, nor the incredible rapidity of changes in space technology.

I do not think I am overstating the case if I suggest that, unless we all come to grips with the reality of the existing situation and acknowledge the revolutionary nature of the task before us, the work of this Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will go unfinished.

When we look at what the Ad hoc Committee has done, we cannot help thinking that results are slow in coming. We seem to be applying ourselves to going over some already well-trodden ground. Yet our discussion of the legal issues, of verification and compliance and of definitions and terminology, to cite only a few examples, have by no means exhausted the mandate agreed on at the start.

We might try to give fresh impetus to our work in the Ad hoc Committee by taking to heart some of the lessons we are learning in our discussions under other agenda items. I am thinking, in particular, of chemical weapons, where it is obvious that a wide range of issues did not receive the attention they deserved from the Conference as a whole until the pace of the work forced all participants to give them priority. In the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, we should try to avoid any situation of this kind.

Here, too, we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral negotiations between the two major space Powers. In the view of the Canadian delegation, we must be particularly careful not to do anything that would be detrimental to the progress of the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space Powers might see some advantage in promoting a discussion in this forum of some of the practical and legal problems that have come to light during their talks.

(Mr. Morel, France)

As regards the other items on the agenda, I cannot go into them in such detail but I must at least mention them, beginning with the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We think that a commendable effort has been made within the framework of the Committee over the past few years. And yet the opportunities for true multilateral work have not been fully exploited; far from it. We are not alone in regretting this, but opinions differ as to the reasons for the shortcoming. Several countries think that it is a question of mandate, and that there is a need for an agreement on a more precise, more directive and more ambitious text. For our part we do not think that that is a promising path to take. On the contrary, it seems to us that the framework that has been determined and has now been carried over on several occasions is altogether appropriate. What is needed is to reconsider the way in which we discuss the prevention of the arms race in outer space, so as to tackle the question in a specific, concrete and realistic fashion.

In the light of the discussions over the past few years, it seems to us that the Conference is now at a turning-point and must shoulder its responsibilities: either it continues its work by using the true situation in outer space as a basis to establish and progressively strengthen the role of the international community in this field, a field that is going to be changing very fast, or it becomes bogged down in a debate on principles without any foothold in reality.

Let us call a spade a spade: 70% of outer space activities are now military in nature, and that situation will not change soon. Furthermore, most of these activities - warning and detection, monitoring, communications, navigation, meteorology, data collection - contribute to strategic stability and more generally to the security of States throughout the world, and play an already significant and certainly increasing role in arms control.

Saying this is not a matter of pleading the cause of fatalism but of trying to size up the movement now under way. Civilian activity in space is progressing at the same time as military activity, and in certain cases it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between them. That is to say

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(Mr. Morel, France)

that one cannot be content with declaratory acts or arbitrarily fixed borders. Nor can one ignore what is going on in the Soviet/United States bilateral framework.

It seems to us, therefore that the Ad hoc Committee that has just been re-established under the chairmanship of Ambassador Taylhardat must take advantage of the situation to determine an approach that is both modest and ambitious. Modest because nothing can be done without real collective competence, which must be rapidly increased, in particular by recourse to national experts who could strengthen delegations in turn; ambitious because, even starting from the current situation, it is possible, so broad are the prospects, to identify the most promising directions for international action - and we are thinking in particular of non-interference in non-aggressive space activities, the preparation of a code of conduct in outer space, the strengthening of notification, and verification.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation has asked for the floor today to submit for circulation as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament a Soviet proposal for the "establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space".

Guided by the goal of achieving a strict and universal ban on the deployment of all arms in outer space, the Soviet delegation proposed during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament that, without waiting for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement on space, a start should be made on establishing a system for international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. In the opinion of the USSR, the central place in such a verification system might be taken by an international space inspectorate having access to any objects intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space.

The Soviet proposal to establish an international inspectorate was met with interest, as witnessed by the questions addressed to us and the requests made to us to explain the details of our proposal. Taking into account the discussion of this idea at the Conference, in particular in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, we have put our proposal in more concrete terms and today we are submitting the result in the form of a document. In this connection, we believe that, depending on the specifics of actual agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the verification system, the structure of the international space inspectorate and its modes of operation could be further worked out and refined in the course of negotiations.

Let me briefly describe the major provisions of the document we are submitting.

The document defines the main aim in establishing the international space inspectorate as being to implement measures to verify that any objects to be launched into and stationed in outer space by States parties are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind.

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Obviously, the simplest and most effective way to verify that objects to be launched into and stationed in space are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind is on-site inspection directly before launch. Consequently we suggest that States should inform the international inspectorate in advance of every forthcoming launch, giving, inter alia, the date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general information on the space object to be launched. Then, at a certain time to be agreed upon, inspectors would check the object to be launched. As space launch sites are few in number and launches are rather frequent, it would seem appropriate for the inspection teams to remain at the launch sites during the period between inspections as well, that is, for them to be there permanently.

Of course, we cannot ignore the possibility of undeclared launches of space objects. Under our concept, a State party has the right in this case to request the international space inspectorate to obtain clarification from any State party regarding a situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object. If the requesting State party considers the clarification insufficient, it may request the international space inspectorate to take a decision to hold an ad hoc inspection at the launching site and in the area of landing of detachable parts of the launch vehicle and spacecraft. A State which has received a request from the international space inspectorate for the holding of an ad hoc inspection shall be bound to afford the ad hoc inspection group the opportunity to carry out such an inspection without delay, that is, without right of refusal.

The document contains proposals on the structure of the governing bodies and the financing of the international space inspectorate's activities and on the composition and method of appointment of permanent inspection teams.

To enable the inspectors to determine with sufficient certainty that the space object is not a weapon and is not equipped with weapons, it is provided by way of obligations for the inspected side vis-à-vis the inspectors that the receiving State shall, inter alia, in the course of the inspection: provide the inspectors with the necessary instruments, materials and equipment; provide the inspectors, in the course of the observation programme, with the necessary information directly connected with the performance by the inspectors of their functions; admit the inspectors to the sites where space objects are mounted on the launch vehicle and to their launching sites; etc.

It goes without saying that many of the provisions of this document can be further developed and refined in the course of the future negotiations. We trust that, after careful consideration of the Soviet proposal, delegations will share their views on it in the course of our work. We are open to constructive proposals aimed at an early and effective solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

Mr. President, the non-aligned and neutral countries have consistently been of the view that outer space is the common heritage of all humankind and all exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes should be carried out for the benefit, and in the interest of, all developing countries. Satellite technology has now reached a stage where its advantages in terms of communications, remote sensing, navigation and meteorology are becoming progressively more accessible. We, therefore, view with great concern the development of anti-satellite weapon systems. Priority must be accorded in this area to a ban on the development of anti-satellite weapons coupled with the dismantling of existing systems. It is an encouraging sign that, in the two States with most significant space capabilities, some restraints in this regard are currently being observed. What is needed now is urgently to begin negotiations on a binding multilateral commitment.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will take place at a crucial, but opportune moment. The advances in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR should improve the prospects of the success of the Conference. The consensus on the Final Document of the first special session of 1978 makes it a document of abiding value and long-term validity. Our goals are clearly and unambiguously stated in the programme of action contained in the Final Document. These should be now taken up for implementation in earnest. We look forward to the session as an opportunity for a genuine search for ways of breaking out of the impasse in the multilateral process during the last decade or so and stand ready to work with all for outlining the course of activities for the future. The session will also deal with a new agenda item relating to the qualitative aspects of the arms race and the disarmament process, included on the basis of an initiative taken by India and some other countries.

Today we stand on the threshold of a new arms race which seeks to combine the most recent developments in the field of electronics with the lethality of nuclear explosive power. With increasing miniaturization and advances in techniques of target acquisition, discrimination and precision capabilities, warheads are becoming smaller, more lethal and accurate. There is an increased versatility both in launch platforms and in warheads. At the same time, the functions of reconnaissance, surveillance, target identification, kill assessment and evaluation are being re-designed to make greater use of satellite and other sophisticated sensor technologies and data processing using fifth-generation computers. With such deployments, the command and control systems stand in danger of becoming increasingly automated and hence

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(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

dehumanized. Exotic technologies, such as X-ray lasers, plasma weapons, rail guns, etc. - mechanisms which involve very rapid transfers of highly-focused precise amounts of destructive energy - are being developed.

On the other side, there have been developments that enable us to enhance confidence in compliance with existing and future disarmament agreements. The same satellite technologies can be used to play an important role as a confidence-building measure. The same sensor technologies can also assist in the monitoring of a future chemical weapons convention or an ASAT ban. Technology is neutral; its applications can be stabilizing or de-stabilizing. We have to develop the means to channel these applications into a stabilizing mode. In order to do so, we need continually to assess the implications of these developments for security. We also need to develop appropriate institutional mechanisms which are capable of undertaking this task. The arms race has unfortunately made science and technology the masters of war rather than the servants of peace. At SSOD-III, we must look at this equation and attempt to redress the balance.

Verification of compliance is an issue of concern to all nations. Consequently, it cannot be left only to those which are advanced in military technology. There is now a growing recognition of the need of a suitable multilateral verification system as part of strengthened multilateralism to manage the present complex international economic and political relations. It was in this context that the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative proclaimed in the Stockholm Declaration:

"We recognize the need for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free-world".

The six leaders have declared their intention jointly to propose to the United Nations to promote the establishment of such a system at the forthcoming special session on disarmament.

In reviewing the work of the CD, one cannot escape the uncomfortable feeling that its achievements have been modest in relation to the arduous tasks and onerous responsibilities the Conference is faced with. It is evident that the CD can advance only so far as each one of us is willing to allow it to. The importance of mustering the necessary political will, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, cannot be over-emphasized. We do not share the view that there is any inherent defect in the structure, composition or the procedures of the Conference on Disarmament. Of course, we are not against organizational reform. We favour the suggestions for improving the Conference's effectiveness made by the Group of Seven, especially the proposal for automatic re-establishment of ad hoc committees every year with a standard mandate on all agenda items. However, such measures can only supplement, and not be a substitute for the will to make progress.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Our exercise relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space seems to be in such an unending first stage. In spite of the sincere efforts of a number of delegations and of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, we can hardly expect substantive progress. It might well happen that we shall be engaged in identifying issues relating to that agenda item until the arms race irreversibly penetrates into outer space.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has just recently been established. Although tardy, this step gives us real grounds for satisfaction given the very special interest we have in this subject. After three years of "study", "identification" and "general consideration" on the substance of questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we had the right to expect this year to be a year of negotiation.

Such a development, which would have fitted logically in with resolution 42/33, has not been possible. It is thus easy to understand our disappointment at the fact that the adoption of the mandate and the President's statement have been delinked. Given this situation we have to be realistic, and we have to benefit from all elements which can help to achieve progress in the work of the Ad hoc Committee: the results of three years of work, the continuation of the bilateral negotiations in Geneva which cover space weapons, among other matters, and the presence at the head of the Committee of Ambassador Taylhardat, who last year made an outstanding contribution to the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

International interactions in outer space are gradually degenerating into a possible arms race. With increasing technological advancement in space science, outer space may soon become an arena for an arms race. Outer space should continue to be the common heritage of all mankind, and its uses should be restricted for peaceful purposes.

My delegation is pleased with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space. Although the mandate given to it is a non-negotiating one, we believe that the Ad hoc Committee could still carry out practical work that would facilitate the strengthening of the present legal system which governs outer space in order to effectively ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(U Tin Tun, Burma)

My delegation was happy to witness early this month the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is well that the Ad hoc Committee has now adopted its programme of work and started its substantive work in earnest.

The overwhelming importance of this question is recognized by us all. This question encompasses two basic aspects - the technical aspect and the political and legal aspect. In dealing with the technical aspect of the question, we will find the expertise of scientific experts useful. My delegation therefore supports the proposal for the establishment of an expert group to provide technical assistance to the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 5.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

A happy contrast which vindicates the CD's role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum is the progress made in negotiating a draft chemical weapons convention.

A special debt of gratitude is due to Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden for all his innovative, patient and sustained efforts during 1987, which succeeded in bringing the draft convention to a point of near-fruit. Our good wishes go now to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who takes the baton from Ambassador Ekéus as the CD enters what we hope is the final sprint on the home stretch. The complexity of the outstanding questions that remain is certainly not being minimized. But Sri Lanka feels that an outcome which falls short of a universal, comprehensive and verifiable ban on all chemical weapons will not succeed in outlawing these weapons. Slackening the pace of negotiations could result in unravelling agreed measures and encouraging the further proliferation of chemical weapons. The speedy conclusion of a convention must be pursued. The momentum must not be lost.

That the CD has succeeded in reaching an advanced stage in this complex question largely because it has had the benefit of about two years of work under a negotiating mandate, must surely have a lesson to teach. That lesson

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(Mr. Rodriqo, Sri Lanka)

has unfortunately not been learned in respect of item 5 of the CD's agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The Ad hoc Committee on this item has begun its work under the skilful and experienced guidance of Ambassador Tavlhadrat of Venezuela, but unfortunately on terms which gives it less than a mandate to negotiate. My delegation would have preferred to have seen the Ad hoc Committee invested with an adequate mandate to undertake negotiations towards the eventual conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

There is no doubt that the question of averting an arms race in outer space is one of considerable complexity. To delay a negotiating mandate for the Ad hoc Committee is, however, to lose valuable time during which the relatively conflict-free reaches of outer space could deteriorate into a vast theatre of deadly discord and confrontation which could not only irretrievably scar the heavens but have disastrous consequences for life on this planet as well.

The existing legal régime in outer space is being overtaken by technological and strategic developments. Early action in a multilateral context is essential to strengthen the legal system and supplement its inadequacies to ensure the exclusively peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of its weaponization. Closer co-operation could perhaps be considered between the Ad hoc Committee and the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Outer space has virtually unlimited potential for development purposes. It is also betraying signs of emerging tensions and conflicts. New technologies in space science can be exploited for peaceful economic and other development just as much as they can be abused for destructive purposes. Although outer space is already being used for military purposes, the options are not yet closed and the choice still remains open.

Even for small countries like my own, the non-military benefits being derived from satellite technology are not only accessible, but vital for our development process. The development of anti-satellite weaponry may be prompted perhaps by the military uses that can and are being made of satellites, but special priority needs to be given in a multilateral framework to effecting a ban on the development of anti-satellite weapons affecting the peaceful uses of outer space.

Several proposals now before the Ad hoc Committee deserve careful consideration and study. Structured consideration of the complex issues affecting outer space and the manner in which different proposals seek to deal with them could advance work in the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Under the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", purposive work should at last be accomplished with a view to reaching an understanding on practical steps within a multilateral framework. Ideas and proposals on this matter are at hand.

CD/PV.455

4-5

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Another question which deserves greater attention from the Conference relates to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Despite the acknowledged urgency of this issue, we are obliged to note that our consideration of this matter still falls far short of the expectations of the international community. The difficulties encountered in attempts to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space are significant in this regard.

The adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 42/33, and the commitments, limited though they are, assumed by the American and Soviet sides in their joint statement in Washington, should normally have led the Conference to embark on genuine negotiations under item 5 of the agenda. We none the less hope that the Ad hoc Committee dealing with this item will use this present session to take a concrete and more specific look at the various questions on its work programme. We know that the Conference can count on the devotion and the skills of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylardat, to ensure the greatest possible progress in the work of this body.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, comrade President. It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to this post, as the representative of the Hungarian People's Republic, with which our country is bound by relations of friendship and close co-operation. We know that you are an experienced diplomat, and we wish you success during the important period in the Conference's work on the threshold of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Soviet delegation would also like to express gratitude to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, for his able guidance of our work during the month of March.

Today's statement by the Soviet delegation coincides with a significant date. Exactly 27 years ago today, on 12 April 1961, the world's first cosmonaut, a citizen of the Soviet Union, Yuri Gagarin, blazed a path for man in outer space.

Over a relatively short period in the history of civilization and science, achievements in space exploration have been truly astonishing. Dozens of States have embarked on space exploration, and every year more countries join in the utilization of space for their practical needs.

From the very outset of the space era, however, it became clear that the new technology is capable of tackling not only scientific and economic tasks, but military tasks too. The Soviet Union consistently advocates the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to contribute to the scientific, economic and social development of all States.

Our country has been consistently pursuing this policy here at the Conference on Disarmament too, in seeking to prevent an arms race in space.

At today's session, the delegation of the Soviet Union has tabled new concrete proposals regarding the creation of an international space inspectorate. We are expecting that the participants in the Conference will take an active part in discussion of this proposal and will express their views on it.

The Conference on Disarmament is an eminently qualified forum to contribute to the maintenance of outer space as a domain for exclusively peaceful co-operation among all nations. A lot of useful work in this respect has already been accomplished by the Ad Hoc Committee on this topic. It is high time, however, to commence specific international actions.

Poland has always attached major importance to the Conference on Disarmament and believes, therefore, that the negotiations conducted in this forum should be strengthened and further developed.

(Mr. Nazarkin - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

Equally meagre progress has also been made in the elaboration of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space - item 5 on the agenda - which I touched upon at the beginning of my statement today. Although the Ad hoc Committee on this item has been functioning in the framework of the Conference since 1985, for four years it has proved impossible to move forward in working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, since the committee has been functioning for four years on the basis of the same mandate, which does not provide for negotiations.

The Soviet delegation considers that such a state of affairs in the key areas of the Conference's work should be the object of very serious consideration at the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is our expectation that, at the forthcoming special session, decisions will be taken that will spur on and give a powerful stimulus to negotiations on these problems, which are of vital importance to mankind.

(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches great importance to the role which the Conference should play in preventing an arms race in outer space. The danger that weapons will be deployed in outer space becomes more tangible each day. To counter this danger it is necessary to respect existing agreements strictly and speedily devise new measures which would firmly block the arms race in this direction.

On the basis of this approach we support the proposal for the institution of a system of international monitoring of the ban on the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. A central role in such a system could be played by an international outer space inspectorate, which would have access to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in space.

CD/PV.457

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(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

Poland firmly believes that prevention of an arms race in outer space should be firmly established among the Conference's priorities. It is beyond any doubt that the extension of the arms race to outer space would inevitably unleash a new, more intensive, more costly and much more fatal round of the arms race on Earth. As a corollary, progress in disarmament would be rendered

almost impossible. The Conference on Disarmament is an eminently qualified organ to contribute to the maintenance of outer space as a domain for exclusively peaceful co-operation among all nations. A lot of useful work in this respect has already been accomplished by the Ad hoc Committee on this topic. It is high time, however, to negotiate specific international accords.

Poland has always attached major importance to the Conference on Disarmament and believes, therefore, that the negotiating mandate of this forum should be strengthened and further developed.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Like other countries, Egypt realizes that the exploration of outer space could prove very beneficial for mankind through its peaceful uses, but at the same time it poses an increasing danger of the use of space for military purposes. This danger will not be limited to the major Powers with space technologies, but will extend to the rest of the world as well. One can even say that the third world countries will be even more seriously endangered, since they do not possess the technology and capabilities available to the major Powers to defend themselves against such danger. As soon as the arms race in outer space begins, an increasing number of States will hasten to join in, thereby creating a situation the outcome of which would be difficult to predict. We still maintain the hope that concerted efforts will be made to ensure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only, and to prevent the extension of the arms race to it.

The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has examined and defined all issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the course of three sessions. This year saw intensive deliberations aimed at moving forward with the work of the Committee to a stage consistent with the principles of General Assembly resolution 42/33 adopted on 30 November 1987. The resolution calls upon the Conference on Disarmament "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

My delegation is disappointed at the inability to develop and improve the mandate of the Committee on the basis of the General Assembly resolution, and the inability to agree on means of improving the programme of work to allow the Committee to achieve the desired results. This inability is due to the rigid position of one delegation.

The deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee also indicated that, in spite of the many positive factors inherent in the legal system governing the use of outer space, this system still has some shortcomings that ought to be remedied, as required through the conclusion of a treaty or treaties to prevent an arms race in outer space. Logically, the Ad hoc Committee should proceed to another stage in its work, by examining the proposals that were submitted to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many of these proposals before the Ad hoc Committee deserve study and evaluation. I am referring, in particular, to the proposal to expand the scope of article IV of the 1967 Treaty on outer space to include the banning of all types of weapons, instead of restricting this prohibition to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The proposal further aims at extending the ban from mere placement of such weapons in outer space to their use as well. This proposal fills a serious gap in the legal system currently governing the use of outer space. In view of the fact that the attempts to broaden the scope of article IV have not been successful over the last 20 years, we consider that the time has come to satisfy this requirement, in the light of the increasing and definite dangers of an arms race in outer space. Not too long ago, this was only a possibility, but the danger now is an actual fact.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We must realize the seriousness of the situation, and must adopt the necessary steps to face it, knowing that the element of time is not in our favour. Therefore, we urge the Conference to deal objectively with this item, concentrating on the substance and providing the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, with the powers and freedom of action required to enable him to guide the work of the Ad hoc Committee towards the attainment of that objective.

CD/PV.460

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(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another subject of urgent priority for our Conference. We welcome the fact that the Ad hoc Committee on this item commenced its substantive work last month, though somewhat belatedly, and would like to assure Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela of our full co-operation in the accomplishment of his difficult task. Since its establishment in 1985, the Ad hoc Committee has carried out a detailed examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and of existing agreements. We must now focus our attention on

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(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

the third item of its programme of work, relating to existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to reaching agreement on concrete measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Committee will be enabled to address this task meaningfully this year.

It cannot be seriously disputed that the current legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space, comprising customary law, the Charter of the United Nations and several international agreements pertaining specifically to outer space, is not adequate to the task of preventing an arms race in this environment. Several shortcomings in the existing law have been identified in the course of discussions in the Ad hoc Committee. It has already been overtaken by technological developments not foreseen by those who drew up the existing treaties. The rapid pace at which space technology is advancing threatens to make the existing space law a tenuous fabric.

A wide variety of military activities is already taking place in space, and space support systems have become an important part of the military machine of space Powers. However, present military activities do not involve the use of weapons in space or of weapons directed against objects in space. It is still not too late to adopt measures that would permanently preclude an expensive and highly dangerous arms race in space. A comprehensive new international régime which ensures that our last frontier does not become an arena of armed conflict is urgently needed. There should be a strict and universal ban on the development, testing, production and deployment of any weapons in outer space. This régime should, in addition, aim at making the beneficial and stabilizing uses of outer space available to all nations on a basis of equality.

Greater transparency in the military activities of space Powers in outer space would serve an important confidence-building function. We therefore invite countries engaged in the research, development and testing of space weapons to inform the Conference on Disarmament of these activities in an open and detailed manner, pending a complete ban on such weapons. The proposal for strengthening the registration Convention has been supported by many delegations. Information on the general function of space objects at present given under article IV of the convention is not provided in a timely manner, is not sufficient to give a clear picture of the military activities of space Powers, and is not subject to verification. To overcome these shortcomings, it would be necessary to amend the registration Convention or to conclude a new agreement providing for the furnishing, before launch, of detailed information, inter alia on the precise function of the space vehicle, and for the verification of this information at the launching site by an international agency. In this connection, I should like to refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the establishment of an international inspectorate to verify the non-deployment of weapons in space. We feel that, as a first step, such an institution could be set up for the purpose of verifying data concerning the function of space objects with a view to providing the international community with reliable information on activities in space, especially those of a military nature.

My delegation has on previous occasions voiced its support for the proposal for the establishment of an international space monitoring agency.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Such an organization would provide the international community with the means of verifying compliance with disarmament agreements on the basis of the remote sensing and surveillance techniques now available to only a few. It would contribute to confidence-building and transparency and thus strengthen international peace and security. We view with concern the large-scale programmes currently under way in a few countries aimed at developing space-based ballistic missile defences. We believe that the deployment of such systems, if technically feasible, would lead to unending competition in strategic defences, a host of countermeasures that can be arrayed against them, and the deployment of more numerous and more sophisticated offensive weapons. Such an arms race, affecting the Earth as well as outer space, would be futile, costly and highly destabilizing.

The dangerous consequences of a competition in ballistic missile defences have been appreciated since the 1960s. Strict limits were therefore placed on such systems in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The philosophy underlying the Treaty, that limits on offensive nuclear weapons are possible only if strict constraints are placed on anti-missile systems, remains valid and is of universal application. There is therefore a need to supplement and reinforce this bilateral treaty through the conclusion of a multilateral agreement of unlimited duration. I would like to recall in this connection a proposal to this effect made by my delegation in 1986.

The importance of a ban on ASAT weapons is widely recognized. Needless to say, such a ban should give protection only to satellites performing peaceful functions, and not those which threaten the security of other States. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposes an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space fulfil this criterion. These are issues which must be addressed urgently. Effective verification is an indispensable element of any international disarmament agreement. This is true also for agreements concerning outer space. The difficulties associated with verifying compliance with outer space agreements, in view of the vast extent of this environment, are sometimes exaggerated. Perfect verification cannot be achieved and should not be aimed at. All space objects are launched from the ground and are not unlimited in number. The location of launching sites is known, and satellites can easily be inspected before launch. Moreover, outer space itself is open to inspection, as considerations of national sovereignty do not apply.

Full compliance with the existing legal régime governing outer space, insufficient and incomplete as it is, is of fundamental importance. The ABM Treaty is one of its essential components. It should be strictly observed and its provisions maintained and further strengthened. My delegation welcomes the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers on space matters, and urges the two parties to bring them to an early conclusion which would also be in keeping with the wider interests of the international community.

I have addressed items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of our agenda in my statement this morning. I hope to take up items 4, 7 and 8 in a later intervention.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

On item 5 of the agenda, my delegation is of the opinion that outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, should be reserved for exploration and exploitation for peaceful purposes alone. The legal régime at present governing space activities should be adapted, taking into account the

astonishing progress in space technology. It would be highly desirable for the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, to be amended by an additional protocol.

In this sphere of outer space it is necessary to arrive at a ban on anti-satellite weapons, the declaration of a moratorium concerning these arms, the adoption of a code of conduct governing the placing of space objects, the strengthening of the Convention on the registration of space objects and an exchange of information on space activities.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to convey the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you preside over the work of our Conference for this month and for the inter-sessional period. We wish you every success and assure you of our full co-operation.

I am taking the floor on this occasion in order to introduce to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which I have the honour of chairing at this session. This report has been circulated in document CD/833 and is in the hands of delegations.

The report of the Committee, which will form part of the report that the Conference will submit to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, covers the work of the Committee from its creation in 1985 to the present. During this time the Committee has worked actively, and at this point I must mention and pay tribute to its former chairmen for the excellent work accomplished by my predecessors as Chairman of the Committee, Ambassadors Alfarargi of Egypt, Bayart of Mongolia and Pugliese of Italy.

In the three and a half years of its existence, the Committee, in carrying out the tasks set out in its mandate, has devoted itself to consideration of the following subjects: issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; existing agreements; and existing proposals and future initiatives.

The substantive part of the report gives an account of the consideration of these subjects and sets out the different positions of the delegations in this regard. The deliberations were lively, and ideas and proposals were put forward by various delegations which contributed thereby to thorough examination of item 5 on the agenda of the Conference. They were also useful in highlighting the difficulties posed by the problems related to prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I believe it is appropriate to point out that one of the innovations before this special Assembly will be this very report. As you will recall, the substantive work of the Conference on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space began in 1985, that is to say after the second special Assembly devoted to disarmament. For the first time, therefore, the Assembly will receive an input from the Conference on this crucial issue.

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(Mr. Taylhardat, (Venezuela))

If account is taken of the relatively short time the Conference has spent on examining the subject, it must be concluded that although concrete results have not as yet been reached, the balance of the discussions and deliberations of the Conference is clearly positive.

There is no doubt that significant progress has been made in the multilateral consideration of the subject. In this connection it should be emphasized that the conclusion of the report reflects the consensus attained on important points. There is general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and a desire to contribute to achieving that common objective. It is also stated that the work carried out by the Committee since its establishment has helped make progress towards the accomplishment of its task. The Committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of the various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussions contributed to better understanding of the problems and the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space does not by itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need to consolidate and reinforce it and enhance its effectiveness, and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. In this context emphasis was placed on the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which provided that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies." Lastly, the report states that preliminary consideration was given to a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

I would not wish to conclude the presentation of the report without expressing my appreciation to all the delegations for the valuable contributions they have made and for the flexibility and spirit of co-operation they have showed and for the support they gave me in efforts to overcome differences of opinion with regard to certain points, enabling us to reach the present results, which will now be presented to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. In particular, it is my duty to express my gratitude to the group co-ordinators for the extensive support they offered me at all times. I would also like to express my thanks to the Secretary of the Committee, Mrs. Aida Levin, as well as her colleagues and all the Conference officials who, directly or indirectly, participated in the work of the Ad hoc Committee and who contributed to its activities.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has now been functioning since 1985. During this period the committee has regrettably reached only limited results. The discussions so far have contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions. Firstly, it has been generally recognized that activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, there has been a growing awareness of the need to consolidate and reinforce the existing legal régime for outer space. Thirdly, it has been confirmed by most delegations, including my own, that the overall objective of the work of the CD in this field should be the long-term goal of a complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons.

Pending the realization of that comprehensive objective, Sweden, as well as several other delegations, has stated that a most urgent partial measure could be a ban on anti-satellite weapons. In order to make further progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee there is an urgent need for some technical groundwork to be done. I want to take this opportunity to reiterate the Swedish proposal to organize within the Conference a governmental experts' meeting of limited duration to address, for example, definitions and verification techniques relevant to our common efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I have great pleasure in extending the Argentine delegation's congratulations to you as your country takes over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. We take this opportunity to tell you that my delegation is most eager to co-operate with you in the performance of your duties. We also wish Ambassadors Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan and Tin Tun of Burma every success in their new positions. We should like to welcome Ambassadors Ruoro of Kenya, Loeis of Indonesia, Kostov of Bulgaria and de Rivero of Peru to this Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the delegation of Argentina has proposed that space Powers declare that they have not deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis.

This initiative has been prompted by the example of different delegations that have pressed for unilateral declarations aimed at creating a climate of confidence. It is well known, for example, that various delegations - some of them members of military alliances - have urged States to declare unilaterally whether they possess chemical weapons and to state what stocks of such weapons they possess if they do. In keeping with this idea, many countries, among them the Argentine Republic, have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons.

Of course, these unilateral statements have no value except in so far as people wish to trust them, as they are not subject to any verification procedure until the Convention banning chemical weapons enters into force.

Moreover, in the strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, there have been some exchanges of information about numbers, types of systems, deployment, etc. These are also unilateral declarations, which are made with a view to creating a climate of confidence in the negotiations despite the unverifiability of the information.

Similarly, in the Vienna talks on reductions of military forces and conventional weapons, an exchange of information on quantities and types of such weapons has also been proposed without any kind of verification procedure being required.

Another example from the bilateral strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States is the proposed exchange of information on sea-launched cruise missiles in view of the difficulties posed by verification of this category of weapons. Such a unilateral, good-faith declaration would also be unverifiable.

It is worth noting that in the field of multilateral disarmament agreements, the principle of the validity of unilateral declarations has been recognized by the international community. Let us take the case of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. It welcomed with satisfaction declarations by States to the effect that they do not possess any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. The Conference considered that such declarations increased confidence in the Convention.

We have cited all these precedents bearing in mind that one of the objections made to the Argentine proposal was the unverifiability of a declaration by a space Power stating it had not placed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis.

Verification does not play any role in this sort of declaration, whose merit lies solely in the mere fact that it is made and in the credibility of the State making it. Unilateral declarations have nevertheless been recognized as helping to create a climate of confidence along the lines of the confidence-building measures successfully dealt with by the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session.

It is our belief that countries and delegations that advocate unilateral, non-verifiable declarations in different fields, such as chemical weapons, strategic arms both land -and sea-based, and conventional weapons, should also acknowledge the benefits of unilateral declarations by which space Powers would state that they had not deployed weapons in space.

Another objection that has been made to this Argentine proposal is the lack of a universally acceptable definition of a space weapon.

We should like to draw attention to the fact that our proposal does not refer to space weapons, but simply to weapons, as we assume it is known what weapons or arms are. Otherwise the Conference on Disarmament would not be about anything at all.

It has also been argued that any object in space could be used as a weapon; for example, if it were placed on a collision course with another space object. This argument is in our view obviously superficial. By analogy we should conclude that a bus driven so as to cause a collision is technically a land weapon.

We take this opportunity to repeat our request to the Conference on Disarmament to analyse this initiative, whose contribution to the creation of a climate of confidence in the prevention of an arms race in outer space is obvious.

It is quite clear that any space Power that declares that it has not placed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis assumes a commitment before international public opinion which will remain in force until it announces that the declaration is no longer valid.

A declaration of this nature constitutes a basic condition, I would even say an essential condition, if an arms race in outer space is to be prevented.

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

We consider, and we have said so on various occasions, that the promotion of confidence-building measures is a valid and appropriate alternative at the present pre-negotiating stage in which the Conference on Disarmament finds itself concerning outer space.

The proposal we are putting forward clearly fits into this category.

We also think it is important to stress that the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission on confidence-building measures recognized the fact that one of the main purposes of such measures was to reduce or even eliminate the sources of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding or miscalculation with regard to States' military activities.

Unilateral measures of a voluntary character like the ones we are suggesting were also recognized as valid means that could in due course be developed further into effective international agreements.

For the time being, our objective is of a more modest nature. It is simply to put together collateral measures that could prepare the ground for future and more specific agreements if that were the wish of members of this Conference.

Document CD/716 of 16 July 1986 submitted by the Canadian delegation on "Terminology relevant to arms control and outer space" stated on page 5 the following: "To the best knowledge of the international community, weapons have not yet been placed in orbit on a permanent or semi-permanent basis although it is generally assumed that anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) have been inserted into full or partial orbit for testing purposes on more than one occasion in the past."

Since it seems that weapons have not yet been deployed in space on a permanent basis a declaration by the space Powers such as we propose would help to freeze the situation, thus sending a message of reassurance to the international community. Silence, on the contrary, would arouse the greatest suspicion and at the same time create the fear that the space Powers were trying to keep absolute freedom of action for themselves in order to turn outer space into a theatre of activities to be conducted at their discretion.

We hope that delegations of the countries regarded as space Powers will express their views on this initiative in this Conference.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The danger of the transfer of the arms race into outer space adds a new dimension to the arms race in general. Therefore, prevention of its extension into outer space is a precondition for preservation of space for peaceful uses and co-operation. Countries that own space technology cannot reserve it for themselves, because all countries that use space to a larger or smaller extent have a legitimate interest in negotiating, as a point of departure, a system of legal measures for the prevention of additional militarization, regardless of whether space weapons be located in space or on earth. We expect all delegations to show understanding for such an orientation in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee.

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(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Secondly, a large number of countries made an objective evaluation of the international and disarmament situation. They rightly pointed out that although there had been a certain improvement in East-West relations and some progress on the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the super-Powers which had signed and ratified the Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the arms race between them had not come to a halt; instead, there had emerged a new trend marked by their quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons and their accelerated application of sophisticated scientific and technological achievements in the research and development of a new generation of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as space weapons. The expansion of the arms race into outer space and other high-technology fields cannot but arouse the grave concern of the international community.

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(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Thirdly, many countries put forward reasonable and practical proposals on the future goals and tasks of disarmament, covering areas such as nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, a ban on chemical weapons, naval arms and disarmament, confidence-building measures, verification, and the relationship between disarmament and development. It is particularly noteworthy that all the participants further affirmed that the super-Powers possessing the largest and most sophisticated arsenals bore special responsibility for disarmament. They should take the lead in substantially reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons and in halting the space arms race. This represents the effective and unavoidable way for the realization of a genuine disarmament.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The spilling over of the arms race into outer space must be prevented, if the aim to end it on earth is to be achieved. The negotiations to cut the Soviet and United States offensive strategic nuclear missiles by half are inevitably bound up with the overall question of observing the ABM Treaty.

In its work on agenda item 5, the Committee should primarily see to it that the discussion is even more focused on global measures designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. We can note with satisfaction that a number of proposals are already on the table. In this regard, we should like to remind you of the working paper of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia on "Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects" (CD/777). We are well aware of the complicated technical issues which do exist in this field. For this reason, we endorse the idea that a group of scientists working on a temporary basis should be set up.

Mr. MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French): In my statement today, I will address item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. In subsequent statements later in the session, I intend to take up two other major areas of priority for Canada: chemical weapons and a nuclear test ban.

Speaking for the first time in plenary since the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, I cannot hide my disappointment that the session ended without agreement on a substantive final document. However, like many of those who spoke before me on this subject, rather than pin blame on one participant or another, I believe we must, in this Conference, build on the common ground which emerged during the deliberations at that session and continue the dialogue in those areas where divergencies continue to exist.

The emerging consensus at the third session confirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. Accordingly, the participants urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts in this area. The draft document also referred to the significant contribution that success in the American-Soviet negotiations would make to our common objective of preventing an arms race. The Government of Canada concurs fully with this analysis, which recognizes the significance of the task before us and gives proper weight to the importance of the bilateral dimension.

Notwithstanding this latter point, it is clear that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. This is, as it should be, a point that is implicitly recognized in the draft document of the special session where all States are called upon to contribute actively to work towards the objective of the peaceful uses of outer space. Given the potential for an arms race in outer space, the increase in the number of countries with significant interests and capabilities in space and the continuing growth in space activities, the Canadian Government believes that it is appropriate that this dimension should be expected to take on, and should actually take on, increasing significance.

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(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Having said this, it is clear that if the multilateral dimension is to take on greater importance, the Conference on Disarmament will have to play a more substantive role in preventing an arms race in outer space. To achieve this objective we must start from four important considerations. Firstly, we must take very great care to enhance stability and not detract from it, secondly our negotiations must compliment, in the strictest sense of the word, the negotiations between the two major space Powers. Thirdly, we must recognize that a very considerable measure of prohibition and protection already exists in outer space and that we must base our efforts on that foundation, fourthly, we must not confuse or lose sight of the very useful and practical division of labour between the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer space.

Establishing a starting-point is relatively easy. What comes next is a lot harder. Prevention of an arms race in outer space clearly involves a significant effort both in defining space weapons and in defining legitimate space activities. Each of us recognizes the bewildering complexity of the problems regarding the emplacement of weapons in space and the deployment on Earth of weapons capable of attacking objects in space. We are all also aware of the difficulty of defining the kinds of military activities that might or might not be legitimately conducted in space.

The fact that the task is difficult and complex does not dictate that we should eschew it, but rather that we should perhaps focus more on measures that could provide a starting-point in the establishment of an appropriate international régime.

One might confine oneself to asserting that these questions require a comprehensive solution and not piecemeal or partial treatment. We could agree to incremental measures provided that they were fully compatible with the existing and future régime, and that compliance with the legal obligations thus created could be effectively verified.

We also believe, as the Australian delegation noted last year, that these goals will be finally attained only in so far as States give all due transparency to their space activities. We must all face the fact that unless we can make significant steps in the direction of greater transparency in these areas, our chances of negotiating a comprehensive régime for the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be pretty slim.

One area which might permit practical progress in increasing transparency would be multilateral exchanges of data on the military functions of space objects. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space offers clear potential for improving our collective behaviour, provided that we decide to improve compliance with the provisions, and especially the spirit of the Convention. In particular, article IV, paragraph 1 (e) stipulates that each State shall furnish to the Secretary-General information on the general functions of space objects carried on its registry.

It should be noted at the outset that the Registration Convention is not primarily an arms control agreement or a disarmament treaty, it should further be noted that the Outer Space Treaty, which was also negotiated in the

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, is in part incontestably an arms control measure. Clearly it is the terms of an agreement and not its provenance which should reflect its purpose and functions.

As noted, article IV of the 1975 Convention requires, *inter alia*, that each State furnish information concerning the general function of a space object before launching it or procuring its launching. In the past, descriptions furnished to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under this heading have been extremely vague. In fact, as the United Kingdom and Canada pointed out to the Conference in 1985, not one of the space objects whose launching has been registered has ever been described as having a military function, despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, over half of all space launches were primarily for military purposes. We accept the fact that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning military activities may, by necessity, be limited by considerations of national security (although even this point might deserve some examination), but we do not believe that this should extend to a refusal to describe space objects as having military functions. Here again it is a question of using elements of the existing legal régime in outer space to strengthen confidence and effectively promote greater transparency.

What we are suggesting, therefore, is that States parties to the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space should take their reporting responsibilities more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the general function of space objects to provide more detailed and timely information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening of the application of the Convention for arms control purposes.

Assuming that States parties to the Convention reach an understanding and agree in the future to provide information on the military or civilian nature of space objects systematically, at the time of registration, the space Powers that are not parties to the Convention will then be able to accept General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which calls on all States to provide information on their space objects.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to appeal to members of the Conference that have launched space objects and are not parties to the Convention, or are parties to the Convention but either do not register their space objects or have delayed several years before doing so, to become parties to the Convention or better observe the spirit of its provisions, as the case may be.

Clearly this would be a very small step towards more transparency and openness. How to go about it would also be a matter for study. Perhaps we should take up a proposal made by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1987, which suggested combining our efforts with those of other forums with the necessary legal expertise.

Strengthening the application of the Registration Convention might even pave the way for the preparation of a code of conduct for outer space, as advocated by France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

the Conference on Disarmament in 1985. It could also help to make progress with suggestions concerning the legal immunity of satellites. In this connection we have noted with great interest that Foreign Minister Dumas of France, at the third special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, urged that the Conference on Disarmament should give close examination to various issues, including the strengthening of the system of notification under the 1975 Convention, and the framing of a code of good conduct for outer space. The important point, we believe, is to understand clearly that if this Conference continues to work in the hope that it can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then it will never achieve anything. However, we must start somewhere. The elaboration of confidence-building measures, even modest ones, would surely constitute a useful beginning.

On the another subject, the distribution of compendiums to this Conference cannot be regarded as a confidence-building measure. However, we have been encouraged over the years by the reactions of other delegations around this table to believe that the compendium put out by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Canadian Department of External Affairs has been most useful to this Committee and the Conference in general. We have asked the secretariat to circulate the compendiums for 1986 and 1987. They were dispatched to delegations under the symbol CD/OS/WP.23 on 23 May 1988. I hope that they will contribute in some way, however small, in advancing the work of this Committee.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Mongolia is convinced that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that its exploration and use should be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interests of the scientific, economic and social development of all States. The extension of the arms race into outer space would not only make its peaceful exploration and use impossible, but could also jeopardize the ongoing process of limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. It is in this context that we note the pressing need to prevent an arms race in outer space, as well as the great responsibility borne by our Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body in this field.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is continuing its work under the able leadership of Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela. We would like to stress once again that the time has come to scrutinize all the proposals and initiatives placed before the Ad hoc Committee, including those submitted by the delegations of the socialist countries. These initiatives include, first of all, the Soviet proposal (CD/817) on the establishment of a system of international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, which envisages the creation of an international space inspectorate; the "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777) presented jointly by the German Democratic Republic delegation and my own; the German Democratic Republic's proposal for a structured discussion of item 3 of the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work (CD/OS/WP.18); and the compilation of definitions of space weapons, containing definitions proposed by Bulgaria, Hungary and the USSR (CD/OS/WP.14). It goes without saying that we stand ready in a constructive spirit to consider the valuable initiatives advanced by other delegations participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

In order to analyse the existing initiatives and proposals as well as to identify specific measures on this basis so as to prevent the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, the creation of a governmental expert group as suggested by the Swedish delegation could prove to be instrumental. We believe that the work of the Ad hoc Committee has already reached the point where the creation of such a group with a clear-cut mandate could be highly useful and contribute to goal-oriented and fruitful work within the Ad hoc Committee, and also facilitate the refining of a truly multilateral approach to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Fortune)

The outer space committee deals with one of the most important issues before the international community today. In New Zealand's view, there is considerable scope for work to be expedited within the Committee. The most effective way of preventing an arms race in outer space is to ensure that no weaponry is ever deployed there. For four decades the world has sustained what has been described as global stability without weapons in outer space. The further strengthening of global stability should proceed within that same constraint. The Charter of the United Nations of itself, will not prove sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space, any more than it has proven sufficient to contain a nuclear arms race on Earth. The Charter has been supplemented by nuclear arms control agreements such as the partial test ban Treaty and the NPT. It has also been supplemented by the outer space Treaty -

not undermined or made redundant by these treaties, but supplemented and strengthened by them. Nuclear weapons are deployed on Earth in the name of the self-defence provisions of the Charter. The same logic could allow nuclear weapons to be deployed in outer space. But the international community has banned this in the outer space Treaty. It is clear, therefore, that the right to deploy nuclear weapons in the name of self-defence is not irrevocable, but may be, and has been, forfeited in certain circumstances in the common interest. The same logic can apply to all weaponry in outer space. Technical problems such as definitions and verification are not insoluble.

Mr. OBOUKHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I would like to express my appreciation at being given an opportunity to speak at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, and to inform its participants about the Soviet assessment of the state of affairs at the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space arms taking place in Geneva.

First, a few words about the history of the negotiations. As you know, in accordance with an agreement reached at foreign minister level between the USSR and the United States, the talks on nuclear and space arms started in the spring of 1985. From the very outset of the negotiations, at which each side is represented by a single delegation, three groups were set up, on space arms, strategic offensive arms and also intermediate-range nuclear systems. Nine rounds have been held. On 12 July this year work began at the tenth round of the negotiations. Those are the statistics.

Now what are the concrete results of the delegations' work over the last three and a half years? As of today, the most important result is the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The historic significance of that agreement, signed during the Soviet-United States summit in Washington last December, is that for the first time it eliminates an entire class of Soviet and American nuclear arms and sets new standards for arms control. In all approximately 2,500 missiles are to be eliminated. The parties have undertaken not to produce in the future land-based ballistic or cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres and not to flight-test them. Thus a practical start has been made on building a world without nuclear arms. The INF Treaty has entered into force - a protocol on the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty was signed at the Soviet-American summit in Moscow in May/June this year. Since then a number of activities related to the inspection functions provided for in the Treaty have been carried out. The strictly monitored process of elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles has begun. The INF Treaty is a concrete expression of new thinking in politics, now that mankind is facing in all its magnitude the problem of ensuring its survival and preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

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(Mr. Oboukhov, USSR)

It should be stressed that the programme of nuclear disarmament proposed by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 has been of fundamental importance in developing the Soviet approach to negotiations on nuclear and space arms in general and the issue of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in particular. That programme, building on the realities of the current international situation and the practical possibilities arising from it, sets out conceptual and at the same time concrete aspects of the struggle to achieve a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. Thereby Soviet diplomacy has been provided with clear guidelines for active efforts aimed at reaching that goal.

The Soviet-American summits in Geneva in October 1985 and in Reykjavik in November 1986 were of paramount importance in moving the two sides towards the INF Treaty. Thus the mutual understanding reached at the Geneva summit to the effect that the USSR and the United States will continue to be guided by the conviction that a nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won has been of great importance for constructive progress at the negotiations. At that time the two sides stated that they were firmly resolved to prevent any war, nuclear or conventional, between the USSR and the United States and that neither would seek military superiority over the other. That declaration made at Geneva was reaffirmed by the two sides at the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Washington.

There is every reason to say that the INF Treaty embodies that declaration in the specific area it covers. When difficulties which seemed insurmountable arose at the negotiations, the creative search continued for the most appropriate solutions. The initiatives put forward in that connection during 1987 by M.S. Gorbachev offer striking examples of a wise balance, flexibility, an ability to take all factors into account in the search for solutions that serve the interests of the USSR and the United States, their allies, as well as other countries. It is also necessary to emphasize the role played by Soviet-American meetings at the foreign minister level in the elaboration of the INF Treaty. Five such meetings were held between April and November 1987, that is, during the period of the most active and substantive work on the Treaty. Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and United States Secretary of State G. Shultz resolved many issues of fundamental importance which were blocking the way towards agreement. As a result - with active support from public opinion and many States - a document was drawn up which embodies a balance between the two sides' interests and reliably serves to strengthen universal security.

The Soviet Union, faithful to the ideals of nuclear disarmament, views the INF Treaty as a first practical step along this difficult but perfectly feasible path. All the more reason to be disturbed by the current talk in some NATO circles of measures to "compensate" for the American missiles being eliminated in Western Europe. Clearly this would run counter to the growing trend towards the reduction of nuclear arms and the lessening of the nuclear danger.

The INF Treaty must not remain an isolated event in the struggle to eliminate nuclear arms. The conclusion of the INF Treaty signifies that the entire international community has gained invaluable practical experience

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enabling it to proceed further without losing momentum. In the process of disarmament delay is unacceptable. The Soviet side would like to see progress in all areas of disarmament without any pre-conditions or linkages.

The INF Treaty is innovative both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of Soviet and United States nuclear arms - and for the novelty and scope of its verification provisions. The system of measures to verify compliance with the obligations assumed by the two sides under the Treaty is truly unprecedented both in scope and in depth. We consider that, since what is involved here is the elimination of an entire class of Soviet and United States nuclear missiles, issues of verification are of particular importance too. In these circumstances certainty that the Treaty will be strictly observed becomes not only a question of confidence-building but also a question of meeting legitimate security interests. For this very reason the Soviet side advocated from the outset that agreement should be sought on an effective and stringent verification system within the framework of the INF Treaty, based on the use of national technical means of verification in conjunction with on-site inspections.

I would like briefly to address the basic parameters of the verification system established under the INF Treaty. The provision of baseline data by the parties, within the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding which is an integral part of the Treaty, facilitates the implementation of verification procedures. These data include both numerical indicators and certain qualitative characteristics of arms to be eliminated. The level of detail and the volume of data are unprecedented. In order to ensure strict verification and achievement of the agreed goals, the parties agreed to put documentation on the negotiating table including photographs of arms and site diagrams of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, among them production facilities, which used to be kept in secret safes, sealed as we say, with seven seals. This is a striking manifestation of glasnost in the new phase of the struggle for nuclear disarmament which has been initiated by the INF Treaty.

One of the Treaty's distinguishing features is that it provides not only for the complete elimination of all deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also for cessation of their production. At the same time, proper verification of compliance with this obligation is provided for. In particular, it has been agreed that continuous monitoring of production will be instituted at the exits from a plant in Votkinsk in the USSR and an American plant in Magna, Utah. This will provide an assurance that the Soviet side has stopped production of "SS-20" missiles and that "Pershing-2" missiles are no longer produced in the United States. Periodic inspections will help in verifying the non-production of launchers of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles of the relevant range. A list of facilities subject to such inspections is contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. On-site inspections are provided for both on the territory of the USSR and the United States and on the territories of countries where missiles to be eliminated are deployed: the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands on the other. Inspections within an established quota may be conducted throughout the entire period of elimination of missiles and during the subsequent 10 years. The USSR and the United States

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have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per year during the first three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, 15 in the next five years and 10 in the five years after that.

In addition to continuous monitoring at the exits from manufacturing plants and inspections within established quotas to verify that ballistic and cruise missile launchers are not being produced, the following inspections are provided for: baseline inspections, inspections to confirm that missile operating bases and missile support facilities (with the exception of missile production facilities) have been eliminated, and inspections of the elimination process with respect to intermediate-range and short-range missiles. Also provided for are inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated under the Treaty, with the exception of former missile production facilities.

Agreement was reached on the common obligations of the parties relating to the procedure for providing notifications of an intention to conduct an inspection, the obligations of the inspected and the inspecting parties with regard to such notifications, procedures for arrival and accommodation of inspectors and transport to the inspection site, including procedures for the use of measuring equipment, general rules for conducting inspections, privileges and immunities of inspectors and air crew members, etc. The procedure for conducting inspections on the territories of basing countries is governed by agreements with them which are based on the relevant provisions of the INF Treaty.

Of particular value was the Soviet-American agreement on nuclear risk reduction centres which was signed in Washington in September 1987 at the foreign minister level. The facsimile communication line between these centres is used to transmit notifications and other relevant information in connection with the INF Treaty. The parties have agreed to establish a Special Verification Commission to consider and resolve questions relating to compliance with the Treaty. All this provides a reliable system to verify that the obligations assumed are strictly and unswervingly complied with. The verification system provided for in the INF Treaty is already demonstrating its potentialities. Thus, in the process of preparing the Treaty for ratification, the two sides, using the Treaty provisions as a basis, managed to find mutually acceptable solutions to a number of issues connected with the implementation of verification measures. This testifies to the fact that, when there is good will on both sides and a common desire to build up confidence and remove concern, it is possible to resolve the most complex problems of verification in a satisfactory manner. This was clearly demonstrated by the experience gained in the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the first steps in its implementation. I consider that this experience should not be limited to this Treaty alone. It can and must be used - taking into account the specific characteristics of each issue, of course - in working out other bilateral or multilateral agreements in the area of arms control and disarmament.

It must be said that the USSR and the United States have decided to use this experience in a creative way in the process of reaching agreement on verification provisions in the draft treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. As a result a number of provisions of vital

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importance in this area have already been agreed. We think that the spirit of innovation inherent in the verification mechanism which was created under the INF Treaty, as well as some of the specific approaches and solutions contained in it, can be successfully used in tackling problems arising in the complete destruction of chemical weapons and cessation of production and preparing a draft convention on the subject.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty has dramatically demonstrated that verification, no matter how complex some of its aspects may be, need not be an obstacle to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Disarmament is a global problem, and it must be approached in such a way that the gains achieved in one area serve as an incentive and a nutrient for a good harvest to be reaped in other areas.

After the INF Treaty had been concluded, the negotiations on nuclear and space arms were somewhat reorganized. Of the original three groups in the negotiations, two now remain, one on strategic offensive arms and the other on space arms. At present, therefore, work at these negotiations is focusing on the two principal goals - the preparation of a draft treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms, and a separate agreement on issues relating to the ABM Treaty.

Negotiations on nuclear and space arms are part of the process of positive changes now under way in the world. The foremost result of these changes is that the risk of nuclear war has been diminished. Following the major agreements that have been reached, the emphasis in international affairs is shifting from confrontation to co-operation, mutual understanding, negotiations with the prospect of concrete results, primarily in the area of weapons of mass destruction. Soviet-American relations have improved. The pan-European process has become more vigorous, both at the international level and particularly in terms of public participation. The Geneva agreements have been concluded, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has begun.

It is the wish of the Soviet side that the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and the agreements that may be reached there, should serve as a solid contribution towards further normalization of the international situation. This is all the more necessary since the situation in the world is still complex and contradictory. No radical change for the better has yet taken place. The danger that human civilization, life itself will be annihilated, still remains. Hence the need for new vigorous efforts aimed at reducing military expenditure, diminishing and ultimately eliminating the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The USSR and its allies are united in their desire to achieve these goals. This is demonstrated by the results of the recent meeting in Warsaw of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Analysing the situation in Europe and the world at large, as well as the burning issues of today - the prevention of war, the halting of the arms race and a decisive turn towards disarmament - the meeting of the Committee outlined priorities in this field. Amongst them is the conclusion of a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms, subject to compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and non-withdrawal from it for an agreed period.

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(Mr. Oboukhov, USSR)

What, in concrete terms, is the situation now at the negotiations? As you know, major decisions on the entire range of nuclear and space arms issues were taken as early as December 1987 at the Washington summit. Agreement was reached on a number of conceptual problems relating to the negotiations, and both delegations were instructed to work vigorously towards the completion of a joint draft of the future treaty. Moreover, a formula was found concerning compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Since the Washington summit both sides have done a great deal towards reaching an agreement on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In that process a special role has again been played by the Soviet-American meetings held regularly - virtually every month - at the foreign minister level, where the most important problems in the current negotiations are discussed. As a result, the joint drafts of four documents have been prepared: the draft treaty itself on 50 per cent reductions in offensive arms, as well as drafts of a memorandum of understanding, a protocol on inspections and a protocol on conversion or elimination.

The joint draft treaty reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic delivery systems and 6,000 warheads, as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 in the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. The draft treaty also records agreement between the parties that, as a result of the reductions, the aggregate throw weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be brought down to approximately 50 per cent of the existing level, and that this level will not be exceeded. Understanding has also been reached that in future work on the treaty the parties will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the joint statement of 10 December 1987, and the number of warheads that will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile, which is subject to negotiation. Agreement has also been reached on a rule that heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and short-range missiles will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit. Of course, this counting rule, which was agreed back in Reykjavik, will apply if the 600-kilometre threshold, also agreed before, is used to divide air-to-surface missiles into long-range and shorter-range missiles.

The drafts of the protocol on inspections, the protocol on conversion or elimination and the memorandum of understanding, which are integral parts of the treaty, build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and refining them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The verification measures will include as a minimum the exchange and updating of data, baseline inspections, on-site observation of elimination of relevant systems, continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited, etc.

Unfortunately it must be noted that we failed to reach complete agreement on the draft texts of the above documents by the time of the Moscow summit. The difficulties that arose here were largely objective in nature. They are caused by the highly complicated nature of the problems under discussion - what is involved, after all, is radical reductions in armaments of various kinds and types. It is necessary to find agreed approaches to every one of

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them, both in terms of methods of effectively limiting them and in terms of reliable verification of compliance with the obligations to be assumed. And this is not an easy task.

The Soviet-American summit in Moscow gave new, important impetus to the work of the delegations at the Geneva talks. Thus the discussions in Moscow led to a substantial broadening of common ground on such important matters as verification of mobile ICBM launchers, and also limitations on long-range ALCMs and heavy bombers. The additional common ground has been recorded in documents exchanged by the two sides. The delegations are to place these understandings on record in the joint draft text of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. But of course, it is necessary to go further and seek to resolve the above issues completely.

It is also of great significance for the positive development of the negotiations that the joint statement adopted at the end of the Moscow meeting reaffirmed the language on ABM Treaty issues agreed at the Washington summit in December 1987. The Soviet and United States leaders directed their representatives at the negotiations to prepare a joint draft of a separate agreement and continue work on its associated protocol. As a result of the Moscow meeting the parties expressed their shared conviction that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only for the Soviet and American peoples, but for the whole of mankind. The parties have agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. They have also reached an understanding in principle that, once the remaining problems have been solved and the treaty and its associated documents agreed, they will be signed without delay. Thus the Moscow summit gives both negotiating teams a joint mandate, drawing on the progress already achieved, to seek the early preparation of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty.

It is with these intentions that the Soviet delegation came back to Geneva for the current round of negotiations. Following instructions from its leadership, the Soviet delegation has taken the course of accelerating the negotiation process from the very beginning of the round. For the past three weeks we have been introducing an entire range of proposals to ensure further progress. They include the Soviet draft protocol regarding the aggregate throw weight of ICBMs and SLBMs, tabled as early as the first plenary meeting of this round. This Soviet move, which takes into account the considerations put forward by the United States delegation, allows us to resolve the issue of throw weight on a mutually acceptable compromise basis. The Soviet side has put forward constructive proposals concerning the section of the future treaty on conversion or elimination to be implemented for the purpose of achieving and maintaining radically reduced aggregate limits established for relevant systems under the treaty. The Soviet approach makes it possible to reach complete agreement on this section of the future treaty. The USSR delegation has also pursued a dynamic course with respect to the materialization of new areas of agreement on issues relating to verification of mobile ICBM launchers, and also restrictions on long-range ALCMs and heavy bombers. We have tabled a series of formulations to this effect for inclusion in the documents being elaborated. We look forward to a constructive response from the American side to this and other Soviet proposals.

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(Mr. Oboukhov, USSR)

It should be noted that the very first weeks of the current negotiating round have already seen a degree of progress in some areas. But we have to be self-critical - this progress is very modest. We are convinced that it could have been much more significant. There is a great amount of work that has yet to be done to resolve outstanding issues. For this work to be accomplished, good will and readiness to search for solutions, backed up by specific and constructive steps at the negotiations, are needed on both sides.

It should be noted that progress at the negotiations is largely dependent on the resolution of such issues as compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and also limitations on the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

Why is it these questions that have now come to the fore in the negotiations? Let us take outer space issues. The point is that there is a deep and organic interrelationship between radical reductions in strategic offensive arms and the reaching of an agreement which would confirm the obligations of the USSR and the United States as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty for the next 9 or 10 years. Indeed, an extension of the arms race to outer space would be fraught with the danger of a very serious destabilization of the world situation in its entirety. M.S. Gorbachev stresses: "Normal logic cannot grasp the idea of curbing strategic offensive arms on Earth while building a bridge to extend the arms race into outer space". Clearly these two processes would be incompatible.

What in concrete terms is the Soviet approach to the issues related to the ABM Treaty? We would like the agreement reached in Washington on 10 December 1987 to be reflected precisely and fully in appropriate legal language in the provisions of a separate agreement to this effect. To put it differently, the agreement being elaborated should incorporate the obligation to comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, not to withdraw from the Treaty for an agreed period, and to hold intensive discussions on strategic stability not later than three years before the end of the period of non-withdrawal.

The conclusion of an agreement on compliance with and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period is a necessary prerequisite for radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. Without it such reductions would be impossible. In this connection we believe that the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty must be clear and unambiguous. It must be an absolute obligation. Only then would it play a stabilizing role in the context of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. This approach flows directly from the essence of the Washington agreement. This agreement also clearly stipulates that the ABM Treaty must be complied with as signed in 1972. Thus, the language agreed in Washington reaffirms the limitations imposed on the parties by the ABM Treaty, and cannot be considered as permitting the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It would also run counter to the spirit and letter of the Washington agreement if the right of the parties to deploy a large-scale ABM system, including a space-based system, immediately after the period of non-withdrawal, was laid down now. Such an approach would be tantamount to an attempt to predetermine the outcome of future negotiations on strategic stability. Thus we favour reaching agreement on compliance with

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and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, and not on a joint shift to deployment of the ABM systems which are prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

In the course of the previous negotiating round the parties succeeded in preparing a joint draft of a protocol to the ABM Treaty. However, the many brackets that remain in the draft require further serious work to remove differences in the parties' approaches. The Soviet side proceeds from the view that the verification, confidence-building and predictability measures reflected in the protocol should also be aimed at providing the parties with a firm assurance that the ABM Treaty will be strictly complied with. To this end we propose that the following measures should be carried out. First, an exchange of data on ABM-related work, meetings of experts, reciprocal visits to test ranges where work in this area is carried out. Second, exchange of information to prevent uncertainty as regards compliance with the obligations assumed by the parties. Third, verification of compliance with the obligations assumed, by means of measures including inspections of facilities with respect to which the parties feel concern. Fourth, consultations to examine situations which one of the parties considers as jeopardizing its supreme interests. During the consultations the parties would use all available means to resolve the situations on a mutually acceptable basis. Thus these Soviet proposals too serve as a good basis for agreement.

The Soviet delegation at the talks is resolved to do everything necessary to carry out the instructions given by the leaders of the USSR and the United States as a result of their meeting in Moscow, i.e. to prepare the joint draft of a separate agreement which would clearly and fully reflect the Washington formula on ABM Treaty issues, and to finalize the protocol to the Treaty.

The limitation of long-range SLCMs poses another problem of utmost importance for the future treaty on strategic offensive arms. This new and dangerous kind of strategic offensive weapon must be limited in a way that can be relied on. This is indispensable to ensure the effectiveness and permanence of the future treaty, to guarantee that it will not be circumvented. As we understand it, both sides recognize the importance of this matter. This can be seen from the mutual obligation assumed under the Washington joint statement to establish ceilings on long-range SLCMs with effective verification. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet side, in keeping with that obligation, has put forward and substantiated a comprehensive programme of far-reaching measures in this area, including a proposal for specific numerical limits on the deployment of long-range SLCMs. I would like to address the issues of verification in more detail because, as our negotiating partners have noted, it is these questions that pose the greatest difficulty.

The Soviet side has proposed that the entire life cycle, as it were, of long-range SLCMs should be subject to strict verification. Verification would start with the establishment of continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at the production facilities for such missiles. In this way each SLCM produced would immediately be counted. Continuous verification would also be established at designated arming stations where SLCMs are equipped with nuclear warheads, following which they are loaded on submarines and surface

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ships of the agreed types. We propose that the number of such arming stations should be limited, and that the loading of SLCMs on submarines and surface vessels elsewhere, including in the open sea, should be prohibited. If at the time of the entry into force of the treaty on strategic offensive arms either party has submarines or surface ships already equipped with long-range SLCMs, that party will have to display each such missile for counting purposes. The Soviet side also favours the extensive use of national technical means of verification. The American side has received a proposal for a joint experiment involving the use of remote verification equipment to determine the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships.

Should concern arise in the process of verification using such means, inspections could be conducted directly on board a submarine or surface vessel which was undergoing such verification. This would remove any possible misunderstandings. Much importance is attached to inspections in general in the Soviet approach to the issues of verification of long-range SLCMs. For instance, we propose that short-notice inspections should be conducted at locations where either side considers covert deployment of long-range SLCMs is occurring. This means that any warship on either side would if necessary be subject to inspection on a reciprocal basis. I believe that such a radical verification measure speaks for itself. Obviously all the provisions of the treaty under which the limitations laid down may be verified would be applied to SLCMs and other kinds of strategic offensive arms. These include the exchange of relevant data, the provision of notifications and the conduct of inspections to check the accuracy of the baseline data that the sides would exchange upon the entry into force of the treaty, as well as verification of elimination procedures, etc. The reliability of the verification would also be assured by the Soviet proposal to limit the number of types of surface vessels and submarines on which long-range SLCMs may be located. Taken together, all these forms and methods of verification would offer the parties an assurance that the obligations assumed were being strictly adhered to. In short, the problem of limiting the numbers of long-range SLCMs with proper verification can and must be resolved. Failing this, the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms would be ineffective.

In the course of the negotiations we will be trying to persuade the United States to accept the effective and far-reaching methods for verifying long-range SLCMs that we have proposed. Once again I would like to stress that the Soviet side attaches particular importance to questions of the strict verification of compliance with the limitations to be established. This approach of principle was reaffirmed by M.S. Gorbachev in his report to the recent nineteenth All-Union Party Conference. The Soviet delegation intends, as in the past, to pursue this approach consistently in the practical work at the negotiations. We are convinced that effective verification measures should apply equally to all strategic offensive weapons covered by the future treaty, including ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and long-range ALCMs and SLCMs. Any discrimination, any selective approach is inadmissible here. We are looking forward to constructive co-operation with the American side in devising a reliable verification system suited to the goals and purposes of the future treaty.

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(Mr. Oboukhov, USSR)

Substantial progress has already been made towards a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In accordance with the instructions given to the delegations by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States at their meeting in Moscow, the Soviet side is ready to work actively and productively in both groups, on space arms and on strategic offensive arms. We do not wish to lose momentum, but to pursue the speedy finalization of the joint drafts of the documents in question, in co-operation with the United States representatives at the negotiations. The future treaty can only be the fruit of joint efforts on both sides. All countries, all peoples, cherish the hope that the Soviet-American treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty will soon become a reality. The interests of overall security and prevention of the threat of war demand it.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

These are the thoughts on the third special session devoted to disarmament which I wanted to share with the other members of the Conference. And now I would like to refer particularly to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is at present being considered in the plenary of the Conference.

There is serious and legitimate concern in the international community over the prospect that outer space could be turned into the scene of a continuation of the arms race that we are currently witnessing on Earth. This concern deepens as progress in space science and technology brings man to the point where he will be able to develop and produce space weapons. That is why the overwhelming majority of countries insist that the few countries that have the capacity to deploy arms in space should renounce the possibility of doing so. Through various instruments the international community has clearly expressed its unequivocal determination to preserve space from the military rivalry that prevails on Earth, and its intention of reserving the use of this environment exclusively for peaceful uses. This wish has been followed in practice so far.

It is true that many activities carried out in space have military significance. We know that approximately three quarters of the man-made objects that are currently spinning around the Earth are performing military functions. But as has been said repeatedly, in many cases these functions have a stabilizing effect or also play a beneficial role from the civilian point of view. However, this does not detract from the assertion that the nature of space as a "province of mankind", dedicated primarily to the common interest of peoples through its peaceful use, has in practice been preserved up to now. There is no doubt that this has been possible thanks to the existence of an international legal order that has so far been able to prevent space being used for the deployment of weapons. But this legal order has proved inadequate in the face of the headlong progress of space science, which is bringing us ever closer to the moment when an arms race in outer space could be unleashed.

When we talk of preventing an arms race in outer space we are referring to something that has not happened yet, but could happen. To prevent means to forestall, anticipate and avert the occurrence of something that has not yet happened. As far as we know, no one has yet deployed weapons in space, and it

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

could even be said that true space weapons do not yet exist. So we still have time to prevent it, we can still stop it happening. We have to avoid a situation where the Powers that have the technological capacity to do so get locked in competition in space weapons. In our view, the most effective way to achieve this objective is to establish a general and complete ban on space weapons, covering the development, testing, production, deployment and stockpiling and use of space weapons.

The outer space Treaty has already established a partial ban on space weapons by prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space. What is needed now is an extension of this ban to any other kind of weapon that could be conceived for use in space, from space or into space. In our opinion this could be done by modifying article IV of the outer space Treaty. This instrument clearly contains a gap, a loophole that must be closed. To do this it would be sufficient to have an amendment to add a provision whereby the States parties would also undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth, or deploy in their territories or in any other place under their jurisdiction, any kind of space weapon or system of such space weapons. The amendment must also stipulate the obligation of States parties to abstain from developing, producing, testing, stockpiling or using such weapons in any form.

It may be argued that this idea is too ingenuous or too naive to be viable. On this matter it is interesting to point out that on this very day, 4 August 1988, on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, a group of six States parties to that instrument, including my own country, have approached the Governments of the three depositary States of the partial test-ban Treaty requesting the convening of a conference intended to introduce into the partial test-ban Treaty the necessary modifications to convert it into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. This is an idea which no one so far has described as ingenuous or naive. On the contrary, it has been building up steadily to the point that the last resolution of the General Assembly on this question was approved by an overwhelming majority, with the only votes cast against being those of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. If we bear in mind that the procedure for amendment provided for in the outer space Treaty is much simpler than that laid down in the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, the initiative intended to extend the scope of the latter should not cause any insurmountable difficulties.

It can also be said that a comprehensive ban of this kind requires very efficient and reliable verification machinery. In our view verification is absolutely essential to any disarmament measure. But the design of appropriate verification arrangements for a ban on space weaponry should not cause insuperable difficulties. We understand that the most difficult problems in the verification of a ban on space weaponry would arise in relation to Earth-based weapons. These problems are similar in many ways to those that arise in monitoring compliance with the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the agreement on strategic arms which is currently being negotiated. The two super-Powers have already displayed imagination and creativity in designing the monitoring and verification measures which will be applied to the INF Treaty. Ambassador Oboukhov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations, has provided us this morning with

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

complete, detailed and very interesting information on the verification arrangements agreed for the INF Treaty, and also the problems posed by verification of the START treaty. A similar effort could be made for space weapons, which in addition could benefit from the techniques and methods applicable to long-range and intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Coming to arms deployed in space proper, the problem as we understand it is less complex. As far as we know, given the present state of the art, it is impossible to hide anything in space. Any space object can be detected and identified and its functions interpreted with almost total accuracy. A few years back this was said to be possible with any object the size of an orange situated in space. The development of space technology since then has certainly made it possible to do the same thing today with an even smaller object.

It must also be borne in mind that there are treaties in force that have operated without verification. The partial ban embodied in the outer space Treaty has been in force for more than 20 years without a real system of verification, and no one has said that the operation of this instrument has been affected thereby. There are other examples of comprehensive treaties that have operated without verification: the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty, the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the 1972 Treaty on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the 1979 Treaty governing the activities of States on the moon and other celestial bodies. None of these agreements have required developed or sophisticated verification machinery.

As we know, it is impossible to design and develop verification arrangements which may be considered 100 per cent secure. This problem can be presented by means of the following question: How much verification is needed? - or how much verification is enough? On this point it is worth mentioning that the outer space Treaty does contain rudimentary elements of verification machinery. Article IX provides that a State party which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in peaceful exploration and use may request consultations concerning the activity or experiment. Article X provides that a State party may request an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by another State. Article XI places an obligation on States parties to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the nature, conduct, location and results of their space activities. The same article also provides that the Secretary-General must disseminate that information effectively. Article XII provides that all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies should be open to representatives of other States. These provisions could be supplemented by an appropriate instrument to make them compatible with a treaty completely banning space weapons.

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(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

The conversion of the outer space Treaty into a treaty completely banning space weapons logically requires that we should have a clear and accurate idea of what is meant by space weapons. So the amendments to be introduced in this instrument must provide for the inclusion of a definition of space weapons in the Treaty. As we know, during the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on item 5 of the agenda, various proposed definitions have been put forward. They all have elements in common, which leads one to think that it should not be difficult to work out a definition that would properly cover the various conceivable types of space weaponry.

As everyone knows, my country has been taking a special interest in the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. This interest has been demonstrated by our participation in the discussions, the presentation of proposals and most recently my own performance of the functions of Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee dealing with this topic. My delegation would now like to make an additional contribution by presenting a working paper containing a proposed amendment to the outer space Treaty. This document has been distributed today under the symbol CD/851. This document, which is based on the ideas that we have put forward on a number of occasions, and which I have further developed in my statement today, is intended to serve as a basis for focusing discussion on a global and comprehensive solution to the problem raised by space weaponry.

We are aware that some countries prefer the marginalist approach to this topic. Some countries would like the Conference on Disarmament to confine itself to ancillary measures, such as the preparation of a "highway code for space objects" and the like. It has even been said that "if this Conference continues to work in the hope that it can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then it will never achieve anything". The same opinion, holds that what we should do is "start somewhere", and for that purpose "the elaboration of confidence-building measures, even modest ones, would surely constitute a useful beginning". We respect that opinion, but we hold the view that if there is political will it will always be possible to achieve a global and comprehensive solution, as has been done in the case of chemical weapons.

Our document, consistent with this position, is founded, as is logical, on our universalist approach to disarmament efforts and is motivated by the profound concern that we feel over the prospect that in a short time an arms race may be unleashed in outer space whose dimensions - in terms of the human, material and financial resources that it would absorb - are incalculable and morally totally unjustifiable, even if efforts are made to present it as a means of putting an end to the nuclear danger.

We trust that delegations will examine our proposal with the attention it merits, and for our part we will receive and analyse with interest any comments or observations made.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is also an issue of universal concern. This is an objective agreed upon by consensus, both bilaterally and multilaterally in the Conference on Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 offers an opportunity for all member States to contribute to the achievement of that common objective.

The delegation of Bulgaria believes that work in that Committee should focus on the existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to agreeing on appropriate measures to ban the introduction of any kind of weapons in outer space. An interesting paper on a possible approach to this issue has been submitted today by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela. My delegation will study it with care. There are various other proposals which have been submitted in the Ad hoc Committee, and we believe that the time is ripe now to start with an ASAT ban. The existing legal régime for outer space does not exclude the possibility of developing conventional types of such weapons. The current virtual moratorium on testing of ASAT systems, honoured by both the Soviet Union and the United States, facilitates a beginning of concrete negotiations on such a ban. The working paper on "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777) submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia could serve as a useful basis for such work. Various elements of the Soviet idea for the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space could also be successfully used for the purposes of an ASAT ban.

There are a number of complicated issues of definition and technical issues which will have to be addressed in dealing with an ASAT ban. Such problems should be considered by an appropriate group of governmental experts

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

to provide technical expertise and guidance to the Ad hoc Committee in overcoming possible difficulties. The Bulgarian delegation has advanced specific proposals aimed at making progress on this issue in the Committee.

We learned with keen interest of the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora, that members of the CD should make solemn unilateral declarations that none of them has deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis. Implementation of this proposal could become an important confidence-building measure, introducing more openness and transparency into outer space activities related to military matters. Because of their confidence-building nature, such unilateral steps require no verification, and would be a good starting-point for more specific partial measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is another important issue which I intend to discuss in more detail on some further occasions. My delegation regrets the fact that for a number of years now the Conference on Disarmament has not been making much progress in its substantive work on several items. It seems that the Conference is slowly moving away from discharging its responsibilities as a negotiating body. We feel that this tendency should be halted. The delegation of Bulgaria believes that it is time for the CD to undertake concrete action on all priority items on its agenda, and is determined to make its contribution towards this end.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has become a priority item on our agenda. Despite that, tackling this topic remains complex because of the diversity of interests at stake and because of the existence of a legal framework which, though imperfect, involves an appreciable number of States. Many proposals have been made to avert what the press has called "star wars", but leaving aside the excessively dramatic reactions to the risk that this threat will become a reality, the fact is that matters are fortunately manageable and, at the same time, negotiations are continuing between the super-Powers to establish a modus vivendi which will banish the immediate danger.

When the Treaty on principles governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, was adopted in 1967, the conviction very probably prevailed that military competition in outer space was thereby being ruled out. Unfortunately, this has not been so, and now science and technology are presenting us with a new challenge. The 1967 Treaty is a testimony to the relativity of agreements which fall under the doctrine of arms control. It is not a bad multilateral instrument, still less does it leave the essentials out. The fact is that it is a treaty valid for its time and consistent with the dynamics always imposed by scientific and technological development. This is the reason why in this very forum in August 1987, Peru raised the need to amend the Treaty. Now we also have a draft from Venezuela. When last year Peru raised the question of amending the 1967 Treaty, it stressed on that occasion the need to prohibit the deployment in orbit of any device bearing any type of weapon. This approach is more

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

pragmatic, expeditious and practical; it does not attempt to define space weapons, as this would be as difficult as to try and find a definition of land-based weapons generally accepted by all. What is important in a weapon is not so much the space or area in which it operates as its function and effect which characterize it as such, in addition to an always hostile intent. Hence, whether a device bearing any type of weapon in space is permanently or semi-permanently present is of no interest. Nor is its principle of operation. Now, to the extent that it is not only by deploying a weapon in orbit that a given effect can be produced in space, it is necessary, as my delegation has previously pointed out, to "multilateralize" the basic obligations under the ABM Treaty in order to rule out any possibility of sidestepping the spirit of the 1967 Treaty which reserves outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Verification is the expression of mutual trust and is called upon to generate greater trust. Verification is not a police type of activity; its main function is deterrence. It does not point to the future intentions of States, it confines itself to detecting non-compliance by commission and by omission. This aside is valid in respect of item 5 of our agenda. Verification in outer space may be carried out using national means of verification and through multilateral action. The 1967 Treaty was essentially based on the former. It is obvious that, if this international instrument is to be amended, priority will have to be given to multilateral verification. From this standpoint the amendments to the 1967 Treaty, in addition to improving the existing verification machinery, should include express provisions relating to review conferences so that States parties are in a position to carry out endogenous reforms to adapt the verification machinery to the imperatives of science and technology. The important experience acquired in 1986 on the occasion of the Second Review Conference of the parties to the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Treaty is a highly stimulating and very instructive example of what can be done when States parties have the necessary political will.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

On the occasion of his speech at SSOD-III, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled the deep-rooted conviction of the Italian Government that - within the context of general and complete disarmament - outer space must be exclusively devoted to peaceful uses. On that occasion, Minister Andreotti expressed, in particular, the hope that the Conference on Disarmament may achieve some progress in this field, despite the undeniable political, strategic and technological difficulties involved.

During the work of the special session we were able to note a convergence of views both on the fact that the Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts in this area, and on the responsibility that falls on all States in reaching the goal of the peaceful use of space. An important - if not altogether decisive - contribution to the progress of the debate in this forum might derive from the positive development of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we whole-heartedly hope that a common approach will be agreed upon in the bilateral talks at present under way in Geneva, also with respect to the offence-defence relationship.

Regarding the possibility that in this sector of disarmament too a rapprochement between the American and Soviet positions may soon occur, the new initiative in the field of space co-operation for civil purposes agreed upon at the recent Moscow summit seems to us to justify some optimism. While awaiting these desirable negotiating developments, it remains important for the Conference on Disarmament, through its subsidiary body, to pursue the work done so far. On the one hand, it should specify in greater detail the various aspects of the legal régime which applies to arms control in outer space, and, on the other, it should examine some of the activities at present being pursued in space.

As regards the legal régime, we consider that in-depth consideration is still necessary to define some technological aspects unambiguously, and to reach a more precise understanding of the real scope and objectives of future rules in the field of arms control in outer space. In this context, however, we would like to underscore the major contribution to the strengthening of the existing legal régime which would derive from stricter compliance with the bilateral and multilateral agreements which form this régime, as well as broader adherence to them. In addition to the legal topics, we believe that some progress should also be made in the field of verification and modalities for ensuring compliance with the agreements.

In conclusion, we wish to stress that - in line with a realistic approach and a renewed spirit of co-operation - our common reflection on outer space should not lose sight of the developments which are shaping up at the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, while encouraging their positive conclusion.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The issue of outer space can no longer be swept under the carpet or be shrouded in rhetoric. We can no longer deny the fact that the legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space is grossly inadequate to the task of preventing an arms race there. The legal régime has been overtaken by rapid developments in science and technology which were not foreseen when the treaties were drawn up. Although the military activities currently taking place in space do not as yet involve the use of weapons, it would be timely at this stage to adopt necessary measures to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. Such a race would be extremely expensive and highly destabilizing. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind. The last frontier of mankind should never be permitted to become an arena for the arms race. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space will soon be given the appropriate mandate to give serious consideration to this matter.

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

I would add that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as well as the achievement of balance between the arsenals of conventional weapons of the two major alliances would offer irrefutable proof of good faith vis-à-vis the obligations entered into under the provisions of article VI of the NPT. Undoubtedly, such a development would have great impact on nuclear disarmament on Earth, it being understood that we should prevent the vital interests of the security of all States from being threatened by new military devices deployed in space. Which brings me to my last point, the prevention of an arms race in space. The multilateral dimension of the peaceful use of space requires that all States should actively participate in preventing an

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

arms race in this field. It is true that space is already the subject of measures of protection which should be borne in mind in drawing up an appropriate international instrument. Because activities pertaining to the exploration and use of space should be carried out in conformity with the principles of international law, including the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. More specifically, we should consolidate and strengthen the legal régime in force applicable to space and draw useful lessons from the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

For its part, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space stipulates in article IV that each State should provide the Secretary-General with information on the functions of each space object, specifying first and foremost whether it is designed for military or other purposes. However, it seems that to date no space object whose launch has been recorded has been described as having a military function. Yet, this problem was raised in 1985 by several member States of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in respect of satellites which are known sometimes to carry out civilian or military missions or both. But in fact even if it cannot be shown that a weapon has already been placed permanently in orbit it may be supposed that anti-satellite weapon tests have been carried out. In any event, the space Powers must be prevented from arrogating to themselves the freedom to turn space into an area of activities within their sole discretion. For space, like the sea-bed, should form part of the common heritage of mankind. So here there is a need to ensure the application of the existing legal régime for arms control to strengthen confidence and increase transparency. Wisdom would also have us bear in mind the principles set out in General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which calls on all States to furnish information on objects they launch into space. The long-term objective should be to completely prohibit the development, testing, manufacture and deployment of space weapons. Meanwhile we should at least prohibit anti-satellite weapons and address ourselves to definitions and verification techniques designed to prevent an arms race in space.

These, then, are the thoughts inspired by the current developments, bringing about changes which, whether we like it or not, are taking place before our eyes through the disarmament initiatives between the two super-Powers and within this Conference on Disarmament, and their possible impact on general disarmament. Bilateral negotiations and agreement between the super-Powers are definitely necessary to undertake any form of disarmament, but multilateral efforts are essential to sustain the process because disarmament commits all countries. Bilateral and multilateral efforts should therefore complement and reinforce one another. The Conference on Disarmament should broaden and deepen the basis for debate on all the items on its agenda, bearing priorities in mind within the context of its negotiating machinery, its procedures and its methods of work.

(Mr. Ruoro, Kenya)

Efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space should be increased, and this Conference should continue its valuable discussions on this issue. We are of the firm opinion that outer space should be preserved exclusively for

peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations. The transfer of the arms race into outer space would pose serious complications for international peace and security. All efforts must be undertaken to prevent the installation of weapon systems in space or the development of any space-to-space, space-to-Earth or Earth-to-space weapon systems. The international community should conclude a multilateral agreement on permitted and conceptually defined and agreed peaceful military activities in outer space.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

As regards outer space, we are in favour of any measure to prohibit the design, development and deployment of any system of space arms, and strict respect for all existing rules in this field. The prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space, and the halting of the arms race, should go hand in hand with the establishment of a régime which ensures that outer space is used for exclusively peaceful purposes as the common heritage of mankind.

(Mr. Burns, United States of America)

In the forum dealing with defence and space issues, our objective is to seek agreement on how we can, jointly with the Soviet Union, manage a stable transition to increased reliance on effective defences that threaten no one. A separate agreement on these issues is being worked on, which reflects the principles which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev outlined in December at the Washington summit. In addition, work is continuing on a draft protocol designed to improve predictability as research is carried out in the strategic defence area and preparations made for a possible transition to greater reliance on defences. Few persons expected, at the outset of these talks, that we could go so far.

It is our view that the United States Strategic Defence Initiative has provided an important incentive for serious negotiations in the defence and space area. In President Reagan's words, it is "our best hope for a safer world". The programme of research, development and testing in which the United States is engaged is in full compliance with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. And, as we have made clear, the Strategic Defence Initiative is not something that we will bargain away or modify with crippling provisions. We will research it, test it, and, if it works, deploy it!

I realize that many around this table would pose the question: After six years of negotiations, when can we expect a completed START treaty, and a completed agreement on defence and space issues? I can answer that the United States seeks sound agreements, and that the United States is not negotiating against arbitrary deadlines. I can also say that, when it comes to vital issues of international security, the United States believes that we are better off with no agreement than with a bad agreement. So we will continue to work hard, but as we do so, we will be patient.

President: Mr. Ali-Akbar Velayati. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and we support efforts to limit the potential for conflict in space, the exploration and exploitation of which is now being pursued by an increasing number of nations. It is essential that we reach agreements that will effectively prevent the weaponization of space and ensure the continuation of an "open skies" régime. The existing legal régime is not sufficient, and the Conference on Disarmament should speed up its efforts to consolidate, reinforce and complete it. Activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law including the Charter of the United Nations. The ultimate goal of the Conference on Disarmament should be the complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. Until that is achieved, a most urgent partial measure could be a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

CD/PV.479

10

(Mr. Pericás, Brazil)

Instead of believing that we are entering an era of renewed bilateralism or selective multilateralism, we would prefer to think that this process of change, if persistent and consistent enough, will gradually bear further results and will at last reinforce true multilateralism, not least in disarmament negotiations. We must recognize, at any rate, that the third SSOD was convened at a moment when trends were still not totally clear, when encouraging signs were still mixed with old fears, when new perceptions interacted with well-established reactions, be it at the bilateral, regional or global level, and these complex and ambiguous mixtures and linkages compounded our difficulties. The "quasi-consensus" of New York was in a way a by-product of this uncertain season the world is living through.

Brazil feels it did its part. As an expression of my country's very deep and serious commitment to disarmament, President Sarney took it upon himself to convey Brazil's message personally to the Assembly. He put forward some principles which we regard as fundamental in guiding multilateral deliberations on disarmament: no State should demand from any other disarmament measures that it itself is not prepared to take; concerns regarding the security of one State are just as valid, just as important and just as relevant as those of any other State; industrial and technological development do not free any country from the obligation to observe and respect disarmament measures which have been internationally agreed upon; the non-militarization of outer space constitutes an essential pre-condition for the adoption of significant measures for regional disarmament; and the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons compromises the policy adopted by many States in renouncing the nuclear weapon option.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

We also think that the adoption of a consensus resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not far off. It is fairly likely that the General Assembly will draft a resolution that will gather the unanimous support of delegations. This, too, would give a considerable boost to the work of the Conference next year. In this respect we feel entitled to demand that efforts should be made to facilitate at least the multilateral consideration of, and progress with, those proposals that are before the Ad hoc Committee and are in keeping with the existing multilateral legal régime on outer space, as well as with the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, on which the bilateral negotiations seem to be moving forward significantly, according to information available. We also think that the General Assembly will be in a position to adopt a consensus resolution on conventional disarmament and this might perhaps serve as a sound basis for our Conference on Disarmament to tackle this topic with a view to negotiating specific agreements on it.

If the topics already mentioned, particularly the ending of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, benefited from a convergence of political will, the Conference on Disarmament, which is currently working effectively on the drafting of a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, would then be engaged in a series of substantive negotiations on important topics on the disarmament agenda, and would thus bring the content of its work into line with the international situation, which has quite clearly improved. Otherwise, I am very much afraid that it will be difficult for us as responsible delegates here to deny the charge of not having found concrete formulas for disarmament agreements that reflect this favourable international atmosphere, created through the efforts both of the great Powers and of many States that have decided to seek a political solution to their regional conflicts. Disarmament should be, then, an inescapable consequence of this international climate if we intend to take full advantage of it.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The principle enshrined in the 1967 outer space Treaty constitute, along with other relevant legal instruments, a legal régime that governs and regulates space activities. Mankind as a whole has a common interest and a legitimate right in strengthening this legal régime. We should all harness our efforts in this direction. However, because of rapid technological evolution this legal régime, notwithstanding many of its positive factors, continuously needs to be updated, articulated and strengthened. I referred in my statement on 21 April this year to one of the shortcomings that need to be redressed, citing the need to expand the scope of article IV of the 1967 Treaty on outer space to include the banning of all types of weapons instead of restricting the prohibition to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This expansion aims at preserving outer space exclusively for peaceful uses. This requirement must be promptly honoured in the light of the increasing danger of an arms race in outer space. Egypt remains convinced that urgent measures are needed to consolidate, reinforce and develop the existing legal régime and enhance its effectiveness. By the same token we believe that existing bilateral and multilateral agreements should be strictly complied with.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has had an arduous task this year. During its summer session the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela, has very ably guided its deliberations. He has provided us with a useful document containing a list of the existing proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, along with the names of their sponsors. My delegation noted the interesting discussions and the numerous interventions which centred around these proposals. It is apparent that in its summer proceedings the Committee devoted more time and emphasis to these proposals. In our view, this is a fact that must be reflected in our report.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Allow me to touch briefly on the issue of outer space. My country attaches particular importance to appropriate measures regarding arms control in outer space, a complex subject which defies simple solutions. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on these matters, in particular around the ABM Treaty, clearly show how difficult, how arduous the task is to achieve tangible results in this area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Hans van den Broek, indicated at SSOD-III how important agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be. It is therefore encouraging to hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are very slowly edging forward towards agreement on a period of non-withdrawal. Agreement on this period would add to stability because it would create a more predictable strategic environment.

Predictability has also been enhanced by the recently concluded agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prior notification of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. I wonder whether it might not be possible to further study the implications of this agreement for other countries. Perhaps the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space may wish to consider the question of whether this agreement could serve as an example to other relevant countries. Since the bilateral agreement on prior notification of launches of intercontinental missiles clearly serves the cause of stability, and thus the security of us all, similar commitments by other relevant States would be important.

I would not like to prescribe or predict what other relevant countries could do in this respect. But they may wish to consider acting as if they were parties to the bilateral agreement. They may also wish to consider formally adhering to the bilateral agreement. Or they may consider creating a multilateral mechanism of their own. I strongly believe that arrangements of this kind should ultimately have a firm foundation in international law with the purpose of securing binding commitments by all relevant States.

During the past session of the CD a lot has been said about the existing legal régime. The views of my Government on this subject are known to you: we believe that there is scope for improvement, to fill gaps, and we are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament should examine the subject in depth. One aspect concerns the strengthening of the registration Convention, which in our view should be given serious consideration. Pending agreement on the strengthening of its provisions, I wish to stress the importance of adequate implementation of the existing Convention. Proper application of the provisions of the Convention could lead, for example, to more and better information on the nature and function of objects in space. If the registration Convention were applied more fully, this could well increase transparency and strengthen confidence on the part of all countries concerned. States may also be prepared to improve on the notification provisions under the registration Convention. Notification could, for instance, be done before instead of after the launching of objects into space. Useful suggestions have been presented in a recent working document by Australia and Canada. The Netherlands fully supports these suggestions.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The Group of Socialist Countries regrets that meagre progress has been achieved in the elaboration of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Ad hoc Committee on this item, which has been working since 1985, is not in a position to move forward in working out measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, which should be used only for peaceful purposes, since it has been functioning for four years on the basis of the same mandate, which does not provide for negotiations. The delegations of socialist countries made an effort to render work within the framework of the existing mandate and programme of work as fruitful and intensive as possible. The best way to achieve this goal was to focus attention on the discussion of proposals made by various delegations. Thus the main result of this year's session was the concentration of discussion on item 3 of the programme of work. This debate was useful, and made it possible to demonstrate the positive potential of the proposals introduced as well as a positive stock of initiatives accumulated by the Ad hoc Committee. The discussion further confirmed the need for the substance of submitted proposals to be examined by experts and subjected to in-depth and thorough analysis, taking into account their complex scientific and technological character. It confirmed once again the timeliness of the Swedish proposal for the establishment of a group of governmental experts. The Group of Socialist States is in favour of giving the Ad hoc Committee a full-fledged negotiating mandate next year and enabling it to fulfil its primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

I now have the honour to present to the Conference on Disarmament the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which I have been privileged to chair during the current year. The report of the Committee appears, as you indicated, in document CD/870 and consists of four chapters - the introduction, a description of the organization of work, an account of the substantive work done during the 1988 session and the conclusions. Although a clear idea of the activities carried out may be obtained from the report itself, I would like in addition to offer the Conference a few thoughts on the work done.

First I would like to express well-deserved appreciation to my three distinguished predecessors as chairmen of the Committee, Ambassadors Alfarargi of Egypt, Bayart of Mongolia and Pugliese of Italy, who in their respective terms as chairman laid the foundations which underpinned the work accomplished by the Committee in 1988. Each of them in turn gave a new and vigorous stimulus to the work, and that made my task even more challenging.

I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that this year agenda item 5 of the Conference had some very special characteristics, because two dominant trends vied for influence in the handling of this item in multinational forums. On the one hand the vast majority of countries want specific measures to be adopted that will forestall the spread of the arms race to outer space. On the other hand this issue is a particularly sensitive and delicate one for some countries, prompting them to adopt a very cautious position which leads them to prevent the Conference from playing a significant role in this area, by subordinating action at the multilateral level to the development of efforts being carried out bilaterally. Nevertheless, I think that the report I am presenting to the Conference today will make it possible to see that this year the topic has been the subject of growing attention. More delegations spoke, both in the plenary of the Conference and in the Committee, to express their opinions and to make specific proposals. That in my opinion is a reflection of the increasing priority that the topic has been enjoying within the overall disarmament agenda. My main concern as Chairman of the Committee was to try to ensure that, on the basis of the work accomplished in previous years, the discussion this year would be organized in such a way that we could take a step forward in the efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

When we started our work I said that to do this we would have to work in the most effective and practical way possible, and at the time I echoed an expression that had recently been used by Ambassador Morel of France when he stressed that it was necessary to tackle the question of preventing an arms race in outer space "in a specific, concrete and realistic manner". I think that this approach to the Committee's work produced a favourable impact, since this year, although some people are still reluctant to recognize it, there has been a qualitative change in the consideration of the topic. This change can be clearly seen in chapter III of the report, which shows that in 1988 we went into much greater detail in the substantive consideration of the questions covered by the programme of work. This led to better awareness of the delicate political and technical implications of the topic. At the same time, the important differences between the fundamental positions of the main participants in this complex of problems were brought out. Rather than being a step backwards, in my opinion this marks a step forward because until we have a clear idea of what it is that separates us from each other, it will be impossible to try to resolve the differences and close the gap between the extremes.

Another aspect that chapter III of the report brings out clearly is that during the current year, most of the discussions have revolved around the various proposals that have been presented during the debates on the topic. This made the work action-oriented, and also highlighted the fact that although all the members of the Committee recognize that the three topics covered by the programme of work are of equal importance, and that discussion cannot be considered to have been completed on any of them individually, at the same time there is an important segment of the Committee that does not wish the work programme to turn into a kind of strait-jacket that would prevent any progress in the work of the Committee. The discussion on the proposals was helped considerably by an informal paper that I took the liberty of preparing, putting forward a compilation of the proposals presented by the various delegations during the four years in which the Committee has been in existence. In brief, the fact that we concentrated attention on the item of the programme of work relating to existing proposals and future initiatives served to bring out further what has been called the "organic link" between the three points covered by the programme of work. At the same time, it showed that if we want to make progress, we have to focus on identifying specific measures that the international community can take to prevent an arms race in outer space.

I must confess that throughout my term as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, I have often felt as if I was driving a four-wheel-drive vehicle with one of the wheels jammed - sometimes it was even going in the wrong direction - with the result that the vehicle moved only with difficulty. That is why, as far as conclusions are concerned, the Committee has simply reproduced in the report that is now before the Conference the same conclusions as those that appeared in the special report submitted to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since this is the part of the report that brings together the ideas and concepts on which it was possible to achieve consensus, we were unable to go beyond what you read here. The decision to reproduce the conclusions of the special

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

report was the result of a compromise which shows the spirit of flexibility of the member States of the Conference and their desire to ensure continuity into the future of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. To conclude my presentation of the report of the Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, I would like to commend it to the Conference for approval and at the same time express my sincere hope that next year the work of the Committee will be given the stimulus demanded by the importance of the topic so that its results faithfully reflect the profound concern of the international community over the growing danger that outer space will become another arena for the arms race.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the representatives of Egypt, Mongolia and Italy, the item co-ordinators for the various groups, and also the representative of China, for their invaluable support for the work of the Committee and their ever appropriate and relevant words of guidance which helped me considerably in my task. I would like to address special words of thanks to Miss Aida Levin, the Secretary of the Committee, for her invaluable co-operation at all times and her tireless work for the Committee. I would like to extend my thanks to all the other members of the Secretariat staff who directly or indirectly made our work possible and helped to provide all the services needed so that the meetings of the Committee ran smoothly and without interference. A well-deserved word of thanks, too, to the interpreters, and our great admiration and profound respect for the professional skill and devotion with which they did their job.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

In accordance with the programme of work, the Conference is to adopt today the reports of two subsidiary bodies, as well as its annual report to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As I announced at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall first take up for adoption the report of the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and chemical weapons. We shall now deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/870. That document was circulated at our previous plenary meeting. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

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WORKING PAPERS

THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>1988</u> <u>Date</u>
CD/793 (extract)		Letter Dated 21 January 1988 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its Forty-Second Session.	27.01.1988
CD/797 (extract)	USA	Letter Dated 1 February 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America, Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of the Document entitled "Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987.	5.02.1988
CD/807 (extract)	Argentina India	Letter Dated 15 February 1988 Addressed to the President of Mexico the Conference on Disarmament Sweden by the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and	19.02.1988

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
		Sweden Transmitting a Document entitled the "Stockholm Declaration" adopted in Stockholm on 21 January 1988 by the Five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania.	
CD/816		Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".	9.03.1988
CD/817	USSR	Letter Dated 17 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of a Document entitled "Establishment of an International System of Verification of the Non-Deployment of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space".	17.03.1988
CD/833		Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.	25.04.1988
CD/846 (extract)	USA	Letter Dated 25 July 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Text of a Document entitled "Joint Statement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Issued Following Meetings in Moscow, USSR - 29 May to 1 June 1988".	25.07.1988

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
CD/851	Venezuela	Proposed Amendment to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.	2.08.1988
CD/859 (extract)	India	Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order.	15.08.1988
CD/867 (extract)		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.	2.09.1988
CD/870		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.	12.09.1988

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/793
27 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH
(Extract)

LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1988 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS
ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
FORTY-SECOND SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament in 1988. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the annex.

For the information of the Conference, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and a decision dealing with or relating to disarmament matters which were adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(A) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament

At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

...

42/33 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

...

42/42 B "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"

...

(5) In resolution 42/33, operative paragraph 6 reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space; operative paragraph 8 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 9 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 10 urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work; and operative paragraph 14 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

...

(B) Other resolutions and decision dealing with disarmament matters

At the forty-second session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters;

42/38 A "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"

42/42 E "International co-operation for disarmament"

General Assembly



II. Resolutions relating to disarmament matters

It should be noted that, at its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are relating to disarmament matters:

42/68 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken in article III to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

The Commission on Disarmament and International Security, in its report of 1984, has recommended that the Commission should continue its work on disarmament matters.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/33
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 56

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/745)]

42/33. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1/ have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

1/ Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, and 41/53 of 3 December 1986 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, 3/

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations 4/ made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament, 5/

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, paras. 36-39.

4/ See Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982 (A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2), para. 426.

5/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and in their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, 6/ of working out effective agreements aimed, inter alia, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question, 7/

Welcoming the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the work accomplished in 1987 by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament has contributed to a fuller identification of issues and a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

1. Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

6/ A/40/1070, annex.

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), sect. III.E.

3. Emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;
4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;
5. Recognizes, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, that the legal régime applicable to outer space, as such, is not sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the significant role that régime plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and to enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;
6. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;
7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;
8. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;
9. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;
10. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;
11. Calls upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

12. Takes note that the study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequence of extending the arms race into outer space, called for in resolution 41/53, has been prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and that, after a final meeting of the group of experts held in September 1987, the report was finalized and being prepared for publication in autumn 1987;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the views of Member States on all aspects of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

14. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/38
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 62

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[On the report of the First Committee (A/42/669/Add.1)]

42/38. General and complete disarmament

A

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, 1/

Noting that in their joint statement of 8 January 1985 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America agreed that the subject of the negotiations was a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship, 2/

Noting with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have reached an agreement on the total elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

1/ A/40/1070, annex.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/642/Appendix II/Vol. II), documents CD/570 and CD/571.

Noting also with satisfaction the agreement of the two Governments that a similarly intensive effort will be made to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks,

Noting further with satisfaction that, at their forthcoming meeting, the leaders of the two countries will consider thoroughly the development of instructions to delegations on a future treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms and on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 3/ for an agreed period,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. Welcomes the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to conclude a treaty eliminating their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles;
2. Notes with satisfaction that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in the United States beginning on 7 December 1987 and that a further meeting in the Soviet Union is envisioned between them in the first half of 1988;
3. Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of all their agreed objectives in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, in particular early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent, which could be signed during President Reagan's visit to Moscow;

3/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 944, No. 13446.

4. Invites the two Governments concerned to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 4/

5. Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

E

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to expedite the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 11/ and its resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981, 37/78 B of 9 December 1982, 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, 39/148 M of 17 December 1984, 40/152 I of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 K of 4 December 1986,

Stressing the vital need to proceed to balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective measures towards halting the arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of comprehensive international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interests of all States in the adoption of concrete effective disarmament measures, which would, through conversion, release considerable material, financial and human resources to be used for peaceful purposes and, with the assistance of the respective international machinery, particularly for overcoming economic underdevelopment in the developing countries,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, and on the increased openness in military matters in accordance with the priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Stressing that international co-operation for disarmament should, as a matter of priority, be aimed at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuation of

11/ Resolution 34/88.

nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and conventional disarmament on a global scale, taking into account the characteristics of the different regions, and at confidence-building as an indispensable component of relations among States,

Considering that the progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world can be executed stage by stage in terms of both participation and armaments to be covered, with the steady strengthening of international security and stability,

Believing that a broader internationalization of all disarmament negotiations would be an important factor contributing to their success,

Noting with satisfaction an increased dynamism of the efforts of the international community to avert the nuclear threat and to make a genuine breakthrough in the field of disarmament,

Emphasizing that the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals should continue and further expedite their negotiations with a view to curbing the nuclear-arms race while mutually refraining from launching weapons into outer space,

Believing that all nuclear-weapon States should make their national contributions to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Conscious that in the nuclear space age the reliable security of all countries in all spheres of international relations can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all States,

1. Invites all States further to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, so that they may prevent the qualitative enhancement and quantitative accumulation of weapons, as well as the development of new types and systems of weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction, and secure a meaningful and all-embracing disarmament process;

2. Stresses the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;

3. Emphasizes the necessity of refraining from the dissemination of any doctrines and concepts that may endanger international peace and security by justifying nuclear war;

4. Invites all States to consider, in a spirit of co-operation, ways and means to achieve a broader internationalization of the current disarmament negotiations;

5. Declares that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 12/ constitutes a phenomenon incompatible with the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

6. Reiterates its profound conviction that outer space should be excluded from the sphere of military preparation and used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind;

7. Appeals to States members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in a spirit of co-operation and openness, the gradual mutual limitation of their military activities as well as the reduction of their armed forces and armaments, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

8. Calls upon all Member States and the international organizations concerned to continue to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign, launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

9. Calls upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war and to strengthening international peace and security.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/797

5 February 1988

Original: ENGLISH

(Extract)

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT" ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 10 DECEMBER 1987 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN, AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, IN WASHINGTON, 7-10 DECEMBER 1987

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled "Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This Treaty is historic both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms - and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and space talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50 per cent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50 per cent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 per cent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

(Cont'd)

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total;

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area;

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following number of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, co-operative measures and on-site inspection;

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force;
2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty;
3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits;

...

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/807

19 February 1988

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

(Extract)

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1988 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA, INDIA, MEXICO AND SWEDEN TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED THE "STOCKHOLM DECLARATION" ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM ON 21 JANUARY 1988 BY THE FIVE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO AND SWEDEN AND THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA

As a result of their continued examination of questions relating to disarmament and international peace and security, the Five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania adopted in Stockholm, Sweden, on 21 January a document entitled the "Stockholm Declaration".

The Stockholm Declaration - the text of which is annexed to this letter in English and in Spanish - relates to several items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that the Declaration contains ideas and perspectives which can be positively useful in our common endeavour to promote the cause of disarmament and peace. We therefore request that the text be reproduced and distributed as a document of the Conference.

(Signed) Mario Cámpora
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Argentina for Disarmament
Affairs

(Signed) Jaskaran Singh Teja
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
India to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

(Signed) Alfonso Garcia Robles
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Mexico to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed) Rolf Ekéus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Sweden to the Conference on
Disarmament

19 February 1982

ORIGINAL SOURCE
(Reference)

Military competition must not be introduced into new fields. Space belongs to us all, and the number of countries growing more and more dependent on the benefits of the peaceful utilization of outer space is increasing. It must not be used for destructive purposes.

There is still time to prevent an arms race in space. We call on the parties to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to strictly abide by that Treaty. We also reiterate our call for a complete banning of anti-satellite weapons. Specifically, and as an interim measure, we propose an agreement banning the testing of such weapons.

* * *

...
(Signed) [Name]

(Signed) [Name]

President, [Organization]
[Address]

[Address]

(Signed) [Name]

(Signed) [Name]

[Address]

[Address]

Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the
agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled
"Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"

(Adopted at the 446th Plenary meeting on 8 March 1988)

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1988 session, in view of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It will also report to the Conference before the conclusion of the second part of its 1988 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/817
CD/OS/WP.19
17 March 1988

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION OF THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS OF ANY KIND IN OUTER SPACE"

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document entitled "Establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space".

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this document to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(Signed) Y. NAZARKIN
Representative of the USSR to
the Conference on Disarmament

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION OF
THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS OF ANY KIND IN OUTER SPACE

The USSR delegation shares the concern expressed by the representatives of many States participating in the Conference on Disarmament about the possibility of the arms race spreading to outer space.

During the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed that, without waiting for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement on space, a start should be made on establishing a system for international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. The main purpose of such a system would be to determine that objects to be launched into and stationed in space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind.

In the opinion of the USSR, the central place in such a system of verification might be taken by an International Space Inspectorate upon which the States parties to the agreement would confer the right of access, for inspection purposes, to any objects intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space.

In the present paper, the USSR proposal concerning the International Space Inspectorate is given concrete form. In this connection, the Soviet Union believes that, depending upon the specifics of the actual agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space, the system of verification, the structure of the International Space Inspectorate and its modes of operation can be worked out and refined in the course of negotiations.

I. Aims and definitions

1. The main aim in establishing the International Space Inspectorate is to implement measures to verify that any objects to be launched into and stationed in outer space by States parties are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind.
2. On-site inspection directly before launch is the simplest and most effective method of making sure that objects to be launched into and stationed in space are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind.
3. In order to ensure a complete ban on space arms, measures of verification with the aid of the International Space Inspectorate should include:

(a) advance submission by the receiving State to the representatives of the International Space Inspectorate of information on every forthcoming launch, including the date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general information on the space object to be launched;

(b) the permanent presence of inspection teams at all sites for launching space objects in order to check all such objects irrespective of the vector;

(c) the start of inspection ... days before the object to be launched into space is mounted on the launch vehicle or other vector;

(d) the holding of inspections also at agreed storage facilities, industrial enterprises, laboratories and testing centres;

(e) the verification of undeclared launches from undeclared launching pads by means of ad hoc on-site inspections.

4. The expression "space object" means any apparatus intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space.

5. The expression "weapons prohibited for launching into outer space" means systems and devices, irrespective of the physical principles on which they are based, that are created ab initio or are re-equipped to strike objects in outer space or in the atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth (the list of such systems and devices will be agreed upon in the course of negotiations).

6. Ballistic missiles whose launches are not connected with placing any objects into the orbit of an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path to other heavenly bodies shall not be subject to verification by the International Space Inspectorate.

II. Structure and financing

1. The governing body directing the work of the International Space Inspectorate shall be a Council composed of representatives of all States parties to the Agreement. The Council shall hold regular annual sessions, as well as special sessions which may be convened by the Inspector-General at the request of a majority of States parties to the Agreement.

2. The executive body of the Council shall be the International Space Inspectorate; it shall be headed by an Inspector-General, who shall be elected by the Council for a term of five years.

3. The basis of the International Space Inspectorate shall consist of a corps of inspectors, who shall be selected from among the specialists of the States parties to the Agreement in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical representation.

4. The International Space Inspectorate shall have permanent inspection teams composed of ... persons assigned to the following launching sites of States parties (the list will be agreed upon in the course of negotiations).

5. Ad hoc inspection teams shall be composed of members of the corps of inspectors and of additional specialists assigned as necessary by States parties.

6. The activities of the International Space Inspectorate shall be financed out of the annual proportional contributions of the States parties (to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations).

III. Permanent inspection teams

1. The permanent inspection teams shall be appointed by the Inspector-General, by prior agreement with the receiving State, from among the candidates nominated by the States parties on the principle of equitable geographical representation and totalling not more than ... persons.
2. The heads of the permanent inspection teams shall be appointed by the Inspector-General, by prior agreement with the receiving State, from among the candidates nominated by the States parties.
3. Every permanent inspection team shall include representatives of the State party conducting regular launches of space objects in whose territory the team in question serves.
4. The heads and members of permanent inspection teams shall be accorded the privileges and immunities which are granted to diplomatic representatives in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
5. The receiving State shall render maximum assistance to the permanent inspection team in the performance of the team's functions.
6. The permanent inspection teams shall be stationed in proximity to the launching sites.
7. The permanent inspection team shall, by agreement with the receiving State, import and use the instruments, materials and equipment needed for the performance of its functions, the list of which will be agreed upon in the course of negotiations.
8. The activities of the permanent inspection teams shall be financed out of the budget of the International Space Inspectorate.

IV. Working procedure of the International Space Inspectorate

1. The receiving State shall submit to the International Space Inspectorate a general observation programme concerning each forthcoming launch of a space object ... days before the launch, at the same time forwarding a copy of the notification to the competent permanent inspection team.
2. A notification of a forthcoming launch shall include the following information: the place, date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general data on the space object to be launched (the volume of information to be submitted will be agreed upon in the course of negotiations).
3. A reply to each notification of a forthcoming launch shall be transmitted by the International Space Inspectorate to the receiving State not later than ... days after the submission of the notification and shall be accompanied by the sending of instructions to the competent permanent inspection team to hold an inspection.

4. Together with the notification, the receiving State shall provide a general observation programme including the following information:

The date, time and place of the inspectors' access to the space object;

The planned duration of the observation programme;

The languages to be used for interpretation and/or translation;

Other necessary information;

The terms for the supply of any observation equipment that will be made available to the observers by the receiving State.

5. To enable the inspectors to determine with sufficient certainty that the space object is not a weapon and is not equipped with weapons, the receiving State shall in the course of the inspection, in accordance with the observation programme:

Provide the inspectors with the necessary instruments, materials and equipment, the list of which will be agreed in the course of negotiations.

The inspectors may also use their own instruments, materials and equipment, which shall be subject to checking and approval by the receiving State;

Provide the inspectors, in the course of the observation programme, with necessary information directly connected with the performance by the inspectors of their functions;

Provide the inspectors with transport for use in the area of the launching pad;

Admit the inspectors to the sites where space objects are mounted on the launch vehicle and to their launching sites;

Provide the inspectors with facilities for prompt communication with the International Space Inspectorate (the receiving State shall not be bound to bear the cost of the use of the means of communication by the inspectors);

Provide the inspectors with adequate board and lodging at a suitable place for carrying out the observation programme and with medical assistance if necessary.

V. Verification of undeclared launches

1. A State party has the right to ask the International Space Inspectorate for assistance in clarifying any situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicion of the undeclared launch of a space object. For the purposes of clarifying the situation, the International Space Inspectorate may request all necessary information from specially designated observatories (the list will be agreed in the course of negotiations).

2. A State party has the right to request the International Space Inspectorate to obtain clarification from any State party regarding a situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object. In this connection the requesting State shall provide the International Space Inspectorate with all the information which has given rise to the suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object.

In this case the following procedure shall be applied:

- (a) The International Space Inspectorate shall forward the request for clarification to the State party concerned within 24 hours after its receipt;
- (b) The requested State shall furnish clarification to the International Space Inspectorate within ... days after the receipt of the request. The International Space Inspectorate shall forward the clarification to the requesting State within 24 hours after its receipt;
- (c) In the event that the requesting State party considers the clarification insufficient, it may request the International Space Inspectorate to take a decision to hold an ad hoc inspection at the launching site and in the area in which detachable parts of the launch vehicle and spacecraft land.

3. The International Space Inspectorate shall inform the States parties of any requests for clarification of a situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object.

VII. Ad hoc inspections as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object

1. The decision to hold an ad hoc inspection in order to clarify a situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object shall be taken by the International Space Inspectorate on the basis of a request from a State party which considers the clarifications received to be insufficient.

2. The ad hoc inspection shall be carried out by an ad hoc inspection team composed, on the principle of equitable geographical representation, of members of the corps of inspectors of the International Space Inspectorate and of the permanent inspection team in the country concerned. The State party which has requested the holding of an ad hoc inspection may nominate not more than two representatives of its own, who shall be included in the team as observers and shall enjoy all privileges and immunities equally with the other members of the team.

3. Within 24 hours after the adoption of the decision to hold an ad hoc inspection, the International Space Inspectorate shall address a request to the State party concerned. In the request for the holding of an ad hoc inspection, the International Space Inspectorate shall inform the receiving State of the following:

The grounds for the request;

The location of the area mentioned, as defined by geographical co-ordinates;

Preferable points of entry for the ad hoc inspection team;

Where in the area mentioned the inspection will begin;

Whether the inspection will be conducted on the ground, from the air or by both methods simultaneously;

In the case of an aerial inspection, what aircraft will be used;

Whether the ad hoc inspection team will use its own ground transport or that of the receiving State;

The particulars needed for the issue of diplomatic visas to the inspectors entering the receiving State.

5. A State which has received a request for the International Space Inspectorate for the holding of an ad hoc inspection shall be bound to afford the ad hoc inspection team from the opportunity to carry out such an inspection without delay.
6. A reply to a request for an ad hoc inspection shall be provided within 24 hours after the receipt of the request.
7. The ad hoc inspection team shall be composed of not more than ... persons. The inspection shall be completed not later than ... days after the arrival of the ad hoc inspection team in the area mentioned.
8. While the inspectors are in the territory of the receiving country in connection with the holding of an ad hoc inspection, they shall be accorded privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
9. The receiving State shall provide the team with adequate board and lodging at a place which enables the inspectors to perform their functions and with medical assistance if necessary.
10. The ad hoc inspection team shall use its own maps, instruments, materials and equipment.
11. The ad hoc inspection team shall also have access to the appropriate means of communication of the receiving State, including facilities for maintaining continuous communication between members of the inspection team in an aircraft and others in a ground vehicle used in the inspection.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

1958

SPECIAL REPORT ON THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

1. Introduction

The 1958 Disarmament Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 10 August to 10 September 1958. It was the first of a series of annual conferences on disarmament, which were initiated by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1954.

In the course of its work, the Conference considered a wide range of proposals for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, conventional arms, and chemical and biological weapons. The Conference also discussed the need for a comprehensive disarmament agreement, which would cover all types of weapons and would be based on the principle of mutual non-aggression.

The Conference was held in a spirit of cooperation and good will. The participants, representing 48 countries, engaged in extensive discussions and negotiations. The Conference produced a number of important documents, including a Declaration of Principles, a Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and a Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

The Conference also established a number of working groups and committees to continue its work. These groups were charged with the task of preparing draft treaties and agreements on disarmament. The Conference's work was continued by the Disarmament Commission, which was established by the General Assembly in 1959.

The 1958 Disarmament Conference was a landmark event in the history of disarmament. It was the first time that a large number of countries had gathered together to discuss the possibility of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. The Conference's work has laid the foundation for the current disarmament process, which is being carried out by the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/833
25 April 1988

Original: ENGLISH

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was first established at the 1985 session pursuant to the following decision of the Conference on Disarmament:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

"The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to examine, as a first step at this stage, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

"The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1985 session."

At the 1986 session, the Conference re-established the Committee and requested it "... to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space [... taking] into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken

place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1985 ...". At the 1987 and 1988 sessions the Committee was re-established with the same mandate as in 1986. In that connection, at both sessions, the President of the Conference and various delegations made statements regarding the scope of the mandate. All of those statements made possible the adoption of the mandate.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

2. In 1985 the Ad Hoc Committee was chaired by Ambassador Saad Alfarargi (Egypt), in 1986 by Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia), in 1987 by Ambassador Aldo Pugliese (Italy) and in 1988 by Ambassador Adolfo Raúl Taylhardat (Venezuela). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as the Committee's Secretary.

3. During the period covered by this report, the Ad Hoc Committee held a total of 62 meetings.

4. At various stages of the work, representatives of the following States not members of the Conference participated in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

5. In addition to the documents of the 1985, 1986 and 1987 sessions, 1/ the following documents were before the Ad Hoc Committee at the 1988 session:

CD/807 Letter dated 15 February 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden transmitting the Stockholm Declaration, adopted in Stockholm on 21 January 1988 by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania;

CD/816 Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space";

1/ The list of documents of these sessions may be found in the respective reports of the Ad Hoc Committee, which are an integral part of the annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (CD/642, CD/732 and CD/787).

CD/817 Letter dated 17 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space" (also issued as CD/OS/WP.19);

In addition, the Committee had before it the following working papers:

CD/OS/WP.19 Letter dated 17 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space" (also issued as CD/817);

CD/OS/WP.20 1988 Programme of Work

CD/OS/WP.21 Statement by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee at the 3rd meeting, on 22 March 1988;

CD/OS/WP.22 Proposed Programme of Work for 1988, submitted by the Group of 21.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING 1985-1988

6. In discharging the tasks set forth in its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of each session adopted a programme of work covering the following subjects: issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; existing agreements and existing proposals and future initiatives. Since 1986 the Committee has worked under the following programme of work:

1. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
2. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
3. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In carrying out its work, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Committee in 1985."

The work of the Committee was governed by the mandate only.

A. Issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

7. In the course of the work, various delegations drew attention to a number of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as:

the status of outer space as the common heritage of mankind which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, the absence at present of weapons in space, the identification of threats to which space objects are confronted, the relationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and arms limitation and disarmament measures in other areas, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and questions relating to verification and compliance.

8. There was general recognition of the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Some delegations, while stressing that there was clear need for the Conference on Disarmament to play a role with respect to problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, held that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of the bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, they believed that multilateral disarmament measures in this area could not be considered independently of developments at the bilateral level. Other delegations, emphasized that ongoing bilateral negotiations in no way diminished the urgency of multilateral negotiations and reaffirmed that, as provided for in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject, the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

9. Many delegations reiterated that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful uses to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations. Stressing the overriding importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, they expressed concern that the military competition between the two major powers was being extended into outer space. In their view, the introduction of weapons into space would result in an irreversible competition in the field of space weaponry which would have dangerous consequences for international peace and security, give the arms race a qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing agreements and jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole. They, therefore, believed that the priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee should be the immediate prohibition of the testing, production and deployment of weapons systems and their components adaptable for use in, towards, or from space. To that end, in their opinion, attention should

focus on the question of the measures that should be adopted. These delegations also pointed to the military uses of space that were already taking place as an extension of weapons systems on Earth. In that connection, it was noted that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites had been used in support of military operations against developing countries. The view was expressed that to guard against such uses, satellite reconnaissance and surveillance activities should be entrusted to an international agency. The view was also expressed that, in the interim, space powers should give assurances to non-aligned and neutral States against the discriminatory and inequitable use of satellites.

10. Delegations of a group of socialist countries shared the view that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, its exploration and use should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries. They also stressed the overriding importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. They were concerned about the danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space which would, in their view, accelerate the arms race in other areas and make reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals impossible. These delegations were of the view that the stage of exploring the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space had been passed and that the Ad Hoc Committee should proceed to more practical and concrete work on the elaboration of measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They believed that the most important aspect of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space was preventing the introduction of weapons in space through the prohibition of space-strike weapons. Their understanding of the term was that it included: first, space-based ABM systems of any principle of action, second, space-based systems of any principle of action designed to strike from space targets in the atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth and, third, systems of any principle of action and however based designed to strike space objects. They underlined the importance of assuring that the non-deployment of weapons in space would be effectively verified and to that end supported the establishment of an international inspectorate, as discussed below in paragraph 33. These delegations also noted that, although satellites were being used in a variety of support missions and were playing an important role in the strategic relationship, there had been no weapons permanently deployed in outer space up to the present time. They further observed that ballistic missiles having their launching sites and targets situated on Earth, were not space strike weapons either.

11. Some delegations, while attaching utmost importance to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, stated that for thirty years space had appeared as an appropriate environment for national security activities like the Earth and the atmosphere. They also noted that military systems deployed in space accomplished a variety of support missions and that they played a vital role in the strategic relationship of the two major powers. They believed that it was necessary to give thorough consideration to the role that the military uses of space played in the maintenance of international peace and security. Beyond that, they noted that outer space was not immune from utilization by existing weapons systems such as ballistic missiles. These delegations rejected selective approaches to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as represented by the concept of "space strike weapons" which did not give an accurate picture of the threats faced by space objects and of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space. They also criticized attempts to define categories of "space strike weapons" which were at the same time too broad, because they placed in the same category systems with different functions and implications, and too narrow because they excluded weapons and other means which have the capability to disrupt the normal functioning of space objects. They were of the view that, while the Ad Hoc Committee had had very substantial discussions, fundamental divergencies persisted and the work was still in an exploratory phase. They considered that issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space could not be examined in isolation, but should be approached in the wider context of developments in other fields of arms limitation and disarmament, in particular the reduction of nuclear weapons. These delegations emphasised the need for a more thorough examination of questions relating to verification of, and compliance with, existing and future agreements. They also called for detailed information on national space programmes of military significance.

12. One delegation stated that outer space should be explored and used in the service of peace and economic, scientific and cultural development for the benefit of the entire human race. It reiterated that it opposed the qualitative escalation of the arms race to outer space. It considered that the two major space powers, which at present were the only ones that possessed and were continuing the development of space weapons, should assume special responsibility for halting the arms race in outer space. It believed that they should adopt practical measures in undertaking not to develop, test and deploy space weapons, and an international agreement on the complete

prohibition of space weapons should be concluded through negotiations as soon as possible. It was of the view that at the present stage, work in the Conference on Disarmament should centre on the solution of the problems that were most directly related to preventing the "weaponization" of outer space.

B. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

13. There was general recognition that, as provided for in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Delegations generally also recognised the relevance of the Charter provisions concerning the non-use of force.

14. Some delegations emphasized that the Charter of the United Nations played a central role in the legal régime applicable to outer space and, in that context, highlighted the special importance of the Charter provisions on the non-use of force - Articles 2(4) and 51 - which, taken together, prohibit any act of aggression in outer space. Accordingly, they believed that these provisions, together with other agreements, afforded a substantial degree of protection to space objects. Various other delegations, while acknowledging the importance of the Charter, considered that its provisions on the non-use of force were not, and by their nature could not be, sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space since they did not address the problem of the development, testing, production and deployment of weapons in space. For example, these delegations recalled that the legal provisions of those Articles had not prevented the arms race on Earth, nor did they diminish the universally recognized need to negotiate disarmament agreements and even to ban specific types or whole classes of weapons. Some delegations also maintained that Article 51 of the Charter could not be interpreted as justifying the use of space weapons for any purpose or the possession of any type of space weapons. They further stressed that Article 51 could not be invoked to legitimize the use or threat of use of force in or from outer space.

15. In the course of the work, various multilateral and bilateral instruments were examined, inter alia: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of

Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1971), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977) and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1979). In this connection, reference was made to documents CD/OS/WP.6 and 7.

16. It was noted that under the multilateral agreements in force: (1) it is prohibited to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction and to install such weapons on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; (2) the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conducting of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies are forbidden; (3) the testing of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosions in outer space is prohibited.

17. Many delegations recognized that the outer space legal régime played and continues to play a significant role for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is for this reason that many delegations stressed the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

18. Many delegations noted the USSR/US statement at the December 1987 summit that their bilateral delegations in Geneva be instructed "to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time".

19. Various delegations, while recognizing that the existing legal régime placed some barriers to the arms race in outer space, through limitations on

certain weapons and military activities in that environment, stressed that in some areas there were loopholes and some provisions of this legal régime lent themselves to different interpretations. They noted that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, because of its limited scope, left open the possibility of the introduction of weapons in space, other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in particular anti-satellite weapons and space-based anti-ballistic missile systems. They also noted that some of the Treaty's basic terms lent themselves to different interpretations. Furthermore, in their opinion, current developments in space science and technology, coupled with ongoing military space programmes, underscored the inadequacy of existing legal instruments to prevent an arms race in outer space. They, therefore, held that there was an urgent need to strengthen, supplement and amplify the existing legal régime applicable to outer space with a view to the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

20. Some delegations considered that there already exists a considerable body of international law applicable to outer space and that the arms control régime in that environment is much more comprehensive than that on Earth. These delegations also believed that broader participation in existing multilateral agreements and strict observance of both multilateral and bilateral agreements would strengthen the legal régime applicable to outer space. They believed that in order to identify lacunae that might exist in the legal régime governing outer space it was first necessary to establish common ground on what were permitted and prohibited uses of outer space. They noted that the examination of existing agreements in the Ad Hoc Committee had revealed differences of view concerning the meaning of a number of basic terms -- such as "peaceful uses", "militarization" -- which remain to be defined in a satisfactory and generally acceptable fashion.

Consequently, in their view, there was still a need to arrive at a common understanding of what is forbidden and what is permitted under the legal régime applicable to outer space. In particular, these delegations were of the opinion that it was necessary to give in-depth consideration to the question of terminology with a view to reaching greater precision in the use of terms and referred to document CD/OS/WP.15 as a good basis for work. One of these delegations circulated a two-volume dictionary of terms relating to space science and technology, which was generally welcomed.

21. One delegation, in addition to sharing the views reflected in the above paragraph, considered that the existing legal régime for arms control in outer space was equitable, balanced and extensive and that it could be said that it had been far more successful in preventing an arms race than any comparable legal régime on Earth. In the view of this delegation, since the

advent of the space age thirty years ago, recurring predictions of an impending so-called arms race in outer space have not been borne out. The existing legal régime can be seen to be wide-ranging and logical. Moreover, the existing régime did not contain gaps and holes; instead, it placed strict legal controls on virtually any possible type of weapon in outer space and had several significant accomplishments to its credit. This delegation further noted that, for example, outer space is a zone free of nuclear weapons and not one known act in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter has occurred in space. In addition, it pointed out that in several cases there are even redundant and mutually-reinforcing legal constraints. It further believed that what was needed now was more participation in, better compliance with, and a fuller understanding of the existing legal régime. It maintained that if all nations were to comply fully with all existing agreements, there would be no doubt that outer space would be used only for peaceful purposes.

22. Many delegations were of the view that all States, in particular the space powers, should become parties to the multilateral treaties in force that contain provisions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in particular the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

C. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space

23. Proposals and views were put forward by various delegations for consideration in the course of the work.

24. Many delegations reiterated that the overall objective of the Conference on Disarmament should be the complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. Pending the realization of that comprehensive objective, they considered that efforts should be concurrently directed towards the adoption of partial measures. Some delegations considered one of the most urgent problems to be a ban on anti-satellite weapons. Some other delegations maintained that the strengthening of the Registration Convention, inter alia, through effective verification provisions; prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space; and ensuring that existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems are fully complied with, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances, were also urgent. In this context, mention was also made of

other measures called for in the Harare Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-aligned Countries. These delegations recalled that individually or collectively they had presented the following proposals for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee under point 3 of the programme of work:

- Amendment to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or additional protocol thereto;
- Definitions of space weapons;
- Declarations on the non-deployment of weapons in space;
- General treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites;
- Prohibition of dedicated ASAT weapons;
- ASAT moratorium;
- Multilateral instrument to supplement the 1972 ABM Treaty;
- Strengthening of the 1975 Registration Convention;
- Establishment of a group of governmental experts.

25. Delegations of socialist countries submitted the following proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space: draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (CD/274), draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space, or from space against the Earth (CD/476), main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of ASAT weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects (CD/777), establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, based on the international space inspectorate (CD/817) and the proposal for a structured discussion on item 3 of the programme of work (CD/OS/WP.18).

26. Some delegations stated that proposals for measures relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be judged in terms of their effectiveness, their contribution to international peace and security and their verifiability. Some of those delegations were also not in favour of proposals which have been made, by delegations calling for an immediate ASAT ban, immunity for all satellites, a ban on so-called space weapons, a comprehensive ban on the use of force in space, an international inspectorate for the verification of the non-deployment of weapons in outer space and other similar approaches.

27. Various delegations considered that existing proposals for the definition of space weapons (CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1 and Add.1) shared common elements and thus provided a good basis for further work towards the objective of prohibiting the emergence of space weapons. Other delegations, were not in favour of this approach since, in their view, it did not give an accurate picture of all the threats confronting space objects and also overlooked other significant factors of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space.

28. Various delegations discussed proposals concerning the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and the protection of satellites. It was suggested that one possible structure for an instrument on the subject would be in the form of a general treaty with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites. Reference was made to the suggestion that, in order to assure the verifiability of treaty commitments, untested anti-satellite systems could be prohibited, i.e., those capable of attacking satellites in high orbit. Another suggestion was that for purposes of an ASAT prohibition, a distinction might be made between dedicated anti-satellite systems, designed and tested for a flexible attack capacity, and ancillary systems with a limited and not clearly identifiable anti-satellite capacity. Still another view was that a treaty on the subject should: ban the use of force against any space object; prohibit the deliberate destruction, damage or interference with the normal functioning of space objects; proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and provide for the destruction under international control of any existing ASAT weapons and to prevent the utilization and modification of any space object as well as manned spacecraft for anti-satellite purposes. Some delegations which supported a ban on ASAT weapons, emphasized that such a ban on ASAT weapons should give protection only to satellites performing peaceful functions and not to those engaged in activities which threatened the security of other States. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposed an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space fulfilled this criterion. Some other delegations were of the view that the issue of defining peaceful functions would have to be resolved in the context of negotiations on an ASAT ban. Commenting on proposals for the protection of satellites, one delegation noted that it would first be necessary to establish as clearly as possible within the context of existing international law and established international practice, which satellites perform functions that are in the common interest, what these common interests are and how these satellites

contribute to them, following which, it would be necessary to identify how these satellites could be protected. In this regard one delegation also recalled that a proposal had been made that active discussion be entered into on measures to protect from attack all satellites - and their associated ground stations - that contribute to strategic stability and to verification of arms control arrangements. Some delegations commented in detail on a wide range of means that were available to interfere with the functioning of satellites which, in their view, demonstrated that in the examination of proposals to prohibit ASAT systems it was clearly necessary to take into account that the concept involved much more than weapons systems specifically designed and intended to destroy satellites. They pointed out the limitations, both of the notion of "intention" for the classification of a device as an ASAT weapon, and of any distinction between so-called "dedicated ASAT systems" and "ancillary ASAT systems". In addition, they also stated that the diversity and the characteristics of the potential threat against space objects could, in their view, make a treaty on the prohibition of ASAT systems difficult to verify and easy to circumvent.

29. Commenting on proposals for the adoption of measures for the protection of space objects, some delegations noted that the majority of satellites perform military missions and held that to grant them immunity would be tantamount to legitimizing the military uses of space. In their opinion, the adoption of measures to protect space objects should be accompanied by a strengthening of the 1975 Registration Convention to assure that the functions and purposes of protected space objects are clear. It was suggested that the Convention should include provisions to verify the accuracy of the information provided thereunder and that the verification of the nature of space objects could be carried out at the launching sites.

30. Delegations of socialist countries noted that scope and procedure for broadening the international exchange of information on the space activities of States were included in the proposal on the establishment of an international space inspectorate.

31. Some delegations mentioned as worthy of study, such ideas and suggestions as the possibility of multilateralizing the provisions of existing bilateral agreements relating to the immunity of satellites; the role that the international monitoring of satellites might play; the possibility of placing constraints on some elements of anti-satellite activity, consistent with the security interests of all States; and a

"rules-of-the-road" agreement for space. Some delegations suggested several possible measures relevant to the security of satellites and to confidence-building and transparency for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in its exploration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space: the reaffirmation and the development of the principle of non-interference with peaceful space activities; the elaboration of a code of conduct in outer space to prevent the risks and fears that could arise from certain manoeuvres of space objects; the reinforcement for greater transparency of the system of notification established by the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Space Objects; and international cooperation for the use of earth monitoring satellites for the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

32. Referring to proposals for banning the use of force in outer space, immunizing satellites from attack, immunizing satellite ground stations from attack and banning anti-satellite weapons, one delegation held that such proposals were either redundant or perhaps even prejudicial to the legal controls that were already in place. In its view, all uses of force except in self-defence were currently prohibited by law; all satellites and the ground stations associated with such satellites were already protected from attack except in cases of self-defence; the existing legal régime placed many restraints on the nature, deployment and uses of ASATs; and a comprehensive ASAT ban would raise many complex problems. Regarding proposals and views to amend the Registration Convention, this delegation stated that consideration of the Registration Convention falls properly within the venue of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and not the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space.

33. Various delegations noted that existing legal restraints were not comprehensive enough to prevent the emergence of non-nuclear ASAT weapons in outer space and should, therefore, be supplemented by agreements which would preclude the introduction of such weapons in that environment.

34. Some delegations, noting that limits on offensive nuclear weapons would be possible only if strict constraints were placed on BMD systems, emphasized the need to supplement the bilateral ABM Treaty through the conclusion of a multilateral agreement of unlimited duration banning or placing stringent limits on such systems. In this connection, they recalled the proposal to this effect made by one delegation in 1986 (CD/OS/WP.12).

35. Various delegations supported the proposal that members of the Conference on Disarmament should declare that none of them has deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis. Other delegations questioned its usefulness because, in their view, such a declaration was not verifiable and might interfere with the bilateral negotiations.

36. Delegations generally recognized the importance of verification in the context of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Beyond that, some delegations considered that verification did not raise insurmountable obstacles to the conclusion of agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space since, in their view, it should be possible to assure verification of compliance through a combination of national technical means and international procedures. A number of delegations were of the view that verification functions should be entrusted to an international body to provide the international community with an independent capability to verify compliance. In this connection reference was made to the proposed international satellite monitoring agency. Mention was also made of the possibilities offered by the PAXSAT concept - a research programme on the feasibility of the application of remote-sensing techniques to the verification of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements and covering both space-to-space and space-to-ground remote-sensing.

37. Sharing these views, socialist delegations underlined that the non-deployment of weapons in space should be effectively verified. They supported the creation of a world space organization which would, inter alia, perform verification functions. They also suggested that, pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement on space, a start should be made on establishing a system for international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. The main purpose of such a system would be to determine that objects to be launched into and stationed in space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. In the opinion of the group of socialist countries, the central place in such a system of verification might be taken by an international space inspectorate upon which the States parties to the agreement would confer the right of access, for inspection purposes, to any objects intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space. In order to ensure a complete ban on space weapons, measures of verification with the aid of the international space inspectorate should include, inter alia; advance submission by the receiving State to the representatives of the international space inspectorate of information on every forthcoming launch, including the date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general

information on the space object to be launched; the permanent presence of inspection teams at all sites for launching space objects in order to check all such objects irrespective of the vector; and the verification of undeclared launches from undeclared launching pads by means of extraordinary on-site inspections without right of refusal.

38. Some delegations maintained that issues relating to verification and compliance needed to be considered in greater depth. They noted that many elements of the existing legal régime applicable to outer space were relatively simple and stated that the more complicated any arms control agreement for outer space was, the more difficult it would be to verify compliance with it. They believed that verification and compliance issues were particularly sensitive and complex in this area because, on the one hand, vital national security interests were at stake and, on the other hand, the vastness of space and the possibilities of concealment on Earth posed special problems. With respect to the proposal for the establishment of a world space organization, some delegations were of the opinion that its consideration was beyond the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. They also foresaw substantial technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate. In this regard, they believed that one had to keep in mind that virtually any space object, if controlled and manipulated properly, is capable of serving as a weapon. They stated that this basic fact plus many technical, definitional, organizational and political obstacles bar the way to a successful international verification inspectorate.

39. Some delegations, expressing concern at restrictions being placed on the transfer of space technology, stated that in the consideration of proposals it was necessary to contemplate ways and means of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space so that all States would have access without discrimination to space technology to promote their economic and social development according to their needs, interests and priorities. In that connection, these delegations underlined the need to further the objectives of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.

40. Delegations of socialist countries drew attention to the proposal for the establishment of a world space organization organization and to the proposal that the leading space powers establish an international centre for conducting joint research and development of space technology prototypes ordered by developing countries.

41. Many delegations emphasized that all aspects of the arms race in outer space should be dealt with in order to achieve a comprehensive régime to prevent an arms race in outer space. Three possibilities were suggested to achieve a complete prohibition of all activities that could directly or indirectly contribute to an arms race in outer space: amending Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, an additional protocol thereto, or the elaboration of a new comprehensive treaty or partial agreements aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as appropriate.

* * *

42. Some delegations supported the idea of establishing a group of governmental experts to provide technical expertise and guidance in the consideration of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The view was expressed that such a group could assist the Ad Hoc Committee with respect to problems of definition and verifiability of space assets. Another idea advanced by some delegations was that the group could be entrusted with the task of defining the nature of the information that should be provided pursuant to the 1975 Registration Convention in order to permit that a distinction be made between military and non-military space objects. Other delegations believed that a governmental expert group was not the only alternative and that other appropriate arrangements could be considered to provide scientific and technical expertise to the Committee. Some delegations shared the view that the participation of experts made a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee and believed that it would be useful for experts to be included in delegations. In their opinion, however, at this stage of the work, the Committee was not yet in a position to establish a group of experts with a specific mandate. Some delegations suggested that, with a view to reaching a common approach to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, it would be desirable that the Committee draw up an open-ended list of questions and, at an appropriate stage, identify those that needed further elaboration by experts under a clearly-defined mandate.

43. Some delegations were of the view that the Ad Hoc Committee had completed the exploratory phase of its work and that it should concentrate on the consideration of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. They believed that the ideas and suggestions that had been put forward in the course of the work provided sufficient areas of consensus for the initiation of multilateral negotiations on such measures. Other delegations considered that, while the work accomplished had contributed to a

broader and deeper understanding of the subject, it was still necessary to continue the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in order to reach a level of common understanding that would permit the Committee to arrive at a common definition of the scope and specific objectives of multilateral efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

IV. CONCLUSION

44. There was general recognition in the Ad Hoc Committee of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that common objective. The work carried out by the Committee since its establishment contributed to the accomplishment of its task. The Committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussions held contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. In this context, there was also recognition of the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies". A preliminary consideration was given to a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/846
25 July 1988

Original: ENGLISH
(Extract)

LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, USSR - 29 MAY TO 1 JUNE 1988"

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled "Joint Statement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Issued Following Meetings in Moscow, USSR - 29 May-1 June 1988" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 1 June 1988.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

I.
Arms Control

The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF

The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the Treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol.

The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4900 on the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft Treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the Treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMs will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1600 limit and one warhead against the 6000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the Treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges, to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.

D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

- (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
- (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The Delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Recognizing the long-standing commitment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space cooperation by exchanging flight opportunities for scientific instruments to fly on each other's spacecraft, and by exchanging results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of assessing prospects for further U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international cooperation.

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VENEZUELA

Proposed amendment to the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Article IV of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, should be amended as follows:

Insert in the first paragraph:

After the phrase "or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction", the words "or any kind of space weapon or system of such space weapons".

Insert between the first and second paragraphs:

"The States Parties to the Treaty also undertake not to develop, produce, store or use space weapons.

"For the purposes of the preceding paragraph space weapons are understood to mean any offensive or defensive device, including its operational components, whatever the scientific principle on which its functioning is based:

"(a) Capable of destroying or damaging from its place of deployment in outer space an object situated in outer space, in the air, in water or on land;

"(b) Capable of destroying or damaging from its place of deployment in the air, in water or on land an object situated in outer space.

"The following are also space weapons: any offensive or defensive device, including its operational components, and any system of such devices, whatever the scientific principle on which its functioning is based, that is capable of intercepting, from outer space or from land, water or the atmosphere, ballistic projectiles during their flight."

The amendments to the Treaty should be complemented by a Protocol establishing appropriate verification machinery to ensure observance of the global ban on space weapons.

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INDIA

Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free
and non-violent world order

1. Humanity stands at a crossroads of history. The world has lived too long under the sentence of extinction. Nuclear weapons threaten to annihilate human civilization and all that humankind has built through millennia of labour and toil. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike are threatened by such a holocaust. It is imperative that nuclear weapons be eliminated. The recently signed INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a first major step in this direction. This process must be taken to its logical conclusion by ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The time has also come to consider seriously the changes in doctrines, in policies, in attitudes, and in the institutions required to usher in and manage a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. Peace must be predicated on a basis other than the assurance of global destruction. We need a world order based on non-violence and peaceful coexistence. We need international institutions that will nurture such a world order.

2. We call upon the international community to urgently negotiate a binding commitment to an action plan for ushering in a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons. We suggest the following action plan as a basis for such negotiations:

2.1. STAGE I (duration: 6 years, from 1988 to 1994)

...

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page 2

2.1.e. Space weapon systems:

2.1.e.i. A moratorium on the testing and deployment of all space weapon systems.

2.1.e.ii. Expansion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

...

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INDIA

India's view on the need for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order

2.2.c. Space weapons:

2.2.c.i. Agreement within a multilateral framework on banning the testing, development, deployment and storage of all space weapons.

2.1.e. Space weapons systems

2.1.e.i. A convention on the testing and deployment of all space weapons

2.1.e.ii. Expansion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

CD/867
page 3

Annex

[Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

[Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

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page 6

14. [Mindful of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space that could undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament, all States should refrain in their activities relating to outer space from actions contrary to the

observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, thus securing that it shall not become a new arena for an arms race.]

8. Outer space shall be the province of all mankind. Its exploration and use shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all States and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. All States, in particular the major space Powers, should contribute actively to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

...

IV. Priorities

1. */ In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;
- [- prevention of an arms race in outer space,]
- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

2. [Effective measures of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.]

3. [Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.] Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

...

5. Negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed consciousness of their special responsibility for maintaining peace and have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate the work at their bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations has been widely welcomed. In this context nations of the world have endorsed the proclaimed objective of these negotiations and have stressed the importance of their being pursued with utmost dispatch with the objective of reaching early agreements. In this regard the United States and the Soviet Union should also continue to keep in view the following:

(a) The objective to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth as well as limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

(b) The need to take fully into account the security interests of all States.

(c) The need to display a spirit of flexibility and to maintain equal and undiminished security for all at constantly decreasing levels of armaments and the principle that neither side should seek to achieve military superiority over the other.

(d) The requirement for effective measures for verification of compliance with agreements.

(e) The fact that while reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR are directly to be negotiated and effected by the two sides involved, the overall subject of nuclear disarmament is of world-wide concern since nuclear weapons and their accumulation pose a threat not only to their possessors and their allies but every other nation.

(f) [The United Nations General Assembly has reiterated its belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.]

[The fact that bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.]

(g) The need to keep the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the state of negotiations, inter alia, in view of the responsibilities entrusted to these bodies as well as the universal desire for progress towards disarmament.

(Cont'd)

The Soviet Union and the United States, having agreed to accelerate the pace of their bilateral negotiations, should exert every effort to achieve agreements on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals to be implemented during the initial phase of the disarmament process, which should be as brief as possible. In this context, the two sides have already agreed on the principle of 50 per cent reductions in their nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During this initial phase other agreements helpful to the overall disarmament process should also be concluded and put into effect.

Following is the text of the Joint United States-Soviet statement which was issued on 8 January 1985, regarding their negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

"As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George P. Schultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

...

E. Related measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account, as appropriate, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.

3. */ In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. **/

To this end all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In this regard bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The two parties are requested to continue to keep the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly informed of the progress made in their bilateral sessions in order to facilitate multilateral work on this subject.

Efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and which has a primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. ***/

...

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF
AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 446th plenary meeting, on 8 March 1988, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1988 session, in view of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It will also report to the Conference before the conclusion of the second part of its 1988 session."

In that connection, the President of the Conference and various delegations made statements regarding the scope of the mandate. All those statements made possible the adoption of the mandate.

2. Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a special report covering the consideration of agenda item 5 during 1985, 1986, 1987 and the first part of the 1988 session. At its 462nd plenary meeting, on 29 April 1988, the Conference adopted the report of the Committee which is an integral part of the special report submitted by the Conference to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to Disarmament (CD/834).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

3. At its 446th plenary meeting, on 8 March 1988, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat (Venezuela) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as the Committee's Secretary.
4. The Ad Hoc Committee held 17 meetings between 8 March and 7 September 1988.
5. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
6. In addition to the documents of the previous sessions and those submitted during the first part of the 1988 session, 1/ the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following new documents:

CD/851 Proposed amendment to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, submitted by Venezuela (also issued as CD/OS/WP.24).

The Committee also had before it the following new working papers:

CD/OS/WP.23 Letter dated 23 May 1988 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada, transmitting documents relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

CD/OS/WP.24 Proposed amendment to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, submitted by Venezuela (also issued as CD/851);

CD/OS/WP.25 Working paper entitled "Strengthening of State practice under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of satellites, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission", submitted by Australia and Canada;

CD/OS/WP.26 Working paper entitled "Arms control and outer space. A retrospective review: 1982-1987", submitted by Canada;

CD/OS/WP.27 Working paper on the use of certain terms relating to arms control and outer space, submitted by Canada.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1988 SESSION

7. Following an initial exchange of views and consultations held by the Chairman with Members of different groups, the Ad Hoc Committee, at its 3rd meeting on 22 March 1988, adopted the following programme of work for the 1988 session:

- "1. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
2. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
3. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In carrying out its work, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Committee in 1985."

With regard to the organization of work, the Committee agreed that it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered by its mandate and specified in its programme of work. Accordingly, the Committee agreed to allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects, namely, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, existing agreements and existing proposals and future initiatives. It was noted that in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure any member wishing to do so may discuss any subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

8. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee was governed by the mandate only.

9. The Ad Hoc Committee continued the consideration of the subjects covered by its mandate in the light of the positions and views previously set forth by delegations. 2/

10. In the course of the work, delegations discussed or referred to a number of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as: the determination of the scope and objectives of multilateral work under the agenda item, the status of outer space as the common heritage of mankind which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, the absence, at present, of weapons in space, the identification of the functions performed by space objects, the identification of the threats confronting space objects, the relationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and arms limitation and disarmament measures in other areas, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, questions relating to verification and compliance and the need for information on how outer space is being used and on national space programmes of military significance. A working paper was submitted presenting a retrospective review of the evolution of some of the primary issues relevant to outer space during the period 1982-1987 (CD/OS/WP.26).

11. A group of Socialist States held also the view that in the period of growing sensitivity about the Earth's atmosphere, depletion of ozone layer, increasing fears about unintended climatic changes, any plans of testing and stationing of weapons in outer space for possible use, must take into account also their probable negative consequences for the Earth's delicate and still poorly understood atmospheric chemistry. These delegations believed that these questions required reflection in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

12. There was general recognition of the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and it was stressed that bilateral and multilateral efforts were complementary. Many delegations emphasized that those negotiations did not diminish the urgency of multilateral negotiations and reaffirmed that, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 42/33, the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. They also stressed that the scope of the work of the Conference on Disarmament was global and larger than the scope of the bilateral negotiations. Some other delegations, while recognizing the need for the Conference to play a role with respect to problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, stressed that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of the bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, they believed that multilateral disarmament measures in this area could not be considered independently of developments at the bilateral level.

13. One delegation stated that outer space, as the common heritage of mankind, should be used only for peaceful purposes and in the interests of human welfare. It considered that to halt the arms race in outer space has become a new priority item in the field of disarmament. It believed that the development of space weaponry has caused a qualitative escalation in the arms race, which constitutes a new threat to international security and stability. It considered that the prohibition of space weaponry is an effective way to halt the arms race in outer space. It reiterated that the two major space powers, which possess the greatest space capacity and are engaged in developing space weapons, should commit themselves not to test, develop, produce and deploy space weapons and to destroy all their existing space weapons and on such a basis, an international agreement on the complete prohibition and destruction of space weapons should be concluded. It was of the view that at the present stage, work in the Conference on Disarmament should centre on the solution of the problems that were directly related to preventing the "weaponization" of outer space.

14. Many delegations were of the view that as a result of the work carried out in previous years, at the 1988 session, attention should be devoted to proposals for measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. They believed that the various ideas and suggestions that had been advanced provided sufficient points of convergence to move forward in that area. Accordingly, many delegations held that the Ad Hoc Committee should proceed with a more structured and goal-oriented examination of the subject. In this context, they welcomed the informal paper of the Chairman, dated 23 August 1988, containing a list of existing proposals relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as a useful basis for such a work. Some other delegations considered that, while the work of the Committee since its establishment had

contributed to a better understanding of questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there were fundamental divergences with respect to all the subjects covered by the mandate. In their view, therefore, it was necessary to continue the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a view to reaching a common understanding and definition of the scope and objectives of the work of the Committee. Some delegations also noted that there was no record of an informal paper of the Chairman, dated 23 August 1988. These delegations insisted that such a paper did not exist. Many delegations recalled that there were precedents in the Conference of informal documents submitted by presiding officers which have contributed to the consideration of the issues under discussion and have been referred to in relevant reports. Therefore, the fact that some delegations refused to acknowledge the existence of one such document does not diminish its usefulness for the work of the Committee.

15. A number of delegations considered that the participation of experts would contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and mentioned a number of areas where it would be desirable to have technical expertise and guidance, among them, problems of definition, questions relating to ASATs and the protection of space objects, verification and data exchanges. Some delegations favoured the establishment of a group of governmental experts and various possible mandates for such a group were suggested. Other delegations, sharing the view that experts made a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee, believed that such contribution could be made through their inclusion in delegations. In their opinion, however, the work of the Committee had not yet reached the stage where the establishment of a group of experts would be useful.

16. One delegation made a detailed presentation at the expert level of the basic principles of operation of observation satellites and the fundamental techniques of interpretation of satellites data. This presentation was highly appreciated.

17. One delegation belonging to the group of Socialist States had prepared with the help of experts and submitted for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee a systematic analysis of major proposals, submitted by delegations of various countries in the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This set of exposés referred to the problems of ensuring immunity of satellites; prohibition of ASAT weapons; verification and monitoring issues; as well as "partial measures". That delegation pointed out that it sought to give an overall picture of submitted proposals and to identify their common points so as to ensure the best preparation possible for the future multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It held that comparative analysis of such major proposals, views and approaches of delegations made it possible to identify general approaches to solving the problems facing the Conference. This delegation stated that the Committee had accumulated a wealth of ideas and proposals and that a good basis had been established for concrete and goal-oriented work. It noted that delegations belonging to all groups of countries had presented such proposals and ideas. Thanks to the discussions it was possible to reveal the positive potential of every introduced proposal. In its view, should the proposals, that had already been introduced, be put into effect, taken as a whole they

were capable of accomplishing such a complex task as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was convinced that the in-depth examination of problem issues, collective experience and exchange of views would help to find common solutions leading to the elaboration of multilateral agreements. The delegations of other Socialist States expressed the view that these presentations created a good basis for practical and concrete work of the Committee.

18. One other delegation noted, however, that basic misunderstandings about the subjects in items 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee's work programme continue to exist. This delegation noted with concern that questionable definitions presented in the past during the work of the Committee have been inaccurate and non-representative. This delegation stated, furthermore, that much of the discussion on item 3 of the Committee's work programme seemed poorly prepared and reflected only rudimentary efforts to press into that area without having accumulated sufficient background and understanding.

19. Some delegations noted the 1987 UNIDIR study entitled "Disarmament: Problems Related To Outer Space", which had been prepared with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, representing various schools of thought, and submitted to the General Assembly, which noted that study in resolution 42/33. These delegations favoured extensive use of the findings of that study in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee.

20. Many delegations recognized that the outer space legal régime played and continues to play a significant role for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is for this reason that many delegations stressed the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

21. Many delegations noted the USSR/US statement at the December 1987 summit that their bilateral delegations in Geneva be instructed "to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time". Delegations of Socialist States also noted that this statement was reaffirmed in the June 1988 summit.

22. One delegation pointed out that for several years one major space power has had serious concerns about non-compliance of one of the parties to the ABM Treaty. It noted that in particular, the construction of a large phased-array radar (LPAR) near Krasnoyarsk, because of its location and orientation, constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. It continued that although the latter party to the ABM Treaty has sought to convey the impression that it is addressing these concerns, it has not taken the necessary actions to resolve them. This delegation further stated that the existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar calls into question the continued viability of the ABM Treaty. It noted that unless this violation is resolved, one major space power will be forced to consider the exercise of its rights under international law to take appropriate and proportionate responses. It also noted that the radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor are not violations of the ABM Treaty. It further stated that these two radar installations already existed when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972 and that modernization of these installations is allowed by the Treaty.

23. Commenting on the issue, another delegation stressed that this matter should be dealt with on a bilateral basis and that the ABM Treaty provided for a mechanism of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to consider the concerns raised by the sides. As regards the radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk, it reiterated that the radar was designed for tracking space objects and was not subject to the limitations of the ABM Treaty. As a good will gesture this major space power expressed its willingness to dismantle the equipment of the radar, provided agreement was reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972. This major space power in its turn expressed concern regarding compliance of the other side with the provisions of the ABM Treaty, resulting from the deployment of the large phased-array radar in Thule and the construction of a similar radar in Fylingdales Moor.

24. Various delegations, while recognizing that the legal régime placed some limitations on certain weapons and military activities in outer space, emphasized that existing legal instruments left open the possibility of the introduction of weapons in space, other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and, consequently, were not sufficient to prevent an arms race in that environment, particularly in view of the rapid pace of progress in space science and technology as well as ongoing military space programmes. They believed that there was an urgent need to consolidate, reinforce, and develop that régime and enhance its effectiveness with a view to the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space.

25. Some other delegations stressed that there was already a body of international law governing activities in outer space which provided a considerable measure of prohibition and protection. They believed it was important to have a full understanding of the scope of the existing legal régime, of the inter-relationship of its provisions and of aspects related to adherence, compliance and enforcement. They also believed that the examination of that régime in the Ad Hoc Committee confirmed that there continued to be a need to arrive at a common understanding of what were permitted and prohibited uses of outer space. In this regard, an analysis of some terminological problems that had to be dealt with was presented to the Committee (CD/OS/WP.27).

26. In addition to sharing the views reflected in the above paragraph, one delegation reiterated that the existing legal régime for arms control in outer space was equitable, balanced and extensive and had been far more successful in preventing an arms race than any comparable régime on Earth. In its opinion, any problems associated with the existing legal régime would be inherent in any legal régime, no matter how developed, since a legal régime by itself is not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space but also requires compliance, enforcement and participation. Beyond that, this delegation believed that many of the proposals that were being discussed were based on an inadequate appreciation or flawed understanding of the existing legal régime. It considered, for instance, that proposals for banning the use of force in outer space, immunizing satellites from attack, immunizing satellite ground stations from attack and banning anti-satellite weapons were either redundant or perhaps even prejudicial to the legal controls that were already in place.

27. Some delegations stated that further specific measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space will not detract from the importance of the existing legal régime just as certain arms control measures currently in force did not do so in the terrestrial environment. It was also pointed out that the fact that an arms race has not yet materialized in outer space cannot be attributed to the adequacy and sufficiency of the existing legal régime.

28. Some delegations, stressing the urgency of forestalling the introduction of weapons in space, discussed comprehensive proposals for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as those calling for a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the Earth, a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and amendments to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. In this context, some of these delegations considered that the various definitions of space weapons that had been put forward provided a good basis for working towards a comprehensive prohibition of weapons that were not yet outlawed under the existing legal régime. They also suggested that with the assistance of experts it should be possible to formulate a definition that would not only describe space weapons but also list their components. A proposal was submitted (CD/851) to amend Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty so as to make its prohibition applicable to any kind of space weapon and to include a prohibition on the development, production, storage and use of space weapons. That proposal also provided for a definition of space weapons. It was envisaged that those amendments to the Treaty would be complemented by a protocol establishing appropriate verification machinery to ensure compliance with the complete prohibition of space weapons. Another suggestion called for an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty to broaden its scope to cover any type of weapon, combined with the multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and a ban on anti-satellite systems other than space-based systems.

29. Some other delegations were not in favour of such approaches on the grounds that they did not give an accurate picture of all the threats confronting space objects and overlooked other significant factors of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space. These delegations also held that proposals should be examined bearing in mind questions relating to compliance, verifiability, practicability and utility.

30. Some delegations, noting that existing legal restraints did not preclude the emergence of non-nuclear ASAT weapons, stressed the importance of a ban or limitations on anti-satellite weapons. A number of issues that would have to be addressed in the consideration of such a ban or limitations were identified - for example, scope of the ban, definition of ASAT weapons, the problem of dual-purpose spacecraft, means of verification. In that connection, some delegations considered that the participation of experts would assist the Ad Hoc Committee in clarifying the problems involved in those issues. Various proposals and ideas were discussed, such as: a general treaty supplemented by specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites; prohibition of systems capable of attacking satellites in high orbit; prohibition of dedicated anti-satellite systems; a treaty that would ban the use of force against any space object, prohibit the deliberate destruction, damage or interference with the normal functioning of space objects; proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons and provide for the destruction under international control of any existing ASAT weapons and to prevent the utilization and modification of any space

object as well as manned spacecraft for anti-satellite purposes; a ban on the testing and/or use of ASAT weapons, pending the achievement of a comprehensive ban on the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons, on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space, the destruction of all existing ASAT weapons and the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems. Some delegations, supporting a ban on ASAT weapons, emphasized that it should protect only satellites performing peaceful functions and not those engaged in activities that threatened the security of other States or endangered the peaceful activities of other States in outer space. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposed an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space fulfilled that criterion. Some other delegations were of the view that the issue of defining peaceful functions would have to be resolved in the context of negotiations on an ASAT ban.

31. Some delegations considered that there were inherent difficulties in proposals for a ban or limitations on ASAT weapons and referred, in particular, to the diversity and characteristics of the potential threats to space objects, the existence of weapon systems that had an ASAT capability, the limitations of such notions as "intention" or "dedicated" for purposes of defining and prohibiting ASATs, problems of verifiability and the close link between questions relating to ASATs and matters under consideration in the bilateral negotiations. Beyond that, one delegation also elaborated on the various legal restraints that the existing legal régime already imposed on the nature, deployment and use of ASATs.

32. Other delegations gave examples of dedicated ASAT systems that have been tested despite the existing legal régime and reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive ASAT ban which could effectively close this loophole.

33. Various delegations were of the view that consideration should be given to the question of the protection of satellites and a number of proposals and ideas were examined. Some delegations considered that attempts to establish a protection régime based on a categorization of satellites would give rise to many difficulties and advocated the granting of immunity to all space objects without exception, it being understood that space weapons would be subject to an unconditional ban. Other delegations were of the view that certain distinctions should be made for purposes of immunizing satellites and various possibilities were mentioned in terms of their functions, purposes and orbit. In this connection, some delegations held that a protection régime called for improvements in the system of registration of space objects to permit the identification of the nature and missions of protected space objects. Some delegations stressed in particular that immunity should not be extended to satellites that perform military missions. One delegation suggested a step-by-step approach to the protection of satellites, including establishing within the context of existing international law and established international practice, which satellites perform functions that are in the common interest, what these common interests are and how these satellites contribute to them, after which it would be necessary to identify which satellites should be protected followed by identification of an appropriate protection régime for such satellites. In this regard this delegation recalled its proposal concerning measures to protect from attack all satellites - and their associated ground stations - that contribute to strategic stability and to verification of arms control arrangements.

34. Various other possible measures relating to the security of satellites were mentioned, such as multilateralizing the immunity provided for in certain bilateral agreements to satellites that serve as national technical means of verification, a "rules-of-the-road" agreement, the reaffirmation and development of the principle of non-interference with peaceful space activities and the elaboration of a code of conduct in outer space to prevent the risks and fears that could arise from certain manoeuvres of space objects.

35. One delegation noted that international legal instruments already existed to ensure the immunity of satellites. This delegation stated that these instruments prohibit the use of force and the threat of the use of force against satellites except in cases of self-defence. This delegation noted, however, that these instruments are not intended to compromise the inherent right of sovereign States to take adequate measures to protect themselves in the event of the threat or use of force.

36. Many delegations noted that general provisions on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force have unfortunately not proved to be adequately binding in the past. This has necessitated the growing need for negotiation of specific disarmament agreements, for example, those relating to chemical and biological weapons, inhumane weapons, etc.

37. One delegation recalled its proposal for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement to supplement the 1972 ABM Treaty (CD/708).

38. Some delegations highlighted the contribution that confidence-building measures could make to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and stressed in that regard the importance of transparency in the activities of States and of accurate information on how outer space was being used. It was pointed out that to date not a single one of the space launches registered had been described as having military purposes, although well over half of space objects performed military functions. The view was expressed by another delegation that there was a need for expert examination of the parameters on which information should be provided and it was suggested that a group of experts be set up for that purpose. Some other delegations believed that the strengthening of the Registration Convention would be a valuable confidence-building measure, and they discussed various ways and means of improving the system of notification established thereunder with a view to assuring the availability of timely and adequate information on the nature and purposes of space activities. A proposal was submitted (CD/OS/WP.25), suggesting that an understanding be reached among States parties to the Convention that in discharging their reporting responsibilities they would provide timely, accurate information on the functions of a satellite, including whether it fulfilled a civilian or military mission or both. This same proposal included the suggestion that States which have launched space objects, but are not party to the Convention should join the Convention or agree to submit the same information under the terms of General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI). A number of delegations also noted that the proposed course of action submitted in CD/OS/WP.25 would enhance confidence through the provision of more specific information regarding objects launched into space as well as through increased adherence and better compliance with an existing legal instrument. It was believed that although the Convention had not been negotiated as an agreement in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, it offered possibilities that could be used to advantage in this field. Another

view was that consideration be given to procedures to verify the accuracy of information on space objects, including verification of their nature at the launching sites. Some delegations considered that questions concerning the Registration Convention fell within the competence of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In addition, one delegation noted that the Registration Convention had been negotiated to establish an international register of space objects to give practical effect to the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects and held that the introduction of changes in the former entailed a high probability of introducing confusion into the latter. Some delegations pointed out that the Registration Convention, as mentioned in its preamble, has to be seen in the context of developing international law governing the exploration and use of outer space and therefore has direct relevance to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Some delegations suggested that besides data on objects launched into outer space, information should also be provided, in the interest of greater transparency, on ballistic missile defence research currently being carried out by some countries.

39. Referring to its proposal concerning declarations that weapons have not been deployed in outer space on a permanent basis, one delegation explained that the initiative aimed at generating a climate of confidence in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations supported the proposal and recalled that the usefulness of unilateral declarations as confidence-building measures had been acknowledged in various fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Supporting this proposal, one delegation belonging to the group of Socialist States recalled that it had stated that it would not be the first to place weapons in outer space.

40. Another delegation, commenting on the problems that in its view this proposal raised, noted that there were many kinds of weapon systems that could be used against space objects and that not all of them need necessarily be placed in space. It pointed out that those were the kinds of issues that were under discussion in the bilateral negotiations.

41. Delegations generally recognized the importance of verification in the context of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Some delegations considered that it should be possible to assure verification of compliance with agreements relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space through a combination of national technical means and international procedures. It was also noted that the Outer Space Treaty contained some verification provisions. A number of delegations were of the view that verification functions should be entrusted to an international body to provide the international community with an independent capability to verify compliance. Reference was made to the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and to international co-operation for the use of Earth monitoring satellites for the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Mention was also made of the possibilities offered by the PAXSAT concept - a research programme on the feasibility of the application of remote-sensing techniques to the verification of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements and covering both space-to-space and space-to-ground remote-sensing.

42. Sharing these views, delegations of a group of Socialist States underlined that the non-deployment of weapons in space should be effectively verified. They supported the creation of a world space organization which would, inter alia, perform verification functions. They were also convinced of the necessity to establish, under the auspices of the United Nations, a mechanism for wide-ranging verification of various disarmament agreements, such as an international verification agency (IVA). When established, the International Verification Agency would co-ordinate and verify compliance with agreements and treaties on specific aspects of the limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments. It could also be entrusted with the task of verifying compliance with agreements on the reduction of international tension. Another function of the agency could be to monitor the military situation in regions of conflict, with a view to taking measures to prevent military conflicts. These delegations were convinced that as applied to space, verification was called upon to ensure a resolution of two interrelated, major problems: first, to ensure a non-deployment of any weapons in space, i.e. to preserve outer space free of arms; second, to help in detecting breaches of present and future agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space. For the purposes of solving the first problem - preventing deployment of any arms in space - the Ad Hoc Committee had the proposal entitled "Establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space" (CD/817). The main purpose of such a system would be to determine that objects to be launched into and stationed in space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. Its central element would be an international space inspectorate upon which the States parties to the agreement would confer the right of access, for inspection purposes, to any objects intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space. In order to ensure a complete ban on space weapons, measures of verification with the aid of the international space inspectorate should include, inter alia, advance submission by the receiving State to the representatives of the international space inspectorate of information on every forthcoming launch, including the date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general information on the space object to be launched; the permanent presence of inspection teams at all sites for launching space objects in order to check all such objects irrespective of the vector; and the verification of undeclared launches from undeclared launching pads by means of extraordinary on-site inspections without right of refusal. They were convinced that on-site inspection carried out immediately prior to launchings was the most simple and effective way to be sure that objects placed into space did not carry weapons of any kind. Despite the very complex nature of space technology the verification of the presence or absence of means of warfare on a space object seemed to be relatively simple. So far, launching sites in the world were not so many, a space launch complex was something that could not be hidden, and the permanent presence of international inspectors at these launching sites would be a reliable guarantee that objects launched into space were not weapons and did not carry weapons of any kind. All States conducting space activities would be put in an absolutely equal situation while the permanent control on the part of international inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. Thus, the problem of preventing arms in outer space could be considered on the basis of the proposal on the international space inspectorate. The problem of a different kind, related to the previous one - detecting cases of arms already put into space - could be tackled on the basis of other proposals. The PAXSAT concept seemed to be worthy of attention.

These delegations believed that the establishment of an international space monitoring agency (ISMA), which might in future become a component of an international verification agency, could provide international community with authentic and diverse information on compliance with multilateral treaties and agreements in the area of disarmament and reducing international tensions as well as monitoring military situation in regions of conflict. Seeking to provide this idea with a practical basis delegations of Socialist States proposed to start negotiations on the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, including the programme and material and technical basis for it.

43. Some delegations maintained that issues relating to verification and compliance needed to be considered in greater depth. They noted that many elements of the existing legal régime applicable to outer space were relatively simple and stated that the more complicated any arms control agreement for outer space was, the more difficult it would be to verify compliance with it. They believed that verification and compliance issues were particularly sensitive and complex in this area because, on the one hand, vital national security interests were at stake and, on the other hand, the vastness of space and the possibilities of concealment on Earth posed special problems. With respect to the proposal for the establishment of a world space organization, some delegations were of the opinion that its consideration was beyond the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. They also foresaw substantial legal, technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate. In this regard, they believed that it should be kept in mind that virtually any space object, if controlled and manipulated properly, is capable of serving as a weapon. They stated that this basic fact plus many legal, technical, definitional, organizational and political obstacles bar the way to a successful international verification inspectorate.

44. One delegation stated that any type of international verification inspectorate is impractical because treaties already in place adequately regulate military activities in space, while also permitting the conduct of important national security and self-defence activities such as early warning of attack. It noted that the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Registration Convention constituted significant elements of this Treaty régime. This delegation believed, moreover, that proposals of this type could be more destabilizing than stabilizing because they could circumvent the development or compromise the effectiveness of strategic defence capabilities that threaten no one. It noted the possibility that greater reliance on effective defences against ballistic missiles could, in the future, provide a safer, more stable basis for deterrence of war than the sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation. This delegation stated that to provide a fully effective layered defence, some elements of a ballistic missile defence system may need to be based in space. This delegation stated that the programme of research, development and testing related to this layered defence system is in full compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty.

45. Commenting on the issue, another delegation stated that Article V (1) of the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems, which are, inter alia, space-based or include space-based elements. The same delegation emphasized that its State had been observing fully and precisely the ABM Treaty.

46. Some delegations noted with satisfaction that at the 1988 session the Ad Hoc Committee gave detailed consideration to concrete proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In their opinion, the examination of specific proposals had served to identify areas of possible convergence of views and thus provided a good basis for practical work on measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Recognizing the complexity of the subjects under consideration and the need for further analysis, they held that relevant issues, including those concerning the legal régime applicable to outer space, could be addressed in the context of the consideration of specific proposals. They believed that the work of the Committee should continue in that direction. Some other delegations were of the view that it was necessary to continue the examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space that had not been sufficiently explored. They believed that much more detailed examination had to be done before it would be possible to undertake further activities. They considered that given the divergence of views on substantive and political issues, the broad scope of individual topics and the highly technical nature of the subject, the Committee had carried out work which contributed to a better understanding of the subject, but that much remained to be accomplished within the terms of the current mandate and programme of work. They also noted that much of the discussions held on proposals clearly showed the persistence of radically different approaches to the issues and that consensus did not exist on them. Consequently, the Committee needed to continue to study all the subjects covered by the mandate and the programme of work in order to establish a common body of knowledge and understanding, and common definitions of the scope and specific objectives of multilateral efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

47. Many delegations, while recognizing the importance of substantive consideration of relevant issues, emphasized that such consideration should be an integral part of the multilateral process of elaborating concrete measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space and that it could be done in the context of considering specific proposals. They reaffirmed that the objectives of multilateral efforts in this field are clearly set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They also recalled the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. In this context, these delegations stressed the indispensable role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and the inscription of item 5 on its agenda. Delegations of Socialist States shared the views expressed in this paragraph.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

48. There was general recognition in the Ad Hoc Committee of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that common objective. The work carried out by the Committee since its establishment contributed to the accomplishment of its task. The Committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussions held contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the

prevention of an arms race in that environment and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. In this context, there was also recognition of the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies". A preliminary consideration was given to a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

49. It was agreed that no effort should be spared to assure that substantive work on this agenda item will continue at the next session of the Conference. It was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1989 session, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work of the Committee since 1985.

Notes

1/ The list of documents may be found in the 1985, 1986 and 1987 reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (CD/642, CD/732, CD/787 and CD/834, respectively).

2/ Those positions and views are reflected in the annual reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and in the special report submitted to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

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