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The **Disarmament** Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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Prime Minister Comments on Historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement



Oval Office Deliberation — President Reagan (left) and General Secretary Gorbachev discuss issues of current interest to their countries during a private conference in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington. This was one of several meetings between the two leaders attended only by their interpreters. US Information Agency

Following the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement on December 8, 1987, the Prime Minister issued the following press release.

"On Tuesday, December 8, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed an historic agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. I am sure that all Canadians applaud this treaty as a pragmatic step towards a better and safer world. It is a celebration of common sense over adversity.

The agreement requires the complete dismantling and destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. For the first time in

the nuclear age, a whole class of super-power weapons will not be merely limited, but eliminated completely.

President Reagan can justifiably claim great success. It was he who provided the vision in his zero option proposal of 1981. It was he who held firm against those who wanted to freeze these weapons at levels still threatening to the West. It is he who has had the courage to distinguish between firmness and intransigence.

However, we must not hesitate to give Mr. Gorbachev his full share of the credit. It took a new kind of Soviet leader to undo his predecessors' decision to introduce those missiles in the

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first place. And it has taken a new Soviet leader to realize that a more stable world is possible through mutual reductions in military might.

We welcome the new spirit as well as the tangible achievements.

The agreement introduces the most stringent verification measures yet seen. For the first time, American and Soviet inspectors will be stationed on each other's territory. Measures like these are essential, not only to ensure compliance but to build trust. This precedent will be extremely valuable for future arms-reduction accords.

The fear that removing these missiles might somehow split Europe from North America is unfounded. The links were strong before the missiles were introduced. They will remain strong after they are removed. The presence of American and Canadian forces in Europe is compelling evidence of the North American commitment to Europe.

Security is indivisible. The elimination of intermediate-range weapons benefits all Western countries. But the weapons that directly threaten Canada — destabilizing intercontinental missiles, as well as nuclear-armed submarines and bombers — are not affected by this agreement. We therefore especially welcome the progress that has been made on strategic weapons at this Summit. Canada hopes that the INF Treaty will now provide the momentum for reducing the huge number of nuclear weapons that remain, and lead to an agreement in Moscow next spring. This would meet the fundamental Canadian priority — stable security at much lower levels of armaments.

The INF Treaty tells us much about the meaning and importance of collective security. In 1979, the Western Alliance decided to deploy a limited number of these missiles. At the same time, we offered to negotiate reductions with the USSR.

Some West European governments came under strong public pressure not to provide bases for these missiles. Our

West European allies held firm. When they saw that the Alliance could not be divided, the Soviets returned to the table they left in 1983. The Treaty just signed is a clear vindication of NATO's policy of combining deterrence and dialogue. We abandon either element at our peril.

Change and Continuity in East-West Relations

The Treaty is welcome for what it accomplishes. It is also welcome for what it tells us about East-West relations. Only a few years ago, such an agreement seemed far in the future — hopelessly idealistic.

So much has changed since then. What was once the stuff of dreams is beginning to come within our grasp: significant arms reductions; the resolution of regional conflicts; progress on human rights.

But we must not delude ourselves about the daunting obstacles that remain. Nor should we forget how we arrived at this point.

The need for Western cohesion remains as necessary as ever. Antagonism between East and West will not evaporate overnight. Though we hope the walls will become lower, Europe remains divided. The Soviet military forces remain well in excess of what anyone in the West would consider reasonable and sufficient. *Glasnost*, welcome as it may be, will not be able to transform quickly a Soviet Union that has roots in centuries of Russian authoritarianism as well as Marxist dictatorship.

The need for consistency and prudence therefore remains. Freedom will continue to need a strong defence. Neither Western Europe nor North America nor both together can maintain an effective and stable military balance between East and West by conventional means alone. Thus the West as a whole will continue to rely upon nuclear deterrence until our security can be guaranteed in other ways.

It also means we must seek, through negotiations, to do away with the current imbalance in conventional forces and scrap chemical arms entirely.

That elements of the past endure should not, however, blind us to what is new and positive.

In the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is courageously trying to arrest social decay, to turn around the economy and improve the standard of living. If this means that ordinary Soviet citizens will have greater initiative and self-expression, this evolution is decidedly in our interest, as well as their own. We should not hesitate to encourage a Soviet leader who is trying to loosen the shackles of the past, repudiating some of the errors and excesses of the past.

Externally, the Soviet leaders are coming to recognize the price of going it alone and the challenge of interdependence. The Soviet Union will never be secure by making other countries feel insecure.

Some steps have been taken. Mr. Gorbachev seems to recognize the advantages of collective action through international organizations. This is welcome. Of course, there are issues of confidence which depend on Soviet action.

Soviet troops have brought death and destruction to Afghanistan for eight years. Up to now, Soviet leaders have ignored the demands of the international community for a total and immediate withdrawal. To comply now, to allow the Afghan people by themselves to determine their future, would greatly bolster confidence in Soviet intentions.

In the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, dissidents have been released, divided families allowed to reunite, emigrants allowed to leave. We certainly welcome those developments. But there are still far too many people who are penalized for seeking to exercise rights guaranteed them in international human rights accords. We ask only that Soviet and East European leaders keep the human rights promises they freely made in those accords.

Mr. Gorbachev's interest in the world economy is understandable. He cannot ignore the information revolution, global



technological developments or the impact of currency fluctuations and commodity prices. Closer integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy is also in the West's long-term interest. It is well to remember, however, that it is the global economy that is open and the Soviet economy that is closed. We call upon the Soviet Union to adjust its economic practices so that it may take advantage of the many opportunities that are open to it in Canada and elsewhere.

The Canadian Contribution

I believe there are five essential principles by which Canada should be guided as we enter this new and path-breaking phase of East-West relations.

First, we must do everything possible to promote greater communication between the peoples of East and West. Through visits, through cooperation in the Arctic and in cultural exchanges, through trade, we can do much to break down the walls of distrust and suspicion.

Second, we must continue to make a full and effective contribution to collective defence, alongside our friends and allies. Working together and maintaining a strong deterrent, in conjunction with dialogue, has brought us this far; it can take us even farther. Canada is doing its part, as the Defence White Paper shows.

Third, I reaffirm our goal of vigorously promoting progress in arms control and disarmament. The objectives in the nuclear, space, chemical and conventional field that I set out in 1985 are as valid today as they were then. We will continue to work in every forum available to us — in NATO, in the Conference on Disarmament, in conventional arms talks — to achieve this purpose. We may not be at every negotiating table, but our commitment and expertise will be brought to bear wherever they can contribute effectively.

The goal in all these areas is stability; stability at lower levels of arms, and stability in the relationship between offence and defence.

An enduring security structure, however, requires a broader basis of confidence than we have had in the past.

Canada's fourth principle, therefore, is to encourage a more constructive Soviet role internationally. We welcome a world in which the Soviet Union is a committed, responsible partner, whether in political or economic matters. We encourage this, and look to the Soviet Union to match its words with action.

Fifth, we will continue to stress the human side of East-West relations. Canadians believe deeply that families wishing to be reunited should be permitted to do so. We believe in religious freedom, the right to emigrate and the right to dissent. We will continue to raise our voice on these matters at the Vienna Meeting on European Security and Cooperation. And we will not cease until we are satisfied that international standards are being met.

Canada rejoices in the agreement signed in Washington on Tuesday. We salute the leaders who had the courage to take this step. We commit ourselves to work to reduce barriers between East and West, to create a safer, saner world for ourselves and those who will come after, and to establish habits of cooperation instead of confrontation.

But a world which must contend with pressing economic, social and environmental problems will not wait forever for us to succeed. The Treaty signed on Tuesday in Washington shows that with hard work, resolve, and common sense and purpose, we can prevail.

It is a grand beginning, but a beginning nonetheless. Let us get on with the challenge ahead."

SSEA Declares INF Agreement an Historic Achievement

On December 8, 1987, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today expressed his great pleasure at the signing of the historic agreement between the USA and the USSR to eliminate all ground-based Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles globally. Mr. Clark said: 'This agreement is an unprecedented breakthrough in efforts to reverse the nuclear arms spiral and engage in actual reductions in nuclear arms rather than just their limitation. The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) accord will result in the complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles and is therefore the first nuclear disarmament agreement in modern history.'

The terms of the INF treaty, particularly its verification provisions, are significant and extremely important. For the first time, the Soviet Union has agreed to the establishment of a permanent monitoring site on Soviet territory manned by USA

personnel. The associated inspection regime is a rigorous one involving, in the beginning, up to 20 challenge inspections per year. The concept of a prior exchange of agreed data has also been accepted and satisfactorily implemented. Finally, the need for asymmetrical reductions to common levels has been recognized as the USSR will eliminate four times more warheads than the USA. All of these measures have been Western priorities in arms control for many years and have important implications for other arms control and disarmament negotiations.

'The outcome of the INF negotiations has reaffirmed the validity of NATO's December, 1979, 'double-track' decision. It underlines the important role Alliance unity and solidarity have played throughout. The difficult decisions taken over the past eight years on the issue of INF have had a direct bearing on the successful outcome of these negotiations. Canada is satisfied with the results and looks forward with anticipation to similarly successful conclusions to other arms control negotiations currently underway.'"



SSEA Applauds New Vitality in Arms Control Process


On September 22, 1987, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, spoke to the 42nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Following are excerpts from his address.

"A year ago, the atmosphere in this assembly was heavy with a sense of crisis. The financial shortfall of the United Nations, serious in itself, was also a symptom of a deeper worry about the very existence of this organization.

Canada — and other friends of the United Nations — used this podium to call for reform. I am pleased today to note that substantial reform has begun. That is both a tribute to the men and women who make this organization work, and testimony to the recognition, by most nations, that a strong United Nations is essential to world peace. We are especially impressed with the United Nations resolve to extend reform beyond the institutions in New York, to United Nations economic and social institutions throughout the world.

For our part, Canada made a point of paying our 1987 assessment fully and as early as possible. We hope other nations will quickly pay their current and past assessments. Those who call for internal reform have a particular obligation and opportunity to encourage it, once it begins. That good example would increase the pressure upon other powers, whose contributions are consistently delinquent.

During the past year this real internal reform has been matched by solid progress on many of the major issues of concern to the United Nations. Sometimes that progress occurred outside this multilateral organization — as, for example, in the historic breakthrough on an arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the steady pressure against apartheid mounted by the Commonwealth, and in the initiative towards peace launched by the five presidents of Central America. But in many other cases, the world's movement forward was rooted here. Those cases are worth enumerating.



Mr. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

In the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, Security Council Resolution 598 reflects welcome political will and unanimity in the Security Council, and the Secretary-General is to be commended for his patient, persistent mediation. The Secretary-General's mission was not as successful as we all had hoped and the speech this morning by the President of Iran can only be characterized as destructive and deeply disappointing. Therefore the Security Council should be reconvened to take the next step. Canada would fully support implementation of the axiomatic second half of Resolution 598, the application of sanctions.

At UNCTAD VII, the consensus statement on trade, debt and commodities may presage a new era of cooperation between developed and developing countries. UNCTAD VII was an example of an international conference for whose outcome the prognosis was uniformly gloomy. The doubters were wrong. The UN scored a major success.

The special session on Africa is beginning to yield concrete results, albeit there is a long, long way yet to go. The international community clearly now

recognizes that the majority of African countries are making great efforts to turn their economies around. But the international community must equally recognize that the debt situation for many African countries is desperate, and must be addressed in new and innovative ways or the entire recovery programme may collapse. In that context, I welcome the Secretary-General's appointment of the advisory panel on resource flows. We anxiously await its report. As most members of this assembly know, Canada is so concerned about this issue that at the Francophone Summit we announced the cancellation of all official debt which we have held in francophone Africa. Next month, we will do the same at the Commonwealth Conference for anglophone Africa.

The Brundtland Commission has produced a blunt and clear report on the urgency of protecting our resources and environment. In that spirit, in Montreal last week, nations signed an ozone treaty, controlling the emissions of chlorofluoro-carbons. Dr. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, called it 'the first truly global treaty that offers protection to every single human being on the planet.' Our government believes that Montreal treaty will serve as a model for future international agreements on the environment.

The Conference on Disarmament and Development, just concluded, yielded a remarkable consensus document, holding disarmament and development as essential to national security. It graphically demonstrated the capacity of this organization to find agreement in the most complex fields.

The World Health Organization is recognized as a crucial resource for gathering the statistics and planning necessary as countries struggle to master the worldwide AIDS epidemic.

Within its own doors, the United Nations has made social strides in another field — the equality rights of women. In 41 years there had not been even one woman permanently appointed as an Under-Secretary-General. Now there are three, and we take particular



satisfaction that the first woman appointed is an outstanding Canadian, Madame Thérèse Paquet-Sévigny, Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Public Information.

There have been other accomplishments in this past year — the successful Vienna Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking; the coming into force of the Convention Against Torture; the International Maritime Organization Draft Convention on Maritime Security; and the progress on verification at the UN Disarmament Commission with which Canada is proud to be associated. They are proof of the worth and vitality of this United Nations, and clear evidence of the benefits to be derived by continuing to confront the world's problems together.

The great purpose of the United Nations is to extend the reach of peace and justice in the world. Sometimes, as in the war between Iran and Iraq, its role becomes most acute when all other efforts have failed. In other cases, it can encourage regional initiatives that may lead to peace where peace is threatened, or focus international attention upon injustice that must end. I want to speak today of one initiative we must encourage, and one injustice we must end.

The initiative is in Central America, where the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have joined together in a genuine effort by all parties to settle their differences peacefully. The surprisingly positive outcome of the Guatemala Summit was the result of many factors. They include the foundations laid by Contadora and the Contadora Support Groups; the preparatory work of the Central American countries; and the concessions made at the Summit by each of the five presidents. That achievement was applauded by us all. But it was only the first of many steps along a difficult road.

Canadian aid to the region has been steadily increasing, as has our funding and acceptance of refugees. We have expressed our view that the root problem in Central America is poverty,

not ideology; that the real need is development assistance, not military activity; and that intervention by outside powers will only aggravate the tensions. We have supported the Contadora process, and have made available to Contadora the expertise Canadians have acquired in the techniques of peacekeeping.

...Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us.

Mr. President, the injustice which I referred to earlier and which I now want to address is apartheid. Canada's position is clear and on the record. We have acted upon all of the sanctions recommended by the Nassau Conference of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. We have imposed a ban both on new investment in South Africa and reinvestment of profits. We have banned the promotion of tourism and ended air links. We have banned the importation of coal, iron and steel. Furthermore we have made it clear that, if other measures fail, we are prepared to end our economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa. We are helping the victims of apartheid, with scholarships, legal aid, and other assistance. We contribute substantially to the development of the Front Line states, both bilaterally and through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. We apply our influence, wherever it is effective, to build the pressures against apartheid.

...The Prime Minister of Canada met with the leaders of Zimbabwe and Zambia and Botswana in Victoria Falls in February, and I visited Southern Africa six weeks ago, a visit which included a meeting in Pretoria with the South African Foreign Minister. Oliver Tambo visited Ottawa a month ago and met with our Prime Minister and other Canadian leaders. In early September it was our honour to host the second Summit of La Francophonie, in Quebec City, and

next month, in Vancouver, we host the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, the international family to which South Africa once belonged.

...It is Canada's view that the sanctions imposed upon South Africa have been effective. Specifically, in the first six months of 1987, Canada reduced its imports from South Africa by 51 per cent. But the impact is not only economic, it is also psychological. While the government of South Africa has reacted by limiting liberty even more, growing numbers of individual South Africans have reached out for reform, in meetings in Lusaka and Dakar, and in the private contacts we must multiply.

...The instability in Southern Africa is both an ally and a product of apartheid. One of the most wrenching conversations I have had was with Canadian aid workers in Mozambique, who fear that the projects they build to help people will become targets of terrorists, and put at risk the very lives they are working to improve. An essential part of the challenge in Southern Africa is thus to bring more stability to the Front Line states.

...Mr. President, I began by talking about the atmosphere of crisis which was so pervasive as we met last year. Today, we must all surely take satisfaction from the atmosphere of hope that surrounds us. Hope, because both globally and regionally there is recognition that a peaceful and secure world is of universal benefit and worthy of relentless pursuit. Hope, because the social and economic evils that beset us are being addressed in a meaningful way. And, finally, hope because this organization of ours, the United Nations, is reasserting its capacity to play the central role it was designed to play, in dealing with the ills that still plague the international community. The UN agenda stretches before us: Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Cyprus, peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states, an end to terrorism, and the relentless human struggle to eradicate hunger and injustice. Somehow, Mr. President, it feels as though we are closer this year than last to tackling that agenda."



Members of Consultative Group Attend First Committee



Members of the Consultative Group on a trip to New York. First row left to right: Lt. Gen. Reg Lane, Ms Janet Sawyer, Ms Judith Meinert, Ambassador Roche, Ms Valerie Klassen, Dr. Terry Carson. Second row left to right: Mr. Fergus Watt, Mr. Alec Morrison, Permanent Mission to New York, Dr. David Leyton-Brown, Mr. Rankin MacSween, Prof. Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, Ms Beverley Delong and Mr. Paul Bennett, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs.

Ten members of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs participated in an Orientation Programme at the First Committee of the General Assembly from October 11 to 17, 1987. This is the second year in which the Department of External Affairs has undertaken this programme. Its aim is to enable committed and interested members of the Consultative Group to be more fully involved and informed about the multi-faceted work for arms control and disarmament undertaken by Canada in the United Nations, and in particular the First Committee, which deals with security and international affairs.

The purpose of the programme was therefore twofold: first, to assist in the education and dissemination of information among those involved directly in the

programme and indirectly to the organizations/communities with which the participants are associated; and second, to enhance and strengthen the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs.

The participants were briefed on the arms control and disarmament activities of the Permanent Mission of Canada and of First Committee operating procedures. They met separately with UN representatives of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom and Indonesia and with various UN secretariat officials. Participants also attended a number of First Committee meetings, in order to see first-hand how business is conducted in that forum. The group was present to hear the main Canadian intervention on October 13 by Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament.

There were also opportunities to attend sessions of the General Assembly, and to meet non-governmental representatives.

During the course of the week, a number of participants were struck by the lengthy and complex processes of the First Committee, and by the significant role which Canada appeared to play in arms control and disarmament.

UN Recognizes 'Peace Messengers'

On September 15, 1987, the International Day of Peace, the United Nations formally recognized the work of some 100 organizations and institutions around the world which had made significant and concrete contributions to the 1986 International Year of Peace. The United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, presented those being honoured with "Peace Messenger Awards" in a ceremony at the United Nations Peace bell, while simultaneous events took place in Geneva and Vienna. Ten Canadian groups were honoured for their contributions with this prestigious award: Children for Peace, College Saint Maurice, the International Council for Adult Education, the International Organization for Psychophysiology, Peacefund Canada, the Peace Research Institute-Dundas, People in Equal Participation, Inc., Saskatoon Mothers for Peace, the United Nations Association in Canada and the International Political Science Association. Unfortunately, representatives of only three of the Canadian winners were able to participate in the New York ceremonies.

Following the awards presentation, recipients toured an exhibition of material emanating from the International Year of Peace. Canadian exhibits included the Saskatoon Mothers' quilt, posters and essays, the International Year of Peace postage stamp, and a copy of the award-winning *What Peace Means To Me*, copies of which are still available in English and French by writing to the Editor.



Conference on Disarmament and Development Poses Challenge to Participants

At the request of the General Assembly, an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was held from August 24 to September 11, 1987, in New York. One hundred and fifty states including Canada participated in the conference. The USA did not attend.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark headed a strong Canadian delegation which included Members of Parliament, government officials and representatives of Canadian non-governmental organizations. Mr. Clark was honoured to deliver the opening speech of the conference, in which he stressed the importance of both disarmament and development as fundamental Canadian policy objectives. He set forth Canada's views on the relationship between the two processes and expectations for the conference.

At the outset, it became evident that the wide range of approaches to the subject posed a serious challenge to participants to resolve differences and work to achieve consensus. Some emphasized, as a priority focus of the conference, the need to augment de-

velopment assistance to Third World countries, including through the disarmament process. Others went so far as to make development efforts an express objective of further disarmament measures. Canada and many others took the position that disarmament and development are distinct and mutually supportive processes, related in that each contributes to security and benefits from enhanced security.

Despite some rocky moments, the conference succeeded in reaching agreement on a consensus final document and was widely heralded as a success. Having established a moderate approach in its opening statement, Canada played an active role throughout.

The conference established that disarmament and development form two distinct elements of a larger and very complex relationship. Although they are separate processes and should be pursued independently, regardless of the pace of progress in the other, each contributes to the benefits from security, which constitutes the essence of the relationship. Security was defined as including not only a military dimension,

“but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects.”

The conference also adopted an Action Programme based on the following three objectives:

- (a) “fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security as constituting a triad of peace”;
- (b) “promoting multilateralism as providing the international framework for shaping the relationship between disarmament, development and security based on interdependence among nations and mutuality of interests”;
- (c) “strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development.”

In Canada's view, among the major accomplishments of the conference was the achievement of broad recognition that genuine “security” includes much more than limited military calculations, and the pledge by all 150 participants to pursue both disarmament and development objectives and to adopt appropriate measures for that purpose.

SSEA Addresses Conference on Disarmament and Development

On August 24, 1987, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development in New York. Following are excerpts from his address.

“We are not discussing a theoretical problem. Ten days ago, I was briefly in Mozambique where I met, among others, Canadians involved in non-governmental organizations operating clinics and other projects in that country. They face every day the prospect that the projects on which they are working — development projects of the finest kind — will be bombed or attacked. They face the dilemma that projects launched to help

people in need in fact make those people targets of attack. I am not here arguing that arms create that conflict; but, certainly, when a clinic becomes a target, arms are the enemy of development.

Let me begin my remarks by noting, as Canada usually does, that the test of this conference will be what we do, not what we say. There is rhetoric enough on the evil of arms and the need for development. What we must seek to achieve here is practical cooperation, not mutual recrimination. The work of the preparatory meetings has been encouraging, but that atmosphere must continue if we are to protect the principle which Canada assumes all participants share — namely, that less

money must be spent on arms, and more money must be spent on development. The relevant question is how do we make progress, not whom do we blame.

Our purpose is to increase real security, for individual nations, and for the world. Progress towards development, and progress towards disarmament, can both contribute to that security, but their relationship is not simple. This conference can be most useful if it probes beneath the assumption that there can be an automatic transfer of funds from arms to development. We must understand why governments spend on arms — and understand also that there is simply no evidence —



no reason to believe — that governments are likely to disarm, at the expense of what they consider their security, in order to divert funds to development. If we are serious, the reality we must recognize is that the level of a nation's security is the main criterion against which efforts for disarmament must be measured, not the level of economic gain. Security is the touchstone, and again, the reality is that each nation will judge its own security on its own terms.

I mean security in its broadest sense — not just military strength. The sense of economic and social well-being is an important factor in a nation's overall security. Seen in this light, development can make a major contribution to overcoming non-military threats. It can contribute to the establishment of a stable international system that will, in its turn, reduce the relative importance of military strength as an instrument of security.

It is fitting that, at the request of the General Assembly, this conference is being held under UN auspices. It was, of course, the United Nations that pioneered the study of the linkage between disarmament and development. The three-year study by 27 experts, headed by Inga Thorsson, inspired this conference. The Canadian Government commissioned a popular version of that study, entitled *Safe and Sound: Disarmament and Development in the Eighties*.

From the time of its establishment in the devastating wake of the Second World War, the United Nations has been dedicated to four key principles:

- freedom from the scourge of war;
- faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person;
- respect for international obligations; and
- the promotion of social progress and better living standards.

Our success in upholding these principles depends in large measure on the

degree of commitment of individual member states to the disarmament and development processes. Indeed, our success in pursuing these objectives can mean the difference between a decent quality of life and deprivation, poverty or even death.

Canadians hope that this conference will rekindle the flagging political will upon which real progress depends.

Our goal should be to issue a consensus statement at the end. It will be a lost opportunity if we do not unite to state clearly that the security of everyone will be strengthened by both disarmament and development. Neither process can be held hostage to the other, but progress in one can facilitate progress in the other.

It is not surprising that world attention is focused on global military expenditures. It now amounts to \$1 trillion per year, or nearly 6 per cent of gross world output. Rather than disarmament, arsenals of conventional weapons have proliferated. Efforts to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons have seen very little success. There is documented evidence of the repeated use of chemical weapons, in breach of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The armaments industry and trade in arms absorb vast quantities of resources, which would be better devoted to civilian use. Even allowing the preoccupation of governments with the security of their citizens, the level of arms expenditure frequently exceeds reasonable security requirements.

There is, of course, the promise of a significant reduction in nuclear arms as a result of the initiatives of the United States and the Soviet Union and the negotiations at Geneva. Obviously, arms control is everybody's business. But the two superpowers have the power to make the changes we can only recommend, and we should welcome the seriousness with which both those nations appear to be approaching the Geneva negotiations.

Concerning development, all of us are aware of the world's enormous economic problems — slow growth, trade disputes, contraction of financial

flows to developing countries, increased debt burdens, and the almost impossible plight of the poorest nations. These problems are made worse by looming scarcities of raw materials, declining prospects for economic growth, and the long-term price we pay for degrading our environment. In human terms, that means hunger, illiteracy, high unemployment and inadequate housing and social services.

Genuine progress in development is occurring, involving some countries more than others, but nowhere is it enough. Nonetheless, as we make our assessments, it is worth noting which of the countries with stronger economies contribute most to international economic development, and which contribute least. I am speaking, of course, of development assistance, not military aid.

Of course, some of the most important progress in international development has come as the result of multilateral actions, including through the agencies and efforts of the United Nations. That has been especially true when UN efforts have focused on practical, constructive and clearly defined activities.

Through its child survival strategy, UNICEF has reduced infant mortality worldwide. The UN commissioner for refugees has provided legal protection and material assistance to millions of people fleeing war and persecution. The United Nations Development Programme has helped nations build viable economies by supporting 8 500 projects in 150 countries. Smallpox has been eliminated through the work of the World Health Organization. The UN has also provided an essential forum for debate on global development issues, most recently at the successful Special Session on Africa.

Those achievements were the result of careful planning, the setting of realistic goals and reliance on practical measures. The lesson for this conference is clear when we turn to disarmament, where the record of the United Nations — and of its member states — has been less impressive. Twenty years ago, the UN's performance in this field



offered prospects for real progress. More recently, the focus of attention here on nuclear weapons has often been at the expense of interest in other problems of arms control — problems that might be easier to solve. Nuclear weapons issues dominate the resolutions of the First Committee, yet global levels of conventional arms are high and rising, and that is a problem which many member states could help resolve by their own action.

As a first step now, we should attach higher priority to the development of confidence-building measures, which are a prerequisite to any major arms limitation agreement. In Europe, where the confrontation between East and West is most direct, the Stockholm Conference has made a valuable contribution to increased security. In Central America, there appears to be a prospect of agreement because the countries involved have worked together in a spirit of cooperation and taken actions which contribute to mutual confidence. These examples differ in form, but demonstrate that small, steady, practical steps can create the confidence that leads to progress. We should increase our efforts to promote such cooperation at the regional level.

Canada is strongly committed to both development and disarmament as fundamental policy objectives. In allocating resources at home, the Canadian Government seeks to achieve an equitable balance between a healthy economy driven by a vigorous private sector, and the fulfilment of basic human needs for all. Programmes such as universal subsidized medical care, child support and unemployment insurance are examples of solidly established Canadian benefits.

Canadians have, by tradition, a strong sense of obligation to help improve economic and social conditions in less fortunate parts of the world. From a modest contribution to the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme in 1949, Canada's development assistance programmes have expanded to cover all continents and a broad range of international institutions. To date, Canada has provided a total of

\$24 billion in official development assistance. The major portion of that has been directed at the poorest countries and people.

The Canadian development assistance effort extends well beyond the provision of grants. Efforts to seek a more open trading environment and acceptable arrangements on international debt constitute an integral element of Canada's relations with the developing world. Finally, Canadians in the private sector, from individuals and non-profit organizations to businesses, all contribute in various ways to development in the Third World. Since 1980, Canada has disbursed more than \$100 million under its industrial cooperation programme which focuses on joint ventures in, and the transfer of technology to, the Third World, particularly its private sector.

The control and reduction of armaments — both conventional and nuclear weapons — constitute a major Canadian foreign policy objective. We participate in all multilateral forums where arms control issues are considered and engage in a wide range of bilateral consultations and discussions. We have established specific priorities in the pursuit of this important goal. A major priority is the development of confidence-building measures such as the improvement of the technology and methodology of verification of arms limitations or reductions.

Mr. President, I strongly urge my fellow delegations at this conference to work towards the adoption of a consensus document. We agree on the goals, though not yet on the means. To dwell on our differences is to doom this conference. The four preparatory meetings — particularly the 19 elements and 10-point action programme agreed to at the third preparatory meeting — show that a fair and reasonable balance of views can be reached. To compromise on details is to protect the principle that more money must be spent on development, less on arms.

We need the commitment of *all* states if we are to make progress. We should examine the potential developmental benefits of disarmament measures.

These can include redirecting spending to social purposes; reducing public debts; stimulating economic growth, trade and private investment; and increasing official development assistance.

We should emphasize the importance of cooperation at the regional level, and the necessity of supporting existing global and regional institutions which promote cooperation. The conference document should support current arms control and disarmament negotiations, and acknowledge the necessity of confidence-building measures in that context.

Finally, the protection of individual rights and freedoms is so basic to both disarmament and development that it is often overlooked. The individual has a key role to play in these processes, but must be provided freedom and opportunity to become involved. In this context, I welcome the attendance of so many non-governmental observers here. My delegation will follow closely their contributions to the conference.

...If we are to succeed, the United Nations must deal effectively with the distortions that scar human life on this planet, distortions that mean that one person in six lives in abject poverty, while arms expenditures rise.

This contrast is highlighted frequently by respected studies such as those on world military and social expenditures produced by Ruth Leger Sivard and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, among others. It is highlighted even more starkly by the poverty and suffering I have encountered during visits to development projects in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

One useful purpose of this conference could be to return the global spotlight to the costs of the continuing arms race. But spotlights aren't enough. We need practical solutions to enable us to devote fewer resources to weapons and more to development. Security in the interdependent world of today demands both disarmament and development."

Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 42

(TOTAL ACD RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED — 71)

*Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.
Countries in parentheses were lead sponsors.*

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (46 including 28 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote—WOV)
42/13 (Costa Rica)	International Year of Peace	WOV
42/16 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	122-1-8
42/25 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	147-0-7
42/27 (New Zealand)*	Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty	143-2-8
42/28 (Egypt)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in Middle East	WOV
42/29 (Pakistan)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-36
42/30 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
42/31 (Bulgaria)	Strengthening of security of non-nuclear weapon states against use or threat of nuclear weapons	112-18-20
42/32 (Pakistan)	Assure non-nuclear weapon states against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	151-0-3
42/33 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	154-1-0 141-1-11 151-0-4
42/34(a) (Madagascar)	Denuclearization of Africa—Implementation of the Declaration	WOV
42/36 (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
42/37(a) (Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	WOV
42/37(b) (Austria)	Convention on biological and toxin weapons	WOV
42/37(c) (Australia)	1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention	WOV
42/38 (Cameroon)*	Review of role of United Nations in field of disarmament	WOV
42/38(a) (United Kingdom)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	115-0-39
42/38(b) (Japan)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	WOV
42/38(c) (Australia)	Notification of nuclear tests	147-1-8
42/38(d) (Zimbabwe)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	143-0-13
42/38(e) (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
42/38(g) (China)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
42/38(h) (China)	Nuclear disarmament	WOV
42/38(i) (United Kingdom)*	Objective information on military matters	133-0-12
42/38(k) (Sweden)	Naval armaments	154-1-2
42/38(l) (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	149-1-6
42/38(m) (USA)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	WOV
42/38(n) (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on regional scale	154-0-0
42/39(d) (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	WOV
42/39(e) (Belgium)*	Regional disarmament	WOV
42/39(f) (FRG)*	Guidelines for confidence-building measures	WOV
42/39(i) (Nigeria)	United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament	156-1-0
42/39(j) (Madagascar)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
42/39(k) (Peru)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America	WOV
42/40 (Yugoslavia)	Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament	WOV
42/41 (Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (46 including 28 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote—WOV)
42/42(f) (Canada)*	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
42/42(g) (Bulgaria)*	Report of Disarmament Commission	WOV
42/42(i) (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	WOV
42/42(j) (United Kingdom)	United Nations disarmament studies	WOV
42/42(k) (Netherlands)*	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	127-0-28
42/42(n) (Cameroon)*	Rationalization of work of First Committee	134-0-20
42/43 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace	WOV
42/45 (France)*	Relationship between disarmament and development	WOV
42/90 (Malta)	Strengthening of security cooperation in Mediterranean	WOV

NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions, the following was also adopted:

(Chairman)	General and complete disarmament	WOV (decision)
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Opposed by Canada — 7

42/39(b) (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	139-12-4
42/39(c) (India)	Convention of prohibition of use of nuclear weapons	135-17-4
42/39(h) (Mexico)	Implementation of nuclear freeze	140-13-2
42/42(a) (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	125-17-12
42/42(c) (Argentina)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	137-13-7
42/42(e) (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	118-18-14
42/42(m) (Yugoslavia)	Decision of First United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament	142-12-3

Canada Abstained — 18

42/26(a) (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	137-3-14
42/26(b) (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	128-3-22
42/35 (Byelorussia)	Prohibition of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction	135-1-18
42/38(f) (Iraq)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	119-2-32
42/38(j) (Czechoslovakia)	Implementation of United Nations resolutions on disarmament	128-2-24
42/39(a) (Cyprus)	Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament — review	129-1-23
42/39(g) (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	146-1-9
42/42(b) (Iraq)	First Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament — decisions	137-1-14
42/42(d) (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	140-3-14
42/42(h) (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	133-0-21
42/42(l) (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	135-5-15
42/44 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	97-2-52
42/46(a) (Zambia)	Question of Antarctica	122-0-9
42/46(b) (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	100-0-10
42/91 (Poland)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	128-0-24
42/92 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of Security	131-1-23
42/93 (Poland)	Comprehensive system of international peace and security	76-12-63
42/34(b) (Madagascar)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	140-4-13

Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The following are excerpts from an intervention made by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on November 4, 1987, in New York.

"The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objective.

I believe there are new grounds for hope that genuine progress towards this important objective can be made. The most significant is the decision announced on September 18 by the United States and the Soviet Union to begin full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing by the end of this year. This is welcome news for all of us. This body should offer strong encouragement and support. A first step is provided in the draft resolution contained in document L.77 which welcomes the US-Soviet joint statement. I am pleased to announce today that Canada will co-sponsor this resolution, which is entitled 'Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.'

In pursuing the objective of a halt to all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time, the superpowers have a special responsibility. As the producers and guardians of the overwhelming proportion of the world's nuclear explosive potential, they have a key role to play in showing others the lead. Canada fervently hopes that they will exercise fully and creatively that lead both in their bilateral negotiations and within the appropriate multilateral forums.

A comprehensive test ban treaty can never be achieved, however, without the full support and cooperation of *all* the nuclear weapon states. Therefore, while negotiations between the superpowers are of crucial importance, the importance of efforts at the multilateral level must not be underestimated.



Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament

This is why this resolution, which Canada considers one of the most important on the agenda before us, focuses particularly on the role of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The resolution urges the CD to 'initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session.' In Canada's view, this appeal stands at the heart of the resolution. It is time for the members of the CD to rise above differences over how a mandate for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee in the CD should be defined so that discussions on the substance of the nuclear test ban question can finally get underway. Attempts to impose an approach to this issue which remains unacceptable to key nuclear weapon states will obviously not bear results. However, when the price is a continuing failure even to begin to address the subject, one is tempted to question the tactics of the advocates of this approach.

...It remains Canada's view that progress towards a more secure, less heavily armed world can only be achieved through measured and balanced steps which are mutually satisfactory to the parties concerned. This approach applies just as much to

the process of negotiating reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals as it does to the cessation of all nuclear testing. Experience has shown that declarations and rhetoric cannot hasten the arms control and disarmament process and may indeed retard it.

Based upon this rationale, Canada supports a step-by-step approach to the realization of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. A meaningful start within the Conference on Disarmament would be the consideration of the questions of scope, compliance and verification. We should not lose sight of the fact that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to the ultimate goal which is the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. I would submit that the primary purpose of the reduction and cessation of nuclear testing should be to enhance confidence in the global arms control and disarmament process. Engaging in prolonged disputes concerning how this process could best begin will not enhance the process of confidence-building.

Mr. Chairman, the draft resolution contained in L.77 also refers to the progress made by the CD *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts towards the development of an international seismic monitoring network. An operational network of this kind will be required to verify an eventual CTBT.

Canada is very pleased at the steady progress which has been made by this important group whose work can truly be characterized as the most positive continuing contribution to the quest for a halt to nuclear testing in recent years. As I noted in my statement to this Committee on October 13, we welcome the selection of Dr. Peter Basham of Canada as coordinator for a major global text as part of the development of an International Seismic Data Exchange.

...We urge a very strong vote for this resolution which is a realistic step to the goal of a safer, more secure world. The time has come for us to move, as a world community, towards the cessation of all nuclear tests."



Third UN Special Session on Disarmament

The United Nations General Assembly decided to hold a Third Special Session devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III) from May 31 to June 25, 1988, at the UN headquarters in New York. As was the case with the First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, respectively, UNSSOD III will be a high-profile international event attended by a number of Heads of State and Government and many Foreign Ministers.

Canada attaches high priority to a successful UNSSOD III in line with its commitment to the multilateral dimension of the arms control and disarmament process, including, in particular, the role of the United Nations. In pursuing its major objectives in this field, Canada takes the view that the UN can and should enhance and complement ongoing efforts in other arms control and disarmament forums including at the bilateral level.

Canada participated in four international preparatory meetings for UNSSOD III where an exchange of views took place and an agenda for the Special Session was established. Canada considers the agenda to be reasonably concise, well-balanced and forward-looking; in sum, a good starting point for UNSSOD III. Participants were, however, unable to reach agreement on more detailed directions for the Special Session.

The main tasks set out for the Special Session include:

- (a) a review and appraisal of the present international situation;
- (b) assessment of the implementation of the decisions of UNSSOD I and UNSSOD II;
- (c) consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- (d) assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects relevant to the disarmament process;

(e) consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; and

(f) the relationship between disarmament and development.

Canada conveyed its views to the UN Secretary-General last year concerning the desired areas of focus of UNSSOD III. These include *inter alia*: encouragement of the continuation of meaningful negotiations between the superpowers concerning the limitation and radical reduction of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of strategic stability; recognition of the importance of confidence-building measures in creating the climate necessary for the successful conclusion of arms control and disarmament agreements; the importance of compliance and transparency in the development and implementation of meaningful arms control agreements, and of the essential role of effective verification in that regard; enhanced efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament including the achievement of a cessation of nuclear testing; strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime; reduction of levels of conventional armaments with special emphasis on the importance of regional approaches; the need to conclude a multilateral convention on chemical weapons; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and the importance of disarmament and development as distinct processes which both benefit from and contribute to security.

...Throughout the preparatory meetings and in consultations with other governments, Canada has endeavoured to develop a pragmatic and realistic approach to UNSSOD III which emphasizes the importance of searching for common ground. An important stage of the Canadian preparations involved a special meeting of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs on April 14-16, 1988. The meeting focused on UNSSOD III and the Canadian approach. Members of the Consultative Group were able to examine in considerable detail, over the course of two full days, the key agenda items for UNSSOD III and to formulate

their own priorities and preferences concerning Canadian objectives. These suggestions and proposals received from the Consultative Group will be among the key inputs during the final stages of deciding Canada's policy priorities for UNSSOD III.

Canada takes the view that UNSSOD III will succeed if it avoids focusing on perceived past failures and instead emphasizes constructive consideration of measures which might make concrete contributions to the arms control and disarmament process. A successful outcome should reinforce the validity of the practical, step-by-step approach to this process, without which the prospects for real progress could be dim.

Positive Developments After Stockholm

The provisions of the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which was to become officially known by the unwieldy title of the CCSBMDE, came into effect on January 1, 1987. The Document was the result of negotiations among the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which resulted in a series of provisions designed to enhance the transparency of and increase confidence in the conduct of military activities in Europe. Among other things, the implementation of these provisions during their first year has resulted in Canadian observers attending Soviet military exercises, Polish observers having access to American exercises in the Federal Republic of Germany, and British personnel conducting an on-site challenge inspection in the German Democratic Republic.

The Stockholm Conference itself was established by the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE as a full-fledged diplomatic conference with a specific negotiating mandate and unlimited duration. The Stockholm Conference in fact met for two years, from January 1984



until September 1986. The aim of the CCSSMDE as set down in its mandate was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." The Stockholm Conference was to initiate a process "devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe."

A series of specific measures resulted from the Stockholm process aimed at improving the confidence of participating states in the nature of military activities conducted by other signatories, establishing predictability in military affairs, enhancing transparency and reducing the possibility of surprise attack. Among the measures negotiated were the following:

- agreement to provide prior notification to other members of the CSCE of military activities involving at least 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks. Prior notification is to be made in writing 42 or more days in advance of the activity.
- agreement to circulate annual calendars of military activity subject to prior notification by November 15 of every year.

— provision to invite observers from every participating state to military activities involving 17 000 troops (or, in the case of amphibious or parachute activity, 5 000 troops) conducted in the area of application in Europe. Each CSCE participant may send up to two observers to each observable activity.

— provision for on-site challenge inspection by any participating state. This provision can be exercised by any state suspecting military activity that has not been notified, or activity suspected to be at the observable threshold for which no invitations have been issued. Within 36 hours of the issuance of an inspection request, the inspectors are to be permitted entry to the territory of the receiving state. No more than three inspections are allowed in a single country within any one year.

To date, there have been over 20 observations and approximately 10 challenge inspections undertaken under the terms of the agreement. Canada has sent observers to every observable military exercise held thus far, and intends to continue this practice. (While Canada is outside the zone of application for the agreement, which only includes the territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, Canada can, as a signatory to the Stockholm Document, participate fully in observations and inspections.) On the other hand, Canadian military activities in Europe are similarly subject to the provisions of the

Stockholm Document. In a Soviet inspection of a military exercise conducted in Norway this year, for example, Canadian troops were among those inspected.

Our early experience with the implementation of the agreement demonstrates that the provisions of the document have been largely honoured by all 35 participating states in both letter and spirit. The agreement has arguably been extremely useful in enhancing stability and security in Europe by increasing the confidence of the participating countries in one another's military intentions. At the current CSCE Follow-Up Meeting taking place in Vienna, the implementation of the Stockholm Document is being reviewed and discussions are also underway to establish two new negotiations on conventional security in Europe. While one of these would consider ways and means of enhancing stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional armaments, the other would consider new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) — in other words, continuing the work on CSBMs begun at Stockholm.

In the meantime, the implementation of the accords achieved at the Stockholm Conference must be regarded as an encouraging development by those concerned about conventional security and stability in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control: Stabilizing the Balance in Europe

With the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles, recognition of the importance of conventional forces within NATO's deterrent triad has in recent years increasingly focused attention on the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels and capabilities.

One avenue towards reducing the imbalance which NATO has taken has been to build up and to modernize forces so as to improve overall conven-

tional capability. The Long-Term Defence Plan and the three per cent increase pledge are both evidence of NATO's resolve since the late 1970s to improve the conventional balance. Unfortunately, the Warsaw Pact did not stand still: it has not only maintained its conventional superiority in terms of quantity, but it has also managed to narrow the gap in quality, and has thereby enhanced its overall advantage.

The Harmel Report of 1967 recognized the need to address Warsaw Pact con-

ventional superiority, and recommended a "two track" approach to achieving enhanced stability: first, maintenance, as necessary, of a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, and, second, implementation of a policy of détente, which included arms control. The two tracks were to be complementary — not mutually exclusive.

When assessing the balance, force levels must be considered in light of *all* relevant factors — geography, terrain, peacetime deployment of forces,



preparedness, levels of transparency and confidence, warning and reaction capability (e.g., the ability to detect and successfully resist surprise attack), force-to-force and force-to-space ratios, and so on. The process of conventional arms control is therefore highly complex, in that it must take into account and interrelate a great many diverse factors and considerations.

In recent years there have been two major conventional arms control forums. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks ran into numerous difficulties from the very outset in 1973. These difficulties involved, among others, issues such as differences over prior agreement on data, refusal by the East to accept intrusive verification, disagreement on definition of what factors constitute a fair balance of forces, the concept of asymmetrical reductions, and failure to agree on what types of forces would be involved. Nonetheless, the process itself has been seen as a useful instrument in the management of East-West relations at the conventional force level.

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament (CCSBMDE) (more widely known as the CDE), conducted under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was successful not only as a process, but also in reaching an agreement (contained in the Stockholm Document). The gradualist approach (as adopted in Stockholm) for such a highly complex and important undertaking as conventional arms control proved in practice to be the more sensible. This approach proceeded on the premise that the building of confidence should precede any negotiations aimed at constraining military activities or at reducing the numbers of forces deployed. In the MBFR talks there has been no attempt to build initial confidence so as to create a less confrontational climate which might then be more conducive to further discussions on more substantive aspects such as troop and armament reductions.

Encouraged by the progress then being made at the Stockholm negotiations as well as in Geneva at the USA-USSR

bilateral talks on nuclear and space defence questions, the NATO Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in Halifax in May 1986, created the High Level Task Force (HLTF) to study wider options for the Alliance for future conventional arms control negotiations with the East. The HLTF was tasked to report to the North Atlantic Council on the feasibility of negotiating force levels and deployments on a greater scale than was being done in the MBFR talks, taking into consideration a zone extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Warsaw Pact followed up with a proposal of its own — the "Budapest Appeal" of June 11 — which called for large-scale reductions of forces in a similar zone.

The HLTF began in June 1986 to work in earnest on its ambitious and highly complex task. After much painstaking internal research and considerable discussion among the Allies, the HLTF produced its first report, which resulted in the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control.

The Brussels Declaration contained the main elements of what has become the essence of the new Western approach to conventional arms control. It invited the Warsaw Pact to enter into discussions with NATO concerning a mandate for a new conventional arms control negotiation which would apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The situation in Europe was described as being "marked by asymmetries and disparities..." which were detrimental to Western security and which were "...a source of potential instability." The relevant factors were listed as:

- the armaments, equipment types, deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness of the armed forces involved;
- the information, predictability and confidence about them; and
- consideration of geography.

Recognizing the enormous complexities involved in dealing effectively with such factors so as to enhance security at the conventional level, the HLTF agreed upon a set of objectives as the basis for the Alliance position for future conventional arms control:

- the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the elimination of disparities;
- a negotiating process which proceeds step-by-step, and which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage;
- focus on the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large-scale offensive action;
- further measures to build confidence and to improve openness and calculability about military behaviour;
- the application of the measures involved to the whole of Europe, but in a way which takes account of and seeks to redress regional imbalances and to exclude circumvention;
- an effective verification regime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vital part) to ensure compliance with the provisions of any agreement, and to guarantee that limitations on force capabilities are not exceeded.

It was decided that the best way to achieve NATO's objectives would be to propose two *distinct* negotiations. One of these forums would build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among the 35 members of the CSCE. The other, recognizing that the forces of the two Alliances were the most immediately involved in the essential security relationship in Europe, would focus on eliminating the existing disparities and, eventually, on establishing conventional stability at lower levels between the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting at Reykjavik in June 1987, it was decided that the stability talks among the 23 could be conducted within the *framework* of the CSCE process, but that these negotiations would retain autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures.

Following the publication of the Brussels Declaration, representatives of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact began to

meet in Vienna in late January 1987 to discuss formulation of a mandate for the proposed "conventional stability" negotiations. Subsequently, in the summer of 1987, Western representatives tabled one draft mandate for the confidence- and security-building measures negotiations at the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, and another for the "stability" talks at a session of the weekly "breakfast meetings" of the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations. The HLTF, as the coordinating body for NATO's conventional arms control policy, has continued its work in Brussels to develop and to refine the Western position while the East-West discussions on the mandates for the two distinct negotiations continue in Vienna.

While no prediction can be made with certainty, it now appears to be reasonably assured that the mandates for these new negotiations are likely to be agreed upon, and that the actual negotiations will be started in the months ahead. Much, of course, will depend on the timetable of the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, which is also discussing other aspects of the East-West relationship. If the new negotiations proceed as expected, the transition into a new era for conventional arms control will have been marked; in these negotiations is the potential to chart the nature of the European security relationship for the remainder of this century and well into the next. As this article has, however, indicated, immense problems must be overcome, and it is unlikely that quick or easy solutions will be found.

In addressing the stability of the conventional balance in Europe, the negotiations will inevitably focus primarily on ground forces, for it is essentially the land forces of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Army in particular) which pose the most serious threat to NATO. The elimination of disparities and stabilization of this balance will require considerable effort; it is not simply a question of reducing forces. As was indicated earlier, force-to-force and force-to-space relationships, geography and reinforcement rates are but some of the issues that must be examined and resolved.

Throughout this process it will be necessary for all of the NATO allies to maintain the integrity of their forces. Canada's pledge in the recent White Paper to consolidate the ground force commitment and provide a division in

the critical Central Region will contribute positively to NATO's aims of enhancing stability. The physical presence of Canadian troops in Europe also affords Canada an active part in the arms control negotiation process.

Development of Chemical Weapons Ban Intricate and Vexing

The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) organized an important Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention from October 7 to 9, 1987, in Ottawa. The conference provided a timely opportunity for academics and researchers, representatives of industry and labour, as well as officials and diplomats, to come together to assess progress to date in the chemical weapons negotiations, to discuss important outstanding issues which remain to be addressed, and to consider the road ahead.

The following are excerpts from the address by Mr. James Taylor, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

"I am honoured to be present here this evening among such a distinguished gathering of experts from many countries. I am pleased, on behalf of Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to welcome you to our capital and wish you well in your deliberations.

I would also like to take the opportunity to commend the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for having jointly taken such a timely initiative by convening this conference. I express, for us all, a special word of thanks to John Lamb and his staff at the Centre, in particular Miss Jan Glyde, for their tireless work in putting the administrative arrangements into place so smoothly. The Canadian Government welcomes and encourages meetings such as this one and the Department of External Affairs is pleased to have been able to assist in its realization.

The arms control and disarmament process is one of vexing complication and intricacy. Headlong technological developments proceed without let-up, heedless and independent of the painstaking efforts of official negotiators and their political leaders. The existing body of international law provides an all-too-tenuous foundation upon which the international community must build — shoring up those portions which seem in danger of crumbling, adding to and adapting existing parts of the legal structure and sometimes carrying out extensive renovations in response to new and previously unforeseen needs. All of this must be achieved in a politically charged context. This cannot be otherwise since the matters with which you deal touch directly on the security interests of states and are legitimately the object of sustained attention and concern on the part of political leaders and the publics to whom they are responsible.

In these circumstances, if their collective efforts are to be successful and efficacious, governments cannot rely on their own resources. The erudition and expertise of scientific and legal specialists must be brought to bear in the negotiating process itself. Just as important, especially in those societies in which public debate is an essential part of the policy formulation process, adequate understanding of the issues and problems involved, both by experts and wider publics, can be achieved only through free and frequent discourse across national boundaries. Your meeting is an example of this necessary process.

It is pertinent to recall on this occasion that chemical weapons (CW) have a special place in the Canadian collective memory, since Canadian troops in



Europe were among the first victims of chemical weapons use during World War I. However I am not an expert on chemical weapons nor on the intricacies of the negotiations aimed at a comprehensive, verifiable ban on such weapons. Faced with the diverse expertise which you represent, it would be presumptuous for me to offer advice or evaluative comment on any particular details of that negotiation. What I would prefer to do is to locate the chemical weapons negotiation in the broader arms control and disarmament context at its present juncture. From this I will attempt to sketch out, with a tentativeness befitting my profession, some inferences about the significance of the CW negotiation, some of which may have implications for the manner in which that negotiation might best proceed.

From the perspective of those with an interest in arms control, your meeting occurs at a more than usually auspicious moment. I refer of course to the recent announcement by the USA and USSR of their agreement in principle to ban intermediate-range nuclear missiles globally, as well as their agreement to enter into negotiations relating to nuclear tests. It has already become almost trite to observe the historic significance of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement as the first which would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons and which would for the first time call for reductions in nuclear arsenals, rather than merely limit the build-up of such arsenals. It is similarly being widely observed that since the INF agreement would effect only a proportionally small reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, and would not touch their central strategic arsenals, the significance of the agreement is primarily political rather than military.

Such observations are no doubt true. However the political significance of the recently announced agreements relating both to INF and nuclear tests should not, in the Canadian view, be construed in any narrow sense. We ought to recall that for most of the past decade the prospects for new arms control agreements were bleak in the extreme, with the nadir occurring in late 1983 and early 1984 when all East-West arms con-

trol negotiations and talks were for a period suspended. Since that time, and sometimes with painful slowness, not only have all previously existing channels for East-West discussion and negotiation been reactivated, they are visibly being used to good effect. I would note, for example, that the old, sterile debate about capabilities versus intent may now be behind us. There now seems broad acceptance that both matter and that each ought to be addressed not through simple, declaratory approaches but by concrete, verifiable measures, if mutual confidence is to be sustained.



Rear Admiral (retired) Robert H. Falls, President of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, addresses the Chemical Weapons Convention in Ottawa.

Arms control has traditionally largely confined itself to the issue of military capability, leaving the question of intent to largely declaratory political gestures. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement in Stockholm in 1986 on specific measures, subject to agreed verification procedures, designed to increase mutual assurance about the benign military intent of parties to the agreement. The notably efficient and effective way in which challenge inspections of conventional military exercises were recently conducted on the territories of the USSR and of the German Democratic Republic respectively is a most welcome development. So, too, are recent formulations by official spokesmen of the USSR which speak in terms of a 'sufficiency' of military force. More than at any time in recent years, parties on all sides of the East-West divide seem to accept that security is a matter of mutuality. Neither side can feel secure unless both do.

Another important development of recent years, I think, has been a growing awareness on all sides of a significant interrelationship among various kinds of arms control measures. To some considerable extent, this may be a positive by-product of the intense INF debate and related controversies of the past few years. Already, the pending INF agreement has triggered vigorous discussion about the most desirable combination of conventional and nuclear military forces which ought to be retained in order to preserve and strengthen stability in the European theatre, a debate which will predictably continue for some time. This increased awareness of the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces, particularly at the theatre level, has doubtless been one of the factors which has given impetus to the efforts to formulate a mandate for negotiations among members of the two major alliances, within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework, on conventional force levels in Europe. At the strategic level, the USA and USSR have recognized, in their own agreed negotiating mandate, the importance of giving attention to the balance between offensive and defensive forces. If we are successful, over the coming period, in moving towards significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, those interrelationships among different kinds of force deployments, and related arms control measures, will acquire yet greater importance.

Given the centrality of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR to the global configuration of military force, it is natural that international attention should have focused on the bilateral negotiations between those two powers. However, it has long been Canada's view that we are entering a period in which multilateral arms control agreements will be increasingly significant and necessary. We must recognize this and so must the superpowers. Of course several such agreements already exist, among which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty are among the most important. Foreseeable areas of potential new negotiations towards multilateral agreements, in addition to the chemical weapons negotiations, include conventional forces (particularly in Europe),



outer space, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In such areas, multilateral agreements will be necessary because existing and potential military capabilities in the respective areas go much beyond the East-West context and include states from all areas of the globe. Such negotiations will give enhanced salience to such multilateral negotiating forums as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which in recent years seems to have suffered a weakening of its earlier sense of purposefulness. They will also bring about a different dynamic in international relations, one which will be much more complicated than that of the USA-USSR or East-West relationship.

Finally, I cannot conclude this brief evaluative survey without mentioning that favourite Canadian theme — verification. There now seem to be few who would contest the conclusion, based largely on our experience with arms control agreements concluded in the 1970s, that necessary political support for the arms control process is impossible to achieve in the absence of adequate verification provisions. Agreements which are not effectively verifiable by agreed methods can undermine reciprocal confidence more than they strengthen it. This is now widely accepted. It also seems to be increasingly accepted that effective verification provisions will in most instances require a degree of intrusiveness, involving a certain delegation of sovereignty of a type to which states are not yet well accustomed. In a complementary way, there seems also to be growing recognition that concrete verification measures need to be carefully tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement and that there should be safeguards against the potential abuse of such provisions for intelligence or other purposes not related to the agreement. What is perhaps not yet fully understood is that the effectiveness of verification, and the related enhanced confidence in compliance, will depend to a considerable extent on the parties adopting a cooperative, rather than a contestatory, approach to the implementation of agreed verification measures.

All of the main factors which I have mentioned in this hasty excursion through recent arms control history, I believe, have a direct relevance to the CW negotiations which are your primary focus of interest. Certainly, if what I discerned as a major adjustment in the broad political approach by the two leading military powers to arms control as a key element of their security relationship is correct, this has huge implications for the negotiations. The notable progress which has been made in the CW negotiations in the past two years has both reflected and contributed to this gradual improvement in the East-West atmosphere. In this connection, I am greatly encouraged that some of you are in this room fresh from having visited a major chemical weapons facility in the Soviet Union. The invitation for this visit was comparable to the 1983 USA invitation to CD members to visit a major chemical weapons facility in America. This is heartening.

As statements of several political leaders have already made clear, chemical weapons in the East-West setting are seen as acquiring increased significance in the context of moves towards reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly within Europe. This makes your endeavours all the more relevant and is likely to result in increased political attention to your work. This may not at all moments seem a blessing to the negotiators but should nevertheless be welcomed as a sign of the growing seriousness with which prospective agreement is being addressed.

In a more broadly generic way, the successful negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. Unless I am mistaken, this would be the first time the international community would have negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, which incorporated detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses

formidable challenges. It is a matter for encouragement that the negotiators are now giving increasing attention to issues relating to the structure, resources and decision-making procedures of the international authority. In the event of success, the results of the negotiation will without doubt in many respects serve as an important model for future multilateral agreements in other arms control areas. This, in addition to the inherent need for an effective ban on chemical weapons, makes it especially important that the negotiators address the thorny and intricate scientific, legal, institutional and financial issues with particular care and meticulousness. We must make haste, but with deliberation and without arbitrary deadlines.

Finally, while I have alluded to the significance of CW in the East-West context, it perhaps needs to be emphasized that the successful conclusion of a treaty is of importance not solely, perhaps not even mainly, in that limited context. Chemical weapons pose a global problem. CW capabilities and arsenals are not confined to the East-West context. In other areas of the world, CW capabilities exist and may have a proportionately greater military significance there. Currently, the repeated deplorable use of chemical weapons by Iraq, as officially confirmed by the UN Secretary-General, illustrates this disturbing reality. We must hope that countries from all regions recognize a common interest in the earliest possible conclusion and implementation of an effective ban, and will make their proportionate contribution to the final stages of the negotiation.

I began the substantive portion of my remarks by mentioning the corpus of existing international law. This includes, of course, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the use of chemical weapons. The near-universal abhorrence of these weapons is reflected in the fact that the Protocol is now widely regarded as embodying customary international law. The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on such weapons would be rightly regarded as a long overdue completion and implementation of that law. Such an achievement could scarcely be overpraised."



Ambassador Marchand Addresses Conference on Disarmament

The following are excerpts from the speech by the Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, to the Conference on March 10, in Geneva.

"In my initial plenary statement, I wish first to comment on recent and ongoing developments in the field of international security and arms control and disarmament outside this Conference, beginning with the bilateral negotiating process between the two main nuclear powers. Secondly, I want to address the three principal items on our agenda: the Negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Ban, Nuclear Test Ban and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. And finally, I also want to say a few words on our preparations for the Third Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III). Mr. President, throughout my remarks I shall emphasize what Canada considers a fundamentally important element which must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, that is, effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. This is essential to maintain confidence in compliance.

The Conference on Disarmament begins its work this year amidst more auspicious circumstances than have prevailed for many years. The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) signed by President Reagan and by General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington in December marks an historic achievement. It is the first agreement ever to provide for real reductions in nuclear weapons on a global basis and thereby constitutes an important first step in the reduction of nuclear arms. Canada's understanding of the significance of this agreement was succinctly expressed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney:

'The treaty is welcome for what it accomplishes. It is also welcome for what it tells us about East-West relations. Only a few years ago, such agreement seemed far in the future — hopelessly idealistic.

So much has changed since then. What was once the stuff of dreams is beginning to come within our grasp: significant arms reductions; the resolution of regional conflicts; progress on human rights.'

The evident seriousness with which the USA and the USSR are pursuing additional arms control agreements is a further reason for encouragement. In particular, the priority attention now being given to the negotiation of a major reduction in strategic nuclear weapons deserves our full support. The successful conclusion of such an agreement would be a key contribution to the central objective of the arms control process — enhanced security at much lower levels of armaments.

The verification regime of the INF Treaty represents a breakthrough in efforts to provide effective verification provisions in a disarmament agreement. It includes not only prior exchanges of data but baseline inspections of facilities, challenge inspections and the establishment of permanent monitoring stations manned by each side at production

facilities on the territories of the other. These precedents will be extremely valuable for future agreements.

Indeed, Mr. President, this treaty, as well as the negotiations on substantially reducing strategic nuclear arms, constitutes an encouragement, an example and a precedent for our work in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in the chemical weapons (CW) negotiations. The bilateral negotiations have illustrated a central truth of effective arms control: that meticulously detailed and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of viable, politically sustainable arms control and disarmament agreements.

Our work on a draft convention banning chemical weapons has progressed during the last year and during the intersessional period, thanks to the untiring efforts of the chairman Ambassador Ekéus and his assistants Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch. This work is now continuing under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka to whom I pledge my full cooperation and that of my delegation.



Members of the Canadian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in discussion with Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. From left to right: Mr. Arsène Després, Canadian Counsellor, Ambassador de Montigny Marchand and Mr. Dhanapala.

L. Bianco



Notwithstanding the progress we have achieved, it is clear to my government that, while the end is in sight, we are not quite there yet. As Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky told this body on February 18, 'serious, major issues are still outstanding.' Some of us, conscious of the enormous strides taken and impatient to end the race, have suggested that these problems can be speedily resolved. I respectfully suggest that such an expectation, implicitly if not explicitly, belies the importance and difficulty of the remaining issues. As our Japanese colleague suggested on February 16, the danger of the marathon runner deciding to make a last desperate spurt towards his goal is that he risks running out of breath or stumbling into pitfalls. While the moment to begin our final sprint is not yet here, this is not to say that we cannot increase the measured pace Ambassador Yamada refers to — we can and we must; but we should make haste carefully.

With respect to the major issues referred to by Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky, it is evident that several of them turn on the central issue of effective verification.

First and foremost among the outstanding verification issues is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons — the Article VI issues. These involve some of the most complex and difficult decisions of the entire treaty negotiation process. Assuming that we have an effective regime developed for destroying existing CW stocks and CW production facilities (i.e., for Articles III through V), how can we achieve an optimally reliable verification regime for non-production, with minimal intrusion or interruption in the legitimate commercial activities of our chemical industries?

In the view of the Canadian Government, the problems raised here should not be insuperable. Several valuable and illuminating suggestions for filling gaps and resolving issues, like that most recently submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on *ad hoc* checks, have been advanced and warrant our careful consideration. Moreover, as suggested at the Pugwash Conference last

month, equipment and procedures that would go a considerable way to realizing our goals exist already or could be designed and developed within a reasonable time. It is encouraging to note that the industry itself is now actively engaged with our problems and positively inclined to helping us solve them.

A second major area of direct relevance to verification is Article VIII and our efforts to develop an organizational structure to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the Convention, as well as its timely adaptation in the light of experience and new technological and scientific developments. It is the International Inspectorate, with its verification tasks, which will carry the greatest responsibility for ensuring that the Convention is, and is seen to be, effectively implemented. With this in mind, my government intends to submit in the near future working papers dealing with the personnel and other resource requirements of the International Inspectorate.

Effectiveness of verification is also a relevant consideration for a third major area of concern, the Challenge Inspection provisions of Article IX. We seem agreed that a challenge inspection is to be a rare event; a last resort when all other avenues are exhausted. This underlines the importance of putting in place as complete and as comprehensive *routine* inspection procedures as possible. Insofar as the conduct of a challenge inspection itself is concerned, I suggest that the most essential requirements are that the inspectors have the fullest access and information possible that they need, and the indisputable technical competence, to allow them to conduct a thorough inspection and issue a definitive report. If this requirement can be met, then many of the concerns and issues currently preoccupying us in terms of procedures for handling inspection reports might well diminish or disappear.

A further major issue related to these considerations is the question of exchanges of data prior to the coming into force of the Convention. Clearly, some such exchanges will be essential,

not only as confidence-building steps, but to assist in making realistic assessments of the extent of verification required and the size of the machinery needed to implement it. The information already provided by some states has been useful in this regard. In particular, we welcome the attention that both the USA and the USSR have given to this issue. Here, I might note our interest in the proposals submitted by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on February 18; they contain some useful suggestions which we hope will be further clarified and built upon in the weeks to come.

Mr. President, the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. This would be the first time the international community has negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, incorporating detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses formidable challenges. Our shared sense of urgency in this work can only be strengthened by continued reports, verified by the UN Secretary-General, of repeated chemical weapons use and by disturbing reports of the proliferation of chemical weapons capabilities. Canada was therefore gratified to note that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Summit Statement on December 10, 1987, 'reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention.'

I turn now to Item I on our agenda, Nuclear Test Ban. A comprehensive test ban (CTB) remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. It is of special interest to participants in this forum that the major nuclear powers have also launched a process of negotiations relating to nuclear tests. The planned exchange of on-site observations of nuclear tests on their respective territories augurs well and will, we hope, pave the way for the earliest ratification,



as a first step, of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This is the kind of step-by-step process which Canada has long considered as providing the most realistic path to progress in controlling, and eventually eliminating, nuclear tests. We earnestly hope that these negotiations will proceed as soon as possible to the second phase in this process, that is, further limitations on nuclear testing.

I agree with the points made by Ambassador Yamada of Japan that it is particularly important to see this development between the United States and the Soviet Union as presenting an opportunity for our work in this multilateral forum, rather than detracting from it. I also fully support his view that it is equally important for the two major nuclear powers to become constructively engaged in the multilateral process in order that progress in this area may be achieved.

In the search for ways to move forward on the CTB issue, we must rise above differences over how a mandate for the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee should be defined so that discussions on the substance of the nuclear test ban question can finally get underway. Attempts to impose an approach which remains unacceptable to key nuclear weapons states are obviously doomed to failure. We must also give careful consideration to how we can best structure our work so as to support and complement the USA-USSR negotiation process.

Mr. President, one area of work on which we can all agree is the development of an international seismic network for the verification of an eventual CTB. The steady progress which has been made by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is truly reason for satisfaction. We expect the GSE to continue this important work this year through further preparations leading to the international data exchange experiment for which a member of my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen as the coordinator.

Our discussion under the agenda item entitled 'Prevention of an Arms Race in

Outer Space' reflects our widespread appreciation of the fact that we are being confronted with what could potentially be a completely new battlefield. Often, however, our appreciation of that novelty is paradoxically both too much and too little. Too much in the sense that the desire of some to close the barn door of militarization before the horse escapes neglects the fact that for 30 years military-related activities have been carried on in outer space. This is not a fact that can be wished away. Nor, I would maintain, given the stabilizing role of many of these activities, should it be wished away. At the same time our appreciation of the novelty is too little. Too often our discussions reflect neither the innovative and evolving aspects of the legal regime in outer space, the elements of which are gradually being put in place, nor the incredible rapidity of changes in space technology.

I do not think I am overstating the case, Mr. Chairman, if I suggest that unless we all come to grips with the reality of the existing situation in outer space and the revolutionary nature of the task before us, the work of this Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will not be truly consummated.

Mr. Chairman, when one looks at the actual practical work of the committee, it is clear that we are in somewhat of a hiatus. We do seem to be tramping over some already trodden ground. Yet our discussions of the legal issues, of verification and compliance and of definitions and terminology, to cite only a few, have by no means exhausted the current mandate.

We might try to give new impetus to our work in the committee by taking to heart some of the lessons we are learning in our discussions under other agenda items. I am thinking in particular of CW, where it has become evident that there are a whole range of issues that did not receive adequate attention from the Conference as a whole until the pace of the work forced everyone to focus on them. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Outer Space we should make an effort to avoid a similar situation.

Here too, we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral discussion between the two major space powers. A first order of priority of the Canadian delegation is to ensure that we do nothing to set back or interfere with the work that is being done in the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space powers might see advantage in promoting discussion in this forum of some of the practical and legal problems brought to light in the bilateral talks.

Mr. President, in the last several years, members of this Conference have put much work into enlarging our understanding of the issues involved in a treaty or treaties on radiological weapons. Under the able chairmanship of my British colleague, Ambassador Solesby, we are making another effort this year to move forward on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I do hope that we will make progress on this question. If in fact, despite the efforts of all concerned, we are not able to make any progress, I think our report to UNSSOD III should then reflect both that fact itself and the conclusions to be drawn from it regarding the agenda of our conference in the years to come.

Mr. President, an important event of this year will be the Third United Nations Special Session devoted to Disarmament. This, of course, will have significant implications for our work programme. Most specifically, it will be our responsibility to prepare a report on our work, to be put before the Special Session. Our report should be concise, factual and free from polemics. Important and useful work has been done in several areas. Moreover, as Foreign Minister Varkonyi of Hungary aptly observed in his recent statement here, this Conference reflects the international political climate and, even during a relatively unproductive period, serves as an important forum for dialogue. My delegation also agrees with Minister Varkonyi that we need to give more serious attention to how we might improve our own procedures. His suggestions in that regard merit careful study.



Finally, I feel I must register the fact that the outcome of the Preparatory Committee process for the Special Session was a disappointment but not a disaster. As we approach the Special Session itself we must change our mindset to make this Conference a success which will provide impetus to multilateral arms control and disarmament. To press unrealistically for the setting of comprehensive and detailed negotiating priorities and targets in ways which are unacceptable to many would be a recipe for failure. No participant should be expected to subscribe to commitments inconsistent with its own policies and objectives. In addition, all participants must recognize the need for flexibility and constructive give-and-take as a contribution to the legitimate efforts of the international community to debate and discuss security and arms control issues of vital concern to it, and register those concerns in a collective way. We must avoid making of the Special Session a stage for acrimonious and futile exchanges. Instead it must be a cooperative endeavour to define realistic, forward-looking priorities for the multilateral arms control agenda.

...In this and other multilateral arms control forums, care must be taken to ensure that our efforts are supportive of and do not undermine the vitally important bilateral negotiating process between the USA and USSR. In this sense, we subscribe to the concept of 'constructive parallelism' as outlined by Foreign Minister Genscher at the opening of our session.

Mr. President, I wish to conclude on an optimistic note. Arms control and disarmament are a central element of the international political agenda and, as the old adage has it, politics is 'the art of the possible.' Rhetoric has its role but it is important that our words and aspirations retain a close relationship with reality. Otherwise we risk futility and ridicule. To be realistic does not preclude being an optimist and, as I stated at the beginning of this speech, more may now be truly possible than we not long ago dared hope. Let us get on with the job."

Cooperation Crucial to Northern Development

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, participated in the recent Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromso, Norway. Here are excerpts from his speech.

"The Canadian Government recently conducted a thorough review of Canada's international relations, the first for 16 years. This time we were determined to open up the debate on foreign policy to all Canadians. From St. John's in the East to Victoria in the West to Yellowknife in the North, Canadians came forward with their views and concerns. They touched on every aspect of our foreign policy. They told us in no uncertain terms that Canadians remain as internationalist, as global in their world view, as ever. Maybe more so.

One of the areas stressed in that review was the North. In hearings before the Parliamentary Committee an Inuit leader, Mark Gordon, argued forcefully that one of the problems with the North is that too often northern policies are developed in isolation by southerners in capital cities in temperate zones. It is striking for me, and I expect for most of the Canadians in the room, that we are meeting here in Tromso — that Tromso is near the 70th parallel, well north of the Arctic Circle, indeed north of mainland Canada.

It is true that in Canada the majority of our population lives close to our border with the United States. But that fact does not diminish Canadians' sense of the North. Although the High Arctic may be more real to those who live there than to others, the North and the Arctic are a singular influence in the self-image of all Canadians. In the evocative words of a famous Canadian folk-song:

'Mon pays, ce n'est pas un pays, c'est l'hiver.'

It is fitting that Norwegians and Canadians are meeting here this week. As we were reminded so memorably last night, 500 years before Columbus was

even born, Norsemen were exploring and settling in Canada-to-be.

Other countries came to settle the Americas. Through accidents of history Canadians came to speak English and French and not Norwegian! But Nordic peoples continued to fish and explore in Canada's North. They came more frequently in the late 19th century as the search for a northwest passage intensified. A Norwegian, Amundsen, finally found it. Larsen, the first Canadian to navigate that passage, was Norwegian born. Many islands and waterways are named after Norwegian explorers such as Nansen and Sverdrup. In fact we are probably lucky that today Norway lays no claim to the northern half of Canada!

Norwegians joined in the massive flood of immigration to Canada between the 1880s and 1930. They have adapted to Canadian society with ease, while retaining elements of their distinctive culture and their language.

Norwegians contributed so much to Canadian society because our societies and our values are strikingly similar. I think our common northern environment is a key factor: we each developed the difficult parts of our respective continents.

Canadians and Norwegians have common attitudes towards the individual and towards the individual's relationships with family, nature, God and one's fellow man. That is not simply a coincidence. It is a product of our common geography. Harsh climate and the challenge of survival breed an attitude of sharing, of cooperation, of responsibility.

We are both democratic societies, but more importantly, we believe in the same type of democracy. We believe passionately in freedom and in justice. We believe that collectively society has a duty to ensure the rights of minorities, to protect the weak and to maintain high standards of health, welfare, education and safety. In northern climates government must provide services, strengthen the economy and protect the environment.



As northern societies, we are both geographically remote: most of Canada from the heartland of North America, Norway from the European heartland. Politically and militarily we are neither the largest nor the smallest of states. We are both especially dependent on the international economic and political order. These realities have made both of us strong defenders of collective and international institutions such as NATO, the OECD and the UN system. In a world of superpowers and giant economic blocs, nations like Canada and Norway understand and can support each other.

This symposium has had sessions on resource development, historical trends, defence, legal issues and indigenous peoples. I want to address some northern issues of particular concern to Canada and my government. These are issues where we seek Norwegian understanding, experience and wisdom — issues on which we can cooperate in the broader international community.

A northern dimension to our foreign policy is not new for Canada. In 1882 Canada was a participant in the first International Polar Year. Since then international cooperation in northern regions has been a special Canadian concern.

Our government's response to the joint parliamentary review of international relations focused on four broad themes of a 'comprehensive northern foreign policy.' These themes are:

- affirming Canadian sovereignty;
- modernizing Canada's northern defences;
- preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and
- promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation.

The overwhelming Canadian challenge is geography, a vast, unique realm of land and water and ice.

The waters within the Arctic archipelago are not like warm waters which are used for international navigation. Our waters are in fact frozen most

of the year — navigation as on the high seas is impossible. The shoreline is where open water meets solid ice, not where water meets land.

Indeed, Canadian Inuit live on this ice for part of the year: for them it is home. So whether *terra firma* or *aqua firma*, Canada claims sovereignty over this entire area. In 1985 our government established straight baselines around the perimeter of the Arctic archipelago. This defines the outer limits of Canada's historic internal waters.

To open our Arctic waters we are building the world's largest icebreaker — a class 8 vessel. That ship will be used to keep open waterways and ports that are now closed part of the year. It will facilitate commerce and the development of our northern resource potential.

We are improving the entire infrastructure that is needed for the control and development of the North. We are developing the means to provide basic information on weather, tides, currents and ice conditions. We are developing aids to navigation and communications. We are evolving regulations for shipping, development and the protection of the environment. We are discussing with the United States an agreement whereby they would acknowledge the need to seek Canadian consent prior to passage by an American icebreaker through Canadian northern waters. Major efforts to protect the northern environment go back to 1970 when we passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.

All of these measures are essential for safe navigation in the Arctic. They are consistent with the Government's pledge to facilitate shipping in our internal archipelagic waters subject to our sovereignty, security and environmental requirements and the welfare of the inhabitants of the North.

We have also done extensive work in oil and gas exploration and development. Last summer we shipped oil from the Arctic. Lower oil prices have curtailed but not stopped that work. Our research and development in northern resources is a continuing investment in the future.

When I say we are taking these measures, I mean the federal *and* the territorial governments, because the governance of our North is a partnership of national and local governments. Indeed, one of the most significant developments in Canada's North is the deliberate and gradual devolution of power and responsibility from Ottawa to northern governments. Our government has also accelerated negotiations of aboriginal land claims — a complex process of fundamental importance to our northern peoples.

Another trend of enormous importance is growing circumpolar cooperation between countries north of the Arctic Circle.

— in the 1960s we played a leading role in the formation of the International Permafrost Conference

— in 1971 we participated in the Canadian-Scandinavian workshop on caribou and reindeer

— in 1976 we reached agreement on the conservation of polar bears

— in 1983 Canada and Denmark reached agreement on environmental cooperation

— in 1984 Canada and the USSR agreed on exchanges in Arctic sciences

— in the 1980s we supported the development of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference

— and most recently Canada and Norway have intensified our commitment to cooperation in the field of science and technology.

So Canada has been actively involved in northern initiatives for a long time and my government is committed to intensifying its relations with Arctic neighbours.

We wish to see peaceful cooperation among Arctic Rim countries developed further. We were therefore encouraged when General Secretary Gorbachev stated at Murmansk on October 1 that the Soviet Union wished to increase its bilateral and multilateral cooperation in



the Arctic. We have noted his suggestion of cooperation on energy, science and the environment among other areas.

We are pleased that he indicated the Soviet Union's interest in the creation of an Arctic Sciences Council, towards which Canada, Norway and other countries have been working. I understand you have been discussing this proposal and the concept of an Arctic Basin Council.

We have noted his interest in the development of cultural links among Arctic peoples. In circumpolar relations few things are as important as contacts between the Inuit, the Arctic native peoples of Canada, Greenland, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will agree, for the first time, to attend the next Inuit Circumpolar Conference in 1989 and the Inuit Youth Camp in 1988, which Canada will host.

So we welcome Mr. Gorbachev's interest in the North. But we need — and have asked for — clarification on what it means in practice. And we will continue to pursue our own goals and interests in the Arctic.

The Murmansk speech also brings us to the issue of peace and security. The world watched last night the scene in Washington as General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan signed an agreement for the first-ever reductions in nuclear weapons. This historic disarmament agreement is solid proof of an improvement in East-West relations.

Peace and security are vital issues as well in the world's North. It is just since the 1950s that the Arctic has become a focus of military activity, and thus of more strategic concern for all of us.

Canada and Norway share membership in NATO. We both know that collective defence is necessary to deter aggression and to protect our way of life.

NATO has given us an unprecedented generation of peace. The Alliance is indispensable for defence and for encouraging arms control and disarmament. While the dynamics of East-West

relations may change, while relationships may change even within the West, Canada's commitment to NATO has increased.

Each Alliance partner must strive to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its contribution. Shortly after its election Prime Minister Mulroney's Government launched a review of Canada's defence policy. We found there was a serious gap between our commitments and our capabilities. We are taking steps to close that gap. We found our reserves were inadequate, our equipment out of date. These problems are being addressed.

We also found that our commitments were too numerous, scattered, and inefficient. We could certainly deploy troops in northern Norway. However, a recent exercise demonstrated that sustaining them would not be militarily feasible. The attempt to do so would also weaken substantially our forces in Central Europe.

You are well aware of the resulting decisions. In Europe, Canada's efforts are now to be concentrated on the Central Front. That will make our Alliance contribution more effective. And that will strengthen the Alliance — and the ultimate security of Norway — as a whole.

Of course Canada will continue to commit a battalion group to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force for the protection of the northern flank.

In the Atlantic we are upgrading substantially the naval and air resources essential to maintaining sea lines of communication from North America to Western Europe through the acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines and of modern surface vessels.

In our North we are replacing our outdated northern radar network by a modern North Warning System. Our air fields are being upgraded. More aircraft are being deployed, the number of surveillance flights increased. More military exercises are being held in the North. Surveillance systems are being developed to detect potentially hostile submarines.

The nuclear submarines we are acquiring for Atlantic and Pacific operations will also be used to detect and counter hostile naval activity in the Arctic, especially under ice where no other method of exercising control is effective.

In his Murmansk speech, Mr. Gorbachev proposed:

1. creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe;
2. limitation of military activity in the waters of the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland seas;
3. examination of a total ban on naval activity in mutually agreed zones.

Canada is interested in developing realistic policies aimed at enhancing the security and stability of the Arctic region but we have serious reservations about these proposals. Our installations in the North, which I described earlier, are all defensive. Proposals to demilitarize our North would imply that we abandon our defences.

Similarly, proposals to declare the North a nuclear-weapon-free zone or to restrict naval movements in areas such as the Norwegian Sea overlook the fact that the nuclear-weapons threat is global, not regional. Both East and West have massive nuclear forces capable of mutual annihilation — weapons on land, sea and air, all over the globe.

Some may be in the Arctic. Some may pass over the Arctic. But the threat relates to the East-West rivalry, not the Arctic. Declaring the Arctic a nuclear-weapon-free zone or restricting certain naval movements there would do nothing to reduce the threat from these weapons. It would be destabilizing for other regions.

Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban of naval activity would be verified or enforced. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to discuss the Western Arctic and not the Soviet archipelago.



Finally, Mr. Gorbachev's words do not reflect the actions of his government. Unlike Canada or the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union has an enormous concentration of military forces and weapons in the Arctic region.

In Canada's view, the best prospects for progress towards enhanced security in the Arctic lie in a balanced, step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Our security in the Arctic is a direct function both of the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance, the climate of East-West relations and progress towards balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.

The North is deeply embedded in the consciousness of Canadians. The North conveys images of breathtaking beauty and of climatic extremes. We have contradictory impressions of vast natural resources locked in an incredibly fragile environment. We seek both modernization in the North and the preservation of traditional ways of life. We seek to protect the precious ecology and beauty of the North, while making it accessible to those from the South.

Throughout our history we have also had northern dreams, often dashed on

this harsh environment. I hope that we have drawn some lessons from our experience. I would like to suggest a few.

The first lesson is the crucial importance of cooperation. Only seven countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle. Only five of them border on the Arctic Ocean. While the North may be important to all of them, the vast majority of the populations of all these countries lies far to the south of the Arctic Circle.

If there is to be progress in meeting the challenges of the North, there must be a sharing of information, ideas, experience and technology by the few countries concerned. Canada and Norway are especially qualified to take the lead in sharing. Indeed, this seminar is of particular importance to developing that cooperation. Canada would consider hosting a further meeting of northern countries in 1988 or 1989.

Second, we should exploit improvements in East-West relations to pursue peaceful cooperation among all Arctic nations. The Soviet Union occupies 50

per cent of the Arctic shoreline. Although it is ahead of us in some areas of development, it has much to learn from us in other areas. We share problems such as the environment that demand cooperation.

...The third lesson is that we must all learn from the Inuit and the Saami, the people who have lived for many centuries in the North. And we can learn lessons that are relevant far beyond the northern environment. Let me quote Robert Williamson, a Canadian anthropologist who has devoted his life to the study of the North.

'In the Canadian Arctic . . . I found peace. It was the Inuit people there, and their values. They lived interdependently . . . They knew that their survival depended on harmony and cooperation. They had found ways of minimizing suspicion, channelling stress positively, and withdrawing with integrity from potential conflict.'

These are lessons we all must learn. In the North and in the whole world. Thank you."

Consultative Group Discusses 'Peace and Security in the Arctic'

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met on October 1-3, 1987, in Cornwall to discuss Arctic peace and security issues. The meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche. The Consultative Group was created in 1979 in response to the recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. It meets periodically with the Ambassador for Disarmament and with officials of the departments of External Affairs and National Defence to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control.

Mr. Bob Hicks, M.P., the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P., and Mr. Derek Blackburn, M.P., representing each major political party, participated in a post-dinner panel discussion on October 1. Among the 20 other meeting speakers were prominent members of non-governmental organizations and the academic and government communities.

The following excerpts from the executive summary of the October meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs were prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report

prepared by the Centre are available by writing to the Editor.

As Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche pointed out in his opening remarks, the Group was dealing with a vital and timely topic. With the continued dispute over the control of archipelagic waters, the possibility of large-scale resource exploration in the Arctic, and the prospect of increased military activity in the region, it is essential that Canada develop an Arctic policy that ensures Canadian sovereignty, protects the northern environment, and contributes to international peace and security.

The Consultative Group arrived at no consensus on the specific features a peace and security policy for the Canadian Arctic should assume. The Group



evinced, however, a general concern that the Canadian Government at present does not appear to have a policy framework adequate to deal with the growing number of issues affecting the Canadian Arctic, and a strong feeling that the Government should develop a comprehensive security policy for the Arctic.

It was generally agreed that this policy should include a defence/deterrent component and a diplomatic/reassurance component. As regards the former, a number of participants felt that Canada should concentrate its military involvement in the Arctic on activities which provide peacetime surveillance and promote crisis stability, and should resist involvement in programmes which assume nuclear war-fighting. As regards the latter, there was a strong sentiment that Canada should explore arms control and disarmament measures that would reduce the need for a Canadian or other military presence in the Arctic.

Participants offered differing assessments of the strategic importance of the Canadian Arctic, and of the threats to Canada in the region. The potential for increased superpower military activity in the North was noted, as was the fact that Canada has little control over the factors influencing the Arctic's strategic significance. Nevertheless, participants observed that how Canada governs the use of its Arctic territory will affect both Canadian and international security. The Group emphasized that Canada's Arctic policy should strive to minimize superpower competition in the North, and to enhance strategic stability.

Towards these ends, the Group agreed that Canada should provide a system of surveillance, monitoring, and early warning of attack in its Arctic airspace. There was much discussion as to whether Canada should limit its activities to peacetime surveillance and a limited capability for interception or should pursue a capability for comprehensive air defence. Participants generally concluded that Canada should avoid participation in the US Strategic Defence and Air Defence Initiatives. The merits and demerits of Canadian acquisition of

space-based radar were debated. The Group also examined the option of moving to a unilateral or multilateral air surveillance system, as opposed to maintaining the present NORAD framework. The negotiation of strict limits or a ban on air-and-sea-launched cruise missiles was proposed as an arms control alternative for dealing with the air-breathing threat in the North.

The Consultative Group affirmed the importance of being able to monitor intrusions into Canada's waters as a means of contributing to both Canadian security and sovereignty. However, many participants expressed reservations about the use of nuclear-powered attack submarines for maritime surveillance. Passive sonar devices, non-nuclear-powered submarines, and underwater mines were suggested as alternatives....

The Group urged the Canadian Government to explore the possibility of increasing collaboration with other circumpolar states on matters of common concern. It was suggested that Canada could seek cooperation bilaterally or through a circumpolar forum. The pros and cons of a full or partial Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone were debated. As a more feasible option in the near-term, the Group proposed that Canada examine potential confidence-building measures for the Arctic that would reduce the risk of crisis and war.

Some concern was expressed during the meeting about the divergence in opinion between representatives of the strategic studies community and representatives of the peace and disarmament community. Several participants opined, however, that the value of the Consultative Group lies in its position as a unique forum in which individuals of different backgrounds and interests can exchange ideas and seek out common ground. The quality of presentations and discourse at this year's meeting was lauded. It was suggested, however, that certain sectors of society should be more fully represented at future meetings.

Canadian Industry Tackles Verification Problem

Over the past several decades Canada has acquired considerable experience in addressing security issues in several multilateral forums, including those dealing specifically with Europe. As the prospect of a multilateral agreement concerning conventional forces in Europe has increased, so has the desire on the part of the Government to see Canadian industry ready to play a part in any verification arrangements. An industry round table in February 1988, on multilateral arms control verification for conventional forces, was the first step in this process.

The exercise was sponsored by the Department of External Affairs through its Verification Research Programme. First established in October 1983, the Programme focuses its efforts on verification issues related to multilateral arms control agreements.

A Hypothetical Arms Control Agreement

The round table was designed to provide senior industry representatives with a hands-on introduction to the technological and operational requirements of a verification system. To give them a general idea of the complexity of verification issues, they were given a hypothetical agreement: its provisions and the figures used represented an approximation of what might happen in reality. The agreement incorporated confidence-building measures similar to those discussed at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) and force reduction measures such as those discussed at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and other associated measures in central Europe.

Measures in the hypothetical agreement were designed to reduce surprise attack, unintentional war and intimidation by increasing the predictability of military activities and imposing constraints on military forces. They required such obligations as:



- circulation of information about military establishments;
- advance notification of military activities (exercises and movements);
- reduction of threatening components in existing military forces.

The main targets for verification of compliance were personnel, heavy equipment and certain military facilities. A verification system for the agreement would have to detect or monitor certain minimum combinations of personnel and/or equipment.

Designing the Components of a Verification System

The round table was basically a simulation exercise covering two working sessions, one on each day. The first day's task was to determine the technological and operational requirements for a verification system for the hypothetical agreement.

After a brief orientation the participants were given a presentation by Mr. Bobby Wolfe, Programme Director at E-Systems, Greenville Division. E-Systems is an international electronics and aircraft systems company based in Texas. It was responsible for designing and implementing a major portion of the system established in the Sinai to verify the disengagement process between Egypt and Israel following the October War in 1973. Mr. Wolfe presented a concrete example of how an agreement involving conventional forces was verified and highlighted particular problems encountered as well as the solutions adopted.

Having been told the elements to look for, working groups were asked to consider which of the following verification approaches might be applicable.

1. On-Site Challenge Inspection

This approach requires that an inspection team be transported at short notice (12-36 hours) to a particular area to carry out an inspection.

2. Entry/Exit Points

These are agreed points through which all troop movements take place. In order to limit the possibility that troops

will filter back to their original positions, Entry/Exit monitoring can be matched with information from remote sensor fields or overhead reconnaissance. This approach requires means by which data can be gathered, stored and communicated; the staff also requires communications, living facilities and security.

3. Observer/Liaison Missions

This is potentially the cheapest form of verification and, depending on the amount of freedom given the liaison officers, it can be the most effective.

4. Portal Monitoring

This method is a compromise between on-site inspection and remote sensing. Inspectors are not allowed inside a base or factory but are allowed to check what goes in and what comes out. It poses more severe technological challenges than some other methodologies. Portal monitoring requires tamper-resistant enclosures and alarms, security fences and portal systems, as well as communications and security.

5. *In Situ* Remote Sensing

This is a method utilizing various types of sensors which are located close to the site being monitored, but distant from the monitoring personnel. Technologies in this area relate to:

- area motion sensors
- intruder alarms
- imaging sensors
- traffic monitors

The emphasis in these applications is on reliable, tamper-resistant designs.

6. Airborne/Space-Based Remote Sensing

This method constitutes the central part of the current verification mechanisms used by the superpowers. In the event that a multilateral agreement was reached which demanded the creation of a third (i.e., non-superpower) overhead reconnaissance system, significant opportunities would exist for developing the relevant technologies, including remote sensing aircraft and/or satellites, discrimination and detection systems, image processing systems, data storage and retrieval systems and communications networks.

Special worksheets were designed for the session so that groups could flesh out the technological requirements of each verification approach they decided would be appropriate for their observations. Groups were asked to fill in details regarding: sensor technology required, other necessary equipment, data handling requirements, data processing requirements, Canadian capabilities, possible constraints, potential countermeasures and cost implications.

The first day's activities concluded with a dinner address by Mr. James H. Taylor, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who briefly reviewed recent progress in arms control emphasizing important developments with respect to verification.

The second day's task was to take the individual elements of the verification system that had been considered on the previous day, and put them all together in one system.

Each group was asked to proceed according to the following series of steps:

- develop an overall verification system (information flow);
- map out the corresponding organizational structure (block diagram);
- estimate the types and numbers of personnel required;
- estimate the types and numbers of equipment/facilities required;
- estimate the costs required to:
 - a) put the system in place
 - b) maintain and operate the system
- identify particular problem areas.

In order to allow groups to make concrete cost estimates, quantitative estimates of verification activities for the West were provided. These estimates were ballpark figures intended to give participants a rough feel for the magnitude of the problem.



The objective of the round table was not to produce accurate conclusions about a future arms control verification system for an agreement to control conventional weapons in Europe. Rather, the central aim was to sensitize Canadian industry representatives to the complexities of the verification issue and to identify potential markets for Canadian technology. As they worked through the simulation exercise, however, the groups identified some points which are of general interest.

1. A basic verification system including ground-, air-, and space-based components would probably not be cheap.

A first rough estimate was in the order of \$1.5 billion including \$1 billion for a specialized satellite system.

2. Installing adequate systems integration for the system would likely push up the price.

Participants felt that a more thorough study of systems integration issues would be desirable. Most felt that the cost implications of doing the job well would be considerable.

3. Any verification system would probably have to be implemented progressively in stages, simply because different elements of the system would require different periods for development.

For example, it was suggested that the implementation might run as follows: ground-based systems (1-3 years), air-based systems (5 years), space-based systems (10 years). As a consequence, the overall system would have to be phased in over time.

4. Arms control measures would probably have to be phased in as well, and be coordinated with the progressive implementation of a verification system.

5. People and technology must both be used in a verification system.

People are often the most reliable sensors. Moreover, the presence of human observers and inspectors helps

to build confidence. Nonetheless, technology provides an essential background monitoring and archival function.

6. Canada is capable of providing much of the required technological and operational services for a multilateral verification system in Europe.

However, other Western countries have many of the same capabilities as Canada.

The Next Step

Most industry participants saw a need for the Canadian Government to become actively involved in further measures to stimulate industry activity in this area. Two types of study were suggested:

How to Verify It, According to One Newspaper

The Canadian Government's Verification Research Programme has received considerable attention recently. The following article by Jeffrey Simpson appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 25, 1988.

"Let's assume that both superpowers could agree to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons. The question would then become how each could verify the other's compliance with the treaty.

That issue — verification — has been among the knottiest in arms control. Just this week, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted that the problems of verification are the most difficult in the negotiations to reduce long-range ballistic missiles.

For decades, the Soviets resisted on-site inspections, describing them as legalized espionage. But the arrival of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev changed all that. The proposed treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe provides for teams of observers to verify the dismantling of

1. an in-depth feasibility study covering essentially the same ground as the round table, but in much more detail;

2. a practical field trial designed to test the different elements of a verification system and to determine how to operate it effectively.

The participants felt that the round table was very successful as an awareness-raising exercise. The majority of industry participants felt that they had learned a great deal about verification, and expressed their intention to remain involved with the field. For their part, government participants learned more about Canadian industrial capabilities, and established much-needed contacts with the private sector.

missile installations and the destruction of the weapons.

Canada, which has no nuclear weapons of its own and is only a small player in the Western military alliances, has nonetheless become exceedingly active in promoting new techniques for verification. It is a suitable role for the country, one aggressively pursued by Canadian diplomats in a variety of international forums.

Any superpower agreement would be monitored by the United States and the Soviet Union, relying on their own satellites, sensors, intelligence and on-site inspections. But what about conventional force reductions in Europe, whose negotiation would involve many countries, including Canada?

Here the problems of verification become mind-boggling. We are talking not just about one weapons family — missiles — but about a variety of military means including troops, tanks, planes, helicopters and artillery.

This week in Toronto, some of the best minds in Canadian industry and the



External Affairs Department sat down to think about how a verification system might work and whether Canadian companies might get contracts to supply some of the monitoring technology. It certainly wasn't a headline-grabbing conference, but it did show that the Canadian government is serious about making a contribution in this all-important field.

As one participant noted, the problems with any verification system are cost, technical challenges and political will. The cost of a verification system of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals would run above \$1-billion. You would need a mixture of satellites, satellite-receiving stations, planes, sensors, checkpoints, on-site inspectors and computers. Mind you, the price tag looks puny compared with the cost of any large weapons system.

The thorniest difficulty is deciding where verification stops and espionage begins. Monitoring compliance would almost certainly require sensors placed near airports to track take-offs, inspectors at key locations, periodic airplane sorties and perhaps a limited number of inspections on demand. Some of these problems bedevilled the unsuccessful negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe, talks which may soon be rekindled in another form.

It would take between five and 10 years for both sides to set up their verification systems after negotiating a treaty, a process that itself could take years. So thinking about verification problems and challenges is really to dream about the twenty-first century, unless an early and unexpected breakthrough emerges.

Still, it's an eminently worthwhile area for Canada to concentrate its efforts, by sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations, financing research by academic specialists, organizing conferences with Canadian industry and trying in the process to carve out a niche for this country. It's unspectacular but necessary work, a foreign policy initiative that represents an excellent investment."

Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament

The following are excerpts from the address given by Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, on the cross-Canada speaking tour, December 1-16, 1987.

"...Clearly, the agreement to eliminate all medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF) is a breakthrough in rebuilding East-West relations. For the first time an entire class of weapons will be destroyed. Although the agreement will eliminate only 3 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal, its political significance is enormous. The bilateral negotiating process has, in fact, achieved a concrete result.

And there is more on the horizon. The two superpower leaders are preparing another summit for 1988 in Moscow at which they hope to sign a treaty eliminating 50 per cent of the present huge stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. An historical process of disarmament is actually underway. These achievements represent a success for those countries, like Canada, that have been pressing both superpowers hard for radical reductions in nuclear weapons.

Of course, any outburst of euphoria is premature. Global problems involving regional wars, massive poverty, environmental destruction and the population explosion are immense. But it would be equally wrong to underestimate the magnitude of this moment that the world is passing through. The air is filled with change.

...Mr. Gorbachev continues to demonstrate a desire for reforms in a more open Soviet Union. His economic reforms and foreign policy initiatives go well beyond style. Whether he can deliver a 'new' Soviet Union, given unresolved questions of the Soviet satellite states, Afghanistan and human rights, is a valid question. Nonetheless, the changes that have taken place are for the most part of the type that the West has demanded for many years. It is important not only to acknowledge these changes but also to respond in ways that could induce further change.

...As a practical expression of this improved spirit, we have seen, throughout 1987, these developments:

— Substantial progress at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Treaty that would ban the production of all chemical weapons.

— Preparations at the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna for a new forum to negotiate conventional force reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, involving all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

— The successful application of the Stockholm confidence-building agreement in which NATO and Warsaw Pact observers conducted 16 unprecedented on-site inspections of each other's military exercises.

...All these advances confirm the overarching fact of our time: peace is a multi-agenda process involving economic and social development as well as arms control measures, the protection of human rights as well as an end to racial discrimination. The agenda for the 21st century is already delineated. The issues that claim humanity's full attention are evident: the threat of nuclear annihilation, regional wars using conventional weapons, the gap between the developing and the industrial worlds, the danger of over-population, the despoilation of the global environment.

...A key to moving the world to a high stage of civilization is to understand the full meaning of security in the modern age.

Nations arm because they feel their security to be threatened, and each nation will judge its own security on its own terms. Only when the threat to security is lessened is real disarmament possible. But the paradox of our time is that the inflated arms race itself becomes a threat to security. Moreover, we now see that the huge suffering caused by under-development is itself a growing non-military threat to security. Working constructively on all aspects of

security — military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights — creates conditions conducive to disarmament; it also provides the environment conducive to the pursuit of successful development. Thus our purpose must be to increase real security — for individual nations and for the world — by finding politically possible ways to spend less money on arms and more on development.

The Reykjavik Summit — and its extensions at Washington and Moscow — focuses the attention of the world on the new possibilities for creative thinking to resolve the problems of conflict and deprivation that still afflict large areas of the world. A basis has been laid for what the Palme Commission calls 'extraordinary progress.'

'An opportunity exists for the 1980s to witness what only seemed to be a dream but which now can become real: concrete accomplishments in disarmament, stability and peace.'

...Canada's approach to the comprehensive issue of peace and security is multi-dimensional — ranging from our strengthening of the United Nations system (where we are the fourth-largest overall contributor) to External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's personal tour of Central America last week to lend Canadian support to the regional peace plan. In addition:

— Canada has boosted aid to \$900 million to famine-stricken Africa, written off \$600 million of African debt, and now provides bilateral development assistance in grants, rather than loans.

— The fight against apartheid through sanctions against South Africa has been stepped up: we have imposed a ban both on new investment in South Africa and re-investment of profits; in the first six months of 1987, Canada reduced its imports from South Africa by 51 per cent; the importation of coal, iron and steel has been banned along with the promotion of tourism....

— Canada is among the most active supporters of multilateral institutions as

reflected in our hosting this fall of the Heads-of-Government meetings of La Francophonie and the Commonwealth. The next meeting of the Economic Summit will be in Toronto in 1988.

...One of my dominant impressions gained during more than three years representing Canada on disarmament questions at the United Nations is how much our country is respected. A strong legacy as a non-colonial nation, multi-cultural, open, loyal to our allies, cooperative, and genuinely involved in strengthening the international system enables Canada's voice to be heard. We have become an influential nation — carrying with this new status the responsibility of an even more prominent role in the difficult years ahead.

This gathering strength in international relations makes possible a stronger projection of Canada's security policy. This security policy is multi-dimensional.

...Canadian security policy must respond to an international environment dominated by the rivalry between East and West. These two groups of nations, each led by a superpower, are in conflict, a conflict of ideas and values. They are divided on how politics should be conducted, society ordered, and economics structured. They are divided on the value of personal freedom, on the importance of the rule of law, and on the proper relationship of the individual to the society. In this conflict, Canada is not neutral. Our values and our determination to defend freedom and democracy align us in the most fundamental way with other Western nations. Thus, Canada is a dedicated member of NATO, whose importance lies not only in countering the military threat from the Warsaw Pact but also in its political support for democratic institutions and for improved East-West political relations. Neither NATO's nuclear nor conventional arms will ever be used except in response to aggression.

As a result of its membership, Canada has been able to make a serious and constructive input to the important arms control negotiating efforts in Geneva,

Stockholm and Vienna. And we are working on ways for NATO to better project the positive qualities of its collective and cooperative security arrangements. Without the continuing direct opportunity to act and react, our influence on such events would be dramatically reduced.

Accordingly, Canada has commitments to its defence partners, which are expressed in the recent Defence White Paper. As Mr. Clark noted, Canada intends 'to modernize our capacity to meet our Alliance and Atlantic commitments.'

...The White Paper states that a strong national defence is a major component — but only one component — of Canada's international security policy. Arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes are equally important. Thus, the White Paper is not a surrogate Foreign Policy White Paper. All these activities should be seen as mutually supportive, and all of them enable Canada to play a role in the changing international community in putting into place the building blocks of peace.

Canada has six such 'blocks':

— Radical reductions in nuclear arms is the core of our disarmament policy. That is why the Reagan-Gorbachev summit process, leading to the dismantling of not only all intermediate- and shorter-range but also 50 per cent of strategic missiles is greeted with enthusiasm. The Canadian Government has consistently pressed both superpowers to achieve this.

— The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada wants a halt to all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time. At the United Nations this fall, the Government again co-sponsored a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to 'initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session.'...



— The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime is critical both to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and ensuring the safe transfer of technology and materials for the development of nuclear power systems. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Canada worked to uphold at the 1985 review, now numbers 131 states, making it the largest multilateral arms treaty in the world.

— At the Conference on Disarmament, Canada actively participates in the multilateral negotiations now leading to a chemical weapons ban. In fact, Canada chaired the *ad hoc* group that launched the current process. As a nation whose soldiers have suffered the toxic effect of these nefarious weapons, Canada has a special interest in ridding the world of them. We have presented to the UN a mechanism for detecting their use in current wars.

— The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another key objective. Canada has contributed to the Conference on Disarmament's deliberations on this subject in several ways: the first substantive working paper dealing with possible stabilizing and destabilizing space-based military systems; an extensive survey of international law to provide a data base concerning its applicability to outer space; an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal to examine ways to strengthen the legal regime for outer space.

— Confidence-building measures are important not only in their own right but also because they improve the East-West negotiating atmosphere. Canada was a member of the 35-nation conference in Stockholm on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and actively aided the implementation of the agreement, which provides a system of greater military transparency in Europe. Another important aspect of 'confidence-building' is the promotion of East-West exchanges, both official and unofficial. There are a number of specific exchange agreements between Canada and the Soviet Union (e.g., Arctic scientists) as well as with other East European countries (medical exchanges with Poland, sports exchanges with the German Democratic Republic)....

On the basis of all these policies, Canada is able to make practical contributions to international security.

We do this by, first of all, urging compliance with existing treaties on the grounds that deviation threatens the credibility and viability of further arms control. Thus we have protested against the US breakout of SALT II. And the Government has consistently urged that the traditional or restrictive interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should be maintained, which would prevent the deployment of space-based defence systems. We have also voiced our concern about the USSR radar at Krasnoyarsk, and the Soviet encryption of telemetry which makes it very difficult for the West to determine if they are adhering to treaties.

A second contribution is through building support for confidence-building measures such as openness, transparency and verification.

Through Canada's extensive work in verification, we have become recognized at the United Nations as a world leader in this subject, which is now seen to be of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. In 1983, Canada launched a verification research programme, with a \$1 million annual budget, which concentrates on verification techniques for seismic monitoring, chemical weapons use, and the feasibility of space-based satellite sensing. This latter is an exciting, far-seeing programme.

...This technical work has made possible diplomatic initiatives at the UN that have led to increasing support for a Canadian-sponsored consensus resolution on verification; the first ever substantive discussion on verification was held last May at the UN Disarmament Commission, where Canada chaired a Working Group. This group developed, again by consensus, an illustrative list of 10 principles that advanced the international community's understanding of how to apply verification. For example, the agreement on the necessity of on-site inspections has a direct bearing on the INF

agreement and a Chemical Weapons Treaty. This activity has led UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to suggest that advancement of verification be highlighted at the UN's Third Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) in 1988.

...It is becoming more apparent to me that new intellectual inroads are being made by the peace movement. One example is provided by Beyond War, a non-partisan educational movement, which recently conducted an unprecedented project involving American and Soviet scientists and scholars. The two teams, meeting in each other's countries, produced a book, *Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking*, published jointly in English and Russian in the United States and the Soviet Union. Making the point that war is no longer an available means towards any desirable end, the book explores the prospects for peaceful resolution of international differences. In Canada, a new book, *How We Work for Peace*, is a wide-ranging description of Canadian community activities, compiled by Christine Peringer of the Peace Research Institute, Dundas, whose long work for peace was recently cited by the UN.

During the past few years, the peace movement, now numbering more than 2 000 local, regional and national groups across Canada, has both widened its activity and deepened its grasp of the terrible complexities of the disarmament subject. A number of leading organizations — embracing physicians, scientists, psychologists, educators, lawyers, among others — have projected a vibrant, intellectually-based concern for peace....

The imaginative work of peace groups, which is multiplying throughout the world, is slowly breaking down the mistrust and hatreds of the past. Competing ideologies cannot be quickly reconciled, any more than competing religions or cultures can. There is no quick or facile solution to the problems of world peace, but succeeding enlightened generations will be able to move forward together. This human movement is essential to sustain public policies that move beyond war...."



Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund Fiscal Year 1987-88

CONTRIBUTIONS:

1.	Science for Peace Toronto—public lectures in peace studies	\$1,500.00
2.	University of Manitoba—lecture series "Conflict and Peace"	\$2,200.00
3.	Kootenay Centre for a Sustainable Future—summer school on global issues	\$1,500.00
4.	Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament—conference on chemical weapons	\$10,000.00
5.	Canadian Pugwash Group—travel to 37th Pugwash conference	\$1,000.00
6.	Disarmament Times—publication costs	\$3,000.00
7.	United Nations Association in Canada—briefing papers on arms control and disarmament	\$6,309.00
8.	Canadian Student Pugwash—travel to 37th Pugwash conference	\$1,000.00
9.	Institute and Centre of Air and Space Law—lecture and seminar series	\$6,000.00
10.	University of Calgary—media research	\$16,000.00
11.	Association of Canadian Community Colleges—curriculum guide	\$3,000.00
12.	Project Ploughshares—hiring of two researchers	\$12,000.00
13.	Canadian Council for International Cooperation—travel to Conference on Disarmament and Development	\$500.00
14.	Group of 78—travel to Conference on Disarmament and Development	\$500.00
15.	Hans Sinn—travel to European Nuclear Disarmament conference	\$1,500.00
16.	Niagara Peace Movement—information booth	\$900.00
17.	Club des Relations Internationales—colloquium	\$1,000.00
18.	Clergy and Laity Concerned—cablevision broadcast	\$1,000.00
19.	World Without War Research and Education Network—organization, compiling and printing catalogue of audio visual material	\$2,500.00
20.	Quaker Peacemakers—Canada-USSR exchange	\$2,500.00
21.	McGill-ICASL—lecture series	\$6,000.00
22.	Defence Research and Education Limited—conference	\$5,000.00
23.	Strategic Studies Programme—University of Calgary—production of video	\$5,000.00
24.	Conference of Defence Associations—publication of seminar	\$3,000.00
25.	Albert Legault—translation of book	\$11,000.00
26.	Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—congress	\$10,000.00
27.	World Federalists of Canada—conference	\$2,000.00
28.	Group of 78—publication of conference proceedings	\$1,000.00
29.	CIIA—Markland Group workshop	\$2,000.00
30.	Clifford Brown—video project—Central America	\$250.00
31.	Project Ploughshares—UNSSOD III project	\$12,000.00
	TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$131,159.00

GRANTS:

1.	Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament—conference on chemical weapons	\$5,000.00
2.	United Nations Association in Canada—briefing papers on arms control and disarmament	\$8,000.00
3.	Institute and Centre of Air and Space Law McGill—purchase of publications	\$4,000.00
4.	World Disarmament Campaign—yearbook	\$25,000.00
5.	UNIDIR—annual contribution	\$25,000.00
6.	Group of 78—trip to UNSSOD III preparatory committee	\$500.00
7.	Voice of Women—conference on disarmament orientation	\$9,510.00
8.	Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament—conference on chemical weapons	\$10,000.00
	TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$87,010.00

TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS

\$218,169.00