





**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic  
Sciences  
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET  
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580  
(716) 872-4503



**CIHM/ICMH  
Microfiche  
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH  
Collection de  
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques



**© 1981**

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers/  
Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged/  
Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated/  
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing/  
Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps/  
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/  
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations/  
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material/  
Relié avec d'autres documents
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/  
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intérieure
- Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/  
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments:  
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages/  
Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged/  
Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated/  
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/  
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached/  
Pages détachées
- Showthrough/  
Transparence
- Quality of print varies/  
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material/  
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Only edition available/  
Seule édition disponible
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/  
Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/  
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



Library of the Public  
Archives of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol  $\rightarrow$  (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol  $\nabla$  (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

La bibliothèque des Archives  
publiques du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole  $\rightarrow$  signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole  $\nabla$  signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

rails  
du  
odifier  
une  
nage

rrata

elure,  
à

TH

**A LETTER**

TO

**THE ELECTORS OF NOVA SCOTIA,**

BEING

**A REPLY**

TO

*“Confederation considered on its merits.”*

BY AN ACADIAN.

HALIFAX, N. S.:  
PUBLISHED BY R. T. MUIR.  
1867.

A  
a p  
are  
erec  
tion  
show  
dow  
in C  
emp  
Com  
at t  
The  
of t  
ject  
hap  
they  
let  
as a  
the  
gist  
an a

W  
to e  
bers  
out  
out  
—w  
brill  
ing  
und  
Arc  
new  
vict  
—a  
to u  
A

Tup  
decl

## TO THE ELECTORS OF NOVA SCOTIA.

---

A FEW Canadian emissaries are busily engaged in distributing a pamphlet entitled "Confederation considered on its merits," and are endeavoring to make us all believe that the author has discovered a new and better argument in favor of Canadian Confederation than has yet made its appearance. I am glad that they have shown by their actions, and their great zeal in proselytizing that down to the appearance of that pamphlet, they did not really believe in Confederation, although you will remember that the half dozen employees or pamphlet distributors were just as willing to cry out for Confederation before they saw this pamphlet as they now are. Yet at that time they believed in Doctor Tupper. They said as he said. They believed as he believed. They cared nothing for the merits of the question: they simply knew that Tupper supported the project and that was quite sufficient argument for them. It was a happy change when, instead of producing Tupper as an authority, they could pull from their pockets and quote an anonymous pamphlet as authority for despoiling you of your constitutional rights,—as authority for denying you the privilege of being consulted as to the disposition of your revenues and property, and as the apologist of Tupper and Archibald in voting this Province into being an appanage of Canada.

While a few shop-keepers are retailing extracts of this pamphlet to every person who has patience to listen to them,—while members of the Legislature are distributing them in sheaves throughout Nova Scotia,—while shoddy politicians wax eloquent in dealing out brilliant passages of "Confederation considered on its merits,"—while fossil pensioners are announcing readings of this new and brilliant page of Confederation literature, and when all the crawling race who believe they have neither brains nor intelligence to understand the question, but rest satisfied with what Tupper and Archibald say to them, are in a state of wild excitement over a new sensation Confederation novel,—let us see if they are not the victims of a wild delusion,—the creatures of a frenzied excitement,—and the ready victims of a mad scheme, startling and ruinous to us all.

And while engaged in the discussion you will bear in mind that Tupper and Archibald, with a majority of the Legislature, declared in England—in Nova Scotia—through the press and on the



platform, that the electors of this Province were too ignorant to understand this question—that they had no right to be consulted, and that they should bow in submission to the *fiat* of Mr. Tupper.

In New Brunswick two elections have been run on the question in two years, and yet in Nova Scotia we have been denied the right—our inalienable right—to pass upon the measure at the polls. Was there no other argument against the whole scheme the people should indignantly protest against the measure upon this ground, and show to the world that they understand their rights and know how to resent so grievous an insult to their intelligence and independence. It would be a fair and legitimate rejoinder to every advocate of Confederation from “Prime Minister” Tupper down to your penny half-penny shop keeper to say—that there must be something weak and rotten in the scheme—something in it unfair and ruinous to the people at large—something inimical to the well being and future of Nova Scotia—or else the “Prime Minister” Tupper, aided and abetted by Adams Archibald and a packed majority of the Nova Scotia Legislature, would not be afraid to discuss this matter fully and freely with the people of this Country, and after such discussion invite the people to express an intelligent opinion upon its merits at the polls. This we all know they have despotically refused. We know they have paid no attention to the petitions of the people—they have treated them with scorn and contempt, and by their false representations have succeeded in preventing the petitions signed by nearly forty thousand Nova Scotians from being respected in the Parliament of Great Britain. This is a great fact, and in itself an argument against everything advanced in favor of this peculiar kind of union.

You will very naturally say, if this union is for the benefit of Nova Scotia, why should Mr. Tupper refuse to let the people judge of its merits? why reject all their petitions? and why bring the influence of the Lieutenant Governor and Council of Nova Scotia to bear to cause the rejection of our petitions by the Parliament of Great Britain.

Mr. Tilley in New Brunswick allowed the people there to give their opinion at the polls. Why did Mr. Tupper refuse the same privilege to the people of Nova Scotia? This is now the great question between Mr. Tupper and the people of this Province.

I should be quite content to leave the matter here, and insist that Nova Scotians should not condescend to argue with either Mr. Tupper or any of his staff of pamphleteers until he recognised the right of the electors to judge of the merits of the argument by an expression at the polls; but I will not leave the pamphleteers even the small consolation of thinking that irrespective of the rights of the people this scheme of Confederation has anything to recommend

itself to the favorable consideration of the people of Nova Scotia.

It will be necessary to consider the country proposed to be united. Of what does it consist? New Brunswick, to the north of us, contains nearly 29,000 square miles of territory—nearly 18,000,000 acres—of which, according to statistics, 200,000 acres are under cultivation, leaving 17,000,000 acres yet to be cultivated and peopled. A large portion of this territory is covered with dense forests, which yield immense quantities of timber, which of course find no market in Canada, but are shipped to England.

In Canada we find commencing with the valley of the Saguenay river, and ending with the vast tract of wilderness extending north-west from Quebec, nearly 150,000 square miles of territory—one vast forest—a great howling wilderness.

Turning to British America next we find over 500,000 square miles of territory, or nearly 350,000,000 acres of land, the greater portion of which is still covered with the forest primeval. This vast extent of wilderness covers the whole of Central British America, the valleys of the Frazer and Thompson rivers—the Athabasca districts, British Columbia and Vancouver's Island. Such is the country proposed to be consolidated and raised to the dignity of a new nationality—which is to be a rival of the United States of America, and which is soon to take upon itself the burthens and responsibilities of a separate existence, free from and independent of Great Britain. Such is the country—such the forest—such the wild, desolate tract extending over half a continent, which Mr. Tupper has proposed to unite under one government, which he has laid your revenues under contribution to protect, and to defend which, he claims to take the bone and strength of Nova Scotia, the Militia of this country, and march them off to the shores of the Pacific, through thousands of miles of wilderness, to uphold the honor and glory of the new flag that is to be the grand herald of the departure of British troops from this continent, and of the withdrawal of British protection from our Atlantic Provinces.

“Union is strength” says the anonymous pamphleteer, as he discourses of Canadian annexation. How beautifully will the truth of this axiom be exhibited, when this country is called upon to defend British Columbia, away back on the Pacific coast—when a vast wilderness, which would bridge the Atlantic, has to be penetrated—where not a road is blazed, nor an inhabitant exists. Union is strength, when the vast barrier of mountains, rivers and wilderness proclaims its weakness, when not one inhabitant exists, nor a log fort frowns defiance at the wild beast or the prowling Indian. Union is strength, when miles of forest intervene between one inhabitant and the other. Union is strength, is it? How long will this axiom hold good in presence of a mighty military power, whose

boundaries are formed by so-called British territory, from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Union is strength, is it? Suppose the United States to-morrow were to seize upon British Columbia? We can fancy some unfortunate resident of that country crying out "Union is strength. A paper constitution has designated us a grand nationality. Where, O where, are the brave warriors and sailors, who dwell away beyond on the Atlantic coast."

"Union is strength," says the pamphlet, and to prove this assertion we are told that "two thousand years ago, Cæsar found England parcelled out among a multitude of petty chiefs and kings, whose strength was wasted in internal dissensions. The Saxon Heptarchy was a step forward; and the annexation of Wales another; and the union of the crowns of England and Scotland, what gave Britain a first place among the nations." How the writer intended to have these remarks apply, does not very clearly appear. When the Canadians, two years ago, set in motion the machinery to annex these Provinces, they did not find the Maritime Provinces parcelled out among a multitude of petty chiefs and kings—our strength was not wasted in internal dissensions.

Wales was conquered and reduced under Edward the First. It was only known to England by incursion and invasion. Within itself there was chronic disorder, contentions, strife and bloodshed, keeping the frontier of England in perpetual alarm. But we have no Wales in British America. England and Scotland united after centuries of bloody and barbarous warfare. They united to save harrassing and cruel wars. They united to save fighting about rival kings and royal supremacy.

We in British America have no rival kings—we have no wars, one Province with the other. We are not called upon to unite for any of the reasons which led to the Saxon Heptarchy, to the annexation of Wales—to the union of the crowns of England and Scotland. The arguments drawn from the page of history, from the time of Cæsar to the union of England and Scotland, to prove the necessity for a union of the Colonies of British America, have therefore no application—are unworthy of serious consideration, and shew the sandy foundation upon which the Canadian annexationists stand, whenever they attempt to draw a parallel between their scheme of union and all great unions from the time of the Heptarchy down to the present.

Now, it is very plain that a union of the Colonies was not necessary to avoid any of the fearful ills which led to the union of England and Scotland; it was not necessary to put an end to bloodshed and war; it was not necessary to prevent border wars between the people of Canada and the inhabitants of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Why, then, did Canada seek this union? Why

did her statesmen pray for this Confederation? And what has Canada to give us that we do not now enjoy?

I have already shown that there was nothing in our social or political relations to render union an absolute necessity. Canada has her own representative government—New Brunswick the same, and Nova Scotia was flourishing and happy under her free institutions. We had no enemies at home or abroad. We had no wars—we were rapidly advancing in trade, agriculture and commerce—our revenues were full—our ships were found in every sea, and our mines were being rapidly developed. Peace, prosperity and contentment reigned in our midst. The flag of England was our protection and our own people were ever ready to defend themselves.

We did not ask for any alteration in our system of Government. We did not ask for a union with Canada. England did not ask us to be governed by Canada.

Why then did Canada press this union upon us? For whose advantage was she seeking when urging in hot haste this unfair and one-sided union?

Ever since the union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1842 that country has presented a strange and often very anomalous aspect to the world. Sect has been arrayed against sect—creed against creed—a war of races, bitter antagonism, and lamentable bickerings have marked its twenty-five years of union. That union was brought into existence by unfair and unjustifiable means. The Province of Lower Canada was never consulted in the matter. While the Upper Canadians approved of the measure the Lower Canadians were in open hostility to it. Protests were sent to the House of Commons. Forty thousand signatures of the inhabitants were appended to petitions to the British Legislature against the measure. But it was of no avail. The bill passed almost without a discussion.

From that hour to the present what has been the political history of Canada? In what way has that Union proved the truth of the axiom that "Union is strength?" On the contrary, did it not result in rendering that country so distracted, so utterly unable to carry on representative government, that dead locks became the rule in their legislation, changes of government occurred about once in every fifteen months, and the whole country became involved in such strife and confusion, that the Canadian Government in 1858, in a despatch to the Home Government, confessed that representative government was with them a failure—that they could no longer work their Union, and that the only way of ridding themselves of their difficulty was to secure control of the Maritime Provinces. They there suggest the necessity of a Federal Government for all the Colonies.

The application was promptly rejected at that time by the British Government, and since that date (1858) they have gone on fighting and wrangling until at last the favorable opportunity offers for them to seize hold upon the Maritime Provinces and drag them into a Union for no other reason than to assist the Canadians, as make weights, in their government.

Why is it then that the author of "Confederation considered on its merits," instead of dealing so largely in fiction, has not given the plain facts in connection with this Confederation movement? Why does he put out of sight the history of Canada while he enters upon the field of prophecy and fortells what is to happen when Canadians shall give laws to our country,—when they shall rule from Lake Superior to the Atlantic.

We in Nova Scotia have never been cursed with dead locks, with double majorities, with a war of races and creeds; and we have protested against being dragged into the strife because the Canadians cannot govern themselves. That protest has been emphatic and should have received the attention of our own Legislature and the government of England. It has not been so received and upon the shoulders of others must rest the responsibility of subsequent results.

The writer under review gives us the position and assumes the wants of Nova Scotia. He imagines in the next place "a difficulty," and then proceeds to point out an imaginary remedy for his imaginary difficulty. His whole argument may be condensed into a few words.

Nova Scotia, he says, is a British Province, (a valuable piece of information) and that it abounds in mineral wealth and that it has an extensive line of sea-coast, besides other valuable resources, and he condescends to acknowledge that considered practically "we might be called a prosperous people." "Our manufactures are few and on a stunted scale, that openings for young men and women are rare, and that many of them have to go abroad to seek a livelihood," and then states "these are facts which every eye can see that chooses to look for them, and if we retain our present political isolation they will continue to be facts in spite of us."

The remedy suggested is "the union of the Colonies under the new dominion Act."—the domination of Canada,—the annexation of Nova Scotia to a country hundreds of miles away from us,—to a country that has not a pound of capital to spare us,—that has not an inhabitant to give us.

The question is asked—"What has hitherto prevented the full development of Nova Scotian resources and the growth of manufactures?" and the answer given is—everybody will at once answer—"The want of capital and the want of a market." Hav-

ing proposed the question and given the answer, it would have been fair for the writer to have informed us *who is to supply the capital?* It wont for a moment be pretended that Canada has any capital to part with, or if she has, that she has not use enough for it at home. If Canada then has no capital, Confederation will be of no advantage to us in that respect. We are well aware that "capital will purchase skill," but that is a poor argument in favor of a Confederation, that I shall presently show, takes from us our revenues, that places a high protective tariff around our shores, and that is seeking to drive us into a trade with a country with which we have, and can have, but little social or commercial intercourse.

The reference to the State of Massachusetts is simply absurd. That State has had her manufactories fostered under a protective, hot house, system. She has had a market among 30,000,000 on her own side, besides the markets of British America, the West Indies, South America, and elsewhere. While building up Massachusetts the Americans were pulling down the Southern States—laying the train that has eventuated in building up the large national debt of the United States—caused millions to be slaughtered in battle, and devastated the fair fields of the South from the Potomac to Florida. A protective system is what Canada is looking after. She is eagerly seeking to drive us up the St. Lawrence to buy her manufactures, while she will endeavor to exclude from the markets of British America everything that can possibly compete with her, In this way the people of the Maritime Provinces are to be benefitted under Confederation. And, after all, what advantage will it be to us? If we can build a ship, send it to the markets of England, and bring back its value in the wares and merchandize of that country, cheaper than any skill or capital could produce the same articles here, why give up shipbuilding, in which we can compete with the world, and establish other factories in which we cannot compete with any one beyond our own doors? Confederation, then, while it will give us free trade with four millions—while it will enable the Canadians to rule the whole Dominion—will virtually shut us out from the markets of the world.

Why preach of "isolation" when the policy under Confederation will be isolation from the mother country—isolation from other nationalities—in fact a Chinese policy of legislating, forcing us to look upon the great forests of Canada as the true representatives of wealth, intelligence, refinement, skill, capital and labor.

With our present low tariff, with the sea before and around us, with the vast resources we have at our command so long as we remain unchecked and uncontrolled by the cupidity of another colony, Nova Scotia might look forward to years of happy prosper-

ity. But the absurdity of legislating for us in Canada in order to advance our interests; in order to build up a grand nationality; in order to develop manufactures; in order to bring in a flood of prosperity, the like of which the world never saw, may be seen at a glance. If Canada had any capital or surplus population to spare, the case might be different, but we all know that Canada is now owned by English bankers.

A tabular statement of a few items of expenditure which has caused Canada to resort to high tariffs—may not be uninteresting.

1. Grand Trunk Railway.....	\$15,312,894
2. Great Western Railway.....	2,810,500
3. St. Lawrence Canal.....	7,000,000
4. The Welland Canal.....	7,500,000
5. Chankly Canal.....	433,800
6. Lake St Peter's improvements.....	1,098,225
7. Harbors and Lighthouses on the St. Lawrence and the Lakes.....	2,550,000
8. Northern Railway connecting Huron with Lake Ontario..	2,311,666
9. Interest on Railway debentures.....	9,642,025

The whole debt of Canada as arranged at the Quebec conference, was £65,000,000 which has now become a charge, not only upon Canada, but upon the people of Nova Scotia. I know this fact is carefully avoided and sometimes denied, but the first clause in the new Dominion bill settles this point. Under the head of "Powers of Parliament" we find.

1. The public debt and property.
2. The regulation of trade and commerce.
3. The raising of money by any mode or system of taxation.
4. The borrowing of money on the public credit.

Here we find the whole resources, tariffs, credit, and everything available as security, placed in the irrevocable keeping of the general government. The resources and wealth of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, are by this enactment laid under contribution. To the general government is confided unlimited powers of taxation, and just in proportion as the necessities of Canada increase, so will fresh contributions be drawn from the industrial resources of Nova Scotia. Every cent of our revenue, in the first place, goes to the general government, and it will not be the fault of that government if they do not make our head money of 80 cents cost us double that amount.

Talk of manufactories, of our iron, our coal, our gold, our ships, our ail. Why the very creation of this "New Dominion" is a standing menace against every attempt to benefit our position, to

develop our resources, or to embark in any enterprize which might have a tendency to promote our best interests.

The case of Belgium, I think has been rather unfortunately alluded to.

Belgium and Holland were united in 1815. The laws of the new kingdom were assimilated somewhat to those of Great Britain, but from the first it was evident that there was a want of common feeling between the Dutch and Belgians. *Taxation, which largely increased under the union*, was a constant theme among the Belgians, and as they had been forced into that union against their consent, trouble and dissension grew out of the connection, and a reciprocal aversion of the Northern and Southern people was exhibited amongst all classes in the State.

Rebellion subsequently broke out, the Union was broken up, and Belgium declared herself a free and independent State. Again proving that union is sometimes the very reverse of strength.—Belgium was forced into a union against her wishes. She had to resort to arms to regain her independence, and after she had regained it there was seen that "isolation," as understood by Canadians, was her salvation.

If Belgium has made the rapid strides which our author says it has, laboring under the disadvantage of being "a small country,"—little larger than Nova Scotia, if she has in a state of "isolation" done that which under a Union with Holland she could not have done, what becomes of the pages of beautiful similes to prove that "Union is strength," and that isolation is weakness?

#### CANADIAN TARIFF.

I have under my hand a rather more reliable authority than the author of "Confederation merits" on the "Canadian tariff." By that authority I find that the Canadian tariff of 1849 on spirits, wines, tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, molasses, spices, &c., were charged with duties, partly specific and partly *ad valorem*, which were gradually made exclusively specific. In 1859 this was changed, and *ad valorem* duties, ranging from *thirty to one hundred per cent*, and averaging *forty per cent*, were adopted and mostly prevail at this time, although additional specific duties have been imposed since 1852.

The average percentage on good paying duty by Canadian tariffs was 13 per cent. in 1854, 19 per cent. in 1859, and during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, it was 23.3 per cent. The same authority gives the public debt of Canada in 1864, not at \$65,000,000, but at \$76,233,061, which will be found, in all probability, the true statement of Canadian liability.

Now, what has Canada to offer us in exchange for our present



position? We collect our revenue under a low tariff—Canada under a tariff averaging 22.3 per cent. Our revenues meet our requirements. In Canada they have an annually recurring deficiency. What has Canada, then, to offer us in exchange for our revenues? We have shown that she has no capital, no men, nothing that can in any way, at present, aid us in building up our Province. Without capital and labor, what can be done? Has Canada either the one or the other to offer us? Look at the matter as any three practical men would look upon a proposed partnership, and what would be the answer? Why, that the whole arrangement is an idle day-dream—a visionary project—destined to wreck and ruin the future growth and expansion of our country. And yet our author writes gaily of “The Benefits to be Realized,” and says that the “oneness of the Confederacy will direct skill and capital to the most available points,” a broad assertion, without a particle of evidence to sustain it.

Where is the capital to come from? What is to cause such a wonderful change? In what way can a mere paper constitution make such miraculous results without the ordinary appliances of capital, labor and machinery. Why not offer some proofs rather more in point than the case of Massachusetts or Belgium?

The author of “Confederation on its merits” seems to deny the fact that the debt of Canada is entirely unproductive, and refers to her railways as paying a dividend of three per cent. on the capital. Even if this were true it proves nothing in favor of Confederation. The rates charged upon Canadian lines are *fifty per cent.* higher than those on leading United States lines. To quote from a late writer—“At present a respectable woman in Montreal cannot pass her Christmas with relatives or friends in Toronto short of an outlay of twenty dollars. The fatigue of a sixteen hours’ journey, and the risk of a broken rail (and neck) are such as to require decided temptations to travel.”

But why pass over the canals which our revenues are now liable to pay for? No less a sum than \$19,000,000. Are these productive? Do they pay anything to the general revenues of the country? The interest has to be met, and we in Nova Scotia have to submit to be taxed for their payment and upholding. Why then did not this writer who had the material at his command exhibit a fair and impartial statement to the people of this country? The reason is obvious. He was dealing in fiction. He was afraid of the truth, and so avoided the issue.

But then we are told that Union is going to do wonders for the farmers. Is it? Let us see. I have already shewn that under Union we have to share in a debt of \$76,233,061, not a cent of which has been expended on our soil, in the contracting of which

we had no part, and as a matter of right, should not be called upon in any way to provide for either in whole or in part. The first boon to the farmers of Nova Scotia is to lay their farms under a mortgage to Canada for their respective shares in this debt of Canada, amounting to over seventy-six millions of dollars. Upon our consenting to help Canada pay this enormous amount—giving her the right and full power to fix our tariffs and regulate our taxation, Canada very graciously offers to assist us in paying \$8,000,000. There is a clear balance against us in this transaction of over \$68,000,000. And yet this writer says “that Union is going to do something great for our farmers.”

With “Union the port of Halifax would be the rival of Montreal.” Montreal is a city containing over 100,000 inhabitants. Halifax about 30,000. The former has got to wait a half century at all events before they can realize this great promise, but in the meantime they have to share in the debts of Canada, have to assist in paying for her Canals, have to be taxed for her Railroads, for her great internal improvements—and will have the satisfaction of seeing the produce of Canada driving out their own products. Already they are being taxed for the article of Flour. This is to force us to buy flour away up in the backwoods of that Province, instead of at Boston or New York, where our natural market lies.

This view of Union will not be very encouraging to the farmers of Nova Scotia, who have been singled out by our confederation author for special reference.

The Fisherinen next receive a complimentary notice. “The only thing that will save them and make them independent will be a market at home.” If this remark has not long since set every fisherman from South to North laughing we very much mistake their intelligence. They could send their fish last year as free and unrestricted as they can under confederation. How, then, is this Union to benefit the fisherman? It affords him no protection, while it will enhance the price of the necessaries of life. It will bring them no greater price for their fish, while it will tax the very bread they require,—their Sugar, Molasses, Tea, and absolute essentials will all be laid under contribution to fill up the treasury of this great Confederation—that will give us 80 cents per head of our own money—that will assist us in paying \$8,000,000 by our assenting to assist them in paying over \$76,000,000.

Surely the farmers and fishermen have great cause to rejoice in view of the wonders of Confederation.

At page 27 our author gives us a summary of the revenue, showing how it is to be apportioned, and how much of it is available to the general and local governments.

To show how utterly unreliable are his facts, figures, similes,

and precedents, I shall here give a review of this part of his pamphlet from a leading Halifax journal :

“The total resources, on the scale of last year, are \$479,000, including the increased grant of \$60,000, and the total expenditure is \$465,090, leaving, the author triumphantly adds, \$14,000 for contingencies. On comparing this statement of expenditure with that of the Financial Secretary, it will be observed that the author of the pamphlet has wilfully understated the amount granted last year for roads and bridges, and at the same time has not taken any account of the large sums expended on the Asylum for the Insane, &c., in excess of the grants. According to him, the estimated expenditure for roads and bridges is \$160,000, whereas the amount actually voted and expended was \$274,000, or only \$114,000 more. If this sum alone, leaving all others out of view, be added to the \$465,090, it makes the amount expended for local purposes last year \$579,090, to meet which we are to receive \$479,000, showing a deficiency of over \$100,000. True it is that this \$114,000 was for special purposes; but every year there are special services to be undertaken, and new requirements springing up, for which our increasing revenues enables us amply to provide. Thus this \$100,000 was paid out of the revenues of last year, without the imposition of any new tax, and we still had a considerable sum to apply to other special purposes. But if Confederation had taken place a year ago, the improvements represented by this \$100,000 could not have been made, unless the amount had been raised by direct taxation. Our revenues last year were sufficient to meet this expenditure, whereas if we had been Confederated, it would have been absorbed by Canada. This one fact alone most clearly demonstrated the injustice to which we shall be subjected if this scheme of Union is ever consummated, and proves that we must either refrain from all new improvements, or resort to direct taxation, in addition to our other increased taxation, to carry them on.”

I think this disposes pretty effectually of the farmers, fishermen, and distribution of revenue.

#### STRENGTH AND RESOURCES OF THE CONFEDERACY.

By this expression I understand the pamphlet to mean our ability and strength to take upon ourselves the responsibility of our own defence—to set up a separate existence—to become the rival of the United States, or, as Dr. Tupper put it, the “enemy of the United States.”

Already we have a debt to pay, upon starting, of over Ninety-one millions of Dollars—a debt now fastened, by an act of Parlia-

ment, upon the resources and industry of this country—a debt out of which we contracted but \$8,000,000, leaving the enormous sum of \$83,233,000 against us which we have been no parties in contracting. These startling facts take the romance out of the beautiful picture of Confederation. Add to the \$91,233,000 for the building of the Intercolonial Railroad, for the benefit of Canada, and we have at starting, even before the scheme can be put in operation, a national debt of more than \$106,000,000.

Then we have half a continent without a ship of war or a gunboat in a harbor or lake, without a regular soldier at our disposal, or the means to pay for any.

Should our young nationality be called upon to defend itself—to place gun boats on the Canadian lakes—ships of war in the St. Lawrence—war vessels in the harbors of Halifax and Saint John, and in the Bay of Passamaquoddy—with gun boats up the Saint Croix; should we have to tax the bone and sinew of “our young nationality” to form an army for the protection of this great forest country—to stretch them away along the American frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific—to lay a levy upon our mercantile marine, or draw from their employment the hardy fishermen who are toiling for a livelihood, and where every head is to be taxed to build up a province like Canada—under such circumstances, what would the “strength and resources of the confederacy” amount to.

Suppose a war to break out with the United States, is any man mad enough to think that we could cope with them. That our sparsely populated districts could contend with the well drilled army and navy of that great military and naval power. Whoever thinks so, let him turn his attention to the war between the North and South. There we had the spectacle of the Southern States, combining their wealth, capital, skill, men, and everything they possessed, to overthrow the government of the United States, and establish a “new nationality.” They spent millions of treasure, they sacrificed hecatombs of their bravest sons and failed. The power of the North was too much for them. And yet we are asked to believe that we could defend ourselves against the whole powers of the United States, embracing North and South. The absurdity of the idea can be seen at a glance.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that we in British America are unfit as yet for national life; we have not the materials at command in wealth and population to undertake so rash an experiment.

The enormous debt we shall have upon us at starting should have retarded the growth of this new nationality idea, as it is plain that the contemplated future of this “New Dominion” can never be realized so long as the great country stretching away

from New Brunswick to the shores of Lake Superior is comparatively a forest.

The absurdity of the "isolation" argument, as put in this pamphlet cannot be better shewn than by referring to Great Britain. She has no connection with the great back country of Europe. She stands alone, with the sea washing her boundaries. Yet England is not isolated because she owns a vast portion of the globe. Nova Scotia cannot be "isolated" as long as she dwells beneath the shadow of the British Crown. Isolation arguments will only be applicable when we are dragged from beneath the protecting wing of the Mother Country, and made to look to the forests of Canada for protection instead of to Great Britain.

Such then is a fair view of what Confederation will do for us. It is the creature of Canadian faction. It was conceived in the womb of Canadian necessities. It will paralyze our industry and cramp our resources. It loads us with a heavy debt for which we never can nor will receive any benefit. It places the power of taxation in a government 800 miles away from us. It destroys our self-government; breaks down our institutions; seizes upon our revenues, and renders us liable at any moment to be dragged into a separate existence and finally swallowed up by the United States. These are the true merits of Confederation. These are the reasons why in Nova Scotia Mr. Tupper has been afraid to discuss the question fully and freely, and then take the opinion of the people at the polls. It is for the people of Nova Scotia then, by all lawful ways and means, to break down a constitution reared in defiance of their wishes, inimical to their interests, that shatters their independence, and that, if unchecked, will speedily sweep them into a separate existence, rendering them indeed isolate and defenceless.

para-

pam-  
ritain.  
urope.  
Eng-  
of the  
dwells  
ments  
th the  
to the

or us.  
in the  
y and  
ch we  
power  
estroys  
s upon  
ragged  
y the  
ration.  
s been  
ke the  
Nova  
consti-  
terests,  
d, will  
g them

