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The Volunteer Review

AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

VOL. VIII.

OTTAWA, (CANADA,) TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1874.

No. 18.

NEWS OF THE WEEK.

On Tuesday morning, the 28th, a destructive fire broke out, between Clarence and York Streets, Ottawa, destroying property to the amount of \$100,000. It is supposed to be the work of an incendiary. And on Thursday 30th another fire occurred on Biddy Street which destroyed three tenants valued at \$4,000. The wind was very high at the time, but fortunately the building was a detached one, for had it occurred in a thickly inhabited portion of the city, it would have been impossible to have stopped its progress.

The 6th Brigade Division, Rifle Association, at their annual meeting, held in Port Hope, on Wednesday, April 22nd, passed a resolution offering a prize of \$50 to any member of the Active Militia of the Division who will qualify himself for the Wimbledon Team of 1874, and compete with the team at Wimbledon. In the event of more than one being selected the prize will be divided between them.

The U.S. Congress has appropriated \$75,000 for Harbour of Refuge at Oswego. And has also appropriated \$360,000 and \$500,000 for the enlargement of the Erie and Champlain canals, respectively.

The inflationists yesterday tried to carry the Currency Bill over the President's veto, but failed.

Recorder Hackett, of New York, lately thus replied to a jury which had rendered a verdict of not guilty. "The court instructs you as to the law, not to your mere private opinion. I have the pleasure of informing you that this boy is a thief; that you have made a mistake in choosing to find him not guilty. Your sympathies are misplaced.

The New York *Manufacturer and Builder* says that a wealthy gentleman in New York has added a codicil to his will ordering that after his death his body shall be injected with petroleum, placed in a metallic coffin and then be deposited in one of the retorts of the Manhattan Gas Company's works. If afterwards no one wishes to inter his ashes they are to be delivered to the Central Park commissioners, to be used as fertilizing material on one of the flower beds near the music stand.

A despatch from Philadelphia, April 29th, says: This morning near Cresson, twelve miles west of Altoona, five raftsmen walking on the track towards Cresson were met by a freight train going east. They stepped on the other track, when the Pacific express, going west, struck them, killing four instantly and seriously injuring the fifth.

The Philadelphia *Poess* has heard of an enterprising citizen who has promised to build a ship capable of carrying ten thousand passengers in time for use at the international celebration, which is to combine a steam railway, a race course, theatre, shooting gallery, circus, and every imaginable modern attraction. He claims that his plan is complete, and has been approved by some of the ablest engineers. He proposes to moor it in the Delaware, and convey it at intervals to the different cities, ports and watering places of the continent. This monster machine will make about six miles an hour, and will be three or four times longer than the Great Eastern.

The west is noted for its admiration of the fair sex. An Iowa Justice of the Peace refused last week to fine a man arraigned before him for kissing a girl against her will. "Because," as he remarked, "the plaintiff is so temptingly pretty that nothing but the overwhelming sense of dignity, and the responsibility of its oath, has prevented the Court from kissing her itself.

Vasquez, the California bandit, whose head is worth fifteen thousand dollars in gold, recently paid poll tax on the precious article. He met the Assessor, Mike Madigan, on the highway in Los Angeles county, and rode along with him for a whole day, chatting good humouredly. On parting he handed over his poll tax, which has been officially returned as that of Tiburcio Vasquez.

At a great battle between the Dutch and Achenese on the 11th inst., the latter were defeated with great slaughter.

A Horse Guards order will shortly be issued expressing her Majesty's approval of the word "Ashantee" being borne on the colours and appointments of the 23rd Fusiliers, 42nd Highlanders, Rifle Brigade, and 1st and 2nd West India Regiments, in recognition of the services rendered by the corps during the late campaign.

The leaders of the Oxford Circuit have resolved to exclude Dr. Kenealy, of Tichborne fame, from the bar mess. As the Doctor did not go on circuit, this ostracism is more nominal than real.

Dr. Viale, the Pope's physician and one of his most intimate friends, has just died at Rome at the age of eighty nine.

The Irish public, says a Dublin correspondent, have acquiesced very readily in the decision of the Government against releasing the military Fenians. The journals which disapprove of the course the Government have taken to do so in rather a faint and insincere manner. Among the higher professional and mercantile community the

vigour which the refusal to comply with a memorial of so many members of Parliament displays, seems to be considered, a good omen in regard to Irish affairs.

The project of laying the dry Zuyderzee is coming into notice again. The cost is estimated at 150,000 florins, which will be amply recovered by the value of the land reclaimed. Twenty four gigantic machines will be required to accomplish the work.

The following "Memorandum" has appeared in the *London Gazette*: "Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to permit the 17th Hussars to bear on its standard The Elephant, with the word Assaye, as well as the word Niagara, as granted to the old 19th Light Dragoons."

Major General the Hon St. George Foley, C. B., has been appointed Governor of Guernsey *vice* Lieutenant General Frome whose period of staff service has expired. The appointment carries with it a salary of £1,500 a year, and is anything but a sinecure socially, as much entertainment is expected.

Official despatches this morning (Madrid, May 2.) announce that the Republican troops entered Bilbao. The Carlists retreated in great disorder. The news creates great excitement.

The latest news from the seat of war state that General Concha, with 20,000 men, has moved from the sea coast in the direction of Valmaseda, 22 miles south west of Bilbao, to strike the Carlists in the rear. Marshal Serrano, with an equal force, is to make a simultaneous attack on the insurgents from the front. The Carlists are reported strongly entrenched.

A Yokohama letter, of March 26th, confirms the previously reported loss of the French Steamship Company's Steamer *Nile*. She left Hong Kong on March 12th, and on the 20th became disabled, and was blown ashore on the coast of Idsa. It is believed she had about 150 persons on board, of whom only 4 were known to be saved. The vessel is a complete loss.

Information was received at Madrid on the 1st inst. of the defeat, in the Province of Tarragona, of a body of Carlists, 2,000 strong, by a force of national troops numbering only 900 men. The Republicans have lately defeated and dispersed several bands of Carlists in Arronga and Albacek.

A London despatch says the mails of the steamship *Amerique* have arrived, damaged by water. They were found in an abandoned boat, picked up in latitude 47° north longitude 7° west, by the bark *Assyria*, which arrived at Havre on the 27th April, from New Orleans.

THE LESSONS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

(Continued from page 195.)

It is not long ago since a very able lecture was given from this place by a very clever man, Mr. Vernon Harcourt, who rather laughed at military men for suggesting the extraordinary developments which should place this country in a situation to be invaded. But does not the history of those 100 days show that the military men were not so far wrong, and that the past, from which alone we can judge the future, points to the military rather than the civilian conclusion. It would be quite foreign to the scope of these remarks to do more than generally indicate how such an event could happen. But any one who looks at a map of the world, and sees the vast extent of country shaded red, or British territory, and thinks that the whole of that great empire has to be defended, may easily conceive how the absence of the English regular Army may throw the defence of the country on her Militia and Volunteers. We are told this is "impossible," but this would have been exactly the answer all Frenchmen would have made if, at the beginning of July, 1870, they had been told in fourteen weeks France must trust her honour, her safety, her position, and her wealth, to her untrained Mobile. I therefore say that such a contingency cannot be ignored, and that every Volunteer, every Militia officer, must remember that some day he may be called on to command his men in presence of veteran troops; and let him remember that the greatest glory, the most noble devotion, will not then compensate for lack of knowledge.

I have already said that there is a strong tendency, in every profession, to run in grooves—despite outside opinions, to consider that wisdom can be found nowhere but in a magic circle of a few experts. We all know how this feeling acts in producing trades unions, and we know how naturally this feeling is fostered by those unions. Now, in Prussia, I believe such feelings exist quite as much as they do in this country. But, in the Army, they are not to be found, because the fundamental principle of universal military service bends all the talent of the country to one object, directs all the intellect of the country to one aim. There can be no jealousy of a profession where all meet together on the one common standing ground of universal military service. And this is the great value of that institution.

In every profession there are a vast number of questions which can be best decided not by a knowledge of technicalities, but by a knowledge of details, but by common sense, guided by extensive general information, and a clear appreciation of what the object in view really is.

In many cases a man so endowed will give you a better opinion on the general bearings of a question than the mere expert. As an instance, I may quote the opinion expressed by Stephenson about the Suez Canal. Stephenson and all his family were railway engineers; they had succeeded the race of canal engineers, who, headed by Brindley, had made most of our inland navigation, and had impressed on the workman who excavates earth the name he now bears, "navy," from navigator. Stephenson's mind ran in a railway groove; all his life he had maintained the railway against the canal, and he could not appreciate the value of any other mode of communication. He failed to appreciate—great man, great engineer, as he most undoubtedly was—he failed to appreciate the value and feasibility of the Suez

Canal. A worse engineer, a man who knew less of railways, more of general questions, would have taken a different view. Such is very often the position of men who are experts.

In Europe there were many armies with great traditions and histories, great schools and colleges, where war, and all the sciences embraced in that word, were worthily taught and carefully studied. But, gentlemen, who first adopted the breech-loader? Was it the Austrian, the Russian, the Frenchman, or the mechanical Englishman? No; it was the Prussian, and he would have never done so were it not, as I have already said, that the Prussian Army contained all the talent of the country, was above prejudice, above tradition, above that precedent which does a wrong thing because it has been done before, but refuses to do right things because it has not been done before. Now here see one of the great advantages of the non-professional, irregular soldier. Look at what the military state of this country was fifteen years ago; look at it now. How many minds have been devoted to military subjects during those fifteen years, minds free from previous bias, minds, in short, which have brought general knowledge and information to bear on military subjects, have started theories and ideas, many absurd I grant you, but many containing valuable and useful matter, and the arguments, disputes, and conversations, that have followed the consideration of these theories, have compelled the people of this country to turn their attention to military matters. This is the great boon, the priceless boon that we owe to the Volunteer movement. And it is one that all military men acknowledge.

I have referred to Mr. Vernon Harcourt's lecture in this Institution; it is a good instance of what I mean. Would he have ever undertaken the task of proving invasion impossible if the Volunteers had not proved that the feeling of the country, with that common sense which usually distinguishes Englishmen, had not declared such a thing to be possible?

We must follow the lead of other Powers. All nations adopted rifled field artillery, because they largely helped France to conquer Austria. All nations adopted breech loaders, because they helped Prussia to conquer Denmark and Austria. And, eventually, we must come to universal military service, because other Powers have adopted that most formidable of all weapons.

When a future historian writes, he will say, that if Jena forced universal service on Prussia; if Sidowa compelled Austria to relax her barriers, arm, and trust her people; if Sedan, Metz, Paris, the loss of two Provinces, and 200 millions sterling, compelled France to place all her youth in the ranks of her Army, it was the Volunteer movement that gradually paved the way for a similar result in this country. Now, somebody may say to me, you are advocating what you have just deprecated, you are proposing to copy Prussia, and adopt her institutions which will not suit this country. But I am doing no such thing. Universal military service is neither Prussian, French, or Austrian, it is the first bond that links men together in societies, and what is more, universal, compulsory service for home defence, is the statute law of this country.

There is another point of view from which we learn much from the recent war. It has demonstrated the necessity of many auxiliary services in an army, services of the greatest value, yet those for which the fighting men must not be diminished.

These auxiliary services of the greatest importance; they are often overlooked. People are far too apt to suppose that war consists in a series of fights, but really for one day's fighting there are many of marching, when the safety of the Army may be compromised, not for want of courage, want of skill in fighting, but for want of information, want of food.

We all know the old fable of the lion going to war, accompanied by the camel, the ass, and the hare. Why take all these to war? said the fox. Because I want the camel to carry the plunder, the ass to trumpet, and the hare to run messages. Now the lion was not only a brave soldier, but he was a good organizer—he himself, as best qualified, did the fighting, while the others, each, according to his gifts, helped him.

Now we had a most excellent lecture in this Institution from my friend Colonel Wood, on the subject of Mounted Riflemen, which is precisely one of the auxiliary services I alluded to. I should be sorry to see one single regiment of mounted riflemen in our regular Army; for this reason. We have a House of Commons that give so much each year for the Army. If a regiment of mounted rifles be raised, it will be raised only by a reduction of the infantry or cavalry. The amount of money annually voted will only give a certain number of men. You can't get the money increased, and you can only get such a useful auxiliary as mounted riflemen by a reduction of other arms. And this system has been going on for some time. Special services and special corps have been added to the Army, but as they are expensive, too often the addition is made at the cost of the infantry and cavalry—the main stay of the whole machine.

These services are undoubtedly valuable. But we must be careful that the Army does not entirely dissolve itself into an army of special services. And I was very glad to hear Colonel Wood's proposal to convert yeomanry into mounted rifles, which would give a most valuable force, without touching our back-bone—the infantry.

When we remember that the recent war proves that 90 per cent. of the killed and wounded, are killed or wounded, not by artillery, not by bayonets or swords, but by rifle bullets, and that this same infantry loses 17 per cent. of its numbers in killed and wounded, the other branches, artillery, cavalry, and engineers, losing but 6 per cent. it makes one very chary of reducing the infantry by one man for any auxiliary service. Yet these services must exist, and forming them without reducing the regular army—which would be the case if Parliament were applied to—appears to offer an immense field to the valuable exertions of Volunteers and Yeomanry. Let us see how in the two countries, Prussia and France, these services were provided. All these services, such as telegraphs, post offices, *etappen*, railways, bearers of the sick, &c., are in Prussia provided for by volunteers from the Landwehr. In France, they were provided only by robbing the battalions of men, and reducing the number of men who could pull a trigger. Thus the French army corps never showed on parade anything like their proper strength; the Prussians invariably did. This is no trifling matter, but one of great and vital importance. Nothing is more curious than to look at the returns which show the employment of a large body of soldiers—the number on parade seems so small compared with the total force, yet go one by one through the employed men and the casualties, and

you cannot help it, the ranks are positively drained for administrative purposes. Now in this country we have Volunteer corps largely composed of Government officials, members of the Civil Service, post-office employés, dockyard and arsenal employés, not one of whom could in war be spared from his legitimate functions.

A country at war is not like a party of gentlemen out shooting. The actual fighting is but a tithe of the strain thrown on the whole State, war tries the weak points of a nation, searches out the flaws both in her civil and military departments. A country at war is like a ship in a heavy gale of wind, everything from keel to truck creaks, strains and labours. Government officials, from the highest to the lowest, could not be spared to fight in the ranks; their whole energies would be required in fields of higher importance.

I have pointed out how all the civil and military forces of France, after Sedan, gravitated to Paris, and were there shut up. Now the chief difficulty the French Government in the provinces, when it attempted to organize the Army, had to contend with, was the want of military officers, and the entire want of civil officers. There were no treasury officials, no war office officials, in fact, there was not one person who understood how the complicated wheels of a vast administration could be kept at work, how supplies were to be bought and furnished, for nearly all the arsenals were in the enemy's power.

We all have seen in the newspapers, accounts of the want of maps in France. Now there is a splendid survey in France, and most beautiful maps; of course the plates from which these maps are printed are most carefully preserved, as those of our own Ordnance Survey are at Southampton. But they were preserved in Paris, and when Paris was blockaded, these plates were all shut up too. Thus no maps could be got, until such stray sheets as existed in offices in the departments, could be photographed and copied; thus in the heat of war, the country had to form a great map establishment, and many of the sheets had even to be sent by balloon to Paris.

Hence the Government had to get officials where it could, had to seek them from amongst railway managers, manufacturers, and promote to higher grades and responsible positions men utterly untrustworthy; the result was that, partly from ignorance of the duties they had to perform, partly from other and worse causes, the contracts made for the unfortunate armies of irregular troops were costly to the country and destructive to the efficiency of the troops. Boots with pasteboard soles, shoddy cloths, cartridges that would not fit rifles, artillery that burst, were issued, and issued so late that bad as they were they were of little use. A country at war, less than at any other time, can afford to dispense with its trained confidential servants. As for our arsenal and dockyard corps, they would have to work night and day to produce, not to expend, warlike stores.

I often here it proposed to form the railway employés into corps of Volunteers; now this was done in France—able, powerful men, under a certain amount of discipline—it seemed as if these men, with their officers, were the finest material that soldiers could be made out of. But what was the result? We read in the pages of Jacquin, the manager of the great French Railway de l'Est, that this crippled the railways to such an extent, that the movement of the troops, the sending up of supplies, was so interfered

with, that the country lost far more than it gained. Accidents frequently happened, the stations being worked by old men, women, and boys. Hence under the new French law of recruiting, railway officials are specially exempted from being called on to fill up the ranks.

But there are certain branches of the State Administration that can largely help an army. I allude to the Post Office and Telegraph Service.

During the Autumn manoeuvres, we had many of the Post Office Volunteer corps doing in their uniform the legitimate proper work they should have done; such men are too valuable to put in the ranks to pull triggers. You may get others to do that, but you cannot get men to do their work at a moment's warning. I was particularly glad to see the Post Office corps working in this way, it is a step to utilizing the Civil Departments of the State for defence by work conjointly with the Army in their own proper sphere. If the Post Office corps had not done this work, sergeants of the regular Army would have had to do it, and you would have then had the regular sergeant doing Post Office work for which he was not trained, and the Post Office official doing soldier's work for which equally he was untrained—an interchange of duties which benefited neither, and would have injured the public service.

There is another duty for which I think Volunteers are admirably fitted, and which opens up a vast field for useful military action, both direct and indirect.

It is well known that nothing breaks up a battalion so much as taking wounded men to the rear; a shot comes in, a man is knocked over, at once three or four men pick him up to carry him off. If the fire is at all hot, these men often make an excuse not to come back again; thus each shot really deprive the battalion of not one but several rifles. It is impossible to prevent this, unless there be some means provided for removing the wounded. In Prussia this is done by special companies of volunteer Landwehr men, who are specially selected for the purpose, and who, to the number of about 500, are attached to each army corps; these men are usually men who have served eight or ten years, and are consequently about thirty years of age. It is their duty to go into action and remove the wounded; thus no man who is in the ranks is allowed to fall out on any pretext, but the wounded man is removed by the bearers, who, are combatant troops specially detailed for this duty.

This dangerous and not over pleasant duty is admirably performed, and contributes much to the steadiness of the Prussian troops.

In such services as these, where intelligence, courage, and skill are especially needed, and the action of which so much aids the fighting troops, there is a great scope for the beneficial action of irregular troops.

In the early stages of the recent war, when the French Army was entirely distinct from the French nation. It is astonishing to see how little aid and assistance it received from the people, and how much of its strength was frittered away in the performance of duty that in the Prussian Army was done by semi-civilian agency. We find with in ten miles of Metz, in a thickly peopled country, troops losing their way; and the same thing happened repeatedly. It appeared as if the French people were distinct from the army, and wished in the contest that was being waged, to be neutral.

On the Loire, when troops were away from

their own localities, they frequently not only met no assistance from the peasants, but the latter, to avoid incurring the anger of the Prussians, actually gave the latter more help than they did their own countryman. We read: "We were ordered to Brou. Several times on the way we fancied we saw Uhlans; we were mistaken; but the Uhlan is in the air, one has only to hear the peasants talk of them."

"When we reached Brou the chief magistrate informed our Major that the citizens had no intention of defending themselves. We found in the town hall £600 worth of bread secreted; our indignation knew no bounds; it was evident these stores were not intended for us, since French troops were neither expected nor desired in the town. We found out afterwards that 12 Uhlans were quietly at supper 500 yards off; in such cases the country people are very careful not to give the alarm, knowing that the enemy would return in force and burn down their houses."

We learn, therefore, from the recent war that, somehow or other, the Army in a country must be part of the nation must strike its roots deep down into the nation's heart; that it must be connected with the civil population of the country at every point; that the feeling, the hopes, the fears of the country must all strike similar chords in the Army.

That there must be some means of drawing on the talent, knowledge, and ability of the civil population; that there must be some means of getting enlisted for the defence of the country the peculiar technical knowledge which is so useful to the Army; that there must be some means of uniting the Army to the country; this, gentlemen, I conceive, is one of the peculiar functions, I would rather say the peculiar missions, of the auxiliary forces.

FIVE YEARS OF NAVAL ECONOMY.

(From the Broad Arrow, April 14.)

Five years have passed since the late Administration took in hand the reduction of the naval expenditure. We ought, therefore, to be in a position, now, to form some opinion of the result. Has the issue been disastrous or beneficial? has the reduction which has been accomplished been partial or thorough? and is the condition of the Service, for this, after all, is the chief point, better or worse than it was five years ago? These questions are worth discussing; and the answers, if given fairly and impartially, should help to clear up doubts which still exist, and must, even yet, arise, as to the effect of this reduction. To treat these questions from a party point of view, is a mistake. The care of the Navy is a national work; for an administration to do this work well is, simply, to be doing a plain and imperative duty; to do it badly, to neglect it to make it subservient to party purposes, is to court unpopularity, if not disgrace. Considering the amount of party spirit which has unfortunately, though, doubtless, unavoidably, arisen during the past five years in regard to naval topics, it is worthy of notice that the late First Lord, Mr. Goschen, has maintained and insisted on maintaining, with an almost unbroken uniformity, an impartial attitude on all naval questions. In endeavouring therefore, to ascertain what has been the practical result of the economy which has been effected during the past five years, it is desirable to refer, as far as possible, only to prominent facts, and leave those facts to speak for themselves.

The most prominent point, in regard to the Navy, which was selected for attack by the late administration, was its cost. In fact, the cost of the Navy may be said to lie at the root of every reform which it has carried out; for when Mr. Childers took office as First Lord of the Admiralty, it was under a pledge, most unequivocally given, to reduce the cost of the Service. Before, therefore, endeavouring to explain, in detail, to what extent this was effected, it will be well to understand what the adoption of this course involved. Regarded superficially, nothing could seem easier. An annual outlay of eleven millions sterling does, at first sight, seem monstrous and inexcusable, and, indeed, to openly invite attack. Surely a firm wrist and a cool head were the only requisites for reducing this sum by at least two millions sterling, and courage would seem a better qualification for the task than financial skill. But the more the reduction which has been effected is studied in detail, the more readily will the difficulties of the task be appreciated. It will be found that the details of each branch of expenditure had, evidently, been watched with an almost over-anxious, and, in some cases, no doubt mistaken cases, to produce the result which had been attained. There are few traces of any bold exploits in the path of economy, and it is certain that wherever any effort can be traced to effect what is pleasantly called "a bold reduction," the result is, almost invariably, a failure, ending in a return to the old paths.

A comparison of the Navy Estimates for 1868-69 with those for 1873-74 will give a fair idea of the extent to which the reduction of the annual cost of the Navy has been carried.

In 1868-69 the amount voted was £11,177,290
" 1873-74 9,872,725

Showing a reduction of £1,304,565

This is the net reduction shown by a comparison of the total amount of the Estimates for each year. But a further investigation will show that the effective service of the Navy, that is the cost of the *personnel matériel*, and administration, were effected to the extent of £1,617,580, the differences of £313,015 being the increased amount required in 1873, as compared with 1868, for half pay and pensions due to retirements which had been effected in the Service during the past five years. To go a step further, however, it will be necessary to analyse these figures more closely, to ascertain what they mean, and how far they represent a real reduction in Naval expenditure, and a *bona fide* relief to the British taxpayer. For nothing is more deceptive than a bare comparison of gross totals in the Estimates and accounts for the public Service. Being framed for other and more important purposes than mere comparison, a careful scrutiny is always necessary to avoid arriving at wrong conclusions. Upon analysing the above figures closely, one of the first things which will be found is that allowances must be made for certain adjustments between the two years; that is, for differences which are merely matters of account.

Thus, sums to the amount of £203,292 appear in the year 1868-69 for supplies to other departments of Government, which are not, in any way, part of the cost of the Navy, but are simply transfers from one department to another, permitted for the sake of convenience, and repaid, in course of time to the Exchequer. The estimated cost of these supplies is not shown in the Navy Estimates subsequent to 1868-69; and, there-

fore, for the purpose of a fair comparison, must be struck out altogether. And, if we further strike out, on both sides, the charge for the conveyance of troops for the War Department, which are only, in the most indirect way, a charge upon naval funds, the amount of the real, *bona fide* saving which has been effected will be reduced by the sum of £291,912, and represents a sum of £1,009,623. Thus, we consider, represents, then, fairly the actual *bona fide* reduction in the annual cost of the Navy which has been effected and which, for the sake of convenience, may be assessed at the sum of one million sterling. It will be necessary to enter considerably into detail to explain how this result has been arrived at and what it really means; but it is of such importance to understand fully the meaning of this reduction, and so essential to prevent the possibility of misrepresentation, that no apology is needed for the analysis we are about to give.

We will consider, first, how the three great branches, of Seamen, Shipbuilding, and the Dockyards, have been affected and have helped to account for this reduction. First, as regards men, the difference between the force maintained when the last Conservative Government left office and the present year is a reduction of 7000. This is accounted for by a reduction of 700 officers, who have retired from the Service under the retirement scheme of the late Government, 5200 seamen, including the old Coastguard force ashore and 1100 Marines and boys. The saving thus effected as shown by a comparison of the Estimates for two years, is no less than £550,000 for wages and food. But against this reduction a sum at least £250,000 has to be set off for increased retirement, making the net saving about £300,000. Next, in regard to shipbuilding, there is a striking difference which will account for another large slice of the total reduction. The number of ships which were found useless and sold during the past five years was 140; these have been replaced by only half that number; seventy-five having been added during the past five years, which are now either built or in progress. Here, then, it will be found upon comparison there is a clear enough saving of £297,662, against which there is nothing to set. But a little explanation is necessary to prevent a possible misunderstanding. In the first place, in the year 1868-69 a special effort was made to commence an exceptional number of ironclads to supply the admitted deficiencies of previous years. The vote for contract work was, therefore, exceptionally high in that year, and a comparison shows a difference of nearly half a million sterling in the vote for contract shipbuilding alone. Then a great change has been made in the stores at the dockyards, which are not kept in stock or purchased to such an extent as was formerly the case. Then, though there is a very large reduction in the cost of contract shipbuilding, there is a large increase on the vote for purchase of stores for shipbuilding and dockyard work, amounting to no less than £185,472. This is accounted for partly by the increased cost of naval stores, but chiefly by the exceptional energy which has been thrown during the past two years into wooden shipbuilding, and in dockyard work. In the vote for labour there is a reduction of about £50,000; so that the total net reduction for shipbuilding and repairing is at least £300,000. Lastly, the reduction in the dockyard, victualling establishments, and hospitals, amounts to £15,000. A large portion of this is due to the closing of Deptford and Woolwich Yards; but a large proportion is

also due to reduction in the establishments. Of this sum, no less than £42,000 is thus accounted for; while the reduction in labour accounts for £53,000, which has been effected by the dismissal of rather more than 2000 men. The rest of the difference is accounted for by a saving in the ordinary outlay upon those establishments in rents, gas, and other miscellaneous expenses. Against this reduction the increased cost of pensions to the extent of £50,000 must be taken into account, leaving a net reduction of £75,000. We find, therefore, under these three great heads, a net reduction in expenditure amounting to £675,000, as follows:—

1. Seamen	£300,000
2. Shipbuilding	300,000
3. Dockyards	75,000
	<hr/>
	675,000

Thus nearly three fourths of the annual reduction which has been accomplished is accounted for. The remaining fourth is composed of the following items:—In the purchase of victualling stores a saving of £80,000 has been effected; by the abolition of the Coastguard Office, and a reduction in the expense of maintaining the Coastguard and Reserve Forces, a sum of £65,000; in new works, through the gradual completion of the new docks at Chatham, £130,000; in miscellaneous service, 70,000*l.*, which is caused by the completion of an ironclad for Victoria, and diminished travelling expenses; and in legal and medical expenses, and the cost of the maintenance of the Royal Marine Divisions, 13,000*l.* These together amount to 358,000*l.*; and with the sum of 675,000*l.* which has already been accounted for, makes a total annual reduction of 1,033,000. From this, however, has to be deducted the sum of 23,000*l.* for scientific expenditure, being the only vote which shows an increase. This is chiefly due to the establishment of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. Allowing for the solitary item of increased expenditure, the net annual reduction is 1,010,000*l.*, or, for convenience, sake, a million sterling. It is worthy of notice that in the administration of the Navy there is no perceptible difference, the slight reduction caused by the reforms which created so much dissatisfaction, being balanced by the increased cost of pensions to officials who were thrust out of the Service.

The principal point, however, is the effect which this reduction has exercised upon the material condition of the Navy; and a few words are necessary to show the practical application of this reduction in money to the alterations which have been carried out in the past five years. In regard to our fleets, the squadrons abroad have been reduced, and large sales have been made of ships, formerly kept in reserve, but which on survey were pronounced worthless. This accounts to a great extent for the reduction in men. But only partly. For not only have reduced squadrons and reserves enabled a large reduction to be effected in officers and men, but two retirement schemes have helped to reduce the ranks of redundant officers; while, as regards men, Mr. Childers routed out, in a merciless way, from the home ports, men who had been in reserve for ten or fifteen years, and had never been to sea; and he also abolished the old Shore Coastguard force. Then, in regard to shipbuilding, the great destruction of old vessels considered useless, has diminished the annual cost for repairs considerably, while the number of ships added to the Navy during the past five years annually, is modest compared with the pro-

gramme carried out in 1868-69; and, in place of the fearfully extravagant cost of materials for the construction of men-of-war, any other policy except under very pressing circumstances would have been doubtful. In regard to the dockyards, we have now two less than in 1868-69, and consequently a diminished outlay; but in addition, large, and in some respects, questionable reductions have been effected in organisation, by which a considerable saving has been effected.

This, then, is the result of the past five years' work of reform upon the Navy. We have, it is true, a powerful Navy; but, as Mr. Goschen pointed out last year, it is a Navy which for the services it is called upon to perform, is conducted with an economy, leaving little hope for further reduction. It is hardly too much to say that the present administration, upon taking stock of the Navy, will be compelled to admit, while they may acknowledge its power and efficiency, that only the bare necessities compatible with the maintenance of efficiency have been provided for. To expect any further reduction, except by the costly process of carrying out some exceptionally radical scheme of reform, is simply hopeless, and it is an undoubted fact that for, at all events, some years to come, the nation must be content with a minimum naval expenditure of between nine and ten millions sterling. We have at least the satisfaction of knowing that a high standard of efficiency has been maintained, at as low a cost as possible, during the past five years; we can and do believe that the next five years will not see efficiency impaired or expenditure materially increased. The Estimates, at all events, amounting to more than ten millions sterling, for the year 1874-75, which are of Liberal construction, and must shortly be discussed, cannot well be subjected to any better criticism than that which has been applied to the naval expenditure of the past five years.

THE STATE OF THE NAVY.

Very little time has been lost by the naval critics in calling the attention of the new Government to the conditions of our naval resources. On Monday last the Earl of Lauderdale, impelled, as he said, by the statements of certain supporters of the late Government, indulged the House of Lords with dismal lucubration upon the state of the Navy. We discussed this question last week at some length, in commenting upon a letter which Lord Brasenon had written to the editor of the *Times*. but, at the risk of some repetition, we cannot pass by without remark the curious passage of arms between Lord Lauderdale and Lord Camperdown on Monday evening. It is difficult to say which was weaker, the attack or the defence. From Lord Lauderdale's speech we may reasonably conclude that nothing will satisfy him but a British Navy exceeding in numbers and power the combined navies of the world. He repeats what Lord Brasenon said as to the incapable condition of the majority of our sea-going ironclads, and points out, with some show of reason, that the ships built in the early days of armour plating are rendered useless by the enormous advance which has been made in the construction of naval ordnance. It is quite true that the *Warrior*, the *Black Prince*, the *Achilles*, and others of the earlier ironclads would be powerless against ships carrying twelve, eighteen, or twenty-five ton guns. It is also true, as Lord Lauderdale

remarks, that foreign Powers on both sides of the Atlantic have not been standing still, and that "we are now surrounded on all sides by ironclads. There are at present," his lordship adds, "229 either built or building for Foreign Powers, including Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Austria, Egypt, and Turkey, and looking over the water, we find that large numbers are building for Chili and Peru." All this is undoubtedly a fact, and would perhaps be a very alarming fact, if we were likely to engage in hostilities single-handed against the world. We are perfectly willing to concede that our chance of success in such an undertaking would be extremely improbable, but the argument which Lord Lauderdale uses, like most broad and general statements, cuts two ways. As a matter of fact, the arming of other nations is quite as likely to prove a source of strength to us as a source of weakness, for it is a position scarcely to be conceived that England would find herself in the midst of a struggle with many of these powerful European nations at the same time and not have upon her side some allies. When we consider how great a jealousy exists between many of the European Powers we may count almost with certainty upon the assistance of some of them if we should be drawn into war with others. Besides this there is a certain degree of unfairness in quoting against us these partial statistics; it will be observed, that Lord Lauderdale speaks on the one hand of our own sea-going ironclads, and eliminates from the list the old unseaworthy and *effete* ships, and makes no account in his estimate of our naval strength of the new ships which are not yet completed for sea, but in detailing, on the other hand, the navies of foreign Powers, he includes the ships building as well as those built, and appears to accept the names of every ship in a foreign Navy List as being always in a perfect state of efficiency. The *Warrior* is useless, but *La Gloire*, for aught we know to the contrary, may be one of 229 foreign sea-going ironclads which are Lord Lauderdale's bugbear. English ships, it would seem, are subjects to all kinds of diseases and disasters, engines, break down, and boilers wear out, and hulks become rotten, but it would appear that foreign vessels do not share these evils and dangers. We have no desire to cry, "Peace, peace, when there is no peace," nor are we amongst those who underrate the value and importance of maintaining every branch of the public Service in the utmost possible state of efficiency; but such exaggerated views and unsound arguments are not only misleading, but they are positively mischievous, as leading only to a host of utterly unpractical conclusions, and frightening the uninformed public into apathy or indifference. The reply which Lord Malmesbury gave was, of course, the only one which was possible for the representative of a Government only a month in office; he promised that the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty should be given to this question, and a report should be made soon after Easter upon the state of the Navy. He did not, however, pledge the Government to appoint the committee to inquire into the subject which Lord Lauderdale asked for. The speech which Lord Camperdown made on the part of the late Government, of course, partook of the nature of a defence of the policy which had actuated their administration of affairs.

We regret that we cannot very highly compliment his lordship upon his success in backing out of the difficulty. It was in

effect, that there were always a great many ordinary repairs to be effected at the dockyards of which Lord Lauderdale had taken no account; it was impossible that all our ships should always be in an efficient state of repair, and that the attention of the late Board of Admiralty had been engaged upon the question whether it was worth while to repair the older class of ironclad ships at a cost of 100,000*l.* and they thought that a smaller sum would be sufficient to patch them up for cruising in the Channel. The late First Lord had gone most carefully into the question of repairing some of the ironclads complained of, and formed a very exact estimate of the number of men that would be required to make good the defects, but it turned out that when the ships were docked, that all this care was thrown away and this accurate estimate was erroneous, and the number of men employed upon these repairs was too small. The *Black Prince*, the *Hector*, the *Minotaur*, the *Achilles*, and the *Valiant*, Lord Camperdown stated, were the ships which the late Board had determined upon repairing, but then the year 1873 was a heavy one on account of the Ashantee war, and Mr. Goschen did not think it desirable to ask for a special vote for these repairs which he had planned with such care. The best that Lord Camperdown seemed able to say about the matter was that the late Government said that these ships wanted repairing, and meant to do it but they would have had to spend more money than they liked. They had made an erroneous estimate, and they evidently hesitated to admit the error, but preferred to shelter themselves behind the Ashantee expedition.

All this, it must be admitted, is far from satisfactory, but we must await the report which the First Lord of the Admiralty is to make on the subject, before we condemn too strongly the course followed by Mr. Goschen's Board. If that report is not satisfactory to the country and to the Service, or if the late Government disputes its accuracy, it would be well that a thorough investigation should be made by some competent committee or royal commission into all the details of the question. It is a question about which there should be no trifling and no hesitation, still less should there be any acrimonious party quarrelling. While Liberals and Conservatives are bandying words about responsibilities, and hurling "*tu quoque*" reproaches at each other, ships are wearing out and boilers are decaying, and the naval force of this country is being weakened.—*Broad Arrow*, April 4th.

Two Russian guns and carriages, trophies of the Crimean war, have been received at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, having been returned from Colchester, where they have stood as public monuments for about seventeen years. It has been notified that several other trophies of similar character have been given up by local authorities to other towns, and that they will be sent by way to Woolwich, where they will be broken up.

Michael Banim, one of the joint authors of "The O'Hara Family," brother of John Banim, the author of the plays of "Damon and Pythias," "Croppy, a Tale of '98," &c., has been forced to retire from the Kilkenny Post Office, Ireland, on account of old age, being seventy-eight years old, on a pension of 4*l.* 7*s.* 4*d.* with which he must support a blind wife and two daughters. A subscription has been started for his relief,

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VOLUNTEER REVIEW
AND
MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

“Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law.”

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1874.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as communications intended for publication must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words “Printer’s copy written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.”

LIUT. J. B. VINTER, of Victoria, is our authorised Agent for Vancouver Island British Columbia. As is also Captain H. V EDMONDS for New Westminster and adjacent country.

In a late issue we noticed a lecture delivered by Colonel GEORGE CHESNAY, the author of “The Battle of Doinking” before the Royal United Service Institution “On the Organization of the Future,” and now have to notice an article from *Broad Arrow* of the 4th April, on the same subject, entitled “Colonel Chesnay’s Army of Knights,” which is reprinted on another page. Amongst all the fallacies which have from time to time occupied the public mind since the Franco-Prussian War on the subject of Army Organization, this, of so clever and talented an officer, appears to us to be the most formidable as well as mischievous; its direct tendency is to

mislead the people of Great Britain as to the real state of the issues between themselves and the other great powers of the world, as well as to seriously retard the tendency of public opinion towards the true solution of the problem of military strength and liability which their position as the chief naval power in the world demands. It is evident to the great mass of the people that the day of the regular armies so-called has passed away—it was a Prussian militia that conquered France in 1870, and it was the dependence on a regular army by the latter that secured their humiliation. This is so notorious a fact that it is hardly requisite to do more than notice it; and as Mr. CARDWELL’s re-organization totally destroyed the British military system, the question which has been constantly forcing itself to the front is: “will it not become our immediate necessity to recognize the fact that the whole male population capable of bearing arms must submit to some amount of military discipline and render the State the first duty owed by its subjects.” A variety of ingenious plans have been found for solving this very difficult problem, none more so by professional jealousy, some of them extravagant and chimerical enough, but it is an open question whether any has yet been furnished as startlingly novel as entirely opposed to the teachings of practical experience as those of the gallant and talented author of the most ludicrous extravaganza of modern days. Like the “True Reformer,” he goes in for thorough and after effectually demolishing Sir MARMAUDE BURLEY and Control makes an effectual onslaught on the Castle of Cards Viscount CARDWELL so fancifully elaborated. It would appear that in putting his theory before the world, Colonel CHESNAY built his *chateau de espogna* on a single point—the success of SHERIDAN’S cavalry in preventing the retreat of LEE’S army from Richmond—the services of that body of *Mounted Infantry* has been greatly overrated—they enable an infantry division to route and drive back a weaker force by weight of numbers alone, and for that our success their failures to be of any service whatever could be counted by the score. It is true we have heard of Dragoons capturing frigates on horseback but since the close of the seventeenth century there is not a single record of the best trained cavalry being able to withstand infantry properly handled, and in any case when they did succeed they were brought under cover within range (100 yards) before they were allowed to charge. It will be admitted that at Waterloo NAPOLEON DE GRAND eads as fine a body of cavalry as there existed; they even hurled against infantry and what was their results; his own expressed opinion is that they were massacred, and it is the true one, although they were numerically five to one compared with any of the squares against which they were launched. The world knows what happened at Balaklava, and during the late contest in France

the cavalry at either side took good care to keep out of the way of infantry. Indeed it is a question well worth considering whether at any period cavalry were a match for a well drilled and disciplined infantry force. The Romans did not use them to any extent—Cressy, Poitiers and Agincourt were won by infantry against armies of Knights in armor that afforded far more effective protection from the cloth yard shaft than anything of the kind which could be devised at the present day; indeed no steel Curias could be invented of sufficient weight for a man to wear or a horse to carry that could resist a rifle bullet, and with breech loading arms and an incessant fire it would be a problem as to how many men and horses would reach an infantry line supposing they had got within 100 yards of it unscathed. Lord CLYDE turned the Russian cavalry charge at Balaklava into a weak battalion in line, and the value of weapons of precision in the hands of infantry soldiers has been many times improved since. But the lecturer proposes to use those *Knights as Mounted Infantry* a species of Horse Marines in other words, and about as appropriate; to make infantry of value aggressively (and he proposes to use them in that way) they must be pushed into close proximity to their opponents, say two hundred yards, from four to six hundred yards is the dangerous zone in modern warfare, the horses of this mounted force must be left outside that zone say at one thousand yards from the line, if the *mounted* infantry meet a reverse or are repulsed how many of them would be likely to leave the field having to traverse a distance of 800 yards under the fire of a victorious foe. We think there can be little doubt as to their fate, and the rule in their case which holds good for a part would hold good for the whole. The celerity of movement on horse back would be valuable under such conditions, and it might be advisable to have a respectable cavalry force for outpost duty, but we are convinced that no officer who has studied war as it ought to be studied by the practical experience of past ages, will seriously advise his countrymen to put their whole military strength in cavalry of any description. Little more than three-fourths of a century has passed since NAPOLEON BONAPARTE encountered what was then the best cavalry force in the world and the nearest approach yet seen to the beau ideal of mounted infantry, the Egyptian Marmilukes fighting on their own soil at the battle of the Pyramids. What was the result? The French infantry soldier armed with a musket that he used to load without a ramrod received the first and last onset they ever made, they were annihilated with a weapon as inferior to the rifle of to day in every respect as it was superior to the old cloth yard shaft with its ounce head of hardened iron and gray goose wing. The thorough soldier that commands the British army, His

Royal Highness the Duke of CAMBRIDGE, must have been highly amused at the theory of the talented lecturer, and his objection to the scheme on the severe expense of and transport with its attendant difficulties was but a pleasant way no doubt, to get out of the dilemma of total condemnation. The only solution of the reason why COL. CHESNEY should propound such an extraordinary theory is to be found in his total lack of faith in an "Armed Nationality," as a highly educated professional soldier he cannot conceive how the rank and file can by patient labour be taught the rudiments of rifle shooting, or the mysteries of the Glasse step except they are kept constantly at it, and he has undoubtedly a thorough contempt for the re-organized British army, therefore he offers as a substitute a fanciful force to be recruited from the better classes, entirely ignoring the fact that the best way to secure the services of those classes is to increase their pay, make it at least equal to what can be earned in the labour market, and if necessary enter into competition with the mercantile element in that particular; indeed true wisdom would direct the State to offer such inducements as would induce the vigorous and enterprising to prefer its service to that of civil life, and to this it must come, but

"The Knights are dust,
Their swords are rust,"

and neither DON QUIXOTE or Colonel CHESNEY possess the power to resuscitate the defunct chivalry.

Broad Arrow of 28th March has an article on "Preparation for War," which discloses extraordinary want of coherence between what ought to be the single department of the Minister-at-War. We have not been admirers of either Mr. CARDWELL's disorganization at the War Office or Mr. CHILDER's destructiveness at the Admiralty, but we cordially conceive the idea that there ought to have been accord between them, which according to our contemporary seems not to have been the case; we cannot reconcile the idea of "Preparation for War," with economy, the mere accumulation of stores, arms, and ammunition, to say nothing of equipage or food, must always be a matter of expense and all this must be increased before there is a prospect of hostilities.

To build ships and lay them up in ordinary is the worst possible folly, there could be no profit whatever in such a course, seamen and gunners must be trained with the vessels they will have to fight, and that training is not to be found within hail of the bum boat woman at Spithead. England's immunity from the evils of war for over 200 years is due in great part to the fact that she has a channel fleet always in commission and that its officers and seamen do not let the vessels ground on the beef bones of their crew's messes. The same rule applies to troops; constant moving, or in other words

active service is the very life of an army. the localization of the regular army within the British Isles is a most decided disadvantage, its true duty is to guard the outlying possessions of the Empire, and it must in all cases be engaged in defensive warfare. The idea of mobilization as applicable to French, German, or Russian armies does not apply in this case; there is no analogy at all. The people of Great Britain should be organized for home defence, and every county would be able to oppose effectually any force thrown on its own shores holding every inch of ground till the force of the adjoining counties had concentrated for its support. In no case ought an English force of 15,000 men be obliged to traverse a distance of 60 miles along a country whose means of locomotion are decidedly the best in the world. The invasion of France by our EDWARD the Third developed the fact that a nation of not more than two and one half million of souls could send an army of 30,000 of the elite of its population to a foreign invasion leaving at the same time sufficient force to meet all local requirements and repel the invasion of what might well be called a domestic foe, it seems to us that the whole theory of national defence as advocated by the British Press and military authorities is entirely false and every step taken in the so called army re-organization is direct evidence of that fact. An army for national defence should be organized to act according to the requirements of its own locality and should be trained specially, therefore it requires other work to organize for invasion—mobilization. In the latter case is a primary consideration, in the former merely secondary, and in support of this position we have to refer to a recent lecture which will be found in another page by the talented author of "The Battle of Dorking," Colonel GEORGE CHESNEY, at the Royal United Service Institution on 27th March the subject being "Our Future Army Organization," in which the idea is to return to the old practice of cavalry, or as he puts it, "a high development of the American Mounted Infantry," to make up for paucity of numbers by rapidity of manoeuvres. And this is one of the many ideas which have been placed before the British people any time for the last ten years. It is evident the gallant Colonel is not thoroughly informed as to the actual value of the "American Mounted Infantry," a force by the way that did no service till the Southern cavalry were used up, all their great leaders dead, and no recruits to supply the place of that force which, under STUART and other dashing officers, so frequently crippled the advance of the Northern Army, and it is well known that the "Mounted Infantry" barely came into notice when the last efforts of LEE was directed to withdraw his exhausted troops from the lines about Richmond, the record of the force was not so brilliant nor its usefulness so apparent as it is deemed by the

gallant lecturer, but it shows clearly that no certain plan for raising a *defensive* force has yet taken hold of the English mind. And "Preparation for War" means more than calling in of detachments whose appropriate duties were to guard the outlying bulwarks of the Empire.

The true principle then is evidently that which we have adopted to render every man liable to serve, to train the force gradually, to make every military district to supply a complete *corps d'armee* with stores and full equipment—to detach the Regular army or service corps for duty in the Colonies recruiting them from Volunteers, and by taking the local forces of the Colonies into the army of the Empire Great Britain would not only decrease her expenditure but at the same time render herself secure from attack and in reality effect that insurance of which *Broad Arrow* speaks. With all the advantages of officers specially educated and control it is evident that the military system of Great Britain could not equip such a paltry affair as the Ashantee Expedition without a series of blunders which it is very convenient to charge to want of accord between departments which must be necessarily separate.

WE republish from the *Broad Arrow* of 4th April two articles entitled "Five Years of Naval Economy" and "The State of the Navy" in this issue, for the purpose of exhibiting in as striking a light as possible the folly of allowing the military power and appliances of a country to be dealt with in accordance with the theories of political parties and at the will of men unacquainted with the machinery they undertake to control. It is well known that the Secretary at War (Mr. CARDWELL) and the First Lord of Admiralty (Mr. CHILDER) assumed to be the administrators of their various departments in the widest and most comprehensive sense of the term, in fact one assumed to be the actual *de facto* commander in chief of the Army, and the other held not only the same position towards the Navy, but he also assumed the role of Naval Architect and the control of every matter connected therewith.

In the first case the failure of the Army reorganization scheme is too notorious to merit more than a passing notice, while in the other the display of monstrosities known as iron-clads and their supposed invincibility has thrown a glamour over the public mind equal to that produced by one of MICHAEL SCOTT's magic prescriptions that

"Could make a nutshell seem a barge—
A Sheeling look a palnce large,"

and thus directing attention from the slight of hand tricks by which what was called efficiency and economy were combined.

The advent to power of another set of administrators has necessarily exposed the sham, and we now learn that the economy has been produced by depriving the Navy of trained men, disposing of its ships because

forsooth it would cost a few hundred thousand pounds annually to keep them in repair. But as this is simply a question of practical opinion and it is to be presumed that the First Lord honestly sought that of the best and most unbiased quality—even if there was an error it was only measurable—but there can be no possible excuse for the reduction of 700 officers and 6,300 able seamen and marines which have been removed from the navy lists. It is perfectly useless to create a navy without having able seamen to man it, and those men cannot be trained as land forces can to understand enough drill and discipline to make good soldiers in three months. In the navy it takes half a lifetime to make an able seaman, so much of the professional knowledge depending on practical experience, and when the soldier can think of retiring after twenty-one years' service, the true sailor is only in his prime. Yet the economy of Mr. CHILDERS placed a large proportion of such men on the retired list, in other words, drove them out of the service.

Of the officers it is not necessary to say much, the same rules apply to them as to the men, and the constant shouldering of them out of a service in which they were sorely needed is exemplified in the disasters to the sea-going vessels of the powerful navy our contemporary talks about, which occurred a couple of years ago. *Broad Arrow's* half angry apology for the false policy adopted would be amusing enough if it did not point out how utterly futile and ridiculous the results of that policy has been, and the reason why its originators lost the confidence of the British people. We do not pretend to be politicians or partisans, but it is evident that it was no "Conservative reaction" which displaced the GLADSTONE administration, but a well founded conviction that they were unable as well as incompetent to carry out the government of the country in a spirit of good faith and in accordance with the national interests. From the experience which this "Five Years of Naval Economy" gives us, it is evident that while our constitutional usages demands that at the head of the Military and Naval Departments a civilian representation is a necessity, yet he ought to be nothing more than their exponent in the House of Commons, and as a matter of course the supervisor for the people of expenditure and designs. Organization, equipment, architecture, armament and all other details should be left in the hands of the experts of either service, and the effort should be not to drive old officers or men out of employment, but to make it worth their while to stay. Indeed it would appear that in the English navy the tendency is to train the seamen as soldiers, and this has doubtless arisen from the training of naval cadets in colleges on shore, which is about as wise a proceeding as it would be to train locomotive engine builders in a pianoforte

manufactory. The age, too, of those cadets while it would probably fit them for being good engineers or classical scholars renders them totally useless as seamen. At seventeen years *mentally* and *mechanically* a lad's mind and body is fixed, it will not readily run in any groove but one; at twelve the plastic material can be moulded at will and the probability that while not 30 per cent. of cadets trained at seventeen will make good seamen, 75 per cent. at twelve are sure to be first-rate.

The subject is a wide one, demanding close consideration, it is interesting to us whose destiny is bound up with that of the Empire, and on whose infant institutions the example of Great Britain will leave indelible impressions. The errors into which British authorities have fallen are two-fold, an undue appreciation of mere educational advantage, and a depreciation of practical experience.

REVIEWS.

The *Aldine* for the month of May is on our table, and a beautiful number it is. The engravings as usual are well executed. The one gracing the first page is a life-like picture, entitled the dying Hound. An aged hunter is kneeling on the ground, his one hand on the dog's head, the companion of his hunting exploits for many years, the other hand holds a paw of the dying animal. The hunter is looking sorrowfully into the dog's face, who has his eyes fixed on his master with a gratified and resigned look. Three other beautiful ones follow of Scenes in Florida, one of the most beautiful and picturesque States in the Union. There are several other very good engravings, but want of space prevents our particularizing. Suffice it to say that the May number is as fresh and beautiful as the month it represents. The literary contents are of greater variety and excellence than usual. Subscription price, \$5, including chromos "The East" and "The West." James Sutton & Co., publishers, 58 Maiden Lane, New York City.

The *Phrenological Journal* and Life Illustrated for May is before us. The number opens with an appreciative sketch of CHARLES SUMNER, with a portrait of the renowned Senator. Several other articles of considerable merit follow. Every body should read it. Price, 30 cents; \$3 a year. Address: S. R. Wells, New York.

Blackwood's Magazine for April contains the following articles: Alice Lorraine; Disorder in Dreamland; New Books; The Story of Valentine and his Brother; International Vanities; The Political Situation; Ashantee. The Leonard Scott Publishing Co., 140 Fulton Street, New York.

WE have received the Prospectus of a Comic illustrated paper of the euphonious name of *Quir*, the first number of which is to make its appearance about the 1st of May. It is the intention to issue it fortnightly, with the view of ultimately making it a weekly should it meet with sufficient encouragement. Price \$1.25 a year. Address, "Editor *Quir*, St. John, N.B."

THE JEWS OF ROUMANIA.—The Roumanian Jews have signed a petition to the Chamber of Deputies asking for the removal of the political and civil labor. The document sets forth the injustice of the treatment they receive, and asserts that in all civilized countries where the Jews have been admitted to civil and political liberty, they have not been behind their countrymen of other faiths in science, art, or patriotism. They complain that they cannot hold property or till the soil, nor even own the houses in which they live. They are shut out from the learned professions, excluded from several industrial and commercial pursuits, and in the army, where there are several thousand Jewish soldiers in the ranks, they are denied all hopes of promotion. The petitioners claim that the ill treatment they receive is in direct opposition to the spirit and letter of the constitution which, in article 21, declares liberty of conscience to be unrestricted, and guarantees the freedom of all religions. The document, which is couched in the most eloquent and respectful terms, and is quite devoid of passion, concludes with prayer that the political and civil disabilities of the Roumanian Jews may be speedily removed, and as they pay the same taxes and are under the same obligations as Roumanian citizens, that they may be granted equal rights and prerogatives.

Founding expectation upon a popular tradition, a company is now, it appears, soliciting from the Turkish Government a firman for dredging the port of Rhodes for the bronze guns and culverins which are said to have been committed to the waters in the times of the struggle between the Knights of St. John and the mighty Soliman. The petitioners offer to give the Government one third of all that they may recover.

In a flood at Bagdad, in consequence of the overflow of the Tigris, several persons were killed.

A conference of shipowners is now sitting at Liverpool, at the close of which it is expected a vigorous competition between the different lines will commence, and freight and passage rates be reduced.

New York City is complaining of its annual expenditure again. The cost of running the city government during the year ending November 30th, 1873, was \$5,588,023.

The Captain General of Havana has issued a decree for a tax of 10 per cent per annum on all incomes over \$1,000, to be applied to the payment of the National Debt, and the redemption of paper currency.

REMITTANCES Received on Subscription to THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW up to Saturday the 2nd inst.

<i>Blenbrook, Ont.</i> —Lt. Col. J. Brown, to May 1874	\$2.00
Capt. Jas. Hoey, " "	1.00
<i>Clifton, Ont.</i> —Lt. & Adjt. Brennan, June " "	2.00
<i>Collin's Bay, Ont.</i> —Capt. & Paym'r J. B. Fairhead, to July " "	4.00
<i>Lunenburg, Ont.</i> —Lt. S. P. Shaver, to Sept. " "	2.00
<i>London, Ont.</i> —Lieut. Thos. Peel, to Dec. " "	2.00
<i>Munster, Ont.</i> —Capt. Wm. Garvin, to July " "	7.00
(Per Capt. L. J. Bland.)	
<i>Halifax, N. S.</i> —Major Parker, to March " "	2.00
Lieut. S. S. Thorne, " "	8.00
Lieut. Wm. Imlah, Jan. 1875	2.00

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor does not hold himself responsible for
 libelous expressions of opinion in communications
 addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW

THE FRENCH CAVALRY—1870.

LETTER No. 1.

I think it may be of interest to your readers to know what befel the French Cavalry during the war of 1870 and the tactical results; therefore send you this first condensed letter from the recent work by Lieut. Colonel Bonie, 11th Dragoons.

At the breaking out of the war the French cavalry were in no way prepared; for some years previous the impression was gaining ground, that modern warfare and improved firearms had sealed the fate of this arm, while the committee appointed to consider the question decided that the regulations, &c., of 1829 were perfect in 1869.

The order, however, had been given to mobilize, and as there were no reserves of horses, a portion of the effective strength four-year old remounts, no supplies of mess tins, kettles, or camp necessaries, all was confusion; marching and countermarching incessant—and sending vain applications to Paris for supplies—thus they marched to meet the enemy and hoped for the best.

Arrived on the frontier, the French cavalry commenced operations upon exterior lines, while the Prussians covered their whole front and flanks with an impenetrable cloud of cavalry scouts, and attacked with all the advantage of interior lines, also a perfect knowledge of the country which the excellent maps in their hands gave them; while the French had no maps—their brilliant courage though it saved the honor of their arms, was wasted in useless charges, the men frequently riding to what they knew was certain death.

Now the Germans commenced to use their cavalry with unparalleled audacity, showing unlimited confidence in the dash of their men, and staying power of their horses; so that to the ubiquitous Uhlan* in a great measure, the general success is entirely due; while the French astonished, tried to follow the example set them, but failed from want of special training—their theory had been that cavalry should be sheltered in masses behind inequalities of ground until required then to be launched against the enemy at the decisive moment—practice on the other hand proved that snells searched out every neck, and regiments were annihilated before they could close with infantry in the charge.

The battle of Wissembourg opened the ball, but the French cavalry did nothing, owing to bad ground; and fell back with the remains of the small force which had fought with desperation against large odds—followed closely by the Prussians whose

vedettes never lost sight of them notwithstanding the most dreadful weather; thus materially helping to make arrangements for the battle of Worth on the morrow.

For the first time we shall see the employment of the French cavalry—who, however, had obtained no information, so that Marshal McMahon was not aware that the enemy's forces had been tripled during the night, he therefore awaited the attack of 140,000 Prussians with his 35,000 men drawn up between Froeschwiller and Worth, Elsaehausen and Gunstett. At about 1.30 the cavalry were called upon by the French General to save the day if possible, and the result of their charges was simply bloody and useless as they had to attack an enemy always out of reach and often out of sight.

The 1st and 4th Cuirassiers charged by successive squadrons retiring with the loss of many men and horses, the latter their colonel—the 2nd Cuirassiers charged by wings and lost their colonel and five officers killed besides others wounded and 129 men and 250 horses—the 3rd Cuirassiers now came into action and one wing charged losing the colonel, seven officers and 70 men and horses killed and wounded.

This seemed the right moment for the Prussians, who at once attacked with redoubled energy, and regiment after regiment marched to the attack of front and flanks—the only hope of the French seemed to lay in using their still fresh cavalry on the right under General Michel, so the order was given to charge; down came a magnificent array of horsemen at a gallop which made the earth shake, the 8th Cuirassiers leading—but as soon as they reached the proper distance two volleys fired by word of command followed by independent firing transformed two thirds of these men and horses into a line of corpses—the 9th Cuirassiers and 6th Lancers following in support were even more unfortunate, owing to the obstacles in their path, the effect of the infantry fire was even more murderous still, what remained of these regiments tried to escape through the village of Mosbrun, but were fired upon in all directions from the houses, and the end of the street being blocked, all who were not killed were taken prisoners.

I must mention too that the 2nd Lancers were left exposed to fire all day apparently, no attempt being made to get them under cover—this regiment lost their colonel, 11 officers and many men and horses without having charged.

One important piece of information we gained, was that although the bullets rattled like hail on the Cuirassiers, not one was pierced.

Thus ended the first employment of the French cavalry in this war.

VIEILLE Moustache.

* Uhlan was the term applied to all the Prussian Cavalry without distinction, by most correspondents during the war.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

DEAR SIR—The House of Commons has just voted Sir Garnet Wolseley £25,000 sterling, and Her Majesty has conferred honors, distinctions, and promotions, on the gallant little band of Ashantee heroes.

Now, may I ask, what return Canada gives to those who devote their time, money, and life, in her Militia service?

What would Colonels Sowell, Dyde, and Denison have answered if asked this question when the present Militia Bill became law?

What did the Canadian Parliament do for those who turned out during the Fenian raids, and on the return of our little band from the Red River? indeed, was good faith kept with those who went?

What inducements does Canada offer to especially able, energetic, and zealous officers, whose claims are simply those of merit?—no politics.

Lastly, what military future will cadets have before them, if they enter the new Staff College and pass with credit to the end of four years.

ESQUIAER.

(KINGSTON CORRESPONDENCE.)

There is a stagnation in military news here as well as in trade.

The Military School is in full swing yet, the cadets seem to be on the increase as to numbers, eleven having joined only the other day. Whether this is caused by an idea that this school is to be closed or no I cannot say, but I should hope there is no ground for it.

We, in this district, are glad to see that the present Government intend to lessen the quota of the active forces and then increase the pay of the force remaining; we think it will have a good effect on volunteering as far as the money compensation for the duty put in is concerned, but at the same time we believe that if the time of yearly service was increased to thirty days it would give a greater impulse to volunteering than mere increase of pay will do. We are also glad to think that the camps stand a chance of remaining the means of performing the annual drill. For my part I don't approve of the regimental camps, nor of brigade camps, unless commanded by an experienced officer who should if possible be an old regular, as they (the regimental) are only too liable to become a source of want of discipline among troops for reasons I need not mention. Moreover the larger the camp (with a good headquarter staff) the more likely is evolution in drill and discipline to arise, and the want of it to become apparent. A good headquarter staff will always have eyes in places the commandants cannot be at all times.

K.

BRITAIN INVADED, A.D. 1900.

Sound the alarm! ring out the bells of church,
and tower!
Call out the "Army of Defence"—lose not an
hour!
Our shores are threatened—the hostile fleets in
view,
And British hearts with British valor must be
true
If they would keep their homes inviolate from
the hand
Of those who seek to desolate their land,
Each son who has the strength to bear an arm
Must face the foe and strive to free from harm
His own loved Isle, the land that gave him birth
The home of freedom—the "diamond of the
earth!"

The foe has landed—but the conquest was not
won.
From the first streak of daylight till the setting
sun
The following cannon scattered death around
Till dead and dying strewed the glory ground.
Amid the dread confusion of the fight,
Just as the day resigned itself to night,
The foe launched forth their boats upon the wave,
Filled with armed men prepared to brave
A nation up in arms for freedom's cause,
Their king, their country's liberty and laws
"Men are not stones!" Our soldiers stood their
ground—
Till dead and wounded lay as thick around
"As cattle in a well-stocked pasture field"—
Prepared to die, but not prepared to yield.
Away—fall back—but keep your faces to the foe!
Our enemies have known that British maxims
long ago,
The battle's lost—the invaders muster on the
shore—
Retire and gather strength! There yet is more
To do ere Britain owns the sway of foreign yoke—
Her spirit may be bent, but never broke.

Muster the squadrons in the busy street!
The "Army of Defence" must now prepare to
meet
No phantom foe upon the rocky height.
The sham is past, now is the real fight,
Forth from their peaceful homes the civil sol-
diers come
At war's alarm, to follow life and drum
The father leaves his wife and children dear,
And from his eye there starts the trembling
tear:
The mother bids her only son goodbye,
With many a fond embrace and stifled sigh;
The lover from his mistress tears himself away,
And speaks of happiness some future day,
Duty calls. Drive back the foe from off our shore,
And leave our flag unsullied as it was before.

'Tis midnight hour, but yet no rest is there,
Illumined by the flickering torches' glare,
Which sheds a glimmering sleety light,
Glancing on swords and sparkling bayonets
bright—
The "Army of Defence," at Duty's call,
Resolve to win what they have lost, or else to fall
As martyrs to their country's common weal—
No traitor hearts were there, but all were true as
steel
Then march—and with your hearts, so brave and
true,
Resolved to win, there is not much to do,
Before your minds your fathers' victories keep—
Their sons have greater glories yet to reap.
Ere yon crescent moon shall cease to show its light,
Ere yon some day shall chase away the night,
If Britain from the invader be not free,
And still their arms retain the victory,
Eternal ignomy will rest upon our name,
And future ages blush to our own shame.
But march—march on to glory and renown—
Hearts so determined victory must crown.
Your country lies behind, the foe before—
What lacks the British patriot more?
On, then, and let your watchword in the fight
Be Britain's freedom, liberty and right.
Maintain your country's ever honored name,
And add fresh laurels to her brilliant fame.
If in your hands Great Britain's might decays,
Then not for us the poet's halloved praise,
No more shall Britain's martial tales be told,
With pride and honour as in days of old.
Charge, then, and let each heart be true,
Remember Balaclava, Waterloo!

'Tis done, our country's free once more—
Free and unfettered as she was of yore.
Shout, then, with joy triumphant! Bring
The lyre and touch its comeliorated string;
And in the magic power of fervent song
Sound forth the praises of the brave and strong,
Whom fell beneath the foiled invaders' stroke,
To save their country from the foreign yoke.
O, land of liberty! land of the free and brave!
Thy flag remains triumphant still on land and
wave;
Thy fleet has still its ancient prestige on the deep
And still thy fame to arms thy warriors keep.
Thy name is revered as it was before—
No foe again shall plant an hostile foot upon your
shore.
J. M.
—*Volunteer News*, 18th March.

COL. EL CHESNEY'S ARMY OF
KNIGHTS.

The author of "The Battle of Dorking"
owed the British public some compensation
for the fright he caused them when that
celebrated pamphlet appeared, and he has
well quitted himself of the debt by his lec-
ture of last Friday at the United Service
Institution. It is a positive moral gain to
be assured by such an authority that we
are at present "well and fully prepared"
for a purely defensive war. But Colonel
George Chesney goes much further than
this, and points out the way by which we
may, if we please, and at no very distant
period, be equally well prepared to sustain
our ancient renown on the battle fields of
Europe. To be sure, the system he pro-
poses to adopt is a revolutionary, and there-
fore, to some extent, a risky one. But its
great merit is that the risk is not too great
to be taken by a first-class Power like Eng-
land, if we are once convinced that Colonel
Chesney's suggestions are not likely to be
bettered by other teachers.

Premising that England is not less high-
spirited now than in the days of old, though
she would not fight in a great, nay, the
greatest, cause, Colonel Chesney asked what
a nation with such high principles would
say "if she saw her Army nothing but a
weak contingent hanging on the flank of
some foreign Power, or, if compelled to
fight single handed, cooped up in some re-
mote corner of Europe, while the issue was
fought out on a distant battlefield." The
question was, if in these days of colossal
armies such a result could be avoided at
any price short of a total abandonment of
our position in the councils of Europe? It
is not long since that Prince Bismark, in
mapping out Eastern Europe afresh, was
of opinion that England need not be con-
sidered,—and it is certain that many more
besides the great German Chancellor have
thought that England has obliterated her-
self as a military power on the Continent.
But not so, in effect, says Colonel Chesney.
England has always led the way in the prac-
tical application of new ideas. Witness our
aptitude for colonization and commerce—
our railways, telegraphs, and manufactures.
In maritime and naval affairs it has always
been the same. In military affairs alone
we have been content with the role of
imitators. Let us be bold enough to strike
out a new line for ourselves in this as in
other important matters, and let it be such
a one as the peculiarities of our position—
our natural advantages and disadvantages
—suggest; and there is no reason why we
should be less successful in military invention
and enterprise than in any other direction.
Such is the gist of Colonel Chesney's prelim-
inary argument.

The fact is indubitable, that we cannot at
present put an Army in the field that
would be capable of competing with one of
the vast continental forces, which are not
simply composed of battalions and divisions,
but of armies within armies. Let us, then,
invent an Army of another kind, in which a
special quality and not quantity, should be
the winning colour. In Colonel Chesney's
opinion this may be done by organizing an
Army of horsemen, not merely cavalry, nor
merely mounted riflemen, but both in the
highest degree of perfection combined—an
Army that should be able to ride down any
cavalry brought against it, and at the same
time be able to operate with rapidity and in
any direction against infantry. Such a
force landed on the continent under an able
leader, might, he declared his conviction,

ride from one end of Europe to the other.
Suppose that it met the enemy even 100,000
strong, part dismounting would be directed
to drive the flank back, while the reserve
coming up would join in the pursuit, driv-
ing back the rest of the enemy across and upon
their own line. This idea has been formed
from what occurred in the American war,
where a small body of mounted infantry
had produced an effect far beyond their
numerical strength. The general idea was
not that mounted men should act as
auxiliaries to the rest of the Army; but, in
fact, that the rest of the Army should act
as auxiliaries to the first line of these horse-
men. As to the cost, there would neces-
sarily be a revolution in the mode of pay,
and of recruiting, if such a plan as this was
carried into effect, but, after all, the mere
amount of pay was but a slight item in the
Army Estimates. Of course, if we succeed-
ed in the application of the idea, foreign
nations would become our imitators, though
for the present they were too much wedded
to their own conscription and vast organ-
ized armaments, and would still, if war
should once again unhappily arise, give us
the opportunity of trying what has so often
and so successfully tried in India, and now
but lately in the woods and jungles of
Africa—the chances of skill against num-
bers. Even when they had adopted our
plans we should be more on an equality
with them than at present, and with any-
thing like equality, what Englishman would
fear for the result?

What Col. Chesney proposes, then, is the
substitution of an Army of accomplished
knights in place of the "thin red line" in
any future continental warfare in which it
may be our fortune to take a part. In the
discussion of this project by the daily press,
the special aptitudes of the proposed new
cavalry have been generally overlooked,
and the proposal is criticised as if nothing
were meant but an augmentation of the
numbers of our present horse troops. If
this were not so we should have heard less
about a trench across the road or a garden
wall stopping the march of such a body.
The leading journal speaks of the proposed
Army of horse as likely to prove "an im-
portant adjunct" to an army in the field,
and makes some other weak remarks on
the subject, which convince us that the idea
had not been grasped in all its breadth and
depth by the writer. The most distinguish-
ed of our evening contemporaries is much
happier in its remarks on the subject. The
Pall Mall Gazette says:

"There is so much to be said for the lec-
turer's view, that it is hard to tell how far
such a revolution in war as he proposed
might not be successful from its very daring
and novelty. The example he referred to
of Frederick 'rolling up' the Austrians at
Leuthen is singularly striking. Frederick
had but 20,000 against 80,000 of his enemy;
yet he routed the latter with perfect ease
and completeness, simply because he had
discovered a process of gaining ground to a
flank rapidly with infantry which the other
side did not know how to imitate or meet.
It seems possible, therefore, in theory at
least, that the instance might be repeated
were the bulk of an attacking force able to
move with the speed of horsemen when
brought against a line of battle composed
even of the best infantry. There is, indeed,
already one example in modern history of
the thing proposed being done; for Lee's
lines of defence before Richmond in 1865
were actually broken, and the long contest
he had maintained brought to a finish at
one blow by the sudden transporting of

Sheridan's newly-arrived force of three divisions of mounted infantry to aid Grant's left in forcing his adversary's extreme right. In consequence of this rapid movement the Confederates were completely overweighed at the point selected for the attack, and their works were actually pierced, rifle in hand, by the dismounted horsemen. And these American troops were but rude men at arms as compared with the army of the cavaliers which Colonel Chesney suggested as a possibility worth considering in the future. It is remarkable that the lecturer did not use the very obvious confirmation of his theory which may be found in the saying of the same General Sheridan when in France in 1870. Some of Friday's audience were no doubt surprised at the audacity which could even imagine that the operations of an ordinary modern army of 300,000 soldiers could be effectually paralysed by one of 30,000 vigorous horsemen. Yet this is just what Sheridan is known to have openly declared that he himself could have done against the investors of Paris with three times the force of mounted rifle men he led from the Shenandoah to Grant's aid five years before.

This is by far the truer way of looking at the matter, and, with all deference to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, we do not think much more of his objections on the score of expense, and the difficulty of transport for such an Army, than of the remarks of our leading contemporary. Take the history of the Fourth Cavalry Division, which played a distinct part in the war of 1870, under the command of Prince Albert of Prussia. This force consisted of six regiments, the 5th Cuirassiers, the 1st, 6th, and 10th Uhlans, and the 2nd and 11th Hussars, formed into three brigades, numbering in all about 3600 men. After junction at Weissenburg, it was sent (August 5) in pursuit of the enemy, and on the night of the 6th it marched against the fugitives from Wörth, and followed them up for thirty hours. On the morning of the 8th, having cut the line of railways east of Saverne, and occupied the whole district from the Palatine to the Vosges, it bivouacked amid a storm of rain, and after a few hours' rest, under conditions most trying to men and horses, it pushed forward again, heading the Eleventh Army Corps, and after having held Marsal for a few hours on the 13th it reached Nancy on the 14th, being always two days' march ahead of the Army, which it kept fully supplied with intelligence often of the highest importance. From Nancy forwards, when the Third Army started for Chalons, the division acted as *avant garde*, and cleared the way over a belt of country so wide that it was bounded on the north by Bar-le-Duc and on the south by Joinville; the cavalry marking out the route for the army, and frequently engaging the enemy. This, we are aware, is only a striking instance of the efficient action of a small body of cavalry as an adjunct to a moving mass of infantry: but it is highly suggestive of the perfection, in cavalry movement, to which the arm may be brought, and of the capability of a body of cavalry, specially organized for the purpose, as Colonel Chesney suggests, performing an important part in any future continental war. It is certain that such a force of cavalry would have succeeded in sweeping the country all around Paris, to the distance of nearly a hundred miles, which was ravaged by the Duke of Mcklenburg's army, clear of the enemy. It would have prevented the junction with that force of the army of Prince Frederick Charles

before Orleans. It would have saved the army of Faidherbe, and we may take General Sherman's word for it, it would have bent up the quarters of the investing army under the walls of Paris.

On the whole, therefore, we are inclined to think that Colonel Chesney's suggestions are worthy of the most serious consideration, if England is not prepared to see herself "effaced" on the continent. There may be difficulties, which some may think almost insurmountable. Such, for example, as the transport of many thousands of horses, and the points alluded to by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief. But the present difficulty of placing a sufficient number of British infantry on any continental battle-field to take part with which the nation either would or ought to be satisfied, far exceeds these difficulties in gravity. No doubt "it would be a sad business, as the leading journal presumes, if we are to incur the trouble and expense of reconstructing our Army on the new model, only to find it incapable of sufficient action, either in an enemy's country or in our own." But we do not understand that Colonel Chesney proposes any such rash proceeding. If England were ever invaded, a force of 20,000 cavalry would find plenty of work to do at home, and the fact of its being trained in the manner suggested by Colonel Chesney would only make it the fitter for that work, while it would be available also for foreign service in the event of our engaging in operations of war on the continent. The proposal, therefore, as we understand it, is to double the number of our present cavalry, and, at the same time, organize the whole cavalry force afresh, on the principles suggested. This is not exactly a parallel case to the reconstruction of the Navy by the substitution of ironclads for the old three deckers, nor do we see that the country would run a too formidable risk on the score of expense, in experimentalising on the creation of such an arm. Would it not be a reasonable course to appoint a conference of officers to consider Colonel Chesney's suggestions, and elicit further information, both from that distinguished officer and from other competent authorities in matters of detail.—*Broad Arrow*, April 14

PREPARATION FOR WAR.

Accepting as an axiom the proposition that preparation for war is the best guarantee for the maintenance of peace, it is obvious that the question how to prepare for war in the most efficient and economical manner becomes at once one of paramount national importance. It is, however, a very large question, more especially for a maritime Power like England, which boasts an Empire on which the sun never sets, a Power which consequently must be prepared to wage war either by land or sea in any quarter of the globe. The scientific study for the subject has hitherto—as we shall see presently—been almost entirely neglected in this country, and it may, therefore, be well to examine briefly the fundamental principles which should guide us in such an important matter.

In the first place, however, we must clearly understand what is meant by being prepared for war. For there is, unfortunately, a pretty widespread idea that such a condition implies that the defensive establishments of the country are on a war footing, but this, we need hardly say, is a most erroneous conception. A nation may be said to be prepared for war when she

can mobilise effective establishments, proportionate to the fighting strength of the country, with sufficient rapidity to meet any possible war emergency. In time of peace fleets and armies are of very little use, and, indeed, it will be sufficiently accurate to assume at present that they are only required for war purposes. Accordingly, the maintenance of naval and military establishments entails upon the country an enormous expenditure which is almost entirely wasted, unless the desired end, preparedness for war is attained. There is, unfortunately, no blinking this fact. Gallant officers, in returning thanks for the Services at civic banquets, sometimes endeavour to commend the profession of arms to the mercantile mind by humorously styling the Army and Navy Estimates an insurance premium, paid by the nation to secure its commercial and industrial wealth. Now, although this conception is more strictly accurate than is sometimes the case with post prandial ideas, yet there is some practical danger in the metaphor itself, because it is naturally apt to engender the notion—especially in the minds of those business men to whom it is usually addressed—that we can "partially insure"; that is to say, that a small Army and Navy afford a certain amount of protection, and that as we gradually increase our defensive establishments—we add a ship or two to the Navy, or a few battalions to the Army—so do we increase our preparedness for war. Now, this is a great mistake. A nation is either prepared for war, or she is not; for if she is but imperfectly prepared—as France was four years ago—she cannot be regarded as really prepared for war at all. This is, in fact, the bitter lesson which the French have learned from their late unsuccessful contest with Germany, and it is one to which we in England would also do well to take heed. Considering, however, the vast expense incurred by the maintenance of naval and military establishments, and their uselessness in time of peace, the grand aim of the statesmen, in endeavouring efficiently and economically to prepare his country for war, should be simply to provide the means of mobilising the requisite men and materiel with the necessary rapidity, dispensing with them as much as possible in time of peace.

This statement may appear to some a mere platitude, and perhaps it is so; nevertheless, when we examine matters a little more closely it will be seen that not only has the English Government never thoroughly recognized and acted on this simple principle, but that there is as yet actually no Government machinery in existence in this country capable of dealing properly with the matter in this way. For, in consequence of the insular position of Great Britain, it is inevitable that our base of operations in a foreign war must always be a seaport; while in the event of being invaded, our first point attacked must likewise be a place on the seacoast. Hence it is evident, that for the proper conduct of the operations of war we in England ought to have a closer connection and a more harmonious co-operation between our naval and military establishments than is required by any other civilized nation on the face of the earth—unless, indeed, we choose to except the Japanese. But what is the actual state of matters? The War Office, instead of being, as it ought to be in the country, a department including or at least controlling, both an Army Office and a Navy Office (or Admiralty), is a purely military institution; and therefore, as appears

from what has just been said, is really incapable of dealing by itself with the question of war at all. If the War Office has to choose an insouciant African chief, it must apply to the Admiralty for transports to begin with, before it can even get at him; while in the matter of coast defence, it is likewise continually appealing for naval assistance, begging an old hulk to house a torpedo company of Royal Engineers, or something of that sort. Now if the War Office and the Admiralty, even as they are at present constituted, pulled well together, this would be a less unsatisfactory condition of affairs than is actually the case, but as matters stand, there is no real, large minded, hearty co-operation between the establishments in Pall Mall and Whitehall, although as regards a few details some thing has been done of late years towards introducing a little harmonious action; for example, in the matter of purchasing certain stores. But it is hardly necessary to say that much more is wanted than simply going shares in a lot of rum or salt pork, and until steps are taken so to organize the mutual relations of the War Office and the Admiralty that they can heartily cooperate for the national defence, the nation will never be efficiently and economically prepared for war.

After all, however, the foregoing is a preliminary consideration, rendered necessary by the want in this country of proper Government machinery for making warlike preparations. But supposing we have that machinery, how should it proceed to effect the desired end with a due regard both to efficiency and economy; Embracing, as the answer to this question does, the whole field of naval and military administration it is impossible for us at present to do more than simply indicate that the fundamental principle of action should be to maintain, without unnecessary outlay, moderate establishments of great elasticity, and therefore readily capable of enormous extension, at short notice, by means of large reserves, both of men and *matériel*. At present we waste a vast amount of money on our Army and Navy, and yet the condition of neither is satisfactory. Take the case of the Navy, for example. What on earth is the use of having a Channel Squadron cruising between the coast of Spain and the Azores, burning coals, and wearing out the boilers, machinery, and rigging of the vessels? The only conceivable object is the training of the crews, but this might be accomplished in a much less expensive manner. Whatever may be said about the deterioration of ships in harbour, we believe that our only way to keep up an adequate number of first class vessels is to organize a large reserve of them at the home ports; take care of them, not knock them needlessly about in time of peace, and arrange to be able to man them at a few hours notice from a large naval reserve. Then as regards the Army, there is far too large an outlay in many respects, in time of peace—on barracks, clothing, arms, and expenses of training and administration generally. Look, for example, at the amount of money annually wasted in moving troops from one station to another. At the same time no sooner does a war cloud appear on the horizon, than the authorities are all in a flurry, and no wonder, knowing as they do how many things have then to be considered for the first time; how much has to be provided—not to say invented—in the way of stores. The organization of an Intelligence Department has been a step in the right direction; for we can never be

thoroughly prepared for war, until we have, like Germany, a body of highly trained officers, whose sole occupation in time of peace is to prepare for the immediate action of our forces against any possible enemy in any quarter of the globe, and as we have shown, it is absolutely necessary that the Navy should be represented on the Staff of such a department. Its members would have more profound war games to amuse themselves with than the so called Kriegs-puck, which, although exceedingly useful in its way, has after all nothing to do with the grand principles of war organization, but only with those strategical and tactical movements of troops which constitute the practical operations of land warfare. If such a department as we contemplate had been organized a few years ago in this country, the officers composing it would doubtless, among their private rehearsals of all possible "little wars" on the outposts of the Empire, have included a sketch of the requisites for a campaign against the Ashantees, a document which would have been lately found extremely useful, and would at all events have prevented any unnecessary outlay for railway plant, wooden huts, pickets, and straw hats for our valiant native auxiliaries.—*Broad Arrow*, 25th March.

A DESOLATE LAND.

Greenland is almost continental in its dimensions, containing not less than 75,000 square miles, and is all a bleak wilderness of ice and snow, save a little strip extending to 74 deg. north latitude, along the western shore. The coasts are deeply indented with bays and fords, which invariably terminate in glaciers. The whole interior seems to be buried beneath a great depth of snow and ice, which loads up the valleys and wraps over the hills. Nothing can be more desolate than the interior. It is one dead, dreary expanse of white so far as the eye can reach—no living creature frequents this wilderness—neither beast, bird, nor insect. The silence, deep as death, is broken only when the warring storm arises to sweep before it the pitiless, blinding snow. This represents the state of the northern part of our continent in the ice age. Some of the Greenland glaciers attain a vast size. Dr. Kane reports the great Humbolt glacier as sixty miles wide at its termination. Its seaward face rises abruptly from the level of the water to a height of 300 feet.

Since ice is lighter than water, whenever a glacier enters the sea the dense salt water tends to buoy it up. The great tenacity of the frozen mass enables it to resist the pressure for a time. By-and-by, however, as the ice reaches deeper water, its cohesion is overcome, and large segments are forced from its terminal part, and floated up from the bed of the sea, to sail away as icebergs. The glacier evidently crows under the water to considerable depths, or, so long as the force of cohesion is able to resist the tendency of the salt water to press it upward.

Though Greenland is said to be inhabited only upon the south and west coast, there is a record of an early settlement upon the side toward Iceland, with which there has been no communication for 400 years. The colony was planted about 1,000 A. D., which flourished, and maintained intercourse with its mother country till the be-

gining of the fifteenth century. Since that time, owing to the settling of the arctic current, and the consequent gradual increase of ice upon the coast, the colony becomes inaccessible, and the records of it disappear from history. At various intervals between 1579, 1751, etc., down to our own time, the intrepid Danes have striven in vain to re-open communication with their lost colony. This emerald coast, with valleys well stocked with reindeer and verdant glades, is now shut in by the pitiless ice pack, and the fate of its inhabitants ought to excite the interest of the world. It would be very interesting to be informed of the condition of this colony, whether the increasing cold has enlarged the glaciers so as to push the dwelling out to sea, or whether the habitations are still standing, and a population has sprung up who know of the outside world only by tradition.—*Popular Science Monthly*.

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