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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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WHY THE NAVY ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED

Imperial Problems.

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TO ENGLISH - SPEAKING READERS : —

The following pages are almost literally translated from several articles published in Le Devoir, from the 1st to the 21st February, 1912.

May I repeat here what I wrote on a previous occasion?

“Some Anglo-Canadians, many of them perhaps, may not agree with me. But will any sensible Canadian, of any race or creed, contend that these are unreasonable views, tending to sectionalism, to race hatred, to interprovincial strifes? I do not think so.”

Whatever solution is chosen to settle the Navy question, or the much larger problem of inter-Imperial relations, the more it is discussed frankly and freely, the better chance it has of being sound and enduring. It is not by stifling free and frank discussion, by branding with disloyalty all who may differ with the views of the Imperialist or any other school of policy, that the Canadian people will be better enlightened and led to adopt a proper and patriotic decision.

On the contrary, let all the aspects of this huge problem be considered, let the strongest arguments be brought forward in favour of or in opposition to any of its possible solutions, and the people of Canada will be in a far safer position to exercise a sound judgment and assert their will; and the better it will be for Canada and the Empire.

In that preliminary discussion, in the bringing forth of those arguments, no Canadian should be debarred by his race, creed, political convictions or past attitudes, from expressing his views and being listened to with the same attention as if he belonged to any other breed, church or party, or as if he had been a coward or a knave in public life.

Henri BOURASSA.

Montreal, March, 1912.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S SPEECH

On the 29th of January last, there came over the cable the announcement of two incidents of material importance to Canada and the Empire. One was the speech just then delivered by Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary. The other was the publication of the long expected book in which Lord Charles Beresford brings the British Admiralty to task.

The former incident, which may justly be called an event, marks a radical change in the foreign policy of Great Britain. It shows that the British Government has determined to allow ample liberty to other powers, or rather, has abandoned all determination to check them, in their predatory enterprises. Great Britain will allow Russia without protest to take hold of Persia and Mongolia, Germany acquire, if she wants it, the Belgian Congo, and tear out from the western coast of Africa the last vestiges of Portuguese power, Italy settle at Tripoli, and France in Morocco.

At first sight, Great Britain's attitude, in these various instances, does not differ sensibly from that which she adopted towards the United States, when they "freed" Cuba and "annexed" the Philippines and Porto Rico, or towards Japan, when she seized Corea. But on closer examination, it will be found that, between the former and latter attitude, there exists a wide difference.

In tolerating the conquests of the United States and Japan, England was favouring friendly nations with the presumable object of gaining for herself particular advantages. To-day, she abandons unprotected nations and wild countries to the free grab of such powers as have an interest in getting hold of them and the means of dominating them. She gives her consent to those conquests with the avowed object of making her foreign relations easier, of appeasing the jealous animosity of nations who long saw in her the "great grabber."

British journals opposed to the new policy reproach the Government with renouncing the "splendid isolation of Britain" and her "traditional mission" as "champion of the liberties of the world", "as protector of the weak nations against spoliations from powerful conquering peoples."

Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues do not seem to be deeply moved by such empty and pharisaic phrases; and they are right.

The policy of Great Britain, like that of all great powers, has always been dictated by her interest. Thanks to the continuity of her external action and the magnificent traditions of her Government and diplomacy, she knew, better than any other nation, how to conceal her game, choose her proper time, and cover her grabs and conquests with the invocation, sometimes sincere and always opportune, of the "rights of civilisation and liberty."

To those who charge him with abandoning, in China, "the traditions of civilisation and liberty", Sir Edward Grey has only to recall the odious opium wars, to the defenders of Persia and Tripoli, the history of South Africa.

That the Foreign Secretary should abandon also, and even denounce, the policy of isolation, is not altogether astonishing to those who have studied at close range the history and policy of England. That isolation, more or less forced, England was induced to find "splendid", rather by virtue of a very peculiar faculty of her people. That faculty is one of the characteristic features of the magnificent national temperament of the Anglo-Saxons; it constitutes one of the main elements of their strength. It has always given them the advantage of filling the minds of other peoples, and perhaps their own, with the delusion that they *want* and admire what they are forced to accept.

But, the humanitarian legend set aside, the British policy of isolation abandoned in regard to other European powers, there remains nevertheless a very material deduction to be drawn from Sir Edward Grey's declaration: the British Government have apparently renounced their umpireship in the great conflicts of the world, not only in Europe, but in Asia and in Africa as well.

Heretofore, once she had taken her share—*primo nominis*—Great Britain defended the neutrality of the rest under some such pretence as “the open door,” free trade, “rights of nations”, etc., but in reality, for the best advantage of her trade; and she enforced her arguments with the full strength of her Navy.

Volumes could be written on the origin and the consequences, near or far, of the new policy, or rather the policy enunciated for the first time in the open by the Foreign Secretary. Let us consider but two of its aspects, which, although related but indirectly to Sir Edward Grey's speech, offer special interest to Canada.

The first is the decisive light thrown by that incident on the situation of the self-governing colonies,—the “sister-nations”, as pompously called by drawing room Empire makers.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES TO THE COLONIES

The policy announced by Sir Edward Grey tends to modify deeply the world's situation; it may also increase or cramp the economical prosperity and the territorial safety of the various countries of the Empire.

From the abandonment of protected nations to the sacrifice of colonial rights and pretensions, whether justified or not, the distance is much shorter than might be thought at first,—especially if both policies have the same object in view, that is, to conciliate rival powers.

In so far as Canada is particularly concerned, our immigration laws and tariff regulations, the safety of our trade, ports and frontiers, may be largely affected by this new attitude of the imperial government,—not to speak of the three-sided problem of Anglo-American relations, which, on account of the peculiar situation of Canada, a country British politically, but American geographically, remains forever the most important and the toughest for us to solve.

But for all that, neither Canada nor any of the “sister-nations” of the Empire, can say or do anything whatever to favour or oppose the adoption of that policy.

The speech of the British Foreign Secretary was delivered in an obscure burgh of the United Kingdom—its name was not even transmitted by the cable;—but it was

addressed to the people of the British Isles and to the civilised world at large. Before it was uttered, Sir Edward Grey deliberated with the ambassadors of the great powers; or at least he thought of the sentiment and the situation of the foreign nations they represent. That declaration of the British Government will be an object of consideration by the rulers of the smallest countries; it will be accounted for in the framing of their external policy. That speech has been read by every voter in the United Kingdom, from the peer of the realm to the humblest labourer. The British electorate may approve or condemn it, and will, by their suffrage, either uphold or repeal the policy enunciated by their Foreign Minister.

Alone, in the whole world, Canadians, New Zealanders, Australians, South Africans, have nothing to do with it. Subjects of His Britannic Majesty, that policy may and will affect them; but they have not the power to act upon it, either favourably or adversely, as the Germans, the Russians, the French, the Americans, the Chinese, the Belgians, the Swiss, the Dutch, ~~may do~~ *with* full liberty. As citizens of the "sister-nations of the Empire", they may be called upon to pay the tribute of blood and money in order to uphold that policy, or in consequence of its adoption; but they do not share with the ratepayers of England, Scotland and Ireland, the right to express their satisfaction or their discontent by their votes, that ultimate expression of the will of a free people!

Can a more subordinate position be conceived?

In that situation, Canada finds, of course, many notable advantages. She thus escapes heavy burdens and serious inconveniences. But it shows also how far Canada is from being a nation, and, consequently, how illogical and unjust it is to try and make her assume the responsibilities of a nation, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier wanted her to do, by creating his Navy. As long as that position remains unchanged, it leaves without any foundation the doctrine of the jingo-imperialists, who claim that we should share with Great Britain the burden of Imperial armaments, by land and by sea, and thereby bear the consequences of a policy conceived, expressed and executed, without our consent, possibly to our detriment, by politicians and rulers over whom we cannot exercise the slightest control!

WHAT IS WORTH TO-DAY THE NAVAL ORGANISATION OF GREAT BRITAIN ?

“THE BETRAYAL”

The foreign policy of Great Britain and her naval organisation are intimately connected. As above stated, England, in carrying out her policy of intervention, has always “enforced her arguments with the full strength of her Navy.” One has only to read the history of England from the time of Elizabeth and Cromwell to be struck with the evidence of that historical truism.

That policy and its effectiveness reached their zenith at the time of the partition of Europe, after Napoleon’s downfall. It was Trafalgar more than Waterloo that gave Wellington and Castlereagh the power to dominate the congresses of Vienna and Verona; it was the British fleet more than the British army that gave to Disraeli the means of swaying the Berlin congress.

Is that power on its decline? Does England renounce her right of intervention because she no longer feels strong enough to impose it on all seas?

If such were the case, the coincidence of Sir Edward Grey’s speech and of the publication of Lord Charles Beresford’s book would be of a much greater import than the mere interest aroused by the simultaneous transmission of both incidents by the eclectic cable agency; and the above question would instinctively recur to the mind under this more concrete form: Does England renounce her right of intervention, because her fleet and naval organisation are in such a state of disorder as described by Lord Beresford?

The sole title of the book is sufficient to mark the bitterness of its contents. In its main parts and criticism, it may be summarised as follows:

The training of navy officers, of engineers especially, is absolutely defective.

The “scrapping” policy adopted in 1904 was so bad that it had to be reversed in 1909. Meanwhile, out of 102

(1)—“THE BETRAYAL” — by Lord Charles Beresford;— P. S. King & Son, London, 1912, 1 vol. 2s. 6d. (\$0.50).

ships "scrapped" in 1904, making a total of 155 discarded units, there were 80 good ships that could still have done excellent service and were replaced by large battleships, such as the Dreadnoughts, which cannot be used for the same purposes.

As to the dreadnoughts,—the famous dreadnoughts so dear to the "admirals" of the *Montreal Star* and the sea-dogs of the *Toronto Telegram*,—they are inferior to the latest American, Japanese and German battleships, and moreover, cannot take the place of the fast cruisers to do police work on the trade sea routes. The whole thing is called "**THE DELUSION OF THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY**"... "most unfortunately... introduced to the public by means of an organised system of advertisement in the press." On this point, Lord Beresford's opinion coincides with that of Sir William White, late director of Naval construction for the British government.

The refusal or neglect of the Admiralty to construct docks for the large battleships constitutes "**A BETRAYAL OF THE PUBLIC TRUST**", and abandons the most important fighting units of the fleet to all the dangers and hazards of war.

"Coaling and repairing stations overseas... have been dismantled and their stores have been sold."

"The fleet is gravely deficient in small cruisers and destroyers... The present condition of the trade routes is a **NATIONAL DANGER**. In 1903, there were sixty small cruisers placed on foreign stations. To-day there are 23."

"The home fleet was a **FRAUD** on the public and a **DANGER** to the State. During the two years which elapsed before the fraud was finally abandoned, ... the navy... would have suffered an initial reverse if not a crushing defeat."

The admiralty is charged with encouraging **ESPIONAGE** and **DELATION** on the part of officers against their superiors, with breaking the career of those other officers who have the courage to remain straight and loyal and disapprove of the tactics and policy of the admiralty. It is even accused with having retarded the construction or the equipment of ships for the benefit of two allied firms, in which some Lords or officials of the Admiralty are openly suspected of having pecuniary interests.

To sum up, Lord Beresford says: "*that the Naval policy of the years 1902 to 1909 was mistaken in every important particular;*" that although "*individual officers, particular crews, and single ships have never been more efficient,...***THE FLEET AS A WHOLE,...***HAS SELDOM BEEN LESS ADEQUATE.*" (1)

What the theories of the Admiral are worth, how far his criticisms and charges are well founded, I cannot, of course, attempt to decide. Lord Beresford counts, both in the Army and the Navy, and amongst the British public at large, many admirers, sincere adherents, and even enthusiastic supporters. His contradictors, opponents and even enemies, are also numerous. His personal standing, experience and services, nobody denies.

At times, he has been nicknamed the "systematic detractor" of the Admiralty, the Cassandra of Britain. By the way, it may not be out of place to recall that Cassandra was right: the Trojans, annoyed at her ill-omened predictions, found it out at their expense, but too late.

Lord Beresford's opinions and advices have almost invariably been met with tacit resistance or open contradiction from the Lords of the Admiralty and the politicians responsible for the Naval organisation and the maintenance of the fleet.

It looks, however, as if his ideas were making their way.

Mr. McKenna's resignation and Mr. Churchill's accession, as First Lord of the Admiralty, would be partly due to Lord Beresford's criticisms. The publication of his volume would even have been delayed, and many pages either struck off or rendered less bitter, because of the reforms made by the new minister and advocated for a long time by the admiral. One of these is the constitution of a Naval war staff.

In short, Lord Beresford cannot be looked upon as an amateur. His opinions in matters of war and naval defence seem to exercise an ever growing influence: they cannot be ignored. At all events, they must be worth as much as those of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr. Borden; his technical knowledge should at least rival the science that may be possessed, either individually or collectively, by Mr. Brodeur, Mr. Foster or Mr. Lemieux.

(1) These paragraphs did not appear in the French text. Lord Beresford's book had not yet come to Canada when this article was written.

Now, his work crushes with its full weight the policy adopted or propounded by our Canadian politicians of both parties, from the adoption of the famous resolution of the 29th March 1909 till the 21st September 1911.

RELATION TO OUR NAVY POLICY

The minister whom Lord Beresford's criticism has followed up and forced out of office, is that same Mr. McKenna who prepared the plans of the Laurier Navy. Out of his hands, Mr. Brodeur received all cooked, and accepted blindly, the scheme which Sir Wilfrid Laurier endeavoured to impose on Canada.

The defunct *Niobe*, that Mr. Hazen, so we are told, wishes to bring back to life, and the agonising *Rainbow*, both belong to the same class of ships of which 102 were scrapped in 1904.

Those models of dreadnoughts, inferior to German, Japanese and American ships, are precisely those which Mr. Borden wanted us to adopt and construct hastily, at the cost of some twenty odd millions.

Once constructed, the Canadian dreadnoughts, thanks to the "betrayal" of the British Admiralty and their neglect to build proper docks, would have been exposed, as their British prototypes, to all the dangers of sea warfare.

That ineffective, impracticable training of Navy officers and engineers, is the same which has been decided upon, and not yet abandoned, for the training of our navy cadets,—not to speak of the dancing lessons at Yarmouth and elsewhere.

That Admiralty to which the fate of Canadian ships and crews would be handed over, in time of war, by virtue of the Navy Act, voted in 1911 and not yet abrogated, is the same Admiralty that Lord Beresford charges with incompetency, blindness, stupidity, corruption and even with "betrayal of public trust."

As to what opinion that distinguished officer holds of the efficiency of the Laurier policy, it is sufficient to quote the following extracts:

"The contributions of the Dominions towards the naval defence of the Empire are based upon the principle of local autonomy. New-Zealand alone has declared herself in favor of one Imperial Navy. Australia and Canada control their own Navies, and reserve the right to decide whether or not in case of war their fleets shall aid the Imperial government. It follows that, with regard to the naval forces of the Empire, there is dual control; **A SYSTEM WHICH IS IMPRACTICABLE IN PEACE AND DISASTROUS IN WAR.**

The plain fact is that, when in 1909 the representatives of the Dominions were called together in conference to discuss the question of their contribution to the naval defence of the Empire, every difficulty was deliberately ignored by the Imperial government, and **THE DOMINIONS WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT, IF THEY BUILT SHIPS ALL WOULD BE WELL.**

As matters stand, it must be said — however disagreeable the task — that **THE DOMINIONS' NAVIES CANNOT BE RECKONED AMONG THE EFFECTIVE NAVAL FORCES OF THE EMPIRE**". (1)

That book and the facts thereby revealed have come in due time to strengthen the many other reasons which demand the immediate repeal of the Navy Act.

The least that can be said, is that such grave charges, brought against the British Admiralty by one of the most distinguished naval officers of the British Empire, demand a full discussion and a thorough investigation, in order that the whole truth be known.

In that discussion, we, Canadians, can take but an academic part. That investigation and the reforms that may be found necessary we have neither the right nor the power to impose. The voters of the United Kingdom, our "brethren" and "equals" in theory, our masters in reality, alone possess such right and power.

But what is in our power, what remains within the very restricted limits of our colonial action, is to let the British authorities understand that we are not prepared to enter blindly into a naval organisation judged to be absolutely inadequate by one of the most important British officers; that we do not mean to hand over the direction of our ships, the lives of our sailors, or the use of our money, to the authority of a board which the same officer publicly charges with ignorance, inability, malversation and betrayal.

(1) "The Betrayal", pages 158 and 160.

The clearest way to express our mind in that regard, is to repeal the law by which the exercise of that authority has been made possible.

Besides, the repeal of the law would not compromise in any way the future action of the Government and of Parliament. It would simply clear the ground; and once the ground was cleared, the Government would remain free to propose what would be, in their opinion, the most practical plan for organising the defence of Canadian territory, and for determining the most efficient participation which Canada should take in the general defence of the Empire.

TRUE PRINCIPLES OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

MEMORANDUM FROM THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE. (1)

Upon the vital question of Imperial defence, the Colonial Defence Committee (now the Imperial Defence Committee) issued, on the 31st December 1896, a memorandum dealing, in a most illuminative way, both with the general principles and the technical details of the defence of the whole Colonial Empire. For fifteen years, it was kept in the dark by the Canadian Government. It has just been brought down in the House of Commons, at Ottawa.

The importance of the document would easily impress itself on the minds of readers who would not be discouraged by its length and the abundance of technical details.

For the public at large it may be of interest to know the history of that memorandum, and to find out, through a concise synopsis, the principles on which it is based and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom; then, to determine how far those principles and conclusions apply to the situation created by the adoption of the Navy Act.

(1) See appendix A.

In July 1896, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Chamberlain, transmitted to the governors and commanding officers in all the overseas dominions—Crown or self-governing colonies—a memorandum, marked "confidential", but not "secret," dated May 19th 1896, and also prepared under the authority of the Colonial Defence Committee. That paper was but the enunciation, under a more developed form, of the principles of military defence which had been accepted by the Australian colonies, after repeated efforts on the part of British authorities, and which it was now sought to extend to the other portions of the Empire. While requesting the Colonial authorities not to make the paper public, the Colonial Secretary recommended that it should be communicated freely to civil officials and military officers responsible for the defence of each colony.

One year later, in August 1897, the memorandum just brought down was sent by Mr. Chamberlain to the same Colonial authorities. Dated December 31st 1896, and therefore already seven months old when sent, this second report is the exact reproduction of the paper dated May 19th of the same year, with the exception of some details on points of strategy, which ought not, as was properly thought, to be known to foreigners. Two interesting paragraphs, one of general interest and the other referring especially to Canada, were also left out without any apparent motive of national safety. To these I will refer presently.

Apart from those excisions, the second document, I repeat, was absolutely identical with the first—except that it was marked neither "secret" nor "confidential", and for an excellent reason: the suppressions made in the first text were made precisely in order that the second edition might be published.

The explanation is simple. The object of the first memorandum was to impress upon the minds of colonial authorities the principles of Imperial defence; and in order to better reach its purpose by being more conclusive, it contained certain strategical informations tending to facilitate the application of the general principles. In making the second report, the Committee meant to popularise, to vulgarise, so to speak, those same principles, with a view to inducing the people of the colonies to accept

them. It was therefore expurgated of all such details as were of no use to the public at large, within the Empire, but could have given to foreign powers some information the divulgence of which might have endangered the safety of the Empire. This, however, does not apply to the two paragraphs already alluded to.

As can easily be seen at once, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his colleagues had no reason whatever to hide that document, or to refuse to bring it down at the request of any member of Parliament. On the contrary, their duty would have been to make it public the moment it was received in August 1897.

WHY THE MEMORANDUM WAS CONCEALED

Why were the ministers remiss in their duty? Why did they refuse to accede to Mr. Monk's request, or what is graver still, to obey an order of the House adopted on the 7th December 1910, on Mr. Monk's motion, and to bring down that document before the close of last session and the general elections?

To hold the Minister of Militia solely responsible for that inexcusable inaction, as has been attempted, is an explanation which cannot be maintained. First, in 1897 and long after, Sir Frederick Borden, in spite of his other failings, was decidedly anti-Imperialist. On no occasion did he fail to resist the interference of imperial authorities in the military policy and administration of Canada. He would have felt no reluctance in making known a document in the conclusions of which the principle of Colonial autonomy was strongly upheld and justified.

Moreover, that paper, of a high importance, had been sent to the Governor General, Lord Minto. In order to keep it concealed from the Prime Minister and his colleagues, there must have been collusion between the Governor and the Minister of Militia. Now, it is no secret to anyone that Lord Minto and his gallant war minister were not a pair of friends: they were not even on speaking terms.

Besides, had collusion ever existed, it would have become impossible the day that Mr. Monk moved in the House for the production of the papers, to the full knowledge of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the whole Government.

No, there is but one explanation possible. In the technical details of that memorandum, in its recommendations as to the purchase of cannons, guns, ammunition and war material, as to the training of troops and the organisation of war services, could have been found, in a large measure, the justification of the policy adopted by the Conservative government, before 1896,—the famous Tupper-Desjardins' purchase of guns;—and consequently the condemnation of the violent charges made by Mr. Laurier and most of his Quebec candidates—Mr. Brodeur notably—against their opponents, guilty of the criminal purpose “of arming the Canadians and sending them to die for England in Africa!” No danger that so clear a justification should be offered to defeated opponents!

Then came the South African war, the Imperialist propaganda, the reaction, and the awakening of Nationalism: all good reasons not to let public opinion, and the various factions endeavouring to catch its favour, become acquainted with a document in which so many weapons could be found and used against the Cabinet.

Lastly, came the “German scare”, Mr. Foster's motion, the Laurier-Borden embrace, the rupture, Drummond-Arthabaska. It was less opportune than ever to let the Canadian people know, by the most crushing evidence, that British authorities, responsible for the organisation of Colonial defence, stood in full condemnation of all the plans of our drawing-room warriors, of Mr. Borden's dreadnoughts and Sir Wilfrid Laurier's *Niobes* as well.

To justify the Conservatives, in 1897 would have been humiliating: to give reason to the Nationalists, in 1910, was infinitely more dangerous.

Thus it is that party spirit and the lust of power bring statesmen to the point of violating their most essential duties, of imperilling national safety, to save their self pride or their portfolios!

Let no one think, however, that such processes are monopolised by Liberals. Many a good Conservative would be terribly angry at his leaders, should they fail to do likewise, if the occasion demanded it “for the sake of the PARTY!” O holy Party, what amount of nastiness is committed in thy name!

Let one read the very interesting "Autobiography" just published of the late Sir William Butler, Commander of British forces at the Cape, before the outbreak of the Boer war; and there it will be found, to the *relative* justification of our politicians, that processes of a similar nature are resorted to in almost every part of the glorious Empire "on which the sun never sets." "*Relative*" is here used by the same kind of reasoning which brought Jules Lemaitre to say that the terror of eternal Gehenna was greatly alleviated by the thought that so many people were going there.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONALIST POLICY

If the memorandum of 1896 is attentively scrutinised, it will be found that, all technical details and developments being set aside, as having no other object but to strengthen the initial propositions laid down and the conclusions arrived at, the whole work can be boiled down to the five following statements: (1)

Sea supremacy is the basis of British power. In order to maintain that supremacy, Great Britain assumes *the full responsibility* of the general protection of the Empire; she keeps to herself the *absolute and exclusive direction* of the Imperial Navy, and the *entire liberty to dispose at her will* of the squadrons and units of which the Navy is made. (Par. 1.)

To the *naval defence of the Empire* the colonies can and should contribute by supplying the British fleet with harbours of refuge and coaling and repairing stations; also by making their ports safe from attack, and protecting their territory against foreign invasion. (Par. 2 and 3.)

In the organisation of Colonial defence the *local conditions*, both internal and external, of each colony must be considered. Land defence should be the main object of continental colonies, *such as Canada*; coast defence that of maritime colonies. (Par. 4.)

For their coast and naval defence, *colonies should not construct costly and useless local fleets*, nor even too extensive fortifications; but rather train and equip local troops, *in view of local defence*, and maintain them on a footing of efficiency. (Par. 16.)

(1) The figures at the end of each of the following paragraphs correspond to the numbered paragraphs of the memorandum. These will be found reproduced in full as Appendix A.

“The development of their own vast territories in time of peace, and the effective protection of them in time of war, is undoubtedly the best contribution the colonies can offer to Imperial defence.” (Par. 19.)

This last paragraph is quoted *verbatim* from the conclusion of the memorandum: it sums up the whole thing.

It may be objected that, as a counter part of that general conclusion, the day is anticipated when the self-governing colonies will be able “to materially assist the Mother country, by placing at her disposal, for operations in any quarter of the globe, bodies of troops, formed from the excellent material of strong, self reliant colonists.”

Far from being weakened by that expression of Imperialist tendencies, Nationalism finds in it a double justification.

First, it removes all doubts as to the Imperialist sentiments of the authors of this memorandum, and thereby gives an additional weight to their opinion and testimony against the policy we fight.

Second, it lays down the principle that such eventual contributions from the colonies must remain subordinated to the duty resting upon each of them to provide, first of all, for the material development and the military protection of their respective territories; and then, any Imperial contribution is limited to “wars which carry with them no dangers of attack on the colonies.”

Can there be a more explicit acknowledgment of the principle invariably propounded by the Nationalists, to the great scandal of Imperialist doctrinaires and hypocritical politicians: *that the primary duty of the colonies, is to look after their own defence?*

Did Mr. Monk ever speak otherwise, from his first utterance on the subject at the Lachine banquet, in November 1909? What else have we contented and stood for during the whole campaign in 1910, and the Drummond-Arthabaska election? What other principles have been asserted in the St. Eustache Resolutions and exposed for the last two years, in the columns of *Le Devoir*? (1)

(1) See Appendix C.

And what adds a double weight to that testimony, is that it lies in a memorandum carefully prepared by a committee specially entrusted by the Imperial parliament with the task of enlightening the colonies upon these matters. In that memorandum are laid down the *principles* on which the colonies must organise their military system; the "*erroneous conceptions*" of several Colonial rulers are set aside; Colonial governments are warned against *exaggerated expenditure* as well as ill-considered retrenchments, and, in general, against all schemes varying from the direction given by the committee and interfering with "the completeness of the general scheme of national defence to which so much importance is attributed."

TWO INTERESTING OMISSIONS

Reference has been made above to two important excisions made in the "confidential" memorandum of the 19th May 1896. I have no scruple in giving them out; for, contrary to the other omitted parts, these have no reference to strategical informations, while they are, to us Canadians, of more than passing interest.

The first omission is from the second paragraph, relating to the exclusive authority of the Admiralty over naval forces. In the suppressed passage, it was stated positively that the immediate object of the British fleet is to protect *British trade*, and not to be scattered on all seas to look after the defence of more or less important Colonial towns and harbours. This was evidently the origin of the withdrawal of the squadrons from Halifax and Esquimalt.

Why was that important statement suppressed? Evidently for fear of scandalising the loyalty and hurting the self pride of Colonials, infinitely more touchy on those matters than old father John Bull.

But it offers undoubtedly an additional justification, too valuable not to be signalised, of the contentions of the Nationalists and of all those who have opposed the Borden dreadnoughts and the Laurier-*Niobes*, and have constantly asserted that the people of Britain do not maintain their navy for the defence of the colonies, but for their own advantage, for the protection of their trade and their daily food.

It is not, I confess, without a certain sense of satisfaction that I have drawn that declaration from the dark corner in which those gentlemen of the Defence Committee had thought proper to conceal it. It is sufficient, I think, to vindicate the Nationalists from the bitter charges of "disloyalty", of "ingratitude", which the same declaration, as uttered by them, brought upon them from the Lemieux, the Guthries, the Sinclairs, the Macdonalds (of the *Globe*), the Dougal's (of the *Witness*), and other loyalty-coated comedians.

As to sincere Imperialists, who unceasingly talk of the sacrifices made by Great Britain to protect our trade on the high seas, let their attention be called to the fact that, in the omitted paragraph, the Imperial authorities speak of nothing else but "*British trade*". And they are right.

By far, the largest proportion of our exports by sea consists in foodstuffs which the British people need to live on. For us, it is a question of *profit*; for the British people it is a question of *subsistence*. It is, therefore, *their trade* much more than ours that the people of Britain protect when they make safe, by use of their fleet, the transportation of Canadian goods to Great Britain.

The other omission specially concerns Canada. It was part of paragraph 4 in which the idea is developed that *every colony should organise its defence in conformity with its local conditions*. This sentence has remained: "The defence of Canada, *with its long land frontier*, obviously requires to be treated on a different basis from that of the small island of St. Helena."

In the omitted part, the situation of Canada was compared to that of India. It was stated that the Indian government had at last understood that the immense empire committed to their care is *continental* as much at least as it is maritime; and therefore that its land defence must be strongly organised. The hope was further expressed that the Canadian government would soon come to the same conclusion. It could have been added that such conclusion is much more imperative in the case of Canada than it is with India. Canadian territory is more continental and less maritime than India. On account of various circumstances, some of them natural, others political, Canada is less exposed than India to an attack by sea, and infinitely less protected on land by natural obstacles.

It may be noted in passing that the opinion of the Colonial Defence Committee found its confirmation, five years later, in a report from Col. Altham, now, if I am not mistaken, a brigadier general. In the report, submitted to the Imperial Conference of 1902, with the approval and under the authority of the Imperial Government, it was stated that the most effective contribution which Canada can make to Imperial defence, is to prepare means of resistance to any possible attack from the United States; and it was admitted implicitly that if the defence of Canada was seriously organised in view of such possible eventuality, every thing would have been done that could reasonably be expected from the Canadian people.

Here again, coupling that report of 1902 with the memorandum of 1896, is it unfair to contend that all the statements, either verbal or written, made by the Nationalists for the last two years, that my own utterances in the House of Commons, as early as in 1900 and 1901, at the time and on the occasion of the South African war, have been amply justified, in almost identical language, by Imperial authorities?

Again, is it much beyond the mark to state that in the memorandum of 1896 is to be found the absolute condemnation of the policy propounded or adopted by either of our "great parties", from the 29th March 1909 to the 21st September 1911?

CONDEMNATION OF OUR NAVY POLICY

In what way, may I ask, would the Borden-head-noughts, the Laurier-Niobes, or the Lemieux-Rainbows, fill the *hope* expressed, in 1896, by the Imperial authorities, that Canada should at last meet the exigencies of her land defence? What would be worth, for Canada's safety, the display of naval force, now contemplated, the purchase of discarded ships, or the costly construction of vessels built from "scrapped" models? What protection would thereby be offered to the "long land frontier" of Canada? How far, by that policy, have we met the requirements indicated and the suggestions made, fifteen years ago, by the very men charged with the responsibility of looking after the material safety of the Empire?

What has been done for the protection of Canada's shores and harbours, for the equipment of its few fortresses, for the renewal of her coast artillery? Have even the most elementary works of defence, recommended by the Committee, been performed?

What has been done, or rather what has *not* been done, for the re-organisation of our militia, the report of General French is there to testify with crushing evidence.

No, for the defence of Canada and the safety of the Empire, *nothing* has been done: but *everything* has been said and done to exploit sentiment, to foster sectional passions and prejudices.

Of that anti-national attitude and policy, the Navy Act adopted in 1910 is the concrete and tangible expression.

All true Canadians, all sincere believers in every political doctrine, all those at least who have no personal interest to serve, no party advantage to oppose to national welfare, should not rest in their demand for the repeal of the Navy Act, because in that law are embodied all the "erroneous conceptions" reprobated in advance by the Defence Committee, because all and every one of the principles on which the military organisation of the Empire should rest are thereby ignored or violated, and "the completeness of the general scheme of national defence," "marred" or arrested.

If the law is repealed, those who will have worked to bring about that result will have rendered a real service to Canada and the Empire; they will have shown themselves better Canadians and truer British subjects than the exalted *loyalists* of the *Montreal Star*, and the sycophants of the Macdonald brand, who, according to circumstances, constitute themselves either the vile interpreters of American interests, or the base exploiters of Canadian jingoism.

SHOULD THE PRINCIPLES OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE BE CHANGED ?

THE "GERMAN SCARE" AND THE DREADNOUGHT CRAZE

The upholders of the principle of Naval contributions may raise this objection: The situation of the British Empire has changed so completely, both within and without, since fifteen years, that the basis of its military organisation should be radically modified. In other terms, the principle of local defence should be partially or totally set aside in the colonies, and we must rush headlong into a policy of participation in the general naval defence of the Empire, heretofore reserved by Great Britain as her own task, to be performed under the exclusive responsibility and undivided control of her government.

The rapid increase of foreign fleets, that of Germany especially, is the pretence invoked by those who favour the revolution. Great Britain, they claim, has lost, or at least is on the point of losing, the "two standard power."

Heaven save me from the foolish pretension of constituting myself a judge in those matters! That I leave to the soft water sailors who build and sink fleets in editors' offices, clubs and Parliaments. As, however, those scoundrels have faced no other storms than those raised in their inkstands, or in the bottom of the sweet-water or whiskey-soda glasses in which their burning patriotism is to be quenched, one may be permitted not to attach too much importance to their opinions.

But what no attentive bystander, even ignorant of military or naval matters, can fail to observe, is that all the warlike agitation out of which sprung the Navy Bill, the unceasing flow of ink and eloquence, the various schemes and counter schemes of Canadian navy or contribution to the naval defence of the Empire—all that arose from the "German scare." The Laurier law, itself the result of the Laurier-Borden Resolution and of the Foster motion, is the direct off-spring of the false patriotism and the blind fright born and bred from the "German Scare" and the exploitation made of it by politicians of all shades.

And that terror known as the "German Scare", whence did it proceed? From the excessive importance attributed

to dreadnoughts, and from the presumption that, within a determined number of years, the German fleet would possess more dreadnoughts than the British.

Now, the falsity of that presumption has been demonstrated by the eminently competent authority of Sir William White, late director of naval construction in Great Britain. (1) With facts and figures, he has shown that the building of dreadnoughts in England is going as fast as in Germany; and that, as regards the number and the effectiveness of other types of ships, the superiority of the British fleet is still overwhelming, and the two standard power untouched.

The fact that Sir William White was then retired, and could not therefore be suspected of any desire to come to the rescue of the government under which he served, adds much weight to his testimony. By no other authority of equal standing, has he ever been contradicted—at least to my knowledge.

If, according to that expert, instead of driving the people mad, both in the Kingdom and the colonies, Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna, Mr. Balfour, “and other politicians, innocent of all technical knowledge”, had but taken the trouble of studying facts and figures and putting them clearly before the House of Commons, there would never have been “the approach of a scare” on account of the groundless German peril;—and, consequently, no Laurier-Borden Resolution, no Navy Law, no *Niobes*, no dreadnoughts, no schemes of all sorts, germed and fermented in the brains of Canadian politicians and journalists, as “innocent”, at least, “of all technical knowledge” as their British prototypes, but infinitely more guilty of duplicity and unsound demagoguery.

On the other point, touching the general superiority of dreadnoughts over ships of a smaller size, or fast cruisers, that superiority, according to Sir William White and contrary to common opinion, is far from being demonstrated.

An interesting communication on that subject appeared in the *Montreal Gazette* of the 5th February 1912, under the signature of Captain Reid (2). It should be read by

(1) Sir William White's opinion was expressed at length in the “Nineteenth Century”, april 1909.

(2) See Appendice B.

all who take an interest in such matters, especially by public men and journalists sincerely desirous of drawing their inspirations from other sources than party gospels. In that letter will be found the opinion of another competent authority, on dreadnoughts especially, and on our navy craze in general. "*Graft*" rather than "*craft*" is, to his mind, the germ of the dreadnought fever; in other terms, naval science and national safety are sacrificed to the cupidity of large shipbuilding firms.

As noted above, on that very question of the effectiveness of dreadnoughts, the opinion of Sir William White, optimistic as it is on many other points, is confirmed by Lord Charles Beresford, the pessimist.

The admiral's fierce criticism bears mainly on the defective training of officers and engineers, on the lack of system in the general organisation of the Navy, on the scarcity and bad state of coaling stations and harbours of supply, on the absence of repairing docks for the larger ships, and especially on the ill inspired policy of retrenchment practised by the present British government with the knavish complicity of the Admiralty.

In what manner would that deplorable state of things be improved either by pseudo-Canadian ships, under "Admiral" Laurier, or Imperial dreadnoughts, under "Vice-Admiral" Borden, or Anglo-Canadian ships of all kinds, commanded by "Rear-Admiral" Sir Hugh Graham (of the *Montreal Star*) ?

COMMAND OF THE ADMIRALTY

Under any system, our ships, whether Canadian, English *blue-blood*, half-breed, or quarteroons, would, in time of war, be under the control of the British Admiralty. The principle of colonial participation in British naval operations being once admitted, the unity of command in time of war must be accepted.

On that point, the opinion and policy of the Imperial authorities have never varied. To that policy the Canadian government refused to accede in 1902 and 1907, but finally gave way.

At the special conference of 1909, at which Mr. Brodeur and Sir Frederick Borden carried out the mandate imposed upon them by the resolution voted in the House

of Commons on the 29th March 1909, and whence they brought back the famous Navy Bill, it was positively stated by the first Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna, that "it has been recognized by the Colonial Governments that, in time of war, the local naval forces should come under the general directions of the Admiralty". (1)

The arrangement concluded in London, last year, between the Imperial and Canadian governments, leaves no possible doubt in that regard:

XVI.—"*In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet and will remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war*".

So that under the operation of the Laurier law, our sailors and ships, our blood and the outcome of our taxes, would be, in time of war, handed over to the exclusive authority of the Admiralty, that is, I do not hesitate to repeat, of "a Board which one of the most eminent British officers publicly charges with ignorance, inability, malversation and betrayal."

Far from being weakened by Lord Beresford's denunciations, the attitude that we, Nationalists, have taken in that respect cannot but be strengthened.

Besides, from those denunciations no definite conclusions can be drawn, either by Imperialists or Nationalists, till they are proven true or false after a thorough investigation.

That investigation, the British government, who are the absolute masters of the British fleet, which they maintain for the safety of British trade and the subsistence of the British people, should order without delay and carry to the very end.

Pending such enquiry and its findings, the least that can be said is that, if anything is changed in our situation by such facts as are revealed by Lord Beresford, it is surely not in a sense favourable to the maintenance of the Laurier Navy Act. Nothing can be found in those revelations to justify Mr. Borden and his colleagues in keeping on our statutes a piece of legislation declared by themselves

(1) "Sessional papers", 1910, 29A.

bad and ineffective. Neither could any excuse be found therein for the inaction and silence of those representatives from Quebec, Ontario, or elsewhere, who have denounced the Navy Act previous to their election. Let us hope none of them has denounced it just for the sake of being elected.

As for us, we persist in saying: *The law is bad, let the law be repealed. "Delenda Carthago!"*

HAVE THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES RE- NOUNCED THE PRINCIPLES OF 1896 ?

The Navy Act and all other counter schemes of participation in the naval defence of the Empire, stood manifestly condemned in advance by the principles laid down in 1896 by the Colonial defence committee. This, I think, has been proven beyond doubt. And nothing positive, no accepted theory, no established fact, justify the government and the people of Canada in believing that the conditions and the requirements of Imperial defence are modified to the point of inducing us to abandon the principles which were thought essential fifteen years ago.

Some contradictors, either through ignorance, lack of attention, or bad faith, hold that "British authorities" have since spoken and acted differently. In several instances, they contend, and notably at the Imperial conferences of 1902, 1907 and 1909, the Admiralty has *substituted* the principle of Colonial participation in the Imperial naval defence of the Empire for the heretofore accepted principle of local land defence.

Should that nonsense be true, this would hardly be the time of putting it under the lime-light. Before the Admiralty's advices are invoked as so many oracles, and Canadians urged to bow to its orders as Mohammedans of old to the Great Turk's Divan, would it not be proper to wait till it is established whether or not the Admiralty is guilty of ignorance, incapability, knavery, graft and betrayal?

But, as a matter of fact, such a revolution in principles and policy of defence has never been advocated either by the Admiralty or by any other constituted body, holding any responsibility in the organisation of the military or naval defence of the Empire.

What is true, is that certain British statesmen, "politicians innocent of all technical knowledge", have solicited the colonies, even pressed them forward, to assume *new responsibilities* and take upon their shoulders, in addition to the burden of their local defence, the load of a direct contribution to the general defence, both military and naval, of the Empire. According to circumstances, the nature, degree and mode of that requested contribution have varied with the personnel of British administrations and the dispositions of the political parties that have swayed alternately British politics.

First and above all others, Mr. Chamberlain expressed his views and wishes with the bold and broad logic that has justly deserved the admiration of those even who have most constantly opposed his ideas,—but also with the lack of scruple which once induced Gladstone to define him as "the first British politician of the Yankee type."

Mr. Chamberlain's successors have followed in his footsteps with less fervour, strenuousness and logic. In a general way, they may be divided into two categories, corresponding, or about so, to the lines of party demarcations. Tory-Unionists have remained more or less faithful to Mr. Chamberlain's creed: they have endeavoured mainly to foster the growth of a vast though ill-defined plan of Imperial unification, in which military centralisation was but the main feature. In that plan, colonies were at least offered to share in the authority as well as in the burdens of Empire.

The Radicals, more timid and selfish, have rather tried to bring the colonies to take upon themselves a part of the military burden now resting upon Britain alone, but without offering them any share in the exercise of Imperial authority. By that policy, they wish evidently to extricate themselves from the dilemma on the horns of which they have been thrown,—one being their pledges of economy in war expenditures, the other the "German scare" and the will of the nation to maintain the efficiency of the British fleet, for the protection of British trade and the subsistence of the British people.

A POLICY OF DECEIT

Both Unionists and Radicals have, almost constantly, looked upon the problem from the point of view of British

interests, passions or prejudices. They spoke and acted as representatives of the United Kingdom, counting upon the favour and the votes of British electors to uphold their arguments, attitude and political situation. Who could blame them?

But, that most Colonial statesmen, politicians and publicists,—in Canada especially—should have played straight into the hands of British politicians, is incredible and grotesque but nevertheless true. They have striven as hard as they could to keep straight facts unknown or wrongly known to the people of Canada; with their clamorous appeals to “loyalty” they covered the voice of common sense; they have impaired the old sentiment of British pride, and opposed the development of a strong national sentiment; under the fallacious pretence of Imperial unity, they have created and fostered a false sentiment of loyalty, and even at times, disgusting servility. The virile and proud language of our statesmen of old they have forgotten to speak; and in order to better deceive the people, they have fallen into the ridiculous habit of sounding the name, void of all sense, of a “Canadian nation”, while they were doing their best to destroy its substance:—the *will* by which nations are conceived, the *manliness* by which they are generated, the *vigilance* by which they are kept alive.

In pursuance of their enterprises and in support of their various schemes, British ministers have submitted to Imperial conferences reports and memoranda, prepared under their authority by military and naval officers attached to the administration of which these ministers were the political heads.

All those documents were evidently meant to lure Colonial politicians and bring them farther away in the direction followed since the time of the South African war,—a conflict provoked by Mr. Chamberlain with the almost avowed object of bringing to a white heat the exalted jingoism of the colonies and their mistaken loyalty.

If it was simply stated that all the moves made by British rulers, for the last twelve years, had in view to bring the colonies to accept the principle of participation in Imperial wars, on land and sea, and to get them to assume this new responsibility *over and above* the burden of their territorial defence, well and good.

But in this, I see no contradiction of my statement. The principles laid down in the memorandum of 1896, as regards colonial defence, have been weakened in no way by more recent attitudes and documents,—except perhaps on this point: in 1896, the colonies were warned against extravagant enterprises and expenditures; they were advised to devote their active energies, in time of peace, to the material development of their territory. Deceived or seduced by the boasts of our bellicose politicians, British ministers now believe that we are either wealthy or stupid enough to bear a double load.

As to the rest, nothing is changed. The British authorities are willing to accept our contributions to the Imperial army and navy; but they still tell us: Protect your harbours and frontiers; arm your fortresses and train your troops; and above all, organise your defence in view of the local and particular dangers that may threaten you.

The voice of reason has been heard, at times, even through memoranda and reports prepared in support of Imperialist doctrines and enterprises. Thus it is, as I have already stated, that in Col. Altham's report, submitted to the conference of 1902, is expressed anew the idea, developed in the memorandum of 1896: That Canada shall have paid generously her Imperial tribute when she has organised her militia to resist an attack from the United States, till at least reinforcements come from Great Britain. Thus it is also that in General French's report on the actual state of our militia is confirmed the opinion mildly but clearly indicated in the "confidential" memorandum of May 1896: That Canadian politicians have not yet understood that Canada being a *continental* country,—even more so than India,—its military defence should be organised accordingly.

No, nothing, absolutely nothing, has arisen, up to this day, to prove that the "British authorities", either civil, military or naval, facing squarely the problem of Imperial defence outside the sphere of political passions, have renounced the essential principle laid down in the memorandum of 1896:

"The development of their own vast territories in time of peace, and the effective protection of them in time of war, is undoubtedly the best contribution the colonies can offer to Imperial defence."

That principle remains true and just. It is in conformity with reason and with facts, with our history and traditions, with the policy accepted and practised constantly by all Canadian governments, up to the nefarious days of the South African war.

The application and consequences of that principle, every Canadian, every "loyal British subject", must accept; and in order to secure its triumph, the immediate repeal of the Navy Act, and the abandonment of the anti-national and anti-British policy through which that law was conceived, should be imperatively demanded.

THE NAVY ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

Whatever mode of contribution is advocated:—"Canadian" navy, dreadnoughts given to England, loans made or tributes paid to the British exchequer,—the various motives urged by all believers in the policy of Canadian participation in the naval defence of the Empire, may all be brought down to these two propositions: First, the external and internal conditions of the Empire are so radically changed, that a reversal of the principles heretofore acknowledged as essential to the good order and safety of the Empire has become imperative; second, the naval power of Britain is threatened: our own salvation and honour compel us to come to her rescue.

The truth of those hypotheses is, as I think I have proven, far from being demonstrated.

On the absurdity of the second proposition, a few observations might be added. The utter folly of the presumption that Canada can and should save England, maritime England especially, can easily be shown. If, after three centuries of glorious traditions, constant studies, intelligent efforts, all devoted to the development of her naval organisation, and inspired by the temperament of her people and the necessities of her insular position, by the exigencies of her world's trade and the government of her Empire,—if, after a century of undoubted sea supremacy—Great Britain cannot find in herself and by herself a cure to the evils and failings of her naval system,—then Canada, totally deficient as she is in those traditions, studies

and practice, whose local conditions impose upon her people numerous efforts of a radically different character, is absolutely incapable of advising Great Britain in that respect, of improving her naval policy and meeting its deficiencies.

However, let that aspect of the question be left aside for the time being; let it be presumed, for a moment, that the believers in the system of Colonial contribution are right, that their assumptions are well founded, either in whole or in part, and that, Canada "must do something":—such is the common phrase, used by scores of politicians from both races and parties. These worthy statesmen are as vague in their expressions as they are obscure in their ideas and weak in their principles. To "do something" they are bound imperiously—but they know not what, nor when, nor how.

All ordinary people, who, not being ministers, senators, or members of the House, remain under the painful necessity of knowing, thinking and acting, cannot rest satisfied with such nebulous formulas. Among those ordinary people, is there one man in good faith, whether Imperialist or Nationalist, with a fairly open mind, who will refuse to admit that if Canada "does something",—if she gets, by one way or another, into the naval organisation of the Empire,—if, to the task of defending her own territory is added a new burden, a portion of the burden of Imperial defence,—then a grave problem, a problem of constitution and public policy, is laid before her people and must be considered in its full breadth?

If Canada contributes, in any form whatsoever, to the general defence of the Empire, what authority will she exert on the Government of the Empire, on its foreign policy and in the general control of its fleet and army?

The absolute correlation between those two propositions has been well understood from the start by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Whatever tactical errors he may have committed of late, it is no exaggeration to say that Sir Wilfrid's political sense was superior to that of most of his Canadian contemporaries. Had he only possessed the will and the energy of a Cartier, a Blake or a Tupper! That any contribution to Imperial defence should carry before long, especially in the eyes of Anglo-Canadian's, the right of

representation in the government of the Empire, Sir Wilfrid Laurier foresaw from the first and felt all along, though with some interlapses in his conviction. But he never dared to face the problem squarely and to offer a clear-cut solution, either in the sense of Nationalism, or in the direction of Imperialism. He thought it safer to draw public attention away from such considerations, to perplex all Canadians, and leave to others the care of solving the problem.

But in spite of all such political jugglings, the problem is before us: It has been laid down by Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself when he secured the enactment of the Navy Act. It remains to be solved.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Whatever differences or shades of opinion may have divided or still divide British statesmen, whatever variations have affected in form the several propositions submitted to Colonial governments, there is one point on which no change, either in kind or in form, has ever taken place: the necessity of preserving the unity of command over the fleets of the Empire, and, consequently, the unity of conception and execution in the naval policy of the Empire. On that main point, all politicians have been in full accord with the naval and military authorities.

Let one read over carefully the reports of all Imperial conferences, from 1897 to 1911, the various speeches made by Chamberlain and Asquith, by Goschen, Selborne and McKenna, by Brodrick and Haldane, memorandums from the Admiralty and the War Office,—and it will be found that through all the vicissitudes of politics, changes in tendencies and opinions, even contradictions on many subjects, there is unvarying *unanimity* on this point. Never was there any attempt to deviate in the slightest way from the axiom laid down in 1896 by the defence committee:

“The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over the sea. . . . The Admiralty . . . claim the absolute power of disposing of their forces in the manner they consider most certain to secure success.

The strength of that proposition and the evidence of the unanimity with which it was constantly upheld, are so crushing, that Sir Wilfrid Laurier did not even attempt to escape from its sway.

But the political side of the question he tried to evade. He and his followers have quibbled at great length and on many occasions on the maintenance of the prerogatives of Canada's government and parliament, on the right they keep of deciding in full liberty whether or not Canada's Navy shall participate in Imperial wars. There is no need of considering now that aspect of the question. But at the Conference of 1909, where the Navy Bill was really concocted, Canadian Ministers were forced to acknowledge "that in time of war, local naval forces should be under the general directions of the Admiralty". The principle and the acknowledgment were both consecrated in clause 18 of the bill, now section 23 of the Navy Act, and confirmed in article XVI of the Agreement assented to by Sir Wilfrid himself, in London, in 1911. (1)

Consequently, under the Laurier Act, just as with any other mode of contribution, Canadian sailors enlisted by the Canadian government, and Canadian ships built with Canadian money, will, *in time of war*,—i.e., when they are used to the sole end for which they exist,—fall under the exclusive authority of a Board controlled by the British government; they will serve in naval operations and engagements under the exclusive command of the British Admiralty and Naval War Staff. The wars in which they will thus serve will be consequent to a foreign policy conceived, expressed, and executed by British diplomacy, under the direction of a department of the British government. Those wars will be settled by British plenipotentiaries, appointed, inspired and directed by the sole British government. And the one source, as the exclusive control,

(1) Section 23 of the Naval Service Act reads thus :—

"23. In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels in the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service".

Article XVI of the Agreement reads as follows :—

"XVI. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British fleet and will remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war."

of all those authorities, of all such powers, political, military and diplomatic, are vested in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, elected by the people of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. In that Parliament, the people of Canada, although they will have lent or given their sailors, ships and cannons, or their money contributions, in order to increase the naval forces of the Empire,—shall not count one single representative, they shall be debarred from expressing, in any manner, shape or form, their approval or their condemnation of the war in which they will have shared, of the policy through which that war will have been prepared and subsequently settled!

If to denounce such a state of things is to be "disloyal", "rebellious", "anti-British", then I boldly confess my insubordination. But in truth, all my notions of English history and British constitution, all that I know of the Anglo-Saxon temperament, would be reduced to naught, if a large majority of Anglo-Canadians, *looking at the question under that aspect*, were not or would not soon become just as "disloyal" and "rebellious" as the most fervid Nationalists in Quebec.

In the turmoil of an election campaign, that aspect may have been forgotten; it may have been kept away from the conscientious and reasoned attention of the Canadian people by timid politicians in every party, by demagogues of both races, whether on the stump or in editors' offices,—but it is nevertheless *the true aspect of the question*. It is that aspect which the Canadian government and parliament must face with intelligence and courage.

The Navy Act should be repealed, because it swerves from the principles heretofore acknowledged as essential to the material safety of Canada and the Empire.

It must be repealed, above all, because it strikes at the basic principles of popular rights and Colonial autonomy, and thereby at the very foundation of the Empire. It must be repealed because it endangers the established order of things and does not substitute anything substantial in the place of what it destroys.

It is a work of disintegration: let it be wiped out before it bears its evil fruits.

WHY SHOULD THE REPEAL BE DELAYED?

All the motives put forward to postpone the abrogation of the Navy Act, may be brought down to three propositions:

Parliament *must not* repeal the existing law without providing by another law for the services and functions established under the statute of 1910.

Parliament *should not* abrogate the Laurier Navy Act without adopting other legislation providing for the naval defence of Canada and her participation in the naval defence of the Empire. "*Something must be done!*"

The government does not want to propose anything—repeal of the Act, or a new policy—without consulting the Admiralty.

Let us analyse each of those three arguments, and see if anything may be found therein but pretences, opposed by politicians with an uncertain mind and a soft heart to the accomplishment of their duty and, as regards some of them, to the fulfilment of their pledges.

The first argument is manifestly trifling.

Every day, services and positions are created by the Cabinet, or by some of its members, without any regard to the text of the law. At every session, those irregularities are ratified by Parliament, and the salary of officials voted "*notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Service Act.*"

Since the ministers have openly declared, and in good faith, I presume, that the policy based on the Laurier Navy Act was completely set aside, all that is needed, at present, is a provisional disposition.

Without any protracted deliberations and wonderful efforts of genius, the government could prepare, move, and press to a vote, a bill containing in substance the following provisions:

1. *The "Naval Service Act," (9-10 Edw. VII, Chap. 43) is hereby repealed.*

2. *The services and functions created and organised under the said law are maintained provisionally under the authority of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries.*

And thus, both the obstacle and the pretence would be disposed of.

"SOMETHING MUST BE DONE."

Let ample satisfaction be allowed to sincere convictions, legitimate wishes and even to fears, less noble but more pressing—even with politicians (!)—than the dictates of conscience.

But what is wanted, I presume, is "something" good. Now, in the opinion of the ministers and the majority at their back, the Navy Act is bad. Mr. Borden opposed it, just as much as Mr. Monk did; the Conservative party, both in the House and the Senate, voted against its adoption in 1910; it has been denounced by almost every Conservative candidate before the elections of the 21st September; according to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, it has been condemned by the Canadian people, just as emphatically as the Reciprocity convention.

Had the Convention been ratified by Parliament, under the sway of the Laurier administration, would the present government hesitate to urge its annulment? Why should they hesitate any more to move the repeal of that absurd Navy Act, wanted by nobody,—no more by sincere Imperialists than by convinced Nationalists?

The Ministers have stated, without any evasion, that the naval policy inaugurated by their predecessors is to be set aside and completely abandoned. That policy, found to be rotten, is precisely based on the law denounced by supporters of the present administration and condemned by the people.

The result is bad, let the cause be suppressed.

The fruits are bitter because the tree is rotten:—Cut the tree.

"But it cannot be done till we know what can be put in its place. *Something* must be done, the salvation of Canada and the Empire demand it."

Once more, granted... for the time being. But till *something* good for Canada and the Empire is found, would not the Empire and Canada be better off without the *bad thing*?

Canada and the Empire have lived and progressed fairly before the 4th May 1910, date of the legal birth of the Navy Act. It is hardly probable that both or either of them would cease to live, or even suffer notably, because

of the absence of any such law, during the more or less prolonged interval needed by the government to find out the unknown *good thing* to be put in place of the well known *bad thing*.

PARTY TACTICS

Apart from that very simple argument touching the merit of the question, are not the Ministers aware that, as a pure party tactic, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and all who voted for the Navy Bill and approved of its enactment, will find a strong justification in the inaction of the government, even in the temporary maintenance of the Act in the statute book?

Many good people will not fail to say or think: "If the Laurier law is bad, why should those who have so strongly denounced it wait so long before they strike it out? It must be better than we thought. Either Laurier was right when he stated that the Navy Bill was good and necessary;—or the present Ministers and members of the majority are a lot of humbugs."

And, let it be remembered, that straight conclusion, drawn by plain common sense, may be arrived at by Imperialists, who denounced the Navy Bill because it did not provide enough for the Empire, and by Nationalists as well, who, some sincerely and others fictitiously, condemned the Bill because they saw in it a violation of the principles of Colonial autonomy.

Let the government make no mistake: the insidious questions put by Liberals in the Senate and the House, the challenge of the late Prime Minister himself, defying them to repeal the Navy Act—all that shows that Sir Wilfrid Laurier is preparing on that ground a pretty dangerous snare for his opponents.

Neither let the present Ministers rest quietly on an exaggerated confidence in their strength and cleverness. It is no insult to remind them that, as far as tricks and tactics go, the old Liberal fox is still the master of each and all of them. True, he left a good piece of his tail in the Navy trap; and, in trying to extricate himself, he put his foot into the Reciprocity snare. But he has still more than one trick in his head; and, like the old fox in the fable, he may still bring many people to think

that the finest and cutest of foxes is the tailless, three-footed one. If he remains in the field, ministerial chickens had better be careful; and should he quit the game, he will not fail to teach the cubs behind him some of his tricks.

CONSULTATION WITH THE ADMIRALTY.

“But nothing can be done without consulting the Admiralty.”

As to the fitness and opportunity of that consultation, on what it should bear, and with whom it should be held, I will come to that presently. But as an objection to the repeal of the Navy Act, let it be met forthwith.

If consultation there must be, it is presumably on what is to be done, on that famous “*something*”, looked for by everyone and yet found by nobody.

Surely, Mr. Borden and his colleagues have no intention of consulting the Admiralty on the opportunity of abrogating the Laurier Navy Act? — in other terms, of soliciting, from a simple executive Board of the British government, permission to repeal a Canadian law declared by our Ministers themselves to be bad and useless,—a law that stands condemned by their votes, denounced in their public speeches, and crushed by the suffrages of the people?

Just as if, before executing the verdict of the jury, the Judge presiding over a Court of Assize, would hold consultation with the bailiff or the policeman!

If another comparison be permitted, there may be sense in consulting a physician on the kind of food to be taken, but it would scarcely be thought necessary to call for a consultation of specialists before throwing rotten meat away and washing the dishes.

WHY SHOULD THE ADMIRALTY BE CONSULTED ? ON WHAT ?

When the intention is attributed to the government of “consulting the Admiralty” upon the *policy* to be adopted, there must be a mistake, at least in the wording of the statement.

In truth, the hour would be ill chosen. The British government and parliament should be given time and opportunity to ascertain whether or not the Admiralty is guilty of having "betrayed a public trust", if it has really shown, for years, imbecility, deceit and ignorance, if it has encouraged delation and insubordination among navy officers. For such are the charges brought by a British admiral, late commander of a squadron, a member of the British Parliament, against those very Lords of the Admiralty, whom our Canadian Ministers, according to rumours, would choose as their guides in matters military and constitutional, as their spiritual advisors, at the very moment one-half of their authority has been taken from them by the First Lord and transferred to a newly created naval war staff.

But should the Admiralty be the most respectable, enlightened and able body in the world, should all and every one of Lord Beresford's charges be totally groundless, it is not with that Board that the Canadian government must hold consultation.

Whatever be the nature and the extension of the Bill or any executive measure proposed by the Borden Cabinet in place of the Navy Act and the Laurier policy, a choice must of necessity be made between two alternatives: Either the principle of Colonial autonomy, as upheld in the memorandum of 1896, shall be fully re-acknowledged; or the principle of Colonial participation in all British wars shall be accepted in some form and degree.

In the first case, no consultation whatever is needed.

In the second instance, the political and constitutional problem, to which reference has been made above, is laid down anew in its entirety :

If Canada contributes, in some form and degree, to the general defence of the Empire, what share of authority will she exercise in the government of the Empire?

The straight and intimate relation between political representation and military contribution has been openly admitted, without any ambiguousness, by the most prominent members of the present government, when they opposed the adoption of the Navy Bill. That there should be no military contribution without political representation, was clearly stated by Mr. Doherty, Mr. Monk and Mr. Borden himself. The only difference between Mr. Monk

and his then future colleagues was this: from Mr. Borden's and Mr. Doherty's remarks, it might be concluded that, in case Great Britain offered us representation, we could not refuse our contribution: whilst Mr. Monk did not seem disposed to concede the one or accept the other. That both questions are indissolubly connected, all three admitted frankly. (1)

And there the situation remains, altered in no respect by the change of government.

That problem Mr. Borden cannot get away from any more than Sir Wilfrid Laurier could. It can be evaded by no politician, strong or weak, clever or dissembling, tricky or timid; for it springs from the very foundations of Empire, it relates to the most essential principles of British constitution and Colonial rights, it is connected with the most glorious traditions of the Anglo-Saxon people.

That problem will not be laid down by the French Canadian people, its most rigorous solution will not be pressed by the Nationalist group:—it is the Anglo-Canadian people themselves who will demand the full measure of their rights. When cured from their ultra-“loyal” fever and delusions, they will measure the accomplishment of their Imperial duty to the length of the exercise of their Imperial prerogatives.

THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF EMPIRE

It is therefore with the whole question of Canada's relations to the motherland that we are confronted,—the very basis of the Colonial system, the political and military reorganisation of the Empire.

And that vast problem, one of the most complex ever brought to the attention of the statesmen and people of the British Empire since the American Revolution, Canadian ministers would endeavour to solve by a consultation with a simple executive bureau, a mere dependence of one of the departments of the British government!

It is preposterous! Just as if the Prime Minister of Canada announced that, before he moved any amendment

(1)—See Appendix D

to, or the repeal of, the preferential tariff, he was to consult the clerks of the Board of Trade; or as if before negotiating a commercial treaty, or some tariff changes, with Germany, France or the United States, the Canadian government announced to the people of Canada and to the world at large, that they were going to hold consultation with German, French or American customs collectors!

As I heard lately, from one of our most distinguished English speaking fellow-citizens: "Can anything be conceived more proper than that "consultation with the Admiralty", to mark the abject dependence to which the "proud Canadian nation" has been reduced by our politicians and their lack of courage, pride and straightforwardness?"

Let us hope that this last humiliation will be spared to Canada, and such a ridiculous attitude avoided by Mr. Borden and his colleagues.

If consultation there must be, it only can be held between the Canadian government, speaking in the name of the people of Canada, and the Imperial government, representing the people of the United Kingdom and acting as tutor of the Empire; and any agreement arrived at by both governments shall be binding upon either country only when ratified by their respective people. To this also the members of the Canadian government are pledged by their word, their votes and their promises. (1)

That in the course of negotiations between the British and Canadian authorities, experts of the War Office, the Foreign Office, or even the Admiralty, be consulted, when needed,—provided those that ought to be "scrapped" or court-martialed are left aside—all well and good; but nothing more.

(1) See Appendix D and E.

SHOULD CANADA "CONSULT" FIRST ?

If a consultation is to be held, should the first step be taken in Canada? Should the request come from the Canadian government and Parliament?

That Canada has nothing to lose by showing some reserve, and her statesmen, some dignity, even in our relations with the motherland, the most frenzied jingos, the most servile politicians, will, I presume, admit either readily or reluctantly.

The Parliament and government of Great Britain have heretofore exercised an exclusive authority on the general policy and defence of the Empire. They have determined our legislative and administrative powers, and limited them strictly to the size of our territory and the very modest extent of our Colonial authority. After seventy years of responsible government and forty-five of Federal unity, we are still denied, by British authorities, the power to legislate on high sea navigation and trade, on copyright and patents. Letters of naturalisation granted in Canada are not even acknowledged in Great Britain!

As regards military defence, the Canadian government—and this ought not to be overlooked,—has received, from the British authorities, no *official declaration* to the effect that the principles of Imperial defence have been abandoned or altered since 31st December 1896, when the Imperial authorities notified us that we should organise our militia and land defence, but leave naval defence aside, or, to put it in a nutshell, that we should *look after our own small affairs and not put our nose in the great problems of the Empire.*

If the British authorities have changed their mind, ought we not to be acquainted with the change otherwise than through hysterical crises and typographical contorsions in a few newspapers controlled by titled parvenus?

Mr. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH.

"Honour commands us to come to the rescue of the tottering naval power of Britain!"—so jingos shout in the *Montreal Star* and elsewhere. They had their answer just a few days ago, in the speech delivered in Glasgow by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, who proclaimed to the face of the earth that the British fleet has never been so powerful, that it can defy the

naval strength of any combination of powers, that Britain is fully equipped to maintain her naval supremacy even against the frenzied armaments of all great maritime nations.

That notable speech is the latest official statement of the British authorities on the naval power of Great Britain and the use she can and may make of that power. That pronouncement has been made without Canada having ever been consulted. It has been read by Canadians neither sooner nor later than by Germans, Russians, Chinese or Brazilians.

It may be pretended that Mr. Churchill has not told the truth, that the British fleet is not as powerful as he stated, and cannot offer all needed protection to the trade of the British Isles—its main object—or to the defence of the colonies—a secondary consequence of its existence. But before we attempt to presume that the British Minister has gloriously lied, should we not wait till we are so informed by the British government? If it be true that Britain, to maintain indisputable her naval supremacy, needs no moral support, no material help, from any quarter whatsoever,—would it not be impertinent on our part, to say the least, to go and proffer such help and support before they are formally requested? Would not the proud lesson, just given to the whole world in the name of the King and people of Britain, by the First Lord of the Admiralty, no doubt in concert with his colleagues, be thus strangely weakened?

Will not that lesson, if England cannot give it without Sir Wilfrid's *Niobes*, Mr. Borden's dreadnoughts, or Sir Hugh Graham's usurious loans, appear, in the eyes of Germany, the United States, Russia or Japan, as a ridiculous and vain boasting?

Once more, if Mr. Churchill has not said the truth, if he has spoken to the gallery, if the British government mean to play with the colonies a different game behind the screen, we should know it, so as to be able to learn our part. The least that can be expected from the motherland, is that she assume, within the Empire as before the whole world, the full responsibility of that dangerous and double game; for, at first sight, it seems to justify, on a larger scale, these hard words addressed by Lord Beresford to that very Admiralty from which light and authority are expected to fall on us:

“...It is the publication of such papers...which impresses foreign observers with the delusion that we are a nation of hypocrites. They cannot believe that we are really so simple as we seem. Our published ideas of strategy are supposed to be an attempt to mislead the foreigner; whereas they are really an endeavour to confuse our own people in order to serve the ends of party politicians.”

Loyal to the Empire we are all willing to be; but we see no necessity of being “loyal” either to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Asquith, or to Lord Selborne and Mr. Chamberlain.

“THAT AUTHORITY CANNOT BE SHARED”

On the vaster ground of political relations, the disdainful words uttered by the British Prime Minister himself, Mr. Asquith, at the Imperial conference of 1911, are the latest expression of the views held by the Imperial authorities:

“For what does Sir Joseph Ward’s proposal come to? I might describe the effect of it without going into details in a couple of sentences. It would impair if not altogether destroy the authority of the government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war and, indeed, all those relations with Foreign Powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. **THAT AUTHORITY CANNOT BE SHARED.**” (1).

Those proud, not to say scornful, words, Mr. Asquith let fall from his Imperial lips in answer to a proposal made by the Prime Minister of New Zealand for the organisation of an Imperial council. But they go much further.

Uttered two years after the Resolution of the 29th March 1909 was voted in the parliament of Canada, one year after our Navy Act was adopted, those words are a direct answer to the lofty speeches delivered by Messrs. Foster, Laurier and Borden, to Mr. Borden’s offering of dreadnoughts, to Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s disguised gift of *Niobes*, to Sir Hugh Graham’s inflamed proposals.

(1) “Minutes of proceedings of the Imperial Conference 1911”. (Br. blue book Cd 5745) — page 71.

It is the response given, after fourteen years, in the name of the Imperial authorities, by whom they have not been contradicted, to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's advances : "*Call us to your councils*".

Lastly, it is a straight and peremptory denial of the constitutional doctrine laid down or accepted by Mr. Borden, Mr. Monk and Mr. Doherty.

"Without a share in the government of the Empire, there can be no military or naval contribution from the colonies," so state the Prime Minister of Canada, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Public Works. "*That authority cannot be shared*", is the emphatic answer of the Prime Minister of England.

If that were to be the last word of the British authorities on the right of colonies to share in the government of the Empire, every Canadian would be justified, as Mr. Cahan emphatically stated before the Montreal Canadian Club, in looking to absolute independence as the ultimate goal to be reached by Canada as speedily as possible.

The least that can be said, however, is that, before they go and consult the Admiralty, the War Office, or even the British government, Canadian Ministers should wait for *another word* from the Imperial authorities. Before offering once more to the motherland a tribute of blood and money from the colony, Canadian Ministers should wait till the condition which they have declared to be essential and preliminary to any contribution, be found possible by the Imperial government.

Let the statesmen and people of Great Britain make up their mind and declare whether they are prepared to share with Canada and the other colonies, now so absurdly called "*sister-nations*", the exercise of Imperial authority as well as the burden of Imperial defence;—let the part which the Empire of India, Crown colonies and protectorates are to be allotted in that Imperial association, be clearly defined and shown to us;—let the magic formula, so long sought for, to conciliate "*the complete unity of the Empire and the untouched autonomy of each of the associated nations*", be at last found and given out:—and the Canadian people, *all Canadians*, will give an attentive hearing to all arguments that may be brought forward, either in support of or in opposition to those magnificent projects.

Should the Imperialist solution be decided upon, in full knowledge, by a majority of the Canadian people, there will be no rebellion of the minority, especially if recruited mainly among French Canadians.

Imperialists, jingos and demagogues, who never cease sowing disunion between English and French-speaking Canadians, had better look after the motley elements that are invading Western Canada. Those new comers are rapidly *americanised*, thanks to the short-sightedness of politicians and cheap patriots bent on preserving them from the "undue influence of the hierarchy", from the "plague" of religious education, from the sway of "French domination". Beware of the generations that will rise imbued with this anti-National, anti-Christian, anti-British spirit!

CONCLUSION

NATIONALISM OR IMPERIALISM

As to us, Nationalists, we firmly believe that the unity of Canada and the maintenance,—for the time it can normally last,—of the bond which unites Canada to Britain, are absolutely dependent on the smooth and gradual development of the principle of autonomy and the ever growing assertion of Canadian Nationalism. The superiority of that policy over all others we will never cease to proclaim.

But in place of the mean, undefined and deceitful policy, heretofore followed, which threatens to load Canada day by day with newer and heavier burdens of Empire, without offering her any share in its glories and sovereignty, we would rather have the full fledged Imperialist system, based on an equitable apportionment of National rights and responsibilities; and this I state emphatically after mature thought and observation.

True Imperialism, like Nationalism, though in a lesser degree, would at least offer us one marked advantage: it would develop among Canadians a sense of National manhood; it would draw us from the narrow track in which Canada has been kept by the timidity of her statesmen and the miserable quarrels of political parties.

But till the government and the people of Great Britain have spoken, till the people of the various colonies have answered, we say:

Let the Navy Act be repealed.

Let our militia be thoroughly reformed.

Let the defence of our harbours and shores be organised.

Above all, let our system of transportation, by land and by water, be completed without a minute's loss. While we are talking "Dreadnoughts" and "Niobes", populations, drawn to Western Canada by alluring advertisements, are clamouring for the means of selling and shipping their wheat. If our politicians lose their time in endeavouring to displace Imperial statesmen and save the British fleet and the motherland in spite of the British people, they may suddenly awaken from their magnificent dreams of Imperialism, and be confronted with serious troubles occasioned in Canada by their neglect to secure Canada's economical safety and national unity.

Let Canada first be looked after. Not only is it the country which Providence has given to all Canadians; it is also *the part of Empire* committed to our care by the Crown of England and Imperial Parliament. If in order to do other people's work, we neglect our own, neither the British nor the Australians will come and help us in setting our house to order.

APPENDIX

A

MEMORANDUM OF THE COLONIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE, dated 31st December 1896, transmitted to the Colonial authorities in August 1897, and laid before the House of Commons in January 1912 :—

ABOUT six years ago the Colonial Defence Committee drew up a Memorandum laying down certain general principles which they considered should be kept in view by the various responsible Governments of Australasia in dealing with questions affecting defence.

These principles have been generally accepted and acted upon in the Australian Colonies, though at times action is still taken there not entirely in accordance with them, while from other parts of the British Empire proposals are still received based on erroneous conceptions of the true policy of a great State having vast interests to defend in all quarters of the habitable world.

The Colonial Defence Committee, therefore, consider that the time has come when advantage will be derived from a further enunciation of the principles which have guided and still guide them in making recommendations to the various Departments of State with regard to the defence of the Colonies.

2. The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognized by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organized invasion from the sea. To fulfil this great charge, they claim the absolute power of disposing of their forces in the manner they consider most certain to secure success, and object to limit the action of any part of them to the immediate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by operations at a distance.

It is recognized, however, that Her Majesty's ships, engaged in hunting out and destroying the squadrons of an enemy, may not be in a position to prevent the predatory raids of hostile cruisers on British ports. The strength of such an attack will vary in the different parts of the world, according to the strengths of possibly hostile navies, the proximity of their bases, and the troops that are or could easily be brought there in anticipation of war. It also varies from time to time with changing political combinations. But it is improbable that a raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it be of any permanent effect unless troops could be landed. In no case could a greater force than a few thousand men be collected and conveyed without such arrangements and preparation as would bring the operations under the category of those dealt with by the navy. Against a raid of the nature indicated it has been considered necessary to make secure those places which are essential to the navy for coaling, refitting and repairing. Ports for this purpose have been selected by the

Admiralty, and Imperial resources in men and money available for use abroad have been concentrated on their defence. Many of the Colonies have contributed largely to their own military protection. In Australian waters defence for naval purposes has been provided by the Colony of New South Wales in the protection that has been given to the port of Sydney, while the defence of certain mercantile strategic positions has been undertaken mainly by the Australian Colonies whose commerce they will protect.

3. Apart from the harbours fortified for the navy, there are other ports which, though they do not enter into what may be called the general strategic scheme, are also liable from their commercial importance to predatory raids, and which require measures of defence for the protection of the special interests involved. The resources of places, which, in the opinion of an enemy, would justify the very considerable risks which a raid on them would involve, are generally sufficient to admit of the provision of local defence by local means, and where the liability to attack and the resources to resist attack co-exist, it has been held to be the duty of the Colony to make provision for adequate defence.

In dealing with places of this nature the Committee have advocated the creation of sufficient fixed defences to resist occupation by hostile cruisers, but more especially the provision of troops sufficient to deal effectually with such forces as an enemy must put on shore to enable him to secure any permanent advantage from his attack. Troops without works may defeat an enemy and frustrate his object. Works without troops are useless and delusive. It is necessary to lay stress on this fact, as fortifications give an appearance and feeling of security which is not justified unless they are fully garrisoned by well trained men and supported by mobile forces, and because expenditure on defences involving a heavy outlay at one time and little at another can be more easily fitted into the exigencies of fluctuating budgets than expenditure on troops, which must be constant to be effective. When money is made available in time of anticipated war, there is a tendency to spend it in increasing fortifications and armaments, sometimes already on an unnecessarily elaborate and extensive scale, while in time of external quiet and internal financial depression there is a tendency to reduce to a dangerous extent the military forces, which can only be of value if constantly kept up to a state of efficiency in numbers and training.

4. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the system of defence for the whole Colonial Empire must take fully into consideration the special conditions of the various Colonies. The organization of forces in a vast continent like Australia must differ from that of a small body of men whose duty will be to protect the single port of a West Indian Island. The Colonies of Australia should be in a position to afford each other mutual support by combined offensive or defensive action. An armed police force, prepared to resist the few troops that might be landed from a single cruiser, may suffice to guard the smaller interests of a West Indian Town. Again, the defence of Canada, with its long land frontier, obviously requires to be treated on a different basis from that of the small island of St. Helena.

To enable them to deal with these varying conditions on the basis of the general scheme for the defence of the whole Empire, the Colonial Defence Committee have recommended that a Scheme drawn up on certain indicated lines to show the probable strength and nature of attack on each Colony, and how its existing resources could be utilized to the best advantage for defence, should be submitted annually for their consideration and remarks. Such Schemes are now regularly received from all the Crown Colonies, and from most of those that are self-governing. The clearer perception of the strategic conditions of each place which is shown in the later schemes, and the increase in their definiteness and practicability as they are revised year by year, lead the Committee to attribute the greatest importance to them, and strongly to urge those Colonies which have not already done so to at once take this step towards informing themselves as to what would be their weak points in war, and what means they have for remedying them. Defence Schemes are not of mere academic interest. If war with a great power were to break out tomorrow there would be no new data available on which to draw up such Schemes if they did not already exist. They would have to be hastily compiled, considered and adopted, and would probably be considerably above or below the requirements of the case, unnecessarily dislocating the civil progress of the country in the former case, and dangerously risking its safety in the latter.

5. In addition to the Schemes which deal, as above stated, with the organization of existing resources for purposes of defence, various annual Reports of the Commandants of the military and naval forces, of the self-governing Colonies have been referred to the Committee, as well as proposals which have been received from time to time by the Colonial Office from the Colonies with reference to alterations in their personnel and materiel. This has enabled the Committee to advise on the organization, conditions of service, training and equipment of Colonial military and naval forces and on the fortifications and armament of the many defended places abroad. The Committee can, of course, only advise, and, for reasons of local policy or expediency, or for other causes, it has not always been possible for the Colonial Governments to accept the advice that has been given. The failure to do so has sometimes involved them in expenditure which to the Committee has not appeared essential, while sometimes they have effected economies which to the Committee have not appeared wise, and thus have in part marred the completeness of the general scheme of national defence to which so much importance is attributed.

It will be convenient to repeat here the principles which are now guiding the Committee in advising on the more important details with regard to the above subjects.

N. B. Paragraphs 6 to 15 deal with technical details of military organisation.

16. Certain Colonies have provided themselves with local floating defences to supplement the fixed defences of their ports. Since the completion of the latter, the Colonial Defence Committee have attributed less importance than formerly to the small colonial

navies, considering that it is generally difficult to obtain from floating harbour defences an effect commensurate with the outlay entailed by them. Where, however, there is a sufficiently spacious area of navigable water apart from the fortifications to permit local defence ships to manoeuvre, this objection does not apply. Colonial war-ships, where maintained, should be kept in a thoroughly efficient condition both with regard to personnel and materiel.

17. There are many points in addition to those touched on above concerning which the Colonial Defence Committee have offered advice to the Colonies in the past and are prepared to do so in the future, but which it is obviously inadvisable to deal with in a Memorandum for general information. In this connection they would repeat a paragraph from a former Report. "The necessity for preserving secrecy in regard to the position of guns and details of defence was brought before the Colonial Conference in 1887, and has at various times been impressed upon the Colonial Governments. It is earnestly hoped that these warnings will in future be acted upon".

18. The Committee would also take this opportunity of pointing out that they can more satisfactorily assist the Colonial Governments in dealing with questions of defence if all general Reports and important proposals of their Military Advisers are referred to the Committee through the Colonial Office as soon as possible after being considered by the governments.

The Committee completely recognize that, for financial and other reasons, possibly of a confidential nature, and of a political rather than of a military character, it may often not be practicable to give effect to the recommendations that are made. They think, however, that they would be in a better position to follow and advise upon the general military policy of the Colonies, if the recommendations were always communicated to them, accompanied, if necessary, by the confidential opinions of the Governments and Governors thereon.

19. In conclusion, the Committee are led to refer, by the prominence which has of late been given to the question of Federal defence, to the mutual co-operation of the Colonies for this purpose in time of war. It will be obvious that at present such co-operation must be mainly confined to adjacent Colonies, such as those of Australia, and in a smaller degree those of South Africa. In Australia this subject has been considered with happy results by the Federal Military Conferences of 1894 and 1896, and more recently at a meeting of Premiers at Sydney.

Doubtless a time will come when the increasing strength and resources of the self-governing Colonies will enable them to materially assist the mother country, by placing at her disposal for operations in any quarter of the globe bodies of troops formed from the excellent material of strong, self-reliant Colonists, but at present the development of their own vast territories in time of peace, and the effective protection of them in time of war, is undoubtedly the best contribution the Colonies can offer to Imperial defence. To this, however, there is an important exception.

England may be engaged in the future, as she has frequently been in the past, in a war which carries with it no danger of attack on the Colonies. In such a case the offer of assistance from them would be prized, as it has been on more than one occasion, not only for its real value, but also as evidence of that solidarity on which the greatness of the British Empire must ultimately rest.

(Signed)

M. NATHAN,

Secretary,

Colonial Defence Committee.

December, 31, 1896.

B

LETTER from Capt. REID, R. E., to the Montreal GAZETTE, February 5th 1912.

To the Editor of The Gazette :

Sir,—I have followed with much interest the articles and correspondence in the Canadian newspapers on the question of Canada's naval defence, whether she should construct a navy for her own control, or pay a proportional annual money subsidy to the British Government, the latter course a plan more acceptable to the Lords of Admiralty.

The arguments advanced against the building of a naval fleet of battleships in Canadian waters appear absolutely convincing. It seems merely a purpose for uselessly spending her public money. The arguments even go further. They prove that the purely coastal defence of Canada is unnecessary. To me, the following arguments seem to be feasible in considering this question further :

So far as the eastern Maritime Provinces are concerned, excepting the case of the important shipping town of Halifax, there is no need for the presence of a fleet of battleships. Mine fields in the narrows of Belle Isle and at Rimouski, thickly strewn in the passage between Cape Ray and Cape Breton, and in the Bay of Fundy will afford ample protection from a hostile fleet. In addition during the severe winter months there is the fell guardianship of General Fevrier. The great cities of Canada are therefore perfectly immune, except to land attack by grand armies from the interior.

Strategically, in time of war, an allied fleet in the waters of the St. Lawrence Gulf would be of no value to Great Britain, except in event of hostilities with the United States, which God forever forbid.

No fleet in the world can venture far from its coal bases. Cervera when he sailed from Cadiz, sailed to his doom. Wisecres foretold that Togo would meet Rojestvenski's caravan of ships near Singapore, but the Jap waited patiently in the home waters off Nagasaki for the Russians' arrival.

Neither the British, nor the French, nor the German, nor the United States fleets will ever venture singly across the Atlantic to their opposite shores bent on a hostile errand. A coal-less battleship is as helpless as a shoaled whale. Moreover, where on a strange and hostile continent is a badly hulled Dreadnought to be docked and repaired? Must she risk the Atlantic passage again homewards deep in the water?

Thus, it will be seen, that, leaving the question of her own supporting fleet entirely outside, Canada could by certain preparations beforehand render valuable aid to a British fleet. I detail them in this manner:

First. Fortify a point-d'appui at the mouth of the St. Lawrence Gulf.

Second. Make fleet coaling stations there with ample supplies.

Third. Construct two graving-docks capable for the biggest Dreadnoughts. A floating dock, as well.

Fourth. Let this new point-d'appui be held permanently by a powerful torpedo-boat flotilla, and a few submarines.

Fifth. Organize a corps of sappers and miners for submarine mining, recruited from the fishermen on the coast line.

Such a scheme would be ample for Canada's eastern coast defence, and would prove in time of war an excellent base of operations for the British fleet. But against whom?

There can only be one answer—the United States. Such a terrible contingency cannot possibly arise now between these two mighty nations. In fact, the establishment of a Canadian battle-fleet, or naval preparations, such as I have detailed, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, might justifiably be interpreted under present circumstances by the United States, as "an unfriendly act". This is a serious point.

But, I wish to take your readers further than the writers and corresponders on this burning question of Canadian battleship construction have so far done.

There is monopoly graft as well as craft in the construction of a monster battleship, and the former fact is largely responsible for the utterly fantastic proportions which these leviathans, as they are familiarly termed, now assume.

I speak particularly of the British navy, though my criticism applies to the other great navies as well. Up to the premature appearance of the Dreadnought, Great Britain built her battleships in homogeneous groups of eight. The "King Edward" class of 15,000 tons, succeeded the eight "Duncans".

Naval writers once loved to dwell on the importance of the term, homogeneity; same length, same depth and breadth, same tonnage, same speed, same power and number of guns. This is all; shoved behind now, and the Dreadnoughts have succeeded each other abnormally in groups of twos and threes, and single odd ships.

In the construction of a Dreadnought, the Harvey-Krupped armor, a monopoly enjoyed in Germany and Great Britain under the famous Krupp patents, costs an enormous sum. It is reckoned

that this monopoly alone has cost the British Admiralty, with the Dreadnought class, an extra sum amounting to nearly £15,000,000 sterling. No official attempt has been made to contradict the fact that Krupp armor plates cost the Admiralty \$590 per ton, whilst English steel itself, from which these plates are prepared, is sold at \$100 per ton. Every Dreadnought has cost for armor plates alone \$2,905,000, whilst the profits of the naval builder and the marine engineer have been sweated down to the smallest limits. Hence, the Krupp steel monopolists in Germany and Great Britain have encouraged and fattened on the same joyous cry of a big, bigger and yet bigger navy! The agitation has actually been fathered in both countries by the self-same capitalist interests!

The Lords of British Admiralty are not happy over this exorbitant expenditure on armor plates, and also on big guns. It is rumored that they intend building an experimental ship, a leviathan Dreadnought, of course, with a full complement of 13.5 guns but "unarmored" and trusting for protection to her marvellous speed of 35 knots. But this is not likely now, seeing that the newly launched "Lion" has already steamed 31 knots. The margin is insignificant.

I now deal with the new naval strategy of the British Admiralty, as its application to the Gulf of the St. Lawrence and the eastern Maritime Provinces is pregnant with warning.

For her deep duplicity when the Russian fleet on their way to the Far East bombarded our helpless Dogger Bank trawlers, Germany now finds our main Dreadnought fleets concentrated in the North Sea. Since that occurrence, the spacious naval harbor has been completed at Dover for swarms of torpedo-boat destroyers, thus blocking the Straits on declaration of war. The Rosyth docks in the still waters above the Forth Bridge are proceeding apace, and even our Orkneys act as a naval base.

From the Pentland Firth along the northeast coast line of Scotland, down south to the Firth of Forth, these huge Dreadnought battleships and cruisers are continually manoeuvring and banging with their monster 12-inch guns, shaking the doors and windows of house nearly 10 miles inland from the coast line during quiet nights, and alarming the dwellers.

The vibratory swirl of the enormous screws of these deep-lying battleships, and the frightful blast and concussion of the 12-inch gun on the surface of the waters overhead, can give some idea of the effect upon the shoals of fish.

Last summer cruisers banging their guns in the Firth of Forth cleared it of white fish. The fishermen of the Fife shores pleaded against their means of livelihood thus being taken from them. But our Admiralty paid no heed. They never do.

The many fishing villages on the northeast coast of Scotland, whose hardy fishermen chiefly depended on the baited-line fishing, had all lapsed into decay before the malignant arrival of the English Dreadnoughts. The steam-drifters, with their enormous sunken bag-net and beam, raking continually over the spawning beds on the shoal banks off the coast, had almost utterly destroyed the white fishings, unless in the far distant White Sea and Siberian waters where this hungry Aberdeen steam fleet now operates.

But the herring shoals still pass along the north and east coasts of Scotland in summer, alleviating in a degree the present hard circumstances of the fishermen. But even then, big gun banging by Dreadnoughts have sometimes driven the herrings from the Moray Firth into deep water. What does Admiralty bother about the pernicious influence of their Dreadnoughts! Kipling has sung to us what their price is.

Every statement I write is true. If any one doubts them, let him go, the next time he visits the Northeast of Scotland, to these fishing villages, where I have spent my boyhood, and judge for himself.

Consequently, in considering the question of a Canadian naval fleet, the value of the fishings, \$15,500,000 per annum, of the Eastern Maritime Provinces, is a prime factor. These fishings must not be disturbed. Dreadnoughts' screws and the banging of the 12 inch gun mean their utter deterioration. Better a good fish supply than the doubtful security of freak ships.

I term the Dreadnought class a freak one. It is totally unsuited for the shallow waters of the North Sea. Its latest monstrous development, the super-Dreadnought of 28,000 tons, with its 13.5 gun, and 1,250-lb. shell, is as cumbersome and expensive a naval white elephant to Germany as it is to Great Britain. The waters off the Elbe and Weser mouths are too shoal for the easy manoeuvring of the German Dreadnoughts, and it is far too big to go through the strategically placed Kiel Canal, the water being insufficient and the locks too small. In Great Britain there are at present only two docks—at Portsmouth—capable of receiving such naval monsters. If such a ship, costing \$10,000,000 was badly hulled by torpedo or mine off Cromarty in North Scotland, how could she in time of war in the North Sea possibly take the long journey southwards round the Foreland and Beachy Head?

Admiralty fond of experiment encourages the abnormality of these super-dreadnoughts. Every one passes out of its trials satisfactorily. The big "Inflexible" battle cruiser was declared perfect, though her 12-inch gun barbettes were useless during the first six months she was in commission! The "Sao Paulo" is a super-dreadnought built at Elswick for Brazil. From an officer I learned that on manoeuvring down channel on the way across for testing purposes whilst in a fair headway, at fair speed, her helm was suddenly jammed hard down. She heeled over until those on board thought she would never right again! The manoeuvre was not repeated.

The 13.5-inch gun is also a freak. Seamen gunners declare that the smaller 9.2 is the safest maximum-bore weapon. The 12-inch, with her dangerous 3-foot back-fire flash, when the breech is opened after discharge, fills the barrette's interior with dense choking fumes to the distress of the gun team. The gunners become gunshy, i.e., as nervous of safety as the herrings in the waters underneath. The Marconi operator on the "Sao Paulo" told me that when the mutineers off Rio Janeiro discharged the two 12-inch guns in her fore barrette the frightful concussion threw him down on the floor of the Marconi room, with the fittings after him; and that the flames from the guns' muzzles bent upwards like two enormous whips scorching and terrifying the observation party

in the tripod mast fire-control station! The mutineers bolted from the barbette like rats, and never entered it again.

The reports of the firing trials of the new 13.5 gun on board the super-Dreadnoughts afford humorous reading were it not so serious a matter. Its discharge has blown the bottoms out of big boats on deck and burst open syrup tins in the canteens below. What it does to the ships' scantlings we are not told. This much we know, that no battleship can be feasibly constructed which will endure "the continuous firing" on its deck of 13.5-inch guns in battle action. To arrive at this conclusion is merely a study of comparison. The heaviest efficient gun that can be mounted on land defences is the 9.5-inch, with its 500 shell. The continuous firing of a heavier weapon disturbs the concrete foundations. Even on board ship the 12-inch gun, notwithstanding the ship's easy motion in the water, when discharged subjects the surrounding parts to a terrible strain. But there are 10 and 12-inch guns, each with a 850 lb. shell, on board, and the result of this collective strain on the ship's structure should this entire armament be engaged in continuous firing for some time, is at present "purely problematical". What, then, must 10 guns of 13.5-inch calibre, and discharging 1,250 lb. shells mean? The hypothesis leads one to sternly cry "Halt!" to this monster battleship insanity!

Whilst Great Britain is threatened by Germany in this mad, suicidal race for superiority of naval armaments, it is only fair that Canada should assist the Mother Country proportionally in the excessive expenditure required. But it would be God's mission, indeed, if all Great Britain's colonies commenced a persistent agitation against the needless piling up of further armaments. A limit should by force be imposed. For the taxation for such enormous armaments is in Great Britain and Germany taking the bread from the mouths of the populace, and in each country points the way to revolution.

J. REID, Capt., R.E. (T).

Montreal, February, 1, 1912.

C

NATIONALIST RESOLUTIONS.

1.—Resolutions adopted at St. Eustache, July 17th, 1910 :

“We, citizens of Canada, loyal subjects of H. M. King George V, declare ourselves ready to defend with our blood the soil of our country and the rights of the British Crown in Canada, as our fathers did in 1776, against the British subjects of His Majesty, in 1812, against the armies of the American Republic, and as we did in 1885 against our fellow-citizens in rebellion.

“Firm in our belief in the greatness and efficiency of the principles of decentralization and self government, which have been, for half a century, solemnly proclaimed and acknowledged by both the authorities of Great Britain and Canada, we are opposed to any new policy, the result of which would be to draw us into distant wars, foreign to Canada, so long, at least, as the self-governing colonies of the Empire shall not enjoy with the Mother Country, and upon an equal footing, the sovereign power and authority which control the Imperial army and navy, treaties of peace and alliance, foreign relations, and the government of India and of the Crown Colonies.

“We sincerely believe that such a policy of centralization and apparent imperial unity, in the accomplishment of which the new naval law is but an initial step, will generate within the empire misunderstanding, rivalries and conflicts which will threaten the peace and unity of the numerous countries and peoples of all races that are now so proud of their loyalty to the British Crown.

“Having never been in the past a case of conflict for Great Britain and the Empire, we believe that a policy of peace and of moral and material development is necessary to Canada, to her growth and unity, and, thereby, to the glory and safety of the Empire.

“Free citizens of a democratic country, we claim the right to express openly our sentiment upon this question, as well as upon any other that may affect the fate and the interests of Canada.

“We acknowledge the right of the majority of the Canadian people to determine a new course in our relations with the other parts of the empire, provided such a step is taken in full knowledge of its consequences.

“But we protest against any attempt to withdraw such a ponderous problem from the free consideration of the Canadian people at large, and of any of its various groups.

“We disavow the declarations made in Toronto in December last by Hon. Alexandre Taschereau, provincial minister of public works, by which he fallaciously contended that the people of Quebec are ready to accept blindly any policy of naval defence for the

Empire, and we blame the members of the Government and of the Legislature of this province, who by their vote, on the 2nd of June last, sanctioned those declarations.

"We blame the federal government and the majority in Parliament who have imposed on Canada the new navy proposition, thrown our country in the vortex of militarism, erstwhile emphatically denounced by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, threaten the peace of Canada, and misappropriated for the construction of murderous weapons and the preparation of bloody wars millions destined to the development of our agriculture and means of transportation.

"We censure as well the attitude of Mr. Borden and those of his followers who have urged the adoption of a no less nefarious policy.

"We maintain that Parliament had no right to pledge the future of Canada to a policy which has never been submitted to the people upon whom shall fall the tribute of blood and the load of military taxation.

"We approve unreservedly of the courageous and straight-forward conduct of Mr. Monk and the few members of Parliament who, faithful to their trust, have demonstrated the dangers of that policy, and claimed for the people of Canada the right to express their will before their representatives bind them to such heavy obligations".

These Resolutions were declared adopted after hands had been raised for and against their adoption. About 5,000 hands were raised "for", and 8 "against". The same resolutions were likewise adopted at ten or twelve meetings, varying from 1,000 to 15,000 people, in the summer and autumn of 1910. The largest number of hands raised against the motion was 13 in a meeting of 8,000.

2.—RESOLUTION adopted at the Ontario Skating Rink, Montreal, November 9th, 1910, after the defeat of the Laurier candidate in DRUMMOND-ARTHABASKA :

This meeting acclaims the result of the election in Drummond and Arthabaska as the triumph of the principle of Canadian autonomy.

That victory justifies emphatically the attitude adopted on the Navy Bill by Mr. Monk, member for Jacques Cartier, and by the federal representatives who supported him.

It shows that the people want to be consulted before being dragged into a new policy of Imperial militarism.

The meeting approves and ratifies the verdict rendered by the electoral division of Drummond and Arthabaska, reaffirms the will of the Canadian people to uphold the rights of the British Crown in Canada, declares itself ready to approve all necessary and efficient measures to make sure the defence of Canadian territory, but it considers as contrary to the principle of Canadian autonomy and to the real unity of the Empire, any policy tending to impose upon Canada, that has no voice in the Government of the Empire, any share in its external responsibilities and its military defence outside of the Canadian territory,—the only portion of the Empire upon which the Canadian people may exercise any political or constitutional action.

D

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AT OTTAWA (1)

MR. MONK, M. P., (now Minister of PUBLIC WORKS):

1.—On the first reading of the NAVY BILL, January 12th, 1910 :

What is proposed to-day is to invite us to become responsible for the policy, for the diplomacy, for the treaties, for the alliances of which we know nothing, over which we have no control, made by men, excellent men no doubt, but men who are not responsible to us. And, the proposal is to ask us to assume all these responsibilities without our enjoying the privileges of representation. I do not speak for the province of Quebec; I say you will never find Anglo-Saxons who will willingly accept that responsibility, who will willingly bend their heads to what I consider to be an infraction of the ancient rights of British subjects established centuries ago in England. (1775).

2.—On the second reading of the NAVY BILL, February 3rd, 1910 :

Lord Tweedmouth, Mr. Chamberlain, and other English public men, imbued with the broad principle that responsibilities of this kind carried representation, had stated, as Lord Tweedmouth did at the conference of 1907 : "We don't ask you to do this without inviting you to share in the representation". That proposal was in harmony with British ideas. But on our side nothing was asked, nothing was claimed. I do not mean to say that if these things were in that shape before us, I would adhere to them. I think that 'sufficient to the day is the evil thereof'. But I am impressed with the idea that nothing seems to have been asked, and that we entered into this unlimited scheme of responsibility in such a manner as to distinguish us completely from the British subject who lives in the British Isles, and who himself controls the foreign policy of the Empire. (3021).

Mr. DOHERTY, M. P., (now Minister of JUSTICE), on the second reading of the NAVY BILL, February 24th, 1910:

The overshadowing feature of this measure by which we intend to create a naval force is that it of necessity leads us into the situation that we cannot avoid participation in the wars which may result from the foreign policy of the mother country, and, by that foreign policy we are absolutely bound because the mother country exclusively—and under our existing conditions absolutely rightly—has control of the foreign relations which pertain not only to herself, but to all her colonies...

(1) Figures at the end of each paragraph refer to the "Debates of the House of Commons" revised edition.

The control of a navy force is a function of the power which controls the foreign policy—the policy that governs the conduct of the nation towards other nations—that a navy is called upon to enforce. From that it would seem to me fairly to follow that the conditions precedent to our undertaking to participate in the naval defence of the empire is that we should be given an effective voice in the governing and determination of the foreign relations of the empire. (4137).

.....

What I desire to do is simply to make clear that the finding of a way by which we may have a voice, and a real voice, in the control of the foreign policy of the empire, is an essential condition precedent to our embarking upon any permanent policy of participating in the maintenance of naval forces, that that is an essential condition precedent, if our autonomy, to which the right hon. gentleman (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) attaches such great importance, and to which I may say he does not attach one wit greater importance than I do, is to be maintained. (4138).

.....

I am here to say that, when this duty is presented to us of our taking a share in the maintenance of the naval forces of this empire, there is necessarily presented to us at the same time another duty, the duty of our taking our share in the heavy burden of the control of the foreign affairs of this empire. And I say that we are not at liberty to choose to do the one duty and refuse to do the other, because these two duties are inseparably bound up together. (4142).

.....

I say that we should not enter upon a course which means participation in the naval wars of the empire without first seeing to it that the means are provided for the performance of our part of this other duty from which, to my mind, it is absolutely inseparable. (4144).

.....

It seems clear to me that the measure, if put into execution under existing circumstances and without proper provision for the performance of the duty it carries with it, is destructive of what is most sacred and holy in the autonomy of this country, and, moreover, it seems to me that the measure is clearly useless as a measure for the defence of the empire. From any point of view I fail to see how any Canadian subject of the King can realize that it is his duty to do otherwise than vote against that measure. (4149-50).

Mr. E. L. BORDEN, M. P., (then Leader of the Opposition, now PRIME MINISTER), on Mr. Monk's amendment to the ADDRESS, November 24th, 1910 :

“I cannot see that it is possible to maintain the naval supremacy of this Empire by a series of disunited navies, not under one central control.... I think the question of Canada's co-operation

upon a permanent basis in Imperial defence involves very large and wide considerations. If Canada and the other Dominions of the Empire are to take their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the Empire as a whole, shall it be that we, contributing to that defence of the whole Empire, shall have absolutely, as citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the councils of the Empire touching the issues of peace or war throughout the Empire? I do not think that such would be a tolerable condition. I do not believe the people of Canada would for one moment submit to such a condition.

“Shall members of this House, representative men, representing two hundred and twenty-one constituencies of this country, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, shall no one of them have the same voice with regard to those vast Imperial issues that the humblest taxpayer in the British Isles has at this moment.

“It does not seem to me that such a condition would make for the integrity of the Empire, for the closer co-operation of the Empire! Regard must be had to these far reaching considerations, a permanent policy would have to be worked out, and when that permanent policy had been worked out and explained to the people of Canada, to every citizen in this country, then it would be the duty of any government to go to the people of Canada to receive their mandate, and accept and act upon their approval or disapproval of that policy”. (227-228).

E

MOTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

1.—By Mr. BORDEN, in amendment to the second reading of the NAVY BILL :

The proposals of the government do not follow the suggestion and recommendations of the Admiralty and, in so far as they empower the government to withhold the Naval forces of Canada from those of the Empire in time of war, are ill-advised and dangerous.

That no such proposals can safely be accepted unless they thoroughly ensure unity of organisation and of action without which there can be no effective co-operation in any common scheme of Empire defence.

That the said proposals while necessitating heavy outlay for construction and maintenance will give no immediate or effective aid to the Empire and no adequate or satisfactory results to Canada.

That no permanent policy should be entered upon involving large future expenditures of this character until it has been submitted to the people and have received their approval.

That in the meantime the immediate duty of Canada and the impending necessities of the Empire can best be discharged and met by placing without delay at the disposal of the Imperial authorities as a free and loyal contribution from the people of Canada, such an amount as may be sufficient to purchase or construct two battleships or armoured cruisers of the latest dreadnought type, giving to the Admiralty full discretion to expend the said sum at such time and for such purpose of naval defence as in their judgment may best serve to increase the united strength of the Empire and thus assure its peace and security.

2.—By Mr. MONK, as a sub-amendment to the second reading of the NAVY BILL, February, 3rd, 1910 :—

This House, while declaring its unalterable devotion to the British Crown, is of opinion, that the Bill now submitted for its consideration changes the relations of Canada with the Empire and ought in consequence to be submitted to the Canadian people in order to obtain at once the nation's opinion by means of a plebiscite.

3.—By Mr. Monk, as an amendment to the ADDEESS, November 22d, 1910 :—

The House regrets that the speech from the Throne gives no indication whatever of the intention of the government to consult the people on its naval policy and the general question of the contribution of Canada to imperial armaments.

4.—By Mr. BORDEN, as a sub-amendment to the ADDRESS.

November, 24th, 1910 :—

We beg to assure Your Excellency of the unalterable attachment and devotion of the people of Canada to the British Crown, and of their desire and intention to fulfil all just responsibilities devolving upon this country as one of the nations of the empire. We desire, however, to express our regret that Your Excellency's gracious speech gives no indication whatever of any intention on the part of Your Excellency's advisers to consult the people on the naval policy of Canada.



