

STATEMENT DISCOURS



SPEECH BY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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THE HONOURABLE
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(AS DELIVERED)

Your Excellencies, members of the Institute and distinguished guests -- and I'm not sure when I use the expression "distinguished guests" whether that's a more appropriate definition than "members of the Institute" when I see such distinguished authorities in the field of foreign relations as Mr. Ignatieff, Mr. Holmes and others here at this head table tonight, and others throughout the audience who have had very wide experience and who in addition, I may say, have served Canada extremely well over the years, and whom I'm honoured to have at this table tonight, not only because of their achievements, but also, Your Excellency, because it also illustrates the importance and, I think, the very valuable role which the Institute can play.

The mere fact that it can attract so many people who have not just a casual interest in international affairs but who have had vast experience, such as that of the Ambassador, is really, I am sure, of immense value to you all in the useful work that you're doing -- and I can assure you that it is work for which we, in the Department, have a very high regard. So much so, I suppose, that when it came to two invitations arriving at the same time, one for the Empire Club and one for the Institute and a choice was necessary, I looked at the two and said: This is my first diplomatic choice, and I can't win all the way around; I'll probably do better coming to the Institute than going to the Empire. Those of you who are members of both organizations I hope will understand why I was, in the parlance of the diplomatic state, "tilting" slightly in this direction, probably because I felt that it would be a sympathetic audience, but also, and I may say this in all sincerity, because, of course, for someone like myself it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to turn down an invitation from such a distinguished and outstanding Canadian as His Excellency, Roland Michener.

My problem this evening, apart altogether from being somewhat cowed by the amount of expertise that's present in the room and the number of years of experience when it's related to my few months of experience directly as Foreign Minister, or Secretary of State for External Affairs, is that it is always a problem on occasions such as this to select from among the innumerable number of topics on which I might talk to you this evening those few that perhaps are most relevant and most immediate.

I could, for instance, take all of the time that we have together just simply talking about my recent visit to the Soviet Union and the general reaction that I have and the assessment that I have been able to make, as tentative as it is, of the prospects for détente in the next few months and years as a new administration takes over in the United States. This is going to be a most fascinating experience for all of us, in the international field, to see what now will emerge as a new administration takes over and as a new Secretary of State in the United States, named just this day -- Mr. Vance -- makes his initial impression on the international community.

I could also talk to you almost interminably about Canada's relations with the European Economic Community and what is now starting to develop there as a result of the achievement of the contractual link with the Community. Here, once again, I will simply say that I'm leaving for Brussels later this evening, being there next week for the NATO meetings, but simultaneously attending the opening of the first working session of the Canadian/European Economic Community group. And we have high hopes for this new relationship, but they are hopes that are tempered by reality and which, I have to say, I believe could probably take some time to blossom into the full-fledged kinds of relationship that each side would hope would develop as a result of this unique situation which has come about through the contractual link.

And the Community has many problems of its own, and particularly in terms of additional trading relationships with Canada and developing our economic and financial relations, it is not something which is going to emerge full-blown from the first working meeting. But I think the real achievement here -- for those of us who are interested in international affairs -- is that the European Community, having been established now and having acquired an on-going life which I think, despite precarious adventures which may lie ahead for it, will nevertheless continue, but that community having been established, Canada now has a forum in which it will be possible for us -- which was not the case before -- to come together with those who are making the decisions in Europe and to let them know of Canada's concerns and interests and to have a formalized mechanism through which these observations, these comments back and forth, can be translated first of all into a better mutual understanding and secondly, and probably more important, into increased trade and a closer political kind of alliance that is, in my judgement, essential in the kind of shrinking continent and shrinking world in which we are living.

But I repeat, that is not the subject on which I wish to spend most of my time this evening.

I do want to say a particular word at the outset about Canada's foreign policy in broad terms. The gentleman whom I've mentioned already, as well as many others, laboured over a very long period of time -- a longer period of time even than the forty-six to forty-seven years of the life of this organization -- to evolve for Canada a posture which was different, in the sense that it was Canadian, and which increasingly over time has come to reflect the aspirations, the wishes and the general attitude of the people of this country. And, of course, I suppose there was no greater architect I think we can all say, of that Canadian foreign policy than Mr. Pearson, with whom Mr. Ignatieff worked in the early days of the United Nations. And today we have a foreign policy which I've seen described on many occasions as basically the extension of Canada's domestic policy to the world; in other words, that my responsibility and that of the many thousands who work with me, is to take Canadian goals and objectives and, through foreign policy initiatives and developments, to use

those foreign policy developments to develop and increase the objectives, and to enhance the objectives that we have spelled out for ourselves in Canada.

Now that, of course, is a fairly simple and straightforward definition, and it requires a good deal of elaboration because, first of all, as is very clear to all of us, there is not unanimity within Canada, obviously, as to what our domestic goals and our national objectives are. And perhaps that was never more a subject for serious discussion than it is at this particular time.

Secondly, many of our domestic goals and our aspirations are short-term, and essentially, and perhaps necessarily, subjective. And so therefore, when one talks about translating foreign policy thrusts, foreign policy initiatives, as a method for bolstering national objectives it has to be recognized that there will inevitably be times when, in the foreign policy field, we will be looking much, much longer, in terms of our perspective than is likely to be the case within the country at a given moment.

Similarly, of course, it will always be the case that whatever our foreign policy is and whatever thrusts we may undertake in international affairs, there will always be particular interest groups within Canada who will not be totally in agreement with some aspect of our foreign policy. This may be because of economic reasons. It may be because of ethnic reasons. It can be for a whole range of other reasons including regional ones. And so, therefore, when one is seeking to determine at any given moment in time what foreign policy activities should be undertaken by Canada, it is always important to recognize that, in the words of the old expression, "You can't please all of the people all of the time."

What I'm really saying in essence is that while our domestic policy and our domestic objectives will tend to be fluid, at least superficially, our foreign policy activities have to be of a more stable and long-range nature, and certainly cannot be subject to buffeting on a constant basis by a variety of pressure groups however well-intentioned and however deserving those may be.

And so against that kind of brief comment about the way in which I visualize handling the foreign affairs of this country, let me spend much of my time now by talking to you about the subject that I thought might interest you more than any other, and that is how Canada will behave as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations when we assume our membership on that council on the 1st of January.

It's interesting in this context, by the way, to note that Canada is now taking on its fourth tour on the Security Council. We were there back in Mr. Ignatieff's first tour, I believe in New York in the first decade of the United Nations, and we have been there in each of the decades since.

During that time the Security Council has suffered its own ups and downs. There was a period when there was very grave doubt and many reservations expressed as to whether or not in fact the Security Council and, by implication, the whole of the United Nations, might have to undergo serious revision in its structures and its mechanism, because it didn't appear to be working. Some of you will remember that back in the late 1950s the Security Council in one year met only five times because of a whole series of events that occurred during that period of the cold war and the tensions between East and West. Well, since that time, slowly but to some extent one can say, satisfactorily, the Security Council has changed its shape and has, in my judgement, become more effective. That doesn't mean that it is a perfect instrument, clearly it falls far short of that; but as against those five meetings that I mentioned in one year, in the first half of 1976, the current year, the Security Council has met some 69 times and indeed, in addition to that, there have been a number of informal sessions of one type and another, so that it can be said with a good deal of accuracy that the Security Council is now almost a continuing body meeting pretty much all the time, and one which has to be seized of the many serious problems which are generating and have generated tensions throughout the world.

For all of these reasons we, in the Government of Canada, thought very seriously this year when it became apparent that our election to the Council for the fourth time was probably going to come about. We had to ask ourselves whether, indeed, it was an appropriate role for Canada and, put very frankly, we had to ask ourselves whether we were prepared to make and to take the hard decisions that I have no doubt will be put in front of us over the next two years of 1977 and '78. I think it is part of the Canadian tradition, and it's a reflection of that tradition that, while we realized the problems that lay ahead, there was not in the last analysis any serious thought on our part that we could allow this opportunity to pass, or this challenge to pass. And so it is that, as of a month from now, Canada will be back on the Security Council.

What, then, are some of the issues that I see coming before the Council in the foreseeable future? Some of them are quite easy to forecast, quite easy to predict.

Undoubtedly, the whole troubled question of Southern Africa will in one form or another find its way to the United Nations in 1977. We, of course, have no way of knowing, any more than any other country has, what is going to emerge from the present round of talks in Geneva on the future of Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, as it is now coming more and more frequently to be called.

For our part, looking at Southern Africa in total for the moment, we have, of course, consistently rejected and denounced the apartheid policies of South Africa. There has been no waffling, no qualification in that regard. And indeed, Canada was among those countries that urged, and ultimately achieved, the voluntary embargo by a great many nations of any sales of arms or sensitive equipment to South Africa, and we have scrupulously adhered to that policy for many, many years.

Incidentally, there is always room for discussion in responsible groups such as this as to Canadian policy with regard to commercial transactions of a non-sensitive nature with countries with whom we have profound differences on matters of ideology. Up to now, we have taken the position that trade in commercial goods of a non-sensitive nature with South Africa ought to be carried on by private interests if they so wish, and that it is no part of the government's responsibility to put any inhibitions in the way of that type of trade. The same, of course, could very well be said for many other countries where, once again, we are strongly divided between ourselves and those countries on ideological questions. And so, therefore, our position has been that, in the broad terms of commercial activity, it would be virtually impossible for us to set down guidelines or restrictions in terms of how private interests in Canada will be dealing with countries with whom we have these kinds of objections, and South Africa, of course, stands out as the best example of that.

Similarly, in terms of South Africa, we have at the moment a most pressing question in front of us with regard to the whole question of sports activities between teams or participants from Canada and segregated teams from South Africa, whether in that country or with South African teams coming to Canada. Once again, we have taken the position that individual citizens of our country should not be inhibited, or prohibited, in terms of what they wish to do as individuals, but that as the Government of Canada we are discouraging those kinds of exchanges and have determined that we will not provide any form of financial assistance as long as the apartheid policies are maintained. This, of course, has led us and many other countries of the Commonwealth into a somewhat difficult position, as of this moment, with regard to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton in 1978.

We have made many efforts already, and I believe with some success, to ensure, and to try at least to have this matter resolved amicably and to ensure, I repeat, that there is the widest possible participation by Commonwealth countries, both black and white, in the Games; and I will be holding further talks in that connection during this trip on which I'm about to embark.

In the broader sense, of course, Southern Africa, as opposed to South Africa, is really more in the news these days because of the Rhodesian situation. And while none of us can, at this time, forecast what will emerge, as I said a moment ago, from the Rhodesian talks in Geneva, there is one thing of which we can be sure, and that is that majority rule will come to Rhodesia and will come sooner than later. And the question, it seems to me, that faces all of those who are either directly involved in the talks or who are in a peripheral role at the moment -- such as Canada -- is whether that transition, which of course we support -- namely, majority rule -- whether that transition to majority rule is going to be brought about in an orderly and peaceful way, or whether it is going to be accompanied by the kind of violence which all too frequently over the post-war years has accompanied

the independence or freedom movement in one country after another not only in Africa but elsewhere in the world.

For my own part, I feel that the black leadership in Rhodesia has a great responsibility to recognize that they now have the opportunity to gain the support of the vast majority of the developed countries, including Canada, including the United States, by moving toward a rational transition, by working for a change which can be brought about with a minimum of disruption and with no bloodshed, hopefully -- even though that may be an unrealistic expectation -- but nevertheless to work for the smoothest possible kind of change. And so the message that I have been conveying through all diplomatic and other channels that are open to us, to the black leadership is to take to heart this important lesson and to demonstrate that they have the maturity and the competence to bring about this desirable change, which we and so many other countries support in the United Nations, in an amicable way.

Now, of course, you have all read, and I'm sure some of you who have a special interest will wonder whether or not any requests or proposals have yet come to us as to the kind of role that Canada might play during the transitional period. The fact is that other than some quite general and, I may say, vague suggestions or comments, nothing has yet emerged of a specific nature for consideration by the Government of Canada. There has been reference, from time to time, as to the possibility of the establishment of a special fund. And incidentally, I should say in passing that much of the publicity in this regard has, I think, been somewhat off the mark, in that there is no suggestion that this fund, if it ever develops, will be used to finance the exodus of white Rhodesians. It is thought of more as a stabilizing fund for the preservation of the economic and political climate in the country which, in fact, will encourage both the white Rhodesians and the black Rhodesians to settle any differences and to go on living amicably together. But I just mention that because there has been quite a bit of misunderstanding about it.

The second point is, of course, that there has been a suggestion that the Commonwealth might well have a role to play. And you may have noted that in my public comments on this question I have said simply that the principle is one with which none of us can really argue, but that we would want to be very clear as to what kind of position a Commonwealth force, be it civilian or military, might be called upon to exercise in a Rhodesian situation in a transitional period. Certainly I would not wish, nor I think would any Canadian wish, to see Canadian forces, for example, used as a buffer between blacks and whites, or to see us once again thrust into a peacekeeping role between people who are genuinely, indeed, anxious to be literally at each other's throats. But nevertheless, if there is a

possibility of a useful role for the Commonwealth, Canada will look at it realistically, but so far we have made no commitments on either of those scores.

I notice that as I talk about these subjects I tend to get into, perhaps, more detail than is necessary and therefore cut down on the amount of time that I want to spend on other subjects of equal and perhaps greater importance. So I will simply say, in terms of the Southern African situation, that we're equally as concerned about what is happening in Namibia. It is clear that it is an illegal régime -- a variety of international bodies have made that conclusion -- and that South Africa is going to have to accept that decision and be governed accordingly.

Similarly, we do not, in Canada -- as to the best of my knowledge does any, certainly any developed country-- recognize Transkei and that device and technique now being employed by South Africa as an appropriate, or suitable, or effective answer to apartheid. And so therefore it is not our intention, nor do I expect that it will be, that we will give recognition to Transkei as a full-fledged member of the United Nations.

But as I started to say when I talked about the items that are going to come before the Security Council, you can see, just from some of the things that I've said, that the Southern African situation is going to be one of great intricacy and it's going to call for a great deal of skill and in some respects, perhaps, a great deal of courage, on the part of the members of the Security Council, including Canada.

The second area, of course, where we are deeply concerned, for historical and many other reasons, is the Middle East. I don't think it's any secret that matters in the Middle East, except for the tragedy of Lebanon, have been somewhat quiet in recent months for the very simple reason that all of the parties concerned realized that until there was a resolution of the domestic election in the United States, it was highly unlikely that there would be strong initiatives from that quarter. Now the United States' elections have been held. Fortunately, the situation in Lebanon is stabilized -- for however long of course we do not know -- but it is stabilized and there is some grounds for confidence. Therefore, it is my view that negotiations with regard to a permanent settlement in the Middle East should begin at the earliest possible moment, that the situation that presently exists is one which though, as I said, is quiet now, could erupt once again into a very serious danger not only to the peace of the area but to the peace of the world.

Now, I'm not particularly concerned whether the talks are held in Geneva or somewhere else, but it is my intention to call upon all of the parties -- in my official role -- to resume those talks as quickly as possible, and to commit Canada's best efforts to getting them going in a climate which is best designed to bring about a permanent solution. None of us is so naive as to think that that solution will

come easily. But it won't come at all unless there is a commitment and a willingness for all of the parties to get together in a realistic fashion and to face what the complexities are of bringing about a permanent peace.

Insofar as Canada is concerned, our position, with regard to the State of Israel is clear, unequivocal. We subscribe to the United Nations Resolutions which ensure Israel the right to survival behind safe and secure boundaries, and there is no intention, no thought, of changing that position. Furthermore, we believe that a settlement in the Middle East must not only ensure the letter of that United Nations Resolution but the spirit of it as well. And, of course, we're equally determined, as I think every reasonable person is, to see that the Palestinians, the Palestinian people, are also relieved of the terrible crushing burden so many of them have had to suffer for so many years. On humanitarian grounds alone this is surely an essential element in any Middle East solution that must be found. And once again, it is not enough, it seems to me, to argue that it's complicated and complex and that we had best get along with a little patchwork here and a little patchwork there, that there are those hundreds of thousands of people who have rights, which again have been recognized by the world community, and that we must see that as an essential part of the equation and of the solution.

In the interim, of course, Canada has been one of the major contributors to U.N.R.W.A. (the United Nations Organization for Refugees in the Middle East) and only two or three weeks ago I was able to give to the Secretary General of that organization an additional amount of \$300,000 for this year for that purpose. But all of these are what I have called patchwork solutions. I have no doubt that, as members of the United Nations and particularly of the Security Council in this coming year, we in Canada, as with South Africa but perhaps with more visibility, will have to make some very difficult decisions relating to the Middle East. And I have no doubt either that there will be many who will say, as has already been said, that by joining the Security Council, in some way or the other Canada's policy toward the Middle East is going to change in some direction, there's going to be some perceptible shift. Let me reassure you on that point. Our policy will continue to be as I have outlined it and, as you who are students at least of international affairs will know, we have declared it to be for many, many years. But I am also resigned to the very distinct possibility that on this or that particular issue, there are bound to be those in Canada who will disagree with the position taken by Canada. I can only tell you that during my period as Secretary of State for External Affairs, no such decisions, no such votes, no declarations, will be made or taken by us without the most careful analysis and scrutiny of resolutions or actions to ensure that they are consistent with the basic principles that I outlined a few moments ago.

There is much, much more that I could say about the Middle East, but once again time constraints make it impossible. But if Canada, as has happened on two previous occasions, can be in the Security Council and can use its influence to move toward the resolution of the problems of the Middle East, then this will be one of the most satisfying things, I think, not only for those of us who have the active responsibility at a given moment, but also for all Canadians who have had such an intense interest in that area for so many reasons for so many years.

I suppose one of the other questions which is going to occupy us in the Security Council in the United Nations will be the question of the membership in the United Nations of some additional countries. Over the years there has been, of course, a growth in membership to the point where there aren't that many countries that aren't now participants, but there are some, one of them, of course, being the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. It is Canada's position that Viet-Nam should be entitled to and should be given membership in the United Nations. We say this because our commitment has been for years to universality. We don't believe that the United Nations ought to be a club made up only of countries that think alike, that in point of fact, exclusions, as we have seen in the past on a number of occasions, simply result in a heightening of tensions in particular regions of the world or between different ideologies of the world. That is why, for instance, for the same reason of universality, we would argue for the retention of South Africa as a member, and we would argue for the retention of Israel as a member.

And so we would also, and will, at the Security Council continue to press for the admission of those countries which are still outside the U.N. even though, I repeat, we may not be even remotely close to agreeing with their ideology or some of their basic political principles. The point is that the U.N. will only work if we are prepared, within that forum, to listen to views and to argue with views with which we disagree, rather than spend our time in a confined club patting each other on the back and telling each other what good boys we are.

Also, in 1977, there are, I have no doubt, likely to be important developments in the whole area of détente and, of course, the companion area of disarmament. For a number of reasons 1976 has not been a particularly productive year for East-West talks relating to disarmament. I think it is fair to say once again that probably the S.A.L.T. talks and some of the others that have been going on in different fora, have suffered as a result of the uncertainty about the future political leadership in the United States as well as, of course, for a variety of other reasons. But in 1977, once again, I think it is incumbent upon us in Canada to call -- as we have already started to do -- on the great powers to undertake a determined effort to ease the tensions which are

inherent in the current arms race. And here, once again, I'm sure you will understand that this is a subject which again could occupy many hours not only of talk but of discussion, but it is sufficient for me to say this evening that to me 1977 is a very crucial year in that vitally important field, not only important in the sense that it heightens the possibility of even inadvertent war, but also important in the sense that it is diverting such scandalously large sums of money into the arms race when so much of the world is in such incredible poverty and need.

And that brings me to the fourth and final area where I believe there will be great need for wisdom and vision in the Security Council in the United Nations in '77 and in the years beyond, and that is in the area that has come to be called the North-South dialogue. This is such a complex subject that it is virtually impossible without the to and fro of questioning and discussion in small groups, to deal with it adequately. But the simple truth of the matter is that we have a situation in the world today -- perhaps brought to a head by the O.P.E.C. country developments -- that we have a situation in which the vast majority of the people of the world, the vast majority of the countries of the world, are in a deplorable condition economically and in every other imaginable way.

It occurred to me the other day, for instance, when I was looking at some statistics, that a simple way to try to convey the scope of the world's poverty is that there are 900 million families -- people rather -- in the world whose income in a year is only half of what a Canadian family with two teenage children receives from family allowances alone. If you can think about it in those terms it gives you some kind of a conception of why we are facing, in the under-developed world, not only a challenge to our magnanimity, but I suggest in a very real sense, a challenge, ultimately, to our survival. Because until we can find a suitable means of sharing more equally not just in the kind of welfare manner of much of the past, but in a way which gives these people in these countries hope for the future, until we can find some means for doing that, then there will invariably be the kinds of mounting suspicion that have led to voting blocs in the United Nations, that have led to, in some measure at least, such repugnant resolutions as the association of Zionism and racism.

All of these things are a reflection, at least in part, of that ferment that is going on in the under-developed world. And so the North-South dialogue is reflected now in the C.I.E.C. Conference in Paris of which my colleague and predecessor, Allan MacEachen, is Co-Chairman. That forum must make progress because, unless it does, unless the developed countries are prepared to demonstrate clearly what they are prepared and willing to do by way of commodity agreements, whatever form they take, by way of debt forgiveness or easing for some of the poorest countries, and in a whole range of other areas,

unless that happens, then, of course, the leverage of essential commodities such as oil, and the O.P.E.C. group, will unquestionably be used against the developed countries in ways which I shudder to contemplate in terms of the potential that they may have eventually for ripping the world literally apart.

And so in the Security Council, once more, Canada is going to have to be wise and judicious and generous, not only in terms of our own people and what they're prepared to do, but in terms of the leadership that we can give to the developed world. All in all, then, it's going to be a busy year, and that's quite a challenge when one takes into account two other factors I want to touch on very briefly.

First, having to deal with a new administration in the United States. I have no great qualms, incidentally, about that prospect, because Canada/United States relations have gone on for so long and are based by and large on such a firm foundation of understanding and mutual awareness of each other, that a change of administration is not going to significantly alter that relationship. But, nevertheless, it is going to be, . . . that we deal with them in as frank and forthright and rapid a manner as we possibly can to avoid them festering into something far more serious.

And finally, of course, those challenges at the United Nations must be coupled not only with our relations with the United States and how we are going to share this continent, but we also have to decide what we're going to do with our own country.

I've said, at the outset that our domestic, our national objectives, are in a sense reflected in our foreign policy and that our foreign policy is designed to shore up and to reinforce our domestic goals. And so, therefore, if our foreign policy is to be credible, if it is to be effective and to be believed, then obviously it follows that our domestic goals and our objectives must be as clear as it is possible for us to make them.

And without going into at great lengths tonight, in a speech essentially on foreign policy matters, I do want to say that I think it is incumbent on all of us to examine carefully all questions relating to national unity, to ask ourselves in all sincerity whether we want to hold this country together--and I believe the answer will be overwhelmingly, "yes" -- and having done that, to determine what are the best means and the best route for us to follow toward that goal. I'm reasonably confident. I always am. But in this case I have a special reason. His Excellency made the comment that my wife and I were native-born Newfoundlanders. We're also the only two people in this room at least who voted twice against becoming Canadians, in the referendum of 1948. So referenda

are not new to us, and we know something of what it's like to have a country--and it was a country, small, but nevertheless our country -- decide to join a larger country -- the reverse of what some people in Canada are talking about now. So, for my part, I was really, and can describe myself, as a Canadian not by birth or even by choice, but one by conversion, and that conversion has been total and absolute.

And I simply want to say this: that as someone who has gone through that unique experience, I haven't the slightest doubt that this country is worth working for, and that it is worth making a very special effort to hold together. And, of course, I hope also that you feel the same way.

So, when I'm in Brussels next week, or Latin America in January, Your Excellency, it will be good to know that there are serious-minded Canadians who are giving careful attention to international matters and who I know I can count on, not necessarily for total approval of Canadian foreign policy, but, more important, for guidance and advice, and perhaps most important of all, encouragement.

Thank you all very much indeed.