# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

# PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

## 1987




ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

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## PREFACE

This volume is a compilation of final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 sessions relating to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on the outer space issue.

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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the prevention of the arms race in outer space needs to be translated into a co-operative undertaking by your Conference to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter. This is now one of the essential areas in which concerted action can be taken for strengthening international peace and security.



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

It will be recalled that the same Heads of State or Government who, in the Delhi Declaration of January 1985, had stated that "Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty", reverted to this question in the following terms in a new Declaration, adopted in Ixtapa on 7 August 1986:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"We reiterate our demand that an arms race in outer space be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being misused for destructive purposes".

Although, in addition to the resolution that was approved, three other draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee on this item -- one sponsored by China, the second by a group of Western States and the third by a group of socialist States -- no decision was taken on them at the request of their respective sponsors. Then there was the draft resolution sponsored by many members of the so-called Group of 21 among whom, as in the previous year, the representatives of Sri Lanka and Egypt played a particularly important role in its elaboration and in the usual round of consultations; after the original text had been amended by its sponsors this draft resolution was adopted in plenary by the General Assembly on 3 December by a vote which can certainly be described as one of the most impressive of the session, namely, 154 votes in favour, none against and only 1 abstention -- that of the United States.

That resolution, namely, resolution 41/53, like that of the previous year, is very long and as usual consists of a preamble and an operative part. In the preamble, the General Assembly, after recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, reaffirms the commitments assumed by the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular their undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

In the preamble the General Assembly also reaffirmed paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and "appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty".

In the operative part of the resolution I am discussing, it is worthwhile highlighting the following two appeals: the first is contained in paragraph 4 and addressed to all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space" in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

The second appeal is contained in paragraph 9 and is addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union, which are urged to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Finally -- just as I did a year ago -- I have intentionally kept until last the following three quotations from operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 8, since they all refer expressly to the Conference on Disarmament:

In paragraph 5, the Assembly reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, "has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

In paragraph 6 the Assembly expressly requested the Conference on Disarmament "to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space".

Lastly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution, it requested the Conference "to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".



(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

Reykjavik has given us precise awareness of the fact that a nuclear-free world and the resolution of the crucial problems in the nuclear and outer space area is no Utopia but a real possibility. Although the hope that the meeting in Reykjavik would lead to early practical results has not been borne out, the negotitions in the capital of Iceland have taken the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high frontier from which the outline of a nuclear-free, secure world is clearly visible. The Soviet Union is, through active and presistent practical actions at all the negotiations under way, reaffirming its desire to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

Here in Geneva, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are under way. We are not withdrawing a single one of the proposals aimed at the sharp reduction and subsequent elimination of all nuclear devices and the guaranteeing of a peaceful space that we put forward at Reykjavik. Moreover, we are crystallizing our proposals and manifesting in practice a readiness to find constructive outcomes by doing our utmost to impart dynamism to these negotiations. Hence, in the negotitations on nuclear space weapons, the Soviet side has put forward a proposal aimed at moving the discussions on at last from endless debate into the constructive channel of practical preparation of documents. Work on reaching agreement on the documents in question has already begun. We are counting on achieving success in this important task. People expect real results from us. We hope that they understand this in Washington too and that they will positively respond to our efforts there. However, one has the impression that in Washington they are for the present occupied with other business.

(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

Upon the conclusion of the current round of negotiations, we intend, in keeping with the United Nations recommendations, to inform the Conference on Disarmament of the results. We are convinced that openness is bound to be one of the most powerful factors of movement towards a nuclear-free world too.

The results of Reykjavik have become the common heritage of all countries and peoples to whom it is of vital interest that nuclear weapons should be eliminated and that the arms race should not spread into outer space as well. The productive interaction of States both large and small is necessary as never before for the continued existence and progress of mankind.

The solution to the question of nuclear disarmament is inseparably linked with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It would be unforgiveable if, after being wrested from the nuclear nightmare, mankind was thrust into a laser/space nightmare. The time has come for active negotiations and practical work, rather than abstract discussion, on finding effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The view is about here and there that the "serious" negotiations on this problem should be conducted, not in the meeting hall of this Conference, but rather on a bilateral basis, in the Soviet and American missions. We think otherwise. We are convinced that, in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is not and cannot be any division of the negotiations into "serious" and "unserious". We are in favour of being guided by the most serious approach to any negotiations on this crucial problem that has now arisen before mankind.

The Conference has good potential for businesslike and concrete discussion of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. This problem affects all States and is a case in which the Conference could not only become the generator of useful ideas, but also engage in concrete

(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

negotiations on certain aspects of this problem. For instance, in our view, the Conference could engage in the businesslike consideration of the question of the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. After all, from outer space it is possible to select as a "laser target" not only Soviet cities, but any town in any "disobedient" country. The Conference could also consider the possibility of creating a system of international verification guaranteeing unswerving compliance with an agreement of the kind in question and, in particular, study the idea of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for instance, would have the right of access for the purpose of carrying out on-site inspections to all facilities designed for the launching and deployment in outer space of space devices and to the corresponding launch vehicles.

Bearing in mind as the ultimate goal the banning of the deployment of armaments in outer space, the Conference could begin the elaboration of partial, but important measures leading to this goal. In particular, the Conference could consider the possibility of drawing up an international agreement guaranteeing immunity for artificial Earth satellites which do not carry weapons of any sort on board. In this connection, it would also be desirable to study the possibilities of eliminating existing anti-satellite systems. For our part, we suggest banning weapon systems of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth" and "Earth-to-space" kinds. We should like to stress that the USSR, manifesting good will, continues to refrain from placing anti-satellite systems in outer space.

(Ms Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden is gratified that discussions have taken place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the past two years. That Committee's deliberations have, to a degree, been useful in sorting out issues in this field. The existing body of international law relating to an arms race in space is in many respects inadequate. We must negotiate additional measures, for example, a ban on space weapons, including development, testing and deployment of ASAT systems and their destruction. Existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral ones, must be strictly adhered to. The ABM Treaty is a case in point. The Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work during this year's session. Its considerations can be further broadened and deepened within the framework of its mandate. There are still a variety of legal aspects that should be further analysed. An overview of the technical aspect of space weapon development is called for. The setting up of an informal working group of technical experts could be considered.

...

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is scheduled to take place in 1988. Sweden will take an active part in that special session, as well as in the important preparatory work preceding it. The special session should reconfirm the conviction of the international community that there is no task more urgent for mankind than to achieve nuclear disarmament. Bearing in mind the priority of the nuclear issue, the scope could be broadened. For our part, we would be pleased if the special session also addressed such crucial questions as conventional disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the naval arms race and the need for confidence-building measures on a global level.



(Mr. Butler, Australia)

I turn now to outer space. On the question of a convention of an arms race in outer space, the position of the Australian Government is clear: such an arms race should never take place. We accept that it is the basic commitment of the major Powers involved to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is what they have said, and we accept it and we want to see that commitment honoured. We believe that the multilateral community, whose interest in this issue is beyond question, can make an important contribution towards achieving this goal. We believe that the work of this Conference has a central place in this effort and should be resumed this year without delay. It would be distressing in the extreme if the resumption of that work were to be delayed by mere procedural arguments. The task is urgent and the job at hand is large. We hope, Mr. President, that the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space will be well into its working stride before you leave the Chair of this Conference.

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security".

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult, very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing for a good number of years.

In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted around $250 billion to defence. Figures on United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed. They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the reality of the Soviet defence effort.

In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately $1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than $35 billion. Now,

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

that is a ridiculously small sum -- some 15 per cent of what they really spend -- for the declared defence budget of a State regarded as a military super-Power. It bears no relationship at all to the $250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defence effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defence effort on a declared budget of 20.3 billion roubles. It is spending many, many, many times that, and we all know that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defences. The United States Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), of which you have heard some, I am sure, in this room, is an openly declared programme. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses the programme in his speeches. In fact I have personally found it hard to stop him from discussing the subject of SDI at any time, in his speeches or otherwise.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defence and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI programme of its own. We know this denial to be false. I believe everybody in this room knows the denial to be false. We know that the Soviet Union began investigating several advanced strategic defence technologies before we did, years before. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research programme which involves about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately $1 billion a year just on that kind of laser research programme. And we know it is researching a host of other technologies, advanced technologies, as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control if often slow and halting when there is such a lack of openness and honesty between Governments about even such an elementary fact as this one?

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not lead to greater openness on the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to a meaningful agreement. Thus, my message to you today can be summed up as this: unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments in arms control are just going to be limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement towards greater openness is necessary for progress on an issue like the one this Conference has before it.

(Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri, Cuba)

Another question that deserves our attention and that was also examined by the summit Conference of the non-aligned is the extension of the arms race into outer space. The Heads of State or Government meeting at Harare expressed their deep concern at the preparations under way to extend the arms race into outer space and vigorously reaffirmed the principle that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to the benefit of all countries, whatever their level of economic or scientific development, and be open to all States.

Consequently, they urged this Conference urgently to begin negotiations with a view to arriving at agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race, in all its aspects into outer space and to promote the possibility of co-operation in the sphere of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, while emphasizing the imperative need to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, to dismantle existing arsenals, to prohibit the introduction of new weapons systems and to ensure that the treaties in force preserve outer space for peaceful purposes.

In taking stock of what happened last year in the sphere of disarmament, special mention must be made of the meeting that took place at Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October between the highest-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, a meeting which came very close to achieving significant progress in arms reduction that, if they could continue going forward along those lines in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, would obviously have great importance for all mankind. The persistence of one of the parties, the United States, in continuing to develop what is termed the Strategic Defence Initiative to its ultimate consequences has prevented the realization of the agreements that had in principle been reached. That negative policy has earned the opprobrium of public opinion, which contrasts it with the willingness of the other party to give up nuclear weapons, to agree on a plan for their total elimination within a fixed time-frame, to propose guarantees for all as regards verification and, finally, to adopt effective measures to ensure the peaceful use and prevent the militarization of outer space before it is too late and the situation becomes irreversible.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The situation we face today, as has repeatedly been said by other distinguished colleagues in this Chamber, is extremely critical for the multilateral negotiating body if it does not begin negotiations on the chief items upon its agenda. Questions such as the negotiation of a treaty that will prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, measures to prevent nuclear war, the necessity to avoid an arms race in outer space and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot be delayed any further. Nor can we accept that progress on these items should depend upon something so haphazard as the relations between the two principal nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The Conference on Disarmament should not confine its work to the negotiation of questions which, in our judgement, lack the necessary priority, as is the case, among other things, of what are generally referred to as radiological weapons.



(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

My delegation holds the view that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should resume its activities as soon as possible.

There is no lack of valuable ideas and specific proposals in the Conference. We believe it is important now to focus the Committee's attention on the elaboration of significant measures conducive to guaranteeing the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race in it. This Conference should concentrate on the elaboration of an agreement or agreements, for instance on ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In this context, it is warranted to explore the possibility of elimination of existing anti-satellite systems. In other words, what my delegation would like to see on item 5 is deeds.



(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

The delegation of Peru will adhere to the position formulated by the Group of 21 with regard to the re-establishment of the committees on items 5, 6 and 7 of the agenda.

With respect to the first, item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are prepared to participate actively in discussing and considering this increasingly urgent priority item of the Conference on Disarmament, chiefly in the light of the concept of the peaceful uses of space and the possible analogies between such uses of outer space and the uses contemplated in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The delegation of Peru firmly believes that this year the Ad Hoc Committee should be given a broader mandate than last year's which was its first, and an appropriate programme of work.

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

We welcome the fact that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. Substantive, although rather preliminary, discussions have already been held in the past. Bearing in mind the fact that the extensive use of outer space for some military purposes, such as early warning and verification, clearly contributes to international security, continued discussion should, in our view, focus on preventing the weaponization of outer space. A ban on anti-satellite weapons should be a priority objective in this context. Multilateral efforts at this Conference would thereby complement, for the common good of all, the bilateral effort of those two who bear the primary responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space.



(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the prevention of an arms race in outer space should also constitute a priority objective of negotiations in the Conference. Of considerable practical importance would be the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with dealing with all aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the beginning of negotiations on this issue. In our conception it is necessary that priority be given to the cessation of all actions militarizing space, the convening of an international conference and the conclusion of a general treaty on the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

The degree of priority of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space has greatly increased in the face of the events taking place in the development of new weapons systems designed for operation in outer space. The work done last year by the Ad Hoc Committee has produced fairly good results. The exchange of views proved that there is a need and room for developing further the international legal régime for keeping the arms race out of this area. The present system of international legal instruments is evidently not sufficient to prevent the technological arms race from moving into the outer space. It needs to be complemented. We are of the opinion that the Conference is an appropriate place to do this work, parallel with efforts made at other forums. The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space should be re-established without wasting time on procedural aspects, and should start working with a view to concrete measures. It should concentrate on such particular issues as banning the use of force in outer space, space weapons, prohibiton of ASAT weapons systems and the protection of satellites.



(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Over recent years there has been a steady swell of support for the non-aligned resolution in the General Assembly initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which has emerged as the only resolution on this crucial issue. Last year, resolution 41/53 was adopted by a record vote of 154 for, with one sole abstention, and no votes against the resolution. Once again it seems to be a situation where there is a common objective shared by us all -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which, as the province of all mankind, cannot be an arena for the threat or use of force and must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the resolution acknowledges the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on this issue differences exist on what steps are necessary now for this body to achieve these objectives. Since 1985 we have had an Ad Hoc Committee mandated with the deliberately circumscribed task of exploring relevant issues. Last year my delegation was encouraged by the efforts of some delegations to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by attempting to agree on definitions of important concepts and terms relevant to this agenda item. We regret that the participation in this important aspect of work was limited. We would like to see the Ad Hoc Committee re-established with the minimum delay possible and as an earnest of its sincerity the Group of 21 has made a very modest proposal for a mandate which we trust will be accepted. No one can be so wedded to the status quo as to object to the addition that has been proposed, bearing in mind paragraph 80 of the Final Document as reiterated in General Assembly resolution 41/53. The message of the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations to this Conference enjoined us "to create conditions for negotiating agreements on this vital matter". That is our modest goal for this session.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We hear, meanwhile, disturbing calls for an early deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems which were until recently described to us as research programmes. They will, if heeded, inevitably involve non-compliance with existing treaties which even the most elastic interpretation will not conceal. Whether ballistic missile defence systems are being researched and developed in the full glare of media attention or in clandestine, they represent generically a dangerous new phase in the arms race. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space. A balanced and even-handed non-aligned attempt in pursuance of the Harare Declaration to ban such obviously offensive weapons in space as dedicated anti-satellite weapons met with the strongest opposition from those who have crafted the most elaborate arguments to justify defensive systems. As the Harare Declaration noted "Measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and weapons systems in outer space could, through a constant chain of action and reaction, lead to an escalation of the arms race in both 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons thus making the outbreak of nuclear conflict more likely". There is an obvious inconsistency in seeking a world free of ballistic missiles and proceeding to erect shields against them which the overwhelming body of scientific opinion assesses as being vulnerable and therefore only functional as part of a first-strike capability. The

deployment of weapons in space must be prevented in our common interest. The attractions of hi-tech warfare and an interlocking programme of lucrative research contracts should not divert us from the dangers of an arms race in space and the need to prevent it going beyond the research stage. This task cannot be left exclusively to bilateral negotiations. It also requires the establishment of a group of scientific experts within this Conference so that multilateral expertise can be pooled on the technical issues relevant to preventing an arms race in outer space. My delegation therefore supports the proposal made by the Swedish delegation and calls for an early agreement on the mandate and composition of such a group.

The discussions at Reykjavik gave us all a glimpse of a nuclear-free world as a realistic possibility seriously contemplated by the leaders of the two nations accounting for 95 per cent of nuclear weapons in the world. Non-aligned countries like Sri Lanka would like to encourage these nations to pursue this goal in their bilateral negotiations. We are disturbed however by those who seek to obstruct this, arguing the need for nuclear weapons on the basis of an alleged inferiority in conventional arms. The goal of nuclear disarmament must be pursued if the spirit of Reykjavik is to inform the bilateral discussions taking place and lead to agreements in all disarmament forums including the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, as well as the MBFR and CSCE. That goal is a priority issue in this multilateral negotiating body.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

During the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 154 countries reiterated their opposition to an arms race in outer space and called for relevant agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has the duty to answer this call. Reason and realism are utterly incompatible with the strange logic that wants to eliminate weapons on Earth and, at the same time, put most modern means of destruction in space. Hence the world-wide resistance to the Star Wars plans. Time is pressing, as the champions of SDI are doing everything to get weapons deployed in outer space and to create faits accomplis. Attacks on the ABM Treaty are increasing in number. It is thus no longer sufficient for the Conference simply to continue last year's exchange of views. Rather, it must start direct work on practical measures designed to head off the spread of the arms race to outer space and ensure that space is used peacefully, for the good of all mankind. My delegation advocates the early establishment of a committee with a relevant mandate.

In view of the fact that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement and stimulate each other, the following projects could, in our opinion, be envisaged: prohibition of the use of force in outer space, as well as from space against the Earth and vice versa; protection of satellites and prohibition of anti-satellite weapons; and verification measures.



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that unless the threat of the arms race spreading to space is removed, it is impossible to agree on a reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, the meeting has once again cast light upon the key significance of the solution to this problem for preserving and strengthening peace and stability on Earth.

Today, the need to set up a firm barrier against the proliferation of the arms race into space is stronger than it ever has been. The proponents of the Strategic Defence Initiative are setting about speeding up the deployment of the individual elements in space and are trying in this way to shift to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 41/53 the international community once again unambiguously expressed itself in favour of preventing the arms race in space and the holding of negotiations on

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

the conclusion of an agreement or agreements on this question. It is essential now to start negotiations urgently on specific aspects of this problem, bearing in mind the final aim of the non-admissibility of arms in space. The proposal concerning the elaboration of an international agreement on ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites and the prohibition of the development, testing or use of anti-satellite systems, and the elimination of existing systems of that kind, seems in our opinion to be extremely realistic and fully in accordance with the general aspiration to keep space free from weaponry and to use it for peaceful and creative purposes.

We must as soon as possible re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space this year, and avoid creating a situation like the one which arose in the past, where the whole of the first part of the session was wasted on agreeing on the mandate and the programme of work of the Committee.



(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

The progress we have achieved in the realms of science and technology is an indisputable fact. What is more, it is an ongoing phenomenon, day after day. Space technology available today represents the new link in the chain of evolution and advancement with both its useful and harmful facets affecting humanity. It has useful aspects, because each addition to the technological discoveries and inventions represents a new victory, increasing the welfare of the human being by what it provides to fulfil his aspirations to prosperity and the raising of his living standards. It has also harmful facets, by what is achieved by its military facet, the destructive power in the service of the selfish tendencies of the States able to exploit this technology militarly to impose their hegemony and to introduce it in the arms race, thus escalating the race to extremely dangerous heights, where security and serenity are neutralized, even for the States that do not take part in the race.

This explains why the prevention of an arms race in outer space is imposing itself as a priority item on the agenda of all international forums and meetings dealing with arms limitations and disarmament. This is particularly true since the United States declared its Strategic Defence Initiative. Today there is quasi international consensus that the extension of the arms race to outer space and the implementation of the SDI are a serious escalation of the arms race that will have grave consequences in all fields, political, military and economic.

If we spoke a few years ago about the possible availability of the necessary technology for the development and production of space weapon systems, and if we had tried then to imagine the dangers that would attend such a development, it therefore becomes a source of deep concern when we hear today that it has proved possible to achieve such progress in acquiring the necessary technology for the production of such weapon systems. We are worried to hear those who call for hastening the production and deployment of the said systems, in such a way that the danger becomes an actual reality, where it was but a mere possibility in the past.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

What complicates the issue even more is the seeking of some States to participate in the SDI. If the avowed objective of their action is to extract purely commercial profits, we are sure that the participation of other States in this programme will provide them with advanced technology which will help, sooner or later, to proliferate space weapons and will contribute, directly or indirectly, to improving the performance level of a conventional weapon system. The matter becomes more serious when, among such States, we find some that are situated in areas where tension prevails already, particularly when previous efforts to bind such States to one or more of the treaties on arms limitations and disarmament have already failed.

How we wish that the mastering of space technology and the new horizons it conquered will remain confined to serving humanity and increasing its welfare! How we wish that outer space, as a common heritage of humanity, may be explored and exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes!

If in the past we called for the possibility to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, this call becomes more urgent in the light of the current developments. Undoubtedly, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is easier at present, before the space Powers multiply and militarize outer space in such a way as to impede the efforts in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, if it does not destroy the whole fabric. Here, we are at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers is to prevent an arms race in outer space, while at the same time the United States is developing, with the purpose of their deployment, space weapon systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and the destruction of existing systems.

Here again, if there are priorities to be set, in the light of the present developments, we deem it necessary to take action to achieve: first, the halting of the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing systems; second, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space; and third, ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances.

In the face of the present situation with all its ramifications, we cannot but express our dissatisfaction with the attempts to raise obstacles to prevent the Conference on Disarmament being entrusted with carrying out the required negotiations to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly bearing in mind that the record of the bilateral negotiations gives no cause for optimism, since they have failed to achieve any progress until the present. What is more, this failure in the item on outer space resulted in impeding the possibilities of agreement in other areas. General Assembly resolution 41/53 reaffirms the primary role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Notwithstanding the important work done by the Ad Hoc Committee during the last two sessions, there must be a more specific link between the Committee's work, in any particular stage, and the

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

final objective unanimously endorsed by the international community, namely to conclude an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will speedily overcome the procedural difficulties concerning the agreement on an appropriate mandate and a programme of work that ensures that its work will take the right direction towards the final objective of its activities.

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(Mr. Raimond, France)

Everybody here knows that side by side with the discussions which this Conference is to pursue concerning measures to contribute to the prevention of the arms race in outer space, negotiations are going on on a bilateral basis in this same city between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our objective cannot be to give preference to one or other of these approaches, or to cause them to hinder one another.

It remains true that in the mid-1980s the international community included among its concerns the problems of the military use of space in the same way as in the mid-1950s it recognized that the problems of the nuclear age could not be a matter of indifference to it, even though the possession of nuclear weapons was at the time limited to two countries. In 1978, when proposing the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and then in 1984, through the proposals it put before this Conference, France emphasized that these problems could not be excluded from the multilateral debate.

We naturally attach the greatest importance to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It remains true, as your work has clearly shown, that the present régime seems inadequate, particularly with respect to the immunity of satellites of third parties. France will submit, within the framework of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals which take account of the difficulty of formulating a régime based solely on the definition of an anti-satellite weapon.

In fact there is no single way of destroying satellites, and it would therefore not be realistic to found an international régime on the prohibition of ASAT systems, which could only be incomplete. What does seem to be a matter of priority is to implement the fundamental principles of the present

space régime, that is, its utilization under conditions of equality, non-discrimination among States, and non-appropriation of space. If such an approach is adopted, a number of specific measures can be considered concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as the multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities.

At the institutional level, the idea of entrusting responsibility for seeing to the application of transparency measures and the code of conduct for space activities to the International Satellite Monitoring Agency might be considered.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee for the prevention of an arms race in outer space is going to be re-established shortly. The Conference should not close its eyes to the danger of outer space being completely militarized. The Committee's mandate should reflect the objective necessity to establish quite clearly, and in a more conclusive form, the impact of the present legal régime for outer space and to define what additional measures are needed. At the same time we do not consider that a mandate, thus conceived, should prevent us from an exchange of views on specific proposals which already have been, or might be proposed in the coming months. In this respect we were attracted by the statement of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, containing, inter alia, the proposal to establish an international inspectorate to verify that arms are not being placed on objects launched into outer space. This is a new, far-reaching and radical measure which could, in our opinion, represent a solid barrier against the direct militarization of outer space.

There is no need to stress further the urgency of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space since it is sufficiently displayed in the course of the present debate in the United States on the deployment of a first phase of the SDI. It seems that supporters of this allegedly defensive programme are becoming somewhat impatient. They see important changes in the world and finally realize that even the nuclear threat, on which they calculated heavily in their "mission to save the world", as they say might not be here indefinitely. For this reason it is necessary to launch the practical implementation of the SDI, to invest huge financial resources as soon as possible, to make the SDI irreversible. If they succeed, they will assure huge profits for the American military-industrial complex for many years to come. But what is more important, the SDI will become a limitless laboratory for the transition from "dirty" and indiscriminate nuclear weapons to equally efficient, but more "handy" and "practical" weapons based on directed energy. Space is considered wide enough to absorb the effects of nuclear explosions, which are difficult to control on Earth. Certainly, the chosen objects on Earth will be spared the long agony of nuclear destruction. Instead, they will be blown away in a clean, fast and "civilized" manner.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Yugoslavia has always opposed the extension of the arms race to other areas, in particular to outer space. Outer space is the area where international co-operation could be to the benefit of all mankind. Extension of the arms race into outer space would have a destabilizing effect on international security and co-operation, and would undermine the efforts aimed at disarmament. It would also consume vast material resources and the potential needed to meet the basic subsistence and development requirements of the majority of mankind.

Outer space is obviously a global problem. It concerns all countries, whether from the political, security, economic, technological or any other point of view. That is why multilateral negotiations are so indispensable in this area.

Consequently, the Conference should tackle this problem in a substantive way, without, of course, diminishing the importance of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.



(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

The realm of outer space, which has been referred to as the common heritage of mankind and should be confined exclusively for peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations, has proved vitally useful in the sense that civil space satellites have proved crucial in communications, navigation, weather-forecasting and remote-sensing, among other vital uses. Regrettably, this realm has become militarized and the super-Power arms race has been extended into outer space.

It is in the general interest of all mankind that space should not be used to further any aggressive military interests of any State especially those of the two super-Powers and their allies. To do so would threaten the security of the whole world from space as well as efforts to terminate the arms race on Earth. We are hopeful that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the 1987 session of the Conference will be able to address the problems related to this agenda item.

(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

The Nigerian delegation sincerely hopes that the prevention of the arms race in outer space will henceforth be placed in the foreground of our preoccupations at this Conference. My delegation would like to see a subsidiary body established without further delay, with a mandate that is meaningful and flexible and would lead progressively to an agreement.

As a corollary of steps to be taken to halt the imminent militarization of outer space, the Conference must tackle the problem of eliminating the factor which generates mutual distrust and insecurity, which, in turn, fuels the desire to acquire some invulnerable weapon up there in outer space. The Nigerian delegation continues to believe that the first step in this direction is a nuclear-weapon-test ban. This should be followed by a freeze of all nuclear-weapon arsenals. Thereafter, negotiations to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons can seriously begin.



(Mr. Teja, India)

I would now like to turn to item 5 of our agenda -- Prevention of an arms race in outer space -- which has all too obvious a relationship with the nuclear issues. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on this question. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. The Harare Declaration calls on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of the arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee, which has been obliged to function so far within a limited mandate, has reached certain conclusions which are reflected in last year's report contained in CD/726. This document concludes that the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space; that the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified the need for strict compliance with existing agreements; and that the Ad Hoc Committee recognized the interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

What is therefore needed now is to undertake negotiations to reinforce the régimes by developing new agreements or agreement. The issue assumes greater urgency in view of the reports about the possibility of early deployment of the first phase of the ballistic missile defence foreseen in the Strategic Defence Initiative. The Conference was not in existence when nuclear weapons began to be developed. It would however be tragic if our Conference merely engages itself in discussion while development and deployment of space weapons takes the arms race into yet another dimension undermining the existing network of arms control agreements. This cannot but aggravate the threat of a nuclear war. The Conference must therefore address itself to the issue without further delay.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. I listened with great care to all of the statements which have been made this morning and my delegation will indeed give careful consideration to the views which have been expressed. Of particular interest were the remarks made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Narzakine. I would like to make one or two brief comments that I think are useful to us in this forum, which many of you have said in the last two or three days is the only multilateral disarmament conference.

I think that every nation, large or small, is, by its constitution, charged with the responsibility to provide for the defence of its people. That is certainly the case in my country. My country was not the first one to venture into outer space with weapons. We have for many years studied and analysed the questions of defence. We have for many years relied upon a concept with which many of you have voiced disagreement: the concept of mutually assured destruction. The President of the United States, as a man of vision, sought to find a different approach and therefore, as you all know, has instigated a programme of research which is commonly known as the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Now, I started by mentioning a State's right and indeed obligation to provide for its own defence. We question no other country's right to the same but we demand our own right and of course we consult with friends and allies; of course, we take into consideration factors relating to balance, stability and the effect upon peace and security in our world. But the fact remains that the United States does not now have any defence against ballistic missiles. That fact often surprises people: that a country as large as mine would not have a defence against strategic missiles which represent in today's world the most blatant threat to the security of our country. Now we have begun a programme of research which has, in our view, shown that stragegic defence is possible. We are negotiating with the Soviet Union bilaterally, as you all know, in attempts to try to deal with this problem which has arisen -- from the standpoint not only of our own security but from the standpoint of international stability. We hope those negotiations bring results.

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(Mr. Hansen, United States)

Now let me tell you that within the area of nuclear testing, when you speak of X-ray lasers, less than 10 per cent of those tests deal in any way with X-ray lasers. The principal objection which is given to you and to the international media about the United States Strategic Defence Initiative seems to be based upon the premise that the SDI will provide the United States with some sort of space strike capability. In that regard, I should like to quote from a publication resulting from the work and analysis, not of American scientists, but of Soviet scientists, among them Mr. Velikhov, who is generally recognized to be the man in the Soviet Union charged with this particular responsibility. I now quote:

> "As regards the possibilities of destroying ground-based targets by lasers from space, there are even more uncertainties. Space-based laser weapons, although sufficiently powerful to destroy ICBMs in flight, would obviously be impotent against a wide variety of hard ground targets, such as missile silos, strategic command centres, aircraft under hard covers, and so forth. ... Space-based laser weapons would be extremely sensitive to the weather conditions over prospective targets. ... These considerations all strongly suggest that even under favourable weather conditions, laser systems of a space-based ballistic missile defence seem to have limited applicability against ground hard targets."

I do not wish to engage in long debates with anyone, and certainly not in those which have a polemic character, but I do want to make sure that this body understands that we are not seeking a "space strike capability", and the best way for me to let you know that, is the fact that scientists agree that lasers have little potential for such an activity.

The PRESIDENT:

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): The 392nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now resumed. We shall now deal with other matters.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a Working Paper (CD/WP.268) containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 5 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The draft mandate is identical to the mandate adopted by the Conference last year in document CD/694.

I have conducted informal consultations with members from different groups, and in putting this Working Paper CD/WP.268 before the Conference for decision, I wish to state that, as is known to all members of the Conference and as reflected in the 1986 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/732), consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation would have preferred a clearer and more categorical text, but it is well aware that in this case time is of the essence and it would be wrong for your strenuous efforts, Mr. President, not to receive their due reward through the adoption of a decision on this basis. My delegation will therefore agree to our adopting this mandate, with a clear interpretation on the part of my

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

delegation, which we have been told is the interpretation that all groups and all delegations give to this text. Thus my delegation will accept this text, and I shall continue in English for greater accuracy:

(spoke in English)

"with the understanding that the mandate we are going to approve covers measures proposed with the aim of preventing an arms race in outer space".

(continued in Spanish)

As you, Mr. President, and all the other distinguished members of the Conference will have noticed, the words I have used are taken from the penultimate paragraph of the document distributed to us as Rev.1, and from the words you have just spoken. Mention is made in that paragraph of "consideration of proposals for measures", etc. Thus my delegation's interpretation is the one I have just given, which will appear in the record of this meeting.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement, and I thank him for his co-operative spirit. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. ROWE (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation for the untiring efforts you have made which have led to the decision that we are about to take, to adopt the mandate for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We attach great significance to the early resumption of work in this Committee on this very important subject, and we are very pleased that it has been possible to arrive at consensus in the Conference to allow that to happen. We, of course, fully support the resumption of that work on the basis of the mandate which, in fact, was in operation last year because we believe that there is a lot of very useful work which needs to be done before that mandate could be considered to be exhausted, and we certainly look forward to actively contributing to the work under that mandate. We also welcome the statement which you have read out and we certainly accept the terminology of that statement. We fully endorse the way in which that statement is phrased because we feel that that is a very accurate reflection of the state of affairs and of the understandings that certainly we hold about the matters referred to in that statement. I would like to express once again our appreciation for your efforts and our support for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under the mandate which is proposed and, of course, taking full account of the Presidential statement which you have read out.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and also for the spirit of understanding he has displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela.

Ms. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, I wish to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you occupy the Presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for this month. I should also

(Ms. Gonzalez, Venezuela)

like to express our appreciation for the efforts you have made to forge a consensus on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Finally, I wish to say that my delegation associates itself with the interpretation given by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, which fully reflects its own position.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Venezuela for her statement, and also for the spirit of co-operation she has expressed. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I too wish to thank you for the efforts you have made to enable the Conference to take the decision on the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I should also like to say that since the beginning of this session of the Conference the socialist countries have shown their keen interest for the Conference to take this decision as rapidly as possible. They have always shown themselves to be very flexible and most co-operative with respect to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, in order to forge ahead with the Conference's work and not waste precious time, a very important factor as the distinguished representative of Mexico pointed out. The socialist countries join in the consensus that is emerging on the mandate and the Presidential statement on the subject.

I wish to say that the socialist countries are ready and prepared to make an active contribution, as in the past, to the work of this subsidiary body on this important and high-priority item of the Conference's agenda, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement, and for the spirit of co-operation he has displayed. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando.

Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, I wish to express our deep appreciation and gratitude for the efforts you have made for the prompt re-establishment of the highly important Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the spirit of co-operation he has expressed. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

I should point out that the fallacy of the concept of nuclear deterrence was recognized by none other than the United States President, Ronald Reagan, when arguing in favour of the Strategic Defence Initiative: he stated that the new ABM system is designed to render nuclear weapons "obsolete and ineffective". Of course, even if the SDI were to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons, that would only come with the elimination of everything else on our planet, including human civilization. However, the mere fact of President Reagan's recognizing the need to eliminate nuclear weapons is important. But what will happen to nuclear deterrence in that case? The intention is perhaps to replace the nuclear deterrent by space deterrence, but then, where does the "exclusively defensive" nature of the SDI come in?

On this point I wish to elaborate a little bit further. In his statement on 26 February, Ambassador Hansen argued that the SDI is designed for defensive purposes only, and even quoted Soviet Academician E. Velikhov to support this argument. I have to point out that selective quoting is in itself a risky business because out of context it can present a distorted picture.

In fact, objective scientific data indicate that an X-ray laser (referred to at the 26 February meeting) is characterized by important absorption in all substances, including air. Laser X-rays, therefore, are absorbed even in the residual layers of the atmosphere about 150 km above the Earth.

In accordance with the declared goals, the X-ray lasers to be developed under the SDI are designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active section of their flight path, that is, already in the upper layers of the atmosphere. But cannot these same lasers be used against other space targets? For example, against early-warning satellites with the aim of blinding the other side in the event of a first nuclear strike against it? Technically, it would seem to be even easier than to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles; but is that defence?

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

On the other hand, objective scientific data quoted by Academician Velikhov and many other experts, including United States experts indicate that if a laser beam is powerful enough it can make a hole in the atmosphere and consequently destroy a target on Earth. I can refer, for example, to data provided by a United States expert Robert English, published very recently in the International Herald Tribune, on 19 and 20 February 1987. Based on an analysis of the technical possibilities of space laser weapons and of current thinking in the United States Administration, the author comes to the conclusion that the SDI involves the development of space weapons for destroying targets on Earth as well.

Finally, I have to point out that the division of arms into "offensive" and "defensive" weapons is in itself very relative. Basically, only absolutely passive means of defence can be regarded as purely defensive. If a defence system contains active destructive elements it can always, with a varying degree of effectiveness, be used as an offensive means. At the same time, even passive means of defence increase the effectiveness of destructive means. For example, how should we classify tanks, as offensive or defensive weapons? On the one hand, they have fire-power enabling them to hit targets and on the other hand, strong armour protecting their crew from destruction -- so what is a tank?

The answer is probably to be found not in the military and technical characteristics of a given type of weapon but in the political philosophy of those who possess it.

As for the balance of forces, it is determined by both offensive and defensive arms and that is why it is absolutely incorrect to say that one type of weapon is bad because it is offensive and another is good because it is defensive. If, hypothetically speaking, each of the two sides possesses one hundred offensive missiles, that is, a ratio 1:1, and then one of the sides creates defensive means which can neutralize 50 per cent of the offensive missiles of the other side, it is quite obvious that the balance of offensive weapons will change to become a ratio of 1:2 in favour of the side which has the so-called defensive means.

The SDI programme, whatever defensive labels it may be given, is designed to alter the balance of forces to the advantage of the United States.

However, it is not just a question of changing the balance of forces. The implementation of this programme would completely destabilize the military and strategic situation in the world as a whole and create a situation where the question of whether a war is "to be or not to be?" would be decided in a matter of seconds; and the human will's part in this decision would be reduced to a minimum: the decision would essentially be left to computers.

We make no secret of the fact that we regard the SDI as an attempt to draw the Soviet Union into a qualitatively new arms race -- the laser-weapons race. Through the SDI the United States is trying to find a way out of the nuclear deadlock, to acquire these weapons which, while matching nuclear weapons in effectiveness, unlike nuclear weapons would, if used, leave the

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

attacker unharmed. These qualitatively new weapons would make it possible to deliver extremely accurate "surgical" strikes on the most vital targets of the other side. This, according to the plans of SDI supporters, would make it possible, to dictate one's will to other countries while pointing the laser beam at them, and also to avoid the unacceptable consequences of the use of nuclear weapons -- nuclear winter, widespread radiation, adverse genetic and other consequences. This will be a weapon for the rich, available only to the select few. These seem to be the plans.

Lately, there have been attempts by the United States Administration to adopt a so-called broad interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. These attempts are nothing more than a desire to justify, with the help of legal casuistry, the policy of circumventing and violating the above Treaty with a view to speeding up SDI development, making it irreversible, leaving future United States Administrations incapable of modifying their position on the SDI for many years to come.

The Soviet Union has been and continues to be in favour of preserving the ABM Treaty, strengthening the régime established by it, and abiding by the generally-recognized traditional interpretation of all its provisions. At the same time, without abandoning our fundamental position on preventing an arms race in outer space, we are prepared to seek mutually acceptable agreements with the United States, taking into account the commitment of the present Administration to the SDI programme. Our proposal on strengthening the régime of the ABM Treaty by way of a mutual undertaking not to withdraw from the Treaty for 10 years along with strict compliance with all its provisions, goes in this direction. We propose agreeing on the dividing line between activities that are prohibited or permitted under the Treaty.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

I should not have taken the floor today at all if it were not for one statement made by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin. Much of what has been said has been said before in one form or another and I should suspect that you may be somewhat bored with the discourse between the United States and Soviet delegations which has often taken place in this hall. I should like to refer to the statement by Ambassador Nazarkin, which I find particularly unfortunate, on page 11 of the English text. This statement indicates in one way or another, and I should add probably most directly, that the United States has the desire to dictate its will to other countries. This is patently false. It is counter to our political system. It is counter to our political ideology. It is counter to our basic understandings of democracy and government.

But the statement contains another fallacy. That fallacy relates to the idea that one might even be able to achieve something by pointing a laser from outer space at someone or something on Earth. Even the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union pointed out in his intervention today that the properties of lasers are such that their efficiency as a weapon is almost exclusively limited to space. Therefore it becomes difficult to understand how such a weapon, despite articles in the free press, could be used against States to dictate one's will.

During the last plenary session I quoted from a Soviet study, not an American study, not done by political commentators but by scientists. I quoted from this study to show the universality of understanding among scientists. I should like to quote again:

"Kilovolt X-rays are strongly absorbed in all substances including air." (Atmosphere, ladies and gentlemen, is generally composed of air.) "And so a kilovolt X-ray beam is absorbed in upper atmosphere (higher than 100 km). True, if the laser beam is sufficiently powerful, it might 'drill' through the atmosphere. But this property of X-ray lasers is best exploited by firing not downwards from space but upwards from an altitude of 80-90 km from under a relatively thin atmospheric layer when the target is in space."

I do not regard this as a selective quotation. I regard this as a statement of scientific fact which is relevant to issues under consideration. I think that we all recognize that this Conference deals with issues which are both scientific in their essence and political in their manifestation. We must learn to deal with both of these manifestations, both of these elements, in the most objective, dispassionate manner. If we do this, then we enhance our opportunities to make progress.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to express my satisfaction at the positive assessment of our recent proposal on medium-range missiles that has just been voiced by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Hansen. Secondly, I should like to make a number of comments on his reaction to my statement today. First of all, as far as his reaction to the part of my statement referring to plans to turn the SDI into a weapon which could enable its possessor to dictate to others. At the beginning of my statement I referred to a whole series of documents of the United States which were declassified and which prompted me to draw the conclusion I did draw. Indeed, the fact remains a fact that the military plans which were developed and which did exist in the United States, and which then subsequently became public when they were declassified, were based on intentions to carry out a nuclear strike against our country; this is an objective fact, unfortunately. Consequently, of course, I cannot accept the harsh words which Ambassador Hansen used regarding this assumption of mine, as the general policy based on the concept of so-called nuclear deterrence has not changed. At this time today we sense and observe a businesslike approach to political problems.

As for Ambassador Hansen's reaction to my comments regarding the SDI, I do not see any contradiction here, quite frankly, between the fact that he today referred to the statement of scientific experts of 26 February and what I myself said; but he just cited a part of the full picture. I should like just to reaffirm this once again. X-ray lasers are absorbed in various substances, including the atmosphere of the air. So, to be sure, an X-ray laser is more effective when used against targets which are not separated from the laser beam source by air, and particularly if they are on the Earth. But in my statement I referred to the possibility of using lasers against satellites and to this I can add the possibility of using laser weapons against aircraft in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Finally, I did cite considerations with respect to the general balance of forces, which is determined by offensive and defensive weapons. I think that after Ambassador Hansen has studied our statement today more carefully we will have the chance to exchange views on this issue in a more thoroughgoing manner.

The PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 394th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of that Conference.

Once we have heard all the speakers on my list for today, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting in order to consider the requests by non-member States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established under agenda item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Immediately after the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting to formalize any agreements we have reached informally.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

My delegation shares with others the awareness of the importance and urgency attached to agenda item 5, concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Indeed, my Government addresses this issue with the highest interest and sense of priority. Therefore we wish first of all to express our deepest satisfaction for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee almost at the very beginning of this session of the Conference.

My Government believes that an arms race in outer space should be prevented, that in the context of a general and complete disarmament outer space should be devoted to preaceful activities, and that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development.

In this respect the two major space and nuclear Powers share the greatest responsibility in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I believe that there is a general awareness that a competitive drive towards the deployment of armaments in outer space would be a costly and undesirable endeavour.

Current trends in the bilateral talks here in Geneva allow us to hope for a constructive approach in spite of the complexities of the issues involved. In this context we believe that it will be most important for the major space Powers to agree on a common approach in dealing with these problems, including those connected with the offence-defence relationship.

It is of the utmost importance to make sure that space research and activities are consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and that they are aimed at solely defensive purposes.

This Conference can play an important and useful role in the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space which has an essential interest for all States. During the last session, the Ad Hoc Committee, despite a regrettable delay in getting down to substantive work, was able to clarify some important aspects concerning the existing legal régime in relation to arms control in outer space, to consider some relevant issues, and to examine some of the activities which are currently being carried out in outer space. We hope that this work will be continued, with renewed energy this year and that further progress in the examination of the complex and various issues connected with this item will be achieved.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

During our last two plenary meetings an exchange of views developed with respect to directed-energy weapons and their possible use in space and from space against the Earth. Ambassador Hansen of the United States tried to explain that, for example, laser weapons could only be used beyond atmosphere, against ballistic missiles during their trajectory through space. Ambassador Nazarkin then drew our attention to the fact that lasers could already now be used in outer space also for offence against other objects, e.g. early-warning satellites, and that with sufficient concentration of energy they could also penetrate, to some extent, through the atmosphere and attack aircraft, for example, in its upper layers. Even Ambassador Hansen then agreed that lasers could drill through atmosphere, even if he preferred the upward drill. In connection with this exchange my delegation would like to stress just one more aspect. What was discussed were more or less existing or near possibilities of lasers. But what is going to happen 20 to 30 years from now, once weapons have been permanently installed in outer space? We are confident that the present arguments about how lasers cannot penetrate through the atmosphere will seem, to future analysts, rather obsolete, if not ridiculous. And we should not forget that directed-energy weapons represent only one form of possible weapons to be installed in outer space. Already now various other types are mentioned, and it might be safely presumed that several decades from now, if human civilization survives, a whole panoply of strike space weapons could be developed. And it is now for us a high-priority task to stop the penetration of weapons into outer space, and to make it impossible to develop new and highly destructive space weapons.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Since the beginning of the space age, technology has made progress with gigantic steps and space has become an aspect of our daily life. The Soviet Union, the United States, China, India, Japan and the countries working together in the European Space Agency have placed satellites in orbit and other countries will certainly follow suit.

Almost from the start there has also been a steady increase in military activities in space. In the 1970s the borderlines between civil and military use of space became vaguer. Now, up to approximately 75 per cent of the satellites launched have only or mainly military purposes.

For one and a half years, the Conference on Disarmament has, in an Ad Hoc Committee, examined problems in relation to a possible arms race in outer space. We have gradually come to grips with the immense complexities of the issues involved. We believe that the discussions on the subject in the Ad Hoc Committee were serious and profound and that the Committee should this year go on in the same spirit. We should, in our view, concentrate more than before on relevant new developments as far as the military use of outer space is concerned. We feel that, building on those discussions, it would be possible for this Committee to come forward with some specific recommendations for stability-enhancing measures.

Of particular concern to my Government is the protection of satellites that on account of, for instance, their contribution to greater transparency, crisis management and early warning against nuclear attacks, perform a stabilizing role. The search for a satisfactory régime in this field is a very complex task. One of the complicating factors is, of course, that not all satellites concerned play only such a stabilizing role. An approach complementary to the bilateral negotiations with regard to the protection of high-orbit satellites seems to us of particular importance.

The analytic discussions on the legal régime have been interesting. However, what is lacking is consensus on what is and what is not covered by existing international law. We realize it will be very difficult to agree on a paper in which common ground would be defined. But it seems to be of great importance that a serious effort should be made. It would be a good idea if at some moment legal experts from capitals be invited to assist us in our discussions.

(Mr. Bakkevig, Norway)

Outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development. The efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space must be pursued both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Consequently, the Conference on Disarmament has a central role to play in this field. In 1986 the Conference was able to examine relevant conventions and to initiate identification of effective ways to prevent an arms race in outer space. This work needs to be continued. Norway therefore welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. In view of the complexity of the questions involved, the work of the Committee no doubt could profit from the participation of scientific experts.



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

And now, Comrade President, let me turn to item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the fact that the consultations have led to agreement on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 5. We, as well as many other delegations, have argued for a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee which would provide for the holding of negotiations, in the belief that the stage of exploring the problem of preventing an arms race in space has now been passed and it is necessary to proceed to a more practical phase. We therefore noted with satisfaction the statement by the President of the Conference at the time of the adoption of the mandate. In referring to last year's report of the Conference he stated that "consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate" contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268, in other words, the mandate adopted.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the calls for the prevention of an arms race in space contained in the statements made by the delegations of Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia,

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Czechoslovakia, France and other countries. We share the concern expressed in this connection by many delegations which emphasized the importance of finding a solution to this urgent problem.

Concrete proposals on how a barrier could be erected to keep weapons out of space undoubtedly merit attention. This year they have come from Romania, on the conclusion of a general treaty on the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes; from France, referring to its proposal on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the development of a code of conduct for States in outer space; from Egypt, which advocated a ban on the deployment of new weapon systems in space and the strengthening of the international legal basis for the use of outer space; and from the Netherlands, which supported the idea of protecting high-orbit satellites and expanding the information provided to the United Nations in accordance with the 1975 Convention.

The Conference has accumulated a wealth of ideas and proposals and a fairly good basis has been established for concrete, businesslike and result-oriented work in the Ad Hoc Committee. We are prepared to discuss all these proposals.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, intends to seek agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space. I would like to present some ideas on this subject.

The Soviet Union has on many occasions put forward peace initiatives in the field of outer space. Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in space of any kind of weapon and for a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth still stand.

We consider it possible to agree also on partial measures leading to the prevention of the deployment of arms in space. For example, the Conference could begin elaborating an international agreement aimed at ensuring the immunity of artificial earth satellites not carrying any kind of weapon on board. In so doing, it would also be important to explore the possibility of banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ASAT systems.

A multilateral agreement containing international legal immunity safeguards for space objects would contribute to confidence-building among States in the field of space activities and strengthen security and strategic stability. A withdrawal of existing anti-satellite weapons from the arsenals of States and a decision not to test or develop new systems of such weapons would represent a real disarmament measure. Such a measure is aimed at maintaining the existing military balance and is justified by the principle of equality and equal security.

It is our hope that our proposal which was made in the statement by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Y.M. Vorontsov, on 3 February of this year, to take measures to ban space-to-space, space-to-Earth and Earth-to-space weapon systems, will be discussed in a business-like manner.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

During the previous session of the Conference the question of a definition of space strike weapons was actively discussed. A number of delegations presented their proposals on the subject. These proposals seem to be of definite interest and represent a fair basis for further work in this field. In this connection, I should like to recall that the Soviet delegation understands space strike arms to mean the following: firstly, space-based ABM systems of any principle of action; secondly, space-based systems of any principle of action designed to strike from space targets in the atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth; and thirdly, systems of any principle of action and however based designed to strike targets in space.

Non-deployment of any weapons in outer space should be effectively verified. The Soviet Union is in favour of such verification. You may recall that the Soviet Union has already proposed that a future world space organization should also have verification functions with regard to compliance with agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space and that it be endowed with its own technical means to that end.

In order to move the discussion of the question of prevention of an arms race in space from a standstill already now, we propose consideration of the possibility of establishing an international verification of non-deployment of any weapons in outer space, a system which provides for the establishment of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for example, would be given right of access, for the purpose of on-site inspections, to all objects destined to be launched and stationed in space, and to their corresponding launch vehicles. Inspectors could monitor any launching of space objects.

In presenting this proposal, we are aware of its far-reaching nature. It is another indication that verification will not be a problem for the Soviet Union if the goal is really to prevent the arms race from spreading to space.

The Conference on Disarmament has a great responsibility. We are expected to take practical action and measures such as to avert the deadly threat of an arms race in space once and for all, and to preserve space for our own as well as future generations for peaceful exploration; and then, as the great Russian scientist, Konstantin Tsiolkovski, eloquently put it: "Humanity will be rewarded with the ocean of the Universe, as though it were expressly offered to it in order to bring people together to form a single whole, to form one family".

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Contrary to the very widespread opinion in the Conference on Disarmament that the work done last year under the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was no more than an academic exercise, we feel that in 1986 specific results were attained, and although they may not be as dazzling as one might have wanted, they are important and, to some extent, they are the first steps towards achieving our global goal. The results can be summed up as follows. Firstly, the scope of item 5 on our agenda was defined a little better by removing the idea of demilitarization of space with which it had been linked. It is now clear that what we are pursuing under item 5 is not the demilitarization of space but the disarming of space, or better yet, preventing the "weaponization" of space. Secondly, there was progress in identifying the objective of the item, since it is widely considered that to prevent an arms race in outer space means establishing a general prohibition on the deployment of space weapons. This ban should also include the development and manufacture of such weapons. Thirdly, it was possible to define a little more precisely the concept of what should be understood by space weapons. In this connection, we feel that the proposed definitions, including the one submitted by our own delegation in a Conference working paper, helped to make the concept of what is to be understood by space weapons clearer. Fourthly, another achievement, and perhaps the most important of all, is that the consideration undertaken of the prevailing legal order led us to conclude that that order is inadequate and imperfect, and that there was a need for measures to be taken to improve, supplement or complete it.

During our discussions last year many delegations expressed great concern about anti-satellite or ASAT weapons. This concern, which we consider legitimate because they are perhaps the only ones whose existence has been reported, should not blind us to the fact that there are other types of space weapons. In fact, what has given a new dimension to the problem of the prevention of the arms race in outer space are not so much the ASAT weapons but the other types of weapons that fall in the category of space weapons particularly, anti-ballistic-missile systems. Some of these weapons can be used not only for defence in a nuclear confrontation but also offensively in a conventional confrontation. There was an interesting article recently in the International Herald Tribune written by an American expert. Ambassador Nazarkin referred to it in his statement of 3 March. We know that the United States delegation does not much like us to refer to articles

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

published in the International Herald Tribune, but we have to recognize that it is a very rich source of information, particularly as regards disarmament, because it always carries interesting articles by United States authors, many of them people who enjoy a considerable political or scientific reputation. The article in question highlighted that the weapons that are being designed as part of the Strategic Defence Initiative could also be used offensively against non-strategic targets on Earth, even in a conventional conflict.

The author of the article stressed the fact that the distinction between a defensive and an offensive weapon is always a matter of the judgement of the person using it and depends on what it is being used against.

When we submitted out proposed definition of space weapons, we adopted the designation used by the Soviet Union of "space strike weapons" to highlight that it is not possible to talk about "defensive space weapons" of a purely passive nature since any such weapon can be used for actively aggressive purposes, to attack a military objective.

Our proposed definition of space weapons covers any kind of defensive or offensive device, regardless of the principle on which its functioning is based, capable of destroying or damaging from space an object in space, in the air or on the surface of the Earth, and also any device of a similar nature situated in the air or on the Earth's surface, capable of damaging an object situated in space. Our proposed definition also includes in the concept of a space weapon the operational components and any system of such devices. This definition has the advantage of covering any form space weapons could take.

Within the Conference there has been talk of the need to create a group of scientific experts in the Conference on Disarmament to consider the technical questions involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My delegation does not object to such an idea, of course, but we feel that the technical aspect of the question should not be over-valued. In our view, the fundamental issue in preventing the arms race in space is essentially political. I should like to mention here the opinion of Professor Philip W. Anderson, Nobel Prize Winner for Physics, and professor of physics at Princeton University. In an article published in Le Monde Diplomatique last December, Professor Anderson said: "Fortunately most of the scientific problems involved in all discussions about 'Star Wars' are extremely simple; they do not require any specialized or particularly technical knowledge that could be covered by secrecy".

While we feel that there may be some usefulness in having technical advisers on this subject, we do not think it should be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for continuing to make progress in our work in the Conference on Disarmament.

We regard the decision of the Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee to deal with item 5 as a major achievement. We also attach special importance to the statement made by the President of the Conference, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, before the adoption of the decision whereby the Ad Hoc Committee was re-established. According to that statement, it is clear

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to all members of the Conference that the terms of reference given to the Ad Hoc Committee embrace consideration of proposals relating to measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That interpretative statement by the President of the Conference has major implications and should make it easier to establish the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

In our view, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5, and of any of the Ad Hoc Committees of the Conference, has two clearly identifiable stages.

Starting from the principle that the Conference has a general mandate to negotiate, acknowledged in its rules of procedure, the activity of an Ad Hoc Committee can be divided into a first stage, that we might call the pre-negotiating stage, and a second stage of negotiations proper. The dividing line between these two processes is perfectly clear. In the first stage it is necessary to carry out some preliminary work covering consideration of the subject on which negotiations are going to be carried out, identification of the subject and of its component parts, definition of its scope, determination of measures likely to attain the purpose of the negotiations, and so forth. Within this stage it should be possible to carry out those activities which, without being negotiations as such, make it possible to create the conditions necessary to undertake negotiations proper -- which would be the task to be undertaken in the second stage.

That is how we see the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committe on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and that is how we also undertood the interpretative statement of the President.

Last year we carried out important work in this pre-negotiating stage. Without a doubt there are still some questions left pending, among them that of identifying the possible measures that could be adopted to attain the objective of preventing the arms race in outer space.

This year's programme of work for the Ad Hoc Committee must give priority, within the pre-negotiating process, to the question of identifying specific measures to prevent the arms race in outer space.

Since it has been established that the legal order that now exists in this field is incomplete, we now have to identify the measures that could serve to remedy the situation. There are several alternatives. One was proposed some time ago by the delegation of Italy, and would consist in drawing up an additional protocol to the Outer Space Treaty so as to fill in the gaps in that instrument. Another could be to draw up a new treaty that would establish an international régime to prevent the deployment of arms in space.

There is another measure we might consider which might seem naive at first glance but which is still attractive because of its very simplicity. This third alternative might consist of an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty. As we know, the Treaty establishes a partial ban on the stationing of

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arms in space. Article IV specifically provides that States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction. This undertaking also includes not installing such weapons on celestial bodies or stationing them in outer space in any other manner. The Treaty does not cover other classes or types of weapons and here precisely is the legal gap that has to be filled. A simple amendment to article IV, that could consist of merely adding the words "or any type of space weapon", would be sufficient to turn the partial prohibition in the Treaty into a total ban. As we know, a similar idea has been put forward with regard to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the General Assembly has adopted two resolutions whereby Parties to the Treaty are recommended to convene a conference, following the procedure provided for in that instrument, in order to consider introducing amendments so as to turn the partial Treaty into a total test-ban Treaty. Article II of the aforementioned Treaty establishes that any States Party can propose amendments. The procedure for the consideration, adoption and entry into force of amendments is provided for in that same article, and requires adoption by the three original parties to the Treaty, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

The Outer Space Treaty, however, establishes a much simpler procedure for amendments. It is sufficient for one State Party to propose an amendment and this then enters into force for any State that agrees to it once it has been accepted by the majority of States Parties.

We are not at this stage putting forward any specific proposal. We are simply sharing our thinking with other members of the Conference, as one of the possible means whereby the prohibition on the stationing of weapons in outer space could be achieved. If this possibility has been considered feasible in the case of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, there should be no difficulty in following the same procedure for the Outer Space Treaty, which, as we have seen, already establishes a partial prohibition on placement of arms in outer space.

In closing, we wish to express our hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 under the competent guidance of Ambassador Pugliese, whom we congratulate on being appointed to do this difficult job, will very quickly be able to begin its substantive work for this year with a programme of work that will allow it to make rapid progress towards the objective for which it was set up. We offer our active co-operation with Ambassador Pugliese and with the other members of the Committee in order to help to spur on the work of this issue of preventing an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Wu Xueqian, China)

Fourth, disarmament is an important issue which has a direct bearing on world peace and security but it is not the only issue. Its realization requires the necessary international environment and conditions. The current international situation remains disturbing. On the one hand, the arms race is still going on, extending from the Earth's surface to outer space. On the other hand, there are unceasing regional conflicts, invasion, intervention and military occupation of other countries threatening and jeopardizing the sovereignty and security of many small and medium-sized countries. It can hardly be imagined that genuine disarmament can be achieved in a tense and turbulent international environment. In order to safeguard world peace and security and achieve effective disarmament, it is imperative to oppose hegemonism and power politics, check aggression and expansion and eliminate regional trouble-spots. In international relations all countries should strictly abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and peaceful coexistence. It is impermissible to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or violate their sovereignty in any form or on any excuse. This is the only approach conducive to the maintenance of world peace and progress of disarmament.

China is a socialist as well as a developing country, pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace. Having suffered untold hardships from foreign aggression and the scourge of war in the past, China is engaged in a

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socialist modernization drive today. The Chinese people hope to approach and catch up with the developed countries in terms of economic development through the hard work of several generations. Therefore, China needs an international environment of durable peace -- peace not only in this century but also in the next century. For this purpose the Chinese Government has been conducting its foreign affairs with the basic objective of opposing hegemonism and power politics, maintaining world peace, developing friendly co-operation with other countries and promoting common economic prosperity. China will not enter into alliance or a strategic relationship with any super-Power. It will endeavour to establish and develop friendly relations in co-operation with other countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Upholding the arms race and promoting the realization of disarmament is an important part of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China maintains that the arms race, nuclear or conventional, on the ground or in space, should be brought to an end. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and space weapons as well as a substantial reduction of conventional arms. China is in favour of the peaceful use of outer space and is opposed to the arms race in outer space no matter who conducts it and in what form. The development of space weaponry will lead to further intensification and escalation of the arms race and greater tension and turbulence in international situations. The United States and the Soviet Union, the only two countries that possess space weapons and continue to develop such weapons, bear a special responsibility for the cessation of the arms race in outer space. It is our hope that they will heed the voice of the peoples of the world and take immediate and effective measures to halt the arms race in any form in outer space by refraining from developing, testing and deploying space weapons and destroying all existing space weapons.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Whilst we attach enormous significance to rapid translation of this accord into a specific agreement, Mongolia at the same time does not wish in any way to play down the immediacy and urgency of achieving agreement on the limitation and elimination of strategic weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As we understand it, the Soviet-American agreement to the effect that these questions be considered and resolved together remains in force, and needs to be translated into practical political policy and specific actions.

Time is passing and the international community is more and more concerned at the threat that space will become a new sphere for the arms race. This threat is related to the United States plans to develop and deploy a large-scale anti-missile system with space-based elements.

The United States Strategic Defence Initiative plans for emulation between strategic offensive and defence weapons. Its proponents strenuously argue that, compared with the early 1970s when the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of indefinite duration was drawn up, new scientific and technical possibilities have appeared which supposedly would make it possible to rely on this "up-to-date defence", and thus rid the world of nuclear weapons.

However, it is quite evident that the development of a large-scale ABM system might be a major stimulus for the qualitative development and quantitative build-up of strategic offensive weapons, both delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads. Up-to-date technology might equally lead to the development of missiles and also to the creation of new types of weapons.

So-called defensive space weapons can quite justifiably be considered as offensive weapons. They will be capable of destroying the most important early-warning, detection and communication satellites of the other side. Deployed in orbit these weapons will be a constant threat to the space apparatus on which the degree of confidence of States in their own security greatly depends. These weapons threaten to destabilize us and weaken the strategic balance. If weapons were based in space, any significant technical breakdown in an orbiting satellite could be inaccurately interpreted and taken for the signal of an attack, and the consequences of such an error would be catastrophic.

We are informed by the press that American scientists are working on four types of lasers, in particular, nuclear-pump X-ray lasers. As we know, the source for such an explosion would be a nuclear warhead, and any such warhead could be used as an offensive weapon.

In view of these developments, in parallel with the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States, the Conference on Disarmament must really come to grips with the tasks of preventing an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation expresses its satisfaction at the comparatively rapid re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of our agenda, and for this we are greatly indebted to the President of the Conference in February, the representative of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, who spared no effort to find a compromise solution in the elaboration of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. But at the same time, we regret that the Conference did not manage to produce a negotiating mandate, in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations contained in resolution 41/53.

Now, the task is for the Ad Hoc Committee to adopt its programme of work for the current year as soon as possible. The current situation is that the Ad Hoc Committee was established just one month ago, but substantive work is not under way. Is it worth continuing wasting even more time on procedural matters? Would it not be better to get down to the implementation of the mandate, and begin the consideration of matters related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space? Thus, we could come very close to the next, the basic stage: negotiations to conclude an agreement, or agreements, as appropriate, not to allow weapons into outer space.

For this purpose, the Ad Hoc Committee has all that it needs. Over the last two years of its activity, it has accumulated considerable experience. In 1986, it discussed, very thoroughly, the first two items in its programme of work, namely, the consideration and definition of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and existing agreements relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It also dealt with the third item in its programme, existing proposals and future initiatives intended to prevent an arms race in outer space. Here, we note that the volume of the content of that third item is growing, because new initiatives are coming to the fore all the time. Today, the Ad Hoc Committee has before it a whole range of constructive proposals and ideas intended to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Various countries have submitted specific proposals on the preparation of an international agreement to guarantee immunity for objects in outer space, and on the prohibition of the development of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of existing ones. There have been many other proposals as well.

Recently the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, came up with the interesting idea of a possible addition to article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. That idea is along the same line as the proposal by Italy on the preparation of an additional protocol to that Treaty.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Soviet delegation has tabled a new proposal for the creation of a system of international control for the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind, envisaging the establishment of an international inspectorate. We are impressed by the idea of an international inspectorate. This measure will be especially effective if we achieve a full ban on all types of space weaponry -- space-based anti-missile weapons, anti-satellite weapons and space-to-Earth weapons. If the ban is a partial one, for example, just covering one class of outer space weapons, then, obviously, we will need additional control measures. This, by the way, is just another argument in favour of a full ban.

An inspectorate would probably not exhaust all the control possibilities in such a system. We could think about combining such an inspectorate with national means of verification and control and collective consultative machinery which would deal with disputes.

We hope that the idea of an inspectorate will be discussed in the Conference. It would be interesting to hear the reactions of representatives of other countries, in particular those traditionally especially interested in such issues of control.

Obviously, this idea will be further developed in more detail as we work towards the elaboration of specific measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

There can be no doubt that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high-priority task, one of the most important tasks, in fact, which awaits a solution. Therefore, the Mongolian delegation, like many others, considers that this task should occupy its due place in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is being elaborated.

The PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 402nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I assume the Presidency for the month of April, I should like to read out a message transmitted to the Conference by the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Gustav Husák.

"Dear delegates,

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to all participants in the Conference on Disarmament my sincere greetings.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic attaches to the Conference on Disarmament extraordinary importance. Since the very beginning of the existence of that organ, we have been actively participating in its work. Efforts to strengthen peace, enhance international security and stability, limit and halt the arms race and adopt effective measures that would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control constitute an unchanging axiom of our foreign policy. These goals cannot be achieved without broad international co-operation, confidence, reasonable compromises and respect for the principles of reciprocity, equality of commitments and refraining from acts threatening the security of any of the parties.

...

It is proper that the Conference should focus its attention on prevention of an arms race in outer space. Extension of the arms race to outer space would not guarantee anyone's security and, moreover, it would multiply the risk of the outbreak of a war, posing a qualitatively new threat to all States, regardless of their location or affiliation to any politico-military groupings.

...

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The purpose of my statement today is to offer some remarks concerning agenda item 5 -- prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee almost at the very beginning of this spring part of the Conference's session. We hoped for the meaningful continuation of what was accomplished by the Committee last year. Unfortunately, our hopes have been reduced to a certain extent as the Committee has stood logjammed for a month already.

General Assembly resolution 41/53 again requested the Conference on Disarmament "to re-establish an Ad hoc Committee with an adequate mandate ... with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements as appropriate to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". We consider the mandate, also covering the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as a logical next step after last year's substantive work of the Committee. But we see it as only a partial implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution 41/53.

One State's abstention has prevented this resolution from being passed unanimously. We hope, however, that no State will ultimately prevent the Conference to meet fully the General Assembly request and to do the work which almost all States voted for in the Assembly.

The Polish delegation would certainly prefer to participate in the work of a body with an explicitly negotiating mandate; not only because we would prefer to follow a position consistent with what we have advocated in the General Assembly, and not only because we do regard the Conference on Disarmament as above all a negotiating forum.

It is also our firm conviction that the prevention of the arms race in space has long been ripe enough to become a subject of negotiations. We do recognize existing difficulties and doubts of different kind in this field. We think, however, that such problems could best be dealt with within the process of negotiations and not outside it. My delegation continues to believe that sooner or later all the delegations will find it unavoidable to arrive at this point of view.

The mandate based on a compromise we have adopted allows for much more than informal consultations on the programme of work. The long-lasting dormancy of the Ad hoc Committee is a point of serious concern to my delegation. We believe, however, that difficulties will be overcome and work

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

will start soon. Otherwise we will again have to include in the Conference's report a sentence saying that had the Committee started earlier, its achievement would have been much greater.

Up to now, no strike weapons have been deployed in space. However, the situation is about to be changed. The American concept of anti-ballistic missile defences (BMD), as described in President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, is pregnant with very serious political, strategic and military consequences. the first lesson which can be learned from the historical experience is that security is, above all, a political task. The introduction of BMDs will not solve the problem of security. The deployment of weapons in space will only introduce into a remarkably stable strategic relationship between East and West an unprecedented degree of uncertainty and nervousness, attempting to provide hardware answers to political questions.

The emergence of BMDs will generate a total or ultimate arms race and render disarmament impossible. The subject is known well enough and there is no need to elaborate on it further. What is worth mentioning is that the SDI, once unleashed, has gained its momentum within the United States, irrespective of any international context. Partial technologies and different spin-offs can fuel either the creation of new weapons or the amelioration of existing ones, and they do so, indeed, prior to the final decision "whether the initiative is feasible as a whole". Thus, the "contribution" of the Initiative to the speeding-up of an arms race is really manifold.

What is the actual goal underlying the SDI? It is widely recognized that it would be a dangerous illusion to believe that a technological breakthrough could create a vastly improved security. Real security can only be found in co-operation with a possible adversary, not at his expense.

Based on this premise, the basic concept of the ABM Treaty -- mutually assured deterrence -- is still valid. Allow me to quote what President Nixon said in explaining his decision to forego a broad defence of the nation in favour of the limited ABM system primarily to defend United States retaliatory forces. "The heaviest defence system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of United States fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent." Here we are.

The ABM Treaty is a milestone in the political approach to curbing the arms race, avoiding nuclear war and providing hope that nations and their leaders can act to keep nuclear war from erupting. It has proved highly effective in preventing an arms race in space.

It provides for the prohibition of the development, testing or deployment of space-based ABM systems, including those dependent on exotic technology. The Treaty should be strengthened and complied with, instead of bending its

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

language and torturing its basic meaning, as was demonstrated in the October 1985 memorandum regarding the United States ratification record of the ABM Treaty.

Recently, Senator Sam Nunn asserted that "his research had led him to the conclusion, compelling beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Senate's ratification of the Treaty in 1972 was based on a restrictive interpretation of the pact". Also Judge Soafer, the chief author of the above-mentioned memorandum, "explicitly and repeatedly disavowed the October 1985 memorandum ...". Let us hope that these signs mark a better future for the ABM Treaty.

Naturally, the future of the Treaty is entirely the province of the Contracting Parties. However, it has implications with respect to the security of the whole world, and the international community so affected has the legitimate right to express its views on the matter. Thus, a hope could be voiced that the United States will find it possible to accept the proposal by the Soviet Union to strengthen the régime of the ABM Treaty and to agree on what is indeed prohibited and what is permitted by the Treaty. This would at least keep BMDs in laboratories, as originally proposed by President Reagan.

Thirty years after the launching of the first satellite of the Earth, it can be asserted with confidence that no major conflicts have occurred with respect to the legal status of outer space and celestial bodies. The existing body of space law -- no matter how incomplete -- has proven its capability to regulate effectively the relations of States in the exploration and use of space and to prevent -- so far -- the extension of the arms race into this environment. The significance of this legal system has additionally been illuminated by the painstaking efforts to dodge its provisions undertaken by those who would like to proceed with a gun-spacecraft policy.

Undoubtedly, the existing legal order of outer space is not perfect. However, weak points and gaps, by virtue of their existence, do not prejudge the worthlessness of any legal system as such. Everything depends on political will and political choice -- what purpose is a given legal regulation expected to serve.

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any treaty should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Thus, in the view of my delegation, lacunae in the space law must not be used as loopholes for pouring weapons into outer space, because the primary goal and a clear intention of any arms-control-related agreement is to prohibit or limit military activities and not to justify the expansion of an arms race.

The need for a comprehensive and more detailed regulation of contemporary and especially future space activities by the international community cannot be questioned. As it has been stressed on numerous occasions in this Hall,

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

the globality of the subject matter requires global solutions. It is only natural that the Conference on Disarmament should embark on this task -- enormously difficult as it is, but one which has to be undertaken. In our opinion, the work on the identification and analysis of weak spots and lacunae of the existing legal régime of outer space has already been accomplished by the Ad hoc Committee during its previous sessions. What is necessary now is to begin negotiations aimed at improving and strengthening this régime.

Further measures are needed to prevent the arms race in outer space. Certainly, it would be desirable to count on the solution of all problems by the adoption of a single agreement. We all agree that a process should be initiated through which step-by-step agreement or agreements could be worked out progressively, with the final aim of excluding the risk of a lethal competition in space.

In considering issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space as provided for in its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee should immediately embark on the concrete discussion of measures to eliminate the possibilities of the deployment of weapons in space. The Polish delegation is deeply satisfied to realize that other delegations wish to follow a similar position. It has been proved unequivocally by proposals discussed during the current session by the delegations of the USSR, France, Egypt, the Netherlands, Venezuela, Romania and Mongolia. These proposals form a very good basis to start business-like work towards the elaboration of effective international instruments. My delegation is prepared to take an active part in this work.

As I have already pointed out, up to now there have been no strike weapons in space. That is why my delegation welcomes wholeheartedly the Soviet proposal aimed at banning the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. Such a ban would strengthen significantly the general renunciation of the use or threat of use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter and would update it to the conditions of the nuclear and space age. It would not only be a strong bulwark against weapons in space: it would contribute to a confidence-building process as a whole and to the further strengthening of strategic stability.

But, realistically thinking, one must assume that the elaboration of the above-mentioned instrument would take some time; and in space issues, time is running short at a space-age speed. Thus, while working on the ban on the use of force in space, the Conference could also consider additional measures which would forestall and frustrate the stationing of arms in orbit. For instance, as has been proposed by Italy and most recently supported by Venezuela, the Conference could discuss the adoption of a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty. As an interim measure, such a protocol could prohibit the deployment of strike weapons in space, without the need to elaborate from scratch a new legal instrument to this effect.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We realize, certainly, that one important definitional question would have to be solved -- namely, the definition to be given of what constitutes a "strike weapon". Significant work on this subject was done during the previous session of the Committee. It should be continued and completed in the course of the present session. Within the scientific community there is a widespread opinion that proceeding from technical characteristics it is possible to distinguish between passive systems in space which already exist and active or strike weapons for use within, into or from space. Such weapons do not exist yet, but they are being developed actively, at least in one country. If the scientists are right, it must be possible accordingly to formulate legal instruments that would outlaw space strike weapons and provide for proper verification.

The problem of protection of satellites has been discussed on numerous occasions by many delegations.

The Polish delegation fully supports the elaboration of an international legal instrument for guaranteeing the immunity of satellites. Such an instrument would contribute also to the creation of the International Satellite Monitoring Agency as proposed by France, which -- in turn -- could form the essential part of the International Space Organization, as proposed by the Soviet Union. I would like to draw the attention of all delegations not only to the formal attractiveness of the above-mentioned proposals, but also to their characteristic sequence and inherent logic of succession. This is by no means only a coincidence.

One more remark as to the immunity of satellites: it should be granted for all of them. Sometimes the problem of the dual nature of military functions of satellite happens to be raised. It is argued that satellites that are deployed to verify arms control obligations could be simultaneously used for the gathering of sensitive military information. Yes, that can be the case. But to draw the precise line between different functions of satellites is almost impossible, and could be compared to the question of verification of what goes on in laboratory work on any subject. It is impossible to monitor what happens in a scientist's brain, and it is likewise impossible to know in advance in what manner a satellite computer has been programmed. Hence, the only way out is to grant immunity for all satellites.

To make this legal immunity more effective, we should also outlaw the means of breaking it, namely ASAT weapons, prior to their deployment. The ban on ASAT weapons, including the elimination of existing ASAT systems, would contribute greatly to the strengthening of the strategic balance and to confidence-building. As an actual arms control measure, it would also mark important headway on the road towards general disarmament.

The next important problem relating to the protection of satellites which has frequently been raised in this Hall is connected with the growing space traffic and the so-called dual-purpose or dual-capability of space objects. It is feared that an attack on a spacecraft could be carried out by simply

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

ramming it with another space object, i.e. without necessarily using a weapon. A solution could be found by concluding the "rules of the road" agreement proposed already by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and advocated by some other delegations. What I would like to draw attention to is that recently the concept in question has been given additional substantiation, because, logically, "the rules of the road" agreement should become an essential part of the French proposed code of conduct of States in space. Again, two different proposals coming from different delegations compose a logical whole.

Each of the three above-mentioned concepts, namely, the international protection régime for satellites, the ban on ASAT weapons and the "rules of the road" agreement would -- if implemented -- mark a significant step on the road towards peace in space. But they are coherently linked together and supplement each other. Thus, in our opinion, the smartest thing the Conference can do is to change quantity into quality, and to start work towards negotiations on international instruments in those three spheres. It would be a bold move, it would require a lot of courage and imagination, but it would be a responsible answer to the challenges the Conference faces now. For beyond any doubt, such a set of agreements, once it has entered into force, would bring about a qualitatively new political environment. In the meantime, any substantial progress in negotiations could facilitate a headway in the bilateral negotiations.

And last, but by no means the least, the question of verification, which in space -- given the vastness of this domain and the technological advancement of space activities -- will create serious difficulties. That is true, but it is worth remembering that each day of delay in the creation of a verification régime will render these difficulties more serious, for increased sophistication of weapons objectively tends to make the task of verification more complicated. Proceeding from this premise, the Polish delegation supports the Soviet initiative to consider the possibility of creating an international inspectorate the task of which would be to monitor the non-deployment of weapons in space, and the rights of which would go so far as an on-site inspection. What stricter régime could be envisaged? Besides, I should like to draw once again the attention of the Conference to the apparent logic of such a move. The International Inspectorate, possibly a division of the International Space Organization, would be an inescapable link in the above-mentioned chain of structures and instruments. All of them, taken together, would constitute a solid frame of the system of peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

These are the tasks which, in the opinion of my delegation, should become the fruitful domain of activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able guidance of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese. We hope the Committee will embark on this work immediately, because time is running short, and in space issues -- allow me to repeat -- at space-age speed.

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Among the priority issues before our Conference is that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The interest in this topic stems, of course, from a deep and legitimate concern at the danger that this new dimension of the arms race will create for the security of all.

It is our conviction, as we have repeatedly stated, that the extension of the arms race to outer space will only expand the potential domain for confrontation and push our goal of general and complete disarmament even further away.

The preparations underway for developing new weapons systems for outer space therefore make the much-awaited negotiations under item 5 of our agenda particularly urgent.

Furthermore, the common determination to exclude outer space from Great Power rivalry that we believe can be seen through the resolutions of the General Assembly, should logically have led to the granting of a genuine negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In my statement today, I too would like to speak briefly on item 5, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

Active discussions have been going on on this issue both in plenary and in the respective subsidary bodies. This is an expression of a growing concern that there is a real danger of extending the arms race to outer space.

Bearing in mind this threat, the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty who met in Moscow last week called for "immediate termination of the implementation of the SDI, as well as the development of projects such as the "European Defence Initiative".

Along with the majority of delegations in this Conference, the delegation of Bulgaria is alarmed by recent reports that the "research" stage of the SDI programme is approaching a point where decisions on field testing and consequently the deployment of space weapons will be taken. Such a step would lead to weaponization of outer space, and could unleash an extremely dangerous round of the arms race. The efforts to achieve the generally agreed objective of prevention of arms race in outer space would thus be fustrated.

The distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfararqi, spoke about this in plenary on 17 February. Together with him, we are also at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear weapons is "to prevent an arms race in outer space while at the same time the United States develops, with the purpose of deploying, space weapons systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and for destruction of existing systems". On the same date the distinguish representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, rightly drew our attention to the fact that "our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space".

I need perhaps not say more to illustrate that the contemplating of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space is an urgent issue. The urgency of this task should be as high as that of advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament, whose top priority is generally recognized. It cannot be otherwise, since one can hardly imagine deep reductions of the strategic nuclear arsenals if weapons are going to be deployed in outer space. Therefore, we hope that the bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear weapons will soon lead to results.

The task of preventing an arms race in outer space has global aspects. Weaponization of outer space would directly affect the security interests of all nations. All States have, therefore, both the right and the obligation to participate in, and contribute to, the efforts to avoid such a race. As a multilateral negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament can and must play a central role in this field.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In this respect, we fully share the view expressed by President Hussak in his message of today to the effect that: (quote), "Extension of the arms race to outer space would not guarantee anyone's security and, moreover, it would multiply the risk of the outbreak of a war, posing a qualitatively new threat to all States, regardless of their location or affiliation to any politico-military groupings".

Having said this, we welcome the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 was established earlier this year. This offers the Conference an opportunity of going deeper into the problems that have to be solved with a view to arriving at an appropriate agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space. For the last two years the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified almost all issues relevant to this objective. Turning to a more practical and result-oriented work in the Committee is now widely expected. We welcome, therefore, the understanding expressed by the President of the Conference that "consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268". Concentrating on such proposals this year would also be in conformity with the consensus statement contained in paragraph 80 of the Final Document that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held", in accordance also with the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. A good basis for substantive work along these lines does exist.

The delegation of Bulgaria is ready to consider all proposals on specific measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

A new idea relevant to all specific measures providing for the non-introduction of space weapons has been advanced by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The proposal to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements was formally made on 3 February by the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Y.M. Vorontsov. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin, elaborated on this idea in his statement on 17 March. He suggested that such an inspectorate should be given the right of access to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in outer space, as well as to their launching vehicles.

The new Soviet idea is a valuable one. It seems to us that a comprehensive agreement on non-deployment of weapons in outer space could be effectively verified through co-operative measures providing for inspections of the launching sites. Such launches cannot be hidden. They have long been monitored by national technical means. Complementing these activities by international on-site inspections would strengthen the verification régime. International inspectors, present at the launching of space objects, would have the right of access to them as well as to their launching vehicles, thus ensuring confidence in compliance with the respective agreements banning deployment of outer space weapons. This is valid for weapons of any type, whether ASAT or ABM, which are designed to be deployed in outer space. The

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

idea of an international inspectorate could, therefore, be utilized for the verification purposes of both an ASAT ban and a comprehensive prohibition of space weapons.

We cannot but conclude that the establishment of an international inspectorate deserves very serious attention. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should consider it carefully, in the context of examining appropriate measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space. The Committee could, inter alia, elaborate on the principles of the establishment and functioning of such a system.

The delegation of Bulgaria would favour the continuation in the Ad Hoc Committee of the work aimed at a comprehensive prohibition of the whole class of space weapons. Arriving at a general agreement on the scope of such a ban would facilitate our task. Several interesting formulations were suggested last year in an initial attempt to define the weapons that are to be outlawed. We are ready to continue the exploration of this avenue.

Appropriate partial measures could also lead us to the achievement of the same objective. On 19 March, Ambassador Taylhardat spoke about the possibility of amending article 4 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, so that its prohibition provisions cover any type of outer space weapons. This is an approach which, in our submission, deserves to be analysed and pursued further in the Ad Hoc Committee.

A number of delegations have proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should elaborate an agreement on an appropriate ASAT ban. The idea of ensuring immunity of satellites has been put forward as a partial measure. This idea underlines the need to prevent the development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapons systems, and to eliminate the existing ones. The suggested approach envisages also establishing a prohibition on the use of force against space objects. The merit of such a provision is that it would outlaw interference with the normal functioning of space objects by any weapon system which normally serves other purposes but could be used in an ASAT mode.

We support such an approach to the ASAT ban, and believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should allocate more time to its consideration. Anti-satellite weapons are generally considered to be destabilizing. The destruction or disruption of early-warning and strategic communications satellites could, for example, facilitate contemplating a first strike. The arms control missions of satellites are also extremely important. Furthermore, ASAT developments could well cover possible efforts to circumvent the existing restraints on ABM systems, due to the similar character of these two technologies. A multilateral agreement, preventing introduction of ASAT weapons in outer space and providing for the verifiable destruction of the existing ASAT systems, would be in the interest of all States, both those launching space objects into orbits and those using the services of satellites.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada)

I was proposing to intervene primarily to announce the holding of a Workshop on Outer Space by the Government of Canada in the month of May and to take this opportunity to express personal invitations to the heads of delegations -- all delegations -- to the Conference on Disarmament, to that Workshop or to their nominee for those who are unable to participate. I will come back to that in a few moments and spell out the nature of the invitation. Before doing so, however, I wish to provide some background, which is certainly known to some of those present but perhaps not at all, concerning Canada's approach to the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space, because that is our object and purpose and it is quite evidently a widespread and widely-shared object and purpose.

If I could be permitted for just a moment to recall some earlier development, on 26 August 1982 Canada submitted its first substantive Working Paper to the Conference on Disarmament, which was then operating under another name, on the outer space issue. I would remind delegations that the document, entitled "Arms control in outer space", (CD/320), undertook to discuss generally the subject of arms control and outer space in terms of stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics -- a topic that is current still. I would recall also that for a number of years prior to 1985 the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor organization had clearly recognized the importance of the outer space issue. It was only, however, on 29 March 1985 that the CD succeeded in reaching agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This development was warmly welcomed by Canada and other members of the CD, as the

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

first of the crucial steps to organize examination of the subject; this process was, of course, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution relevant at that stage, which was adopted without dissent during its thirty-ninth session on 12 December 1984 and which called upon the CD to consider the question of preventing an arms race in outer space as a matter of priority. I would like to re-emphasize that phrase, "as a matter of priority".

The mandate since adopted and amended remains, of course, in the view of the Canadian delegation a realistic one, as I recall stating at the time; we regarded the mandate as neither too narrow or restrictive, nor too wide-ranging, but rather one permitting the CD to begin concrete action and undertake substantive work immediately. It is worth recalling that the mandate was to examine as a first step, at that stage of substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is worth noting that the mandate that we are now working on continues to permit us to make specific examination of existing treaties, bilateral and multilateral, with a view to determining the content of the existing legal régime and in the process, of course, determining whether there are lacunae which ought to be filled in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. I think this is common ground, there is no doubt on that; but in any event Canada has pursued that objective.

I mentioned the first Working Paper that we had tabled, and in so doing I wish to emphasize that while Canada is not the only country tabling working papers, there are far too few in this field, and in others, and I believe, as I have said on many occasions, that the way to concretize our work is to put our views in the form of working papers that go beyond the kind of statements which we all make in plenary and must make as part of the negotiating process. May I recall that we tabled a second Working Paper, which we considered to be directly on point entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control in Outer Space" (CD/618), dated 23 June 1985. In addition, we tabled a third Working Paper (CD/716) which we continue to believe to be relevant, and indeed some of the statements this morning indicated its continued relevance, on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space; that is a document dated July 1986.

In tabling these Working Papers we had hoped to be of assistance to the Conference, and perhaps to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, in that we did not attempt to present a Canadian point of view -- a specifically governmental point of view -- but rather to outline the issues which in our view have to be addressed.

We are conscious, of course, of the statement by the President for March, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, in making it clear as he did that there is no obstacle to discussing measures. For my part, I have good reason to recall, as President of the Conference in August 1986, that our report has, as I recall, some 11 paragraphs which refer to the questions of measures, and so do not consider that as a controversial issue. We have discussed measures: we undoubtedly will discuss measures. But I would like to emphasize that in an

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

exercise of this complexity and importance, if we want to be serious, let us examine the existing régime; determine what lacunae, if any, exist, and then consider what remains to be done. I don't think we should put the cart before the horse; neither do I suggest that we spend years engaging ourselves in the kinds of arguments that lawyers can sometimes be very skilled at in disagreeing on the legal régime. There is a good deal of scope for immediate work, concrete work, and substantive work to be done, I hope, at this spring session and certainly in the summer session.

In the light of this background information that I have provided, I would like to say that it is obvious that not only our delegation and the Canadian Government but all governments and all delegations understand that one of the most important and difficult arms control and disarmament issues with which the international community must come to grips concerns the kinds of military activity which can legitimately be carried out in outer space, and those which cannot. Technological advances combining with international political dynamics force these questions to the fore with increasing urgency. It is extremely encouraging that the United States and the USSR agreed in early 1985 to make the prevention of an arms race in outer space an agreed bilateral objective. This agreement attests to the importance and indeed the urgency of the subject, and as I just mentioned, in that same year this Conference agreed to establish for the first time a subsidiary body to address the same ultimate objective, but in a multilateral context and certainly without detriment to the bilateral efforts. If I may be permitted I should like to quote from one of our own Working Papers that expresses in this case our own view as well as we are able to do on the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiating processes, which we have never considered to be mutually exclusive. From the Canadian perspective, "the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee in the outer space issue was fully in accord with Canada's express policy and constitutes a significant step forward in coming to grips with the subject." That remains true. "The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee both complements and accurately reflects the reality concerning the bilateral negotiations under way between the United States and the USSR in Geneva", and this is the part I want to stress. That mandate, as it now exists, and as it has been affirmed in this session, "neither undermines, prejudges, nor in any way interferes with the bilateral negotiations," and this fact is considered by Canada to be absolutely central to the successful outcome of both sets of deliberations.

I do not now intend to table another working paper but I do wish to proceed now to mention the Workshop I referred to earlier. Having tried to help lay the groundwork, in so far as we are able to do so, and building upon the work done by many delegations in plenary and in the Outer Space Committee, we have concluded that the approach being followed is a useful one, but it should be pressed forward by specific exposure to practical issues. We were gratified that we were able to agree relatively quickly on the mandate; we share the concern at the delays that have occurred since, but we also share the widespread desire, which we hope is universal, that we will soon be able to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space and get on with the

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

work that is expected of us. Recognizing, however, that there is much remaining to be done of a serious nature, of a concrete nature, of a substantive nature, I am pleased to announce today that as part of Canada's contribution to the work of the present session of the Conference, Canada is inviting each of the heads of delegations present here, or a designated representative, to attend an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal from 14 to 17 May 1987. We are also pleased to extend the invitation to observer delegations and to representatives of the Secretariat. The dates again have been carefully chosen (14 to 17 May) with a number of considerations in mind. Our dilemma was to find an appropriate time and venue for such a Workshop, given the very full schedule of the Conference on Disarmament, which is much fuller than we would even know from the press reports or from many other sources -- it is a very heavy schedule. We decided to follow the example of other Member States which have hosted Workshops in their own countries with a view to contributing to progress in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. It seemed appropriate under the circumstances to schedule the Workshop for a period when at least a significant number of representatives will already have crossed the Atlantic to participate in other activities of the United Nations including, of course, the UNDC. It was just such an approach, as we recall, that the United States adopted when it hosted its Chemical Weapons Workshop in Utah in 1983. In this case we are proposing that the Workshop take place during the period of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, but without hampering the work of that important deliberating body. Many participants will already have gathered in New York. The departure for Montreal would take place on the afternoon of Thursday, 14 May 1987; work would carry on into the weekend, with participants returning to New York early on Sunday 17 May. The Canadian Government will provide transportation from New York to Montreal, return, and of course will cover the expenses of related costs in Montreal as other Workshops have done. The Workshop will focus on certain legal and technical aspects of the outer space issue, including presentation and opportunity for round-table discussion on both aspects. Also included will be a visit to the Satellite and Aerospace Systems Division of SPAR AEROSPACE Limited to illustrate certain practical capabilities and constraints regarding the space-to-space application of space-based remote sensing systems. Although my instructions do not say so, I feel certain we would want the Secretariat to be adequately represented also at this Workshop.

In closing, may I apologize for not addressing a number of other extremely important issues on our agenda, but the very discussion we have heard today, coupled with developments behind the scenes, convinced me that it was timely to make this announcement today, which I will confirm by letters to all of you.

In closing, may I say that we look forward to hosting as many delegations as possible in Montreal in May.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

During the first few weeks of the 1987 session of the Conference, two United States representatives spoke on the agenda items "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of an arms race in outer space." I do not wish to be redundant. However, having listened to a number of speakers in recent weeks, including today, address agenda item 5, my delegation is struck by the need to return to several fundamental points. They explain why we conclude that a number of our colleagues need to devote fresh thought to agenda items 2 and 5.

The first point I wish to recall is that these two subjects cannot be isolated from each other. It is well known that there has been East-West competition for nearly four decades and that that competition has manifested itself in aggression and in large forces under arms and military expenditures. There has been competition in conventional and nuclear arms for these four decades. What is frequently forgotten or -- in the case of some perhaps -- obfuscated is that there is no basis for pointing to the danger of the beginning of a new "arms race in outer space." For competition in that area -- competition associated with nuclear arms -- is not new, or even recent. It has existed now for 30 years. It was in early 1957 that the USSR began advanced development and testing of new ballistic missiles with substantially increased lift capacity. Then, in October 1957, the Soviet Union succeeded in launching into space and inserting into orbit the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I. It was not long after that both the Soviet Union and the United States achieved the capability to utilize the ballistic missile to deliver nuclear weapons on targets in other continents. Thus, the medium of space was utilized as a central medium for pursuit of East-West nuclear competition.

Now it is certainly true that, despite these facts, a number of important arms limitation agreements have been reached relating to space. I mean in no sense to belittle the importance of these agreements. Central in this area have been the Outer Space Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The SALT I Agreement also put certain upper limits on elements of ballistic missile and other strategic weapon competition. But even had SALT I been fully complied with -- and it was not fully complied with -- it could not have prevented the substantial increase in the number and power of ballistic missile warheads that thereafter occurred.

Now if priority belongs, as is generally acknowledged, to disarmament measures in the field of strategic nuclear arms, then surely the strengthening of mutual strategic security, or at least stability, through reducing the

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

chance of a disarming first strike by any one, should be of paramount importance. This fact was recognized by both sides at the time of the January 1985 agreement to begin the nuclear and space talks, and again at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits. Deep reductions in strategic offensive nuclear forces are crucially important for a number of reasons. One of these, of course, is that it would, if properly negotiated and structured, reduce the danger of a first strike, strengthen strategic stability, and thus increase mutual strategic security. In light of the agreed objectives in nuclear and space talks (NST), it is odd indeed to hear the present state of the strategic nuclear balance described, as it was by one speaker today, as "remarkably balanced."

Now it is difficult to conceive of advancement, much less achievement of the important goals set in NST, without the presence of certain basic conditions. One of these is full compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements in force.

A second condition is a high degree of transparency -- on both sides -- with regard to forces in being and to overall intentions. This implies not just glasnost (or openness) -- perhaps the openness of an occasional snapshot of an otherwise closed society. It implies a great deal more candour about national military forces and programmes. Third, it also implies, I would argue, avoidance of any conscious misrepresentation of the programmes and policies of the other side. In this regard, of course, misunderstandings leading potentially to crisis situations are far less likely in an environment in which both sides demonstrate a high degree of transparency as regards their policies and force programmes. I am assuming, for the moment, the absence of aggressive intent involving use of force.

Further, in the view of my delegation, it is destructive to effective arms limitation and disarmament if proposals are advanced that are either purely declaratory, are ill-defined or unverifiable, or are blatantly one-sided in their effect.

I must again call the attention of the Conference to the very peculiar circumstance that some members, who in the past outspokenly decried the doctrine of mutual assured destruction with regard to strategic nuclear weapons, of recent date seem to have become not only willing to accept this doctrine but to reject any effort to reduce reliance upon it. For how else are we to characterize the blind opposition to strategic defence that we have heard in this hall on several recent occasions? Despite the relentless deployment by the Soviet Union of new offensive ballistic weapons and concurrent pursuit of ballistic missile defence over the last 15 years, we still encounter some who think of any Western effort to give consideration to ballistic missile defence as irresponsible, threatening or destabilizing.

For its part, the United States has been cautious in describing the potential for ballistic missile defence, and it has -- once again, openly -- set strict criteria for possible future ballistic missile defence programmes.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation was one of the first to underscore, by means of various contributions and proposals, its determination to participate in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space as part of the complementary role played by the Conference in this sphere. My delegation has never succumbed to the illusion that the overriding criteria of stability in outer space can be resolved in multilateral agreements before decisive breakthroughs have been made in bilateral negotiations. However, in this connection we have always striven for "constructive parallelism" and supported realistic, complementary efforts. We regret that the analytical step towards identifying lacunae and shortcomings in existing law on outer space has not been taken until now. Though shortcomings have been defined and deficiencies deplored, they have neither been linked to one another nor examined with a view to achieving concrete "remedial measures". My delegation therefore feels that, before unanimous agreement has been reached on definitions and interpretations, it is not expedient to examine associated compliance aspects of existing or intended activities in outer space. We consider it necessary and advisable to evaluate in a coherent fashion what legal arrangements are needed and indeed feasible for a prohibitory convention, which is seemingly not possible at present.



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

If we look at post-war history, we see that each new turn of the screw of the arms race, which is precisely the most characteristic phenomenon of this period of human history, has been justified by the United States by the fact that supposedly it has to re-establish the balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Of course, there are no scales where you can weigh up and compare the military power of the two sides. However, it is useful not to forget that it was not the USSR but the United States which first produced the atom bomb. The United States surrounded our territory with a network of military bases with jets which could deliver atom bombs to destroy our towns. Our development of intercontinental ballistic missiles which made it possible to deliver nuclear warheads against targets in United States territory was only a response to the nuclear threat to which we were subjected by the United States, not the other way round.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

This was not the beginning of an arms race in outer space, as pictured by Mr. Barthelemy on 2 April. We were indeed the first to launch an artificial Earth satellite. This launch was carried out in accordance with the scientific research programme of the International Geophysical Year, in other words solely for peaceful purposes, and again it did not signify the beginning of the arms race in outer space. For the time being, there are no strike space weapons in outer space. There are military satellites -- early-warning satellites, communications and navigation satellites and so forth -- but space is, for the time being, free of weapons which shoot. That is precisely why the question is now to prevent an arms race in outer space, not to allow strike space weapons, that is to say, weapons which could destroy any kind of target. By the way, this was set down in the Soviet-American document adopted here in Geneva, in January 1985, as an objective in the Soviet-American negotiations. There it is stated that the objective of the negotiations will be agreements aimed at "preventing an arms race in space and preventing it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and a strengthening strategic stability". I stress that the reference there is to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

But now this aim is being pushed further and further away as the result of the attempts by the United States Administrations to deploy strike space weapons within the context of the Strategic Defence Initiative. In my statement on 3 March, I dwelt in detail on the nature of the SDI, on the direct link between offensive and defensive weapons, and I also noted the contradiction between the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and attempts to put the SDI over as the avenue towards the disappearance of nuclear weapons. Mr. Barthelemy did not dispute the arguments contained in my statement made on 3 March, and thus I allow myself to draw the following conclusions.

First, it is impossible to deny the unbreakable link between strategic defensive and offensive weapons when determining the balance of power. The acquisition by one side of a defensive capability is tantamount to its acquisition of supplementary strike capacity.

Second, it is impossible to deny that weapons launched into space in order to hit intercontinental ballistic missiles may also attack the satellites of the other side, and also with further elaboration, could be used for purely offensive purposes, in particular for striking from space at targets in the atmosphere and on the Earth's surface, for example, airborne command posts, oil reservoirs, and other installations.

Third, it is impossible to deny the destabilizing nature of such armament systems which are called upon to change the balance of power, in particular taking into account the fact that it only takes minutes or even seconds to bring such systems into operation. The SDI is precisely such a weapons system. Moreover, because of its specific nature, it enhances the destabilizing effect because it creates the illusion that the side carrying out a first strike will go unpunished.

Finally, the SDI programmes an arms race for many decades to come. The improvement of the "shield" always leads to the improvement of the "sword", and as the experience of history shows, there are no limits to this process of improving sword and shield.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

I was not here to listen to colleague, Mr. Barthelemy's, speech; I have read it. It is not my intent to either take a distance from that or to defend it -- it stands on its own merit. I myself found it to be logical in its composition and accurate in what it said. One of the things that we are talking about in this forum, or will be talking about in more detail, is the idea of the militarization of space, or if you will, to prevent an arms race in space. This requires that we understand, to the extent that information is available, what this means to us. Are we talking about an offensive military capability in space, a defensive military capability in space, military communications in space, or military intelligence-gathering devices in space. There must be some attempt to draw the line on what this means. I shall not try to do that, but I would note that the projecting of a missile into space bearing nuclear charges certainly fits one definition of the militarization of space, and certainly ICBMs, of which there are a great many, are planned to project nuclear devices through space to attack targets of another country. There are also, according to the analysts of my country, plans to send nuclear devices into space as defence against such ICBMs, and there I am speaking of the ABM system which surrounds Moscow, known in the West as Galosh. There exists a very strong possibility that said (Galosh) missiles are, in fact, nuclear-tipped and that the defensive effort would be brought about by the explosion of a nuclear weapon in space.

The existence of such a system does reflect, as my distinguished colleague Ambassador Nazarkin said, the interaction between sword and shield; others could better explain the Marxist dialectic on the relationship of offence and defence than I. I would only note that it exists, and that in the context of offence and defence it has often been expressed, particularly in the nuclear sphere. I would note that two Chiefs of the General Staff of the Soviet Union have been most explicit on this count, Marshall Sokoluvskiy and Marshall Ogarkov. While I have mentioned that, I should also like to read to you from a rather interesting book entitled "Military Strategy" written under the guidance and editorship of Marshall Sokoluvskiy. The book was written in 1963, in its first edition; its last edition in 1968. I do not want to pretend to tell you the currency of this book, but as an historical instrument I wish now to quote from this book. I am going to read you four paragraphs, and I beg your indulgence:

> "Priority in such outstanding stages in knowledge of the universe as the launch of the first SPUTNIK of Earth, the first flight of man in space, the first group flight of man in cosmic space, the first cosmic flight in the world of a woman, the first exit of man into open interstellar space, belongs to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union created the most powerful rockets in the world, the carriers of cosmic objects. The Soviet Union was the first in the world to create the hydrogen bomb and the intercontinental ballistic missile, and also a number of new kinds of rocket armaments which are new in principle."

It goes on to talk about the incorporation of various cosmic means into the defensive organization of the Soviet Union:

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

"The second half of the twentieth century will, in the opinion of scientists, be a century of space and thermal nuclear energy which cannot fail to influence the development of corresponding means of destruction and of the means of their delivery to the target.

"Taking into account the fact that the Soviets created hydrogen weapons before the United States, and most of all, that the United States does not possess super powered thermonuclear charges such as those possessed by the USSR, we consider our superiority over the Western block in nuclear weapons to be indisputable. By the admission of competent American specialists, our superiority in total nuclear might of strategic rocket weapons is very considerable."

I dislike the type of exchanges which sound like two religious zealots interpreting the Bible, but it is of course important that we have facts at our disposal. I spoke earlier in the context of chemical weapons urging that we build confidence, that there be greater openness among all of us in the context of chemical weapons. I call upon us in this context to be open about what is happening in space. It should in this context be noted that the Soviet Union has had an operational orbital interceptor and anti-satellite weapon since 1971, that is for 14 years, and it has ground-based lasers which have been tested against objects in space. I mentioned the location of Sary Shagan. When we want to deal with issues of this type and this magnitude and this soberness, then let us also be open. The Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defence as it has on strategic offence, reflecting again this interplay between sword and shield. It does have the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile system which is being consistently and continually upgraded. It has an enormous number of airplanes which are part of what is known as air defence of the homeland. It has programmes to shield its political leadership and it has an extensive civil defence programme. We do not question the Soviet Union's right to have these programmes.

In a forum where we attach highest priority to nuclear issues and to nuclear disarmament, there is an obvious acceptance of the fact that nuclear weapons are terrible instruments. In Beijing (China), I recently listened to testimonies of people who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who talk about the terribleness of nuclear weapons -- there is no question about that. Why then should anyone take great umbrage at any nation attempting to defend itself from such weapons? The task that faces us is, of course, to reduce those weapons and, if possible, to totally do away with them. That task is only possible when we build confidence among nations; when we reduce the suspicions that exist among nations, when we learn to co-operate in peaceful and constructive ways.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I do not intend to turn this meeting into an exclusive exchange of views between two delegations; I would like to say just a few words. I too have many quotations which I could well use to prove, as was done by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Hansen, that the United States military leaders at one time or another considered that the United States of America had reached military supremacy; but the reproduction of all those quotations would take up far too much time. I will just give you one small quotation from former United States President Nixon who, in July 1985, in an interview with the United States magazine Time in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the United States of America as a nuclear Power, noted that the Americans were surprised when the Russians produced the bomb (this is a reference to the atom bomb in 1949) and so both States had the bomb, but the Americans had more, and that is when they began to use it as a diplomatic club. Now there was a growing revisionist theory that the bomb did not play an important part in United States foreign policy after the Second World War: that theory was being developed because the bomb was very unpopular, but he (President Nixon) did know that it played a role.

From this quotation from the former United States President it is quite clear what the source of the arms race was. Of course it zig-zagged about, but its sources were such as described by Mr. Nixon in the quote I have just given you.

In conclusion, I would like totally to express my solidarity with Ambassador Hansen in what he said at the end of his second statement, when he called for the building of confidence and for productive and constructive negotiations to be conducted. On this point we absolutely agree with him.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

On the very significant matter of the arms race in outer space, I should like to stress that we fully endorse the views expressed by the Group of 21 in this regard.

With the speedy advancement of space technology, the sovereignty of countries not possessing these capabilities is being increasingly imperiled. The surveillance and spy satellites have provided their owners with possibilities which can easily trample the recognized rights of the countries of the world. Fortunately, many new ideas have been introduced recently in this connection, each of which merits full consideration. Outer space should remain forever safe for scientific explorations with the aim of serving humanity. In our view, the opening up of any new field of militarization is a crime against humanity, a crime which will be extended to the generations to come.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

I make no apology for returning to the subject of item 5 of our agenda -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The overriding importance of the subject in the gamut of disarmament issues before us and in the light of contemporary developments justifies the preoccupation of several delegations, including my own, with this issue. In our statement of 17 February, the Sri Lanka delegation urged the acceptance of the modest improvement proposed by the Group of 21 in the mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of our agenda. In doing so we traced the respectable pedigree of the word "measures" over which so much unnecessary controversy has been created. We pointed out that paragraph 80 of the SSOD I Final Document had referrred to the need for further measures in the prevention of an arms race to be taken and that successive resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly had also referred to this.

My delegation has been closely associated with the negotiations leading to the adoption of a single resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the General Assembly in recent years. In 1985, by a curious irony from the very group of delegations who have found the word "measures" unpalatable here, there came a proposal to the group of non-aligned countries that the operative paragraph in the General Assembly resolution relating to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should state that the objective of re-establishing an Ad Hoc Committee should be "with a view to the achievement of further effective and verifiable measures through appropriate international negotiations in order to prevent an arms race in space". In 1986 the proposal was again made by the same group of countries that an Ad Hoc Committee be re-established in the CD with an adequate mandate "with a view to achieving agreement with regard to effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". While we acknowledge that the two fora -- the United Nations General Assembly and the CD -- are different, the context is the same and we find it inexplicable that a proposal made in the General Assembly regarding the mandate of a CD Ad Hoc Committee so as to achieve a consensus resolution is so strenuously opposed by the very authors of the proposal when we seek to include it in a non-negotiating mandate in the CD itself.

Be that as it may, we were content when through the wisdom of the distinguished Ambassador of China the device of a Presidential statement was adopted to facilitate the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space with the distinguished Ambassador of Italy -- whose delegation has worked so long and with so much dedication on this issue -- as its Chairman. It was a matter of gratification that for the first time we were able to see this subsidiary body re-established in the first month of our session. Consequently, we have been deeply disappointed that a procedural wrangle over the programme of work should have delayed the substantive work of this body. There has recently been a revival of interest in the improved and effective functioning of our Conference -- a subject on which my delegation made a detailed plenary statement on 12 July 1984. To some the focus of attention is only the report-writing procedure. To my delegation, as well as to many others, there is this question together with a larger number of issues that must be addressed by the small group that we all now agree should be set up to

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

consider this subject. They include the need to prevent the use of procedure to obstruct work on substance. I believe that our recent and unhappy experience over the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 should lead us to a consideration of how we can prevent agreement on a programme of work being used as a pre-condition for the inauguration of substantive work in subsidiary bodies of this Conference. Such a situation was without precedent but we have just seen that it can arise.

With the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, delegations will now endeavour to ensure that constructive work is begun without delay. For our part we have found the contributions made in recent weeks in the plenary debate on this item replete with ideas that could be discussed further in the Ad Hoc Committee -- preferably with the assistance of experts. Among the ideas presented to us at this session is the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects an immunity from attack or interference thereby contributing to confidence building and stability. We have stated before that while the militarization of space is a fait accompli, the weaponization of space is not -- at least not yet. By the militarization of space we refer to the fact that three out of four satellites in space are there for military purposes. To grant immunity to them is tantamount to legitimizing the military uses of space unless we are clear about their specific purpose and function. In this connection we would be well advised to re-examine the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space concluded in 1975. This Convention sought to establish a mandatory system of registering objects launched into outer space not only for identification purposes but also to, and I quote from the preamble, "contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space". Launching States are required under the Convention to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of specific details of space objects launched by them including their general function. In the implementation of this Convention there are many inadequacies, particularly concerning information on the function of space objects. In terms of Article X of the Convention the opportunity arose at the forty-first session of the General Assembly to re-examine the Convention. This opportunity was unfortunately missed because of disagreement among Member States and the Secretary-General was merely requested to prepare a report on the past application of the Convention to be submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee for the information of Member States. The report falls far short of the review exercise contemplated in Article X. The strengthening of this Convention must go hand in hand with any move to grant immunity to certain space objects.

Another interesting proposal made is that of an international inspectorate to supervise on-site the launching of space objects. We are aware that this proposal is conceived as a verification measure to ensure the non-deployment of space weapons. We appreciate this but would consider that in logical sequence it should be examined when we are negotiating a ban on all space weapons based on all physical principles. Again we believe that the strengthening of the Space Registration Convention should also be undertaken as a means of reinforcing the existing provisions to prevent an arms race in outer space. The continuing relevance of the proposal of France made at SSOD I for an international satellite monitoring agency has already been noted in our discussions at this session. The potential of such an agency to usher in an age of transparency and to assist in the verification of a future

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

agreement banning space weapons requires to be explored fully. Vast strides in civilian space technology and the ready access to its benefits not only prove the importance of reserving space for exclusively peaceful purposes but also underscore the viability of satellite monitoring of disarmament agreements, including a ban on space weapons. The efficacy of an international satellite monitoring agency as compared to an international inspectorate and more importantly the cost-effectiveness of the two modes of verification require detailed study. We are aware of the useful work going on in Canada on verification, such as PAXSAT, and are grateful to Ambassador Beesley for his invitation to all CD delegations to attend the May workshop in Montreal. Another proposal is for an arms control and conflict observation satellite (ACCOS) to help in the observation of space weapon development. A recent SIPRI study recommends that these concepts of verification should be explored in the Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of this Conference and we endorse this view.

The central issue is the need for an effective ban on space weapons. While we endeavour to negotiate an agreement or agreements for this purpose a number of measures have been suggested. They include an ASAT weapon ban, an amendment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a "rules of the road" code for space, etc. The proposals arise out of a fundamental desire to act urgently to prevent an arms race in outer space. We have always recognized that the developments of concern to us are not confined to one space Power. The space weapons ban has of necessity to apply universally and must have effective provisions for verification, as General Assembly resolution 41/53 recognizes. Interim measures must also be applicable universally. That is why it is envisaged that with an ASAT weapon ban the existing ASAT system will be destroyed. My delegation does not consider it appropriate to enter into the controversy surrounding the interpretation of Article V of the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Our objective is a multilateral agreement to ban all space weapons including anti-ballistic missiles and other ballistic missile defence systems under the terms of General Assembly resolution 41/53. The same resolution emphasizes the peaceful uses of space and we welcome in this context the Agreement on Co-operation in Exploring and Using Space for Peaceful Purposes signed by the Governments of the USSR and the United Kingdom on 31 March in Moscow.

I have referred already to the ASAT weapon ban which has been proposed. The Harare Declaration of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government specifically called on this Conference and stressed the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons and the dismantling of the existing system. In negotiating an ASAT weapon ban we recognize that such weapons must be defined since space objects could be used in an ASAT role to disable other satellites by impact or explosion. A useful distinction has therefore been made between dedicated ASATs designed and tested for a flexible attack capability, and ancillary ASATs with a limited and not clearly identifiable ASAT capability. A proliferation of ASAT capability is a real possibility and can endanger the peaceful uses of space.

In the haste to deploy weapons in space as defensive systems we have noticed a number of novel arguments being advanced. We were intrigued to hear last week that an arms race in space began in 1957 and has continued since then. There is firstly an obvious illogicality of seeking to shut the stable

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

door after the horse has bolted by preventing something that supposedly began 30 years ago through item 5 of an agenda -- a task in which all delegations are engaged, namely the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Secondly we find that there is clearly a lack of agreement on what space arms are. Can we therefore not discuss a common definition of space weapons or space arms as we sought to do in the Ad Hoc Committee last year despite the silence of those who only want a prolonged exegetical exercise on the treaties relating to outer space? Is the inter-continental ballistic missile a space weapon merely because it passes through space in its trajectory? In the view of my delegation this is a question to be discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee and we hope there will be a readiness on the part of all delegations to engage in such discussion.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to which Sri Lanka is a party, specifically prohibits by its Article IV the placing in orbit of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner. At the time of adoption of this treaty the Sri Lanka delegation expressed disappointment that military activities were not prohibited. Those States who acquiesced in this glaring lacuna must not now endeavour to make a virtue out of it.

Differences of opinion in our work in this Conference are to be expected. To attribute them to a failure to study the issues or to a state of ignorance is both patronising and regrettable. My delegation has spoken frequently against the deployment of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems by any country, buttressing our arguments with the opinion of scientists. There has been a significant decrease today in the claims being made for such systems. The quantum leap in the arms race as a consequence of the manufacture and deployment of such weapons has been frequently stated. For example, the mirrors needed for giant laser weapons are estimated by one expert to be "larger and more robust that the 200-inch Mount Palomar which required years of skilled labour and millions of dollars to make". The orbiting fortresses contemplated to provide an area defence will of course be defensive systems as well as offensive systems capable of using deadly lasers against ground targets or to cause firestorms devastating crops and forests. With such an offensive propensity it follows that such systems would invite attack by weapons including laser weapons which could be manufactured for a fraction of the cost of these elaborate BMD systems. The obvious question is not why we should then be concerned over the creation of such systems but why we need go into such a significantly new scale of arms expenditure involving a new arena -- space?

Another type of BMD system contemplated is the so-called "pop-up defence such as the "Excalibur" device powered by a nuclear explosion which could release electromagnatic pulses capable of wiping out power and communications systems over a vast area. Whatever the system the invulnerability of it is now not a claim made even by its advocates. It will lead to the manufacture of an over-kill capacity of missiles invalidating the deterrent value of the system. Additionally, of course, there is the danger of pre-emptive attacks. BMD systems of any type will heighten the element of uncertainty leading to a greater threat of nuclear war. We hope that in the Ad Hoc Committee we can catalogue the types of weapons and activities we seek to exclude from space.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

We have therefore a heavy agenda before the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We must hasten to get through the agenda in order to negotiate an agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Arthur Clarke, Chancellor of Sri Lanka's University of Moratuwa, recalled in his Jawarharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture in New Delhi last November an article written by him in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima which concluded "The only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker". That wisdom is as relevant today for space weapons as it was four decades ago for nuclear weapons. We must devise multilateral agreements to prevent them being manufactured and deployed, whether for offensive or defensive purposes. That task can only be achieved in the Conference on Disarmament with the active co-operation of all delegations.



(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

By its conquest of space, the world has entered a new dimension, as we know, a new technolgocial dimension for which there is no going back, with dazzling advances for the greater good of mankind, but a concomitant train of much-heightened dangers, new threats of destruction, weapons of unprecedented accuracy and range.

The world must start policing outer space before it is too late. It must establish a code of conduct to protect mankind from the new dangers which tomorrow will become a reality, but it must also fully provide for the security of States in and from outer space which at the moment is becoming part of the Earth's living space.

To try to stop progress in science and technology in this area is neither realistic nor useful. It would be wiser to try to channel it. The Conference has understood that time must not be wasted and that it is more important to embark on matters immediately in an appropriate working group than to waste energy on the pursuit of promises or commitments to negotiate which are quite obviously unrealistic at present. My delegation is pleased at this pragmatic approach, and we expect that the work of the Committee under the enlightened Chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese will make a valuable contribution both to initiating its own work and to the work of the Conference as a whole.

We are pleased to note the seminar on problems relating to outer space to be held in May in Montreal, and here we would like to express our warm appreciation and thanks to the delegation of Canada and to the host Government of Canada for this especially interesting initiative.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another important item on the agenda of this Conference. We are glad that it has proved possible to establish an ad hoc committee on this subject for the third successive year, and earlier in our proceedings than ever before. We wish Ambassador Pugliese well in his task as Chairman. Once again, my delegation hopes to make a substantial contribution to the preparatory work of examining the legal, political, strategic and technical aspects of the question. We appreciate the practical contribution that the Canadian Government is making by organizing a workshop in Montreal in May.



(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

I should like to refer briefly to agenda item 5, that is, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this area too differing views are expressed regarding all sorts of issues: what is a space weapon? When did the militarization of space begin? Which country is most advanced in any particular area? Are the new space weapons offensive or defensive? Do they have a destabilizing effect? And so forth. Undoubtedly these issues are important, and experts must deal with them. In our view, however, there are two vital issues: the first is whether we want the arms race to spread into outer space, and whether we want it to be stepped up on Earth. The second is whether we want space to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, as the common heritage of mankind. We believe that if we truly want the efforts of our States to lead to a peaceful world we should reply in the negative to the first question and in the affirmative to the second.

Is it reasonable for us to expect such an answer to these questions? This in itself is a difficult question. Difficult because so far there has been absolutely not a single new possibility opened up by the progress of science and technology which has not been used for military purposes. It seems logical to conclude that once they have become possible, the development and the deployment of space weapons will thereby become inevitable; but we do not share this fatalistic reasoning. Indeed, we do not share the view that the development of space weapons would be a tool or the tool for the elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, such action would rather stimulate the arms race in outer space and on Earth.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

We do not share this fatalistic outlook because our experience is in itself a reason for optimism. I am thinking of the fact that bacteriological weapons have been banned and we hope to succeed in banning chemical weapons and that most if not all States, and particularly the Soviet Union and the United States accept the idea that nuclear weapons should be banned. Why then should we not try and break the vicious circle of the arms race with all its sequel of extremely harmful consequences for peace, for growth and for development. Why should we not try to take a short cut by banning this new class of weapons -- space weapons -- before they are developed, before they jeopardize the security, indeed the very existence of each of our countries, before they swallow up vast resources which are so vitally needed today in order to carry out the transition to a new civilization, a civilization based on other technological foundations, on other consumption models, on other forms of behaviour in respect of the environment. Countries which have neither the means nor the ambition to become space Powers cannot remain indifferent to the absolutely catastrophic consequences of this new arms race. In our increasingly interdependent world, its effects will be felt by all peoples, whether large and powerful or small and weak.

The ongoing negotiations show how difficult it is to rid ourselves of chemical weapons and of nuclear weapons. Why leave our successors the difficult legacy of trying to rid themselves of these weapons which in a few decades will have turned the heavens into a real hell. It is infinitely easier, from the technical and political standpoint, to ban something that does not yet exist than something that does exist and is perceived as a threat. This is the very central idea which the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should take as the basis for its work. This also applies to the entire concept of new weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons.

As far as the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes is concerned, it is high time for us to begin to discuss this issue in practical terms, similarly to the way in which the law of the sea was discussed. A great philosopher said that mankind only poses itself problems that it is perfectly capable of resolving. This is now the case of space. The USSR and the United States are great space Powers. Other countries have or are acquiring appropriate means, whereas the great majority of countries remain outside the entire competition for space. Are we going to resign ourselves to the idea that the history of the conquest of space by mankind should pass through a period of colonial empires? No, I don't think so. The world is no longer what it was a century ago. States are aware of the stakes and of their security and economic interests as well. They are interested in the uses of space and they should have something to say on the subject as of now. In this spirit, may I reiterate Romania's proposals to prepare an international treaty on the use of space for exclusively peaceful purposes as well as the creation of an international body entrusted with ensuring the implementation of this goal. It is essential to lay all the necessary legal groundwork so that there should be absolutely no room for doubt that outer space falls within the common heritage of mankind, a heritage which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and consequently protected from any military competition. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of the Arms Race in Outer Space, whose

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

work has begun under the Chairmanship of the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese, is called upon to make an effective contribution to the achievement of this objective of undoubted importance and urgency.



(Mr. Morel, France)

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Speaking as Co-ordinator for Outer Space of the group of Western countries, I wish to reply to remarks which were directed at this group during our last plenary session on Thursday, 9 April, about the mandate and the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on our agenda item 5.

I wish at the outset to state that we do not want to prolong an argument about the word "measures", which can only have a negative influence on the quality of our substantive work, but since the Western position on the subject was described as inexplicable, I shall repeat here what you all know.

Firstly we have no objection to the consideration, in the course of our work, of proposals for measures relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Secondly, we find no difficulty with the word itself, and we have been the first to underline that it can be found more than a dozen times in the relevant part of last year's report of the Conference.

Thirdly, the Western group has agreed, on the occasion of the adoption of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1987, to confirm that, as was the case in 1986, the consideration of proposals for measures relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space was part of the work of the Committee.

Bearing this in mind, therefore, if there is to be a debate on the subject, and we hope this will not be the case, it can only concern the place to be given to such "measures" in our work. There are, on this question, perfectly explicable and legitimate differences which should, however, not prevent us from proceeding with our discussions. We do not have a common final position on the subject at the Conference. Our sole concern, as the Western group, has been to avoid prejudging the question.

(Mr. Morel, France)

As has been noted, we are indeed referring to another forum, that of the United Nations. Need I recall that the conditions in which consultations are conducted in the First Committee are different from those obtaining here? In New York there is no group which entrusts a co-ordinator with presenting a position defined by the group. There are only delegations which show goodwill and try to bring different viewpoints closer with a view to producing resolutions that enjoy the broadest possible measure of support from the international community.

It has, moreover, been suggested, in respect of the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5, that use has been made of a procedure to obstruct our work on the substance. We do not share this view; each group has submitted a draft programme of work. We do not believe that this type of comment is likely to facilitate the progress of our work, which is now based on a practical and concrete programme.

Finally, we wonder whether it is appropriate to refer here publicly to the informal exchanges which led to the drawing up of the single resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly. Likewise, is it appropriate thus to question the outstanding work of a delegation, the Italian delegation, which played a special part in the consultations leading towards this resolution.



(Mr. Chnoupek, Czechoslovakia)

We expect from the Conference much more intensive endeavours also in the sphere relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. An analysis of the legal régime pertaining to outer space is being conducted at present. In our opinion, such analysis can be useful only if it produces as soon as possible practical conclusions on measures preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. First of all, there should be a ban on anti-satellite weapons and offensive space systems. Their definition can be agreed upon at this forum. It is also possible to set up an international inspectorate that would verify that no weapons are placed on space installations, as is proposed by the Soviet Union. We are convinced that an energetic solution of those issues by the Conference would be greatly instrumental in the pursuit of the goals of star peace, which also constitutes a way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We believe that it would also enhance constructive effort to find a realistic solution to the problem of the so-called space defences, as embodied primarily in the SDI project pursued by the United States.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In order for humanity to be freed from the scourge of nuclear war, an arms race must be prevented in outer space. In one of the next meetings, my delegation will present in greater detail its position on item 5 of our agenda. Inasmuch as this issue relates to agenda item 2, I wish to say the following today: In January 1985, the USSR and the United States pledged "to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability". This pledge has become something of a generally recognized guideline and is now also reflected in various United Nations resolutions. No matter how you look upon it, the pledge rules out the deployment of arms in outer space and makes strict compliance with the ABM Treaty an absolute must. So, it is perfectly in line with the universal demand that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only and not be turned into the arena of a new round in the arms race.

The SDI, in turn, is utterly incompatible with that pledge. The "Star Wars" concept not only endangers military stability and increases the risk of war, it is also the main obstacle to agreements on a drastic reduction of nuclear arsenals and their ultimate liquidation. Those who champion that strategy resort to misleading descriptions of the nature of the SDI and to untenable allegations of activities and intentions on the other side. Still, a simple question is insistently being asked the world over: why does space have to be stuffed with weapons if the aim is to advance the process of disarmament on our planet and if the very arms against which the SDI is supposed to offer protection will be eliminated in that process? The fact is there is no convincing answer to that question, unless one admits that one's real goal consists in obtaining military superiority and threatening the other side with a nuclear first strike capability or with new types of weapons designed to be fired from space.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, certain remarks were made in the plenary on Tuesday, 14 April in what was apparently a response to the statement made by my delegation on Thursday, 9 April. The Sri Lanka delegation, unaccustomed as it is either to provoking or engaging in rights of reply in this august assembly, considers it necessary to state the following for the record.

Firstly, as regards the de facto functioning of groups in the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Sri Lanka can speak authoritatively, as a former Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to the effect that non-aligned Foreign Ministers meet annually at the beginning of every session in the United Nations and issue a communiqué providing guidance on the items of the agenda. In addition the non-aligned delegations of the First Committee meet regularly to discuss and co-ordinate their positions on the issues before the Committee.

Secondly, the process of multilateral diplomatic negotiation over resolutions in the General Assembly is not private and, especially when formal proposals are made specifically on behalf of a delegation or a group of delegations, we see no impropriety in these being mentioned relevantly in a plenary session of this Conference. There is, after all, a close interrelationship between the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and our work here.

Thirdly, no aspersion was intended, let alone uttered, by my delegation in respect of the delegation of Italy, which was one among the many delegations participating in the consultations over the General Assembly resolution on this subject in 1985 and 1986. Indeed my statement specifically referred to the delegation of Italy as having worked "long and with so much dedication" on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We reiterate our appreciation of the work of Italy on this issue.

In conclusion, may I state that the difficulties mentioned by my delegation in its statement of Thursday, 9 April which prevented the earlier start of the substantive work of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of our agenda are now behind us. My delegation does not therefore wish to be drawn into a protracted debate over the causes for this delay by a more extensive refutation of the remarks that were made on 14 April directed at my delegation.

May I, Mr. President like preceding speakers, express the pleasure of my delegation at the presence of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia in the Conference this morning, and thank him, through you, for his important statement.

(Mr. Natwar Singh, India)

Finally, another important measure which is before the Conference is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The concept of the Strategic Defence Initiative enunciated for the first time exactly four years ago envisaged the creation of an impenetrable shield that would protect an entire territory against a missile attack by destroying all the offensive nuclear weapons. Its declared merit is to reduce the risk of a nuclear war by defensive action which would render nuclear weapons ineffective. More recent appraisals of the programme, even by those who originally propounded the idea, show up such a claim as far too optimistic. Over the past two decades, every new evolution in weaponry to counter the risks from existing nuclear forces has inevitably led to a steady development of their offensive capability. An arms race in outer space will be extremely costly, and countermeasures are likely to limit any of its possible advantages. The uncertainty created by this new arms race will have a destabilizing impact.

Current debates on the issues have a distinct ring of the past. During the course of 1932, three commissions of the Disarmament Conference, meeting perhaps in a similar council chamber, spent many weeks in a vain endeavour to classify armaments as "offensive" and "defensive". Delegates of all nations displayed extraordinary ability in holding that armaments which they chiefly relied upon were defensive, while those of their potential rivals were mainly offensive. Instead of getting into such a debate again, the Conference on Disarmament should work on specific proposals to prevent outer space from becoming the cosmic dimension of the all-too-familiar terrestrial arms race.

Through the ages, man has looked up to the skies and heavens and derived inspiration and solace. But if appropriate steps are not taken soon to prohibit the new space weapon systems under development, the same skies will take on a predatory face threatening humankind with destruction. The anti-satellite and anti-ballistic-missile systems, particle beam and laser weapons and other third-generation nuclear weapons in the offing, would aggravate considerably the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust. With its high degree of automated programming, modern weaponry is only too vulnerable to the well-documented dangers of false alarms, miscalculation and other failures in man-made systems.

In the area of preventing an arms race in outer space, priority should be accorded to halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantling existing systems, prohibiting the introduction of new weapon systems in outer space and ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 ABM Treaty, are fully honoured and extended as required in the light of new technological advances.

(Mr. Natwar Singh, India)

The non-aligned and neutral countries have consistently taken the position that the development of space weapons and an arms race in outer space must be prevented. It has been acknowledged that the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes must be carried out for the benefit of and in the interest of all developing countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development. Outer space is the common heritage of all mankind. During the last 30 years, since the launching of the first satellite, there have been remarkable advances in the utilization of space for scientific activities, so far largely peaceful. Space research has expanded the horizons of science and enhanced our understanding of the fundamental mysteries of the universe. It has opened up hitherto unimaginable vistas which have the potential of transforming the conditions of life on our planet. Countries large and small, rich and poor have all benefited from space communications, space remote sensing and space meteorology in a manner unthinkable a few decades ago. These immense possibilities that are unfolding before us call for harmonizing of national interests and avoidance of any unilateral measures that could conflict with or queer the pitch for their optimum utilization.



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Now that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have been reactivated, attempts should be made to formulate measures and conclusions, and thus structure the debate. The dilemmas existing in this regard should not for the time being take the front seat, because adequate solutions could more easily be worked out at a later stage. We hold that the chairmen of these two committees, the distinguished Ambassadors Meiszter and Pugliese respectively, will, thanks to their personal qualities and diplomatic experience, see to it that substantial progress is made in these areas.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

This is an area which, if we walk away from it, the judgement of the international community will be harsh indeed. So it has been no small thing that we have agreed again to re-establish a committee on this subject. There have been disputes about its mandate, but the fundamental reality, in our view, is that this Conference must have a committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. And we have one.

We think that the committee should work in terms of certain basic realities. The first of these is that space is now widely utilized for a variety of purposes, including a considerable number of military purposes. Secondly, there is an existing legal régime to regulate activities in space. But thirdly, the situation is not static. Indeed, it is dynamic in the extreme.

It involves technological development within existing or known space systems. It involves new programmes, programmes of research such as those that are being carried out, inter alia, by both the United States and the Soviet Union. And it involves expansion of the field, including the entry into space of new States that did not previously work in or have objects in space.

The consequence of this is that we need to analyse these changes. We need to identify any gaps that now exist or may be opening up in the existing legal régime so that, on the basis of that analysis and the identification of those gaps or requirements, we can point towards improvements.

And this we certainly believe is a subject of fitting and necessary multilateral concern. For example, we can look at the question of what are the desirable or tolerated uses of satellites. We can look at the question of where new research will lead, including research that is being conducted on

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

ballistic missile defence, by both of the major space Powers. We can ask where that will lead us in terms of the régime to ensure that space remains for peaceful purposes only.

In this context, may I say that my Government places great importance on those who are conducting such research being open and honest with us about it. We know a great deal about the research programme being conducted by the United States. We sadly know too little about that being conducted by the Soviet Union. It would assist us if we were to be told more. We could also continue to work towards, to seek to ensure in this body, that the vital objective of compliance of existing agreements is maintained.

As the utilization of space expands, we can with great benefit look together at what confidence-building measures might be required and what the role of a possible satellite-monitoring agency could be. We could examine, too, the role of an enhanced system for the registration of space objects. We could look at an agreement on the protection of useful satellites.

In this context I must refer to my own Government's proposal for the protection of satellites and their associated ground stations, which contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability.

These are subjects fitting for this multilateral body, to mention just some of them.

In summary, in our view we face a clear choice. The international community must co-operate, now, on ensuring the maintenance of the peaceful uses of outer space or slide towards chaos later. And let it be clear that co-operation has a direct relationship to the other major objective, which is to ensure -- as both the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the CPSU have said -- that strategic nuclear weapons are radically reduced and ultimately eliminated. No one should doubt the clear link between that objective on Earth and the need to prevent an arms race in space.



(Mr. Hansen, United States)

The meeting in Moscow between United States and Soviet officials was less successful in dealing with strategic arms and space issues. Nevertheless, basic agreement exists that each side should reduce its strategic arms by 50 per cent. Here we are speaking again of the formula discussed at Reykjavik; that is, no more than 6,000 warheads and 1,600 launchers would be allowed. Both sides will continue to study the question of sea-launched cruise missiles. And both sides agree on the methodology for counting heavy bombers. There is also agreement that verification measures must be stringent and intrusive.

Although not much progress was made on space issues in Moscow, the United States will continue work on this subject in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva with vigour and intensity, and my Government will continue to act in compliance with the ABM Treaty during research to discover the potential of new technologies for use in a defensive system against ballistic missiles.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze, and United States Secretary of State Shultz, as you know, signed an agreement between the USSR and the United States on co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, providing for joint activities between Soviet and United States scientists in exploration of the solar system, space astronomy and astrophysics, Earth science, the physics of solar-terrestrial communications, and space biology and medicine. There was a productive and substantive comparison of views on other issues of bilateral co-operation which singled out new possibilities for its development and expansion. The visit included a discussion on issues connected with the state of affairs at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular the question of challenge inspection. The Soviet side pointed out that only a few issues are outstanding at the negotiations, and if we focus our efforts the prospects which are opening up are both real and promising.



(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

The delegation of Zaire hopes that outer space will be explored and used solely for peaceful purposes, and that the exploration and use of outer space will be conducted for the benefit of mankind as a whole. The provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space should be strictly applied. Moreover, paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of 1978 advocates new measures and international negotiations in this area. The General Assembly also called upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties.

An arms race in outer space would have incalculable consequences and would render obsolete certain international agreements prohibiting the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth or on celestial bodies. The Conference should do its utmost to conclude agreements which can be

complementary to the provisions of the 1967 Treaty relating to the exploration and use of outer space. Likewise, respect for commitments entered into by the two major nuclear Powers under the ABM Treaty would ensure greater security and increase confidence among all States on the planet.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

In the field of activity of the Conference on Disarmament, the analysis of questions related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming increasingly important.

Here we have a repetition of the situation already described, arising out of the ambivalence of space technology, which can be used either for peaceful purposes or for military purposes.

Examination of space-related issues is giving us more and more knowledge as to how to differentiate between activities that will allow us to use outer space peacefully and those activities of a military nature that are also being developed by the so-called space Powers.

Gradual steps are being taken towards listing those activities which should be banned in any disarmament agreements in order to prevent an arms race in space.

This complex task of trying to delimit the scope of activities in order to prohibit those that would lead to an arms race in space should be carried out with the utmost care, so that it will not obstruct or encroach upon the peaceful use and exploration of space for the benefit of mankind.

Moreover, the prevention of an arms race in space should not be used as an excuse to limit international co-operation or to impose unjustified embargoes on the transfer and export of equipment connected with the exploration and peaceful use of outer space.

We have heard hints about a desire to create a régime for the non-proliferation of space weapons despite the fact that this Conference on Disarmament has not as yet managed to define what a space weapon is.

We are sure that economic interests, and in particular the economic return on space exploitation, are matters that a space Power or group of Powers may legitimately wish to keep for themselves.

Nevertheless, it would not be morally justifiable to attach conditions to international co-operation on disarmament grounds when dealing with situations or space programmes that are obviously peaceful ones.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I have already presented my delegation's views with regard to the work of the Committee on Outer Space. The work has started, though some valuable time was lost. It would be premature to make any evaluations of the Committee's work at the present session. Instead, I would like to stress that my delegation is looking for more intensive and more goal-oriented efforts by the Committee during its summmer session. We hope that a new and important contribution to the work of the Conference on preventing an arms race in outer space will be provided by the Montreal workshop.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I want now to focus on some of the research undertaken in Canada which comprises the joint efforts of government, the academic community and the commercial sector. This approach is nowhere better illustrated than in the research relating to outer space. Canadian activities in this regard represent an attempt to develop and pursue an approach which is practical and innovative.

One of the major undertakings of the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs over the past several years has been to bring together teams of experts from government, universities and industry to focus on Canadian space technology and know-how in its application to the process of arms control verification. A Canadian concept, termed PAXSAT pax being -- with apologies to the Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, as he does not need to be told this -- the Latin word for peace -- PAXSAT is the term which has emerged from these investigations. This concept centres on assessing the feasibility of applying space-based remote sensing technology to the tasks of verification in the context of multilateral arms control and disarmament.

Canada's PAXSAT research has concentrated on two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to multilateral arms control verification. The first is space-to-space remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT A), dealing with verification of agreements involving space objects. The second, entailing space-to-ground remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT B), focuses on how to assist in the verification of agreements involving conventional forces. I want to discuss very briefly this somewhat distinctive Canadian concept in very general terms, outlining the context of multilateral arms control verification and some of the major assumptions underlying the Canadian PAXSAT projects.

From the outset, PAXSAT research has recognized the important technical, political and military realities and trends in addressing the outer space issue. As a result, certain themes form core elements of the PAXSAT concept and contribute to the prospects of actually realizing such a multilateral verification system. These include the following:

Firstly, there must be the prospect of a significant multilateral agreement to warrant the level of sophistication of technology and the expenditure of funds required for the actual development of such an advanced technical verification system.

Secondly, parties to such a multilateral agreement should have the option, at least, of participating in its verification procedures.

Thirdly, use of the PAXSAT system should be treaty-specific: it would be used only with respect to the agreements to which it expressly applied, as part of an overall verification process for those agreements alone.

Fourthly, the treaty being verified would establish the requisite political authority for the verification mechanism and its operation.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Fifthly, technology requirements would be met collectively by participants and would, of course, be open to all States.

Sixthly, PAXSAT should be based, to the extent possible, on existing openly available technology, without requiring major costly improvements. The technology possessed by the Canadian commercial sector was adequate to provide a base for the PAXSAT studies.

Although the PAXSAT research is not yet complete, it has reached the point where its technical feasibility can begin to be assessed, at least in tentative ways. The workshop which Canada will host in Montreal next month, which we are pleased to learn will be attended by you, Mr. President, and in which all delegations in this forum have been invited to participate, will provide an occasion for further discussion and explanation of the concept. We also plan to make a report to the CD in June following our recess.

(The President)

To find much that is positive in other items of the CD's agenda would be a rather painful and time-consuming process. Let me therefore just note that the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the commencement of its substantive work in the spring session, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese, can be considered a step in the right direction. The threat of the spread of an arms race into outer space represents a vital danger to all nations, including those who seek military superiority by conquering outer space. It is my deep conviction that the elaboration of new, specific measures which would defend outer space and exclude it from all military scenarios is urgently needed. Let us hope that the work of the Ad hoc Committee in the summer will pave the way for this widely shared view to become, as soon as possible, a consensus opinion in this Conference, which has all the necessary potentialities and credentials to negotiate the new measures required.



(The President)

I also hope that the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese, the representative of Italy, on security assurances, chaired by Ambassador von Stülpnagel, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and on radiological weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the representative of Hungary, will succeed in achieving progress in their substantive discussions of the agenda items with which they are concerned, in order to compensate for the time lost in the discussion of procedural aspects during the first part of the session.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year's deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space produced results, though modest ones. It was noted that a gradual militarization of space has been taking place for close on 25 years. It was found that the legal régime for arms limitation in outer space raises certain barriers to the arms race in that environment, but that in some crucial areas this régime is far from complete.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden welcomes the re-establishment of the Committee this year and the commencement of its substantive work. It is indeed of the utmost importance to build upon the common ground that has been created in order to achieve progress in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Undoubtedly the key to solving some of the fundamental issues involved is to be found in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic and space weapons. But the deployment of space-based strategic defence systems would also affect the security of other countries. Indirectly, as such deployments might alter the strategic relationship and thus have consequences for overall stability. Directly, because possible defence systems could, at least in theory, be provided with an additional capacity to be used against targets other than strategic weapons, in space or on Earth. For this reason, the deployment of space weapons is a source of concern for the whole international community. There is a strong case for multilateral involvement.

Another aspect of the further militarization of outer space that might constitute a direct threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Many States other than the two major nuclear Powers have developed considerable space programmes and have made large investments in peaceful space activities. It is legitimate for -- yes incumbent on -- members of the CD to address, in a substantive way, questions related to the protection of peaceful activities in outer space.

The Ad hoc Committee should explore the possibility of verifiable and legally binding instruments prohibiting ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A ban on ASAT weapons should include a prohibition on development, testing and deployment as well as use. Existing ASAT systems should be destroyed. However, in order to consider concrete measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, further work is called for. The review of the legal framework has to be completed, and the Conference must seek to define and identify the technologies and weapons systems to be addressed.

In February this year, I mentioned the possibility of setting up a group of technical experts to deal with these issues. Such a group of experts could assist, inter alia, by working out technical definitions of space weapons, specifying the relevant technologies, and addressing the technical aspects of verification.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

For three years now discussions have been going on in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. There are different views as to what has been done and what needs to be done. It is clear that the present legal régime raises some barriers to an arms race in outer space, but that in many crucial areas this régime is far from complete. Hence, on the one hand, existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, must be strictly adhered to. On the other hand, the work of the Ad hoc Committee must be broadened and deepened with a view to considering specific measures and undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.



(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the CD since 1982. It has been identified by the General Assembly as a priority item. However, the discussions which have been held in the plenary, and since 1985 in the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, have been largely confined to an academic discussion of some of the issues which this problem raises. This is so largely because of the inadequacy of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, which does not permit it to embark upon the practical work of negotiating an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in this zone. As long as a suitable mandate which would enable the Committee to exercise its negotiating responsibility is denied to it, the prospects of making meaningful progress will remain limited. The Pakistan delegation therefore regrets that the efforts made by the Group of 21 at the beginning of the session to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee were not fruitful because of the inflexible position taken by one group. My delegation is, however, prepared to work constructively and make its modest contribution to the consideration of this issue in this Committee under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Mankind today stands at the threshold of an important turning-point. Outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, is today being used extensively for military purposes. The majority of the space objects now in orbit serve military functions. There is a growing threat of the emergence of active space weapons and of ASAT and ABM weapons. Unless effective measures are taken to avert this danger, outer space will become yet another area of military competition and confrontation, severely restricting its use for peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries.

Competition in the military uses of outer space would have grave consequences. It would exacerbate the current state of instability inherent in the deployment of global nuclear arsenals, give the arms race a qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing disarmament agreements and jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole.

The imminent threat of "weaponization" of outer space which faces us today underscores the urgency of initiating negotiations in the Conference. While it is relatively easy to stop the development of a weapon in its initial stage or before it is actually tested and deployed, it becomes much more difficult to prohibit after its production and deployment. The Conference must not therefore delay shouldering its important responsibility in this area; otherwise it may soon be too late to reverse this dangerous trend.

It is sometimes pointed out that the question of an arms race in outer space is best left to the two super-Powers, which are already engaged in talks on the subject in Geneva. My delegation finds this argument unconvincing. While we are prepared to admit that, by reason of their actual or potential military capabilities, the two super-Powers, which are also the two principal space Powers, have a special responsibility in this connection, questions relating to outer space are no longer today of concern only to them but equally to other members of the international community. Bilateral talks therefore do not diminish the need for multilateral negotations. Only multilateral negotiations in the Conference can fully protect the rights of the international community. The super-Powers also have a responsibility to keep this Conference, and through it the General Assembly, informed of the progress of their talks.

The current legal régime regarding outer space is clearly inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The rapid technological developments which have been taking place in the area of outer space have revealed serious deficiencies and loopholes in existing agreements. There is no agreement on such basic terms as "peaceful purposes" or "militarization". Agreements currently in force leave considerable room for various military activities, including deployment of a wide range of weapons, in particular ASAT weapons. Further developments in space technology could erode the existing space law and make it completely irrelevant.

The goal that we must set for ourselves is the complete prohibition of all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space such as ASAT systems, weapons which interfere in the functioning of space objects, and space-based ABM systems. Such a ban must also provide for effective verification provisions, including on-site inspection. Pending the

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

achievement of a comprehensive ban on space weapons, certain interim or partial measures could also be profitably negotiated. Priority in this regard could be given to the questions of a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons, and the immunity of space objects.

The United States-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972 imposes important though limited restrictions on the development of space-based ABM systems. There have recently been disquieting reports that the restraints imposed by this agreement may be weakened. Such a development would be fraught with extremely serious consequences. Without these restraints, there would be an unrestrained arms race in both offensive and defensive systems. We therefore call upon the two parties to adhere strictly to its terms. Pakistan's proposal last year for an international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty was made with the objective of strengthening the restraints contained in this treaty and making them applicable to all technologically advanced States.

There are some who maintain that the functions performed by many satellites have a stabilizing effect as they contribute to crisis management, early warning, communication and the verification of arms control agreements. My delegation does not wish to quarrel with this argument, except to point out that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has also been used in support of military operations. However, if the functions performed by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are as benign as they are sometimes made out to be, one may well ask why this capability should remain the monopoly of the space Powers. Should we not entrust surveillance and reconnaissance activities by satellites to an international agency in order to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements? In this context, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency deserves serious consideration. Such a multilateral verification capability could supplement and support bilateral arrangements and national technical means of verification.

The Registration Convention of 1974 provides a useful instrument as a confidence-building measure. The present system of declarations could be strengthened and, if properly implemented, could give greater transparency to outer space activities. So far the space Powers have not described the military functions of their satellites, although it is a well-known fact that most of these are performing such functions. The Review Conference of the Registration Convention which is to be held in 1989 could provide a useful opportunity for strengthening this Convention.

Mr. President, I will now turn to the last item on which I would like to express the views of my delegation, namely the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament did some useful work during the spring part of the session under the dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles, but was unable to complete its work in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/421. While we recognize the complexity of some of the remaining issues, we do not think it is impossible to resolve them if the necessary good will and flexibility is demonstrated by all sides, especially some nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, this spirit does not seem to be much in evidence on the part of some of the delegations which have begun to question parts of the Programme earlier agreed upon by consensus and to reopen issues which appeared to have

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you Mr. President. It is a source of special pleasure for me to take the floor in a meeting during the month in which you are presiding over the proceedings of the Conference. We are all aware that you have thorough knowledge of the subjects which we are here to analyse. We are also fully aware of your impartiality, and, what is more infrequent, that you have faith in the task which we have to discharge. You may be assured, Sir, in carrying out your important functions, of the unreserved co-operation of the delegation of Mexico.

On 22 May 1984 the leaders of six States from different parts of the globe issued a joint statement in which, after noting that their countries differed in religion, culture and political systems, they underlined that they were united in "the conviction that there must not be another world war", adding that

> "on this, the most crucial of all issues, we have resolved to make a common effort in the interests of peace. Agreements which merely regulate an arms build-up are clearly insufficient. The probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and the weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global suicide must be stopped and then reversed."

Two of these leaders, the heads of Government of India, Indira Gandhi, and Sweden, Olof Palme, were to fall victim to assassins' bullets, the first in 1984 and the second in 1986, and be replaced by those who are currently discharging the functions of prime ministers in their respective countries. The six heads of State or Government -- Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, who just a few days ago made an outstanding statement to this very Conference; Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece; Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India; Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico; Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden; and Julius Nyerere, First President of Tanzania -- who have frequently reiterated the appeal made in 1984 not to jeopardize the chance of initiating a process of nuclear disarmament, and who held a second summit meeting in my country last August (you will recall that the first took place in New Delhi in 1985), wished to commemorate the third anniversary of the appeal to which I have just referred.

Accordingly, on 22 May this year they issued a joint statement in which, after noting that they welcomed the resumption of the dialogue on nuclear and space issues between the two super-Powers, as well as the fact that, at the summit meeting held in this city of Geneva in November 1985, between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", they highlighted the importance of

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

the immediate adoption of a number of specific nuclear disarmament measures for which, as was seen in Reykjavik, only political will is required. In this connection I can do no better than quote three of the paragraphs of the joint statement, the full text of which has been distributed today with the symbol CD/758. These paragraphs read as follows:

"Disarmament negotiations are now at a crucial point. There is a real possibility for an agreement in at least one important area. A breakthrough on the issue of nuclear arms in Europe appears to be within reach.

"An agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from Europe would be of considerable significance and would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold, since, for the first time, it would lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of fully operational nuclear weapon systems. We, therefore, urge the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their current negotiations with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion during 1987.

"However, an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces would be only the first step towards our common goal: the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. In the Delhi and Mexico Declarations, we had called for two important measures -- a halting of all nuclear testing and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We reiterate the crucial importance of these measures."

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

To justify our fears one need only mention the astronomical sums, amounting to several thousand billion dollars each year, being spent on the manufacture, development, stockpiling or acquisition of weapons, particularly in the nuclear field. And as if existing arsenals were not sufficient to destroy our planet several times over, their proliferation, vertical and horizontal, is continuing imperturbably, together with their upgrading and refinement. Indeed, the constant progress in strategy as well as in technology has led to a new generation of nuclear weapons which are indecently called "clean", since they cause the deaths of human beings without damaging the environment. But of equal seriousness is the fact that at the beginning of this decade, the unrestrained arms race shifted into outer space, which for us is a matter of grave concern. The militarization of space increases the dangers weighing on our planet and undermines the efforts of the international community, which aspires to make outer space a res communis.

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With the conquest of outer space, which has opened up new horizons for mankind, the arms race has taken on an even more dangerous dimension. While this advance has greatly increased man's potential in the area of cartography, weather forecasts, remote sensing of natural resources and also verification of the implementation of disasrmament agreements, it also offers considerable military possibilities.

Thus the great Powers have been quick to take advantage of these possibilities by using space for military purposes -- surveillance, early warning or rapid communication. However, the progress of science and technology, as well as the striving for military supremacy, quickly gave rise to more dangerous military activities in space. Thus, since the end of the 1970s we have been following with profound concern the military activities of the great Powers which are aimed at setting up an operational system capable of destroying satellites in certain orbits.

Worse -- according to scientific and political circles, these Powers are planning for the near future other military uses of space which would be even more threatening for our planet. It is no secret that new systems of anti-missile missiles are already at a very advanced state of design. These space weapons, which no longer deserve to be called weapons of the future are the product of a new space technology. Thus, space offers a further confirmation of the theory of the arms race spiral, whereby the development of space weapons prompts new refinements of anti-satellite weapons.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

In the face of these activities in space, we cannot but acknowledge that the existing array of international instruments, particularly the 1967 outer space treaty, the 1979 agreement governing the activities of States on the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the ABM Treaty of 1972, have not been able to prevent the militarization of space. This is why we share the conviction of the General Assembly in its resolution 41/53 that "further measures are urgently needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

We are pleased that the United States and the Soviet Union are working to this end in their negotiations in Geneva. We express the fervent hope that their efforts, as well as the efforts of the Conference, which is also actively involved in this area through its ad hoc committee under the competent chairmanship of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese of Italy, will be crowned with success.

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It is also a pleasure for me to express my Government's gratitude to the Canadian Government for the workshop on outer space organized in Montreal last May. This workshop was devoted to one of the items on the Conference's agenda to which we attach paramount importance. It is our hope that the workshop will contribute to the implementation of the mandate entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. I should like to inform the Conference that my delegation intends to take the floor at the next meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, on Tuesday 30 June, on item 2 of its agenda, namely legal issues. With the assistance of experts in space questions who have come from Paris on this occasion, we should like to deal more specifically with questions of definition and terminology which, as the Conference knows, have occupied the attention of our Committee for several years.

In specifically tackling terminological and lexicological problems in the area of space matters and considering the technical constraints related thereto, we wish to derive some pointers regarding useful methods for all matters related to the definition of activities in space. In our view, one may conclude that, rather than proceeding from categories defined a priori, in a theoretical, abstract manner, we should follow a pragmatic approach on the basis of actual data which we know are continuously changing. I might add that on this occasion we shall be pleased to provide each delegation with a copy of a dictionary of space studies which has recently been published by the French National Centre for Space Studies.

(The President)

With regard to the other items of the agenda where the Conference has established subsidiary bodies, I am sure that progress is being made by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. Concerning the finalization of the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) for submission to the resumed forty-first session of the General Assembly, I hope that what has been achieved so far will be preserved and enhanced under the capable and dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, chaired by Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, chaired by Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, chaired by Ambassador Meiszter, the representative of Hungary, will, I hope, succeed in their specially difficult task of harmonizing the various positions.

That concludes my statement.

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

Turning to the realm of outer space, it is undeniably true that space holds out great promises of scientific co-operation and achievements for the benefit of all mankind. The world community should take care that military competititon and destabilizing military activities will not take their place as prime characteristics of this vast expanse surrounding our globe. Various military functions in outer space are of a stabilizing nature, like satellites for observation, early warning and also, in many respects, those for communication. A call for the demilitarization of outer space, as sometimes heard, is therefore, in my view, not only politically unrealistic but, in fact, also damaging to stability.

The question of military developments in outer space is often associated with research by the United States, and the Soviet Union too, with regard to ballistic missile defence. Allow me two remarks on this. The first is that the whole matter relates as much to Earth as to space. In fact the only operational missile defence at this moment is ground-based. My second remark is that the issue of defensive systems cannot be seen in isolation from the so-called offensive systems. We have been witnessing some destabilizing first-strike tendencies in this field over the past decade. We attach great importance to an approach which seeks to counter such developments as part of the 50 per cent cuts, in conjunction with an extension of the period required for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

I have referred to the stabilizing nature of many satellites. Of course, this is not the case for all satellites: in particular, some of those in low orbit can be used for targeting. Banning all anti-satellite weapons would therefore pose serious problems. Moreover, it would hardly seem feasible because there are so many ways to destroy a satellite. But maybe it is not too late to seek some way of protecting satellites in high orbit, which are generally of a stabilizing nature. At a time when more countries are gradually acquiring satellites, at least for civilian purposes, this is becoming an issue for which a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament clearly has a role to play in addition to ongoing bilateral efforts.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Allow me at the very beginning of my statement to express my thanks to the Government of Canada for organizing an outer space workshop in Montreal in May. As a participant in that workshop, I would like to stress that it was a lively and very useful gathering which again drew attention to the necessity to prevent an arms race in outer space, to achieve relevant agreements and to ensure their effective verification. Especially as far as verification is concerned, the workshop proved that there are ways to explore how it could be done. New ideas were brought out and the exchange of views was sincere and valuable. Our thanks and appreciation go also to Ambassador Beesley of Canada, who was the master-mind of the workshop and served as leader of our deliberations there with the famous Beesley approach, his skill at getting everyone to speak his mind openly.

In fact, it is my intention to start my statement today with the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Czechoslovakia's approach to the military aspects of activities in outer space proceeds from the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was published after the Berlin meeting of its Political Consultative Committee on 28 and 29 May 1987. This military doctrine is strictly defensive in nature. In full conformity with this defensive nature, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty calls simultaneously for the gradual reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

That goal, on which there seems to be general consensus, is becoming more urgent with each passing day, more acute with each specific step towards the direct militarization of outer space. But the consensus is still not quite general, since some States continue to act in accordance with the words of former United States President L.B. Johnson "A State with clear superiority in space science and technology will have enormous superiority at the politico-military negotiations over the States without results in that field."

Realizing that outer space is now widely used for communication, navigation, observation and early warning activities, we nevertheless consider that there is one important circumstance which makes it possible to prevent outer space from being completely militarized in the true sense of the word. I mean the fact that to date, 30 years after the first man-made satellite was launched into outer space, no weapons have been placed in orbit. No matter whether it is a result of the existing treaties concerning outer space, or an effect of the insufficient stage of development of the relevant military technology, this state of affairs is highly favourable and worth preserving.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We maintain that all basic categories of weapons should be prevented from being developed and deployed: weapons hitting targets in space from the Earth, space-to-space weapons and those we are most interested in, space-to-Earth weapons. As a relatively small country, we cannot afford an effective defence against attack from above. But not only small or medium-sized countries have this problem. Even large countries with huge military potentials cannot create a reliable defence against attack coming from outer space above their territory. Thus, the permanent deployment of weapons in outer space would represent, for all countries without distinction, a permanent and highly destabilizing threat.

We recognize today the two tendencies which represent a clear and mutually connected threat in this regard: on the one hand, an effort to introduce weapons into outer space under the guise of a defensive shield and, on the other, continued efforts to develop and deploy anti-satellite weapons. Both of these activities should be prohibited, since even if only one of them is continuing, there will be enough room for developments in both. Anti-ballistic and anti-satellite systems would have many common features. The aim of both these types of system is to act against objects moving through space. From the technical point of view, both types of system have a number of elements which fulfil identical or similar functions. Anti-satellite weapons will thus have certain anti-missile capacities, and vice versa. This applies, for instance, to objects armed with sufficiently strong lasers. Such objects could be used for attacks against satellites as well as against missiles. The fast development of sensors is another field which is common to anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons. The dual-use possibilities are also apparent in the case of radar systems used for detecting and tracking missiles and artificial Earth satellites. It may safely be presumed that with the intensified development of SDI, efforts aimed at integrating military functions in one space object will necessarily lead to an increase in such dual-use elements. One might conclude that today anti-satellite and anti-missile activities and their prohibition can hardly be considered in complete separation.

In this connection, we highly appreciate the Soviet moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons which has been in force since August 1983. A certain moderation in this regard has also been imposed on the United States Government by the United States Congress. But the United States Administration seems to be unhappy with this moderation, and recently we have been witnessing efforts to resume ASAT testing. It would be deplorable if the testing resumed and a promising period of calm at ASAT proving-grounds was brought to an end.

As the United States SDI programme advances, there is clearly an uncomfortable obstacle in its way, which is the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty of 1972. We are being offered a so-called "broad interpretation" of the Treaty, which in fact means its liquidation. Just a couple of days ago we marked the fifteenth anniversary of the conclusion of that Treaty, and it was a good opportunity to ponder its significance. Had it not been concluded 15 years ago, the development of anti-ballistic systems would have continued unabated. And it seems quite probable that by now, anti-missile weapons, able

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

to strike not only missiles but a whole panoply of targets, would have been deployed in outer space. The ABM Treaty, which prevented all this, certainly deserves better treatment than its dissolution through a "broad interpretation".

Much has been said and written about the destabilizing consequences of the deployment of weapons -- irrespective of whether we label them defensive or offensive -- in outer space. Any measure will lead to a countermeasure, all advantages gained through the introduction of certain weapons will be nullified by the other side, and not necessarily by the deployment of the same weapons. We presume that all countries actively involved in outer space are clearly aware of the inevitability of this process of action and reaction. It is confirmed for instance by the fact that the United States is intensively increasing the resistance of its space systems against the effects of laser weapons, electronic jamming, electromagnetic impulses created by nuclear explosions, etc. The spiral of the arms race in outer space would continue steadily, as it did on Earth, and no country would ever be in a position to achieve decisive and permanent superiority. Besides, even the most rosy and rather illusory theories about the effectiveness of a multilayer anti-missile defence admit that the penetration rate will amount to at least 0.4 per cent, which, with today's arsenals, represents a huge destructive potential. It would inflict immense damage, especially on civilian populations, and no responsible Government should gamble with such numbers or engage in a course of action that would increase the probability of "testing" defensive shields in practice -- especially not in the hope that after the first nuclear strike the retaliation will be bearable.

It will be very important to evolve appropriate methods of verification which will ensure that outer space is not being used for aggressive military ends. The Montreal workshop I mentioned a while ago dealt with one of the possible approaches, that is verification through satellites. Another possible approach -- inspection of objects launched into outer space -- is reflected in the proposal advanced by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuli Vorontsov, at the beginning of our spring session. It is our feeling that a combination of the two approaches, that is verification "from below and from above" might lead to the establishment of an effective and viable verification system for outer space. Much still has to be discussed, especially how practically to combine the use of national satellites with their possible international use for verification purposes. My delegation would be only too happy if the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space could also discuss these important problems.

We are following with keen interest the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. We find it encouraging that progress has been achieved at these negotiations and there are now real prospects for most dangerous nuclear weapons to be eliminated from Europe. The conclusion of agreements on these matters and their subsequent implementation would undoubtedly be facilitated if the nuclear Powers confirmed their readiness to eliminate the nuclear threat, starting with a halt to the further qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear arsenals. An important step in this direction would be the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Today, I would like to address the question of outer space. While Japan has been improving space technology for peaceful purposes, it has always maintained the view that we should examine thoroughly the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We share the common wish that outer space, the last frontier for mankind, should not become the means or arena of armed conflicts. This wish is expressed in the United Nations General Assembly's resolution 1884 (XVIII), in which the Assembly "solemnly calls upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner".

To date, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have possessed by far the largest share of the technical ability to make practical use of outer space, for example, in communicating via electro-magnetic waves transmitted outside the atmosphere and in transporting various hardware or at times men into outer space. In this context, my delegation welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged since 1985 here in Geneva in comprehensive bilateral arms control negotiations, including negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, my delegation especially appreciates the resolution, with the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee at the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1985, of the problem, which had been pending since 1982, of a subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the Ad hoc Committee last year we examined a wide range of substantial issues and, above all, exchanged concrete views on the legal issues, including the question of definitions.

I would like to make a few remarks on the relationship between the United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks and the discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation holds the general view that there is an organic interrelationship between the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations and the multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Given also the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union play a predominant part in current space activities, the progress of their bilateral negotiations has a

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

critical impact on our discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan therefore urges both the United States and the Soviet Union to make yet further efforts for early progress in their negotiations. At the same time, outer space is open to all and is not a possession of any country. An arms race in outer space would directly affect the security not just of the two Powers but of all other countries in the world as well. We cannot afford to be indifferent to this important issue. In view also of the rapid progress in space development recently made by countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, we should proceed with our work in the Conference on Disarmament to examine fully what kind of multilateral agreements would be useful.

What concrete approach should we take in the Conference on Disarmament to the question of that prevention of an arms race in outer space? Arms control and disarmament have a direct and important bearing on the security of each country. My delegation's approach to the work of the Conference on Disarmament is therefore based on the recognition that our disarmament objectives should be realized in a manner which will ensure and enhance the security of each country. We feel that we should work towards effective and realizable goals, instead of preoccupying ourselves with political declarations. This is how we should approach the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space as well.

First, we need to know fully and objectively how outer space is actually being used. For example, early-warning satellites no doubt have military functions, but they may also play a useful role in preserving strategic stability. On the other hand, meteorological satellites collect meteorological data over vast areas of the earth and serve important non-military purposes -- in agriculture, fisheries and transport -- but they may also be used for a military purpose. These factors need to be seen in perspective.

We should endeavour to find what measures would eventually best ensure our security in consideration of these many aspects. It would not be in consonance with reality to take, without delving into such issues, a sweeping, generalized approach in the name of the non-militarization or the prevention of the militarization of outer space. To do so would not ensure our security. Instead, the approach we should take is to intensify our efforts to gain an accurate grasp of exactly how outer space is being used in many areas. It is only on the basis of a solid grasp of the facts that we can formulate an objective judgement as to what kinds of activities in outer space may endanger international peace and security. We may then proceed to consider what measures may be mutually acceptable, effective and realizable on a multilateral basis.

Based on the concept of our approach that I have just described, I would like to make some observations on the main issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Mutual trust among States is a key element in arms control and disarmament efforts. This applies in outer space as well. To strengthen mutual trust, it is indispensable that all States should adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the principles of international law concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also necessary to free disarmament discussions from political propaganda.

The necessity for objective information for confidence-building among States is set out in the first operative paragraph of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 B, in which the Assembly "reaffirms its conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to building of confidence among States on a global, regional, or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements". It goes without saying that our deliberation on the basis of objective information is a prerequisite for fruitful results. Above all, the United States and the Soviet Union, the leading States in space developments, have a very important role to play in providing information. We note in this context that the substantive information provided thus far by the Soviet Union is, in our view, far from sufficient. It is hoped that this situation will be remedied.

The proposal to formulate a code of conduct as one of the confidence-building measures touches on the fundamental issue of how we go about regulating or controlling the activities of States in outer space, which is singularly different from the Earth. It would entail highly complex problems to try to apply an order or rules based on the relationships among States on the Earth to activities outside the atmosphere or even beyond the solar system, where physical conditions are quite different from those on the Earth. We need to proceed carefully and thoughtfully in examining the adequacy or limits of such application in the context of reviewing the international laws on arms control and disarmament in outer space.

In connection with the necessity for objective information, the deliberations on the expansion or strengthening of the reporting requirement under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space are of considerable significance. My delegation supports the basic idea behind such a proposal. As is clear from General Assembly resolution 1721 B (XVI), entitled "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space", article IV of the Convention was drawn up on the basis of the understanding that the independent judgement of each country should be respected and taking into account how information was actually provided by the countries concerned in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.

The items listed for obligatory reporting under article IV are therefore limited to the minimum necessary for the identification of space objects. It is true that such a registration régime based on the Convention is not necessarily complete, but on the whole it has probably been effective with respect to the peaceful use of outer space. My delegation believes it necessary for us to examine fully from various aspects whether this proposal

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

would lead to concrete and pragmatic measures of arms control and disarmament. There seem to be many difficult problems involved, especially as regards the acceptability of the obligation to report military information, which relates to the problem of verification.

I would like to touch upon the protection of space objects and their activities. As the number of States that participate in space development increases and their activities become more sophisticated and diversified in the future, the need to protect space objects and their activities will become more urgent. Up to now, Japan has launched 36 satellites for such purposes as experimental launching, weather forecasting, communications and broadcasting. We are planning to launch about 10 more satellites by 1990. Japan thus has a keen interest in this issue of satellite protection. My delegation believes that space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected.

In this context, it is highly significant that a proposal has been made to grant immunity to satellites in order to exempt them from attack. If the purport of this proposal lies in non-interference with those satellites which play an important role as NTM (national technical means) of verification, it will contribute to greater stability between the East and the West, and my delegation can support it. However, we should be very careful to make sure that satellite immunity would not in fact protect some activities which might endanger the outer space activities of other States. Much will need to be done to determine what satellites should be granted immunity. At this point, we should pay special attention to the fact that the purpose of protecting satellites cannot be achieved solely by concluding a declaratory international convention on the non-use of force.

Finally, I would like to touch upon a few basic legal issues which are under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

In reviewing the international law related to arms control and disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon? Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures as may be called for.

As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

celestial bodies to representatives of other States parties on a basis of reciprocity. However, as I said earlier, the information to be provided under the Convention on Registration is limited. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty, which was one of the key provisions seriously discussed in negotiating the Treaty, stipulates for nothing with respect to outer space other than celestial bodies. Therefore, those provisions are of only limited relevance in relation to verification. We need to see if these limited provisions are adequate to cope with the verification needs that arise from current space activities.

There have been truly remarkable developments in space technology compared to 1967 when the Outer Space Treaty was concluded. A large-scale space tracking radar can provide crucial information and a satellite in itself can apparently play an important role as a means of verification. Based on these changes in circumstances, it would be useful to examine what kind of technical verification means would be applicable to a multilateral verification system. Conversely, if we can identify available verification means, we may also be able to go on to see what kind of prohibiting provisions can be agreed on multilaterally.

One important proposal in this regard relates to the establishment of an ISMA (international satellite monitoring agency). There will be a number of legal, financial, and technical problems to be resolved on this proposal. However, my delegation shares the hope that such a proposal can contribute towards the solution of the verification issues, and it is keenly interested in seeing how the proposal is dealt with and developed in the future.

I have tried to set forth briefly the views of my delegation on the issues before us. As a country devoted to technological development for the peaceful use of outer space, we wish to continue to contribute to the deliberations in the CD on developing a sharper focus on verification and other problems, bearing in mind the technologies available to us.

I am hopeful that we will make substantial progress in our considerations this year under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government of Canada for organizing a very useful workshop on outer space in Montreal in May. As a participant, I would like to say how grateful I was to Ambassador Beesley for his personal attention to us.

Ever since the seventh century, the star festival has been observed all over Japan in July, that is today. The festival owes its origin to the old Chinese legend that the star Vega (the Weaver), who is separated by the Galaxy from the star Altair, her lover, is allowed to meet him only once a year, on this evening. The children make their wishes, while looking up at shooting stars. Let us keep our sky ever beautiful and romantic.

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

Turning to the Strategic Defence Initiative, I confirm our welcome that the Soviet Union has dropped its earlier linkage between Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The United Kingdom continues to see the United States SDI programme as prudent. Mrs. Thatcher agreed with President Reagan at Camp David in November 1986 that there was a need to press ahead with the SDI research programme, which is permitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But it is just that, a research programme. And it matches the Soviet Union's activities in this field over many years.

(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

On the threshold of the third millennium, we are faced with options for the future: the survival of mankind or its destruction. And the answer is not simple. To our dissatisfaction, a tense and complicated international situation still prevails. In their continued search for military superiority, some forces are accelerating the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, attempting to spread it to outer space. While it needs only one per cent of the existing nuclear arsenals to make our Earth a dead and frozen planet forever, more nuclear weapons and various other types of weapons of mass destruction are being stockpiled. With the very high pace of development of military technology, it is leaving less and less time for peoples, States and politicians to become aware of the real danger and the limits of mankind's possibilities for stopping the slide towards the nuclear abyss. The choice for the future, therefore, must be made boldly and responsibly by all States together, regardless of their social systems and levels of economic development. The time has come for us all to make jointly the greatest possible efforts towards ridding the world of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

...

Facing the serious challenges constituted by the continued nuclear arms race, an ever broader and stronger movement is developing the world over for peace, against nuclear war and against the militarization of outer space. A clear expression of this may be found in the Mexico Declaration of the leaders of the six countries representing four continents, in the Political Declaration of the Eighth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and in the New Delhi Joint Statement by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of India on a nuclear-free world with non-violence in international relations. The trend towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones developing in many parts of our globe such as South East Asia, Africa, Northern Europe, Central Europe and the Balkans displays the desire and determination of the majority of countries to strive for a nuclear-free world.

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

I should now like to devote a brief comment to agenda item 5, the prevention of the arms race in outer space. In an agreement recently approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Parliament, it is declared that Spain advocates disarmament measures which, while preserving the necessary levels of security and stability, will reverse the arms race on Earth and prevent its extension into outer space. I am not going to discuss the question whether there are armaments deployed in outer space or not, but we do believe that there is no doubt that outer space is already being used for military purposes. In many cases, this utilization, even though it is military, has stabilizing, and hence advantageous consequences. However, we are also convinced that the legal rules applicable in outer space are inadequate to guarantee that space weapons will not be installed there.

My Government has grave doubts that new systems of weapons, whether space- or Earth-based, that are designed to destroy space objects can contribute to creating greater stability or security. Much the opposite, we believe that such systems of armaments would inevitably initiate a new race, this time in space, with the consequential weakening of strategic stability. This, of course, a question where the main responsibility devolves on the two major military Powers. Spain has already expressed in other fora, and I reiterate it here, its support for the view that these two countries should comply with the ABM Treaty in the terms in which it has been interpreted so far, and that any other interpretation must be agreed by the contracting parties and be without detriment to strategic stability and security. Consequently, we are in principle opposed to any deployment of strategic defences, be they based in space or on Earth, without an agreement in this connection and without taking account of European interests.

Given the inadequacy of the existing legal order, which only specifically prohibits the deployment in space or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, we are concerned first and foremost about the development of anti-satellite weapons and we are pleased that the United States Congress has not authorized testing of this type of weapon against real targets, and that Soviet testing in this regard has ceased. In this situation, we think that an agreement should be possible and that it is necessary to study the possible machinery for the verification of compliance with that agreement, a subject of whose difficulties we are not unaware.

We are pleased that an Ad hoc Committee has been re-established which is to complete the consideration of the diverse and difficult problems linked to the necessity of preventing an arms race in outer space. Likewise, we are pleased at the resumption of work on agenda item 6 and we have taken note with great interest of document CD/768 submitted by the distinguished delegation of Nigeria, which we believe offers an excellent basis for the discussion of the assurances that States not possessing nuclear weapons ought to obtain against the use or the threat of use of these weapons.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina)

The Argentine delegation has put its name on the list for today's plenary meeting in order to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad hoc Committee is doing the job it was mandated to do. Its deliberations are moving ahead gradually under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese, whose competence in the field is certainly up to the measure of the antecedents of Italy, a country that has been a forerunner in studies and research aimed at establishing a régime for the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. The Ad hoc Committee has already completed deliberations on the first and second items of its programme of work, which, as we know, concern respectively issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race and the legal régime established in the area of disarmament by the treaties in force.

One of the issues of greatest interest which emerged in dealing with the first item was that of determining whether outer space is currently free from the deployment of weapons. The space Powers, which are few in number, have not provided a clear-cut reply, declaring, for instance, that they have not deployed weapons permanently in outer space. We believe that the international community would be truly relieved to hear that so far there are no weapons deployed in outer space. In our view, the means to be used to inform public opinion of that situation, that is, that no weapons have been placed permanently in outer space could well be the report that the Conference on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly. It would be sufficient in that respect for the Ad hoc Committee to include a paragraph stating that none of the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament has permanently deployed weapons in outer space. That assertion avoids the complex issue of defining what a space weapon is, since what is sought is a simple statement to the effect that the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament have not deployed weapons of any nature or kind. It is simply a matter of asserting that there have been no weapons deployed. It would then be enough, as we have said, for such an assertion to appear in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that none of the States

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

members of the Conference on Disarmament will refuse to include such a paragraph. A declaration to that end could well constitute the point of departure for more specific and binding initiatives in future with appropriate verification measures.

In dealing with item 2 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee, which concerns the legal disarmament régime which has been established in the sphere of disarmament by the multilateral treaties in force, we had occasion to witness an interesting exchange of views that has, in our opinion, clarified several aspects of the matter. Firstly, it is an accepted fact that this legal régime establishes that celestial bodies can be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and that, moreover, that régime excludes the military use of celestial bodies as well as the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and also of other weapons which are neither nuclear nor weapons of mass destruction. As regards outer space, it is accepted that it cannot be the subject of testing or deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It is also accepted that it is not permitted to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit. Regrettably, there is no agreement on the multilateral legal régime governing outer space with respect to the testing and deployment of weapons that are neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass destruction.

We must say that it worries us to hear from time to time that the legal régime for outer space should draw on that for the high seas. We believe, on the contrary, that this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament which has as its purpose the prevention of an arms race in outer space corresponds to a basic goal, which is to avoid the legal régime for outer space resembling in any way the régime for the high seas. We believe that, were we to establish a régime for outer space similar to that for the high seas, we would have failed completely in our aim of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is enough to observe the situation obtaining on seas and oceans permanently criss-crossed by military fleets equipped with all types of weapons to conclude that there could be no more deplorable picture of outer space than to conceive of it traversed by space objects of an offensive and defensive military nature such as those that travel the high seas. The phenomenon that characterizes the navel arms race must not be reproduced in space.

The Ad hoc Committee has now begun its deliberations on the third item on its programme of work, which concerns proposals and future initiatives for preventing an arms race in outer space. It is obvious that, to prevent an arms race in outer space, the first measure that must be taken is to avoid the deployment of weapons, and that requires both a binding commitment in that sense and the adoption of verification systems that will ensure compliance with that commitment. The Conference on Disarmament is giving proof within the context of other items that it is possible to draw up complex verification procedures when there is the political will necessary to reconcile the goals of disarmament with those of national security and industrial and commercial secrecy. Why should it not be possible to establish a binding régime for the registration of objects launched into space? That is very simple to do given political will. Regrettably, the space Powers wish to reserve a wide measure of freedom of action for themselves in the military use of outer space and

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

prefer to keep secret the nature of the vast majority of objects that they launch into space. It is then inevitable that the secrecy of the activity of some should generate a similar attitude in others.

The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides an appropriate basis of rules that can be perfected, first of all, by establishing their binding nature and then by incorporating in them verification clauses enabling it to be checked that the information recorded is reliable. The efficient operation of a register of objects launched into space and a corresponding verification system would solve a series of problems relating to the immunity of satellites intended for peaceful use, since it would be possible, as a result, to ascertain the purpose of a space object and, consequently, its right to enjoy immunity. Similar arrangements could be made for the registration of those satellites which have special functions, such as observation satellites, early-warning satellites, satellites for the purpose of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, etc.

There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/152/O relating to verification, a resolution supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked out.

But we cannot help feeling surprised at the fact that the analysis of the item relating to verification within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has not been the subject of greater attention despite the fact that activity in outer space originates here on the Earth's surface in a very limited number of places. The space Powers, which are few in number, also have only a few places for launching objects into space. Verification of the nature of the objects that are placed in space could be effected at the launch sites themselves and that would entirely dispel all doubts as to the military or peaceful nature of an object sent into space. It is obvious that the implementation of monitoring and verification machinery at the bases for the launching of vehicles with cargoes of a military and strategic nature would be resisted by the respective space Powers. It can be deduced therefore that the opening of such sites for the verification, albeit only visual, of loads to be placed in orbit would require a political decision by the space Powers, aimed at achieving a certain transparency in their policy for the use of outer space. To sum up and to conclude this statement, it just remains for me to point out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space depends solely on simple acts of political will by the space Powers.

Mr. TEJA (India)

I would like to devote my statement today to the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space. This new chapter in the unending race for nuclear superiority is not only the most expensive but also potentially the most threatening to the cause of disarmament as we see it. In the Conference on Disarmament, we have a mandate to negotiate and while it is unfortunate that we have been prevented from doing so in the critical area of the nuclear arms race, it would be doubly unfortunate if we did nothing to prevent this new threat that looms over the planet.

We are aware of the diplomatic skills with which Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during 1986, addressed himself to his tasks. We are confident that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy we will be able to register substantial progress on this item during 1987.

Since 1983, there has been rapid progress in the development of anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defence systems. Yet in our Conference, there is unfortunately little progress and the Conference seems bogged down in peripheral issues. What lends urgency to our plea for negotiations on this question is our apprehension that the pursuit of space-based defence can lead to a breach of existing arms control agreements,

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(Mr. Teja, India)

thereby precipitating unrestrained competition and, in the process, unravelling the entire web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war, not to speak of the enormous resources deployed in this area.

The debate between offensive and defensive weapons is an old and unresolved one. I would not like to enter into a discussion of the technical possibilities and/or limitations of the ballistic missile defense systems currently being researched. It would be sufficient to note that extending the arms race into outer space will not lead us from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival; the only logical means to achieve that is nuclear disarmament.

The non-aligned and neutral countries have been sceptical of such theories and exposed the dangers of basing doctrines of security on the so-called logic of nuclear deterrence. We have consistently taken the position that the development of space-based weapons and arms race in outer space must be prevented. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on this issue. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth non-aligned summit calls upon "the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space." In particular, the leaders of the non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of "halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space in order to ensure that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances". It is clear that, once the fragile web of existing arms control arrangements begins to be unravelled and these treaties are violated, it will become progressively more difficult to undertake any constructive disarmament negotiations.

The reasoning that there does not exist a specific agreement prohibiting the introduction of a ballistic defence missile system is, in our view, no justification; the fact remains that there does exist a corpus of international law, adequate and coherent, though not comprehensive, which, if interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, cannot only prevent an arms race in outer space but also indicate the areas which require strengthening in the form of additional legal instruments to provide for a comprehensive legally-binding structure. At present, the law in relation to arms relations in outer space consists of treaty provisions. These treaties are both bilateral and multilateral, the most significant among them being the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972. The two have to be viewed against the backdrop of other agreements. Until recently there has been uniform compliance in keeping with the ultimate objective but, of late, differences of interpretation have arisen. These differences can be reconciled if we acknowledge that impartial interpretation is based upon compliance with treaty obligations in good faith.

(Mr. Teja, India)

A number of detailed analyses have been made of the existing international legal régime. Without going into details at this stage, I should like to state that the most fundamental of these agreements is the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the "threat or use of force". The Charter, which is applicable to outer space in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty exemplifies the concept further by recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The term "peaceful purposes" has been traditionally understood to imply non-military purposes. Until the mid-1970s, this interpretation was accepted by both the super-Powers, More recently a new, qualitatively different interpretation has been advanced by one of the space Powers, according to which peaceful purposes is defined as "non-aggressive". This is tantamount to sanctioning militarization of space. My delegation believes that the reference to the Charter of the United Nations in the Outer Space Treaty makes the interpretation of "non-aggressive" redundant. This view is also strengthened by the understanding of the Antartic Treaty, where the term "peaceful purposes" is still interpreted to imply non-military purposes.

Another significant treaty is the bilateral United States-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Certain technological developments and on-going research programmes have led to divergent opinions about the scope of this Treaty. These issues need to be resolved urgently while keeping in view the basic objective of the Treaty, and, if need be, through strengthening the provisions in the light of recent technological advances.

Semantics will lead us to involved discussions on the meaning of research and advanced research, development and testing, laboratory testing, field testing or demonstration testing, but these exercises will not be conclusive. Language is intended as a means of communication. We believe that the only valid criterion for deciding when faced with such semantics is to accept that which is compatible with the widest, broadest and universally acceptable principle of peaceful purposes, in outer space. United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/53, which was adopted with an overwhelming majority of 154 votes, refers to the activities of "exploration and use of outer space" as to be carried on "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding". Given this criterion, which, we think, we can all accept as reasonable, we feel that there need not be any dispute about interpretations of what is prohibited and what is permitted.

So far I have alluded to the first two aspects of the mandate given to the Ad hoc Committee of our Conference. An impartial consideration of the technological aspect of the proposed BMD systems reveals its inherent shortcomings, which in turn only confirm that development of such systems cannot lead us away from nuclear deterrence, but merely heighten the precarious edge of deterrence by leading us into a new cycle of the arms race. Secondly, I have tried to bring together some of the strands of the current international legal régime which, if seen in their complementarity, clearly indicate its adequacy. There is, none the less, a need to make it more comprehensive. Before I move to suggestions in this sphere, I would like to refer to another aspect of the arms race in outer space, namely, anti-satellite weapons.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Satellites, for our country as for many others, are a part of an effort to use technology for the benefit of our peoples. We are all aware of the applications of satellites in telecommunications, meteorology, remote-sensing, navigation and scientific research. At the same time, these very functions also have another aspect: the verification of arms limitation agreements. More recently, wartime combat support functions have also been included in satellite capability. While some may be indirect, i.e., in the areas of communications and navigation, others may be more direct, such as radar location of targets and navigational guidance for attack missiles. Perceptions of these attributes and their development have, side by side, also spurred attempts to develop anti-satellite weapons. If satellites have been accepted as an aid to confidence building by virtue of their role in verification, then putting them at risk would only serve to exacerbate tensions and have a destabilizing effect on any crisis.

In virtually all missile defence concepts, satellites are foreseen to perform essential functions, either as sensors or as relay stations in the attack, and they must, therefore, possess a defensive capability. This is the close connection between the development of the BMD systems and the development of the improved anti-satellite systems, in addition to the inherent ASAT potential of many BMD systems. It is, however, the distinctions between BMD systems and the ASAT systems which are more significant for us, as these indicate the approach that can be adopted to develop a treaty banning ASAT weapons. The significant ASAT methods like spacemines, jamming and deception measures and attacks on ground stations, have no BMD analogue. The levels of performance for a BMD and for attacking satellites are very different. ASAT can be mounted from a friendly territory, its targeting is relatively easier and can be undertaken over a long period of time, its survivability is easier as it is likely to operate in a crisis situation rather than in a hostility situation -- in short, while the technology is similar, the technical differences between an effective BMD system and an ASAT system are significant.

These distinctions are relevant in designing any ASAT ban -- which, to be comprehensive and effective, must not only ban testing, development and deployment of all ASAT weapons but also eliminate existing such weapons. Even at present, the issues of verification and compliance are likely to require considerable reserves of political goodwill and trust before they can be resolved; with any delay in the undertaking of negotiations and possibly if faced with deployment, it would become that much more difficult. One possible structure for such a treaty could be in the form of a general formulation, with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites. Evidently, the categorization of today may not remain as exhaustive for tomorrow. This explains the necessity for separate protocols, which can be derived from and placed under the umbrella of the general treaty formulations. For the present, three categories for which specific protocols could be relevant would be NEO (Near-Earth Orbits), HEO (Higher Earth Orbits) and GEO (Geosynchronous Orbits). However, this is merely indicative and not an exhaustive listing. The formulation of the general provision would be an indicator of the underlying political commitment. Elements of such a proposal have already been tabled in this Conference and it is now necessary that we take a comprehensive look at it.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Closely related to this, but wider in scope in terms of its applicability to all objects launched into space, is the Registration Convention of 1975. My delegation believes that this convention needs to be strengthened, especially the provisions relating to article IV, which provide the information about the characteristics of the objects launched. Such an exercise is fully in consonance with the objectives of the Convention, as stated in the preamble, namely to "contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space". Under the existing scheme, while we know from independent reliable sources that about three fourths of the satellites launched are used for military purposes, the description most frequently provided under the requirements of the Registration Convention read "Exploration of upper atmosphere and outer space". Admittedly, the dividing line between military and non-military uses is thin, but to be able to examine it and judge it impartially, we need to be able to get close to it. My delegation would be in favour of the idea that an expert group be convened to help the Ad hoc Committee in such a task. To begin with, the mandate of the expert group would be to devise the necessary parameters on which information needs to be provided under article IV of the Registration Convention. Such an activity would not only further the objectives emphasized in the preamble, but also be a significant aid to confidence-building.

A better understanding of this aspect would contribute to our discussion on the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects immunity from attack or interference. Clearly, such an agreement would need suitable verification, on which, too, proposals have been submitted to this Conference.

We have the means to begin to consider specific provisions and measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. It is the earnest desire of the delegation of India that, with the wholehearted commitment and co-operation of all other delegations, the Conference on Disarmament will be successful in safeguarding outer space, as the common heritage of mankind, for the generations to come.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

It was with these considerations in mind that we invited heads of the Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations to attend the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The Workshop was intended to provide tangible evidence that the Canadian Government takes seriously the responsibility which the Conference on Disarmament has accepted "to examine, and to identify, through susbtantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be recalled that the Canadian delegation has already submitted a series of working papers to the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We have tabled three working papers dealing respectively with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements on outer space; with international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with terminology relevant to outer space.

These working papers were not meant to propound a specifically Canadian governmental viewpoint, but rather to build upon and contribute to the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues as comprehensively as possible. Consistent with this objective, the purpose of the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and I thank the distinguished representative of India for his kind comments, was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views, in an informal setting, on a number of broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal régime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also exposed participants to the presentation of some of the results of Canadian PAXSAT research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification.

Today, I would like to table a summary report on the Outer Space Workshop as CD/773, together with its annex, the detailed report. The report seeks to provide a distillation of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during discussions at the various segments of the Workshop. In keeping with the aim and atmosphere of the Workshop, the report does not attempt to draw conclusions or recommendations from these deliberations, and we must apologize if any delegate, any observer, feels that his or her views were not adequately reported, but we have certainly done our best.

We are pleased that representatives of 35 countries, in addition to Canadian officials, and an honourable representative of the Conference on Disarmament secretariat, were able to attend the Workshop. The positive response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests, in our view, to the importance attached by all member and observer delegations of this Conference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government fully shares this interest and this concern. It is hoped that the Outer Space Workshop has stimulated some new ideas and approaches to this subject and brought out the complexity and variety of viewpoints on many of the questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- complexities and varieties which we must try to develop into common ground. Clearly, there can be no "quick fixes" in this area. It is our hope that the Outer Space Workshop has contributed, in a modest way, to our efforts to achieve progress.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

In my statement today, I wish to offer some comments on the prevention of arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has become an issue of increasing concern to the peoples throughout the world. This is well justified. There is a Chinese saying, "The tree leaves do not rustle unless there is wind". With the intensified efforts of the two major space Powers to develop space weapons, people cannot but worry about the dire prospect that weapons might be deployed in outer space. When the first man-made Earth satellite entered into orbit and when the first Apollo spacecraft made a successful landing on the Moon, the people of the world warmly hailed these remarkable achievements as pioneers to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by man. At that time, people were not concerned about an arms race in outer space.

However, today, 30 years later, outer space is congested with various types of satellites and space vehicles for military purposes. Besides, as land-based weapons capable of hitting objects in outer space appeared a long time ago, the emergence of exotic space-based weapons is no longer something inconceivable or remote. It has become a well-known fact that in recent years the two major space Powers have increased their efforts to develop space weapons. While one major space Power, investing huge amounts of financial and human resources in developing space weapons, has claimed from time to time that "breakthroughs" have been achieved, the other major space Power, not willing to be outdone, has openly declared that it will never allow itself to lag behind. Chasing each other, the two are locked in a fierce competition. Naturally, people will not turn a blind eye to all this. Although the two are conducting negotiations on space weapons -- talks between them are better than no talks -- they have not hitherto been able to make any substantive progress in banning space weapons. At present, they differ only on the speed and scope of the development of space weapons. What they are seeking is a timetable based on their respective needs for the development of space weapons rather than a true prohibition of all types of space weapons. The stark reality that the two major space Powers are vying with each other in the development of space weapons has naturally aroused grave concern in the international community. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to establish smoothly an Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space fairly early in 1987, is in a certain sense, a reflection of the sense of urgency that the people of all countries have in their grave concern about the arms race in outer space.

The international community has another reason for its concern about the arms race in outer space, for it will lead to a qualitative escalation of the arms race between the two super-Powers. Their strategic nuclear forces are now in a rough equilibrium, with neither side being able to overwhelm the other. An extension of the arms race into outer space is bound to bring about new changes in the strategic stances of the two sides, make nuclear disarmament even more complicated and difficult and exacerbate the spiral escalation of the arms race, thus jeopardizing international peace and security. The grave consequences of such extension of the arms race into outer space affect more than the security of the two major space Powers. Many countries are already worrying that the various types of missiles with nuclear warheads produced by the two major nuclear Powers might fly to and fro over their airspace. Once weapons are deployed in outer space, disaster may befall any country at any moment. The peoples throughout the world are naturally more worried about this. Therefore, prevention of an arms race in outer space and of the weaponization of outer space is an issue of major importance that concerns the security of the people of all countries.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

As already stated, the two major space Powers are at present the only countries that possess and are continuing the development of space weapons. They have naturally become the focus of attention of the international community. They ought to assume special responsibility for halting the arms race in outer space. If the two major space Powers truly have the political will to stop the arms race in outer space, they should adopt practical measures in undertaking not to develop, test or deploy space weapons, and on this basis conduct negotiations with a view to concluding as soon as possible an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons. Resolution 41/53, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, also "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in the constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space".

Since prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, quite a number of delegations have advanced propositions and proposals on the subject, covering a wide range of elements relating to the issue. The Ad Hoc Committee on outer space may address these proposals in an orderly manner on the basis of a consensus view on their priorities to be determined according to their relevance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Attention should be focused on the study and solution of the issues that are most directly related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At present, there are already many proposals before us on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations suggest that an agreement on the prohibition of ASAT weapons should be reached first. Since ASEP weapons are the space weapons that exist at present, to start with their prohibition is of certain practical significance. The Chinese delegation, therefore, can go along with this proposal. However, I wish also to point out that the prohibition of other types of space weapons should by no means be ignored. These include the exotic ABM space weapons, such as directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons and other types of space weapons currently being developed by the two major space Powers. We should prohibit all kinds of space weapons.

Last year, in my statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space, I noted that the existing international agreements on outer space were reached under respective specific circumstances at the time of their conclusion. Therefore they all have certain limitations. With the development of space science and technology, especially due to the fact that the two super-Powers have been using new technologies to extend their arms race into outer space, these legal instruments, though of positive significance, no longer entirely suit the present needs and are not adequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in a fundamental way. In order to attain the ultimate goal of the "demilitarization of outer space", it is necessary to conduct negotiations on new international agreements, with the "non-weaponization" of outer space as the main objective at the present stage. If the arms race is to be prevented from extending into outer space, this work should no longer be delayed.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Outer space, a common heritage of the whole of mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is opposed to an arms race in outer space. We oppose it, no matter who conducts it. We have consistently advocated that the exploration and utilization of outer space must be carried out in the service of peace and of the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries and for the benefit of the entire human race. China, the first inventor of ancient rockets, once made its contributions to human civilization and progress. Today, the Chinese people are also engaged in peaceful uses of outer space. Our space technology, though still at the stage of research, experiment and initial application, has already started its service in peaceful uses of outer space. China has already entered into co-operation and exchanges with some countries and international organizations in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space. China has launched and is going to launch a variety of applications satellites covering geodesy, geo-resources surveys, communications, broadcasting, meteorology, etc. They have contributed and will continue to contribute vigorously to China's economic modernization and to its economic, scientific and cultural exchanges with other countries. The Chinese people will do their best to this end.

Thanks to the able guidance of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and the active participation of many delegations, the 1987 Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has made some progress in its work. Through an extensive exchange of views, some issues have been clarified. This has contributed to a better understanding of the positions and views of all parties. This year, some delegations have submitted new proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Meanwhile, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also conducted deliberations on the issue of outer space, particularly on its priority position. There has been a deeper understanding of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and a willingness to work actively for the realization of that goal.

Before concluding my statement, I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to Ambassador Beesley of Canada and, through him, to the Government of Canada for the opportunity accorded to me to participate in the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal. The valuable efforts made by the Canadian delegation to promote the work of the Conference on Disarmament on preventing an arms race in outer space are recognized by all.

(Mr. Tindemans, Beligum)

Belgium welcomes the examination by the Conference on Disarmament of a number of concerns relating to the arms race in outer space. The problem of the protection of satellites, the elaboration of an appropriate multilateral régime and the drawing-up of an international code of conduct are, in particular, the questions that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully debate at the multilateral level. They are independent of the ABM Treaty and the SD I, which, in our opinion, remain within the direct competence of the two super-Powers concerned.



(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has a special place in the line of thinking that I was expounding in the previous part of my statement. Outer space is an area where the military technical means of a credible deterrence has not yet been deployed although the existing aspirations are well known. Consequently, any tangible result in preventing an arms race in outer space, even if concerning only a specific aspect of it, would be most welcome.

The proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space under the able and devoted chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese testify to a need for more streamlined work directed towards working out specific measures to strengthen

- (Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

the international legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space. Positions show a great divergence of views as far as the issue of outer space as a whole is concerned. Statements made at the plenary meetings or in the proceedings of the Committee, however, tend to converge on the necessity to provide protection for the satellites in orbit around the globe, that is to assure their immunity for the sake of their unimpeded functioning. Statements made on this issue have generally declared this wish, but delegations have not elaborated on the concrete ways and means of providing protection for satellites.

In our opinion, this could be an aspect to which the Committee on Outer Space should pay specific attention in its future work. Even during the remaining part of the present session the Committee might consider if its work could be focused on examining and perhaps outlining specific measures aimed at ensuring the unimpeded functioning of satellites. In this regard, I listened with great interest to the statement of His Excellency Leo Tindemans, referring to the possible steps in this field in connection with outer space. Concerning this question some important questions may arise which perhaps would merit serious in-depth consideration from the Committee.

Some of those questions are relatively easy to answer, for instance, the one whether all the parties concerned are interested in providing immunity to satellites. The answer, it seems to me, is an unequivocal yes. All States, irrespective of whether they possess or do not possess satellites, are vitally interested in the normal and safe functioning of satellites. It seems to me that there is widespread recognition that the world would run into chaos without them.

Some other issues are not so simple to answer, although positions show a convergence to a considerable degree. These questions are the following: Is the present international legal régime sufficient to guarantee beyond doubt the safe functioning of satellites in orbit, or are some further, appropriate multilateral legal measures required to provide the necessary guarantees? Should all satellites -- military and civilian -- enjoy adequate protection? Is it necessary and possible to make a distinction between civilian and military satellites, taking into account that none of them -- at least as of now -- is equipped with weapons? Do the satellites with military assignments perform functions vital enough for international security to make them eligible for protection? Should the problem of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be appropriately dealt with in this context? Can the existence of ASAT weapons be considered compatible with the aim of guaranteeing the normal functioning of satellites? Should the measures to be worked out be of a legally-binding character? Is it desirable that the measures to be worked out should be multilateral, with an appropriate adherence?

These are but some of the fundamental questions to be addressed by those taking part in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The expert of my delegation will elaborate on these questions in further detail in the forum of that Committee. I am sure that thorough consideration of such issues would give a concrete and useful direction to its proceedings.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The unabated nuclear arms race has gained momentum in such a way that it is going to contaminate outer space soon. It seems that the whole globe is not vast enough for the super-Powers to fill it with terror. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and using it for any other than peaceful purposes is a crime against mankind. The development of space weapons has complicated the race qualitatively and has entangled the trend of nuclear disarmament with more complexity and problems. We believe that strengthening the legal régime for outer space can prevent the escalation of the arms race in new domains.

There is nothing to substantiate the claim that military satellites have a stabilizing role. If the presence of reconnaissance satellites is necessary in space, this can only be acceptable under strict international observance pending comprehensive disarmament. It is unfortunate to say that no sizable progress has been made in any of these areas. I hope that, by finalizing the convention on chemical disarmament the Conference will be able to gain momentum towards solving other disarmament issues.



(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 has been discussing the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space for three consecutive years. This session it is working under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy. In spite of the efforts of many delegations to move us closer to some kind of agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the current proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee are widely perceived as repetitious in many respects of the Committee's work last year. The decreased intensity of the Committee's deliberations might well be indicative of an already exhausted and apparently inadequate mandate. What we need now, and maybe next year, is more concrete, purpose-oriented and structured work on this item, with the eventual identification of points of convergence in the positions. Elaboration of specific treaty language and mutually agreed definitions on areas of generally recognized interest could well be the most logical next step in our work. The proposals put forward would be a natural focal point in this respect.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

A subject which already seems ripe for concerted action is an agreement on an ASAT ban. The existing legal régime for outer space places some important restraints on the nature, deployment and possible use of such weapons. These restraints do not seem, however, to be comprehensive enough. Non-nuclear ASAT weapons, for instance, could well be developed and deployed in outer space despite the established legal restraints.

We consider that there are available, at least currently, two important prerequisites conducive to concrete negotiation and early conclusion of an ASAT ban agreement. Firstly, the two leading space powers now observe an actual moratorium on testing and deployment of such weapons. Secondly, the majority of the countries today favour an early agreement to ban all dedicated ASAT weapons and dismantle the existing ones. Many CD delegations have already tabled specific proposals on how to achieve such a ban.

Appropriate measures, designed also to produce a confidence-building effect, could lead us to the accomplishment of this objective. Ensuring the immunity of satellites and, possibly, their associated ground stations, for example, may be viewed as an important step towards attaining an ASAT ban in a more comprehensive and realistic manner. Such an agreement could take care of the need to prevent development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapon systems and to eliminate the existing ones. There could also be a prohibition of the use of force against space objects. Such a provision would have the merit of outlawing interference with the normal functioning of space objects by systems which usually serve other purposes but could, in principle, be used in an ASAT mode. This would address the problem of the so-called dual-capability space weapon systems.

The view has been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 that the problem of dual-capability systems might present certain difficulties in banning all dedicated ASAT systems. Such apprehensions do not seem, however, to be justified. There are ways to overcome possible difficulties in this respect. The key criterion to be used, for example, in assessing the actual capability of a system to be a military significant ASAT weapon could be the testing of such systems. Opponents of a CTB have insistently tried to convince us that nuclear testing is of immense importance for ensuring the military significance and reliability of new weapons designs. If we are expected to believe such an argument regarding the CTB, I fail to see why we should have to belive otherwise in the ASAT context. To be reliable, a space system meant to perform ASAT functions should be tested extensively enough in such a mode. Given the existing monitoring capabilities of each side, these tests cannot remain hidden. Thus, military significant ASAT systems would inevitably be known to the other side, something that would facilitate verification of the ban on them.

Another reservation with respect to the suggested agreement on satellite immunity contends that, under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, space objects are already protected against use of force. We do not recognize the importance of the Charter in international law. A careful consideration of Article 2, paragraph 4, in its entirety would, however, reveal that its provisions actually prohibit the use of force against

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

the territorial integrity and political independence of States. It seems very hard to imagine how the specific case of outer space -- this common heritate of mankind -- could reasonably be linked with the notion of "territorial integrity and political independence of States". A more feasible alternative is the elaboration of a special agreement to provide immunity for satellites, which would specifically complement and enhance the general provisions of the Charter.

In my statement of 2 April this year, I dwelt in detail upon a valuable idea relevant to all measures providing for the non-introduction of weapons into outer space. I refer to the Soviet proposal of 3 February 1987 to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements. The concrete elements of this proposal deserve very careful consideration. The suggested team of international inspectors could serve to monitor the implementation both of an ASAT ban and of a comprehensive prohibition of the deployment of any other type of space weapons. The Ad hoc Committee should, in our opinion, take up the proposal seriously and examine, in practical terms, its specific provisions.

All the Ad hoc Committees are entering now that final stage of their proceedings in which delegations will start considering the respective reports. We hope that these reports will reflect some progress reached during the current session. My delegation believes that such a development could lay the ground for even more productive work in the following session of the Conference, which may well be the last one before the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Today I would like to make some observations on item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". But, before I come to that, let me comment briefly on the most recent developments regarding the envisaged elimination of medium-range and operative-tactical missiles.

All relevant statements at this Conference have made it clear that we are well aware of the far-reaching implications an accord between the USSR and the United States in that area would have for the entire disarmament process and the strengthening of international security. Everyone is agreed about that. The German Democratic Republic believes the successful conclusion of the negotiations currently under way would literally constitute the key with which the door to disarmament can be opened wide. The impact on the work of the Conference would unquestionably be a positive one, since the mere commencement of the negotiations brought about a significant improvement in the political climate.

A few days ago, General Secretary Gorbachev granted an interview to the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, in which he presented a new offer aimed at giving a fresh impetus to the negotiations and bringing them closer to a conclusion. The Soviet Union is totally renouncing medim-range and operative-tactical missiles, based on the concept of the double-zero option. Given reciprocity, it will, therefore, no longer insist on retaining 100 warheads for medium-range forces in its Asian territory, as was agreed in Reykjavik. Thus, it does appear comprehensible that the Soviet Union expects the United States not to increase its nuclear presence in certain regions of Asia. It is up to the other side now to remove the remaining stumbling blocks obstructing progress in the bilateral negotiations. And this would have to include the destruction of United States warheads for Pershing-1A missiles.

In making this new proposal, the USSR has met the wishes of Asian nations. At the same time, it has drawn our attention to the need for, and the concrete possibilities of, promoting disarmament security and confidence in the Asian and Pacific region. Obviously, this is of special interest to the countries in that part of our planet. The very discussion about the global double-zero option has, however, seen all sides stress the worldwide dimension of disarmament and security. That is why my delegation welcomes all relevant efforts not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the globe.

Let me come back now to item 5. In a few months, it will be 30 years since the signals of Sputnik 1 were first received, signals which ushered in the space age. The striving to put weapons in outer space and to create regional SDI offshoots is today casting shadows over the prospects space is holding out in terms of peaceful uses. There is not much time left to ensure, through international agreements, the exclusively peaceful use of outer space including the immunity and protectin of satellites.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese has been doing a useful job. A valuable set of ideas and proposals has been accumulated and a rather good basis has been laid for conrete, businesslike and goal-oriented work. To this end, working papers have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament by, for example, Italy (CD/9), the Soviet Union (CD/274 and CD/476), Canada (CD/678 and CD/716), Pakistan (CD/708) and Venezuela (CD/709/Rev.1). Item 3 of the Committee's work programme, entitled "Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", should really be used to conduct discussions and, later on, negotiations on appropriate measures.

In the course of the debate, various delegations have addressed the question of what a treaty banning ASAT weapons should look like and how the immunity of satellites could be ensured in a legally-binding manner. At the plenary session on 24 July 1986, my delegation described the principal elements which it felt ought to form part of a future treaty. Today, I intend to develop a number of ideas which concern the scope of a future accord, verification of compliance, and the relationship between a ban on ASAT systems and the peaceful use of outer space. In so doing, I will take into account suggestions and proposals put forward by various other delegations.

Even though the Committee has not been able so far to agree on the objects to be protected in outer space, it seems to us that a common denominator is emerging on what the envisaged treaty should cover. The assumption to proceed from, in this context, is that there are no weapons in outer space and that, consequently, all objects in space must be protected. Given this assumption, it should be within the scope of the treaty to: (a) ban the use of force against any space object; (b) prevent the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects; (c) prohibit interference with the normal functioning of any space object; (d) proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and (e) provide for the destruction under international control of any ASAT weapons that may already exist. It ought to be possible on this basis to meet the concerns expressed by a number of delegations, which have said that it would be difficult to distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities. "Rules of the road" or a "code of conduct" could find their place under the type of scope I have outlined just now. It goes without saying that all these things require in-depth study.

Ensuring compliance is undoubtedly one of the most crucial and thorniest problems. Various options would be conceivable individually or in combination: (a) broadening of information exchanges on trajectory parameters and functions of space objects; (b) use of national technical means of verification; (c) creation of a multilateral consultative mechanism complementary to other forms of consultation; (d) establishment of an international inspectorate provided with far-reaching powers, including the right to conduct stringent on-site challenge inspections. The details of these measures and methods need to be worked out.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In this connection, allow me to comment briefly on the role an international inspectorate could play. The USSR delegation has suggested the establishment of such an inspectorate for the purpose of verifying that no weapons are deployed in outer space. The proposed body should, for instance, have the right to conduct on-site inspections of all objects designed to be launched into and stationed in outer space. The creation of that inspectorate would also be of major importance for ascertaining compliance with a future ASAT accord. In fact, the inspectorate would serve to verify reliably the non-deployment of whole classes of possible ASAT weapons. With this Soviet proposal and the French suggestion that an international satellite monitoring agency be set up, plus Canada's PAXSAT concept, a full-fledged system of possible verification measures is shaping up. At this stage, it would seem desirable to probe its potential. Therefore, the Ad hoc Committee should have a closer look, in the near future, at all the issues related to that matter, preferably by enlisting the help of experts, who could function as a working group of the Committee.

In view of the above-mentioned possibilities, an international inspectorate would be quite capable of verifying the non-stationing of ASAT weapons in outer space. As for verification in regard to ground- and air-launched ASAT weapons, it may be a good idea to draw on the experience gathered also in other disarmament negotiation fora.

There is another aspect of broad importance for the verification of compliance with multilateral treaties. Their effective operation is in the interests of every signatory. It is against this background that my delegation believes it to be necessary to discuss how information on compliance, obtained by national technical means could be made available to all States parties, either directly or through a multilateral machinery.

We must seek not only to prohibit arms in outer space, but also to advance co-operation in peaceful research into and use of outer space. Any disarmament agreement will have to be a direct contribution to the strengthening of international collaboration. This very endeavour is behind the proposal the Soviet Union tabled on 10 June 1986 concerning the establishment of an international outer space agency, which could be placed in charge, among other things, of monitoring compliance with multilateral treaties. This idea was pursued further in the Soviet proposal that an international centre for joint space technology research for developing countries should be set up with the assistance of the leading space Powers.

There is no denying that an intrinsic interrelationship exists between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its peaceful use by all peoples. We should always think of that in our practical work.

Nobody is overlooking the problems negotiations on the prohibition of ASAT weapons will be posing. To point them out is a legitimate thing to do. The time is ripe, however, to proceed to their solution.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The objective of preventing an arms race in outer space appears to be shared universally, although there is some disagreement about how this can best be achieved and who should bear the primary responsibility for achieving it.

My delegation acknowledges the significant responsibility of the two super-Powers in this field. As the distinguished Ambassador of Japan has pointed out, progress in their bilateral negotiations has a critical impact on our discussions in this Conference. But we are also firmly convinced that the international community, through the multilateral disarmament machinery, must play a role in assisting in the fulfillment of this urgent task, not least because outer space is not and will not be used exclusively by the two super-Powers.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

It is also true that existing and future uses of outer space have and will have a profound impact on the security of all States.

The crucial issue that needs to be addressed by the international community if it wishes to prevent an arms race in outer space is the need to monitor the military uses of space, and in particular the issues of whether the space Powers can agree not to use space for purposes that others consider would require a response, defensive or otherwise; and whether compliance with a non-arms-race régime can be verified effectively.

Regarding the first question, this is a matter currently under negotiation between the two major space Powers, and is of course inextricably linked with efforts to halt and reverse the arms race on Earth. However, it is also relevant to the activities of other space-using States. In seeking to determine whether the international community needs to devise additional legal instruments in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, a thorough understanding of what the existing legal régime covers is a fundamental prerequisite.

It is our view -- and we believe that it is also the view of the majority of delegations here -- that the existing legal régime is not a foolproof guarantee to prevent an arms race in space. The application to space of general international legal norms, including the provisions of the United Nations Charter, as for example reference to the right of self-defence, does not necessarily reduce or significantly diminish the prospects of an arms race in outer space.

Preventing an arms race in space involves, in our view, preventing the development and deployment of arms against space assets, not just the prevention of the use of force in space. For example, the existing legal régime offers very little in the way of specific protection for satellites. The variety of views which there is on the meaning of such terms as "peaceful uses", "militarization" and "stabilizing" introduces a wide area of uncertainty and ambiguity into attempts to establish what are permitted or prohibited uses of space, and into attempts to define which satellites should be protected.

The question of whether compliance with a non-arms régime can be verified effectively is, of course, of fundamental relevance to our work. It is true that with ever-increasing technological sophistication, verification of what functions space objects are capable of performing becomes increasingly difficult. But we must not forget that sophisticated technologies are also helpful in devising increasingly sophisticated techniques of verification.

This Conference can and should make a contribution in the area of verification, not least because the technology is not limited to the major space Powers alone. This was admirably demonstrated by the workshop and the presentation given to us in the Conference on Disarmament on the PAXSAT concept by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In this respect, I would like to address briefly verification proposals regarding the possibility that surveillance and monitoring functions of satellites should be entrusted to an international agency.

Australia supports the concept of international means of verification as an extension of the principles that the issue of global stability are the legitimate business of every nation, and that together with the right to be heard on these issues comes the obligation to play a full role in making possible a more stable and secure world with a minimum level of armaments.

We also believe that national technical means will need to be supplemented by new measures, and that they will need to be protected for the indefinite future.

We therefore see an international satellite monitoring agency as a positive contribution to existing arms control efforts in terms of its verification, confidence-building and transparency objectives.

Such an agency might also help to provide for a system which could verify that the threshold between permissible and non-permissible military uses of space, once identified and agreed upon, is not crossed.

But considerably more work needs to be done in defining the scope and application of the proposal -- technological feasibility and cost being two major factors.

The concept of an international satellite monitoring agency is yet another area where this Conference clearly has the resources to make its own contribution towards seeking the most effective ways and means of meeting the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The effectiveness and viability of the existing and future legal régime pertaining to outer space ultimately depends on two factors -- participation in and compliance with such a régime, and the ability of States parties to verify that the agreements are being complied with. This involves both a political decision as well as adequate technological means to support that decision. That decision will be based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether an agreement is cost- and security-effective, and whether it will deter non-compliance.

Accordingly, this Conference must continue to seek to demonstrate in a scientific and rigorous way on what basis we might need additional multilateral agreements to regulate activities in outer space, and how this might practically and realistically be achieved.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As time went by some disarmament problems gained new importance, in view of recent developments in arms technology and the threat emanating therefrom. This applies, in the first instance, to the problem of prevention of an arms race in outer space. Almost five years ago it was preliminarily agreed to place a couple of paragraphs on outer space within the section on "Related measures". But a reservation on the part of many delegations, including the socialist countries, on the placement of these paragraphs in the CPD, was attached to it. It is becoming increasingly clear that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the central problems affecting efforts to stop the nuclear-arms race and to proceed to nuclear disarmament. It is not by chance that space arms have become a subject of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was thus only appropriate to suggest that a new, more prominent place be found in the CPD for the section on outer space, preferably within the main section on disarmament measures.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is an international task of the highest priority. There is far-reaching agreement on that. In an effort to speed up the conclusion of a treaty and, at the same time, pave the way for a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the USSR has just recently submitted a draft treaty in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. The German Democratic Republic welcomes this initiative. I think the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, too, will have to make its contribution to ensuring that no type of weapon is stationed in outer space and that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Many delegations believe that the Conference should devote more attention to practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It was in this context that I presented some ideas in my speech of 28 July on what a treaty banning ASAT weapons could look like and how the immunity of space objects could be guaranteed in very practical terms.

Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and my own, a working paper in which we suggest the main provisions of a future treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. The paper has come out as CD/777. It focuses on the scope of such a treaty, compliance with its provisions and the safeguarding of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the good of all peoples. Various verification methods and techniques are proposed, among them on-site challenge inspections under the auspices of an international inspectorate. Information obtained through national means, as well as data on launch parameters and the general function of space objects, should be made available to all parties to the treaty.

We offer this document as a basis for discussion and trust it will be useful in the ongoing search for understanding at the Conference, especially in the Committee on agenda item 5. In conclusion, I wish to thank the secretariat for having distributed our working paper so promptly.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

The deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have shown once again that the existing legal régime is still a long way from being able to ensure a complete and effective ban on the spread of the arms race to outer space. It would appear that a large number of members of the Conference share this opinion.

We consider that the work of the Committee, particularly its consideration of item 3 of its programme of work, namely "Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have registered appreciable progress under the competent chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese which could in the future serve as a basis for a substantive approach to the issues of such complexity which arise in this area. We support the proposals made by the delegations of Argentina, Venezuela and Sri Lanka, aimed essentially at drawing up a list of issues and proposals formulated to date that would offer a basis for a possible reference "rolling text" for future debates, without such a document necessarily figuring already in drafts of new legal texts.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is now about to wind up this year's work. As the Co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries, my delegation ventures to sum up in a preliminary way the results of the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the Conference's agenda for the year 1987.

The delegations of the socialist States, determined to block every possible means by which weapons could be stationed in space, have actively participated in and contributed to the work of the Ad hoc Committee during the 1987 session, by introducing proposals which took into account the views of other States. Here I wish to recall some of them: the Soviet Union introduced initiatives on the establishment of an international inspectorate to verify compliance with an international agreement on the prevention of stationing any weapons in space, studying the possibility of eliminating existing anti-satellite systems and ensuring immunity for artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board, and prohibiting weapons of the "space-to-space", "space-to-Earth", and "Earth-to-space" types. The German Democratic Republic and Mongolia submitted a draft set of "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibitons of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" which have just been introduced by Ambassador Rose; the German Democratic Republic proposed a structural discussion on item 3 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee; and previous proposals tabled by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union were reaffirmed. The Ad hoc Committee has worked actively this year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy.

However, we share the opinion of a number of delegations that the work of the Ad hoc Committee, which to a large extent repeated last year's discussions, has not made any tangible progress, despite the efforts of many delegations. This is obviously linked with the lack of new elements in the mandate and the programme of work. In fact the first two items in the programme of work, "Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and "Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space", have been thoroughly considered during the last two sessions. Giving careful thought to the fact that there is a limited number of international agreements constituting the international legal régime of outer space, the Ad hoc Committee has practically completed its work on the definition and identification of the existing bans and limitations. As a result it has been able to outline the areas which urgently require the elaboration of a new agreement or agreements.

During the discussions the overwhelming majority of delegations noted both the urgent need for maintaining and strengthening the existing legal régimes governing the activities of States in outer space -- first and foremost such an important one as the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty -- and

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

the necessity to start serious substantive negotiations with a view to preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of carrying out this task. This sole multilateral negotiating body has on its table a considerable number of initiatives and proposals which could serve as a solid ground for further concrete negotiations.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is one of the jointly agreed priority goals of the Conference. Unfortunately, not all States have yet come to realize this sine qua non. A number of countries, while speaking in favour of preventing an arms race, are in fact blocking the immediate start of the multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, and are attempting to replace the negotiations by purely general discussions around the problem.

Such is the thrust of statements to the effect that it would be appropriate to keep the Ad hoc Committee's programme of work in its present form for the next year. In this context, references are being made to the fact that during the discussion of the programme of work it was not possible to arrive at generally agreed positions. This is not in the least surprising, given the positions currently taken by certain States which reject even such proposals as the idea of distinguished Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina about the inclusion in the Conference's report of declarations by States members of the Conference on Disarmament that they do not possess weapons in space deployed on a permanent basis. I would like to state that the socialist countries have no difficulties with this proposal, and we are ready to include a relevant formulation in the Conference's report. In our opinion, the idea expressed at the last meeting of the Ad hoc Committee -- that the annual report should be divided into three parts corresponding to the items of the programme of work -- would facilitate a clearer reflection of the positions of all groups and a better understanding of the essence of these positions.

Now, when we come to the report-writing stage, it is necessary to give serious consideration to ways and means of making the work of the Ad hoc Committee more substantive and its activities more practical. The work of the Ad hoc Committee should be oriented to the future rather than to the past. In this respect, we believe that the work of this Ad hoc Committee should be concentrated on the existing proposals and initiatives aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which would no doubt make the work more substantive. In other words, we all should do our utmost so as not to be compelled tomorrow to talk, ex post facto, about disarmament in space.

My Government continues to consider that in the present situation, which requires immediate and redoubled efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth, every State, especially those with major space capabilities, should refrain from actions contrary to this endeavour. Following this logic, we cannot but express our regret at the fact that the Government of Japan has taken a decision to allow its companies to participate in the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative, widely known as the "Star Wars" programme.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to play in preventing an arms race in space.

We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal for the establishment of an international verification system to make sure that outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space launch a reasonable one? There are as yet not that many space launch centres in the world, and the presence of international inspectors there would reliably guarantee that the objects placed in outer space are not weapons and are not equipped with any weapons. But we go further, and propose not merely a presence but a permament presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to representatives of the inspectorate.

What doubts can there be about the sincerity of verification proposals made by a Power which is very actively involved in launching space objects?

All States engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely equal position, and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. After all, a space launch complex is something that cannot be hidden. In this case the technology itself ensures relatively simple and effective verification. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch was carried out from an undeclared launch site.

And, in the event of a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc.

If a State has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.

Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals. It is a sphere for the peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.

Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the distances that humanity has to travel in order to reach its cherished goals. Some of those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been covered half of the way, and there are still others where the end of the road is already in sight.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

With respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is clear that first of all a verifiable distinction must be drawn between the placing of objects in orbit with hostile military intent and the placing of those with non-hostile military intent. Under article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the prohibition, which extends only to objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, applies once the object is placed in orbit, in other words once a circuit around the Earth has been completed. On that basis Peru supports all initiatives aimed at amending the 1967 Treaty as a means of finding a partial solution to the problem, but it would advocate the simpler amendment of prohibiting the placing in orbit of any object carrying any type of weapon whatsoever. We do not think it would be necessary to introduce new elements such as the concept of "space weapons", as what defines the prohibition is non-placement in orbit. Nor is it possible to accept new criteria concerning the length of time the objects remain in orbit, because the approach followed in the 1967 Treaty is much more appropriate in that it prohibits even the temporary presence of a delivery system in outer space, provided it completes a circuit around the Earth.

Now, in so far as an amendment of this type would not involve weapon systems that can destroy objects in outer space from the air, land or sea through direct hits or using the principle of directed energy or other principles of physics, it is clear that their viability will depend on the concurrent effort being made to multilateralize the basic obligations of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as well as those that are necessary to prohibit all anti-satellite weapon systems which are not based in outer space. It is understood that all of this should not undermine any régime for the full use of space for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

By definition, if one wishes to prevent the transfer of the arms race to outer space, the set of prohibitions to be agreed on should be comprehensive and free of all unambiguity; in other words, there should be no problems of interpretation such as that posed by article V of the ABM Treaty, because that would simply undermine mutual confidence and thus weaken the scope of these obligations. But perhaps what would be really important would be to set up guidelines or parameters which would allow for the regulation of advanced technology. While not taking the existing non-proliferation régime as a model, because it is lopsided and discriminatory, Peru is of the view that it would be possible to explore formulas that would impose contractual limitations on the development of certain advanced technologies for hostile purposes that have a destabilizing effect on the status quo. Of course, the aim would not be to impede or discourage technological progress, but rather to regulate it so as to place it at the service of our needs and aspirations, and not to have it used for destruction and endless military competition.

This reflection leads us directly to another, relating to the important role that effective prevention of the arms race in outer space could play in halting and reversing the arms race as a whole. We think that there is a direct relationship here, and it is vital to avoid this new spiral in the arms race. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the real problem does not lie here but in the causes and epiphenomena which encourage the arms race urbi et orbi. In other words, it remains an urgent and top priority to fight against the untiring search for illusory security through the indiscriminate build-up of weapons, of which the extension to outer space is only the most sophisticated manifestation.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Permit me in this statment also to make some brief remarks related to another item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The continued deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese, have been very useful. The Committee has benefited from valuable presentations, such as that of the Canadian PAXSAT for space-to-space and space-to-earth verification. The analysis of legal and technical matters, as well as definitions, which has taken place this year has made a valuable contribution.

Substantive proposals have been made. I can, for instance, refer to the main provisions of a treaty text submitted by two delegations, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. As nothing indicating the contrary has been brought forward in the Committee, my delegation also finds quite interesting the idea voiced by Argentina that the Conference's report could register statements by member States that they have not permanently deployed weapons in space.

The centrepiece of the work of the Committee has been and, in the opinion of my delegation, must continue to be proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the need to examine possible measures to that end warrants the efforts of the Conference on the item. That such an examination takes place does as such not prejudice the conclusions to be drawn by the Committee. Statements made have illustrated substantial differences of opinion among States on the adequacy of present legal barriers to an arms race in outer space, on the urgency of additional measures and on the scope and contents of such measures. It has also been disputed whether such measures could be verified at all. The fact that positions are indeed divergent does not, however, detract from, but add to the importance of continued and deepened consideration of the matter.

One aspect of military space activities that might constitute a threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons. There is a strong case for pursuing the matter of a global prohibition of ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A comprehensive ban would cover the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons.

A number of political and technical problems would have to be solved before such a comprehensive ban could be realized. It has been emphasized that a workable definition of ASAT weapons must be laid down. Verification arrangements, possibly of a very far-reaching character, would have to be devised. The Ad hoc Committee should continue to explore problems of this nature in order to prepare the ground for substantive negotiations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

A number of partial measures to control or constrain ASAT developments have been discussed. They range from registration and information on relevant activities to arrangements to prevent incidents and restrictions on the testing and deployment of specific, dedicated ASAT systems. Substantive consideration of those proposals can also hopefully serve to bring about a common understanding on the role of various types of satellite for international security, and on desirable approaches to avoid the deployment of ASAT weapons.

The implementation of even limited measures to check such a development could be of major significance. Any measure restricting the possibility of carrying out an ASAT mission in a reliable way may reduce crisis instability, and thus benefit international security.

On several occasions my delegation has made it clear that the Conference on Disarmament would benefit from the contribution of scientific expertise on space technology. Scientific and technological development in outer space activiites is dynamic. Our work is suffering from a lack of up-to-date information on such developments. The deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee would be greatly facilitated if it became possible to obtain a jointly shared perception of basic elements in space technology and development that is of relevance for the work of the Conference. The Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, Canada, in May this year was an effective demonstration of the usefulness of a scientific presentation of the state of the art relating to outer space techniques.

With these considerations and experiences in mind, my delegation would deem it an important step if the Conference could consider the possibility of organizing a meeting of scientific or technical experts on space issues during its 1988 session, preferably during the first part of the session. During such a meeting, which should be of ad hoc character and of limited duration (one to two weeks), definitions and verification techniques relevant to anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite warfare could be addressed. Furthermore, trends and long-term prospects regarding the possible or potential weaponization of space could be addressed. Deepened knowledge and expanded overviews would make the delegations better equipped to advance the work of the Ad hoc Committee in a serious and constructive way.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the task of preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space as one of the most urgent of our time and it intends, as the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, emphasized in his statement, to work towards "a strict and universal ban on deployment of any weapons in outer space".

Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth remain on the table.

We have reaffirmed on more than one occasion our willingness to come to an agreement even on partial measures, for example, on the immunity of artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board and on banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ones.

The Conference also has before it a joint document from the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777 of 31 July this year), which we support.

The views expressed by a number of other delegations also deserve most serious consideration. For example, in his statement on 21 July this year, the head of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Teja, showed the urgent need for the prohibition as soon as possible of the development, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and for elimination of such systems as already exist, and also expressed interesting ideas about ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In his statement on 7 July, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, also expressed support for the view that "space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected". We have also noted the readiness expressed by the delegation of China to proceed, as a first step, to negotiations on the banning of anti-satellite systems and we are, of course, in full agreement with Ambassador Fan's view that this measure must be complemented by other steps aimed at preventing an arms race in space. Interesting views on agenda item 5 have been expressed today by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus. We shall, of course, study those views attentively.

The socialist countries' proposals, together with the ideas of other delegations, constitute for the Conference on Disarmament useful assets that could serve as a good basis for business-like work on preventing an arms race in outer space.

It goes without saying that agreement on this issue without reliable verification is unthinkable. In this connection, I should like to recall that, on 17 March this year, the Soviet delegation proposed that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing an international system, to include an international inspectorate, for verifying the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind. Our proposal met with great interest and a number of questions were put to us in order better to understand its essence.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Many of those questions were answered in principle in the statement by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, on 6 August. Today, the Soviet delegation would like to make some further clarifications.

The Soviet Union is proposing that a start should be made on establishing a verification system right away, without waiting for the conclusion of the corresponding agreement on space, so that the system can be operational as soon as possible. The principal purpose of such verification would be to determine that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. The concrete list of the systems and devices that the verification bodies should not allow to be launched into space would have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. The intention is that the verification system could be refined if an international agreement or agreements are drawn up.

We are convinced that on-site inspection immediately before launch is the simplest and most effective way of making sure that objects launched into space are not equipped with weapons of any kind. The distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, also talked about this point in his statement on 21 July. Such inspection might begin not long before the object to be launched into space is installed on the carrier rocket or other launch vehicle. However, should the future agreement provide for a complete ban on space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would, as Minister Shevardnadze stated, be "willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc." The verification system we propose would provide for groups of inspectors to be present permanently at all sites for the launching of space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. In addition, representatives of the secretariat would be given in good time information on each upcoming launch, including the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of the launch. In cases where launches were infrequent, use could be made of inspections on the basis of prior notifications of the launches, instead of permanently stationing inspectors at the launch sites. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from specially designated observatories, a list of which would be compiled by the time the verification system became operational, and also to make, if necessary, a special on-site inspection if the launch could have been made from an undeclared launching site.

What is meant here is, of course, the verification of the non-stationing in space of weapons of any kind, and not the verification of launches of ballistic missiles unconnected with the placing of any devices in an orbit for an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path towards other celestial bodies.

Although we view an international inspectorate as the principal element of a possible verification system, this does not preclude the possibility of establishing other structures, for example, means of tracking space objects, within the framework of the inspectorate.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

As experience of negotiations that have reached an advanced stage -- for example, those on prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons -- shows, it would be advisable to make provision within the framework of the verification system for some central executive body and secretariat. The corps of inspectors and the number of inspection groups would have to be defined taking into account the need for the verification to cover all sites or ranges for the launching of space objects. From the organizational point of view, the verification system could function either independently or within the framework of a world space organization once that is set up. It would be advisable to provide for a certain link between the verification system and the United Nations bodies to which States already, as is provided for by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, send general information on the objects they launch into space.

Naturally, specific questions relating to the composition, structure, organization and financing of the verification system should be the subject of negotiation. Account might be taken in this respect of the experience in devising measures and machinery for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements in other fields.

In conclusion, I should like to express thanks to all the delegations which have expressed support for the Soviet proposal for a system to verify the non-stationing of weapons in space.

(Mr. Teja, India)

I would now like to turn to item 5 of our agenda -- "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" -- which has been under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee for three consecutive years. Despite the efforts of many delegations to move closer to concrete achievements, this year's proceedings in the Ad hoc Committee leave us with a sense of déjà vu. It might well be an indication of an apparently exhausted and all too inadequate mandate. What we now need is a more concrete and purpose-oriented mandate, which can enable structured work on the numerous proposals before the Conference.

The subject of an ASAT ban is one such proposal on which a considerable convergence of views is in evidence. The time is ripe to translate this convergence into concerted action. Since ASAT weapons are the existing space weapons, to begin with work on prohibition of ASAT weapons would reflect a sense of pragmatism and also open the path to the prohibition of other space weapons, including those based on new technologies. In our opinion, the politicial climate too could not be more opportune, as both the leading space Powers are currently observing a moratorium on the testing and deployment of such weapons.

A number of proposals of a substantive nature have been submitted. Reference can be made to CD/777 submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, which contains basic provisions of a treaty text. Strengthening of the Registration Convention, declarations of non-deployment of weapons in space, amendment of article 4 of the outer space Treaty, are all possibilities containing merit and deserving serious consideration. Such work will also raise technical issues on which the CD would benefit from inputs from space technologists. Beginning with the ASAT weapons ban, such inputs from a group of experts would help in developing a shared perception of other elements of relevance to our work. As I indicated in my statement of 21 July 1987, the first such exercise could relate to the development of criteria pursuant to the 1975 Registration Convention in order to examine the possibility of making a distinction between military and non-military space satellites. Undoubtedly, the issues of verification and definitions of ASAT will require a considerable amount of work, but this should not prevent us from giving the Ad hoc Committee an adequate mandate within which such work can be undertaken.

(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

As things have evolved, the first test will be the negotiations on an INF accord. Such an agreement would be highly significant, both in a European context and as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. It would also facilitate solutions to some crucial issues in disarmament negotiations generally, not least on verification. But at the same time, we are facing distinct dangers of a renewed arms race, threatening to undo what has so far been achieved in arms control.

There would be little point in eliminating one category of weapons only to transfer the arms race to other areas. The security and stability that new technologies are said to offer is accomplished far more simply, far less expensively and far less dangerously by mutual arms reductions. This, I am convinced, applies for instance to the field of space weapons. The net result in terms of security and stability is dubious, to say the least. It is equally valid in the continuing development of naval forces. The Swedish Government is closely watching the naval military build-up and especially its consequences in northern Europe. Naval developments are a cause for concern not only in our part of the world. This is a problem of global dimensions.



(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

With regard to the agenda item on outer space arms control, under the effective leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy the Committee continued its examination of the difficult issues entrusted to it. Our delegation believes that the Committee has not entirely exhausted its work. And our delegation has not been persuaded that a need exists to change the terms under which the Committee could continue its work.

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

We have behind us a serious discussion in plenary meetings and three years of concrete work in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, this year so ably guided by Ambassador Pugliese of Italy. Many issues were clarified and new ideas expressed. Undoubtedly, we have today a much clearer picture of the problem as well as a deeper understanding of avenues and difficulties connected with its resolution.

The Conference's work in this field must, however, raise concern. A substantial part of our time was devoted to the review of the existing legal régime applicable to outer space. Despite sometimes conflicting assessments of its adequacy for preventing an arms race in outer space, there seemed to be a general convergence of opinions on the need for its preservation and strengthening. This should lead first of all to bona fide implementation and interpretation of accepted obligations in both bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The reality is, however, far from these reasonable expectations. And one can hardly reconcile declarations on the importance of and attachment to existing agreements with practical steps which threaten the legal régime they establish.

This applies in particular to the bilateral Soviet-United States anti-ballistic missile Treaty of 1972. Strict adherence to this agreement is today an indispensable condition for any successful work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its limitation on Earth. The basic philosophy behind this Treaty, namely that arsenals of offensive nuclear missiles could be successfully limited only if anti-missile systems were strictly constrained, retains validity. Nevertheless, threats to the ABM Treaty exist. They include the possibility of its abrogation or reinterpretation violating its spirit and intent.

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

This is why Poland fully supports the Soviet proposal that this crucial and termless agreement should be reaffirmed and strengthened, inter alia by the adoption by both sides of a commitment not to withdraw from it within a certain period of time, and by the establishment of a clear understanding on prohibited and permitted activities within the framework of this Treaty. This would be an important confidence-building measure.

Respect for and compliance with the outer space Treaty of 1967 should not only mean compliance with its specific prohibitions. Any sincere declaration of attachment to this Treaty must also mean full respect for other obligations and principles established in the Treaty. They include recognition of the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as well as the obligation to explore and use outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

It is true that the exact meaning of those concepts is subject to discussion, but probably nobody can deny that the introduction of weapons into outer space, objected to by so many parties to this Treaty, would mean violating these clearly established even if general legal obligations. It is my delegation's strong conviction that the incompatibility between the "weaponization" of outer space and the principles of the outer space Treaty would be confirmed by any independent legal body, including the International Court of Justice.

Finally, the applicability to outer space activities of article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations -- prohibiting the use of force -- has been stressed in our discussion. But if we sincerely want this basic principle of international law to become an efficient norm guiding the activities of States in outer space, we should endeavour to establish real guarantees of its efficacy by prohibiting any space weapons. There is a logical link between the norm banning the use of force and the norms limiting possession of the instrument of force. And it is the very aim of this Conference to fill the existing gap in this respect and supplement this general prohibition of the use of force with norms limiting the power which can lead to its violation, whether on Earth or in outer space.

The fact is that despite the existing body of law, an imminent danger of an arms race in outer space continues to exist, and preparations are being made for the early introduction of weapons into outer space. And it is a paradox of our discussion that the adequacy of the present legal order is most loudly emphasized by those States which are planning to introduce weapons into outer space or are supporting such plans both politically and with their scientific and economic potential.

What really counts is not what States are declaring about the present legal order applicable to outer space, but what they are actually doing within the framework of it. One has to wonder about the utility of further

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

discussion on the present legal order applicable to outer space when this order and the discussion on it do not seem to deter States -- one today and probably others tomorrow -- from the "weaponization" of outer space.

The only conclusion must be that if we really want -- as we declare we do -- to put an effective barrier to this danger, we should concentrate our efforts on what is the main task entrusted to the Conference in this field by the United Nations General Assembly -- namely the elaboration of an agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in all its aspects and ensuring that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We hope for serious and goal-oriented work by the Conference in this field during the next session. Appropriate recommendations should appear in this year's report of the Ad hoc Committee.

An encouraging element of our work on outer space problems has been that a number of valuable suggestions relating to both comprehensive and partial arrangements in this field were presented, which should be the main focus of the future work of the Committee. My delegation is open to any constructive solutions, though our preference clearly goes in the direction of comprehensive agreements which would effectively prevent an arms race in outer space. This is why we have expressed our strong support for the ideas contained in Soviet drafts on prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. During this session we have noted with attention the reappearance of the idea of widening the scope of the existing arrangements, and in particular the 1967 outer space Treaty.

The adoption of this Treaty defining principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space was undoubtedly one of the most encouraging events in disarmament and disarmament-related negotiations. In fact, it can and should be both the inspiration and the starting-point for further efforts. The work undertaken by our predecessors more than 20 years ago, with such prescience of future dangers, should be completed today by us now that the picture of those threats and dangers has become so much clearer.

Our attention during the present session has also been drawn to a number of partial solutions. There seems to be a growing consensus regarding the idea of an arrangement on the immunity of artificial satellites combined with a ban on anti-satellite weapons. Poland welcomes in particular the outline of basic provisions of such an agreement presented recently to this Conference by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. Such an agreement would be an important step in creating a comprehensive legal régime for the peaceful uses of outer space. It would also introduce an important element of confidence, and could establish the basis for necessary co-operation in cases of satellite collisions, the risk of which is increasing with continued tests and growing amounts of man-made debris in outer space.

The work of the Conference has not only brought forth ideas for possible international agreements, but has also helped to outline crucial elements of such agreements. This applies in particular to the problem of verification, which so many speakers on so many occasions have described as the "heart of the matter".

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

The Soviet idea of an international inspectorate presented during this session and developed in recent statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Ambassador Nazarkin is the most valuable contribution to the practical solution of this problem. Poland welcomes this new, bold and far-reaching proposal. We sincerely hope that it will become a subject of serious discussion at this Conference and a key element of a future agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We also express our appreciation for the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and the presentation made to the Conference by Canada on the results of its PAXSAT research programme. It enhanced our knowledge of possible remote sensing techniques, and should be helpful in our efforts.

Progress which has been made during this session in the area of verification, traditionally such a difficult domain of any disarmament negotiations, is the best proof of the possibility of making a decisive step in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. What is necessary now is the reorientation of our efforts towards a genuine search for acceptable solutions in this field, and the political will of the participants in the Conference to undertake such an effort.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

The United Nations General Assembly resolutions were clear and explicit when they called upon the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. In spite of this, when establishing the Ad hoc Committee agreement was reached on an exploratory stage to prepare the way for such negotiations. After three sessions, we are still at this stage, which seems destined to go on and maybe never end. This is not a result of the fact that the subject is multifaceted and complex -- even though we agree with that -- but basically due to the differing views about the point of departure. There is quasi-unanimity that the legal régime which at present governs outer space, despite its positive traits, has shortcomings and needs to be strengthened and supplemented, while one State stands alone in its judgement that this very same legal régime is comprehensive and effective and ensures the prevention of an arms race in outer space if complied with. All this amid accusations and counter-accusations about the existence of programmes and counter-programmes for the "weaponization" of outer space.

I really do not know where the logic is in all this. Assuming the validity of the claim that the present legal régime is comprehensive and effective, after such programmes are implemented such attributes will be invalidated. And as long as the result is one and the same, namely that the legal régime governing outer space will be deficient, sooner or later, why then are we requested to stay with our hands tied and wait until the blow falls, while the voice of wisdom claims that prevention is better than cure? And assuming the continuation of the exploratory stage and our failure to reach agreement on an improved mandate and a more specific programme of work for the Ad hoc Committee, we see no reason that prevents the Ad hoc Committee from concentrating the greater part of its work in the coming period on a detailed study of the existing proposals and future initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only through such a study can we judge the validity, effectiveness and realism of the proposals. We believe in giving greater powers to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee to ensure this, in accordance with his responsibility to guarantee the good conduct of work in the Ad hoc Committee, and we do not view this as going beyond the mandate or programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee in any way.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

We cannot, however, delude ourselves either as members of the CD or as members of the human race that all is well. The nuclear threat has not abated. Increasing sophistication and qualitative modifications have increased the magnitude and terror of that threat, fostering suspicion and instability instead of inspiring confidence and security. The reaches of outer space are threatened by man's ultimate pollution -- "weaponization". Economic problems abound while expenditure on arms moves up. As the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden said in his very important address this morning, the great problems of our time go far beyond East-West rivalry. They are global and often economic. Small countries are intimidated and threatened.

My own delegation has had a special interest in item 5 of our agenda. Resolution 41/53 adopted at the last General Assembly with virtual unanimity signals the concern of Member States to prevent an arms race in outer space and the desire to utilize the Ad hoc Committee of the CD towards this objective. That resolution also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space. Prevention now is better than seeking later, perhaps futilely, to limit, halt or control -- let alone eliminate -- an arms race in outer space.

Extension of the arms race into outer space would have adverse repercussions on current arms control agreements in other fields as well, leading to their weakening. Existing legal and other provisions to deal with the prospect of an arms race in outer space have been found wanting and in need of supplementing, particularly in the light of recent technological developments.

The benefits of the peaceful, rational and equitable exploitation of outer space are perhaps impossible yet to properly assess. However, we already have a more than clear assessment of the dangers perilously imminent in the creeping "weaponization" of outer space. Some 75 per cent of satellites in space are oriented towards military rather than development objectives. Calls for their protection should be examined in relation to the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer space. On-site

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

inspection of space objects by an international inspectorate at the point of launch has been suggested as a contribution to prevent the deployment of weapons in space.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union made serious and worthy proposals earlier this month with the object of ensuring that items launched into space are not equipped with weapons.

The proposal of your country, France, Mr. President, in 1978 for an international satellite monitoring agency has been studied intensely and remains on the table. The Canadian presentation on verification and PAXSAT and proposals by China, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, Japan and Argentina call for close examination and study in the Ad hoc Committee. Proposals for a comprehensive ASAT weapons ban and revisions to the 1967 outer space Treaty to remedy its shortcomings have also been put forward.

The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Hameed, speaking (as a member of Parliament) on article 4 of the Treaty way back in 1967, hoped that its shortcomings would not give licence for military activities in outer space, thus negating the lofty objectives of the Treaty. Concerns then expressed have been sadly borne out in the militarization of space. Last year at the CD, Mr. Hameed said of research into space weapons that, before the research of today becomes the reality of tomorrow, we must legislate effectively to keep space free of weapons. The potential of outer space for peace and development should not be blighted by the propensity of space Powers to move to a new arena to pursue an arms race.

The peaceful and equitable use of outer space needs to be promoted in order that co-operation and not confrontation, development rather than destruction impels our endeavours. At the Harare Summit, non-aligned States called for urgent negotiations in the CD to conclude agreements on all aspects of outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in its peaceful use.

In view of the highly technical nature of many of the issues involved, my delegation firmly supports suggestions for the establishment of a group of scientific/technical experts to clarify and update these issues. The inputs of a qualified group would most certainly enhance the quality of our work.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

This year, for the third successive session, the Conference established an ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. My delegation would like to compliment Ambassador Pugliese of Italy for the efficient manner in which he chaired its proceedings. The results achieved in the Committee cannot, however, be regarded as satisfactory, considering the urgency of the subject and the priority which most delegations attach to it. Statements made in the Committee on the first two items of its programme of work, namely, examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and relevant existing agreements, were largely repetitious and polemical in nature. A duplication of this exercise next year would not serve any purpose. These two topics have already been given exhaustive examination, and there seems to be broad agreement that, while current international law imposes some restraints, there is a need for further measures. The necessary groundwork has thus been done for a more focused discussion on measures which would promote the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. We hope, therefore, that agreement will be reached at the beginning of our next session on an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee so that the task of elaborating concrete measures to supplement the existing legal régime may be taken up in earnest.



(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Outer space is an issue on which it is more difficult to document substantive progress over the past four years. None the less, we have not stood still, and we have not retrogressed. In 1983 the Canadian delegation urged the CD to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal régime, and made clear Canada's intention to participate actively in this work, urging the establishment of a subsidiary body on this subject. We were, of course, not the only delegation to do so. Subsequently, we tabled a series of working papers intended to advance our work. The Ad hoc Committee was first established in March 1985. Its work since then has been always arduous, sometimes productive, often interesting and frequently frustrating.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I would like to clarify a point I made in an earlier statement when I referred to the régime of the high seas by way of analogy to the régime of outer space. The Canadian working paper tabled at that time did the same. I wish to stress that I did not refer to the law of the sea as a model, but by way of a law-making analogy. I wish to emphasize this point without developing it further, so as to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the Canadian position.

Given the complexity of many of the questions we have discussed under the existing outer space mandate, the Canadian Government considers that the best way to expedite our work is to put forth our views in the form of working papers. The purpose is to concretize discussions and negotiations, whether or not delegations agree with the papers tabled. Even disagreement clarifies issues, far more than general statements not focused on specific proposals. In my statement to the Conference on 2 April I cited the series of working papers that Canada has put forward, and I do not need to do so again. I would however like to refer to our workshop in Montreal in May of this year, which I had the honour to chair, as another instance of our effort to make concrete contributions in this field. I wish to thank the many delegations which have expressed their appreciation for this workshop. The Canadian PAXSAT presentation to the Ad hoc Committee represented a further effort to concentrate on the practical problems of verification.

With regard to the specific question of verification concerning outer space, I think that it is worth reiterating the point I made to the Conference in my statement of 21 July. Careful negotiation, drafting and implementation of adequate and effective verification systems is essential if verification is not to become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening it or eliminating it. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union is giving attention to this problem, as evidenced in the proposal outlined in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August. We would encourage the Soviet Union to give further thought to its proposal for an international verification system. We have particularly taken note that, as seems clear from this and other elements of Mr. Shevardnadze's statement, the Soviet Union accepts in principle that useful and practical work on aspects of verification can be done independently of a specific negotiating context, and without having previously reached agreement on the details of what is to be controlled. This is a view which has long been advocated by Canada.

By way of clarification, I should also emphasize, however, that, as reflected in our own PAXSAT feasibility study, in our view the implementation of verification systems ought, at least in most circumstances, to be treaty-specific. Canada has not advocated third-party approaches involving verification activities outside the context of an agreement or by countries not party to an agreement. A corollary to this approach has been that Canada has not advocated the putting into place of verification systems or procedures in advance of the conclusion of an agreement. These comments are applicable, of course, not only to outer space but to nuclear test issues as well.

I would make an additional, final point about our work in relation to outer space. The working papers my delegation has submitted have pointed to the potential importance of careful drafting of definitions. The somewhat

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

restrictive definition -- if I may so -- of outer space weapons which appears in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of 6 August reinforces us in our view that such work could indeed be useful. This is of special importance because, as I have emphasized on other occasions, the central and essential purpose of any arms control agreement and its related verification system must be to enhance stability, and thus we should close the door on any possible areas of ambiguity or uncertainty. I hope I have succeeded in indicating some progress even on outer space over the past four years.



(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

I would now like to make a few comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and to say how much we appreciate the valuable contribution of Ambassador Pugliese as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. In the view of the Algerian delegation, consideration of the items discussed during the session allows us to draw the conclusion that the Ad hoc Committee will in the future have to undertake more substantive work in keeping with the urgency of item 5 on our agenda. It is true that the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee under this item for the third year running is a worthy achievement, but it must be admitted that the work done to date does not reflect in practice the recognized importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Consideration of the applicable legal régime has revealed loopholes and flaws which will have to be rectified if we really want to prevent outer space from becoming a "potential battlefield". To meet such a challenge, political good will on the part of all will be necessary, and it would be pointless in our view to place the role of our Conference in opposition to the framework of negotiations between the two main military and space Powers in order to justify the lack of appropriate negotiations on item 5 of our agenda. Specific proposals have been made under this item, and it is desirable for our Conference to give them all due attention.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States hold the view that at present item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is acquiring ever greater urgency. Our aim is to achieve a strict and universal ban on the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

To the credit of the socialist States are such major proposals as the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the Earth, and the "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777). Our delegations have repeatedly reaffirmed their readiness to seek agreement on partial measures as well.

The delegations of the Group of Socialist States, as convinced supporters of effective international monitoring of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements, consider that monitoring plays an especially important role in preventing an arms race in outer space. This is the intention behind the Soviet Union's proposal that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing a system of international monitoring of the ban on stationing weapons of any kind in outer space, which would provide for the establishment of an international inspectorate.

The Conference has also built up a valuable stock of ideas and proposals tabled by other delegations, which might serve as a good basis for specific negotiations designed to prevent the transfer of the arms race into outer space. All these initiatives and proposals offer convincing evidence of the need to move the work of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda onto a practical track. Without exaggeration it may be said that at its 1986 session the Ad hoc Committee had already defined the problems related to preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space, considered and identified the prohibitions and limitations deriving from existing international agreements, and also highlighted the loopholes in the legal régime governing outer space. We consider, and we are not alone in this conviction, that the future activity of the Ad hoc Committee must be directed towards the substantive and thorough study of existing proposals and initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space. The work of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space should be directed towards the future, not the past.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

I have the pleasure today to submit to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. After its re-establishment, at the end of February, the Ad hoc Committee began its work on 13 March and held its last meeting on Monday, 24 August. In accordance with the agreement reached, the Committee pursued its activities this year on the basis of a programme of work comprising the following three items relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space:

(a) Examination and identification of issues;

(b) Existing agreements;

(c) Existing proposals and future initiatives.

The substantive part of the report reviews the points of view that were expressed about these three items. The purpose of the final part, entitled "Conclusion", is to indicate a consensus in the Committee on essential points, emphasizing once more the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the consequent need to make every effort to ensure the resumption, on an adequate basis, of the substantive consideration of this agenda item at the next session of the Conference.

The work of the Committee, and the intense consultations held by the Chair to find a basis of agreement, have certainly not been easy. The efforts of the Committee reflected once more the importance of the agenda item on outer space. At the same time, our vigorous and often intense discussions revealed the difficulties involved in treating an issue that is directly and deeply connected with bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR, as well as a subjec heavily affected by signigicant and rapid technological developments.

I believe that the Committee's endeavours have helped to advance its task and to lay the foundation for its work at future sessions. I think it is a fact that the Ad hoc Committee has achieved some useful work in this session and has, in particular, given a wider opportunity for a deeper examination of various important issues.

In concluding, I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to all the delegations for their valuable contributions to the Committee's work and, in spite of all the differences and dialectical exchanges, for the spirit of flexibility and co-operation which at the end emerged. Without this basic good will, we would not have been able to achieve the results obtained. I have to mention the co-operation and endeavours of the group co-ordinators, but our gratitude and appreciation are also due to Miss Aida Levin, the Committee's Secretary, and to the other members of the secretariat whose devoted co-operation and efficiency were instrumental in facilitating the Committee's work.

The PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 435th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Today, in accordance with its programme of work the Conference will consider and adopt reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, the report on the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the forty-first session of the General Assembly and the annual report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

As I announced at yesterday's plenary meeting, I will now put before the Conference for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees in the order in which they were introduced by their chairmen. I now propose that we proceed to adopt these reports. The first, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, is to be found in document CD/786. Are there any delegations which would like to take the floor before we adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee? If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference has adopted this report.

It was so decided.