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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 14 - Fall 1990

NPT Review Conference: Much Progress, But No Final Document



The NPT Review Conference in plenary session.

Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China) provides for review conferences at five-year intervals, if so desired by the parties. This was the fourth review conference to be held since the NPT entered into force in 1970. Fifteen states attended the Conference as observers, including France and China, the two nuclear-weapon states not party to the NPT.

Although best known for its first two articles, designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NPT is a multi-faceted treaty that also includes provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and disarmament. All of these aspects were considered by the parties present in Geneva.

Eighty-four of the 142 parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) met in Geneva from August 20 to September 14 to review the Treaty's operation.

The NPT, which is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear-weapon states (the United States, the

While the Conference achieved significant and positive results in most areas, it was regrettably unable to produce a final document. The sticking point was Article VI of the Treaty, which calls on parties to pursue negotiations in good faith aimed at ending the arms race and moving to nuclear and general disarmament. On this, the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was the most controversial.

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External Affairs and
International Trade Canada

Canada

From a Canadian perspective, the Review Conference was highly successful in its consideration of issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and safeguards. Canada played an active role in the elaboration of language on full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply that received broad support.

In addition, Canada launched an initiative at the Conference regarding the extension of export controls on nuclear materials to include tritium — a material necessary for the detonation of nuclear devices but currently not subject to international export controls. The Conference agreed on language calling for “early consultations among states to ensure that their supply and export controls are appropriately coordinated,” in reference to tritium and other materials and equipment. Canada intends to pursue efforts to conclude international tritium export control guidelines in the near future.

In another welcome development, parties called for an examination of ways to widen the application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon states, and for a clearer separation of those states’ peaceful and military nuclear facilities. Agreed language also included a call on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make fuller use of the inspection rights at its disposal, particularly its right to use a form of challenge inspection to clarify questions of compliance.

The Review Conference achieved constructive, consensus language on almost all issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reaffirmed the goals of Article IV of the NPT, particularly that of encouraging NPT parties to engage in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear items for peaceful purposes. The report of the Conference committee dealing with peaceful uses recognized the special needs of developing countries in this regard, and reaffirmed the desirability of giving preference to NPT parties in transfers of peaceful nuclear technology.

As had been anticipated by many observers, consideration of the disarma-

ment aspect of the NPT (Article VI) proved to be the most difficult. Canada played an active role in all Article VI deliberations. The Canadian delegation advocated a balanced review of developments in disarmament since 1985. This would have entailed acknowledging the important — and unprecedented — progress towards nuclear disarmament, as well as the significant positive developments in negotiations concerning non-nuclear weapons and forces. At the same time, Canada recognized that much remains to be done to fully realize the disarmament goals set out in Article VI.

The final days of the Conference saw marathon negotiations in an effort to find consensus language on Article VI questions. Although much common ground was found, differences of view — particularly on the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) — proved to be insurmountable. The President of the Conference made a last attempt to achieve a final document by proposing text that summarized the differences. This initiative was unsuccessful, as one delegation (Mexico) objected to adoption of the President’s proposed compromise.

The Review Conference’s inability to agree on a final document was a disappointment to Canada and many other countries. However, in Canada’s view, the agreed language on full-scope safeguards, tritium controls and other matters represents a strong commitment by NPT parties to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Canada will continue its initiatives in these areas.

In the disarmament area, differences of approach reflected divergent views among states on such key questions as how to proceed to the goal of a CTBT. Canada believes that while NPT parties should respect one another’s approaches, they should not allow their differences to obscure the fact that a strong NPT is in the security interests of the entire international community. Every effort should be made to ensure that this vital treaty continues to be strengthened. ■

Canada’s Opening Statement to NPT Review Conference

The following are excerpts from the statement delivered by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT in Geneva on August 24.

Canada comes to this important Review Conference confident that together we will reinforce the credibility and strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and inject new impetus into our collective search for a world characterized by peace and international security without nuclear weapons. We believe that developments in international relations since our last review conference, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament, provide a positive background conducive to achieving a successful outcome to this meeting...

The NPT is the linchpin of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It serves as an effective barrier to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, sets a framework for nuclear and general disarmament. In addition, it reinforces the verification role of IAEA safeguards and contributes to peaceful international nuclear cooperation and commerce. The NPT is thus a vital instrument for international peace, security and economic well-being in the modern world.

Canada has played an important role in the areas of non-proliferation, safeguards and nuclear cooperation. It is therefore natural that Canada’s goal at this Review Conference must be to reaffirm the Treaty’s accomplishments in these areas and urge firmer commitments to appropriate goals where necessary — both to attract stronger support for the Treaty and, if possible, wider adherence to it by those countries that may not have fully appreciated its benefits. As a firm and strong supporter of the NPT, Canada wishes to work actively with other states at this Review

Conference to reinforce and improve these elements of the NPT.

Canada also attaches great importance to the disarmament dimension of the NPT. As a country that participates actively in all of the principal multilateral arms control and disarmament fora, we look forward to joining other delegations, in the days ahead, in examining progress that has been made since the last review conference toward fulfilling the disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT.

The NPT has played a central role in curtailing horizontal proliferation by the legal obligations in the first two articles. It is no small accomplishment that there are no nuclear-weapon states beyond the five recognized in the NPT. However, the nuclear activities of some so-called threshold states not party to the NPT give cause for concern. Canada encourages these states, at a minimum, to conform with the NPT obligations that the vast majority of countries have freely accepted. There is legitimate anxiety that risks of insecurity and war increase in proportion to the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, particularly if they are in areas of chronic tension. The security interests of regions like the Middle East and South Asia are ill-served by even the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty undertake, in Article I, to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or in any way contributing to the development of such weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon state. Article II commits the non-nuclear-weapon states adherent to the Treaty to neither receive nor develop nuclear weapons. These all-important obligations enhance regional and international security and allow countries to reinforce their internally-determined national commitment to non-proliferation by adherence to an international treaty.

The fact that over 140 states have made this commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is immensely important to international security, and is a tribute to the world community in our collective efforts to ensure that nuclear energy is

used only for the benefit of humanity and our planet. Canada greatly appreciates the accession of several states to the NPT since the last review conference in 1985...

Canada calls on all states that remain outside the NPT to accede to what has come to be regarded as the most important treaty of the nuclear era. We are particularly optimistic that South Africa will soon accede to the NPT and that other non-parties in Southern Africa will do likewise. Each new party increases the influence of the NPT and universal adherence should remain our ultimate goal. In urging states not party to the NPT to accede, Canada holds out its own example unabashedly; despite having the technology and capability to do so from the earliest days of the nuclear era, Canada declined to develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons and has adhered firmly to this principle ever since.

Strong as the non-proliferation commitments established by Articles I and II of the NPT may be, they are not foolproof. Non-proliferation, above all, is an act of national policy, commitment and even morality that is only partially verifiable by IAEA safeguards and other means.

It is equally true that the political commitments to horizontal non-proliferation in the NPT would be less convincing without the obligations in Article III. These relate to verification of the non-explosive use of nuclear energy through a system of IAEA full-scope safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. All parties must ensure IAEA safeguards apply to the export to any non-nuclear-weapon state of proliferation-relevant nuclear materials and equipment. Article III does not preclude the possibility of nuclear-weapon states entering into voluntary agreements with the IAEA to apply safeguards to some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Such voluntary offers add to the equity of the application of IAEA safeguards under the NPT

regime, and we welcome the extension by the USSR of its voluntary offer as announced earlier this week. The Review Conference should examine ways for safeguards to be extended in nuclear-weapon states, on a cost-effective basis.

As a uniquely-successful international security verification system, IAEA safeguards are based on the timely detection of diversion of safeguarded materials for production of explosive devices or purposes unknown. That there has been no report of diversions of nuclear materials by an NPT party provides confidence that IAEA safeguards are operating effectively in preventing proliferation...

Canada, by its example, is an unreserved supporter of NPT-type IAEA safeguards: in assuring the system's full-

The NPT is a vital instrument for international peace, security and economic well-being in the modern world.

scope application within Canada; in requiring IAEA safeguards on all Canadian nuclear exports; and in establishing a Canadian safeguards support program. While the Review Conference is not the forum to review in detail the budgetary and other challenges confronting safeguards, we think it must reiterate the importance of safeguards in the NPT context and make constructive suggestions, if possible, to strengthen the safeguards system.

The essential credibility and future relevance of the NPT rests on this basic non-proliferation/IAEA safeguards verification framework. Past review conferences have tended to confirm, often without extensive debate or analysis, that state parties have complied with Articles I through III of the NPT. At this Review Conference, we should be concentrating more attention not only on recognizing that all NPT parties must comply, but on urging them to do everything possible in word and deed to be seen to be complying with these essential NPT commitments.



From left to right: Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, UN; Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero, President of the NPT Review Conference; Mr. Jan Martenson, Director General of the UN Office at Geneva; Mr. Arpad Prandler, Secretary-General of the NPT Review Conference.

What more can be done to enhance the NPT's commitment to horizontal non-proliferation, given the lack of specific provisions in the Treaty to ensure enforcement? Above all, this depends on the good intentions of the state parties. But there is room for more confidence-building measures. Fuller explanations should be given when questions are raised about compliance with the NPT. State parties should refrain from any action or statement that might bring into question their commitments to non-proliferation and should take actions to clarify and restore confidence when accusations have been made. One such method is to invite the IAEA to conduct specific inspections when special uncertainties arise... Enhancing the credibility of compliance with the NPT can help lower levels of suspicion and raise the security of concerned states. With respect to transactions of items not under safeguards that might nonetheless be useful in nuclear explosive programs, greater transparency and openness by recipients, as well as vigilance by suppliers, should be encouraged. Canada has a suggestion on tritium in this regard.

With respect to Article III, the obligation to conclude an INFCIRC 153-type safeguards agreement within 18 months of NPT adherence is clear. All NPT par-

ties should make every effort to respect this obligation. We have a special concern in this regard, however, that North Korea, a party with considerable nuclear activity, has not yet concluded its safeguards agreement. This is a particularly clear example of non-compliance which we hope can be resolved soon.

Finding ways to improve the credibility of compliance of all state parties with the NPT is the responsibility of all participants in the Review Conference. Canada hopes this matter can be examined in some greater detail in the weeks ahead.

A basic premise of the NPT is to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As addressed in Article IV, nothing in the NPT is to affect the right of parties to develop peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination — provided this is done in accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. NPT parties are called on to participate in nuclear exchanges of equipment, materials and information "with due consideration for the needs of the developing world." One of the purposes of this Review is to determine to what extent the goals of Article IV have been fulfilled, and the constraints — financial, political or technical — that may impede peaceful inter-

national nuclear cooperation under this article.

It is self-evident to a nuclear-supplier country like Canada that, without the confidence-building, non-proliferation basis of the NPT, there would be much less peaceful international nuclear commerce than is the case now. The NPT provides an essential assurance that such commerce will not contribute to the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Without the NPT, international access to and provision of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes could be greatly reduced.

In the assessment of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the role of Article IV, we are fortunate to have at our disposal the extensive IAEA background paper which summarizes the varied peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in many cases their particular applicability in developing countries. Certainly, there is room for greater efforts to make nuclear technology more available to developing countries — and we would expect this Review Conference to make some recommendations in this regard.

But we must recognize that despite some of the advantages of nuclear energy, including its contribution to sustainable development, it will take some time yet for significant nuclear industry to emerge in most countries. Acquiring nuclear power capability is a particularly daunting challenge to developing countries for financial and technical reasons. It is a view shared by Canada, however, that a series of environmental, economic and energy-related factors may ultimately cause an increase in demand for nuclear power; if and when that occurs, the NPT in general and Article IV in particular will help to promote and facilitate this development.

In the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, extensive international cooperation takes place through the IAEA. Of particular importance for the implementation of Article IV, is the fact that the vast majority of disbursements (about 80%) from the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund

(TACF) and contributions (well over 95%) to the TACF come from NPT parties. Their collective participation in this preeminent IAEA multi-lateral fund to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is surely an excellent example of NPT parties fulfilling their obligations under Article IV.

Mutually-beneficial bilateral nuclear cooperation is engaged in by many parties to the NPT. But no NPT state is obligated to enter into nuclear cooperation with each and every other state party, nor is it likely to be in a position to do so. Nonetheless, the NPT provides a solid non-proliferation framework to facilitate the development of bilateral cooperation between NPT parties when mutually agreeable.

Canada, as a major exporter of nuclear items, has played and will continue to play a significant role in international nuclear cooperation with a wide variety of countries, both developed and developing. Canada will submit to the conference, as was requested in 1985, a paper on its extensive bilateral nuclear cooperation activities. These include uranium exports, provision of CANDU power and research reactors, nuclear technology transfer and related training and education.

Canada enjoys the full range of nuclear cooperation activities with 28 states through bilateral agreements. All of these states except France, a nuclear-weapon state, are parties to the NPT. Canada makes NPT or equivalent status, as well as full-scope NPT-type safeguards, prerequisites for bilateral nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states.

Canada believes that there is no satisfactory alternative to the NPT-based international non-proliferation regime. For Canada, membership in the NPT or an equivalent binding commitment is a minimum requirement for significant bilateral nuclear cooperation. Receiving the benefits of membership in the NPT club without paying the dues for membership is, for Canada, unacceptable. We are one of the strongest proponents of making NPT adherence and NPT-type safeguards essential conditions of nuclear supply and we shall be so ad-

vocating at this Review Conference. We are encouraged by the number of nuclear supplier states that have indicated support for this policy.

In addition, continuing to clarify the list of materials and equipment that trigger safeguards under Article III and calling on all NPT parties to respect these safeguard obligations would be in direct support of the provisions of Articles III and IV, and the international non-proliferation regime in general.

Some parties to the NPT object to the non-proliferation assurances additional to the NPT often required by suppliers. These requirements, while a matter of national policy, respond to nuclear non-proliferation concerns, including the need to implement fallback safeguards in the event that the IAEA is unable to apply safeguards; to take particular precautions with high enrichment and reprocessing and to have some control over the retransfer of items to third parties. The reasons for bilateral non-proliferation frameworks going beyond, but remaining anchored in, the NPT are more valid than ever.

It is within this more comprehensive non-proliferation regime — buttressed in the NPT but supported by bilateral elements — that Canada believes that assurances of supply, as well as demand, for nuclear commerce can continue to grow and to make contributions to world prosperity. I should add that this potential value does not extend, in our view, to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, as provided for in Article V, which remain in doubt.

One of the fundamental elements of the NPT is the Article VI provision in which parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith towards ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament. The goals envisaged in this Article, despite efforts undertaken, appeared for many years to remain dis-

tant and elusive ones as international tensions provoked the build-up, rather than reduction, of arms.

However, much has changed in the international climate since the last review conference. In the East-West context particularly, the era of suspicion, distrust and tension has been replaced by one of increased cooperation in which states are demonstrating a revitalized commitment to resolve problems by peaceful means. The area of arms control and disarmament is one where this most welcome change is evident.

Since 1985, progress of an unprecedented nature has been made towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. This progress is facilitated by the NPT and represents a significant advance towards fulfilling the Article VI goals. The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987, is now being implemented and represents a noteworthy achievement. Building on the success of the INF Treaty, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have persevered in their negotiations and, at the recent Washington Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reached agreement in principle on a START Treaty. The signing of this Treaty will result in substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Both the INF and START treaties require actual cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the signatory states. Their importance in this regard must not be underestimated. Furthermore, these landmark treaties represent precedents upon which additional deep cuts in nuclear arsenals may be negotiated. Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have committed themselves to negotiating a START II Treaty and pursuing a dialogue on enhancing strategic stability after the implementation of START I.

The members of NATO have also called for the opening of new

No Summer Issue

Due to the temporary reassignment of our editor to another project, there was no Summer 1990 issue of *The Disarmament Bulletin*. We hope to resume regular quarterly publication with this, the Fall, issue.

negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces upon the signing of a CFE agreement. This is consistent with the announcement by President Bush in May to cancel the United States' land-based SNF modernization programs and represents another significant indication that the superpowers have indeed embarked on the path of nuclear disarmament.

Efforts to progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing have been frustrated by differences of view on how to proceed towards this goal, to which my delegation attaches great im-

It is our solemn duty to continue to build towards a world where the power of the atom will only be used to benefit humanity.

portance. However, even on this difficult issue, I believe there is justification for optimism. After a long hiatus, the Conference on Disarmament has this summer established an ad hoc committee on the item entitled "Nuclear Test Ban," which has opened the door for substantive work on this issue. Canada actively participated in the recent meetings of this ad hoc committee and looks forward to the continuation of this body's work in next year's session of the CD.

Equally encouraging is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties which can now be ratified. Canada looks forward to the early resumption of bilateral superpower negotiations on further restrictions on nuclear testing. The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, which will be held in January, will provide an additional opportunity for focused discussions on issues related to a CTBT.

The momentum that has characterized the bilateral nuclear negotiations has also been present in efforts to reduce and control levels of conventional forces in Europe. As a participant in

the CFE Negotiation in Vienna, Canada has joined the other states represented in that forum in a determined effort to conclude an agreement this year that would drastically lower the current level of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Prospects are indeed excellent that a CFE agreement will be concluded before year's end. This will be reinforced, of course, by the continued observation of the terms of the Stockholm Document, and the application of further confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed in the CSBM negotiations now taking place in Vienna.

There have been equally welcome developments recently in efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate

chemical weapons. We regard the bilateral US-USSR agreement on chemical weapons destruction, signed on June 1, as a major accomplishment and one that should give encouragement to the entire international community in our collective efforts to conclude and implement a worldwide ban on all such weapons.

The great progress that is underway in the East-West context has contributed to an equally welcome reduction of tensions in several parts of the world marred by regional conflicts in recent years. Unfortunately however, as we are all acutely aware, there are regions where tensions continue to be high and, as a result, where the states concerned have yet to embark on the path towards the goals enshrined in Article VI. It is Canada's hope that the disarmament process that is unfolding in the East-West context will continue unabated, and that it will be echoed in other regions characterized by high levels of armament.

While the NPT is the basis of the international non-proliferation regime, it acknowledges, in Article VII, the right of groups of states to conclude regional treaties to assure against the presence

of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Canada does not consider such arrangements to be a fully satisfactory alternative to ratification of the NPT. However, we do regard such initiatives as useful contributions to the goals of non-proliferation, provided they command the support of the countries in the relevant area and promote regional and international stability. Such zones may be of particular importance in regions that include states that have not yet joined the NPT.

In anticipation of this Conference, numerous ideas have been proposed intended to strengthen various aspects of the NPT. We note in particular the useful working paper submitted by Egypt, which considers a range of relevant issues, and the proposal of Nigeria concerning negative security assurances. My delegation welcomes the constructive spirit in which these and other ideas have been introduced to our discussions and looks forward to considering them in the work of the appropriate committees.

Canada intends to work closely and in a spirit of cooperation with all delegations over the next three weeks in a thorough evaluation of the NPT. My delegation hopes we can agree on a consensus final document that acknowledges the important achievements of this Treaty and identifies areas where there exists the possibility of further strengthening the positive influence of the NPT.

A positive outcome of this Review Conference will establish an excellent basis for consideration in 1995 of extension of the NPT. Canada firmly believes that our goal should be the indefinite extension of this vital Treaty at the 1995 conference.

In this era of rapid change and renewed hope, the world will be looking to us to make a strong and unequivocal statement reaffirming our collective commitment to the goals enshrined in the NPT. It is our solemn duty to ensure that these expectations are met and in so doing that we continue to build towards a world where the power of the atom will only be used to benefit humanity. ■

Open Skies: No Treaty at Budapest

The second round of Open Skies negotiations between the 23 members of NATO and the WTO ended in Budapest on May 10 without a treaty being signed. Such a treaty would provide for regular, short-notice overflights of each other's territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft. The negotiations are presently suspended until an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) is completed and signed later this year.

Although some progress was made, including on the type of sensors to be used and on the number of flights to be conducted, many of the issues that remained unresolved at the close of the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February were still without agreement at the end of the Budapest meeting.

In particular, the Soviet Union continued to insist that the country being overflown should have the right to decide which aircraft will be used, leaving open the possibility of the overflown country supplying an aircraft from its own fleet. Canada and its allies believe that since the purpose of Open Skies is to build confidence on the part of the country carrying out the overflight, the

The Soviets also wanted to restrict both the number and duration of annual overflights of Soviet territory to a bare minimum. In addition, they continued to suggest that they would declare some military and civilian areas out-of-bounds to overflights, thus reducing the openness achieved through Open Skies.

In contrast, Canada and its allies continued to favour an Open Skies regime that is open to the maximum extent possible, without any limitations other than those required for flight safety. Issues on which NATO countries held firm at Budapest include:

- keeping overflight restrictions to the absolute minimum consistent with civilian flight safety regulations;
- allowing sophisticated all-weather sensors;
- raising the number of overflight quotas to a significant level.

The two sides explored fully the practical implications of each other's positions during the three weeks of talks in Budapest. A clear picture of the remaining differences now exists as a basis for political leaders to decide whether they wish to proceed with the negotiations.

Canada has worked actively to promote the Open Skies concept and facilitate the negotiation of an agree-

ment. Despite the present suspension of negotiations, Canada will continue to explore ways of breaking the logjam that has developed between the Western side and the Soviet Union on some of the key issues.

Although Canada believes that the present Soviet intransigence will have to soften if a third round of negotiations is to take place, it also recognizes that a Western willingness to compromise will have to be shown if the negotiations are to succeed. Once a CFE agreement is signed, Canada hopes that both sides will give full attention to resolving the differences that now prevent agreement on Open Skies. ■

Open Skies: Canada's Closing Statement

The following is the text of the remarks to the closing plenary of the Budapest Open Skies Conference delivered by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation, on May 10.

As we come to the end of the first phase of the Budapest portion of the Open Skies Conference, we must acknowledge that we have not succeeded in the ambitious task we set for ourselves in Ottawa.

But we should not minimize what we have accomplished here. Most delegations have shown some flexibility on the question of sensors — we all now agree on the need for sensors that would enable all-weather 24-hour a day coverage.

Differences on the technical capabilities of the sensors have been narrowed considerably. Indications have been given about access to sensor systems with comparable technology, and of employing only those sensor technologies to which other nations are granted access.

Some progress has been made on the quota issue. The technical aspects of the regime have been developed as have the legal aspects.

I believe that we could have done much more had there been a willingness by all participants to accept a basic principle of the Ottawa ministerial communiqué — the right to conduct and the obligation to receive overflights.

We have been limited in our potential at this session by continuing fundamental political differences on certain key issues. Once those political differences become unstuck, as I remain confident that they will, the technical solutions will follow very quickly.

It will be incumbent on all of us to rethink the basic issues that have divided this Conference since Ottawa and not to forget the very clear solutions to those problems suggested informally

Third round possible after CFE agreement.

overflying state should choose the aircraft to be used.

The Soviet Union also maintained its view that data resulting from each overflight should be available to all participants in the Open Skies regime. NATO countries have argued that each country should process its own data and decide for itself with whom it wants to share.

On the issue of permitted sensors, the Soviets adhered to a position that would reduce the remote-sensing capability of Open Skies aircraft below that considered by NATO countries to be sufficient for confidence-building on a 24-hour/all-weather basis. The Soviet position was not shared by all WTO states.

by the distinguished representatives of Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Ottawa.

My delegation has worked, and will continue to work, towards an agreement based on these ideas and on the principles I enunciated in my closing remarks in Ottawa.

I also want to look at Open Skies in a wider context. The original Open Skies proposal by President Eisenhower in 1955 represented an attempt to break with past suspicion and mistrust and to take advantage of a possible new opening in East-West relations. The new Open Skies proposal by President Bush is more ambitious in its scope and participation than the original concept, but it represents relatively less of a leap forward than the 1955 proposal.

Unlike 1955, satellites now cross the skies of all our countries, unimpeded by any rules or regulations on sensors, quotas, flight plans or territorial restrictions. The principle of on-site inspection has been accepted in the Stockholm Document and reinforced in the INF Treaty. The distinguished Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, told ministers assembled to launch the CFE in March 1989 that

the Soviet Union was prepared to accept any intrusive verification measure on a reciprocal basis. We are engaged in an active negotiation to reduce conventional armaments in Europe to parity at levels below those of NATO's current force structure. We are prepared to commence negotiation on SNF immediately after the negotiations on the CFE Treaty are finalized. We are looking forward to a CW treaty. We hope the US and USSR will reach agreement on cutting strategic nuclear weapons.

The walls and curtains that posed physical and psychological barriers dividing Europe have come down. There has been an opening up of Eastern Europe on a scale which no one forecast even one year ago. At the Ottawa Conference, ministers welcomed the agreement on ceilings for US and Soviet forces in Europe outside national territory. In Ottawa, six nations agreed on a process to deal with the international aspects of German unification.

None of these factors was present when President Eisenhower launched his original proposal. Indeed many of them occurred after President Bush's proposal of last May. These developments have led some to conclude that the idea of Open Skies has become redundant, overtaken by events. Canada does not accept that view, but to those who do, I would recall the words of Mr. Shevardnadze in Ottawa that no excess is too much when it comes to verification.

I have also heard it said that the inability to move forward on Open Skies is a price being demanded by some elements of the military of one country to enable them to accept concessions elsewhere. There are two ways of looking at such a hypothesis: one is that the military can be bought off for a relatively small price compared to other more substantive decisions already taken; the other, more serious way, is that those who oppose Open Skies


are opposed to aerial glasnost and all the principles that underpin it. Glasnost cannot survive in a climate where fear and suspicion keep the skies of one country open to only its own aircraft and limit even the number of those overflights to two per month.

The concept of Open Skies is an essential element of the new security structure for Europe and North America. That structure must be built on a solid foundation — that of openness. There cannot be a common European home where some countries have restricted or unlit zones that give rise to suspicions and do not create confidence. The concept of the new European security structure cannot be based on old concepts of military power alone. The strength and stability that come from openness are a far better and more durable defence of each country's security interests than the artificial barriers, fears and suspicions of past thinking.

In the last decade of this millennium, as we strive to reach the basis for a better, more secure world, we must not be blown off course by those who wish to extol the ghosts of the past. We must look to a future of openness, which is the basis of confidence and understanding. Our vision of Open Skies not only builds confidence, but provides for equal treatment between the North American and the European participants. We do not seek any advantage; indeed, Canada is prepared to accept the same level of intrusiveness for Open Skies flights as we seek for purposes of aerial verification in the CFE.

Our vision should not be limited to what was feasible in 1986 in Stockholm and in 1988 with the INF Treaty. We are in a new era, and new confidence-building measures like Open Skies must build confidence, not remain static.

As we return to our capitals, key political decisions are required. We all need to reflect on these. Any successful negotiation is a matter of give and take in which no one feels disadvantaged. We are hopeful that the vision that led our political masters to take many of the steps I mentioned previously will prevail in these negotiations too, and the sooner the better. ■



Detail of the former imperial palace in Budapest.

UNDC Wraps Up Old Agenda Items

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its 1990 substantive session from May 7 to 29 at UN headquarters in New York. This session saw the beginning of the implementation of a reform package agreed upon during consultations in the fall of 1989. The reforms are designed to revitalize the UNDC, whose limited accomplishments in recent years have been a disappointment to many.

The reforms were outlined in a paper entitled "Ways and Means to Enhance the Functioning of the Disarmament Commission." This document urged member states to conclude at the 1990 session all outstanding items, many of which had appeared on the agenda for several years with little progress. Beginning in 1991 the UNDC should, according to the paper, limit its agenda to four items, none of which should remain on the agenda for more than three years.

Member states participating in the 1990 session demonstrated a remarkable determination to implement the reforms. All six carry-over items were concluded, four of them with a consen-

sus document — an achievement unprecedented in UNDC history. Perhaps the greatest success was the consensus text on "The Nuclear Capability of South Africa." The Canadian delegation, led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, was also pleased with preliminary consideration of the single new item on the agenda: "Objective Information on Military Matters." Canada looks forward to substantive consideration of this item in 1991.

Discussions are currently underway concerning the 1991 agenda. Aspects of regional disarmament and conversion of military facilities to civilian uses are among the proposed items. In Canada's



At the 1990 UNDC: Col. Doug Fraser, Counsellor, Canadian Mission to the UN; Mr. Perry Calderwood, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, EAITC; and Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament.

view, the UNDC is now in a position to start anew. Canada is committed to making every effort to ensure that the UNDC plays a real and productive role in addressing today's pressing disarmament issues. ■

Preparations Advance for PTBT Amendment Conference

An organizational meeting in preparation for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from May 29 to June 8. The purpose of the meeting was to determine administrative and organizational aspects of the Amendment Conference, which will take place in New York from January 7 to 18, 1991. The Conference is the result of an initiative by some 40 signatories to convert the PTBT, through an amendment, into a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

The organizational meeting resulted in agreement on such matters as rules of procedure, background documentation and financing of the conference. A number of delegations, including Canada's, gave statements outlining general views on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Canadian delegation was led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, who will head Canada's delegation to the January Conference. In her address to participants, Ms. Mason reiterated Canada's commitment to achieving a CTBT. She said: "Canada believes that the Amendment Conference has the potential to build on common ground among parties and provide a fresh impetus to work towards the CTB goal, particularly at the Conference on Disarmament." She also noted that the Amendment Conference may play a useful role in furthering understanding of the verification requirements of a CTBT. ■

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, October 1990 through February 1991.

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing to November 19: CFE Negotiation, Vienna

October 15 - November 30: UN First Committee, New York

November 19: CFE Negotiation scheduled for conclusion; to be followed by CFE IA (see page 16)

November: Canada-Netherlands trial CW challenge inspection of Canadian Forces Base Lahr, Germany

January 7 - 18, 1991: PTBT Amendment Conference, New York

February 1991: CD spring session begins, Geneva

Consultative Group Discusses Naval Arms Control at Halifax Meeting

Members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs from the three maritime provinces and Newfoundland met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Halifax on June 25 to discuss a range of arms control and disarmament issues. In addition to Consultative Group members, the consultation included several others from the region who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and the Department of National Defence.

The consultation focused in particular on naval arms control, with presentations by Commander Peter Haydon, Royal Canadian Navy (retired), of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, and Mr. Tariq Rauf, Senior Research Associate at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa.

Commander Haydon, speaking about naval arms control's history and prospects, pointed to the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain as the ideal to imitate. He attributed the success of this agreement, which limited naval forces

most scope for naval confidence-building measures, particularly applied to non-nuclear navies, as well as for some superpower movement on the limitation of strategic and possibly tactical nuclear weapons.

Commander Haydon gave a mixed assessment of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. He argued that while it will be an important part of any future concept of maritime security, it is also likely to lead to boundary disputes and increase the risk of naval confrontation.

Mr. Rauf, addressing Canada's role in naval arms control, argued that the issue should be tackled sooner, rather than later. He proposed several initiatives that Canada could suggest to the superpowers, including: regular data exchanges and staff contacts; the introduction of permissive action links on sea-based nuclear weapons; the elimination of non-strategic naval nuclear weapons; a ban on all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and negotiated deep cuts in general-purpose submarines.

On unilateral moves, Mr. Rauf recommended that Canada: add naval arms control to its present list of arms control objectives; begin naval verification studies; propose an extension of the CSBM Negotiations' Madrid Mandate to include independent naval activities; expand its existing incidents-at-sea agreement with the Soviet Union to include sub-surface activities; and take an active role in proposing naval arms control and confidence-building measures at the UN.

During the Group's discussion, there was some criticism of Canada's policy of supporting the practice of allies possessing a sea-based nuclear deterrent of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard their warships during visits to foreign ports. It was also suggested that those concerned about the environmental

dangers posed by nuclear-armed or powered ships should devote greater attention to commercial vessels, which are involved in proportionately far more accidents than military ones.

The suggestion of a UN naval force was raised, but some participants voiced concerns about the inter-operability of navies and observed that any such force would be at substantial risk intervening in a war in, for example, the Persian Gulf.

While some argued that the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides an adequate legal basis for a future peaceful regime of the seas, others expressed opinions closer to Commander Haydon's view and emphasized the definitional ambiguities enshrined in the Convention.

In general, participants noted the complexity and difficulty of naval arms control, particularly as an increasing number of states come to regard navies as useful and flexible instruments of national power. The fact that navies are moving in several cases into quasi-military roles, which further complicates constraints, was also raised.

Other topics discussed during the consultation included the changing face of Europe and Canada's involvement therein, global security arrangements, the changing nature of security, possibilities for Arctic cooperation and Canada's policy on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Consultative Group meetings provide occasion for informed debate among people who approach current arms control and disarmament questions from very different perspectives. They also offer government representatives a chance to hear the most persuasive arguments in favour of and against various policy alternatives. Both governmental and non-governmental participants expressed satisfaction that the Halifax meeting continued this valuable tradition. ■

Participants noted the complexity and difficulty of naval arms control, as more states come to regard navies as useful instruments of national power.

on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, to precision in geographic limits, realism in objectives, verifiability and establishment of a management process.

Commander Haydon was less sanguine about naval arms control's prospects, noting that with over 100 states now possessing combatant naval capability, the chances of universal agreement on radical change to the status quo are non-existent. He saw the

The Canadian Position on Naval Arms Control

The following are excerpts from an address delivered by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, at the Conference on Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security sponsored by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax on June 27.

It is a cliché to say that Canada is a maritime nation. When it comes to naval arms control, however, it is a cliché that bears repeating. The three oceans off our shores are sources of great natural wealth, in the form of fish and energy resources. Seaborne trade contributes significantly to our national income. In fact, our domestic exports using a sea mode of transport are worth more than \$30 billion each year. Traditionally, the distance provided by the oceans has helped to keep us secure from military invasion.

If military invasion has, over the years, been regarded as a reasonably lower-order threat to Canada, the areas of potential vulnerability have remained similar to those faced by most maritime nations reliant on trade and vigorous port activity. These are: disruptions to our sea lines of communication and ports through anti-shipping attacks and mining of harbours and sea lanes; protection of our sovereignty and economic rights, particularly, but not exclusively, in fisheries; and protection from physical attack by long-range, sea-based weapons, mainly missiles (some of a nuclear variety), which could conceivably come into play were a major war to break out between East and West...

Developments in naval arms control and maritime confidence-building will not diminish Canada's responsibilities as a maritime-dependent, sovereign nation to be a credible caretaker in the ocean approaches to our nation. By international agreement, we are responsible for the conduct of affairs in sea areas totalling 11 million square kilometres — an area ten percent greater than our land mass. Clearly the priorities for Canada's maritime forces will continue to be surveillance, early warning, presence and control — on,

over and under the waves — in those areas for which Canada is responsible...

The solution is clearly not to eliminate the maritime defence aspect of our security, but to seek to complement it by the diplomatic instruments of naval arms control and maritime confidence-building...

[The Madrid Mandate, which governs the CSBM Negotiations,] limits CSBMs to the sea area adjoining the whole of Europe. The possibility might exist for some expansion of measures regarding naval activities directly linked to notifiable ground force activity, perhaps in the area of an information exchange. But this remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, there is a growing expectation that by the time of the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992, the possibility might exist of a negotiation on a new mandate, which might include naval forces and their activities. This would involve a complex deliberation, in which due consideration would have to be given to issues such as the following:

1. Do naval CSBMs run counter to a fundamental aspect of maritime policy for member states of NATO? NATO is vitally dependent on the free use of the sea for the collective defence of Europe. But naval CSBMs are often seen as limiting the capability of the US and Canada to reinforce Europe in a crisis. By contrast, the WTO enjoys an essentially self-contained land mass, with no challenge to its defence analogous to NATO's task of keeping sea lines of communication and supply routes open. Furthermore, some see naval CSBMs as possibly limiting the international right of passage on the high seas, as well as unimpeded transit through or over straits used for international navigation.

2. Would provisions for naval CSBMs have an inequitable effect on security? Naval CSBMs would disproportionately affect NATO, which is a maritime alliance, and the US in particular. In this sense, naval CSBMs, in the East-West context, could run counter to a basic CSCE principle by not providing for

"equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating states."

3. Are naval CSBMs appropriate to the CSCE? Naval CSBMs would constitute a de facto expansion of the CDE zone, but where would these lines stop? Artificial lines of demarcation in international waters might have to be drawn in an attempt to define as regional highly mobile and inherently global naval force activities.

4. Are naval CSBMs practical? For example, how are we to define a "naval manoeuvre"? Naval forces are constantly manoeuvring as a routine part of their daily operations. And how are we to verify, for example, a distinction between "activities" and routine "manoeuvres"? This poses an immense verification challenge. We have few answers as to how an appropriate and negotiable verification regime for naval CSBMs could be established.

There is, of course, another important area where some success has been registered in the realm of naval arms control...the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks...

Most significant in our view is the acceptance of the principle of constraints on nuclear SLCMs and the reaffirmation by the US and the Soviet Union of their 1987 Washington Summit Statement to continue to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of SLCM verification. Given Canada's longstanding support of verifiable constraints on nuclear SLCMs, we noted this part of the overall agreement with satisfaction.

Taken together with the other measures in START, including specific prohibitions on heavy SLBMs and their launchers; on new types of SLBMs with more than 10 re-entry vehicles; and on the flight testing and deployment of existing types of SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987, they constitute a first step towards the enhancement of strategic stability and collective security at sea. Canada strongly

supports the outline set forth for START II, and we hope it will lead the superpowers to further reductions and limitations in pursuit of these objectives...

At this year's session of the UNDC, naval disarmament was again considered. Substantive and open-ended consultations were conducted under the chairmanship of the representative of Indonesia and resulted in a chairman's paper that summarized the views and proposals of countries that participated in the discussion.

This paper, although it contains widely-divergent opinions, deals with a number of ideas, some of which may be pursued or elaborated in future multilateral consideration of naval arms control and disarmament. Ideas discussed included proposals on the regulation of nuclear-powered ships, including notification of accidents and safety guidelines for seaborne nuclear reactors, and an elaboration of earlier proposals on multilateralizing incidents-at-sea agreements. Canada supported consideration of naval disarmament issues in this forum, and we regard this dialogue as a useful and relevant one.

As I now turn back to an area where Canada believes are the best prospects for progress, at least in the short term, I am reminded of a well-known Canadian

journalist who, on the margins of the Open Skies Conference, compared Canadian arms controllers to Dale Carnegie instructors because of their fixation with confidence-building. This same Canadian journalist went on to say: "For the uninitiated observer, confidence-building seems to be like a mantra for the arms control experts, a phrase which, if chanted often enough, takes on magical, though undefined, properties."

Undefined though those properties may be, in my view they add up to a process, the sum of which is indeed greater than its parts — because of the mutually-reinforcing action of the process of confidence-building with the overall state of political relations.

That is why Canada has actively promoted discussion within NATO on confidence-building in the maritime environment. Preliminary consideration of naval security and arms control has been undertaken both in Brussels and in Ottawa. I believe that, despite the difficulties, we must continue to pursue such studies.

Canada favours, in principle, consideration of measures that would promote mutual trust through transparency, enhance personal contact, and build upon the seafaring traditions of fairness and courtesy. The recently-

signed Canada-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea is a good example of this approach on a bilateral basis. The Agreement includes a procedure enabling the timely passage of information concerning incidents that may occur at sea. It outlines a list of signals,

agreed upon in advance, which permit ships of one country to inform those of the other of their activities and intentions. This could avoid the possibility of ships incorrectly concluding that they are witnessing aggressive acts directed against them.

An important aspect of this Agreement is the human one. Annually, Canadian and Soviet naval staffs will meet to discuss the Agreement and other subjects of mutual interest. The signature of this agreement is therefore a step Canada has taken to promote stability and mutual confidence at sea.

Our military exchange agreement with the Soviet Union, which envisages expanded military contact, also includes reciprocal naval visits. Under this agreement, four Canadian vessels recently conducted an unprecedented visit to the port of Vladivostok...

Given that confidence-building measures are intended to address the psychological or subjective aspects of the perception of "threat," as well as its more objective aspects, the importance of promoting such contacts between our militaries cannot be overemphasized. In the Vienna CSBM context, for example, the value of the seminar on security concepts and military doctrines was as important for the fact that it allowed the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the 35 CSCE participants all to meet together face-to-face as it was for the content of the discussions.

In conclusion, in judging the prospects for naval arms control, it is important to bear in mind that we are at the early stages. Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe have been ongoing, in one form or another, for the past seventeen years, and are only now beginning to bear fruit. Negotiations on strategic arms have a twenty-one year history. Given the complexities of the maritime environment, it is unrealistic to expect rapid movement or dramatic action in this area, especially as so much attention is being placed on the large-scale reductions of conventional forces envisaged for Europe under CFE I and its follow-on. What is required now is a careful, imaginative assessment of the possibilities in the maritime area. ■



Canadian and Soviet officers on board a Soviet vessel during the Canadian visit to Vladivostok (see page 13). Rear-Admiral Cairns is in the front row, third from the right.

Naval Confidence-Building in Vladivostok

From June 3 to 7, a Canadian naval task group consisting of Her Majesty's Canadian Ships Huron, Kootenay, Annapolis and Provider visited the Soviet Far Eastern port of Vladivostok. The visit occurred under the umbrella of the military exchange agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union, signed in November 1989 during Prime Minister Mulroney's visit to the USSR. A reciprocal Soviet naval visit to Canada's West Coast is planned for 1991. The following paragraphs are drawn from the reports of Rear Admiral Peter Cairns, commander of the naval task group, and the Canadian Embassy in Moscow.

Admiral Cairns characterized the visit as follows: "I would say at the outset that the visit to Vladivostok was an outstanding success. Any less a superlative would, in my view, understate the case. Vladivostok has (with a few tightly controlled exceptions) been a closed city. This visit was the first time in 53 years that Westerners in significant numbers were allowed into the city with complete freedom of action, and the history of the occasion was not lost on the Soviets. From the time I set foot on land and partook of the traditional bread and salt welcoming ceremony until I completed the farewell handshakes and boarded Huron for departure, the inhabitants poured out their hearts to us, and our Canadian men and women responded with warmth, generosity and friendliness as only they can. You would have been proud to see them."

The Embassy observed that in extending the invitation to visit Vladivostok to Canada, the Soviet Union demonstrated unexpected openness. The ambitious schedule of events removed any lingering doubt about the Soviets' desire for the occasion to be "a special event for both sides." As the ships steamed into Vladivostok harbour on June 3, several thousand spectators were on the jetty, and buildings were festooned with English-language banners proclaiming peace, understanding and friendship.

This was to be but a small indication of the general public's response to the

Canadian presence during the four subsequent days. As the Embassy reported, "Soviet officials had obviously done considerable pre-visit preparation in alerting the local population, and while one is normally hesitant to wax so enthusiastically about civic attendance at public events in societies such as the USSR, spontaneity of outpouring of curiosity and warmth nevertheless clearly was obvious. The official welcome by the Soviet naval authorities and civilian city officials was equally warm and enthusiastic. One was left with the impression that the entire city of three quarters of a million people had been patiently waiting over 50 years for just such an event.

"Any suspicion that this reception was in any way contrived was immediately swept away by the reaction of the city's inhabitants to the presence of Canadian sailors and ships.

Uniformed Canadians were repeatedly mobbed by hundreds of curious and friendly onlookers on countless occasions. Soviet authorities freely allowed citizens to invite Canadians into their homes, although the highly-charged program prevented much contact of this kind. An estimated 30,000 people from all walks of Soviet life visited the Canadian ships. Many had to be turned away. Conversations among Canadians and Soviets on board and ashore were animated and open, with the latter asking many penetrating questions about Canada, its people, our way of life, and the Canadian Armed Forces. At the same time they were not reticent to talk about current events taking place in the USSR.

"The Canadian Naval Band played throughout the visits, most notably at an evening public concert, at which they offered a rendition of Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture, not played in its entirety in this city for over 30 years; they received a standing ovation. Individual vignettes of this kind are too numerous to men-

tion, but all were indicative of a special atmosphere prevailing throughout."

Soviet naval officers who visited Canadian vessels showed little interest in equipment, but were intensely curious about bread-and-butter issues such as terms and conditions of service in the Canadian Forces and the pay, care and feeding of personnel aboard Canadian ships. They took extensive videos of mess facilities and living quarters. Given the ongoing debate within the Soviet military about the merits of full professional volunteer forces, such keen interest was telling.

Soviet media covered the visit extensively. Canadians conducted interviews with all major Soviet press organiza-

The visit was an outstanding success. When the Canadian ships left the jetty, there were few dry eyes to be found.

tions, both civilian and military. Coverage of the arrival and departure of ships was carried by state television, which also conducted interviews with Canadian service personnel. Japanese television crews were also on hand.

Summing up the visit, Soviet Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Gennady Khvatov declared that "President Gorbachev's visit to Canada and the stay of Canadian ships in Vladivostok will help our two nations forge closer contacts." He underlined the fact that Canada was an ally in the Second World War and remains a neighbour in the Asia-Pacific region today.

Admiral Cairns concluded his report by noting that "this visit did much to put a human touch to the process of openness that is going on in the USSR... I cannot conceive of how our men and women could have been any better ambassadors for Canada. There were thousands on the jetty to say goodbye, and when the last line was let go, there were few dry eyes to be found." ■

Disarmament Fund Projects

The following projects were assisted by a grant or contribution from the Disarmament Fund.

Looking for conference speakers or workshop facilitators? *Making a World of Difference: A Directory of Women in Canada Specializing in Global Issues* gives the names, addresses and backgrounds of 250 women in Canada with expertise in disarmament, development and/or environmental issues. The *Directory* was compiled by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation and can be ordered from the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (CRIAW), 408-151 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5H3. The price is \$15.00.

Policy-makers, academics and members of the attentive public spent three days discussing "Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security" at a conference sponsored by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax in late June. The conference was the second in a series of three dealing with maritime security issues related to Canada's security policy. The third, on "Maritime Interests, Conflict and the Law of the Sea," will be held in June 1991. For further information, contact the Centre c/o Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4H6.

Guerre, paix et désarmement: bibliographie thématique en langue française and *Regards sur la guerre et la paix: filmographie critique en langue française*, both by Annie Bourret and Érik Poole of Laval University's Peace Research Group, provide a detailed inventory of, respectively, French-language documents and French-language films about war, peace and disarmament. To order, contact Les presses de l'université Laval, Avenue de la médecine, Cité universitaire, Sainte-Foy, Quebec, G1K 7P4.

Canada and Asia-Pacific in the 1990s

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a luncheon hosted by the Victoria Chamber of Commerce in Victoria, B.C. on July 17.

[E]vents in Europe find their reflection in Asia in reduced superpower tension and involvement. But the reduction in tension has been less complete, and that reduction has not acted to eliminate those conflicts which always have been — or have become — local in nature. There is a specific set of Asian security concerns which have gone unaddressed and which, if not managed, can threaten regional and indeed global peace.

This is where there has been a remarkable difference between the structure of security in the Pacific region and the structure of security involving North America, the USSR and Europe. During the Cold War, a web of military alliances and institutions for economic cooperation acted to coordinate state behaviour and to limit conflict. And now, in the post-Cold War period, a new set of institutions is emerging, in the form of transforming alliances, an enlarged and unified European Community and an institutionalized CSCE process.

Call for North Pacific security dialogue

The Asian equivalents of these organizations do not exist. There is no NATO, no Warsaw Pact, no CSCE. There are no regional institutions where leaders and officials can meet regularly to exchange views and construct new understandings. The one exception is ASEAN, a regional organization which Canada values. However, ASEAN can only fill part of the vacuum we see, because of its limited membership.

In our view, this difference is not simply a difference between regions. It is also a shortcoming. If there is one lesson which recent decades demonstrate, it is that economic prosperity cannot long endure without a structure of institutional relationships and stable security, just as security is short-lived if it is not accompanied by economic strength and social justice.

That security, that prosperity, that justice will best arise by nations regularly talking together, working together. No matter what the issue, the beginning of any process towards peace is conversation. Conversation which does not necessarily accept that the other side is right, simply that the other side has a legitimate viewpoint. It is an acceptance of the reality that on most issues there can be only winners — or only losers.

That kind of dialogue, and the development of the practice of working together are remarkable by their absence in Asia today. Dialogue is needed between India and Pakistan. It is needed among the four Cambodian factions. It is needed between the two Koreas. It is needed between Vietnam and China. It is needed between Japan and the Soviet Union. And it is needed among all the players in the region.

The time has come to develop institutions of dialogue in the Pacific to match the maturity and prosperity of those societies and those economies. Canada believes that one place to begin is among the countries bordering the North Pacific. That would include the United States and the Soviet Union, the two Koreas, Japan, China and Canada. At the outset, such a security dialogue need not involve fixed agendas or require that all issues be discussed. The priority should be to develop the habit of an open and free discussion. That process would identify the issues on which North Pacific nations could make progress together.

A North-Pacific security cooperation dialogue is long overdue. Security problems are a singular threat to continued economic growth. They are a chief cause of refugee movements and could easily derail democratic reforms throughout Asia. Persistent security problems perpetuate distrust, propel arms races, prompt

questionable nuclear programs and involve a massive haemorrhaging of resources. The absence of structures to manage these problems is in direct contrast to the intense economic activity in the region, and a direct threat to the future of that economic activity.

We might consider a Pacific adaptation of the CSCE. One area for initial exploration may be the so-called "confidence and security-building measures," which contributed so much to the transformation of Europe since the Helsinki Conference.

Throughout the 1980s, the Soviet Union made numerous proposals in this area. Most were either propaganda or a search for unilateral strategic advantage. But given the transformation in East-West relations, perhaps it is time to identify those proposals that have serious merit and to make serious counter-proposals.

Such measures could include information exchanges, military manoeuvre notification and Open Skies regimes. And if the dialogue on conventional forces in Europe develops into a dialogue on naval forces, the Pacific Ocean is an obvious locus of concern and action. ■

NATO Industry Verification Study Group Meets in Canada

In late autumn 1989, the Conference of National Armaments Directors commissioned the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) to undertake a study of conventional disarmament verification technologies. The Conference is a high-level body established under the authority of NATO's Atlantic Council to encourage member countries to join together in equipment and research projects, as well as to provide a means of information exchange on technical matters.

As a result, a NIAG study group — involving industry representatives from most NATO countries — is reviewing technology and systems available within the alliance relevant to the verification of future conventional arms control agreements. Representatives from Canadian companies played a key role in setting up the study and are actively participating in all aspects of the group's work. A Canadian — Dr. F.J.F. Osborne of Spar Aerospace Ltd. — has been selected as Deputy Chairman. The group held its first meetings outside Brussels in Montreal and Ottawa during the first week of September. Speaking at a luncheon co-hosted for the group by EAITC and the Department of National Defence, Mr. Rob Gillespie [DND's Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)] and Mr. Mark Moher (EAITC's Director General for International Security, Arms Control and CSCE Affairs) emphasized the importance that Canada attaches to verification and the utility of the study group's work. Canada, Mr. Moher said, has invested considerable effort in exploring verification questions and is proud of the work of the Verification Research Program established within EAITC in 1983. Both Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Moher stressed the value of cooperation between government and industry in this field. They briefly outlined the structures in place to facilitate industrial cooperation between member countries of NATO, which could be used for cooperative projects on verification technologies.

The NIAG study is planned for completion in the spring of 1991. ■

Canadians Address Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space

After considerable delay in agreeing on a mandate and work program this year, the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space began serious and constructive deliberations during the CD's summer session. As part of this work, two Canadian experts made presentations to the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. Jeff Tracey of EAITC's Verification Research Unit spoke to the Ad Hoc Committee on July 19 about past, present and future capabilities of commercial satellite imagery for arms control verification purposes. The use of various types of presently-available commercial satellite imagery, including data from the French SPOT system, the Soviet Soyuzcarta program and the American Landsat program were discussed. Also mentioned were future

satellite programs such as Canada's RADARSAT satellite, the Soviet Almaz satellite, the American Landsat 7 satellite and the French Helios program. Through examples of current commercial airborne optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar imagery, the future of commercial satellite imagery was explored as was the question of how the resulting data might be used for verification applications. Mr. Tracey also addressed other applications of high resolution commercial satellite imagery, such as to United Nations peacekeeping and to environmental monitoring.

Mr. Peter Stibrany of Spar Aerospace Ltd. addressed the Ad Hoc Committee on July 24. His presentation examined possible ambiguities that might arise concerning space activities over the next twenty years, in particular dis-

tinguishing between weapon and non-weapon activities. The question of what constitutes a "space weapon" has proven extremely contentious. Mr. Stibrany outlined some preliminary research undertaken on behalf of EAITC's Verification Research Program to develop a systematic way to discriminate between benign, hazardous or harmful space activities using a "harmfulness index." Such an index could prove useful in arms control schemes designed to constrain either the capabilities or configuration of spacecraft. Mr. Stibrany noted that verification of the level of relative harmfulness could be made most effective by supplementing existing treaty restrictions with confidence-building measures designed to add information about the missions of space objects. ■

Canadians Observe Soviet Military Exercise



Soviet General-Major Lavrenyuk (centre) with Canadian observers Lt.Col. Jack Harris (left) and Mr. Denis Boulet (right).

Two Canadians were among 46 officials from 23 countries who observed a Soviet military exercise in the Kiev military district in March. They were there in accordance with the 1986 Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures, which requires signatories to invite all other CSCE members to send observers to exercises involving a minimum of 17,000 troops. The observers are to confirm that the exercise is carried out in conformity with the exercise notification.

Although the observation threshold is 17,000, nothing prevents a country from inviting observers to any exercise taking place on its territory, regardless of the level of participation. This was the case with the Soviet exercise, which was forecast to involve 17,000 troops but actually involved 12,000.

The Canadians — Mr. Denis Boulet of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of EAITC and Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Harris, Military Attaché with the Canadian Embassy in Moscow — were flown to Kiev on March 19 with the other observers. There General-Major Lavrenyuk, Deputy Commander of the Kiev Military District, briefed them on the purpose of the exercise, the

number of troops participating and the observation program.

The observers had an opportunity to watch a number of military operations including offensives and counter-offensives, the construction of a 100-metre bridge and its subsequent crossing by armoured vehicles and trucks, an airborne assault and simulated tank combat. They visited a field care unit, a field hospital and a defensive position. In addition, they viewed a demonstration of equipment, including armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and air defence equipment. There were numerous opportunities for dialogue between observers and hosts, as well as between observers and troops taking part in the exercise.

There was no doubt in the minds of participants that the observation contributed significantly to the development of confidence, which in turn encourages the growth of security. It was with the satisfaction of knowing that the objectives of the Stockholm Document had been met that the observers returned on March 23 to their respective countries. ■

CFE Update

Beginning mid-year, work on a CFE treaty was accelerated to meet the target of concluding an agreement by November to coincide with a planned CSCE Summit meeting in Paris. In addition to aiming for this deadline, negotiators had to respond to dramatic changes in European security, which altered the underlying assumptions on which the CFE negotiation was based. The agreement reached in Ottawa in February, for example, which placed limits on the level of US and Soviet forces stationed in Europe, became irrelevant as a result of the bilaterally-negotiated withdrawals of Soviet forces from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Responding to a widely-held view that follow-on negotiations could further improve security in Europe, NATO

leaders proposed at their Summit meeting in July that further talks on conventional force reductions begin — with the same participants and mandate — following signature of the first CFE treaty. Participants began to refer to the current round of negotiations as CFE I, and to the follow-on round as CFE IA.

Eastern concerns about the size of the armed forces of a unified Germany were resolved with a binding German commitment to reduce the size of its combined armed forces to 370,000 personnel. Western participants stated their readiness to address the issue of the level of their armed forces in follow-on negotiations.

By late September, considerable progress had been achieved in the

negotiation, but serious difficulties remained for resolution. The problems included demands by the Soviet Union concerning levels of combat aircraft, and sufficiency (the percentage of total treaty-limited equipment that any one state may hold). A Soviet demand to retain 80 percent of all WTO entitlements was opposed not only by Western states, but by most East European states as well.

In addition, negotiators had to resolve how to calculate quotas for the verification inspections envisaged in the treaty, how to define the operational criteria for aerial inspection, and how to accommodate Soviet demands for the large-scale, irreversible conversion of military equipment to peaceful purposes, as opposed to its destruction. ■

Canada and the New Europe

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus, Toronto, on May 26.

Around the world, 1989 will be remembered as the year of European revolution... Canadians watched with wonder as what we thought would take decades came to pass in weeks. The impossible suddenly became possible and the dream became reality. But that reality, while hopeful, also carries heavy responsibilities — for Europeans and for Canadians.

If 1989 was the year of revolution, 1990 marks the beginning of a decade of reconstruction... The events of 1989 swept away oppressive and outdated economic and political structures. But new societies and new institutions remain to be built. That task has only just begun.

The remarkable events in Central and Eastern Europe are intensely personal for millions of Canadians whose roots are there. Many have ties of language and family. Some were forced to flee by the very regimes which have now collapsed. Most have family or friends whose hopes were thwarted, or lives diminished, by those old regimes, but who have the prospect now of building new lives and new societies in old homelands.

Virtually no other nation possesses the web of intense personal connections to Eastern and Central Europe which we have in Canada. That gives us a special interest, and a special capacity, in helping those societies become prosperous and free.

The revolution of 1989 has fundamental implications for the entire European continent — and for North America which, in terms of culture and history, is Europe across the Atlantic. The requirement for leadership and imagination extends across all issues — political, military and economic. That requires a new Canadian approach not only to

Central and Eastern Europe but towards the entire European region.

On February 5th, at McGill University in Montreal, I announced the initiation of a review of our policy towards Europe. The purpose of that review has been to define Canadian interests in Europe and to develop a strategy to secure those interests. I would like to share some thoughts with you that have arisen through that review.

I begin with two basic observations. The first is this: Canada's stake in Europe should not be taken for granted. We have interests around the world and our past preoccupation with Europe is no argument for a focus for the future. Nostalgia is no basis for policy. Our interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling.

The second observation is that Canada's wishes will not necessarily determine

Canada's role. Powerful new economic and political forces are at work, forces over which Canada has

limited influence. A European role will not be bestowed upon us because we decide it is in our interests. It must be earned. That requires imagination and realism and hard work.

What are Canada's primary interests in the new Europe?

One of them is to help ensure that Europe does not again become what it once was. Another is to help ensure that Europe becomes a positive force for change both at home and around the world.

Our primary interest is the interest in peace. Two world wars this century have taught Canadians that a Europe at peace with itself is a Europe at peace with the world. Security in Canada has no meaning without security in Europe.

Our economic prosperity depends upon stability in the world. Threats to that stability are threats to our prosperity.

More directly, as a country dependent on trade for 30 percent of our GNP, the unifying market of Western Europe is vital for jobs and prosperity in Canada, and the vast and untapped markets of Eastern Europe constitute a long-term opportunity of potentially immense proportions.

Politically, the values which have triumphed in Europe are our values too. We rejoice in their ascendancy and also take comfort in the fact that democracies are inherently more peaceful than the totalitarian alternative. The construction of durable democracies there is not only a moral quest; it is also a security imperative.

Finally, Canadian interests in the new Europe relate not only to what occurs there but also to what is occurring elsewhere. For decades, our preoccupation with a brittle peace in Europe has hindered our ability to deal with mount-

Our interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling.

ing global problems — the threat to the global environment, the crises of international development and debt, the evils of the international drug trade and the proliferation of terror and weapons of mass destruction. Many of these problems do not have European origins. But our preoccupation with Europe — ideologically and militarily — has kept these other priorities far too low on the global agenda. With Europe at peace with itself, we can turn together to a planet in need of urgent action.

So we are not interested in Europe for reasons of history, or nostalgia, and certainly not for reasons of charity. It is not only their prosperity which is at stake, it is ours. It is not only their security, it is ours.

While our interests in Europe remain strong, the means by which we pursue those interests must change radically. They must change to reflect the new security framework now in evolution; they must change to reflect the growing power and unity of Western Europe;

and they must change to reflect the particular advantages and assets of Canada.

The primary Canadian bridge to Europe has been our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. That contribution has involved thousands of Canadian troops on the ground in Germany, troops whose lives have been put on the line daily in the defence of freedom. In a real sense, that contribution of Canadian lives can have no substitute and no parallel.

That military contribution is bound to decline. It will not be a decline which we regret, because it will be a product of the long-sought reduction in East-West tensions which is the result of the new Soviet foreign policy, the dissolution of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unilateral and negotiated reductions in conventional and nuclear forces. At long last, we are moving from a partial and artificial peace to a comprehensive, more natural peace, a peace where intentions are becoming benign and capabilities are being reduced to the point where surprise attack is no longer possible.

This process and this reality can only be applauded. What has begun must continue, and a firm foundation must be built for a structure of lasting security at the lowest possible level of military forces, conventional and nuclear. That will not come suddenly or easily, but it is now a realistic goal.

It is a seeming paradox that NATO's very success requires the Alliance to renew itself. But, in fact, that is easy to understand. An organization whose primary role has been to defend against plausible aggression must revise its role when that aggression becomes less plausible. It is only natural in these circumstances for NATO to assume a more political role, a role which would reflect both the new European reality and a declining military mission.

That is a change which Canada fully supports and which meets Canadian interests. But it is not enough to simply declare that NATO must become more political. NATO will only become a forum for increased dialogue if it is used for that purpose by all its members, European and North American. NATO

cannot be declared more political; it must be made more political.

To a large extent, the future relevance of NATO will depend on the degree to which it adopts, reflects and strives for a broader definition of security. Security must become cooperative rather than competitive. The time for the zero-sum game is over. Even more than in the past, NATO must embrace security through arms control with as much vigour as it has pursued security through armament.

NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It makes little sense to retain a military strategy which is based on a scenario of a surprise attack across a front which no longer exists and where surprise is no longer possible. And it makes little sense to continue to retain in Europe the largest peace-time deployment of military force in the history of the world.

This is not to deny the continuing requirement for prudence and military stability at this time of historic change. Twelve months do not invalidate the lessons of history. The possibility of instability is there and Soviet military capabilities remain substantial. Therefore, a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there is crucial as we strive for strategic stability at significantly lower levels of military force.

But NATO cannot be seen as a barrier to the peace it has preserved so well for over 40 years. If NATO does not lead, it will lose the critical legitimacy it has enjoyed in Europe. NATO will be seen not as part of the solution, but as part of the problem.

It is important that NATO become even more actively engaged in the dynamic security dialogue now emerging between East and West. Those security questions involve NATO's members and NATO's interests; the Alliance

should turn outwards to embrace its old adversaries and new friends.

To this end, early consideration might be given to the Soviet foreign minister meeting on a regular basis with NATO foreign ministers. Similarly, a direct and regular dialogue between the leaders of the Western Alliance and the USSR might be worthy of pursuit.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, NATO should develop an enhanced capacity and role in confidence-building and verification activities. Dedicated, multinational forces on the ground might be deployed for this purpose. NATO should also look to the establishment of a Verification Centre to coordinate these activities.

In addition, in the context of reviewing its military strategy, NATO should move away from a rigid forward defence to a much more flexible approach involving mobile units, possibly including forces of a multinational nature. NATO's new military posture should be designed to minimize force levels and to maximize stability. We want to reduce insecurity in the East.

But NATO, although it is of enduring value, has its limitations, a function of its mandate and its membership. There are other institutions whose role must be enhanced and transformed if they are to play a useful role in the elaboration of a new European system. And it is there that Canada must also focus its efforts.

Central among these is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its membership is comprehensive, encompassing the nations of Europe, North America and the Soviet Union. Its mandate extends across the board — to security, political and economic matters, as well as to human and social rights.

The principles embodied in its earlier accords provided the vision and the standards which helped inspire the brave democrats of Eastern Europe. The role of the CSCE must now be expanded so that it becomes the drawing board for the new European architecture. As a complement to NATO, the CSCE can become a true instrument of cooperative security, one which would

supplement deterrence with reassurance. And, as the nature of European security expands beyond military balances to political stability and economic prosperity, there is a central role for the CSCE in the areas of human rights, economic cooperation and environmental action.

Until now, the CSCE has functioned on an intermittent basis. It has lacked the institutional framework now required for effective and ongoing cooperation and confidence-building. If the CSCE is to become the preferred forum for comprehensive discussions in the political, economic, security and human dimensions, it must develop the tools to perform those tasks.

Canada believes that continuing political direction from the highest level is required on a regular and ongoing basis if the CSCE is to realize its full potential. Canada proposes that the CSCE should meet annually at the level of foreign ministers and biannually at the level of heads of government. This political body could serve as the beginning of a Council for European Cooperation, a future, permanent forum for dialogue on pan-European issues.

The CSCE should develop a forum to reflect the increasingly democratic character of its membership. Therefore, we also propose the establishment of a CSCE Assembly where parliamentary delegations from member states would meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern.

In the security area, the CSCE will have a role in mandating a further round of conventional force reduction talks. These talks should be conducted among all 35 members of the CSCE, rather than solely the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The CSCE should also increase its role in verification and confidence-building. Here, I have in mind a CSCE Verification Agency which would facilitate and coordinate verification and confidence-building activities mandated by the negotiations on conventional force reductions and confidence- and security- building measures. In addition, there is a potentially valuable role to be played by the CSCE in crisis prevention

and conflict resolution. This could involve the creation of a mechanism whereby panels could be established to facilitate dialogue if a crisis develops involving any participating state and to conduct fact-finding investigations if required. This mechanism could recommend a strategy to resolve the crisis — whether it be mediation, arbitration or even peacekeeping. If the crisis develops into conflict, the CSCE could initiate mediation activities. These activities could be supported by a permanent Institute for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which would provide expertise for crisis prevention and conflict resolution activities...

In designing a new role for the CSCE, we must avoid duplication and new bureaucracies. The goal is concrete progress, not talkathons. In this connection, if the CSCE is to assume an activist role in the new Europe, it may well have to modify, perhaps on a selective basis, the current principles of unanimity in its decision-making process...

I would like to address briefly one issue at the centre of Europe's evolution: the unification of Germany. The degree to which that historic union is accomplished smoothly and without rancour will determine the future pattern of European relations. We have articulated many times our strong support for a free, united and sovereign Germany — within NATO and the European Community — a Germany which will be a powerful instrument of stability, unity and prosperity at the heart of Europe.

The so-called "two plus four" talks now underway — and initiated in Ottawa at the Open Skies Conference — are looking at the external aspects of German reunification. Those talks must succeed.

There are delicate and important issues to resolve at those talks and elsewhere — within NATO, the European Community, at the Vienna talks and between a united Germany and its neigh-



The Right Honourable Joe Clark.

bours. These include the future of Germany in the Alliance, the size and status of stationed and German armed forces, and the implications for NATO's nuclear deterrent.

As these crucial issues are addressed, two realities must be borne in mind: the fact that the Soviet Union has legitimate, central security preoccupations which must be accommodated; and the requirement to ensure that

The CSCE can become a true instrument of cooperative security, supplementing deterrence with reassurance.

Germany's role retains the popular support of the German people. On these two points more than any other, success and stability will rest.

A new direction for NATO, an expanded role for the CSCE, and an intensified relationship with the European Community: those are the institutional pillars of our new policy towards Europe. They reflect our assessment of the most effective means by which the new Europe can be built. And they also reflect Canada's interests and assets — political, security and economic — in ensuring that we are at the table, that trans-Atlantic links are maintained and that our priorities are addressed...

I would like to conclude with three observations.

First, the policy I have discussed today addresses a Europe in transition. The policy itself must also evolve with the region it addresses. Europe is not static; and neither will be Canadian policy.

Second, I have described the extraordinary Canadian advantage represented by our multicultural community. That advantage also carries with it responsibilities. One of those responsibilities is this: as Europe frees itself from the shackles of the past, old animosities are re-emerging, animosities frozen by

repression and made more dangerous by the absence of traditions of compromise. These animosities can threaten the very social stability which will be required if democracy there is to survive. We Canadians — all Canadians — have a responsibility to avoid fanning the flames of intolerance. We also have an opportunity to encourage compromise and accommodation — the only avenue for societies who wish to turn their back on the old ways and embrace a democratic future.

One final point. What is happening in Europe illustrates graphically today's imperative of interdependence — interdependence between countries and

regions, and interdependence between issues — political, military and economic. Interdependence means opportunity. It also means challenge. Global existence today does not have an escape clause — or an escape hatch.

How we behave towards each other at home has an impact on our interests abroad. And what we do abroad determines how prosperous and safe we are here at home.

Engagement with the new Europe is not a luxury; it is a necessity. And Canada will be there, as we must, for our own sake, our own security, our own prosperity. ■

NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed Alliance

The following Declaration was issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on July 5 and 6.

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a

continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the

European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build

new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all of our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to

NATO must be an agent of change.

new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united

Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on Open Skies.

11. The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.

12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with addition-

al measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.

13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future

an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up-to-date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear

SNF negotiations should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed.

systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.

18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to

adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence," where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection, NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should

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become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, *inter alia*:

- CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
- CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
- CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
- CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.

22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:

- a program for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress towards a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchanges of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and
- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent. ■

Canada's Goal for the CSCE Summit

From November 19 to 21, the leaders of the 34 (with the reunification of Germany) countries of the CSCE will gather in Paris for a summit meeting. The following article on Canada's approach to the Summit was prepared by the International Security Policy and CSCE Affairs Division of EAITC.

The political scene in Europe differs significantly from that prevailing in 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was adopted by the (then) 35 countries of the CSCE. The Final Act, and the follow-up to it, had a great deal to do with the changes that led to current political circumstances on that continent. In the past, the CSCE did much to ease the burden of a divided Europe. It now offers a framework for the management of pan-European security relations in the post-Cold War era. For this framework to become a reality, the CSCE will have to adapt to the ongoing changes in Europe.

The Paris Summit will set this process in motion. It will, we believe, affirm the validity of the CSCE process, register and consolidate the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe, and give substantial new impetus to the CSCE process in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act. Canada's goal for the Summit is to have the leaders arrive at a powerful and concise document that confirms and enhances the role of the CSCE as the key pluralistic, pan-European and transatlantic process within which a true cooperative security framework can be developed. An important aspect of this framework will be the establishment of a conflict prevention centre, which we see as the initial step in a comprehensive and evolutionary approach to European security.

Preparing for a Ban on Chemical Weapons: Trial Inspections in Canada

During the past two years, various countries, including Canada, have carried out "trial" verification inspections in their civilian chemical industry or at government facilities. Conducted on a national basis, these trial or mock inspections aim to test the procedures for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) currently under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The majority of trials have involved routine — as opposed to challenge — inspection procedures. These procedures are designed to provide confidence that chemicals are not diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons.

The draft CW Convention deals with three "schedules" of toxic chemicals: Schedule 1 comprises agents that have no application other than as chemical weapons; Schedule 2 comprises chemicals that could serve as key precursors to the manufacture of chemical weapons, but have legitimate commercial applications; Schedule 3 contains toxic chemicals that are widely used in the chemical industry but could be modified to produce the chemical weapons listed in Schedule 1. Under the Convention, Schedule 1 chemicals will be banned. Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals will be monitored through a variety of routine inspection procedures.

Inspection of DRE Suffield

The draft CWC recognizes a requirement for research into defence and protective measures against the effects of chemical weapons. Thus, even though states joining a CWC will have forsworn the development, production, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons, they will still retain the right to conduct research into and develop equipment for defence against possible CW attack. All states represented in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the CD regard this right as

a prudent and necessary aspect of CW disarmament.

As a result, each state, if it so desires, will be permitted to retain a single, small-scale facility (SSSF) at which limited amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals could be synthesized and used in experimental work in the area of protective research and development. Each SSSF will be under close scrutiny by the international inspectorate, the body established by the CW Convention to monitor and verify compliance with its provisions. Through routine visits to the facility, the inspectorate will establish whether:

- declarations made by the state with respect to the SSSF and activities carried out there are consistent with obligations assumed under the CWC;
- quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, stored, transferred, or consumed are within the national limits prescribed by the CWC (i.e., one metric ton);
- reaction vessels used in the facility are limited in size and not designed for continuous operation (i.e., that the facility does not have the capacity to produce quantities of Schedule 1 materials in excess of the one metric ton limit).

Canada does not possess any production facilities for chemicals currently listed in Schedule 1. Nevertheless, as a contribution to the development of inspection procedures under negotiation at the CD, in November 1989 Canada carried out a trial inspection at a simulated SSSF. The facility selected for the trial was located at Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) in Alberta.

Small amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals have occasionally been prepared at DRES as part of ongoing research into protective measures against the effects

of chemical weapons. If and when such chemicals are needed, they are prepared in a standard organic synthesis laboratory of the type found at many universities and research institutes.

The research lab at DRES does not have any large reactors or permanently-installed processing equipment. Its capacity is limited to bench-scale synthesis. It is therefore not comparable to the kind of dedicated SSSF envisioned in the draft CW Convention, and the procedures for routine inspection outlined in the draft CWC had to be adapted accordingly for the DRES inspection.

Suffield trial demonstrates feasibility of carrying out routine inspections at an SSSF.

The Canadian trial simulated a routine, periodic (annual) inspection of an SSSF at which Schedule 1 chemicals could be produced. Having defined DRES as a simulated SSSF, the aims of the inspection were to:

- evaluate the approach to verification at an SSSF as outlined in the then-current version of the draft CWC (CD/952);
- determine the problems such verification procedures might create for the facility's normal operations;
- assess, in general, the routine verification provisions envisioned in CD/952 for an SSSF.

As part of the trial inspection, officials at DRES provided an "initial declaration" along the lines of that which would be required under the CWC for all states possessing an SSSF. The declaration included: a statement of the location and detailed technical description of the facility; a statement of the quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals possessed as of the date of the Convention's entry

into force; and a list of Schedule 2 chemicals (and their quantities) maintained as precursors for Schedule 1 chemical synthesis.

The inspection was conducted by a team of inspectors drawn from various federal government departments, including EAITC, the Department of National Defence, Agriculture Canada, and Industry, Science and Technology Canada. Five members of the team were scientists with backgrounds and experience in the chemical field. There was also a representative from the Canadian chemical industry.

The inspection successfully demonstrated the feasibility of carrying out routine verification inspections at an SSSF preparing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes without compromising sensitive or secure facilities, equipment or operations. All aims of the trial were achieved, although some difficulty was encountered in adapting the SSSF model to a research laboratory site such as that found at DRES. The inspection was sufficiently realistic to test the practicality of the inspection procedures already contained in the draft CWC, and the results provided excellent guidance for their further negotiation. A number of recommendations pertaining to improvements in the inspection procedures, as well as a detailed description of the Canadian

trial inspection, were presented to the CD in April 1990 under the cover of CD document 987 (CD/CW/WP.290).

Inspection of a Pharmaceutical Facility

In July 1990, Merck Frosst Canada Inc. of Pointe-Claire, Quebec, received a team of inspectors whose ostensible task was to ensure that a certain chemical was not being diverted to the production of chemical weapons. In fact, this was a trial inspection, conducted with the cooperation of the company, and had little to do with a particular chemical. Rather, the purpose was to contribute to the development of procedures that could assist Canadian and international inspectors when a ban on chemical weapons enters into force.

Canada does not possess chemical weapons. Nonetheless, once a CWC enters into force, Canadian industry will be subject to reporting requirements on the disposition of certain chemicals that are used for legitimate commercial purposes. Canadian facilities will also be subject to inspection by the international inspectorate established under the Convention. These requirements reflect the concerns of CWC negotiators that certain chemicals, and certain chemical or pharmaceutical production facilities, could be diverted to covert production of chemical weapons, whether on a large or small (batch) scale.

July's Merck Frosst inspection attested to the cooperation that has developed since 1989 between the federal government and the Canadian

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and its members. Similar cooperation exists between the government and the Canadian Chemical Producers Association. Merck Frosst Vice-President Andy Quinn and his management staff spent the best part of two days receiving an inspection team made up of officials from EAITC (assisted by a consultant from the University of Saskatchewan), the Department of National Defence, Agriculture Canada, Environment Canada, the Bureau of Dangerous Drugs, and Industry, Science and Technology Canada. Also participating as an observer was an official from the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Such a range of expertise was considered essential because of the trial inspection's diverse objectives:

Merck Frosst inspectors confident that a Convention can be made to work without compromising commercial interests.

- to assess the value of using an audit trail of a (simulated) chemical of concern in order to verify compliance;
- to assess the impact of an audit trail inspection on confidential business information; and
- to investigate the use of quality control procedures and equipment as they might be required and available in support of such inspections.

The insights achieved as a result of the trial inspection have already been communicated to the CWC negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Everyone involved in the exercise — company management, government officials and scientists, and the foreign observer — agreed that the inspection was a challenging and informative experiment in the real world in which a CWC will have to operate. In particular, all came away with the belief that a Convention can be made to work without compromising the confidentiality of a company's commercial interests. ■



The trial inspection team with the management of Merck Frosst Canada Inc.

Canada Assesses CD's Progress Towards a CW Convention

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by Mr. Gerald Shannon, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), to the CD in plenary session in Geneva on August 24.

In our view, some very useful and important work has been accomplished in the summer session...

Under Ambassador Hyltenius' [Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons] overall direction:

- Working Group A has further considered ways of improving the Inspection Protocol, in particular the section on "Alleged Use" and the overlaps with the Annexes to Article VI, and has begun examining the proposal for Ad Hoc Verification;
- Working Group B has been particularly successful in finding solutions to some critical technical issues related to Articles IV, V and VI, in particular on thresholds, definitions, and dates, and elements of the question of the Order of Destruction;
- Working Group C has carefully worked out texts on Amendments, Settlement of Disputes, and Measures to Redress a Situation that seem to enjoy a high degree of general support and which offer the hope that these issues might well now be on the way to final resolution;
- the various "Friends of the Chair" on such issues as Article X, "Old Chemical Weapons," and "Jurisdiction and Control" have made very laudable efforts to develop consensus approaches to these long-outstanding issues.

Notwithstanding these advances, however, we are disappointed and disturbed that more was not achieved during this past summer, particularly given the sense of heightened expectations that seemed to prevail during the spring session...

This failure to achieve greater progress is also surprising in light of the signing, on June 1st, of the USA-USSR bilateral agreement for the cessation of

CW production and the destruction of all but 5000 agent tons of their CW stockpiles by December 31 of the year 2002. My government welcomed this agreement and hoped that it would further facilitate the early conclusion of our multilateral negotiations here in Geneva.

In saying this, I should note that my delegation is not one of those that believe that all it will take to wind up our negotiations and produce a draft Convention for signature is simple political will. Certainly that will be necessary, but there yet remain a number of major, crucial issues to be resolved. There are also important technical questions that still need to be thoroughly addressed if we are to produce a truly effective Convention.

The reasons for this limited progress seem as varied as they are elusive. Some have indeed pointed to an alleged lack of willpower. Or perhaps there is an unreadiness in some quarters to accept that we might actually be on the verge of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Others might point to an insidious, dangerous degradation of the overall negotiating climate, where chemical weapons proliferation is increasing and where chemical weapons are seen by some — erroneously, we believe — as a "poor man's" weapon of mass destruction.

Quite irrespective of the current situation in the Middle East, that area has been a source of particular concern for some time because of the approach of some states in the region to chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used there not long ago and, recently, threats to use CW have been made which then provoked counter-threats. We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. These can only contribute to heightened tension and greater uncertainty. Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations, and that the only road to real security against the chemical weapons threat lies in the negotiation of a global ban of chemical

weapons on which we, in the Conference on Disarmament, are now actively engaged.

The Canadian government's position is very clear: we firmly support the goal of a total ban on chemical weapons. And we want to see this achieved as soon as is feasible — not tomorrow or next week, but also not five or ten years from now. Delay can only add to the risk of greater proliferation and greater use of chemical weapons.

We also want the Convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords — in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By global, we mean a Convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike), and the approximately 80 other states not participating in these negotiations, will wish to become parties. We seek a Convention that has addressed the security interest of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike...

By comprehensive, we mean a Convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals.

A Convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our minds. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The Convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the Convention's comprehensiveness — i.e., complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged ten-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To us, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the Convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By effectively verifiable, we mean a Convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the Convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last: a truly effective verification regime. This, in our view, would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification regime under the Convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an ex-

tent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement.

In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request," and however we characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the Convention — the final means under the Convention whereby a state party can seek assurance that other states parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly-intrusive challenge inspection regime — one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the state initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer — can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns...

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the Convention would require additional measures to be effective — measures that would go beyond those of Article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of Article IX — in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the Convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extension of challenge inspection: rather, it complements the regime by providing another needed component to effective verification...

We are convinced that if we can develop a fully effective verification regime — one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component — we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the Convention. There are, as indicated, a number of other major problems that are critical to ensuring the globality and comprehensiveness of the Convention, but we believe that they, too, can be best addressed through a constructive and open-minded attitude...

I hope that the foregoing comments and the studies and reports noted will be seen as constructive and concrete demonstrations of my Government's firm commitment to negotiating an effective, total ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding our disappointment that more was not achieved, we continue to have high expectations that a successful conclusion to our negotiations in the near future is within our grasp.

Verification Research in Support of a CWC

A major area of activity for EAITC's Verification Research Program is the provision of support to the Canadian delegation to the chemical weapons negotiations at the CD. In addition to drawing on EAITC resources, the Program channels expertise from other federal government departments and from consultants outside the government towards the goal of a CWC. Particularly helpful to the Program during the last two years have been Professor Ronald Sutherland, on leave of absence from the University of Saskatchewan's Department of Chemistry, and Dr. Bruno Schiefer and his staff at the University of Saskatchewan's Toxicology Research Centre.

Anyone involved in research will realize that credible work is not produced and distributed overnight. However, 1990 has been a very fruitful year in seeing the conclusion of a number of projects. Canada has already submitted the following major reports to the CD:

- *Role and Function of a National Authority in the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention;*
- *Verification Methods, Handling and Assessment of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents;*
- *Toxicity Determinations and the Chemical Weapons Convention;*
- *The Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Inspectorate: A Quantitative Study;*
- *National Trial Inspection at a Single Small-Scale Facility;*
- *Report on a National Trial Inspection.*

The first four of these reports have been distributed to Canadian university libraries and institutes concerned with arms control issues. Researchers can obtain the two reports of trial inspections from the Verification Research Unit of EAITC, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.

Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting

From July 18 to 20, Canada hosted in Ottawa a meeting of countries participating in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The purpose of the July meeting was to examine ways of enhancing the implementation of the regime.

The MTCR consists of a set of guidelines concerning the export of certain missile-related equipment and technology. It is not a treaty, but rather an agreement among participating countries that each will apply the guidelines through its own national export controls.

A technical annex to the agreement lists all of the items covered by the MTCR and divides them into two categories. Category I contains the items of greatest sensitivity, such as complete rocket systems, complete subsystems, and guidance sets and rocket engines meeting certain specifications. Category II items include lightweight turbojet engines, launch and flight control systems, and selected propulsive substances.

The guidelines are such that items in Category I are rarely exported. The supplying government must be confident that the receiving government will use the items only for peaceful purposes, and that these purposes will not change after receipt. The receiving government must agree that the items will not be replicated, modified or transferred without the consent of the supplying government.

In the rare case where a Category I item is, in fact, exported, the supplying government assumes responsibility for taking steps to ensure that the item is put only to its stated use. Putting the burden on the supplier as well as the recipient is a unique initiative in arms control, and Canada believes that this is key to inhibiting missile proliferation.

The Ottawa meeting was attended by representatives of the seven original

MTCR partners: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was also attended by representatives of the newest participants in the regime — Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — and by a Spanish representative.

In announcing the meeting, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated that "Canada attaches great importance to the Missile Technology Control Regime as an essential component of our efforts to work for peace and security. It is important we do all that we can to ensure that destabilizing weapons systems do not spring up in new locations at a time when great progress is being made in improving East-West relations."

Participants examined the technical and administrative issues that countries face when managing the MTCR guidelines. They considered the completeness of the annex to the guidelines, as well as ways for participating countries better to exchange relevant information with one another. They agreed that such discussions were useful and that future meetings of an MTCR Technical Working Group should be held. To facilitate this process, a permanent contact point for the MTCR was agreed.

Participants also discussed concerns about the continued diffusion to countries in unstable regional situations of capabilities for the manufacture and use of increasingly sophisticated and highly destructive weaponry, including nuclear, chemical and conventional. They agreed that the MTCR has thus far proven effective in addressing the concerns for which it was intended. They noted, however, that the threat posed by the proliferation of equipment and technology capable of contributing to a missile system capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction remains. The MTCR partners renewed their call to all states to adhere to the missile technology guidelines, in the interests of international peace and stability. ■

Building Cooperative Security

The 45th session of the UN General Assembly opened in New York on September 18. The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the General Assembly in New York on September 26.

Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally. Security has ceased to be something to be attained through military means alone. Security has become multi-dimensional and it has become cooperative.

In a world where poverty and underdevelopment plague most of the planet, the developed world cannot pretend to be secure simply because it alone is prosperous. In an era of nuclear and chemical weapons, of ballistic missiles, of terrorism, of interdependent markets and economies, of diseases, the development of prosperity throughout the world is not a question of charity but of security.

That mandates continued emphasis on Official Development Assistance, on more open and freer markets, on innovative debt strategies. Those are not only economic or humanitarian actions; they are security imperatives.

In a world where the frontiers of states may be secure but the air, land and water is being poisoned, environmental action is also a fundamental security question. And in a period of burgeoning population and rapid industrialization, where winds and water know no borders, environmental security will only be achieved through cooperation...

A new concept of security also requires that we address more effectively the political and military tensions which persist in so many regions of the world.

While there is much to be done globally, I believe that a new focus on regional approaches to security is more necessary and more promising than ever. It is more necessary both because of the consequences of conflict arising from interdependence and because of

the destructive nature of modern weapons. And it is more promising because the absence of East-West tension now frees countries and regions to pursue solutions to local problems on local terms.

Security is more than the absence of war; it is the presence of peace. That requires a shared sense on each side that the survival of the other is in its best interest. This means building trust and confidence.

Canada believes that a regional approach to confidence-building has much to offer. That approach can involve a variety of measures: dialogue itself designed to exchange perspectives and increase understanding; greater transparency in terms of military capacity; agreements to inform other members in the region of activities they might consider threatening in the absence of warning; and, eventually, institutions and processes of conflict resolution and crisis prevention.

Confidence-building is not a blueprint or a grand solution. It does not prejudice outcomes or impose solutions. It is not rigid. It is what this organization has always done best. It is

step-by-step. It is functional. It is flexible.

The success of such an approach in Europe is undeniable. Obviously, specific measures taken in Europe may not apply to other regions. Those regions will require approaches tailored to their nature and requirements. But the fundamental principles of confidence-building apply.

It is for this reason that, in addition to proposing new initiatives for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Canada has suggested that the countries of the North Pacific region may benefit from similar approaches to confidence-building. Those might include advance notification of military manoeuvres, an Open Skies regime and military data exchanges. Other regions of the world — the Middle East, Latin America — might also benefit from a regional approach to confidence-building.

One of the key elements of confidence-building is verification. Verification provides proof. And proof triggers trust. This is why Canada co-sponsored the resolution passed by the General Assembly calling for an experts' study on verification to be conducted by the

Secretary-General. A Canadian chaired this study and we will take the lead at this Assembly in proposing a resolution which will call on the UN to:

- promote increased dialogue between diplomats and experts on verification issues;
- establish a UN data bank of verification research material;
- support and expand, where appropriate, the powers of the Secretary-General to engage in fact-finding missions as they relate to the possible violation of existing arms control agreements.

Mr. President, there is one persistent security problem above all others which the international community has failed to address satisfactorily. And that is the problem of proliferation — proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as conventional weapons which have become so destructive.

We all recognize that arms do not cause conflicts. But we must also recognize that arms can make conflict more likely and that they make that conflict more destructive when it occurs.

The progress between the super-powers on the reduction of their stock-piles of nuclear weapons is welcome, as is the progress made to date in ensuring a successful conclusion to the conventional force reduction talks currently underway in Vienna. Those negotiations can and must succeed.

But to reduce capabilities and enhance confidence in one region and with some weapons is only part of the challenge. There is much more to be done.

In the area of nuclear proliferation, the just-concluded Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite consensus on almost all issues, was unable to agree on a concluding document. That failure should alert us all to the dangerous prospect of unravelling of this vital international treaty. Canada believes that movement is needed on all sides. We welcome the joint American and Soviet commitment to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. We believe that commitment should be followed up immedi-

Canada Presents Report to UN

In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1989, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark promised that Canada would submit to the UN the results of its research into the utility of overhead remote-sensing technology for peacekeeping. On May 21, Canada's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Yves Fortier, presented to the UN Secretary-General the results of the study entitled "Overhead Remote Sensing for United Nations Peacekeeping." The report and an accompanying slide briefing was also presented to member and observer states of the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (known as the Committee of 34).

The report focuses on the potential of using commercially-available data

from airborne and spaceborne sources to increase the relative efficiency and effectiveness of UN peacekeepers. It, and the slides, were prepared under contract with the Verification Research Unit of EAITC by a leading Canadian remote sensing company, Intera Technologies Ltd.

Ambassador Fortier also presented the Secretary-General with a scroll listing the 16 verification principles. These principles were developed by a working group under Canadian chairmanship during the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the UNDC. They were subsequently adopted by consensus in the General Assembly in December 1988. The scroll was developed to heighten awareness in Canada of the UN's involvement in verification.

ately, with the final goal being a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

At the same time, we have been deeply disturbed by a tendency among some others to adopt positions which can only act to undermine the vital consensus which underlies the existing treaties on non-proliferation and nuclear testing. Clearly, compromise and forward movement is required on the part of everyone. But the pursuit of other objectives should not be allowed to threaten those existing agreements which have become so vital.

Mr. President, it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other.

Regional nuclear arms, the threat of chemical proliferation and use has been raised starkly again by the situation in the Persian Gulf. We must move quickly to a comprehensive and global ban. We urge all parties at the Conference on Disarmament to ensure that the opportunity for a successful agreement is not lost and that agreement is reached soon. During this Assembly, Canada, along with Poland, will seek to strengthen the commitment of all members to that end.

In addition, Mr. President, there is the very important issue of arms transfers and the arms trade. It is critical that peace in Europe not be purchased at the price of a more innovative arms bazaar elsewhere. That arms bazaar has stunted development by hijacking scarce resources. It has distorted whole economies. It has increased bloodshed.

It is important in this context that all parties to the conventional force reduction talks in Europe take steps to ensure that weapons affected by that agreement not end up as contributions to potential conflicts elsewhere in the world.

The continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology is particularly worrisome. Ballistic missiles raise the prospect of the delivery of weapons of mass destruction into the heart of enemy territory. That possibility means

UNGA 45: Hopes for First Committee

As this *Bulletin* went to press, the First Committee of the 45th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 45) was beginning its consideration of arms control, disarmament and international security questions. The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, was hopeful that this year's session would be characterized by the same positive atmosphere evident in last year's work.

Building on the spirit of UNGA 44, Canada will work closely this year with the Soviet Union and the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe to overcome the differences that have traditionally divided East and West and obstructed progress in the First Committee. At the same time, Canada will do its best to prevent East-West rhetoric and disagreements being replaced by an equally unproductive North-South divide.

Canada will play a leading role in UNGA 45 on several resolutions. These will include a resolution introducing the recently-completed experts' study on the UN role in verification and Canada's annual resolution entitled "Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials." As part of a general effort to increase consideration of proliferation issues, particularly in light of recent developments in the Middle East, Canada will be active on the chemical weapons agenda item, working to strengthen the annual Canada-Poland resolution. The Canadian delegation will also assume a prominent role on the issue of nuclear testing, reflecting the importance that Canada attaches to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Like many other countries, Canada will continue to seek ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the First Committee, including the merging and biennializing of resolutions where possible. In Canada's view, the challenge of the 1990s will be to make the work of the First Committee and other UN disarmament fora mirror the rapid arms control and disarmament progress currently being realized between East and West.

not only great potential suffering; it only induces regional arms races.

That is why Canada has so strongly supported the recent expansion of the membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime. This Assembly should focus on this issue and call for all members to take measures to control the export of this technology. Canada will play a leading role in this effort.

Canada also believes that it is important to make arms transfers and procurement as transparent as is prudent and practical. Transparency builds confidence and is a recognition of the obligation we all have to the common interest. This is why Canada has strongly supported the work of the UN Group of Government Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency and why we support the widest possible voluntary reporting to the UN of military expenditures, procurement and arms transfers. I am

pleased to announce that, this year for the first time, Canada will be releasing an annual report on its exports of military goods.

There is, with arms, a demand side and a supply side. Measures can be taken to restrict supplies to stabilizing and prudent levels. But demand must also be addressed, and that is why a regional approach to confidence-building is relevant to this issue too.

Finally, Mr. President, Canada believes that more can be done to ensure that the UN's unique capacity to provide peacekeeping forces for regional conflicts remains effective and efficient. I am pleased that Canada was able to help breathe new life into the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has now provided the UN with new proposals to improve present peacekeeping activities and to plan for new ventures. However, more

work and even greater commitment will be needed to ensure that the UN is provided with the capacity and the resources to mount varied, speedy and successful peacekeeping operations be they in Cambodia, Central America, the Western Sahara or in the Persian Gulf.

In particular, Canada would support a United Nations effort to secure a clear indication from all member countries of the forces and equipment they could make available in future UN peacekeeping operations. We believe that effort could include an inventory of civilian resources. This might include police forces, communications and logistics personnel and elections experts and observers which could be utilized not only to keep the peace but to prepare for peace...

Mr. President, as we move forward I believe there are several guidelines we can usefully adopt as we seek together to build a structure of cooperative security.

Guideline 1. Cooperative security is multi-dimensional. It is based on the recognition that there are many significant threats to our livelihood, our health, our development and our very existence.

Guideline 2. Cooperative security accepts that links exist between threats. It recognizes that few threats can be managed satisfactorily without also addressing others, that peace requires prosperity, that stability requires justice

within and between states, that democracy, development and disarmament are all related.

Guideline 3. Cooperative security is functional. It seeks to avoid blueprints and grand schemes and focuses on institutions and approaches which work and produce results.

Guideline 4. Cooperative security requires dialogue and compromise. It accepts the fundamental truth that conversation is almost always better than conflict and that conversation leading to compromise is the best way to solve problems.

Guideline 5. Cooperative security builds on the link between stability and change. It demands that we accept that order and predictability are not an alternative to change but rather its foundation, and that order in turn requires growth and flexibility if it is to endure.

Guideline 6. Cooperative security rejects blocs. Blocs perpetuate distrust. They build a tension between regions and groups which is no better than tension between states. They perpetuate a "them versus us" psychology, which may satisfy sentiment but does little to solve problems.

Guideline 7. Cooperative security rejects stale rhetoric and sterile ideology. It sees no advantage in stereotypes and much damage in the prejudice perpetuated by them. It rejects, as does Canada, such blemishes on this organization as the odious resolution

equating Zionism with racism, passed 15 years ago by this Assembly.

Guideline 8. Cooperative security recognizes that true security is impossible without justice. It accepts that democracy within states is a force for stability and prosperity, and that justice between states — whether through development assistance, debt relief or fairer and more open terms of trade — is a necessary component of a secure world.

Mr. President, today in Ottawa on Parliament Hill, a statue was unveiled to Lester B. Pearson... There was no cause to which he was more committed than the construction of an effective United Nations system.

Out of the ashes of World War II and World War I before it, he sought to build a structure of cooperative security which would prevent Armageddon and build a world which was prosperous, free and just for all. Lester Pearson never saw the UN fulfil its intended purpose. His dream was dashed by yet another war — the Cold War.

That war is now over. The promise is renewed, and the dream is re-kindled. Yet the challenges remain more acute, more demanding than ever.

Let us do now what we have been unable to do before. Let us shake off our past failings, confront our present and in so doing build a new future. Let us behave as United Nations. ■

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1, 1990 - September 30, 1990

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Education Centre of British Columbia - 1990 "Youth for Global Awareness Conference"	\$3,000
2. John Guy, University of Calgary - Participation in Ninth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention	300
3. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter - University College Lectures in Peace Studies	1,000
4. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa - Conference on "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World"	10,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$14,300

GRANTS

1. Stornoway Productions, Inc., Toronto - Production of documentary on UN peacekeeping	\$10,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$10,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$24,300 ■

Focus: On the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Focus is our column for secondary school students.

The recent risk of war in the Persian Gulf has drawn the world's attention to the danger that more and more countries may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Articles in this *Bulletin* have looked at Canada's efforts to speed the negotiation of a treaty banning chemical weapons (the Chemical Weapons Convention). They have also reported on the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as the conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). This article will look further at nuclear proliferation and the NPT.

What is proliferation?

Proliferation means to spread or increase in number. In the arms control and disarmament world, proliferation usually refers to the spread of nuclear weapons.

There are two types of proliferation. Horizontal proliferation means the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't already have them. Vertical proliferation means the increase in numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of countries that already do. Used on its own, "proliferation" usually refers to horizontal proliferation.

What is the matter with proliferation?

Since the end of the Second World War, the United Nations has tried to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and encourage disarmament. These efforts have been based on two beliefs:

- the greater the number of countries that have nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used on purpose or by accident;
- the greater the number of countries that have nuclear weapons, the more difficult it will be to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

It is generally agreed that increasing the number of countries that have nuclear weapons will not increase

security. In fact, it is likely to make the world a more dangerous place.

What is the NPT?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1968. It grew out of the concerns mentioned above, and is based on the idea that countries that have nuclear weapons should not give control of such weapons to countries that don't have them. At the same time, the NPT is designed to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to encourage negotiations towards general nuclear disarmament.

The NPT has eleven main parts, known as articles, five of which are key to the Treaty:

Article I - calls on states that have nuclear weapons (known as nuclear-weapon states) not to transfer nuclear weapons or control of nuclear weapons to states that don't have them (known as non-nuclear-weapon states). They are also not to encourage or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

Article II - calls on non-nuclear-weapon states not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, or to take control of nuclear weapons.

Article III - calls on non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on their nuclear activities. Safeguards are the measures and procedures the IAEA uses to make sure that nuclear material and equipment intended for peaceful uses are not being used to make weapons.

Article IV - calls on all states to assist cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article VI - calls on all states to carry out negotiations with the purpose of ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament, leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

For the purposes of the NPT, a nuclear-weapon state is any state that

manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. There are five nuclear-weapon states: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.

Why is the NPT important?

Over 140 states have signed the NPT, which is more than have signed any other arms control treaty in existence. Of the five nuclear-weapon states, three have signed the NPT: the US, the Soviet Union and the UK. Although France has not signed the Treaty, it has a policy of behaving as if it were a signatory. China has said that it will not help other states to acquire nuclear weapons.

The NPT has done a great deal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. No signatory has ever been found in violation of the Treaty. No signatory has ever withdrawn from the Treaty. It has been estimated that without the NPT, there could be as many as 30 nuclear-weapon states by the year 2000, rather than the present five. Just as important, the NPT has helped to create an international standard, or norm, against the spread of nuclear weapons. This makes it more difficult even for countries that have not signed the NPT to proceed with any plans to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

In addition to curbing nuclear proliferation, the NPT has played a central role in encouraging other arms control and disarmament efforts. If countries thought that all other countries were free to acquire nuclear weapons, they would want to keep their own weapons' options open. They would be very unlikely to agree to treaties limiting conventional, chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the nuclear-weapon states would not be likely to agree to treaties that limited their own nuclear weapons.

What are the problems with the NPT?

Several states that are thought to have nuclear weapons, or the capability to build them, have not signed the NPT.

They are thus not bound by its articles. These states include Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa.

Some of these states — and some of the states that have signed the NPT — argue that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear-weapon states are allowed to keep their nuclear weapons while other states are not allowed to acquire them. In addition, non-nuclear-weapon states have to let their nuclear facilities be inspected by the IAEA, while nuclear-weapon states do not.

It has also been argued that the nuclear-weapon states have not done enough to live up to Article VI of the NPT, which requires them to undertake negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and eventually disarm. This link between preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and reducing and eliminating existing nuclear weapons on the other, is often called the “bargain” of the NPT.

The claim that this bargain has not been kept was the source of much disagreement at the review conference of the NPT held this past August and September.

What is Canada's role in the NPT?

Canada does not have any nuclear weapons. Although Canada participated, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in the development of the first atomic weapon, we gave up our option to produce nuclear weapons. We were thus the first country with the knowledge to build nuclear weapons that decided not to acquire them.

Canada was extremely active in the negotiation of the NPT and was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty. We have been strong supporters of the NPT and continue to encourage other countries to sign it.

As a major supplier of nuclear material and technology for peaceful uses, Canada engages in nuclear trade only with countries that have signed the NPT (or made a similar binding commitment to non-proliferation) and accepted IAEA safeguards on their nuclear ac-

tivities. In addition, we have gone further than the NPT in drawing up specific Canadian requirements that must be accepted by countries seeking nuclear imports from Canada.

Canada accepts that the NPT is unequal, in that it sets out different obligations for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Canada believes that the security benefits of knowing that other non-nuclear-weapon states have legally committed themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons outweigh any disadvantages of having to submit to IAEA safeguards.

Like many other countries, Canada is disappointed that more rapid progress has not been made in ending the nuclear arms race and undertaking disarmament. However, Canada does not agree with the criticism that the nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their commitments under Article VI of the NPT. The United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, under which they agreed to get rid of all of their nuclear weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. They are now negotiating a treaty that would require deep cuts in their long-range or “strategic” (over 5,500 km) nuclear weapons. They hope to sign this treaty by the end of the year. Canada believes that it is only by having a strong NPT that the superpowers will be encouraged to go even further in reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Canada regards the NPT as the world's most important multilateral arms control agreement. It will continue to work towards strengthening the NPT, and towards encouraging all countries to sign and live up to it.

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Acronyms

ASEAN — Association of South-East Asian Nations
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CFE — (Negotiation on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 CSBM — confidence- and security-building measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
 CW — chemical weapons
 CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention
 DRES — Defence Research Establishment Suffield
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
 INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces
 MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NIAG — NATO Industrial Advisory Group
 NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
 PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
 SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile
 SNF — short-range nuclear forces
 SSSF — single, small-scale facility
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
 UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
 UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
 WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization ■

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