




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
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
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A  
W O R D  
T O A  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
COMMONER.

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“ A Word to the Wife is enough.”

TRITE PROVERB.

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THE MAILW

Principal Secretary of State


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TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
**WILLIAM PITT,**  
Principal Secretary of State.

S I R,

 I Presume not to approach you as  
a Minister or a Senator, but as  
a private Man; independent of  
all Posts and Employments. I  
speak the free unbiaſſed Sentiments of my  
own Conſcience; I deſire no Man to be of  
my Opinion who thinks I am wrong; nor  
do I wiſh to continue in any of them longer



than I may be removed to better ones: but until that Time I must beg to remain as I am. It is by that inestimable, I had almost said sacred, Liberty of the Press, which every Briton enjoys, that I am enabled to make this Address to you; nor am I sorry that I have no other Means, because Addresses made in public are sure to be seen, while those delivered privately are not always certain of gaining Admittance.

It is reported, upon how sure a Foundation I know not, that Differences have lately arose among the M——, if it be true, I tremble for the Consequences of so great a Misfortune to this Nation, at a Time when its Arms have been attended with Success and Victory in every Quarter of the Globe. That happy Unanimity which has so eminently distinguished the Years 1758 and 1759, is said to be broken in the

the Year 1760, and its Members divided among themselves in the Year 1761.

We are induced to give Credit to these Tales, because our Fleets and Armies have been almost totally inactive during the whole last Year. It is a Mystery why the grand Armament failed before it was carried into Execution; the Cause we are but too apt to attribute to some Disagreement in the M——. The People whose Generosity has lately seemed to know no Bounds, have certainly a Right by the Laws of our excellent Constitution, to expect an Account how their Millions are expended. If the Cause is owing to the Machinations of your Enemies; you have Friends; the Friends of their Country, who it is hoped are more numerous, and who will not see you degraded with Impunity.

We remember the Time when you clamoured against the Mismanagement of a weak

weak and corrupted Ministry; we remember the Time when you most happily united those Divisions, which were fatal to the Interest of your Country; but now unfortunately we are told the Seeds of Party are again springing up, these Causes are unknown; but their Consequences are evident; and no Man steps in to turn these two Extremes into their medium Course.

We have had it confirmed on all Hands, that the French have been vigilant in equipping a Fleet at Brest, which is said to have taken on board a body of Troops, and a Quantity of Warlike Stores, and to be destined for the Isle of Martinico; in order to prevent our becoming Masters of it. Surely, Sir, you are not so great a Sceptic as to doubt the authenticity of this Intelligence: nay, Suggestion itself, is sufficient to convince us, that a Nation less politic than France, would not suffer its  
last

last valuable Plantation to fall into the Hands of her Enemies, and rivals in Commerce, if they could any way prevent it. And must this Fleet arrive at the important Place of its Destination before we attempt to take it? Or, are we to spend a Million of Money in making this Conquest? Or, Sir, are we to have it at all? We remember, that when the French were equipping an Armament at Toulon for the Conquest of Minorca, it was owing to a disbelief of it in the late M——, that we lost that valuable Island; and have we, or are we to lose the fairest Opportunity of taking Martinico, from the same Cause?


Whatever occasioned the Failure of the grand Expedition, or where was the Object of its destination, I enquire not; they are, perhaps, Secrets only fit to be disclosed to proper Heads: but it must be observed,

observed, that another Year's War, carried on in the same expensive and inactive manner as that in 1760, will be injurious, almost fatally injurious, to this Nation; public Credit will not have that influence it has had; and the People will cease to give when they see no use made of their Money: therefore, Sir, we must in earnest, have either Peace or War; this medium between them, is extremely prejudicial to the Nation: if our Enemies will not grant us the former upon honourable Terms, we must vigorously pursue the latter by Sea.

Your Admirer,

Friend, and Servant,

**FIVE MILLIONS!**



A

# W O R D

To a RIGHT HONOURABLE

## C O M M O N E R.

S I R,

THE Eyes of the People are now so  
T far opened, as to see the Evils at-  
tending a Continental War; they  
see that our supporting it is quite  
foreign to our interests, and therefore injurious  
to ourselves. That Tide of Popularity, and  
B most

most egregious Affront on common Understanding, has changed its Course; instead of running with an impetuous Precipitation among Rocks and Shoals, it has made a Channel on a much sounder and less dangerous Bottom.

Those sanguine Friends of the German War, who urged the entering upon it with so much Violence, begin now to retract in their Compliments bestowed on Frederick and Ferdinand; they now say, *they were never such very great Admirers of those Men; they liked them indeed, because they are fine Generals.* The mighty Probus, that remarkable Foreman of the Mob, is most deservedly sunk into a State of Contempt: his stiff and fulsome Adulation on the Union of two Protestant Powers, to defend their Religion and fight it to the last, is now clearly discovered to be only the Product of blind Enthusiasm, a weak and ignorant Mind. It has been proposed, that he collect into the Fields his loyal and zealous Followers; Followers in Opinion, such as cannot but see the Protestant Religion is actually in Danger from the Union of two Roman Powers, and harangue them on this favourite Point; in order

order to prove the Falsity and Disloyalty of that seditious Libel, entitled, *Considerations on the present German War*; and indeed in this Case he would act so like the Oracle at the Tottenham-Court Tabernacle, who lately harangued his eager-believing Flock, on that irreligious and blasphemous Piece, the *Minor*, that the history of the two Impostors would well deserve being recorded in our Annals.

It may be observed in most public Companies, that the hot Friends of the German War are ashamed of the absurd and ridiculous Opinions they once so eagerly embraced. They avoid talking on Politics, because that it is a Subject which would expose their Weakness. The Noise of the Tower Guns, the Bonfires and Rockets, had so effectually lulled all their Senses asleep, they were not able, of themselves, to distinguish what were real and solid Advantages to their Country, from those which were entirely foreign to its Interests. They made more Rejoicings at the Birth-day of the King of Prussia, than for the taking of Louisbourg and Quebec; and testified in a more noisy Manner



their Approbation of the little Skirmish at Corbach, than the Taking of Guadalupe. Time has discovered what shallow Politicians these are; and how insensibly and blindly they have followed that *Ignis Fatuus*, called the Balance of Power; a Balance which Great-Britain has lavished Millions of Pounds and Lives to equilibrate; and yet it is as doubtful and precarious as ever; an Affair which no sensible Man could ever prove us to have any interesting or proper Concern in; an Absurdity so clearly laid open, by the Author of the *Considerations on the present German War*, that surely, hereafter, no honest Englishman will attempt drawing his Country into a Connection with the Quarrels of German Princes; Measures which common Discernment may see are destructive of the true Interests of these Kingdoms.

England, by pursuing her real Interests on her natural Element, may bid Defiance to the Machinations of her Enemies on the Continent; they may threaten to invade her; but they will be only Threats; for while she covers the Seas with her Fleets, none, nor all of them, will

will proceed on so hazardous an Enterprize; which must be attended with certain Destruction, either before they can attempt to land, or before they can return to their own Country.

The Continental Powers very well know, that while we have a H—— to maintain, support and preserve, it is *there* they must attack our Vitals; *there* we shall feel them most sensibly; they can double our Number, and at half the Expence; and if they suffer a defeat, it is easily repaired, and all the lost Advantage regained. Whereas, should they meet us at Sea, we can double their Number, and give them a total Defeat.

To attack us by Land has been always the great Aim of France; H——er only was the destined Mark of her Force to shoot at: For it was never intended, because it is not consistent with the true Interest of France, to go any further than H——. We have a very convincing Proof of this, only three Years ago; when Marechal D'Etrees defeated the Duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck, the French entered

tered Hanover immediately; but though they had above half a Campaign to push on their Conquests in, they never so much as once entered Magdebourg, to favour the Designs of the Empress-Queen; they staid only in Hanover. The Reason of this is plain; because it is not for the Interest of France to see the King of Prussia crushed; for he will always be a Rival to her natural Enemy, the House of Austria.

If the English suffered the French to go into Hanover, and even to plunder it, did she but cease to defend it, the French would seek an Opportunity of restoring it; and make an Attonement for all the Damages they committed in it; provided Great Britain, in the Interim, heartily attacked them by Sea. It is evident that France only threatens to conquer Hanover, because she knows England will at all Events defend it, however inconsistent it is with her real Interest. While we spend millions in this uncertain Defence, we feed the Politics of France; and she by putting us to this Expence, is playing a winning Game for herself. Surely  
every

every sensible Man who is acquainted with the Strength of France will allow, that she can conquer Hanover, if she heartily sets about it, against all the Defence which England is able to make for it; but were she to do this, Great-Britain must in consequence be obliged to spend her Millions elsewhere: A Measure which France most dreads. If France, at this time, wanted to make Conquests in the Empire, why does she not attack the other States, who are less able to defend themselves? Her Friendship for the Empress-Queen can be no Obstacle. The Truth is, it would not now so effectually answer her present Purposes; which are only to distress England, and which she can only do by drawing our Men and Money into Germany, and protracting the War till our Coffers are drained of the last Guinea in supporting it.

If we reflect a Moment on what are the true Interests of France, Reason will point out to us that new Acquisitions in the Empire, at this Time, would prove burthensome to her; she therefore does not seek them, because the Expence

pence of garrisoning their fortified Towns would be greater than her Finances can at present supply; besides, she is afraid lest England should vigorously attack her by Sea, and then she would not have a sufficient Force at hand to defend her Maritime Towns and oppose the Invader; whereas an Army can with much greater Facility, and much less Expence, be moved about, than those Troops in Garrison.

The State of the Interests of the Belligerent Powers is such, that it is not for the Interests of all the Confederates on either Side, to see all their Enemies destroyed; therefore these are impolitic Unions; since the Powers, for the Sake of themselves, will never heartily assist their Allies. The old Proverb, *When I have served myself, I will help my Friend*, is understood in all Nations.

For the Reason already assigned, France will never suffer the Downfall of Prussia; and several States in the Empire will join with her in this Cause. The two Empresses are the only Powers

Powers who can desire such an important Stroke. The lower the House of Austria is kept, the stronger will be the Power of France. Again, it is the Interest of Prussia and Austria to keep Russia out of the Empire: But if Prussia should ever become too powerful for the Imperial Force, and should overthrow it, Russia must expect to be next attacked by the Conqueror. Therefore a Balance of Power is essentially necessary between these four Potentates.

France and Austria are Opposites by Interest; but the Interests of France and Prussia are synonymous, *viz.* to check the Ambition of the House of Austria: Russia indeed can no way affect the Interests of France, except by strengthening the Hands of the Empress Queen against her. It is the Interest of Prussia to keep the Russians at a Distance, and to humble the Pride of the House of Austria. Russia is consulting and pursuing her own Advantage in the most certain Manner; she has gained a Footing in Germany, and will doubtless keep it: She can be no otherwise serviceable to Austria, than by giving her Assistance in case of an Attack

C

from

from the Infidels. The Empress Queen, it is evident, has suffered her Passion to carry her beyond her Reason: it was a wrong Step to bring the Czarina into the Confederacy against Prussia, for she has thereby got footing in Germany, and may, in future, become her most dangerous Enemy: She has done right in making War with Prussia, because it is her Interest to crush that Monarch; but then France will not see that done; therefore here again she has chosen a wrong Ally. Prussia and Austria may be said to be Principals in the present Quarrel, because it is their Interest to humble one another; but their Allies are unskilfully chosen. The German Allies of Prussia can give him no Assistance, except they neglect to defend themselves; and his Treaty with Great-Britain, who has supported him with Money, will expire at the Close of the present Year; and she now seeing the injurious Effects of it to herself, will hardly renew that Treaty. As for the Allies of Austria, France will never lend a helping Hand towards dethroning the Prussian Monarch; nor was it for the Interest of Austria to invite the Czarina to  
such

such a Measure, as she will thereby become too near and powerful a Neighbour to the Imperial Dominions.

The King of Prussia foresaw the Impropriety and dangerous Consequence of suffering the Russians to come into the Empire : when Great Britain made a subsidary Treaty with Russia, whereby a numerous Army of that Crown were to march into Hanover for its Protection, he boldly declared, he would keep all foreign Troops out of the Empire. This Declaration was founded on the Principles of true German Policy ; and thereby he shewed, he was in the Interest of himself.

Had England not been concerned in the German Quarrel, which, whatever partial Writers say to the contrary, was entirely independent of the Disputes in America\*, it is

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\* If it should be thought this Assertion is false, because of our Connexion with Hanover; I beg to observe, that a Rupture was unavoidable between Prussia and Austria, in which, I hope, it will be allowed, our Affairs in America had no Concern.



certain that Prussia and France would have united against Austria and Russia: a convincing Proof of which intended Union is in a Letter which the K— of P— sent to the late K— of G— B— in the Year 1757, just after the Battle of Collin (June 18) ; a Translation of it, from the French, in which Language it was written, you will find in the Note †. If this Letter was not authentic, it would have been contradicted by the supposed Receiver, but so far from that, a Declaration was delivered to the

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† “ I am informed, that the Design of a Treaty of Neutrality, for the Electorate of H— is not yet laid aside. “ Is it possible that your M— can have so little Fortitude and Constancy, as to be dispirited by a small Reverse of Fortune? Are Affairs so ruinous, that they cannot be repaired? I hope your M— will consider the Step you have made me hazard; and remember, that you are the sole Cause of these Misfortunes, which now impend over my Head. *I should never have abandoned the Alliance of France, but for your flattering Assurances.* I do not now repent of the Treaty I have concluded with your M—; but I expect you will not ingloriously leave me at the Mercy of my Enemies, after having brought upon me all the Forces of Europe. I depend upon your adhering to your repeated Engagements of the twenty-sixth of last Month, and that you will listen to no Treaty, in which I am not comprehended.”

P—

P—— Resident in London, which appears to have been calculated as an Answer to its  
 On the present Plan of fighting, France and Russia are the only Powers who can be solid Gainers; and, except the Empress-Queen gets Silesia; for which, it must be acknowledged, she has already spent more Money than it is worth, and even this Advantage may be over-balanced by the dangerous Nearness of her new Neighbours, the Russians, all the rest of the Powers are wasting their Substance on defensive Measures; by which they can have no Hopes of being Gainers. While Austria exhausts herself in striving to regain Possession of Silesia, she is, in the most effectual Manner, serving the Interest of France; for the weaker she makes herself, with the greater Facility can France over-run the Empire on some future Occasion. France has already got Possession of Ostend and Nieuport, as Keys to the Austrian Netherlands; and when she has tired the Patience of England, or exhausted its Treasure, in defending Hanover, she will next attack

attack the House of Austria, her old and natural Enemy.

France would become formidable by the Ruin of the House of Austria, and Russia by that of Brandenburg; for observe, the Interests of France and Prussia only agree in humbling the House of Austria; and when that is sufficiently done, France will not care whether the Czarina dethrones the Monarch of Prussia, or he drives her to the Gates of Moscow. The Russians having footing in the Empire, will not so much affect France, as Austria's becoming too formidable for her to enter the Empire hereafter; because the principal Strength of the former will always be too far distant; whereas that of the latter may be brought, at a small Expence, to her own Frontiers, as she hath often experienced.

If the Empress of Russia steadily pursues her own Interest, as, hitherto, her Conduct in the present War hath plainly evinced, there is no room for the King of Prussia to hope she will ever accede to a general Peace, without retaining

retaining Prussia in her Hands; nor will this perhaps content her: it is now her grand Aim to seize Pomerania, not so much because it is contiguous to Prussia, as the Empire. It is not a Halfpenny Matter to her, whether Prussia or Austria possesses Silesia; she does not so much endeavour at wresting Silesia out of the Hands of the Prussian Monarch, as Pomerania; therefore she may be said to be fighting her *own* Battles, not those of her Ally the Empress-Queen.

The Situation of Prussia and Pomerania is such, that if they were annexed to the Russian Crown, that Empire would thereby become one of the most formidable Potentates in Europe; for these Acquisitions would in the most effectual Manner pave her a Way into the very Bowels of the Empire. They are not of that Importance to the King of Prussia, because they border on the Sea; therefore all their maritime Advantages are lost to him, through the Want of a mercantile Trade, and a Fleet to over-awe the Swedes and Danes, who are by Interest jealous of his ambitious Passion.

Russia

Russia having a large mercantile Trade, and a Fleet the most formidable in the Baltick, can make them productive of infinite Advantages.

Having endeavoured to explain the several Interests of the belligerent Powers, will any sensible and unprejudiced Englishman say, it is for the Service of his Country to intermeddle with the Concerns of these foreign Princes? Or, that England has any natural or advantageous Connection with such Concerns; Would it be one Penny a Year Difference to England, whether Austria possessed Silesia or Prussia? whether the Prussian Monarch was circumscribed within the original Bounds of his Dominions, or permitted to conquer as far as he had Troops to garrison? Whether Saxony is indemnified for the Ravages committed in it by the King of Prussia, since the Quarrel was purely his own? Whether Prussia reverts to its Monarch, or is retained by the Czarina? or whether she or he possesses Pomerania? If any of these can affect the Interest of Great-Britain, it is what I cannot perceive; if not, why are

we to expend Millions on the Continent in adjusting Disputes which are none of our own?

If there is a Necessity for our being connected with the Continent for the sake of defending Hanover, and the Treaty with the King of Prussia was made with that View; would not the sending a British Fleet into the Baltic Sea, have been a less expensive Measure to England, than sending our Men into Germany, and more effectually answering all the Purposes of this continental Alliance?

Had England two Years ago sent a Fleet into the Baltic, she had assisted her Ally in a Manner which was consistent with her own natural Strength. But unhappily, there were a Party who opposed this salutary Measure with their utmost Force. They alledged, that the King of Denmark would send Thirty-six Thousand to join the Swedes, in order to plunder Hanover, as soon as a British Fleet should appear in the Baltic; which would also draw upon us the Resentment of the Russians and Swedes; who might with their combined Fleets, sail

out of the Baltic and land upon the Coast of Ireland or Scotland, Twenty-thousand Men. Such were the Reasons against our sending a Fleet into the Baltic ; which, you will easily perceive, are far from being founded on Maxims of true Policy.

As soon as the King of Denmark heard it had been proposed in England to send a Fleet into the Baltic, he concluded a Treaty with Russia and Sweden ; whereby they agreed to protect the Commerce of the Baltic from all Molestation. The King of Denmark, it must be acknowledged, most prudently consulted the Interests of his People by this Measure ; and while their Commerce flourishes without Interruption, he receives large Subsidies in Consideration of his Neutrality ; therefore his Kingdom will in all probability, become so enriched and powerful, as to be the Wonder of a future Age.—But if a British Fleet compelled him to a Neutrality, he would no longer receive large Subsidies in consideration of his Forbearance. Upon what Account is England so tacitly obliged to consult the Interest

Interest of this Monarch? Is it because when the Rebels had penetrated as far as Derby, in the Year 1746, she demanded of him the Number of Troops stipulated by Treaty, and he refused to comply with this equitable Request, though then a Son-in-law to the late King? Had England as prudently consulted her own Interest, she would not have neglected sending a Fleet into the Baltic. The weakest Reasons urged against this most necessary Measure, by the weakest Men, filled the Northern Powers with an Apprehension that we were afraid of giving them Umbrage; therefore the Court of Petersburg behaved with a haughty Insolence to the British Minister. It was an Error in the Conduct of the B—— G———t, to suffer a few fallacious Reasons against sending a Fleet into the Baltic, to over-rule Common Sense, and Common Policy. The united naval Strength of Denmark, Russia and Sweden, is not sufficient to oppose a Fleet which England could spare for this Purpose. If the Danes refused it Admittance, their Maritime Towns and Fortifications might soon be demolished and razed to the Ground; their Troops



would then find Employment enough at Home to prevent their joining the Swedes; who would also feel such a severe Scourge from a vigilant English Admiral, as not to be able to invade Pomerania again during the present War; Russia would no longer be able to keep possession of Prussia, nor to harrass its Monarch; if her numerous Armies had not Work enough to protect Peterburgh and Cronstadt, the rest would starve on the West Side of the Vistula, for want of Provisions, which are always brought to them by their Fleet; a Navigation which would be totally destroyed, as soon as the British Fleet appeared in the Baltic: and, is it not reasonable to urge, that the King of Prussia would, if he acted the Part of an honest Ally, in Consideration of such material Assistance, send those Troops to join the Allied Army, whom he now Employs against the Russians and Swedes: the British Troops in Germany might then be brought Home, and employed on Services purely English.

I know, and am extremely sorry for it, that the K— of P— can refuse, by the Tenor  
of

of the Treaty, or rather Convention, which England has concluded with him, to send or lend a single Man, either for the Protection of Hanover, or any Service which is not purely his own. We have bound ourselves to pay him, annually, and at one Time, Six Hundred and Seventy Thousand Pounds Sterling; but we have only bound him to employ it in the most advantageous Manner for himself. What British Subject could be so very erroneous, as to assert, such a Stipulation was to the Honour of his King? what British Subject could be so ignorant, as to think such a Stipulation was for the Interests of his Country? Will it be said, in Opposition even to common Reason, it is for our Advantage to send Millions to Germany to support a Contest, which no Matter who gets the better, will not make a Penny Difference to us? I said, if the King of Prussia acted the Part of an honest Ally, he would send his Troops against the French, in case a British Fleet found the Swedes and Russians Employment enough at Home; his not being obliged to do this, nor any thing else, without he pleases, induces me to hope he would act, at least, upon the Principles of

Gratitude;

Gratitude; but to confess my real Sentiments, I doubt his Gratitude.

The real Intention of our Alliance with Prussia, was the Preservation of Hanover; particularly, the keeping the French out of it; or, as it was termed, the keeping of Foreign Troops out of the Empire; which he, with our Assistance, *promised* to do; but he has not fulfilled this Promise: nay, so far from it, what has he contributed towards it? A few of his Troops have been in the Allied Army, and it was expected they would have assisted in driving the French to their own Frontiers; but how great must our Surprise be, when we are told, that these few Prussians in the Allied Army, actually refused to charge the French in the Battle of Crevelt; and, it is said, the fairest Opportunity of defeating the French was thereby lost. Why was that Affair stifled up, which, had it not been for the Author of the Considerations on the present German War, Nine Tenths of our honest Englishmen had never heard of it? Are we to pay immense Sums to a foreign Prince, and suffer with Impunity such manifest Ingratitude?

titude ? I say Ingratitude, because we cannot  
*oblige* him to give us any Assistance; that  
 Treaty, which is perhaps the most eminent  
 Demonstration of *English Sagacity* and Prussian  
 Policy, that ever was laid before the Eyes of  
 the World, now Subsisting between him and  
 us, allows of no such Thing: and ought we  
 not to be as greatly Surprized, to see your  
 Name at the bottom of this more famous Con-  
 vention, than that of Closter-Severn ? Is it  
 because he wants to be Friends with France,  
 that his Troops would not attack those of that  
 Nation ? or to what shall we impute this strange  
 Piece of Misconduct, which for three Years  
 has been so carefully huddled up ?

Though it might be thought injurious to  
 the future Credit of England to break off her  
 Alliance with Prussia, yet surely it will be al-  
 lowed, by all reasonable Men, that he has not  
 fulfilled his Promise in keeping all foreign  
 Troops out of the Empire. Had he done this,  
 he had been the Defender of Hanover; which,  
 according to the present System of Politics,  
 (however Inconsistent it may appear to un-  
 prejudiced

prejudiced Eyes) is the same as assisting England; but this being neglected, and his Troops *refusing* to give Assistance in an Action, partly on an English Cause, leaves in our Minds a very different Idea to that which we would Entertain of an Ally of Great Britain.

The Friends of this German War will say, that the King of Prussia attacked and defeated the Troops of France in the Battle of Rosbach. I admit it: but need we be long at a Loss to Account for this Proceeding? Had he not done this, he would have found it a difficult Matter to get so much Money from England as he does. If the Hanoverians and their Allies, who had laid down their Arms by the Convention of Closter-Severn, had not been enabled to resume them, England would not, nay, could not, have defended Hanover; and except England would enter upon that Step, no plausible Reason could be given for supporting Prussia: Therefore he fought the French because they were joined with the Troops of the Empire; and all the World knows, the Hanoverians resumed their Arms in consequence of the Battle  
of

of Rosbach. For their further Encouragement he gave them a Prussian General, which, it must be owned, pleased the English mightily; who were by this Time become so fond of every Thing that bore the Name of Prussian, that our Bakers, in Order to Acquire a greater Custom, made Prussian Loaves, Prussian Cakes, &c. The Haberdashers, in Order to please our Ladies, who bore a large Share in the Torrent for the Prussian Demi-God, invented Prussian Flies, Prussian Caps, &c. and there was Prussian Purl, and Prussian Ale, for the Mob to Drink. But to return to our Argument; did the Prussian Troops in any other Action attack the French when they were alone? Did they not in the first Battle they were in, when the French were singly opposed to them, absolutely refuse to charge the Enemy?

Thus it appears the King of Prussia, when it was in his Power, and when there was an Opportunity, has not even assisted to keep the foreign Troops out of the Empire. Would not this afford a Nation, less Honest and more Politic than ourselves, the most plausible Rea-

sons for abandoning such Alliance? and would not any Nation but ourselves, have seized that Opportunity, if its Interest were as foreign to it as ours are? So would England perhaps, had not H——— been situated where it is; which is so convenient for the Prussian Monarch to over-run and ravage it, that, however great the Expence be, we must purchase his Friendship.

Millions of English Money have been lavished away, in defence and on account of this Electorate. The Earl of Sandwich, in the Year 1743, with great Propriety said, "It was vain and endless to exhaust the national Treasure, in enriching a hungry and barren Electorate." And the Duke of Bedford, the Year before, with as great Justice observed, "That these Electoral Territories had long been considered as a Gulph into which the Treasure of Great Britain had been thrown: That the State of Hanover had been changed without any visible Cause, since the Accession of its Princes to the Throne of England: Affluence had begun to wanton in  
 " their

" their Towns, and Gold to glitter in their  
 " Cottages, without the Discovery of Mines,  
 " or the Increase of Commerce; and new Do-  
 " minions had been purchased, of which the  
 " Value was never paid from the Revenues of  
 " Hanover."

I have already observed, it is the Interest of  
 Prussia to keep the Russians out of the Empire;  
 therefore these Troops he has frequently at-  
 tacked; whether in conjunction with the Aus-  
 trians or singly. Both these Powers are his  
 Enemies, and it is his Interest to humble them  
 both; when he attacks the Russians, it may  
 be said, he is endeavouring to fulfil the Treaty  
 he made with England, the keeping foreign  
 Troops out of the Empire; but it is not  
 material to England, whether the Russians are  
 in the Empire or not; they will never attack  
 Hanover, because of its great Distance from  
 their Dominions. England is afraid of France  
 attacking it; which Prussia did not in the  
 least attempt to prevent; he only strove at  
 keeping those Troops out of the Empire, which  
 it is not his Interest should have footing in it.



I have but one Thing more to mention, before I quit the Affairs of the Continent. It is concerning the Conduct of D— F—, in his Capacity of Co— of the Al— Army, which has not of late extorted from us the usual Expressions of Adoration, it formerly did. Great Faults have been found with him; and it has been observed that these Censurers, are not the Misanthropes of a discontented Party, but the Friends of their Country. They have observed that it tarnishes the Glory of this Nation to suffer its Troops to be commanded by a Foreigner, hired by their own Money to Command them; who was recommended to this eminent Post by the King of Prussia, whom we tacitly permitted to give us Law: That such a Step, before it was taken, must by a Patriot Minister be well known to be Distasteful to the People: That he has a Dislike to several of the Officers of this Nation; and that not being an English General, whether he can, by us, be called to an Account for his Conduct, in Case it should be found necessary. These are the Objections which have not been Answered; even by those who have avowed themselves his Friends.

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There are another string of Allegations, which have been printed in the common Newspapers, with Answers to them ; and seem to have been collected by one of the Admirers of this German General. But, as I do not approve of these Answers as sufficiently refutatory, and, denying Heathen Mythology, cannot deify him in his mortal Capacity, I shall make a Reply to them : Perhaps it is because I have never been made drunk, with the pompous Tales of a Party, the Admirers of this German General and Germanic Warfare, nor my Eyes yet dazzled with his varnished Picture, that I cannot join with the Mob in his Defence.

#### A L L E G A T I O N. I.

“ The British Generals have not been permitted to command separate corps, or detachments.

#### A N S W E R.

“ It is sufficiently known they are Strangers to the Country and the Language ; therefore it would be highly imprudent to give them

“ a separate Command when they are not able  
 “ to converse with Spies and Guides.”

### R E P L Y.

If the Admirers of this German General had studied seven Years for an Answer, they could not have made one more weak and ridiculous. The Allegation is a Fact, and can be answered no other Way, than because he chuses to bestow such Posts of Honour and Profit on his necessitated Countrymen, who want to enrich themselves. The not being able to converse with Spies and Guides is a Jest; there are Interpreters; but French is spoke by almost all of them, and it surely will be acknowledged that most of our Officers can speak French. It might very properly be asked, why the British Generals, in the same Country, were permitted to hold separate Commands in the Duke of Marlborough's Time? And it might as very properly be answered, because there was an English Commander in Chief.

### A L L E G A T I O N II.

“ There has been a Misunderstanding among  
 “ the Officers and private Men, which has en-  
 “ creased to an Animosity.”

ANSWER.

## ANSWER.

“ It should be considered, who first treated  
 “ the German Officers with Contempt, and  
 “ despised them because they were not so rich,  
 “ nor their Pay so great as themselves.”

## REPLY.

The brutish Behaviour of the German Officers is alone sufficient to make them despised, even by the just-civilized Indian. They are dead to every generous Sentiment, and untinged with the least Spirit of Affability; that broody Moroseness and sullen Selfishness, so conspicuous even in their very Countenances, setting aside all external Marks of Disgust in their Conduct, renders their Company scarce endurable; so very far is it from being agreeable. If they were Objects of Contempt in the Eyes of the English, the Commander, had he acted prudently, would, instead of fomenting this Animosity, have endeavoured to check it in its Infancy, and united the Divisions in his Army. The Truth is, the two Parties were headed by their Commanders in Chief, who heartily hated each other.

ALLE-

## ALLEGATION III.

“ The British Troops have always been placed in the warmest Parts of every Action,”

## A N S W E R.

“ It was agreeable to their Request, which has always been to have the Post of Honour.”

## R E P L Y.

If the Troops desire to sacrifice themselves, must the General grant them that Request? Or is it because they know not how to run away, that they are placed in the warmest Parts of the Action? Are the Germans so eager for the Post of Honour? If so, why are they not put in it? If not (which is most likely) are the Germans only placed there to write endless Encomiums on the British Troops conquering without them? An impartial Person who has read the Accounts from the Allied Army, will say, the Germans have never been very forward in assisting the British Troops in the Day of Action; but rather on the contrary. What Honour does such Conduct reflect on those Men, who  
may

may be said to be the Principals? The British Troops fight their Battles, and have been sacrificed, that they may retreat in Safety \*, in their own Cause; for it is in Defence of Hanover, not England, that they are fighting.

#### A L L E G A T I O N . IV.

“ There has been a Scarcity of Forage and Provision in the Army, which has been frequently in great Want.”

#### A N S W E R.

“ This is true ; but the Purveyors, and not the General, are to be blamed and called to Account for it. This Scarcity has prevented his making several bold Strokes, whereby he might have gained some solid Advantages.”

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\* It is acknowledged, even in the London Gazette, July 22, 1760, That, at the Skirmish at Corbach, the Retreat was attended with a little Confusion. The Truth is, the Hessians and Hanoverians had given Way; and a Squadron of Bland's, and another of Howard's Regiment of Dragoons, were allowed to suffer, that the others might *save themselves*.

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REPLY.

## R E P L Y.

It was a Maxim of the famous Marechal Count de Saxe, who the Admirers of Duke Ferdinand, I suppose, will, at least, allow to be equal to him, " That it should be, and " always was, the first and principal Care of a " prudent General, to provide Provisions and " Forage for his Army, and to provide for its " Health and Preservation." The Purveyors may indeed be blamed; they may be indolent; they may be villainous; but all this will not extenuate the Commander in Chief: He is to superintend them, and, where they are faulty, to punish them according to their Deserts. If this is not his Business, he is robbed of half the Respect that is due to him. If it is, and there is no Precedent to the contrary, is not he to be called to an Account for such a Dearth in his Camp? The Money sent from England is sufficient to provide continual Plenty for that Army, and there is Provision enough in Germany to be had for Money, exclusive of the large Exports made to it from England, which ought to be considered as an Overplus, or at least given in at the Bargain.

ALL-

ALLEGATION V.

"The English have been obliged to pay double for every thing they bought."

ANSWER.

"It is well known that wherever the English come they spoil the Market."

REPLY.

Admitting them to have spoiled the Market, does that *oblige* them to pay them double?

Why is not the Market also spoiled for the Germans? The English can scarce spoil it for themselves only; why are not the Germans obliged to pay double by the same Rule? Such a strange Partiality can never be accounted for, by the English endeavouring to make their own Condition worse.

ALLEGATION VI.

"Had the General not been so fond to put the Money in his Pocket, some important Action had been performed with such an Army as he now commands."



A N S W E R.

“ He has not had the Fingering of the Money, consequently could not put any of it into his Pocket. He has often represented that the Enemies were twice the Number of his Army; and he has not received a Reinforcement that might enable him to act Offensively.”

R E P L Y.

A Falſity is here propoſed to invalidate a ſuppoſed Fact. He is by right of his ſuperior Command allowed to have the Fingering of the Money: And has he not then an Opportunity of putting what he pleaſes into his Pocket? Is he not Avaritious? Are there any Proofs to the contrary? What then muſt we think of a General who has extravagant Remittances of Money, receives Proviſions and Forage from England beſides, and yet ſuffers his Army to be on the Point of ſtarving? The Enemies were never twice his Number: At this Time the Armies are nearer equal, than ever they were. It is well known, that the Sum of Twelve Hundred Forty-four Thouſand, one Hundred

Hundred and Seventy-seven Pounds, Nineteen Shillings, and Nine-pence Three Farthings, was granted by the British Parliament for Maintaining, in the Year 1759, Fifty-seven Thousand and Twelve Germans. To which Number we may add, Twenty Thousand English; and was it ever known that the French in Germany during the present War were twice that Number?

It may be very justly asked, why Duke Ferdinand, with such an Army as he now Commands, was inactive almost the whole last Campaign? And what Answer can be given; that he is desirous of protracting the War, only that he may enrich himself by it? And let it be observed that he has with him a greater Number of British Troops than ever the great Duke of Marlborough had, who it must be allowed frequently did more in one Campaign than he has done in three.

After such a Discussion of Circumstances and Interests, will it be said it is our Concern, who is Emperor of Germany, of Russia, or  
King

King of Prussia? If they Quarrel it is amongst themselves; which ever are Gainers by it will not affect our Interests; but if we intermeddle we are sure to be losers by it. Commerce alone is the Wealth of these Kingdoms, and Commerce alone ought to be the Object of their Attention; and whatever Power attempts to interrupt us, it becomes our immediate Concern and Interest to repel Force by Force.

It is a weak, absurd, and fallacious Argument, made up to serve the Purposes of a Party, which endeavours to prove, that our Conquests in Asia, Africa, and America, are in consequence of our drawing the French into Germany; first let it be observed, that we have not drawn the French into Germany; but all the World knows they have drawn us thither: the French are at this Time only prosecuting their original Intention; namely, the causing us to spend Millions in defending Hanover, and dying the German Plains with British Blood. Had we suffered the French to go into Hanover, and further if they chose it, would that have prevented our making Conquests of the French  
Settle-

Settlements, in the more distant Parts of the World? Surely not, but rather have facilitated it, as our Troops might have been employed there; while now they are slaughtered in defending what is foreign to our Interest. Had the French never marched into Germany at all, but employed their whole Force in defending their Settlements, could not we have taken them? the hood-winked Friends of the German War say no: but the discerning Part of Mankind, and the Friends of their Country, answer in the Affirmative.

As this is the main Pillar of our Argument, it is proper to wave all other Things till this Point is cleared. The Admirers of a Germanic Warfare say, the French out-did us in America before we made our Alliance with the King of Prussia. The Assertion, literally, is true; but our Alliance with the King of Prussia, a Power entirely foreign to us, and our Affairs in America, was not the Cause of their discontinuing victorious there. Until Admiral Boscawen, and the Generals Amherst and Wolfe, took the Isle of Cape-Breton, all

our

our Commanders were either imprudent or indolent. The Rashness of Braddock and Abercrombie excited Displeasure. The Conduct of Mr. Shirley and Lord Loudon was far from being Satisfactory. It would be an invidious Task to enquire into the Causes of their Mis-carriages and Inactivity; but it may be observed, that the Affairs of the British Nation were not attended with Success during their several Commands. Prussia nor Hanover had nothing to do with this.—We come now to another Article in our main Argument; that had we not found Employ for the French Troops in Germany, they would have sent them to America. The Assertors of this must deny our Sovereignty over the Sea; or, at least, aver, that the French must bribe our Admirals and Captains to connive at such a Transportation. How absurd must this Notion appear, to those who do but for a Moment consider the formidable Strength of the British Navy, and the ruined State of that of France; whose very Commerce is almost totally destroyed; whose Ports have been so blocked up, that even a single Cruizer or Advice Boat could

nor

not get in or out without the greatest Danger of being taken by some of the British Navy stationed before them. How then could they send Troops to America? Had but one Third of our Money been expended in America, that is annually exported to Germany, the French would not, at this Time, have in their Hands that vast and important Province, Louisiana; nor the Isle of Martinico. But while we waste Millions in supporting a German War, from which, all impartial and sensible Men will readily allow, we can reap no real Advantage, we cannot afford Thousands to be expended in enlarging our Commerce, without being loaded with the most grievous and insupportable Impositions. It ought to be a Maxim with the English Government, that whenever they are determined to attack France by Land, they must engage in a powerful Confederacy against her; for when we take Prussia alone, or Austria alone, the throwing the other into the Arms of France is the certain Consequence; and the Interests of Prussia and Austria are so different, they can never be brought to unite against France. Therefore we, instead of having an

useful Friend, have only a needful Ally; which turns the Scale against us.

Having cleared myself of Continental Connexions, I will next speak of Things nearer Home.

Our late intended Expedition has brought upon us the Ridicule of all Europe. The foreign Gazettes tell us, with a Sneer, "The English Admiral at length found the contrary Wind he was ordered to look out for"; and apply the trite Proverb with an uncommon Satisfaction, "The Mountain in Labour has brought forth a Mouse." Is it not owing to some strange Misconduct in our M——, that we are exposed to these, and many other such-like Insults? Shall a Nation, whose Arms have been victorious in the four Quarters of the World, be the Scoff and Laughing-stock of its Enemies? Have we not national Pride that disdains the very Thoughts of it?

It has been conjectured, that the grand Armament was destined to make a Conquest of the



the Island of Belleisle; the Importance of it, and the great Service it would be to England, put a Probability on the Conjecture. It is affirmed, the Island has one good Harbour, can afford plenty of Provisions to a Fleet stationed in the Bay, and should it be conquered, may be held as easy as we do the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey. France would sustain an infinite Loss by it; her naval Communication between all her northern and southern Ports would be entirely cut off, or at least rendered extremely hazardous and difficult. A further, and fuller Account of its Importance was Inserted in one of the public Papers; an Account, which so evidently shews the Necessity of taking it, by pointing out its real Use and Advantage, to either France or England, that I cannot omit the Inserting it.

“ The Attacking the Isle of Belleisle, at this  
 “ Time, would put the French into as great  
 “ an Alarm, and draw as many of their Troops  
 “ that Way, as if we were to Attack any  
 “ Part of their main Land, because it lies  
 “ in the Center of their principal trading  
 “ Towns, and almost as near the main Land as



“ the Isle of Wight is to Portsmouth, and would  
 “ consequently put them into as great a Con-  
 “ sternation as we should be in, if they were  
 “ Masters of the Sea and the Isle of Wight, from  
 “ not knowing which Part of our Coast might  
 “ be attacked next: for which Reason they  
 “ must send for a large Body of Troops  
 “ from the Rhine or elsewhere, to cover all  
 “ their Western Coast; and they must send a  
 “ great Number of Troops to guard the Islands  
 “ of Dieu, Rhee, and Oleron, which lie to the  
 “ Southward of Belleisle, and to Ushant and  
 “ Groce, which lie to the Northward, in order  
 “ to prevent, if they can, our becoming Mas-  
 “ ters of them also.

“ As the Island of Belleisle lies directly op-  
 “ posite to Port Louis and L'Orient, none of  
 “ their East-India Ships could ever get in or  
 “ out of those Ports, if it was in our Posses-  
 “ sion; and as Brest has no inland Navi-  
 “ gation to it, nor any Materials whatsoever  
 “ in it, for the building, repairing, or fit-  
 “ ting out Ships, but what are brought to it  
 “ by Sea, from Bayonne, Bourdeaux, Nantz,  
 “ Rochfort,

" Rochfort, Port Louis, &c. and which they  
 " carry thither in the Time of War with great  
 " Safety, between this Island and the main  
 " Land, in spite of our Ships of War, who  
 " know nothing of that Navigation : the tak-  
 " ing of it would put an End to such Com-  
 " merce, so that the French would not be able  
 " to fit out a single Ship from Brest, after  
 " their present Stores are exhausted. Belleisle  
 " is the largest Island on the French Coast,  
 " and most commodious of all to Annoy them :  
 " It is capable of maintaining a great many  
 " Troops, by its own Produce; who, if they  
 " were lodged there, might as Occasion should  
 " offer, make further Attempts upon the other  
 " Islands; thus keep the French constantly  
 " alarmed, and finally ruin the little Remains  
 " of their Trade. The Road of Bellisle is as  
 " good as that of St. Helen's, and our Ships  
 " of War might lie as safe there, as they do at  
 " Spithead; and if we should erect on it Arse-  
 " nals and Magazines, our Ships, stationed in  
 " the Bay, might be supplied with every Thing  
 " all the Year round, without coming home,  
 " as they have hitherto done; which has al-  
 " ways

“ ways given the Enemy an Opportunity to  
 “ get in and out of their Ports unmolested.”

I have been informed, that the Transports which failed from Corke to join the grand Armament from England, actually made (as the Sea Term is) the Isle of Belleisle, but not finding the rest of the Fleet, returned to England; for when the Orders for laying the Expedition aside, were sent to Portsmouth, it was not possible, on Account of the Westerly Winds, to send Advice of it to Corke, therefore those Transports and Ships sailed agreeable to their first Orders.

If it was the Intention of the B—— M—— to make a Conquest of this important Island, as there are great Reasons to believe it was, the Enemy seem to have been informed of it, if we may judge from the Preparations they made for its Defence: They transported to it, in open Boats, a considerable Number of Troops; and by the same hazardous Conveyance, they sent to it Cannon, Mortars, and all other necessary Implements to resist the Efforts of an  
 Attack.

Attack. This, it is said, was done before the Death of his late Majesty. But a Circumstance, perhaps the most extraordinary, relative to this Expedition, is in the Brussels Gazette, about a Month before it was laid aside, where M. Maubert says, the grand Expedition of the English would not fail at all; and positively asserts, that in a little Time it would be laid aside. Our News-writers were so extremely cautious, they never translated this extraordinary Article. His Pen too was the first Courier that told the World of the Scarcity of Provisions in the Allied Army, and of the Faults which had been found in England with its Commander's Conduct, and of the Proposition of a Party to subvert him, by replacing the D—— of C——. It is not possible that these Articles should be the Fruits of Maubert's own Invention; there is the greatest Probability to Imagine he is assisted by somebody who is, I am afraid, too near our ———.

To some unaccountable Fatality must we impute the Loss of the fairest Opportunity we ever had, or perhaps ever may have, of taking  
Martinico.

Martinico. What shall be said for the whole of that strange unsuccessful Attempt upon it in the Year 1759. We were told, that the Troops landed without Opposition at Point Negres, in Port Royal Harbour, drove the Enemy from their Entrenchments and lay under Arms all Night; that in Consideration of the badness of the Roads to Port Royal, which was five Miles distant, General Hopson proposed to Commodore Moore to land the heavy Cannon at the Savannah, which is opposite to Port Royal; but the latter informed him he could not do it till the Troops on Shore, had silenced the West-side of the Fort. Can it be believed that they preferred the Safety of one, or two at most, of his Majesty's Ships to the taking this important Island? How shall we reconcile this, to the Account a French Officer has given of the Force at that Time in Port Royal. He says that the Garrison consisted of no more than Two Hundred and Thirty-six private Men and Fourteen Officers; they had for their Subsistence, says he, only One Hundred Barrels of Beef, and very little Water in their Cisterns. It was a Jealousy between the  
 Officers

Officers that did the Mischief; therefore the Troops were re-embarked, when the Garrison were beginning to think of capitulating. Had Unanimity subsisted, or some other Persons been sent on this Enterprize, Martinico had probably, long ago been in our Possession.

The Mischief its Privateers have done our Trade are inconceivable. At only Six Months after the taking of Guadalupe there were Ninety Privateers belonging to Martinico, which in that Time had taken not less than Two Hundred Sail of Merchant Ships, valued, at least, at Six hundred Thousand Pounds! This is a convincing Proof that our Trade has suffered more, the first half Year only, after the taking Guadalupe, than it had done before, during the whole War. It is now two Years since the taking of Guadalupe; and our Trade has continued to suffer in Proportion to the preceding Account. To what shall we attribute this unaccountable, nay, almost ruinous Suffrage? To the Neglect of the Fleet and Cruizers on that Station? Or to the Obstinacy of that Officer who thought he had done

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enough

enough for his Country at the taking of Guadalupe? Had the brave and vigilant Captain Tyrrel been permitted to carry a broad Pendant on this Station, will it be believed our Trade would have sustained the immense Damages it has?—Never—It must be allowed too, that there are very few, if any Captains in the British Navy, better acquainted with the Winds, Currents, Creeks, &c. than he. In the earlier Ages of the World, that honest Maxim, of Rewarding and Promoting MERIT was steadily observed. Now-a-days Rewards and Promotions are only to be had by Intrigues and Interest; by being a Great Man's Tool, his Dupe, or Bully. If a Man has too much Pride and Honesty, to sink beneath himself, to fawn, to cringe, to lye, to flatter, he gets no Promotion.—So much for the unsuccessful and paltry Attempt on Martinico; which, like that on Quebec, in the Year 1711, has brought Disgrace on our Nation, and Ruin on our Trade.

In Europe we fare no better; every Day are Advices brought, of Six, Eight, or Ten, of our Merchants Ships being carried into the different



different Ports of France. The French Merchants finding their Trade destroyed, have Recourse to fitting out Privateers; which if they increase another Year with the same Rapidity they did the last, there will be very little Probability of any of our Ships getting safe home from our Colonies. Our Trade is now more extensive than ever, and our Merchant Vessels are more numerous than ever; therefore the more Diligent his Majesty's Cruizers ought to be, in clearing the Seas of those Swarms of the Enemy's Privateers. The French Merchants, notwithstanding we boast of having ruined them, will, if we allow the great Success of their Privateering to continue, soon accumulate large Fortunes; while ours, of Course, must be reduced to Bankruptcy. It would be a vain Thing for the English Merchants to equip Privateers, because the Enemies have very little Trade, and Privateers are seldom willing to Attack each other, since it is the very End of their Errand to Attack the defenceless trading Vessels. It is in your Wisdom, that we must expect an Expedient to prevent this Ruin of our Trade; we rely on your known

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Abilities,



Abilities, Patriotic Zeal, and Integrity, for every good Measure that is conducive of Advantage to both King and People. However, we cannot but demur at seeing our Men of War, nailed as it were on the Coast of France, and the Enemy's Ships escaping out of the River Villaine, where they have been blocked up fourteen Months, at an Expence to England of more than they are worth; and escaping out of Brest and elsewhere, with Facility. Had we taken the Isle of Belleisle, the Enemy's Ships could not have escaped out of their Western Ports; and all the winter, and dismal Horrors of a Bay Station, had been removed; our Men, and Ships of War, would have found Refreshments and Security in its Harbour and Lee Shore.

These are Facts which attract Public Attention. From the Opinion which we entertain of your Wishes, and unwearied Endeavours for the Good of your Country, we attribute these Causes of general Complaint, partly, to a Neglect in the executive Part of your well laid Designs; but principally, to the  
malicious

malicious Machinations of a Party, who are  
envious of your Esteem among honest English-  
men, who have left no Stone unturned, no  
Step untaken, nor no Measure unpursued,  
however dangerous, nay ruinous to their Coun-  
try, to degrade the Man who is its great Sup-  
port.

Your Friend and Admirer

FIVE MILLIONS!

POST.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

Few Minutes ago, Report brought  
 A the disagreeable News to my Ear,  
 that England had renewed her  
 Treaty with Prussia. Surely this  
 cannot be true. Is it possible, that England  
 can be so blind to her own Interests, as to sup-  
 port this German War, which Prussia and Auf-  
 tria have kindled up in the Empire? What  
 Millions have we already spent on this conti-  
 nential Service! and are we to Spend more?  
 Are we to exhaust our national Treasure, nay  
 impoverish ourselves, in supporting a foreign  
 Prince to fight *his own* Battles? Whose Interest  
 is no way connected with ours; who owes us  
 no more Friendship, than while we pay him im-  
 mense Sums; and who, in all probability, as  
 soon as the present War is ended, will join in  
 League with France, our natural Enemy.

I will admit, that his joining with France cannot affect England; since the Design of such a Junction would be only to destroy the House of Austria : but if it was his Interest, he would perhaps as soon join with any Power against England. His Conduct at the Eve of the present German War, when the K— of England was afraid of his entering Hanover, which occasioned his calling the Russians to its Relief, is alone sufficient to convince us of this. The under-hand Dealings of Tradesmen, are not more common than the Perfidy of Princes.

If the Prussian Treaty is actually renewed, I think it argues some radical Fault, in the Consultations on the Interests of these Kingdoms; some pernicious Partiality of prosecuting a Continental War, because it is for the Benefit of a few who hold lucrative Posts. We may very well assure ourselves, that D— F—, and the rest of the German Officers, in the Allied Army, are not desirous of procuring a Peace immediately; their Conduct during the whole last Campaign, is a striking Proof of this : It is their Interest to protract

tract the War, because they are well paid with English Money. Nor would the Prussian Monarch care to what length the War was continued, while his Army is paid by us, if he was sure of not being compelled to fight by the manœuvres of his Enemies, and certain of procuring Men to replace those slain in Battle.

Upon the present Plan of carrying on the War, nothing is more evident, than that the British Subjects are loaded with exorbitant Taxes, to prevent those of Prussia paying more than their ordinary Revenues, as they are in the time of Peace; for it is well known, that the Prussian Monarch, has not, since the breaking out of the present War, imposed one new Tax on his Subjects.

Respecting the Interests of these Kingdoms, I have but one Thing more to mention; that a standing Army is, of all Things, one of the most Prejudicial to them. Little need be said on a Subject so often handled. In general Terms, it is sufficient to observe, that a standing Army is inconsistent with the nature of English Services;

vinces, had we no Connexion with the Continent, we should have very little Employ for an Army, and probably one third of that Number we now maintain, would be sufficient to garrison all the necessary Places in the British Dominions. But it will be asked, what must become of the other two Thirds, since they are already raised? Allow them certain Proportions of Land in North America, which they may cultivate, and, with Industry, accumulate Fortunes. Some such Measure ought to be considered, immediately after signing the next Peace.

Our Ancestors, for many Generations, safely relied on what they called their two great Bulwarks, the Navy and the Militia : Even during the Wars between the Houses of York and Lancaster, the Party that prevailed disbanded their Army as soon as the Action was over, and scorned to secure themselves by a *military government*. But now the Times are so altered, it is judged almost an unsafe Measure to put Arms into the Hands of the People, lest they should thereby become enabled to assert their

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rights,

rights, discover the corrupted Machines of the base and unworthy; check the Influence, or perhaps seize the Tools of unlawful and arbitrary Power. If this is not the Case, why is the Militia for the County of ——— not yet raised?

I am aware of a private Objection (which by the bye is a great one) that will be made to disbanding the greatest Part of the Army: *What shall be done with all our Young Nobility!* Many of them have not Fortunes to support their Dignity, therefore it is necessary they should have Posts in the Army? Either put them into Naval (in which I include the Marine) or into Civil Employments.

As Great Britain is more Respectable in consequence of her formidable Navy, than the intrepidity of her Troops, our naval Force can hardly be too strong. It were to be wished that so many King's Ships were not put out of Commission at the End of a War, as frequently are; for our continuing to be formidable on the Ocean, is such a Check on the Ambition

(67)  
Ambition of our Enemies, that they will not hastily presume to break the Ties of Friendship; in either attempting to disturb our Trade, or Plantations; when our natural Strength is so ready to reward their Treachery.

The Inhabitants of this Kingdom reap some Advantage from a Fleet in Commission; which they do not from a standing Army. The King's Ships are always paid at home; therefore the Money is still among us; and it is well known that none are more ready to circulate it, than the Sailors: but an Army is frequently paid abroad; therefore the Money is exported from us; to the great Detriment of every Man in Trade.

It would be presumptuous in me to assert how far the naval Strength of this Nation might, or ought to be exerted: But it must be observed, it is the only natural Strength which we have; and ought to be the principal Strength on which we should rely. Hence arises the important Questions, why this natural and principal Strength has not been lately employed? And



why fifteen Months have been suffered to elapse, with almost the whole Royal Navy in Commission and nothing done? We seem to be sunk into a State of Lethargy, like that in 1756, when we permitted the French to take Minorca, and to make Conquests in America against a superior Force.

All attention, in spite of common Sense and common Honesty, is warped to the Affairs of Germany; Things which are ruinous and foreign to this Nation. When some little Advantage is gained in that Country (witness the taking of the Town of Fritzlar) though not of half the Importance as the taking a French Frigate, the Gazette, in order to intoxicate us with the grand manœuvre, gives us a dull, tedious, and uninteresting Narrative of the March of the Army, over a hundred hard Names, which British Ears never heard before, which swells the *unknown* Advantage to a Trans-action of great Importance; as for instance,

“ The Hereditary Prince cantoned his Corps  
“ at Züschen; and receiving Advice that the

“ Garrison

"Garrison of Fritzlar was not prepared for an  
 "Attack, he went thither, with a few Batta-  
 "lions, in Hopes of being able to carry that  
 "Place at once. He attacked it with great  
 "Spirit, but the Enemy defending it resolute-  
 "ly, and taking all Advantages their Situation  
 "afforded them, the Hereditary Prince thought  
 "it advisable to desist from the Attempt.\*"

Who ever doubted their taking all Advan-  
 tages their Situation afforded them? Did the  
 Hereditary Prince? To be sure, it is necessary  
 to tell the Mob, that the French, by taking all  
 Advantages (which they ought not to have  
 done) and which was dealing very *unfairly*  
 with us, held the little town of Fritzlar, and  
 baffled the Design which the Hereditary Prince  
 had formed against it. This Art is to screen a  
 bad Cause from a weak Mind, and encourage  
 the Rabble still to adore Prince F——, get  
 drunk at the News of his Victory, and run mad  
 on the rejoicing Night.

An Englishman, who knows nothing of mi-  
 litary Affairs, would take these German Gene-

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\* See the Gazette of Feb. 24.

als to be as ignorant as himself, when he comes to the following Part of the same *Extraordinary Gazette*.

“ The Hereditary Prince cantoned his Troops  
 “ about Hadernar, not far from Fritzlar. Lieut.  
 “ Gen. Breidenbach took Possession of a Ma-  
 “ gazine of 40,000 Rations at Rosenthal, and  
 “ advanced towards Marburg. The Attempt  
 “ he made upon that Town did not succeed,  
 “ *the Enemy being upon their Guard. He himself*  
 “ *was even killed in the Attack.*”

It is not to be imagined that General Breidenbach expected to find *the Enemy upon their Guard*; no, he expected they would surrender immediately on his Appearance before the Town. He was such an experienced Officer, that he could not apprehend *the Enemy would be upon their Guard* while he was marching thro' a Country which they possessed.—Did he believe they would open their Gates and strew Flowers in the Roads where he marched? Unfortunately, on this little Town he made an unsuccessful Attack; in which *even he himself*  
 was

was killed : But the Writer of the Gazette has forgot to tell us *even* how many more are killed.

This *extraordinary* Gazette has another *extraordinary* Passage, the most puzzling of any; for it surpasses all the Logic of Maubert. The Brussels Gazette shall no longer be famed for false Reasoning and unintelligible Accounts: Maubert shall no longer enjoy Pre-eminence in the Temple of Dulness, Ignorance, and Falsehood. His Rival on the contrary Side of the Water will totally eclipse him in his Harvest of Laurels. How fair this audacious Rival stands for pulling him down from all his Dignities, take the following Scrap of his own Rhetoric, and you will discover without any Information.

“ In the mean while, my Lord Granby  
“ made some *Demonstrations* towards Guderf-  
“ berg.”

The Writer of the Gazette would very much oblige the Public, if he would, in his next Number, *demonstrate* what is the Meaning of the Word *Demonstrations* in this Sense; or, if he cannot, whether he was of Opinion, or  
whether

whether he was informed, and thought it imprudent to tell it at full Length; that Lord Granby had lost himself in the Woods of Hesse, and was therefore obliged to demonstrate by the Sun and Stars, with a Quadrant, whereabouts he was, what Latitude he was in, and the Longitude; and what Distance Gutersberg bore from him, West, East, North, or South.

And now I have finished the first Part of my History, I shall begin the second, which is the History of the Battle of the Clouds.

The first of these was the Battle of the Clouds, which was fought on the 1st of January, 1745, between the Forces of the King of Prussia and the Forces of the King of France. The King of Prussia was supported by the King of England, and the King of France was supported by the King of Spain. The Battle was fought in the Clouds, and the King of Prussia was victorious.



