





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


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
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THE REVENUE BILL.

ITS EFFECT UPON THE RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH CANADA.

SPEECH

OF

HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS,
OF DELAWARE,

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Thursday, June 14, 1894.

WASHINGTON.
1894.

189A
(A1)

SPEECH
OF
HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS.

The Senate having under consideration the bill (H. R. 4864) to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes—

Mr. HIGGINS said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: This bill will put wool on the free list, and thereby add to the free list another product of Canadian production. To that extent it will increase to the relief given to the people of Canada by the reduction of the duty, either in part or in whole, upon their natural products.

I do not propose at this time to add anything to what I have already taken occasion to say during this debate upon this measure as one of merely domestic policy. Important as that is it does not constitute its entire, and I am not prepared to say that I think it constitutes its chief, importance. In more ways than one, and in no way more vital to the interests of the American people than in respect to its effect upon our relations with Canada, it is a measure of far-reaching foreign policy.

We hear its reverberations already from beyond the waters of the Atlantic in its propositions to uproot the policy of reciprocal trade with Germany and continental Europe as respects sugar and our agricultural products on the one hand, and with our sister republics of South America and the Island of Cuba upon the other.

All that, Mr. President, which is of so much importance to the consumer and the public of the United States, which is of so much importance and has been of so much benefit to the farmers of the United States, is condemned ruthlessly to the block, and I do not know but what there is a feeling on the other side of this Chamber, there certainly is in some of the offices of the able editors in the land, that the time of the Senate is wasted by a discussion before the great forum of the American people as to the effect of this proposed policy.

This bill, as I have already taken occasion to discuss during the debate, as it was passed by the House of Representatives and reported to the Senate, abrogated the reciprocity treaty with Hawaii. I am glad to say that that has been altered by amendment, an amendment in which I hope the House of Representatives will agree.

But I wish at this time to ask the attention of the Senate to some observations which I feel moved to make with regard to the effect of this bill upon our relations with our neighbors of Canada, and therein and thereby of the most far-reaching consequence to them and to us as common citizens of one continent.

I am free to say, Mr. President, that when the Senate considered the McKinley bill and passed it four years ago, it really took very little account of its effect upon Canada. We passed

in that measure a schedule on agricultural and other natural products of Canada of the utmost consequence to them, and, in a certain sense, of the utmost disastrous consequence to them, but in doing it we really took very little thought of them. I doubt if more than a very few members of either House of Congress had their attention drawn to the great and important effect on our Canadian neighbors of the provisions of that bill.

The farmers of the United States—the Republican farmers—wanted protection. They said if there was protection to be given to the manufacturer they wanted protection to the farmer, and out of regard for them, and out of regard for their circumstances, and for the consistency of the policy of protection, which should hold in equal esteem the products of the soil and the products of the loom and the anvil, we enacted the provisions of that law, which also, as I have said, had their effect upon the natural products of Canada. We, in fact, were involved in a profound self-contemplation, and were lost to all thought of anybody outside of or *abunde* ourselves.

When the McKinley bill was passed, with its agricultural schedule and the duty on lumber and coal, the American market was secured to the American producer, and that, too, without any additional cost to the American consumer. Prices did not rise within the wide limits of this broad land, because the consumer was left to the industry and capacity of the American farmer and lumberman and miner. Our splendid resources were fully adequate to that task. We needed for that purpose no assistance from Canada—*non tali auxilio*—and from that source no additional cost thereby has been put upon the American people.

As shown, however, by the figures of the tables, which I will beg leave to submit to the Senate, the duties upon the products introduced into the United States from Canada all fell upon the Canadian producer, and we enforced that much of a right royal contribution to the American exchequer, and to that extent augmented our revenues from our neighbor.

The McKinley legislation, Mr. President, if I may call it so, is an object lesson upon both sides of the line. It shows to the American farmer what an easy remedy he has against foreign competition, and how he can secure for himself the plenitude of our domestic market for his product, a matter of concern the largest at times when we are met in the markets of the world by all the problems of Asiatic and South American and Australian and other foreign competition, and all the complexity of the problem of silver as a money metal.

To the Canadian it was an object lesson at the same time. It showed to him the absolute uncertainty of the American market for him so long as he chooses to indulge in the luxury of being either foreign to the United States or a British dependency; that whatever crop he may plant, whatever particular manufacture or mining plant he may establish, its prosperity and welfare or its destruction are dependent upon the vicissitudes of American politics, and upon the action taken in this Legislature over which he has no control.

The bill now before the Senate, for the first time in American history, proposes to give and hand over to the Canadians almost a free market in their natural products, absolutely without any compensation in return. The history of our reciprocal relations with Canada is important and interesting in this connection.

Our statistics available are only to be found from 1821 to the present time. In 1846 the British Government took the great and impressive step for themselves of free trade, and in the same act cut up by the roots the theretofore differential advantages they had given to their colonies and dependencies in their trade with the mother country; and Canada found herself cut off from an advantageous market for her natural products in Great Britain.

At the same time she found herself face to face with an adverse tariff in the United States. The Walker tariff, of which we have heard such encomiums in this discussion, placed high duties upon agricultural products and the natural products of Canada. So it came about that there was at that time in Canada a condition of profound discontent, so great that the British Government sent one of its first statesmen over there as governor-general, Lord Elgin; and, as we are told by an eminent publicist of England, Lord Elgin himself wondered that the Canadians had rested under the adverse conditions which affected them.

As a remedy, he came to the city of Washington and proposed to the then Democratic Administration the reciprocity treaty, since known by his name, which was adopted by this country. It offered to the United States reciprocity in the natural products of Canada by giving to the United States a free market for agricultural and the like products in Canada in return for free markets for such Canadian products in the United States. That convention and arrangement was what is known as "jug-handled"—it was all on one side.

There was no market for which we cared in Canada for the articles which by the treaty were made free. It was everything to her to have a free market in the United States for her natural products that we thus gave to her free, while she retained her existing duties upon manufactures, and thus excluded us to the extent of her duties from selling our manufactures in her markets, wherein and whereby alone we could get any advantage.

I submit at this point some tables which have been prepared by the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department in response to an inquiry by a resolution of the Senate, giving a recapitulation of the trade of the United States with the British North American Provinces for the years running from 1821 up to 1893 inclusive, and also a table, which is a recapitulation of these annual reports by periods, showing in one set of figures the exports from the United States to Canada and in the other the exports from Canada to the United States. The periods are contemporaneous with what may be called the tariff periods of the United States, and I do not think that such tables have ever before been prepared.

The periods are as follows, giving the years inclusive: 1821 to 1832, 1833 to 1845, 1846 to 1855, 1856 to 1866, being the period of the Elgin treaty; 1867 to 1873, that being the year when our tariff was first materially reduced; 1874 to 1883, when occurred the next reduction of our tariff; 1884 to 1890, the year of the enactment of the McKinley law, and 1891 to 1893, the last year for which we have at this time available figures. The tables are as follows:

Trade of the United States with British North American Provinces.

MERCHANDISE.

Years ending—	Exports.			Total.	Imports.			Total.	Excess of exports (-) or imports (+).
	Domestic.		Foreign.		Dutiable.		Free.		
September 30—									
1821	82,009,596	84,633	82,014,529	820,541	180,856	840,150	840,150	\$1,613,029	
1822	1,832,367	16,256	1,848,623	229,672	128,920	358,592	358,592	-1,504,281	
1823	1,760,350	9,617	1,769,967	184,705	90,751	275,456	275,456	-1,494,511	
1824	2,554,292	1,710	2,556,002	200,700	218,738	410,924	410,924	-1,872,062	
1825	2,105,115	21,430	2,126,545	275,812	153,144	419,498	419,498	-2,136,544	
1826	1,803,382	6,075	1,809,457	178,045	112,566	428,987	428,987	-1,697,588	
1827	1,544,738	3,114	1,547,852	169,630	112,566	280,196	280,196	-1,518,846	
1828	2,138,104	8,552	2,146,656	189,038	97,735	287,773	287,773	-1,290,177	
1829	2,741,211	8,021	2,749,232	236,180	147,844	384,024	384,024	-1,802,051	
1830	3,070,292	9,546	3,079,838	300,457	287,255	398,694	398,694	-2,351,208	
1831	3,315,269	28,122	3,343,391	296,286	380,495	482,136	482,136	-2,492,136	
1832	4,033,781	66,259	4,100,040	558,236	390,495	975,513	975,513	-2,656,610	
1833	3,077,209	57,567	3,134,776	582,904	439,277	686,781	686,781	-3,134,567	
1834	3,364,246	44,859	3,409,105	614,148	313,776	896,380	896,380	-2,238,396	
1835	2,434,265	162,563	2,596,828	1,093,701	787,396	1,237,708	1,237,708	-2,171,337	
1836	2,739,349	136,512	2,875,861	982,904	927,737	1,881,047	1,881,047	-965,201	
1837	2,155,229	138,654	2,293,883	620,082	464,176	1,910,661	1,910,661	-965,201	
1838	3,408,470	139,684	3,548,154	379,836	843,528	1,223,364	1,223,364	-1,188,425	
1839	2,894,466	204,035	3,098,501	610,777	610,219	1,488,258	1,488,258	-1,824,700	
1840	3,570,733	6,483,283	10,054,016	1,170,177	634,240	1,804,417	1,804,417	-4,964,162	
1841	3,565,143	228,080	3,793,223	358,857	634,070	1,985,682	1,985,682	-4,964,162	
June 30.									
1843 (nine months)	2,585,571	82,517	2,668,088	154,602	299,549	454,151	454,151	-2,183,937	
1844	5,207,186	797,473	6,004,659	294,629	574,731	1,019,720	1,019,720	-4,984,939	
1845	4,691,417	873,714	5,565,131	225,217	880,387	1,055,604	1,055,604	-4,510,527	
1846	5,700,766	1,363,767	7,064,533	348,531	965,143	1,314,674	1,314,674	-5,750,859	
1847	5,994,659	1,882,696	7,877,355	305,678	1,174,788	1,480,476	1,480,476	-6,396,879	
1848	5,992,105	1,990,661	7,982,767	278,268	2,085,951	2,686,319	2,686,319	-6,704,219	
1849	7,225,247	2,719,735	9,944,982	322,637	4,856,863	5,179,500	5,179,500	-10,000,000	
1850	9,050,337	11,770,092	20,820,429	276,648	5,093,070	5,273,718	5,273,718	-6,490,374	
1851	6,604,097	3,625,511	10,229,608	339,435	5,130,010	5,469,445	5,469,445	-4,760,163	

1853	7,301,327	5,131,270	12,432,597	385,091	6,132,468	6,527,559	-5,905,088
1854	15,045,244	9,068,164	24,073,408	485,995	8,288,417	8,784,412	-15,288,996
1855	15,746,642	11,996,166	27,741,908	8,065,678	7,082,611	8,288,412	-12,683,519
1856*	2,710,697	6,314,652	29,025,349	20,454,800	821,724	21,276,614	-7,248,735
1857*	19,820,113	4,318,369	23,038,482	12,281,172	827,744	22,106,916	-2,039,566
1858*	19,820,113	4,012,768	23,004,326	18,293,104	491,722	15,784,536	-7,819,690
1859*	21,724,917	6,884,547	28,109,494	18,363,860	733,715	19,287,365	-8,891,929
1860*	13,741,047	3,891,829	22,696,813	22,202,068	50,411	23,721,482	-6,970,729
1861*	13,741,047	3,891,826	22,696,813	17,981,727	599,258	18,581,981	-2,087,045
1862*	18,185,224	2,651,920	20,376,070	16,593,591	991,195	17,484,736	-10,135,238
1863*	24,198,147	2,394,477	27,614,514	16,946,755	1,661,961	29,608,732	-3,034,112
1864*	24,188,147	1,784,378	26,574,624	31,962,980	1,301,443	33,234,403	-4,485,001
1865*	27,045,024	2,448,228	29,829,492	5,490,239	5,490,239	46,528,628	+23,669,748
1866*	22,380,652	3,724,465	24,828,860	43,020,368	1,531,287	25,044,005	-4,023,703
1867	17,296,837	3,724,465	21,020,302	1,890,718	23,153,287	26,291,379	-2,180,602
1868	21,419,222	2,061,555	24,060,777	1,792,840	24,498,539	29,293,766	-5,912,295
1869	20,085,905	3,295,666	23,381,471	3,011,630	23,282,186	33,595,437	+10,926,074
1870	21,090,369	4,278,885	25,839,254	2,660,901	33,760,883	32,542,137	+265,961
1871	27,564,844	4,711,632	32,276,176	2,781,254	29,760,883	36,346,990	+6,995,476
1872	24,426,465	4,864,969	29,411,454	4,715,379	31,631,561	37,649,582	+3,094,419
1873	30,361,368	4,203,745	34,565,113	6,275,435	31,374,107	34,865,961	-9,107,213
1874	381,883,931	4,689,243	43,473,174	8,409,649	25,956,312	28,271,626	-7,963,809
1875	32,238,905	3,956,770	36,235,735	7,522,733	20,746,173	29,010,251	-5,963,800
1876	31,523,415	3,477,716	35,004,131	7,164,089	21,846,162	24,277,378	-15,066,862
1877	36,676,160	2,695,020	39,374,180	6,869,862	17,497,516	24,277,378	-15,066,862
1878	34,631,672	2,695,020	37,326,692	7,463,472	16,954,069	25,327,563	-12,370,148
1879	34,631,672	5,485,349	40,117,021	7,463,472	17,731,530	25,327,563	-12,370,148
1880	29,082,690	2,712,193	30,794,883	9,512,890	23,701,530	33,214,340	+9,438,469
1881	35,793,031	3,719,845	39,512,876	10,896,266	27,145,661	38,041,947	+1,470,929
1882	35,289,859	3,279,653	38,569,512	12,688,318	30,435,157	51,113,475	+12,543,653
1883	42,831,005	3,749,248	46,580,253	14,201,349	30,539,527	44,740,876	-1,793,377
1884	42,510,922	3,900,518	46,411,450	15,237,307	23,778,533	39,015,840	-3,164,366
1885	35,976,815	4,148,092	40,124,907	12,871,884	24,068,657	36,960,541	-2,111,317
1886	31,953,124	2,831,897	34,785,021	12,042,627	25,453,716	38,015,584	-1,111,237
1887	33,495,403	2,669,944	36,165,347	11,885,368	26,130,216	38,015,584	-5,838,004
1888	34,432,059	2,813,060	37,245,119	13,917,954	30,166,169	43,064,123	+6,838,317
1889	39,806,682	2,334,474	42,141,156	12,519,114	29,400,359	43,006,473	-3,939,980
1890	38,544,454	2,959,358	41,503,812	12,139,489	27,297,491	39,396,980	-2,196,852
1891	37,445,515	2,068,240	39,443,755	11,753,344	27,682,191	38,434,535	-9,551,441
1892	42,580,578	2,305,410	44,886,988	9,923,299	35,411,248	38,196,342	-10,452,166
1893	44,890,203	3,798,305	48,628,608	11,649,414	35,586,928	38,196,342	-10,452,166

RECAPITULATION, BY PERIODS.

1447

	Exports.			Imports.			Excess of exports (-) or imports (+).	Per cent of imports.		Total trade average per annum.
	Domestic.		Foreign.	Dutiable.		Total.		Free.	Dutiable.	
1821 to 1832 (12 years)	\$23,766,288	\$108,343	\$26,874,625	\$2,584,635	\$2,276,843	\$4,840,953	-822,032,637	52.97	47.03	\$2,642,966
1833 to 1845 (13 years)	51,805,122	3,023,040	54,834,162	7,747,036	8,276,901	16,022,440	-38,511,222	48.35	51.65	5,450,546
1846 to 1855 (10 years)	84,959,312	41,230,519	128,162,827	11,116,036	43,083,575	54,204,011	-71,958,216	30.51	79.49	18,036,743
1856 to 1873 (17 years) *	233,086,100	40,530,483	278,676,082	258,113,942	14,928,352	272,152,794	-6,523,288	64.47	5.53	50,075,252
1874 to 1883 (10 years)	162,213,410	27,861,457	190,074,547	23,107,147	20,928,300	233,454,208	+35,328,530	17.34	89.66	59,008,218
1884 to 1890 (7 years)	344,612,057	34,031,437	378,644,165	91,982,306	245,545,238	334,427,510	+44,116,655	27.39	72.51	71,317,168
1891 to 1893 (3 years)	256,719,469	21,654,343	278,373,812	90,913,743	165,385,126	178,178,879	-1,394,933	32.71	77.29	79,336,069
	124,756,236	8,201,855	162,958,251	33,325,057	79,630,367	112,465,424	-20,002,827	29.49	70.51	81,971,225

* Period of reciprocal trade.

This table, when you come to rest your eye upon it, is most instructive. It discloses the fact that in the year preceding the adoption of the reciprocity treaty, both the exports and the imports between Canada and the United States were greatly augmented, and that that increase of trade has continued almost without intermission from that time until the present; but it shows also that there was a great advance of the free imports by reason of the Canadians taking advantage of the trade in those articles which came in free under the treaty; and a corresponding falling off of the articles which were dutiable, thereby proving that, while the volume of the trade was not so greatly increased, the burden of the tariff of the United States under the treaty was taken off of the Canadian exporters and the loss borne by us; while both before and after the treaty it was borne by the Canadians.

For instance, the amount of free imports into the United States from Canada in 1854 amounted to only \$495,995, while in 1855, and presumably in the three and one-half months between the 16th day of March, when the treaty took effect, and the 30th day of June, when the fiscal year ended, the free imports from Canada amounted to the enormously increased sum of \$8,085,678, while the dutiable imports from Canada, which were in 1854 \$3,288,417, fell in 1856, the first full year of the treaty, to \$821,724. The last year of the treaty, 1866, when it was abrogated, the free imports had increased from the sum of \$495,995 in 1854, to the enormous sum of \$43,029,389; and the dutiable goods imported that year were \$5,499,239, being a great increase over any previous period of the treaty, they ranging from as low as \$491,732 in 1858, to \$1,661,981 in 1864.

With but one other conclusion shall I burden the Senate from these tables, and that is in respect to the balance of trade. The balance of trade in our favor when we entered into this reciprocity convention was \$15,288,996 in 1854; in 1855, during which we were only under the treaty for three months and a half, the balance in our favor was \$12,623,519. It immediately fell off under the treaty and went as low as \$47,976 against us in 1861. The balance against us in 1866, the last year of the treaty, was \$23,699,748, while under the McKinley act the balance was, the first year, 1891, in our favor \$9,220, and in the last year, 1893, \$10,442,166.

I shall leave these tables, however, to speak for themselves, and shall not trouble the Senate with drawing any further deductions from them.

It will be remembered by some of the older members of the Senate that in 1874 Canada, through the British minister, tendered to the United States a renewal of the reciprocity treaty of 1864, with the addition thereto of a large list of manufactured articles of the United States, which would be admitted into Canada free of duty. President Grant submitted that project to the Senate for its consideration and advice, and the Senate advised against it. That was the action of Congress in 1874 on the question of reciprocity.

In 1892, under the pressure of Canadian politics and the effect of the McKinley act upon their trade, the government of Sir John A. Macdonald, who was at that time alive and the premier, through their representatives, members of the Canadian ministry, and the British minister here, presented to Secretary Blaine, under President Harrison's Administration, a proposi-

tion for the renewal of reciprocity relations. They offered to Mr. Blaine to renew the treaty of 1854, and that he respectfully declined. Mr. Blaine told them that he would only consider the project of reciprocity as it should include certain manufactured articles to be agreed upon, as well as natural products.

Before any answer could be given, however, by the Canadian representatives to that proposition, they put a further question to him as to whether the United States would require, in the event of the conclusion of such an arrangement, that whatever advantages should be given to the United States by the reduction of the Canadian tariff on our manufactured goods, should be exclusive to the United States, or whether we should be willing to have it granted to Great Britain and her other dependencies and colonies. Mr. Blaine's answer was that it must be exclusive to the United States; that we should not be willing to submit our tariff arrangements in that way to Great Britain, and should not be willing that whatever advantages by this convention should be given to the United States should be given to Great Britain and her dependencies. Thereupon, so far as this branch of the conference was concerned, the representatives of Canada terminated it.

So, Mr. President, was shown by this very adroit and statesmanlike treatment of these negotiations by our great premier, the utterly illusory character of any proposition for reciprocity between the United States and Canada.

What shall be our policy toward Canada, the policy of the McKinley law or the policy of this so called Wilson bill? I submit that our true policy toward Canada must be governed, under present conditions, not so much by commercial as by political considerations, and that it must be governed by the great fact of our geographical proximity and of her membership as a dependency of the British Empire.

It is not the same case as it would be if we were dealing with Australia, or the Cape Colonies, or India, or any other British dependency. Indeed it is not the same case at all, because all the reasons lead to the conclusion that they never would ask for any special arrangement with us of that kind. Canada only asked for a special reciprocal treatment from us in our tariff because of her geographical proximity, and indeed her geographical proximity is the great vital fact and consideration in this policy.

I submit, Mr. President, that the outstanding difference between Canada and the United States, growing out of the fact that we are under two different governments, never has received a settlement, and never will receive a settlement until we cease to be members of separate empires and become members of one.

I beg the attention of the Senate to a hasty résumé of these outstanding differences, which can not be left out of account in any adequate consideration which is given to this subject. The first in time, if not the first in importance, is the ancient and outstanding difference with regard to the fisheries. Under the treaty of 1818, negotiated on our part by Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush, the American fishermen could only land on Canadian soil in order to obtain shelter and repair damages, for wood and water, and for no other purpose. It has been contended by our Government that circumstances have altered the original

construction of that treaty, and that we have the right under it to enjoy all the ordinary rights of hospitality in Canadian ports.

That has been steadily resisted by the Canadians, who have, in asserting the right they claim under the treaty, denied to American fishermen the privilege of landing in their ports for the obtainment of bait, seines, supplies, or outfit, or the transmission of their catch of fish to United States ports. Their reason for refusing to give to American fishermen the commonest rights of hospitality has been that they want to force the United States to give them a free market for the fish caught by Canadian fishermen; and on that we have had a long outstanding difference. It was one of the matters brought into the treaty of Washington in 1871.

By that treaty it was agreed that we should let Canadian fish be brought in free for ten years, if on the other hand these rights I have spoken of, hitherto denied, were given for a like period to American fishermen. But inasmuch as the Canadians contended that the rights they granted were more valuable than the rights they obtained by the treaty, we provided for an arbitration of such difference and the payment of the sum so awarded. We went into the arbitration and we were astonished to find as an off-set to the \$15,000,000 awarded us under the treaty of Washington for the Alabama claims, an award of \$5,000,000 against us to Canada for this alleged superiority of rights granted to us over what was granted to them in their fisheries.

Mr. FRYE. An award made by a packed court.

Mr. HIGGINS. I accept the statement of the Senator from Maine. He knows more about it than I do, for I was not then in public life. But on the abrogation or expiration of the treaty of 1871, no other arrangements having been entered into, the Canadians began a systematic harrying of our fishermen, seizing their vessels and condemning them in their courts in order to compel the United States to admit their fish free.

I call the attention of the Senate and the country to the fact that they never tried that with a Republican Administration, but they did it in Mr. Cleveland's former Administration, that Administration being full believers in the doctrine of free trade, which then would admit Canadian fish free, as it is now proposed to admit Canadian fish free under the pending bill.

But they proposed a treaty; and a negotiation was entered upon in the city of Washington that resulted in the draft of a treaty known as the Chamberlain treaty, negotiated on the part of England by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, which admitted Canadian fish free upon their granting to the fishermen of the United States these rights in Canadian ports. That treaty was rejected by the Senate of the United States, then under a Republican majority. Thereupon these commissioners, probably indebted to the good sense of Mr. Chamberlain, who was a practical man, tendered to the United States what is known as the *modus vivendi*, under which American fishermen pay to the Canadians for the enjoyment of these rights of hospitality—to land on Canadian shores to dry their fish, procure bait and seines and nets and outfits, and transship their catch of fish—\$1.50 per ton per annum on the tonnage of their vessels.

That *modus vivendi* has been continued. Thus in this uncertain way the fisheries question between the United States and

Canada remains outstanding, and promises to remain outstanding while Canada remains a part of the British dominion.

Another difference arising out of the treaty of 1871 is the Canadian discrimination in respect to canal tolls. Under that treaty Canada, in respect to her Welland and St. Lawrence Canals, and the United States, in regard to the Sault Ste. Marie and St. Clair Flats Canals, agreed to grant each to the citizens of the other country the same privileges that were granted to citizens of its own country in these canals.

In the face of that the Canadians imposed tolls of 20 cents a ton for all transportation through the Welland canal and the other canals and allowed a drawback of 18 cents a ton on all grain shipped to Montreal, thereby giving a differential rate of 18 cents a ton to the grain shipped to Montreal, for the obvious purpose of building up the commerce of that port to the injury of the commerce of American ports and through American canals or transportation in our own country.

This was called to the attention of the British commissioners by Mr. Blaine in February, 1892. According to Mr. Blaine's account they promised to rectify this discrimination, but according to their own account they only promised to take it into consideration. When they got back to Ottawa it was found that the Canadian government was unwilling to discontinue this discrimination which it was making in plain violation of the treaty. Thereupon President Harrison after due deliberation retaliated by imposing a like discriminatory tariff upon all Canadian vessels passing through the American Sault Ste. Marie Canal, and there the matter has remained but for the reason that the Canadians are paralleling our canal at that point with one of their own construction, which is about reaching the point of completion. When it is completed they will have a system in itself complete from one end of their country to the other without having to use any part of the American canals, and being independent they propose to discriminate to their heart's content. That is the attitude they assume towards us in that respect.

But a matter of very much more importance is the aggressions of the Canadian railways upon American railways and transportation interests in the internal commerce of the United States. As we all know, the policy was adopted at the very outset of our Government that all coastwise commerce must be carried in American ships. Not a pound of British or Canadian or other foreign freight between American ports could be carried in other than American bottoms; and such is the law to-day. It is the law upon the Great Lakes quite as much as it is upon the seaboard on either the Atlantic or the Pacific coast. Yet there has grown up a practice only permitted, not authorized by law, by which Canadian railways carry American merchandise through Canadian territory from one point in the United States to another point in the United States, thereby absorbing traffic which if carried on by ship or vessel could only be by an American ship or vessel.

The origin of this was quite simple and quite unobjectionable. A moment's thought of the geographical boundary line between ourselves and Canada in the eastern part of the country shows the origin of it. It grew up under two sections, 5 and 6 of the act of Congress of July 28, 1866, now known in the Revised

Statutes as sections 3005 and 3006. Under section 3005 any goods or merchandise landed at the ports of Portland, Boston, New York, or other ports to be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury and intended for their final destination in the Canadian Province, can be entered at the custom-house and carried through the territory of the United States on cars under seal, and in bond, not to violate the customs laws, without the payment of any duty to the United States. Everyone will see that that is nothing but a fair and wise and neighborly convention.

Canada for six months in the year is cut off from the sea by ice. Montreal and Quebec can not be reached. The Intercolonial road from Montreal and Quebec to Halifax passes through a country practically impassable at that time of the year. So their easy and natural course during the ice-bound season is through our Atlantic ports; and in that section we have simply said to them that we will permit goods to be carried from Europe or elsewhere in foreign countries through our United States Atlantic ports and over our railways to Canada without imposing any duty, and in a like way from Canada to be carried through the United States and exported from our ports without the payment of duties; and our railroads get the benefit of the carriage.

Now, that is one section, and a very proper one. The other section is the one under which this abuse has grown up, and it grew up in this way. It was very convenient to the United States to permit the carriage of American goods through the peninsula of Ontario between Niagara Falls on the one side and Detroit on the other, or any other route across that peninsula, for goods going from the East to the West or from the West to the East. Both the Michigan Central and the Canadian Southern roads cross the peninsula of Ontario in this way, and they have been in large measure a convenience to American commerce. I do not know, and I do not admit that they are necessary to-day. I see no reason why we should not require that all such traffic should go over the Lake Shore or Nickel-Plate road on the south of Lake Erie, quite as well as to go through Ontario on the north.

But no objection ever would have been raised to that. This statute, to which I have called attention, was enacted in 1866, at a time when the Canadian Pacific Road was not projected, but in 1886 the Canadian Pacific Road was thrown open to traffic. Then arose an exercise of the power under the statute that was never contemplated when it was enacted.

I have omitted to say that this statute is merely permissive. It permits goods to be carried in this way from American ports through Canadian territory under regulations to be adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury. So this whole traffic rests merely upon this permissive statute and certain regulations of the Treasury Department, which at any time may be altered or revoked.

The Canadian Pacific Road extends from ocean to ocean. It has one terminus through the Intercolonial at Halifax and another through a branch or terminal road it has through the State of Maine at a port, the name of which I have forgotten, just north of the boundary between Maine and Canada; and from there it extends to Vancouver on the Pacific Ocean. It has various connecting roads; the Soo railroad, so-called, from the Sault Ste. Marie through Wisconsin to St. Paul, and the Wabash

system, which goes from Detroit; the Boston and Maine system on the east and the Vermont Central, the Ogdensburg and New York.

It has various roads, which operate as feeders, extending down into the heart of our country. On the Pacific coast there is a line of steamers (I do not know whether they are run under the American or the British flag) from San Francisco to Vancouver taking goods to be carried over their road. They make rates from one end of this continent to the other for American goods carried through Canada, not merely goods whose transportation originally begins in the States of the northern border, but by means of these feeders on the coast, as well as inland, extending down into the heart of our country. For a reason I shall give in a moment they can afford to make always and every time a lower rate than any American road can afford to make, and they do make a rate low enough to secure the traffic.

Thus, Mr. President, a shipper at San Francisco can send goods destined to New York up the coast to Vancouver, across the continent by the Canadian Pacific, then down to New York by its eastern connection, at a lower rate than he can send by an American railway. How is it that the Canadian Pacific can command this trade? It is because unless it had this traffic it could not exist as a business undertaking. It could not earn its own axle grease by Canadian traffic alone.

After leaving Ontario it passes a long distance through uninhabited regions until it reaches Manitoba, where there is but a relatively small population, and after leaving there it goes through another waste equally long, and over the triple ranges of the Rocky and other mountains to British Columbia. But because it earns nothing from Canadian freight it can afford to take American freight at any rate lower than the rate made by an American railway, because whatever it gets is just that much more than nothing. This is the attack that is leveled by the Canadian corporation at the railway and transportation interests of the United States.

Now, if this was done by a merely commercial corporation it would be important enough and serious enough, but it is a very much more serious matter. The Canadian Pacific road was constructed primarily not for commercial purposes so much as for political, military, and imperial purposes. It was to make this railway and the Dominion of Canada the connecting link between Great Britain on the one side and her Asiatic and Pacific Ocean dependencies upon the other. It was intended to accomplish the same object for which the Dominion of Canada was created--the consolidation of the confederated Canadian provinces under one government in order to maintain their homogeneity and their dependence upon and allegiance to the British Crown. It was intended for the transportation of troops and munitions of war from one part of Canada to another part of Canada, and to weld the whole together into one harmonious entity.

These rates are made not merely from the coast; they are made from points inland. I can say that positively, because as a member of the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the Senate, in a recent hearing with reference to the amendment or repeal of the clause of the interstate-commerce act forbidding pooling, we had before us a very intelligent witness, having a full knowledge

of our internal trade by railway, who testified to the fact that the Canadian Pacific road made rates to the East for their grain in the very heart of Iowa, and thus from St. Paul, from Iowa, from Denver, from all points in the heart of the country, this marauder upon our internal commerce and traffic levies its contributions upon our American labor.

The fact that this was a political rather than a mere commercial scheme is shown in its innate character and policy; but there is direct evidence in regard to it. Sir E. W. Watkin, member of the British Parliament, in a work upon "Canada and the States," published in 1887, in his preface speaks about this. Sir Edward Watkin made, I believe, some thirty visits across the Atlantic with regard to strengthening the British connection. He says:

Is this great work—

It was the year after the railway was opened—

the Canadian Pacific Railway, to be left as a monument, at once, of Canada's loyalty and foresight, and of Canada's betrayal; or is it to be made the new land-route to our Eastern and Australian Empire? If it is to be shunted, then the explorations of the last three hundred years have been in vain. The dreams of some of the greatest statesmen of past times are reduced to dreams, and nothing more. The strength given by this glorious self-contained route, from the old country to all the new countries, is wasted.

On the other hand, if those who now govern inherit the great traditions of the past; if they believe in empire; if they are statesmen—then, a line of military posts of strength and magnitude, beginning at Halifax on the Atlantic, and ending at the Pacific, will give power to the Dominion, and wherever the red-coat appears confidence in the brave old country will be restored.

Which is it to be?

Some years ago, Sir John A. Macdonald said: "I hope to live to see the day, and if I do not, that my son may be spared, to see Canada the right arm of England. To see Canada a powerful auxiliary of the Empire, not, as now, a source of anxiety and a source of danger."

Later Sir John A. Macdonald, in an interview with a representative of the Pall Mall Gazette, said what I shall read from the testimony of Mr. Joseph Nimmo, jr., before the Select Committee on Relations with Canada, at page 894 of Senate Report 1530, part 2, Fifty-first Congress, first session:

About three years ago Sir John A. Macdonald divulged to one of the editors of the Pall Mall Gazette the politico-commercial idea upon which the whole Canadian Pacific Railway enterprise is based. He described it as a railroad extending from ocean to ocean, and superior to the American roads by virtue of that fact, and the fact that it enjoys a monopoly of the trans-continental traffic of Canada. Then, in an outburst of enthusiasm, he announced the fact that he was an imperial confederationist, and a firm adherent of "Greater Britainism." Referring to the Canadian Pacific Railway as a part of an enormous political scheme, he said:

"With England as a central power, with Australia and South Africa as auxiliaries, we (the Confederated British Empire) must control the seas, and the control of the sea means the control of the world."

The leaders of the political party in power in Canada to-day make no attempt to disguise their purpose. The Handbook of Canada recently published by the Dominion government, states that the Canadian Pacific was constructed "in the interests of the Empire at large, as well as those of Canada," and it adds that if these far-seeing plans had been taken up when first mooted, "Canada would have been at least two generations in advance of her present position, while 'Greater Britain' (i. e., British imperial confederation) would have been in a much higher state of development than it is." This significant remark also follows:

"It was a singular coincidence and perhaps a prophetic omen of the future imperial importance of this railway, that the first loaded train that passed over its entire length from ocean to ocean was freighted with naval stores belonging to the imperial war department, transferred from Quebec to Vancouver."

In speaking of the negotiations for a British subsidy in favor of the Cana-

dian Pacific steamer line to China and Japan, the president of that railroad said in his annual report for 1887:

"The imperial interests involved in this question are so important that there can be little doubt of a satisfactory result."

If this matter were confined to railway transportation it could be thwarted; but the scheme is more far-reaching, and in part it has been carried out. In connection with the Canadian Pacific road there has been established on the Pacific a line of fast steamers, heavily subsidized by the British and Canadian Governments, running from Vancouver, the Pacific terminus of the Canadian Pacific road, to Japan and China by one route, and to Australia by the other; while ships are now building under the assurance of a like subsidy and like speed, faster, or as fast as any yet put upon the ocean, to run between Halifax and Liverpool.

This means British invasion of the Pacific market—the last refuge of the once almost triumphant American marine. Until this competition arose the Pacific Mail and other lines of American steamers commanded the trade between San Francisco and our other ports on the Pacific coast and Japan, China, Hawaii, and Australia, and generally our American trade in what up to recent times has been a most remote region of the globe. The condition is now different. At the outbreak of the civil war we had the second greatest marine of the world and were fast challenging British supremacy. The Alabama, the Shenandoah, and the Florida put an end to that. Sailing from British ports, our Southern friends were able to drive the knife home to our vitals. It remains to be seen whether by this bill they will succeed in increasing the damage which was inflicted then.

But this imperial extension does not stop with the railways or the fast sailing vessels at the ocean termini of the railroads. There is now projected an ocean cable between Vancouver and Australia in opposition to a French cable which has been projected to one of the Australian colonies, I believe, from some point on the coast of Asia. On the 21st of the present month there is to meet in Ottawa a conference of representatives from Great Britain, the Australian colonies, and the Dominion of Canada, to consider the joint and respective subsidizing of an ocean cable from Vancouver to Australia as a completion of this imperial scheme of commercial advantage and military aggression and defense.

I read at this point a short extract from a letter to the London Times of the 25th of May last from a correspondent who has been writing voluminously to the Times from Canada with regard to the matter. He says:

And for what purpose was this mighty barrier of the Rockies and Selkirks, 600 miles wide, to be crossed?

Not to unite two great communities striving for closer intercourse, as was the case when the 40,000,000 people of the Eastern and Western States, already advanced far beyond the Mississippi, made the first American line across a narrower range of mountains to get in touch with San Francisco, and the large population of the Pacific States, which was also pressing up to the base of the Rockies. In Eastern Canada there were only 4,000,000 people; in British Columbia there were less than 50,000 white people—the population of a small English manufacturing town—and few of these on the mainland, when the railroad was undertaken.

It was to complete and round off a national conception; to pave the way for commercial and political advantages as yet far remote, and by many deemed imaginary, that the work was faced. British Columbia, insignificant in population, was significant enough in position and in some of its resources. It fronted on the Pacific; it had splendid harbors and abundant coal; it supplied a new base of sea power and commercial influence. It sug-

gested a new and short pathway to the Orient and Australasia. The statesmen at Ottawa, who in 1867 began to look over the Rockies to continents beyond the Pacific, were not wanting in imagination; many claimed that their imagination outran their reason; but in the rapid course of events their dreams have already been more than justified.

They were, perhaps, building even better than they supposed. We now know, when Japanese and Australian mail and trade routes are already accomplished facts, and Pacific cable schemes are being discussed, and the docks and fortifications of Esquimaux are being completed jointly by Britain and Canada, that they were supplying the missing joints and fastening the rivets of empire. While they were doing this they were also giving political consolidation to the older provinces of Canada. Common aspirations and a great common task, with the stirring of enthusiasm which followed on the sudden widening of the Canadian horizon, did more than anything else to draw those provinces out of their own narrow circles and to give them the sense of a larger citizenship.

So, though British Columbia made no great addition to the population of Canada, its absorption into the Dominion some years after confederation, and the pledge of a transcontinental railway which was the condition of that absorption, marked a great turning point in Canadian history.

* * * * *

Vancouver is the meeting place of the Empire's extreme west and east and south, for of the two main lines of steamships which frequent the port, one has its further terminus at Hongkong the other at Sydney. Their presence vindicates the policy which led Canada to make such sacrifices to secure a base upon the Pacific.

Mr. President, it does not even stop there. I brought with me, but can not lay my hands upon it this moment, a clipping from the London Times which says that on April 25 it had intelligence from Apia that the conference at Ottawa would consider the question of the disposition of Samoa, and that colonial interests require the putting to an end of the tripartite arrangements now governing Samoa.

So, Mr. President, we mark the interesting advent of a new feature in the dominion of the world. We have known in the past plenty of things that have been done in support of British interests, but we now have the introduction of colonial interests. I trust that the day will be long distant when for any considerable time, at least, there will be a disregard in this Chamber of American interests.

But this feature of the question does not rest here. It began with the existence and presence on our Atlantic coast of the fortifications at Halifax, Bermuda, and Kingston in Jamaica; not aimed at France, not aimed at Europe, not aimed at Germany, nor at Russia. They can be aimed at nobody but the United States of America and her colonial posts. Now, we are having added by the joint contributions of British and Canadian funds a like fortification at Esquimaux, in the neighborhood of Vancouver. It is idle to say that it is being built because of the Russian fortress at Vladivostock on the far-off Pacific shore of the Russian Possessions. It is a menace and a threat at Puget Sound, and Portland, and San Francisco, and San Diego. It can be no other.

I do not find fault with this. Everybody has a right to take care of his own, and Great Britain has a right to take care of her own. What I do find fault with is that these grave facts are being ignored by American statesmen, who thereby fail to take care of their own.

But, Mr. President, not only these lines of shipping, but the Canadian Pacific road itself was built by subsidies. It never

could have been built otherwise. The amount which was given in various forms and ways for the construction of the lines of railroad has been variously estimated at from two hundred and fifty to three hundred million dollars, in addition to the subsidies that are given to the line of steamships from Vancouver to the Orient and to Australia, and that are to be given on the line from Halifax to Liverpool, and upon the proposed oceanic cable from Vancouver to Australia.

We hear enough of the doctrine of Cobden—*laissez faire*—let things go as they will. I do not propose to trench upon the ground treated of in such a masterful fashion by the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] in the earlier stages of this debate. No more striking illustration of this is furnished than by the present example to which I am alluding, that while Great Britain wisely relies upon free trade where it is to her advantage, she does not hesitate to offer subsidies and bounties, and to apply the doctrine of protection wherever that will be to her advantage. So we have built around us by subsidies a cordon of railway and steamer lines encroaching upon our domestic and foreign commerce, as well as a military and naval cordon that in any time of difference would be precipitated upon our undefended cities and shores.

Mr. President, in this dark picture there is one bright spot that gleams out on the sky like the North star, shining with no borrowed light, drawing its luster from no sun, a lesson of courage and of statesmanship worthy to be learned by the men who, sitting in this Chamber, direct the destinies of the American Republic. I refer to that noble band of Americans in Hawaii, the picket guard, the outpost of American interests, standing there by themselves, loyal to the country of their origin, loyal to the ideas which carried them there, not to be seduced and not to be driven even by the resistless power of that Republic for whose interests they have stood and whose rulers with folly predestinate strove to overthrow them.

Mr. President, there is one safe point for American interests in the Pacific Ocean. There is no merit in the American Government; but a good deal is due the American people for the influence they have exerted in this critical exigency in their affairs.

This country, with its vast resources, with its magnificent possibilities, with a prosperity up to the time of the advent of the Democratic Administration without parallel in the experience or history of the world, could well afford to contemplate with equanimity and relative indifference any prosperity which Canada might have by any means whatsoever.

We might look on and view it with comparative indifference. Certainly if that were all, I should not submit the remarks I am now making to present this view of the subject. But we are concerned as respects the Canadian Pacific road and its influence, with the removal of a duty upon wool and upon Canadian natural products, and the effect of that policy upon the future problem of the unity of the English-speaking people of this continent.

No American has any thought of the conquest of Canada by force of arms. Profoundly as many Americans believe that the welfare of all English-speaking people upon the continent, on whatever side of the line they may live, demands the unity of

the two peoples under one Government, we would not be willing to accept such a unity as the result of war of conquest.

If Canada comes to the United States she must come of her own free will and as a result of her recognition and her realization that such unity is demanded by her own permanent and paramount interests. I am one of those who believe that the permanent and paramount interests of the American people and those who live on our side of the line equally demand the union of the continent, and hence I am opposed to the policy of the present bill and the rate of duties it imposes upon Canadian products.

The dominating fact for Canadian and American alike is the American market. It is a necessity to Canada equally with the United States. Canada in respect to it holds a peculiar place arising out of her geographical position. Canada is divided into four distinct and separate sections, each separated from the other by a vast uninhabited waste, having no immediate trade or commerce with one another. You have on the east the maritime provinces; in the eastern center, Ontario and Quebec; in the western center, Manitoba and the northwestern provinces, and, on the Pacific coast, British Columbia. Their natural trade is with the United States rather than with each other. If you were to compare them to the fingers of one hand, the tie is naturally with the palm rather than with each other. That palm in this case is the United States.

The prosperity of the maritime provinces rests upon their being able to trade freely with New England and the eastern section of our country. In like manner the prosperity of Quebec and Montreal depends upon their free access to the markets of our neighboring States. So with Manitoba and British Columbia. They are merely joined together by this political road and by no natural tie, as they would be if they lay along the same line of longitude but different lines of latitude, instead of lying along the same lines of latitude.

If the union between Canada and the United States that was made in 1763 by Chatham and Wolfe had not been broken up by the American Revolution, to-day it is altogether probable that instead of 5,000,000 people Canada would have 20,000,000 people, and if she could have, without obstruction, free access to our markets for her natural products, especially wool, while she is free to impose duties against us for manufactured goods, she would grow in like manner.

But for the growth that was made during the pendency of the reciprocity treaty of 1854 she would not have anything like the population she has to-day. Under the influence of the adverse tariffs, particularly those of the McKinley act, one-third of the people born in Canada are to-day residents and possibly citizens of the United States. She is but a way station for immigrants, that are brought to her shores at great expense and after great advertising, for their ultimate destination in America.

Her entire prosperity, so far as it depends upon the American market, is of absolutely uncertain foundation just so long as she remains a distinct country.

Whatever may have been their dreams about reciprocal trade, they were rudely broken up by the McKinley tariff: and whatever expectation they may have of prosperity from the pending

bill, they may rest equally assured that at the end of four years, whatever business may be started during that time is liable to be cut up by the roots by another President and another Congress who will hold sway here at that time.

The Canadian Pacific Road, as I have already said, rests for its trade upon our sufferance, upon a merely permissive statute and a Treasury regulation. I am not unaware of the strength of the position it holds by reason of the certain or uncertain transportation advantages in cheaper freights that it gives to the distinct sections of our country on the northern border. I am aware that parts of New England have made use of the Canadian Pacific Road to obviate what they consider to be the unfair results to them of the antipooling and the long and short haul clauses of the interstate commerce act.

Their patriotism may not be enough for so severe a test, but 't is possible that the clause of the interstate commerce act forbidding pooling may either be repealed or greatly modified, and the long and short haul clause as it applies to them may be modified, and thus they can have a relief from what they consider the hardships of that act without feeling compelled unpatriotically to build up a foreign corporation at the cost of the permanent and paramount interests of their own country; and the same may be said of every community and every city along the whole northern border from one ocean to the other.

One or two other problems in like manner are outstanding and not to be solved by any scheme of policy found in the pending bill. We need not have had any trouble about the Alaskan seals. We need not have had any arbitration over the seals. You needed only to have suggested that the transportation in bond and under seal of goods through Canada between American ports would be suspended to have put an end to every proposition of the Canadians to poach upon our seals. That would have been a swift and a short remedy, and a complete one. If Canada and British Columbia had been a part of the American Union we would have had no seal question.

There was no marauding upon the seals from American ports. It was only from Canadian ports; and it is to be borne in mind that the British Government did not want to engage in it. Lord Salisbury, an English nobleman—gentleman, perforce—was compelled to become the agent of the Canadian poachers to trench upon our right to the seals purchased from Russia, belonging properly to the owners of the Pribyloff Islands, if not by any law hitherto laid down, by a law that ought to be laid down under the circumstances of the peculiar case, as law always is a growth in the application of sound principles to new facts. Thus we have the most unsatisfactory condition of this seal question left to us as a consequence of our present relations with Canada.

But there is another question, Mr. President, of far greater importance. There is no doubt about the attitude or the policy of the people of the United States on Chinese immigration. There ought to be none in the Democratic party. We believe in their exclusion. Certainly we have had trouble enough from race questions in this country. We do not want to introduce another. I am one of those who would give the largest measure of justice to the negro, but no one realizes more than he does the hardship

that is being imposed upon the people by his presence under the circumstances as a part of the American Republic.

We do not want to bring the Chinese here, we all say, and yet to-day any Chinaman can come into British Columbia by the payment of a license of \$50, and then walk across the border, and you can not detect it or prevent it. So while we are stopping up all other gaps, this great wide one is left open, and that too while this fast line of steamers is put on between Vancouver and Chinese ports, that will greatly facilitate all means of transportation, while the owners of these ships will have all the inducements to make money by the transportation of the Chinese.

But, Mr. President, the American people have a large interest in this question themselves, and from our standpoint I took occasion a few days ago, in the course of this debate, to call attention to the fact that we have arrived at the end of our last available land for homesteading. Possibly there may be a few acres added from the Indian reservations. The rush for the Cherokee Strip a year ago furnished an object lesson. For the first time since John Smith landed at Jamestown, or the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, there is no longer a home for any American in need or want to be had for the asking and the taking. That idea has been almost like what metaphysicians tell us of time and space, that they are conditions of thought. One never thought of America but that there was a suggestion of a farm for everyone.

Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm.

Very little attention has been called to this fact, and yet the future historian will speak of it as one of the epochs of America and its people, ranking in importance with the discovery of the continent by Columbus, with the landing at Jamestown and at Plymouth Rock, with the Declaration of Independence and the destruction of slavery. The army of the unemployed can no longer go out upon the prairie and find a home and a competence for the breaking of the soil. They can no longer go into the forest and find a competence by the clearing up of land. It is all in private ownership and has to be paid for, even though much of it is yet practically unoccupied.

The unemployed to-day are not going to the prairie. They are joining the army of the unemployed, or Coxey's army. North of us in Canada there is an illimitable expanse of unoccupied lands, and the isothermal lines formed by the chinook winds coming across the low passes of the Rocky Mountains to the north make the land habitable and arable and profitable to occupy away up on the Peace River of the North.

To-day the Senate is going to vote to break down the barrier between the American people and that land and turn the tide of emigration north. Mr. President, shall they go there under the American flag or go there under Her Majesty's flag? That is an issue of great moment to this continent and to all who live on it now or hereafter.

So far our policy has kept our people within our own limits. Now, there is proposed one which will expatriate our people and send them as emigrants upon a foreign soil. I say to our Southern brethren, who held the other day a convention at Augusta to advance immigration to the South, that their talk is idle. They

can not compass it by the policy of this bill. Not South will this hungry people go to buy land or to compete with the negro. You are going to send them north to build up a new empire under an alien flag.

Mr. President, to the Senate, to the country, to the continent and its people there is presented the most momentous question of the day. Compared with it, your talk about parties and prosperity and power, or wealth or taxation or welfare, is idle and relatively unimportant. It is the great question of peace or of war. We have had it before. This is not the first time this people have had that issue presented to them; and when they were confronted with it they gave no uncertain answer or sound.

No one recognizes more than I do the inexorable influence that drove the South into rebellion. But, Mr. President, if the South did not fight to preserve slavery, the North did not fight to destroy it. If the South fought for the right of secession, the North was nerved to the expenditure of its last dollar and the last drop of its blood because it intended that there never should be on this continent, if it could help it, two governments.

We should not adopt a policy that would create on the North the same conflict that we had made upon the South, and I said it in terms without any reflection whatever upon the causes that led to the late civil war.

Now, Mr. President, because of the 5,000,000 people on the North we have the least possible concern. It is not a power that threatens us in the least. Coupled with the military and naval power of Great Britain, it becomes a matter of much more concern, and yet we take it easily. But it will be a matter of vital difference when Canada contains a population of 20,000,000 or of 50,000,000. Then, Mr. President, we shall again have the question presented of peace or war. As I have already pointed out, the existing foreign military establishment of forts and naval armament is a threat and menace upon our coasts. When that comes, whatever the time or period may be, there will be a trial of strength.

Mr. President, the matter would be very different if Canada were independent of Great Britain, but as a dependency of Great Britain she becomes a part of the European system, a system the character of which is best designated by the term used as "the balance of power." She is subject to all the vicissitudes of war and peace to which Great Britain herself is subject, growing out of European and Asiatic complications. We have no cause of war that is not distinctively American, but Canada is involved in all causes of war which are European or Asiatic.

The difference between Russia and England in India may create war for Canada. The differences between France and England in Africa may create war for Canada. She is liable to become involved at any time, and whenever she does the interests of nations determine their course and their policy, just as in the war of 1812 or in the Napoleonic wars we were finally involved in conflict with Canada. So in the future we are likely to be. To-day, growing out of Asiatic and European complications, England is the silent partner of the Triple Alliance or the Dreibund made up of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Against them stands the tacit alliance of Russia and France.

I can conceive that in the event of the conflagration of war

breaking out upon the European continent we should find that our interests were identical or at least lay alongside of those of Russia and France. It would not be so if England were to withdraw from this continent. With that withdrawal would end as far as it would be possible the schism of the English-speaking race which began more than a century ago. Then the forces of a common language, a common law, a common literature, and a common religion would draw us and England together with all their peculiar and appropriate force. To-day we are divorced because she insists upon holding on to her possession upon this continent, invidious and essentially hostile towards us.

For that we have great authority. The Articles of Confederation included a clause that at any time Canada could become a member. Our army in the Revolutionary war was called the Continental Army, because we proposed to include the entire continent. When we came to the peace of 1783 it was Franklin who constantly insisted with the British negotiators that we should have Canada, because thereby only could we have peace. Our experience in 1812 is a pregnant confirmation of his prescience and his wisdom and the truth of his declaration, although peace has prevailed from that time until now.

Mr. President, the McKinley act, which places practically prohibitive duties upon the natural products of Canada, was a long step in the true solution of this question. Even before it was enacted great restlessness was being manifested in Canada because of their need of access to our markets free from any tariff restraint.

Whatever may be the course that is taken upon this bill, it need not be expected that the American people will permit its enactment to stand as a settlement. You may succeed in passing the pending bill and strike this blow at the welfare and future peace of the English-speaking race upon the American continent, but that race is too strong, too sagacious, too sensible to permit this temporary obstruction to stem the tide of its imperial destiny. The pending bill is but the ephemeral expression of forces essentially secondary. The primary and everlasting forces will speedily reassert themselves. Four years hence will see a President and Congress here that will tear the bill to tatters and re-nact laws and policies that are for the lasting welfare of all the people of this continent.

