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THE WAR IN THE GULF

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The Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, which has been going on for the last seven years, is one of the bloodiest conflicts which has raged anywhere since 1945; its victims are estimated at close to a million. Iraq launched the offensive in September 1980 and the conflict remains unresolved despite efforts at mediation on the part of various governments and organizations. This war is unusual not only for the length of time it has already lasted but also for the complexity of its origins, the way in which its military operations have been conducted, the role played by third parties, and the nature of what is at stake.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

On 22 September 1980, Iraqi troops invaded adjoining Iranian territory. This action arose from a certain combination of circumstances but must also be viewed in the wider context of historical relations between Iran and Iraq. There are many apparent reasons for Iraq's action, some of which are more important than others.

It seems that Iraq's initial objective in launching the offensive was to stifle the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which it saw as a threat to the stability of Saddam Hussein's regime. The latter was anxious to forestall the possibility that the Iraqi Shi'ites, who constitute almost sixty percent of the population, might take Iran as their model. The moment chosen to launch the attack may have seemed opportune because of the chaotic situation in Iran following the political and religious revolution, a situation which was aggravated by the claims for self-government which were being put forward by several of its ethnic minorities including the Kurds and Arabs. In addition, Iran's declared intention of exporting its revolution, and its meddling in internal Iraqi politics did nothing to reassure Baghdad, which hoped that in launching this offensive it would receive

support from the Arabs of Khuzestan, a southwestern province of Iran also known as Arabistan; these Arabs had been receiving help from Baghdad. The mullahs in Tehran had frequently called on the Iraqi Shi'ites to rebel and Iran also provided considerable economic and military assistance to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq. Shortly before the war broke out the Commander in Chief of the Iranian Armed Forces had even gone so far as to announce the formation of a "Revolutionary Islamic Army to free Iraq."

Another objective of the Iraqi offensive was to regain the territory which it had ceded to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The dispute over the location of the boundary and the navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab, connecting the port of Basra with the Persian Gulf, had been a particularly sore point between Iran and Iraq for more than three centuries. As far back as the fifteenth century the neighbouring powers, at that time the Persian and Ottoman Empires, had contested each other's right to control this river. The border between them, which was then somewhat vague, had been defined more precisely in the second half of the nineteenth century, and since then several agreements had been concluded with a view to settling this dispute. They established the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire (later Iraq) over the river, while guaranteeing navigation rights to foreign shipping. Iran was dissatisfied with the agreement, however, and in 1975 it succeeded in negotiating the Algiers Agreement in which Iraq, which at the time was considerably weakened by its war with the Kurds, conceded territory to Iran. The most notable concession was that henceforth the frontier between Iran and Iraq would be located in the middle of the Shatt-al-Arab instead of on the eastern bank as was formerly the case.

A third reason for Iraq's action was that it probably believed that if Iran were to be weakened by war this would serve Iraqi interests in their struggle for

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supremacy in the Gulf.¹ Baghdad has been skilful in manipulating the uneasiness which has arisen in the area as a result of the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran. In view of their precarious position, several of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf wasted no time in joining other Arab states and supporting Iraq in its confrontation with Khomeini.

In addition to these immediate causes there are historical reasons for the Gulf War which derive from the long-standing ethnic rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians and the ideological rivalry between the opposing versions of Islam practised by the Sunnis and the Shi'ites. Persia was converted to Islam after the Arab conquest in the seventh century. In the sixteenth century, during the dynasty of Safavid, Iran adopted the Shi'ite version of Islam as its official religion and thus became the centre of Shi'ism. Henceforth, with over eighty-five percent of the population Shi'ite, it stood out from the rest of the Muslim world which was mainly Sunni, and its influence on Shi'ite communities in other countries was significant. The differences between these two Muslim sects are not only concerned with the question of the prophet Mohammed's succession; they also tend to be separated by political and economic conditions. In the Arab world of today only Iraq and Bahrain have a majority of Shi'ites, although paradoxically enough the Iraqi leaders are all Sunni. During the period which produced modern Iran its successive leaders tried, particularly through the arts and architecture, to give their country a distinct cultural identity which would set it apart from the rest of the Middle East. The advent of both Iranian and Arab nationalism in the twentieth century helped to drive Iran and Iraq even further apart. At the end of the sixties Iraq adopted a policy of pan-Arabism combined with an increasingly secular outlook, just as the Shah of Iran was embarking on an ambitious programme to promote his interests in the area.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Military operations in the Persian Gulf War have been particularly lethal because of the tactics used. Above all, the massive bombing of civilians and the use of chemical weapons have made this conflict different from the usual type of border dispute which frequently occurs in the Third World.

The war was preceded by Iraq unilaterally renouncing the Algiers Agreement and endeavouring to reimpose its authority over the Shatt-al-Arab. A series of border incidents which had taken place in the previous twelve months gave rise to mutual recriminations between the two countries and did much to exacerbate a situation which was already

strained. Nonetheless Iraq's invasion of 23 September and its occupation of a large part of adjoining Iranian territory took Iran by surprise. The offensive took place in three areas: in the direction of Qasr e Shirin in the north, Mehran in the centre and Susangerd/Khorramshahr in the south. Iraq occupied part of Khuzestan, the province which contains Iran's major oil reserves. From 1981 onwards, however, Iraq began to lose its strategic advantage. Iran carried out several successful local attacks with its infantry and retook the village of Bostan and relieved Abadan which had been under siege. Baghdad then switched to a defensive strategy and declared itself willing to accept a cease-fire, under certain conditions. The situation at the front remained virtually at a stalemate until May 1982 when the Iraqi troops were pushed back almost to the frontier. Once it had liberated its territory Iran did not confine its efforts to maintaining military pressure on Hussein. Instead Iranian spokesmen placed more and more emphasis on the need to invade Iraq, which they viewed as a step on the path to "liberate Jerusalem." At the end of the year Iran crossed the border and opened up new fronts in Iraqi territory in the direction of Basra in the south and Mandali in the north, as well as in the central zone. It did not, however, succeed in winning a single decisive victory. From then on Tehran was on the offensive. In 1983 three limited offensives enabled Iran to make some gains, particularly in the north, and the Iranian infantry launched massive frontal attacks on the Iraqi lines. However, the delivery of five French *Super Etendard* fighters armed with *Exocet* missiles strengthened Iraq's air force, which not only attacked strategic and economic targets in the heart of Iran but also opened fire on merchant shipping and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. It also attacked Iran's main oil terminal on Kharg Island. Unlike Iran, which had never stopped exporting its oil by sea, Iraq had been forced shortly after the beginning of the war to rely on overland pipelines for its exports.

The following year a series of Iranian offensives on the southern and central fronts resulted in the capture of important strategic objectives including almost all the oilfields on the Majnun islands north of Basra. While both sides were stepping up their attacks in the Persian Gulf, Iraq had begun to bomb population centres in Iran, in a prelude to what would become known as "the war of the cities." In response to a request from the United Nations both sides temporarily suspended their attacks on civilians but this lasted for only nine months. Meantime Iran's claims that Iraq was using chemical weapons had led the Secretary-General to ask a team of specialists to conduct an enquiry into these allegations. They issued two reports, in 1984 and 1985, which asserted that chemical weapons had indeed been used in Iran; a later report, issued in 1986, identified Iraq as the country responsible for this.

In 1985 Iran launched an offensive on its southern front, north of Basra, which involved heavy loss of life. Iranian troops also fought in the north, in the mountainous area of Kurdistan. Air raids in the Persian Gulf were increasing. To date, more than 300 tankers sailing under the flags of various nations have been attacked by one or the other of the belligerents. Iraq's air offensive is designed to compensate for its disadvantages on land and to weaken Iran by reducing its capacity both to produce oil and to export it. The principal targets for Iraqi air attacks in the Gulf have been oil terminals and complexes, oilfields and tankers which are either Iranian or chartered by Iran. Iran's naval attacks, on the other hand, are principally directed at ships which it suspects of delivering arms to Iraq. Finally, in 1985, a United Nations Report came to the conclusion that both states were regularly contravening the Geneva Conventions in their ill treatment of prisoners.

In 1986, an Iranian offensive, which was launched with the aid of the Kurdish rebels in Iraq, allowed Tehran to make certain gains in Kurdistan in the north-east of Iraq. It was the crossing of the Shatt-al-Arab by Iranian forces, however, followed by the capture of the port of Fao, which was of great strategic importance, for this two-pronged attack opened the route to Basra, Iraq's second most important city, and ultimately to Baghdad. In the wake of this defeat, which had

considerable psychological significance, Iraqi forces took the Iranian city of Mehran in the central sector, but some weeks later Iran recaptured it without much difficulty. Meanwhile the war of the cities continued and was especially effective against the Iranian population.

In January 1987 an Iranian offensive known as Operation "Karbala 5" was launched against the Iraqi lines east of Basra, apparently with the object of either capturing or encircling that city. After six weeks of violent fighting Iran gave up this attempt which had, however, enabled it to occupy territory in the area of Shalamcheh and some islands in the Shatt-al-Arab. Tehran continued to concentrate its troops in this sector of the front which led to speculation that it was planning another offensive for the winter of 1988. However, this offensive never materialized. Elsewhere the two belligerents have persisted in their missile attacks on civilian targets including Tehran and Baghdad.

A large part of the world's oil supply passes through the Persian Gulf, which is thus an area of strategic importance. In 1987 the United States deployed additional air and naval forces in the Gulf in order to facilitate navigation there.² Following Iraq's attack on the frigate USS *Stark*, in May 1987, and in response to several requests from Kuwait, Washington undertook



(Left) Map of the Persian Gulf region. Area in the box is enlarged in the second map (right).

to provide an escort of warships for eleven Kuwaiti tankers which were already registered under the US flag. Shortly before this the Soviet Union had lent Kuwait several Soviet tankers. Italy, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands backed up the United States by also deploying warships and minesweepers in the area. The fact that Iran has missile launching pads near the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, has been a particular source of concern to the Americans. In addition Tehran has stepped up the naval war by making greater use of fast patrol boats armed with missiles and grenade launchers. These developments have led to several encounters in the Gulf between Iran's forces and those of the United States.

The war in the Gulf is fraught with paradoxes and this applies equally to the way in which hostilities have developed. Since 1981 Iraq has proposed a cease-fire on several occasions, and as the years pass these proposals have been accompanied by fewer and fewer conditions. Baghdad has appealed to the UN and to other organizations to act as mediators. Iran, on the other hand, has made any cease-fire conditional on the payment of billions of dollars (US) in reparations, and has also been insisting for some time on the removal of Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein. Iraq's determination to end the war has not prevented it, however, from resorting to tactics which have serious consequences from several points of view. These include its use of chemical weapons³ and its attacks on Iranian cities as well as on the shipping in the Gulf. Given the ill effects of these strategies and the fact that the naval attacks have led to third party intervention, such behaviour can only make any settlement of the conflict all the more difficult to achieve. If Iraq hoped — as some have suggested — to hasten the end of the war by adopting these tactics, then it seems to have failed to appreciate the essential nature of Iran's fundamentalist regime for which a growing number of martyrs serves rather as an incentive to continue the struggle.

THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES

Since the war began both Iran and Iraq have tried to obtain arms from a wide variety of sources. In its 1987 annual report the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists fifty-three countries as arms suppliers to either Iran or Iraq, of which twenty-eight have delivered arms to both of the two belligerents in the Gulf. Some of these sales, whether of arms or equipment, are open transactions between governments; others take place between private dealers and often their governments are unaware of what is going on. It is clear, therefore, that in this particular conflict the sales of arms do not necessarily correspond to political or ideological sympathies on the part of the suppliers.

Iraq's two main sources of supply are the Soviet Union and France. The former provides mainly fighter planes, tanks, and AAM, ASM, SAM and ALCM missiles,⁴ while France provides various kinds of missiles and *Mirage* F-1 fighters. Other countries which supply Iraq with arms or military equipment include Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Jordan and Italy. As far as Iran is concerned the transactions involved have less official sanction and are thus more difficult to verify; several of them involve private dealers on the international market. It is known, however, that arms and spare parts manufactured in the Soviet Union are provided by Syria, Libya and North Korea. Iran also buys auxiliary systems and spare parts from Israel and Western Europe in order to supplement an arsenal which includes many items manufactured in the United States. China is now one of its important suppliers, providing Iran with tanks, missiles and planes, although China does not officially admit this.

At the very beginning of the Gulf War the United States declared itself neutral and emphasized its determination to keep the Strait of Hormuz opened. Washington appeared to be abiding by this policy of non-intervention until it was revealed in November 1986 that it had in fact been supplying Iran with arms. It was then discovered that, with the help of Israel, the United States had supplied Iran with twelve million dollars worth of arms over an eighteen-month period. The official reason used by Washington to justify these sales was that the United States was seeking *rapprochement* with the moderates in Iran. It seemed clear that its ultimate objective in improving its relations with Tehran was to obtain the latter's help in securing the liberation of the US hostages in Lebanon. The US deployment of both air and naval forces in the Persian Gulf, which was the object of bitter opposition in the Congress, has added a new dimension to American intervention in this dispute, and if one studies the reasons used by officials to justify this operation one is likely to be skeptical concerning its chances of success. Washington's initiative has not succeeded in discouraging naval attacks in the Gulf; navigation continues to be disrupted and the Arab monarchies feel that there is an even greater threat than before that the conflict will spread. If one tries to draw up a balance sheet of what Washington has lost and gained by this policy, it would seem that the risks of armed conflict with Iran far outweigh any benefits which it derives from increasing its presence in the area. The idea of defending the Persian Gulf and its vital resources was part of the Carter Doctrine which led to the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for the region. The Reagan Administration has continued the project even though it has become more and more expensive.

In 1980 the Soviet Union announced its intention of

remaining neutral in the dispute, but it is hard to believe that it is genuinely impartial. On the whole it has shown considerable caution in dealing with the situation in the Gulf but, nonetheless, there have been several notable incidents in its relationship with the belligerents. In 1972 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq; however, despite this it stopped supplying Iraq with arms as soon as the war broke out and offered military assistance to Iran instead. When the latter rebuffed this offer, Moscow then reversed its position and resumed selling arms to Iraq in 1982. Since then the Soviet Union has tried to keep in with both sides by selling arms to Iraq on the one hand, while providing economic assistance to Iran on the other. As noted above Iran receives arms manufactured in the Soviet Union from both Syria and Libya. This somewhat unusual position on the part of the Soviet Union must be seen in terms of its geopolitical situation, its relations with the Arab world and its attitudes to Iran which stretch back into history. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union keeps warships, minesweepers and merchant ships in the Gulf, though it has fewer of these stationed there than does the West.

The attitude of the other countries in the region seems to depend more on their prospective gains or losses from the conflict and on the fears it arouses in them rather than on their ideological affinities. Not long after hostilities began several Arab states — Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and the Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman and Qatar — expressed their support for Iraq, partly out of Arab solidarity, but also because of their opposition to the new Islamic Republic. The Gulf monarchies, which are particularly worried by the prospect of regional instability, have since then provided Iraq with considerable material and financial aid and have also set up the Council for Cooperation in the Gulf (CCG), whose *raison d'être* is to strengthen their collective security in face of the threat from Iran. Of the Arab states only Libya and Syria support Iran, for reasons which derive either from ideology or from the strong rivalry between Iraq and Syria — in 1982 Damascus closed the Syrian section of the pipeline which Iraq uses to carry its oil to the Mediterranean. These different reactions soon led to disagreements within the Arab world.

The non-Arab countries in the area have been loathe to declare themselves in favour of either side although some of them have managed to benefit from the situation. Israel, for example, cannot fail to be satisfied with the dissension in the Arab community which the war has caused as well as the adverse effect which it has had on Iraq, one of Israel's chief opponents on the question of Palestine. Whatever Israel's interest in the ultimate outcome, its supply of spare parts to Iran has

possibly had some effect on the progress of the war and consequently has more than merely commercial implications. Pakistan and Turkey have also profited from Iran's international isolation to increase their economic cooperation with the latter, although Turkey has also helped Iraq by transporting its oil through the pipeline and assisting it to suppress the Kurds in both their countries.

Despite their divergent interests, a large number of Arab countries are worried lest the war should spread and thus endanger the whole region. These concerns were voiced in November 1987 at the Arab League Summit which took place in Amman, Jordan. For the first time this group devoted its attention to the Islamic revolution in Iran and the war in the Gulf, and emphasized that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were being more and more affected by the Iranian attacks. Some of the countries present at the Summit decided to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, which is important to the region but which had been cold-shouldered by other Arab countries ever since the Camp David Accords in 1979. In December 1987 the six heads of state of the CCG signed an agreement providing for greater cooperation in matters affecting their security.

The presence of both Western and Soviet ships in the Gulf seems to arouse mixed feelings on the part of the local Arab states. If, on the one hand, it lessens the risk of the conflict spreading, it also gives rise to concern that foreign powers may take over the Gulf in the long run. One country to show considerable caution is Saudi Arabia which, although it is an ally of the United States, has never permitted the latter to install air bases on its territory. If Washington maintains its present level of air and naval forces in the Gulf it should bear these facts in mind in making any estimate of how much cooperation it can expect from the Gulf States.

TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

Various organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Council for Cooperation in the Gulf and the United Nations have made efforts to mediate in this dispute in the hope of achieving an agreement. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted several resolutions calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the belligerents to internationally agreed borders. The most recent of these was resolution 598, of 20 July 1987,⁵ which called for a universal cease-fire under threat of sanctions and the beginning of negotiations for peace. Iran demanded that as a precondition for any such cease-fire an international commission be set up to

investigate the responsibility for the conflict (a process which is presumably assumed would lead to the condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor) and a fixed sum be set up for reparations. Iraq, on the other hand, reiterated its preference for a precisely formulated cease-fire, which would be unconditional.

Unlike its predecessors, resolution 598 gave rise to feverish activity, with the result that for the first time both Moscow and Washington have put the resolution of the war in the Gulf high on their respective agendas. Following Iran's refusal to accept the resolution, the United States brought pressure to bear on its fellow members of the Security Council to adopt an embargo on deliveries of arms to Iran. To date, China and the Soviet Union, particularly the latter, have expressed reservations about this proposal.

Canada has always attached great importance to having this conflict resolved through negotiations. It supports UN resolution 598, and is in favour of adopting further measures, such as sanctions, to put pressure on Iran to respect the above resolution. In recent years Ottawa has condemned the attacks on the cities, the use of chemical weapons, and the evident ill treatment of prisoners captured in the course of this war.

If Iran and Iraq do indeed embark on negotiations with the help of a mediator, there are certain conditions which would need to be satisfied for such an undertaking to have much chance of success. For any mediation to succeed it is essential that both the opposing parties either see no further advantages to be gained from continuing their conflict or at least recognize that any gains they may make will be outweighed by the losses they entail. The belligerents must be willing to cooperate and to make concessions. Once the negotiators succeed in identifying the interests common to both parties, this often enables them to propose a compromise which is not too costly for either side. Considering the current climate between Iran and Iraq, it seems quite unlikely that these conditions could be satisfied. Mediation is not the only form of intervention open to third parties, however; they can also participate in peacekeeping operations. The Soviet Union is currently proposing that the United Nations should send a fleet of warships to the Gulf in order to protect the merchant shipping there. Washington rejects this proposal, however, above all because it would require the West to withdraw its ships. Even though both superpowers have accepted resolution 598, it seems unlikely that they will be able to agree on any kind of joint intervention.

There are various factors which affect the possibility of reaching agreement in the Gulf. First of all Iraq,

which is at an advantage both qualitatively and quantitatively as far as equipment is concerned (fighters, armoured vehicles, artillery), is very dependent on the favourable credit facilities which it receives from France and the Soviet Union, and even more on the financial support which it gets from the Arab monarchs in the Gulf, lead by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq is at a disadvantage, however, as far as manpower is concerned, with a population of 16 million compared to Iran's 46 million. If for one reason or another Baghdad were to lose its two main arms suppliers and could no longer rely on financial help from its fellow Arabs, then its capacity to carry on the war would be greatly diminished if not reduced to zero.

Even though Iran has been diplomatically isolated, both regionally and internationally, this does not seem to have had much adverse effect on its ability to satisfy its military requirements. The considerable human resources which it has at its disposal means that recruitment is easier and abundant manpower can compensate for the lack of sophisticated equipment. In addition to the regular army Tehran can make use of the Revolutionary Guard: the "Pasdaran," a para-military force of militant Muslims, as well as of the "Basij," the young volunteers who make up Iran's suicide squads. The religious fervour of the population gives the Khomeini regime a considerable advantage in its continued pursuit of the war. However, unlike Iraq, Tehran has no reliable sources of arms and to this extent it is more vulnerable.

The war is costly for both countries. They finance it with oil, their main source of revenue, but production of this commodity fell sharply at the beginning of the war and has continued to fluctuate ever since. The large part of their national budget which both countries devote to the war gives rise to serious economic problems such as various shortages, a fall in the gross national product (GNP), a lack of economic development, debt and a deterioration in their balance of payments. So far, whether from choice or necessity, the populations of both countries have put up with difficult economic conditions to which they have been subjected, but, were they to show signs of discontent, this might well have an effect on their respective governments and thus influence the outcome of the war in one direction or another.

Despite the hopes which were aroused by the UN's recent initiatives it seems clear that the attempts at mediation which have been made so far have come up against a major obstacle, namely the complexity of the situation which seems to have produced the conflict. Quite apart from the historical factors involved, the dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab and the incompatibility of the two regimes mean that the differences between

Iran and Iraq are very considerable; any attempt at negotiations will have to take these facts into consideration. The ball is now in Iran's court and it may well be that there is no hope of resolving the dispute until Khomeini has left the scene. The struggle for the succession is already underway in Iran, despite the official designation of Ayatollah Montazeri as the Imam's successor. The mullahs are at odds with each other because of political and religious differences and this would seem to indicate that there will certainly be significant changes in Iran once Khomeini is dead. Whether the result will be a more liberal regime or one in which power is much less centralized it seems likely that this is bound to have some effect on the war. If the regime does become more liberal this may produce leaders who are more conciliatory. But if, on the other hand, central authority disintegrates then this is likely to have an adverse effect on popular support which has hitherto been an important element in the conduct of the war. All one can hope is that one or another of the factors mentioned above will lead to the resolution of a conflict which has already produced far too many victims.

NOTES

1. Judging by the contents of a letter which Iraq sent to the UN Secretary-General on 6 October 1980, shortly after war had broken out, the three factors mentioned do seem to have been at the root of its action. In the letter Iraq makes several precise demands: that Iran should recognize Iraq's historic territorial rights over its land and waters; that it should act as a good neighbour; that it should renounce any intervention in the internal affairs of any Arab states, whether in the Gulf or elsewhere and should return the territory usurped from Iraq; that it should also recognize the rights of Iraq and of the Arab nation. It also speaks of Iraq as "having been forced to take up arms in response to continuous acts of aggression on the part of Iran."
2. According to then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, the aim of this policy was to:
 - maintain freedom of navigation for US flag vessels;
 - preserve Free World access to the oil resources of the region;

- promote the security and stability of the moderate Gulf-Arab regimes in the face of Iranian intimidation and prevent the spread of Iranian radicalism;
- limit the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

Statement before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 23 October 1987.

3. Another study, made public by the United Nations in 1987, emphasized Iraq's continuing use of chemical weapons against both enemy troops and civilians.
4. Air-to-air missile (AAM), Air-to-surface missile (ASM), Surface-to-air missile (SAM), Air-launched cruise missile (ALCM).
5. In fact, on 9 May 1988, the Security Council adopted resolution 612 condemning the continued use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War, and calling for strict controls on the export of chemical products to the two countries.

FURTHER READING

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