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QUEEN'S QUARTERLY

VOL. VII.

APRIL, 1900.

No. 4

All articles intended for publication, books for review, exchanges,—and all correspondence relating thereto—should be addressed to the editors, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont.

GNOSTIC THEOLOGY.

“THERE is a body of men,” says Irenaeus, “who deny the truth, putting in its place fables and vain genealogies, which, as the Apostle says, ‘minister questionings, rather than godly edifying, which is in faith.’* By specious and crafty suggestions they mislead and enslave the simple-minded. They wickedly pervert the good words of Scripture, which they handle deceitfully. They destroy the faith of many, leading them astray by the pretence of ‘knowledge’ (γνώσις) from Him who has established and adorned the universe, claiming to reveal something higher and greater than God, the creator of heaven and earth, and all that is therein. By their sophistry and rhetorical arts they indoctrinate the unwary in their method of questioning, and destroy their souls by absurd, blasphemous and impious doctrines, so that their victims are unable even to detect the falsehood of so gross a fiction as that of the Demiurge.”†

These words, with which Irenaeus opens his *Refutation of Heresy*, indicate the main features of the Gnostic sects as they existed in the second century. Their theology was not set forth in a reasoned and connected system, but was embedded in a fantastic cosmogony; their exegesis was of that artificial character with which our study of Philo has made us familiar; they claimed to be in possession of an esoteric doctrine or Gnosis, revealed only to the initiated; and between the Supreme Being and the world they interposed a number of spiritual Powers or Aeons, attributing the creation of the visible universe to a subordinate agent, the Demiurge. That a doctrine of this kind was inconsistent with the fundamental ideas of Christian theology,

*1 Tim. i. 4.

†Irenaeus, *Refutation of Heresy*, Pref., §. 1.

and in practice led to either an antinomian license or to asceticism, is also true; and therefore we cannot but sympathize with the zeal of the Bishop of Lyons, when he warns his flock against these 'wolves in sheep's clothing,' as he does not hesitate to call them. But while it is true that Gnosticism was fantastic in form, arbitrary in the interpretation of Scripture, full of intellectual arrogance, and dualistic in content, it was not, at least in its main representatives, either so unchristian or so irrational as Irenaeus alleges, nor can it be fairly stigmatised as a deliberate and wicked perversion of the "truth once delivered to the saints." When the Gnostics wrote there was no fixed body of Christian doctrine of which the Church was the custodian, and therefore no "heresy" in the later sense of deviation from the Catholic faith. Even in the age of Irenaeus the dogmas of the Church were still in process of formation, and, judged by the standard of the Nicene Creed, Irenaeus himself must be pronounced heretical. The Church afterwards accepted as orthodox those writers of the first and second centuries who employed speculation as a means of spiritualizing the Old Testament, without carrying their speculation so far as to construct a complete system, while it branded as heretical those thinkers who, employing the same method, aimed at completeness and reached conclusions at variance with later Catholic doctrine. Both classes of thinkers were under the influence of Greek ideas and Greek modes of thought, and both were trying to convert Christian faith into a philosophy of religion. In attempting to estimate the strength and weakness of Gnosticism we must discard the idea that it was a perversion of accepted doctrine, and view it as an honest attempt to show that Christianity was the ultimate and universal religion. The aberrations of the Gnostics were the natural and inevitable result of the acceptance of the Christian faith by men whose minds were already filled with Greek ideas of life, and who felt the need of harmonizing the knowledge they already believed themselves to possess with the new revelation. The Christian faith as proclaimed by our Lord involved a higher conception of the relations of God and man than that which had been reached even by the later Hebrew prophets, but its universal spirit was not yet freed from features due to its Jewish origin. The consequence was that by the primitive Jewish community of Christians it was held in a form which was coloured by tradi-

tional modes of thought. The main struggle of the Apostolic age was to liberate the spirit of Christianity from the natural preconceptions of its Jewish adherents,—a work which was begun by St. Paul and carried out by the writer of the Fourth Gospel.* But the process could not stop here. Even in the Apostolic age, Christianity found itself confronted with believers who brought to it preconceptions derived originally from Babylonian, Persian and other oriental sources, and the danger which it had already experienced of losing its universality from the survival of Jewish beliefs, threatened it from this new source. Evidences of this conflict meet us in the New Testament itself, especially in the Epistle to the Colossians and the Revelation of St. John. A new danger emerged when Christianity was embraced by men who had been trained in the Hellenic philosophy of Alexandria. To this class belonged the great Gnostics of the second century, who attempted to reconcile Jewish, Oriental, Greek and Christian ideas, mainly by weapons borrowed from Greek philosophy. Their syncretistic method could not possibly yield a satisfactory philosophy of religion, but they must get the credit of forcing the problem to the front, and doing their best to solve it. While, therefore, we do justice to writers like Irenaeus, who instinctively revolted against the dualism by which Gnosticism was largely infected, we must not forget that but for the Gnostics a Christian philosophy of religion would have been impossible. Grant to Irenaeus what he never doubts for a moment, that the conception of Christianity held by the majority of the Churches in his day was identical with the faith of our Lord and His disciples, and that the salvation of man depended upon its implicit acceptance, and we can understand why he was unable to account for its rejection by honest and fair-minded men except on the hypothesis that they were perverse and wicked sophists.† The Gnostics he therefore pictured to himself as a class of men who wilfully and sinfully rejected the truth, but, with a malignant ingenuity, sought to destroy the souls of their simple-minded dupes. Instead of accepting the plain sense of scripture, they constructed a colossal edifice of speculation, which only tended to overlay and obscure the gospel. All such speculations seemed to Irenaeus reprehensible, not merely be-

*The writer of the Fourth Gospel has in his mind Alexandrian Judaism.

†To Justin Martyr Gnosticism is the work of daemons.

cause they would not bear criticism, but because they *were* speculations. It is true that the Gnostics pretended to find their doctrines in scripture ; but this was, to his mind, merely a pretext to conceal the real character of their doctrine. Their object was to destroy the souls of men, and the elaborate rhetorical arts by which they sought to effect their evil purpose were only a cloak for their perversity and wickedness. Who but wicked men would dethrone God and put in His place their absurd conception of the Demiurge? Having formed such an image of the Gnostics, it is not surprising that the shrewd but unspeculative Bishop was unable to take a fair and judicial view of their doctrines.

Now, of course no blame can be attached to Irenaeus for his vigorous polemic against the Gnostics. The view that all speculation on divine things is hurtful is not so unknown in our own day that we should be surprised to find it in a Bishop of the Second Century, whose main interest was in the saving of souls, a task for which he was eminently qualified by his zeal and strong practical sense. But, while this is true, it is just as undeniable that his temper was of the hard and limited type which made it impossible for him to appreciate the efforts of more reflective minds to bring the principles of the Christian faith into connexion with a comprehensive theory of the world. The experience of eighteen centuries has taught us to view the movements of the early centuries in their relation to the past and the future ; we now recognize that, while Christianity is based upon a universal principle, that principle is not capable of being imprisoned in a few simple truths, but, just because it is a living thing, must be enriched by all the elements with which it comes in contact. To identify Christianity with its first simple form, and reject its later developments merely because they are later, is as unjustifiable as to prefer the germ to the full-grown plant. We must, therefore, approach the study of Gnosticism with the object of discovering how far, in the wild whirl of conflicting ideas—Jewish, Syrian, Babylonian, Persian and Greek—which was characteristic of the age in which it appeared, it prepared the way for a more perfect system of theology than itself. We are in no danger of becoming Gnostics of the fantastic type which flourished in the early centuries of our era, but we may be in danger of coming under the influence of its modern represent-

atives; and in any case, it will do us no harm to study impartially the early struggle of Christian men to 'give a reason for the faith that was in them.' The vagaries of Gnostic speculation are at first sight strange and almost inexplicable, and, indeed, no human being but a philosophical Dryasdust can now take the least interest in the details, some of them absurd in the extreme, of their multifarious systems. I do not, however, propose to burden you with these details further than is necessary: it will be enough to deal with the more important developments of this early phase of theological speculation, in their relation to the main current of doctrine, which gradually gained for itself the sanction of the Church.

The term "Gnosticism" is sometimes used in a wider, sometimes in a narrower sense. A recent writer tells us that "Gnosticism is a religious movement which is characterised by a seeking for Gnosis or enlightenment for the purpose of finding salvation."* Taken in this sense Gnosticism is older than Christianity, and may be said to make its appearance with the Essenes, who can be traced back to the second century before the Christian era.† In the more restricted sense of the term, however, Gnosticism is an early form of Christianity, which makes its appearance even in the Apostolic Age, but only becomes a clearly marked method of thought in the Second Century, under the influence of Hellenic philosophy. Our subject is Gnosticism in this second and generally accepted sense, and it will be convenient to consider it in three successive phases, as it presents itself in the first, second and third centuries respectively. These three phases may also be characterized as Judaic, Hellenic and Syriac Gnosticism. It will still further simplify matters, if we set aside a number of systems or views which have one or more features in common with the main Gnostic systems, but which had little or no influence upon the general current of theological speculation. I shall therefore simply mention these shortly, without further entering into them.

First of all we have the *Encratites*, who attached supreme importance to the ascetic life, for which they claimed the example of Christ. Next may be mentioned the *Docetists*, who drew

*Carus in the *Monist* for July, 1898, p. 502.

†For a valuable account of the Essenes, see Lightfoot's *Colossians and Philemon*, pp. 83-93.

their ideas from writings in which it was denied that Christ was a real man, their view being that he was a heavenly spirit with a phantasmal body. Then we have, thirdly, the *Carpocratians*, whose doctrine was based upon a literal interpretation of the Platonic idea of reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*) and the pre-existence of souls. The world, on their view, is not the work of God, but of inferior spirits; and the true Gnosis is attained by those who are able to recall the ideas which they had in a pre-existent state, and are thus favored with the vision of the Supreme Unity. The superiority of Jesus over other men they attributed to the unusual strength of his 'reminiscence' and the consequent spiritual excellence and power to which he thus attained. There seems little doubt that some members of this sect fell into theoretical and practical Antinomianism, the speculative basis of their doctrine, as attributed to Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, being that external actions do not affect the spirit and are therefore morally indifferent. In any case the Carpocratians adopted the Communism suggested in the Republic of Plato. Jesus they honored as the greatest philosopher, setting up his statue side by side with the statues of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. Besides these sects there were a number of adventurers—magicians, prophesyers, and alchemists,—who affected the usual jargon of their tribe, and employed magical incantations as a means of duping the public and robbing women of their honour. In contrast to these extreme sects, which were Pagan rather than Christian, there was also a variety of sects which only differed slightly from the Christianity of ordinary believers. Having thus cleared the way, we may go on to consider Gnosticism in its first phase or Judaic Gnosticism.

I. JUDAIC GNOSTICISM.

The most palpable traces of this earliest form of Christian Gnosticism are found in the epistle to the Colossians.* The Apostle warns the Christian not to be misled by the false teachers who threatened to destroy the purity of Christian faith and practice. These teachers insisted upon the observance of Sabbaths and new moons, upon the distinction of meats and drinks, and apparently upon the initiatory rite of circumcision. This, of course, indicates that they were Jews, who had found their

*Col. ii. 4, 8, 18, 23.

homes in the valley of the Lycus, and were unable to free themselves from their faith in Jewish observances and ritual. But they were not Jews of the ordinary type, as we immediately see from the epistle, for the Apostle goes on to mention three features which are not Jewish, but Gnostic. In the first place these Jewish-Christians plumed themselves upon a hidden wisdom and exclusive mysteries, and claimed the special illumination of a privileged class. Knowing, as we do, the Apostle's universalism, it is not difficult to understand his vigorous protest against this new particularism. Just as he had in earlier epistles given no quarter to *national* exclusiveness, so he now denounces this new enemy, *intellectual* exclusiveness. The true Gnosis, as he insists, is no 'mystery,' revealed only to a privileged few, but is open to all men who have faith in Christ. The false teachers set up a 'philosophy' which he characterizes as an 'empty deceit' based upon 'sophistry.' The 'wisdom' to which they lay claim might deceive many, but it was not the 'wisdom' of the Gospel. The rites of initiation which they practised were diametrically opposed to the one universal 'mystery,' the knowledge of God in Christ, which, as he declares, contained 'all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden in it.'[†] Here is no 'mystery,' revealed only to a few, but an 'open secret,' manifest to all who are not prevented by waywardness and disobedience from receiving it. Secondly, the Apostle objects to the cosmology and theology of the false teachers. It is implied that they attributed the work of creation to angels, instead of to the one Eternal Son, the Word of God, 'through whom and to whom all things have been created.' St. Paul also stigmatizes the worship of angels as a false 'humility,' which is wrong in principle. The idea that man may mount to God by the ladder of intermediate beings is mere sophistry, and is subversive of the mediatorial work of Christ. In Christ dwells the 'fulness' (*πληρομα*) of God, and through Him alone it is communicated to man. Thirdly, the Apostle objects to the *asceticism* of the false teachers, which was advocated by them as a means of 'checking the indulgence of the flesh.'[‡] This end it entirely failed to accomplish, and he maintains that the true remedy consists in spiritualizing the passions by a living faith—by dying

*Col. ii. 4.

†Col. ii. 2.

‡Col. ii. 23.

with Christ and rising again with Him, and thereby renewing the image of God in the soul.

There can be no doubt, then, that in the false teaching referred to in the Epistle to the Colossians we come upon an incipient Gnosticism. Even in the Apostolic age there was a tendency to lose the central idea of Christianity in an esoteric doctrine, in vague mystical speculations and in asceticism. The vigorous protest of the Apostle was, however, unsuccessful in arresting the growth of Gnosticism, even in the churches of the Lycus, as we see from the denunciations of the Apocalypse, though in the second century it assumed a different form. The transition from the earlier to the later form we find in the doctrine of Cerinthus,* who even in point of time forms the link between the Gnosticism of the first and the Gnosticism of the second century.

“Cerinthus,” Irenaeus tells us, “taught that the world was not made by the highest God, but by a Power far removed from, and ignorant of, this Supreme Being.”† As we learn from other authorities, he held the universe to have been created, not by a single Power, but by a number of Powers. It is also stated that, in his view, the Mosaic law was given, not by the supreme God, but by the angel, or one of the angels, who created the world. The Christology of Cerinthus is also Gnostic. Like the Ebionites he “maintained that Jesus was born in the natural way, though he excelled all other men in righteousness, intelligence and wisdom. Cerinthus further held that after his baptism the Christ, descending upon Jesus from the Supreme Ruler in the form of a dove, revealed to him the unknown Father and worked miracles through him, but at last took flight and left him, so that Jesus alone suffered and rose again, while the Christ, as a spiritual being, remained without suffering.”‡

In this account of the doctrine of Cerinthus we find a feature which reappears in all subsequent Gnostic systems, the conception that the world was not made by God himself, but by a subordinate agent. The earlier conception of Jewish Christianity, as held by the Ebionites, did not differ from the current Jewish view that the world was the work of God. Cerinthus has de-

*Flourished 98-117.

†Irenaeus, *Refutation of History*, I. xxvi. 1.

‡Ibid I. xxvi. 1.

parted from this view so far as to ascribe creation to a being lower than God; but, on the other hand, he conceives of this being, after the later Jewish fashion, as an angel, not as a spiritual Power or Aeon. Thus his doctrine is evidently in process of transition from the Judaic to the later Gnostic doctrine. And as the creator of the world is said to be 'far removed' from the supreme God, we must suppose that Cerinthus held, more or less definitely, the Gnostic theory of a number of intermediate agencies, though he still conceived of these as angels, not as emanations. Lastly, Cerinthus agrees with later Gnostics in representing the Demiurge as also the giver of the Mosaic Law, but he differs from them in merely ascribing ignorance to him, while his successors represent him as antagonistic to the supreme and good God.

Now, it seems at first sight as if Cerinthus, in his conception of an angelic creator, had fallen back upon a lower conception than that of the Ebionites, who held fast by the conception of God as the creator of the universe. But we must distinguish between the uncritical acceptance of a traditional belief and the first imperfect effort to transcend it. The Ebionites simply accepted the common anthropomorphic idea that the heavens and the earth are the work of God's hands, just as they clung to circumcision and were strict observers of the Jewish ceremonial law. They were only half liberated from Judaism, and therefore they did not perceive that the Christian conception of a self-revealing God was not identical with the traditional Jewish conception. We can therefore understand why they accepted only the gospel of Matthew, and rejected the teaching of Paul. Nor must we forget that the Pauline conception of the Son of God as the creator of the world must have seemed to them as hardly less objectionable than the angelic Demiurge of Cerinthus. We must therefore be prepared to see in the doctrine of Cerinthus, imperfect as it is, an advance upon the doctrine of the ordinary Jewish Christians. What, then, led Cerinthus to deny the direct creation of the world by the supreme God, and to attribute it to an angelic Demiurge? Partly no doubt it was logically necessitated by the reflective movement of the time towards a purely abstract conception of God, a conception which, as we see from Philo, was explicitly developed in the Alexandrian school of Jewish philosophy. In the revolt from anthropomorphic modes of

conceiving the Supreme Being, God was raised so high above all knowable reality, that the difficulty was to find any mediation between Him and the world. In this strait the belief in angels of later Judaism seemed to offer a means of connecting the Infinite with the Finite. Alexandrian Judaism solved the difficulty by hypostatizing the attributes of God as spiritual Powers, through whose agency the world was formed. The way for this doctrine had been prepared by later Judaism in the books which personified Wisdom as the daughter of God, and even the Septuagint sought to preserve the spirituality and independence of God by representing Him as acting indirectly through angelic ministers. Cerinthus rather inclined to this latter view than to the more abstract conception of Philo, adopting a compromise between the old and the new, in which the purified conception of God was combined with the angelology of later Judaism. This illogical doctrine, in which God was viewed as at once the Author of all things and yet as inactive, could not long be accepted, and hence later Gnostics carried out the movement towards a more spiritual conception of the universe by transforming the angels of Cerinthus into ideal Powers or Aeons, while preserving the separateness of God from the world and the creative activity of the subordinate agents. To this second phase of Gnosticism attention must now be directed.

II. HELLENIC GNOSTICISM.

The main leaders of Gnosticism in the second century, while they retain the characteristics we have found exhibited by the 'false teachers' among the Colossians and by Cerinthus, differ in being largely influenced by Greek ideas and modes of thought. This inevitably gave a new character to their speculations. Greek thought had for centuries occupied itself with the problem of explaining the origin of the world, and the principles which underlie the various forms of being and of human society. Early Greek philosophy turned against the anthropomorphism and polytheism of the traditional mythology, and this movement finally resulted, in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, in a pure speculative Monotheism and in a closely reasoned system of ideas, embracing the whole wealth of knowledge as it then existed. In its later phases Greek philosophy had come to despair of a solution of the riddle of existence by the normal

exercise of reason. But, even when a basis for truth was sought in religious intuition, the Greek tendency to intellectual clearness led to the attempt to construct a system of ideas, in which the reflective intellect could feel itself at home. Christianity, with its new revelation of the nature of God and man, compelled thinkers who had been trained in the Greek schools to seek for a view which should solve the problems raised by philosophy, and it was inevitable that the attempt should be made to bring the new ideas into harmony with the preconceptions by which they were dominated. To them Christianity presented itself, not merely as a religion, but as a divine philosophy, and in it, as they assumed, was to be found a complete answer to the problems which philosophy had in vain attempted to solve. But the Gospel was Jewish in its origin, and had been presented by St. Paul as at once a fulfilment and an abrogation of the whole Mosaic law. The problem therefore arose to determine the relation of the Jewish religion to Christianity. St. Paul had put forward the illuminating conception of the Law as a divine preparation for the Gospel, and, by the aid of this reconciling idea, had extracted from the Old Testament a testimony to the transitional character of the whole Mosaic dispensation, while he had also seen in the death and resurrection of Jesus a revelation of the divine nature. In his interpretation of the sacred records the Apostle employed the prevalent allegorical method which had originated in Greece, but always in subordination to the central ideas of Christianity; and in this way he was enabled to reconcile the Jewish converts to Christianity without destroying their reverence for the Old Testament as the revelation of God. But St. Paul's training had been rabbinical, though he was not entirely uninfluenced by Greek modes of thought, and hence men like the Gnostics, whose training had been of a different type, came to the Old Testament from a different point of view. They admitted its divine authority, but they found in it a hidden philosophy. It was to them, as to Philo, by whom they were largely influenced, a symbolic account of the liberation of the spirit from the bondage of nature. This was the method by which they were enabled to retain the Old Testament as a Christian book, and yet to affirm that Christianity was an entirely new revelation. Preparation had already been made for this view in the transformation which later Judaism had undergone under the influence

of Babylonian and Persian ideas, as well as of later Jewish speculation, which was already dominated by Greek ideas. Like Philo, the Gnostics found a solvent for the difficulties involved in the literal interpretation of the Old Testament in the allegorical method of exegesis, which was as much a legacy from Greece as the positive ideas due to Greek philosophy. In support of this method they could appeal to St. Paul and other New Testament writers. Armed with this potent instrument, even the historical records of the Old Testament, not to speak of its other contents, could be interpreted as symbols of hidden truth. Instead of apocalyptic dreams of a Messianic kingdom, the Gnostics substituted a mystical philosophy, in which the centre of interest was transferred from the ordinary world in which men lived to a vague spiritual realm of personified abstractions. But this transforming process could not stop with the Old Testament. In the second century the writings of the New Testament were accepted as a divine revelation, certainly not inferior to those of the Old Testament, and to them was applied the same method of exegesis, so that the birth, life, passion and ascension of the Lord were interpreted as symbols of a great world-process. Thus arose those fantastic creations of Hellenic Gnosticism, in which an attempt was made to find a solution of the problems of philosophy in a mystical interpretation of the sacred records. And when it was once admitted that Christianity in its inner essence could only be understood by those who possessed the inner light which enabled them to interpret the hidden meaning of Scripture, it was an obvious inference that only those who were endowed with this faculty were capable of that special Gnosis or illumination in which salvation was supposed to consist, though at least some of the Gnostic schools were willing to allow a certain measure of illumination to the ordinary Christian,

Now, though the Church refused to accept the solutions proposed by the Gnostics, it has never rejected the problem which they were the first to formulate or the method which they employed in its solution. The Gnostics are the first Christian theologians, or rather the first Christian theologians who sought to construct a theology on the basis of revelation after the model of Greek philosophy and by the use of the Greek allegorical exegesis. The problem and the method were dictated by the

stage of thought at which the world had arrived, and neither the one nor the other was rejected by the Church, nor was the Church uninfluenced by Gnostic ideas, even when these were untenable. Thus Gnosticism almost forces us to ask what is the justification, if there is a justification, for the persistent tendency in all ages to construct a system of theology on the basis of Christian faith. There is, perhaps, no more pressing question at the present day, and though it would be impossible to deal fully with it here, we can hardly pass it by, if we are to form an intelligent estimate of the value of Gnosticism.

In the revolt from what we feel to be the inadequacy of existing theological systems, we are sometimes tempted to cut the knot by ignoring theology altogether, and falling back upon "simple faith." Such an attitude can never give permanent satisfaction. You may imagine that in this way you have got rid of all theology, but it will be found that you have in reality merely reduced your theology to a vague and colourless doctrine, in which all that is distinctive of Christianity has evaporated. For, the moment we ask what is meant by "simple faith," the old difficulties begin to crowd in upon us, and we discover that, unless we wilfully shut our eyes and resolve not to think at all, we must do our best to find a solution for our intellectual perplexities. 'Faith,' as we must remember, must be 'faith' in something: it must have an object, and it cannot be a matter of indifference what that object is. Even if it is only a 'faith' in something higher than the things of sense, we cannot help asking what is meant by 'higher than the things of sense'; and any one who attempts to define the distinction between the sensible and the supersensible will soon find that he has entered upon a voyage which will lead him into strange lands. But of course, we do not mean by 'faith' anything so vague and colourless; we mean 'faith' in that revelation of God which is characteristic of Christianity. But this again only raises a new problem. Where are we to find Christianity uncontaminated by theology? To some writers, it seems to be found in the faith of the primitive Christian community, before it was affected by the speculations of Christian theologians who were influenced so largely by Greek ideas. Harnack, for example, tells us that the basis of the primitive Christian churches was "a holy life on the ground of a common hope, which rested upon the faith that God, who had spoken

through the prophets, has sent his Son Jesus Christ, and revealed eternal life through Him."* But this primitive faith obviously involves a set of ideas which have only to be developed into explicitness to become a theology. And if it is maintained that all departure from this set of ideas is to be regarded as illegitimate, what are we to say of the complex theology of St. Paul and St. John, which went a very long way beyond them? To this objection it may be answered, that, though we must have a theology, it does not follow that we are to have a system of abstract conceptions or dogmas. Theology, it may be said, should be the interpretation of religious experience, and religious experience is too personal and too complex to be imprisoned in any set of dogmas. The moment you begin to define, to formulate, to systematize, you narrow down the infinity which is characteristic of all religious experience and substitute a collection of dead abstractions for the living truth.

Now, while there is a certain amount of truth in this contention, it does not seem to have any validity as an objection to a definite system of theology. That theology must be based upon religious experience is an important truth; and it is also true that theology can never be a substitute for religious experience; but neither of these admissions carries with it the implication that theology is not as capable of precise and definite statement as any other science. What lends countenance to the opposite view is, firstly, the confusion between religious experience and theology, and, secondly, the identification of theology with a fixed and unchanging set of dogmas. (1) It should not be necessary to protest against the former mistake. Every science must be based upon experience, and if experience is ignored or tampered with the science must be correspondently unreal or inadequate. But, on the other hand, no science can be a mere transcript of experience. The experience of every man has in it something unique, which is incapable of being stated in universal propositions. It is this fact which seems to support the view of those who contend that theology should be simply the record of personal experience. It is forgotten that, while no one can live the life of another, much less the lives of the countless millions who have rejoiced and suffered since man appeared upon the earth, it yet is possible to grasp in thought the principles which

*Harnack: *Dogmengeschichte*, I., 211.

give meaning to the lives of men. Were it not possible to make one's personal experience an object of thought, we should neither understand ourselves nor anybody else. We have therefore to remember that, when we speak of our "experience," we do not mean the particular ideas and feelings that arise in us from moment to moment, but the interpretation we put upon them. "Experience," in other words, exists in the medium of thought, and without thought we should have no "experience." Now, what every man does for himself, it is the task of theology to do for the race. It corrects the inevitable but inadequate reflection of the individual by viewing it in the light of wider experience, and the adequacy of this reflection is a measure of the adequacy of a system of theology. (2) This leads us to see the mistake of arguing that, because theology cannot be a fixed and unchanging set of dogmas, it cannot be a science. The assumption here is that theology must either consist of a number of abstract dogmas or cannot be a science. The truth is that, if it did consist of the former, it could not be the latter. No science can be stationary, for the simple reason that experience is not stationary. What would be thought of a historian who maintained that there cannot be a science of history, because history is in continuous process of formation? In the same way theology as the science of religious experience must be continually in process, because religious experience is always growing fuller and richer. What this shows is, that theology must develop in harmony with the developed religious experience of the race. At the same time we must remember that progress is not mere change, but simply a further development of the same fundamental conceptions. With the advent of Christianity was introduced a new conception of God, man and the world, which transformed the religious life and therefore the theology of all previous ages; but the full meaning of this new conception could only reveal itself in the transformation which it has effected, and has yet to effect. To imagine that we can better comprehend the meaning of Christianity by going back to the first simple faith of the Christian of the first century is as absurd as to suppose that the undeveloped germ is more significant than the full-grown tree.

If the view just indicated is sound, we cannot but sympathize with the problem which the Gnostics were attempting to solve. Convinced that Christianity was the universal religion,

they attempted to set forth its fundamental ideas in their systematic connexion. No doubt their method and the results reached by them were very inadequate as an expression of the essence of Christianity ; but nothing else could be expected from men who lived before theology had begun to take definite shape. To them belongs the credit of seeking to interpret all the knowledge, or supposed knowledge, of their time in the light of Christianity, a task which the theologian does not always attempt. Let us, then see what results these initiators of theological science reached in their attempt to construct a comprehensive religious philosophy. Certainly their systems were arbitrary and fantastic enough, but we may be certain that they had some rational meaning, and were an effort to explain problems with which we are still occupied.

As Gnosticism was essentially a philosophy of religion, it began with the conception of God, who was declared to be inconceivable and inexpressible, then attempted to explain the origin of the world with its finitude and evil by the hypothesis of emanation, and concluded with an account of the restoration of man to unity with God. It is thus evident that Gnosticism makes no attempt to advance from the nature of the world as known to us to the ultimate principle of all things, but starts with the ultimate principle and proceeds to deduce the various forms of existence from it. The objection which at once suggests itself to this whole method of procedure is that it begins by assuming the idea of God instead of showing that that idea is necessarily presupposed by the contents of our experience. And there can be no doubt that the Gnostics, instead of seeking to discover the true nature of God by an examination of the nature of the knowable world, started with the preconception of God as absolutely complete in himself apart from and independently of the world. This indeed was inevitable in a philosophy which was based, not upon the interpretation by reason of what was known, but upon a revelation which transcended reason. It must be observed, however, that the Gnostics were led to adopt this method by the whole movement of the age. By the development of the religious consciousness in Greece, the conception of God had been purified from anthropomorphism and polytheism, and by a parallel development among the Jews God had come to be conceived as the God of the whole universe ; and hence

the Gnostics naturally started from the point of view of pure Monotheism. Moreover, the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy had exalted God so far above the world that Philo was led to declare that He was absolutely incomprehensible by the human intelligence. The Gnostics therefore naturally assumed the conception of God which had thus been reached in their day, and their problem was to explain the relation of God to the world, and especially to man. These considerations may explain why the Gnostics start from the conception of God, whom they consider as raised infinitely above all particular forms of being. We shall best understand the character of their theology by a comparison of the two main representatives of Hellenic Gnosticism, Valentinus and Basilides.*

Before there was any created being, Valentinus maintained, existed the Original Father, whom he also calls the Depth, absolutely alone, uncreated, without place, without time, without Counsellor or any other Being that we can in any way conceive. Here it will be observed that the predicates by which the absolute is characterised are entirely negative. God is *not* created, *not* in space, *not* in time, *not* related to any other being. But, while Valentinus denies that we can attribute any positive qualities to the Divine Being, his use of the term *Depth* indicates that he was led to deny all positive predicates of the Absolute from his conviction of the infinite and inexhaustible completeness of the divine nature. Thus in the mind of Valentinus two opposite conceptions are combined without any consciousness on his part that they are mutually exclusive. The absolutely indeterminate Being is at the same time the infinitely determinate Being. Like Spinoza, Valentinus denies that God can be defined, not because He is absolutely simple, but because of the transcendent fullness of His being. It would seem, however, from the account of Irenæus, that there were followers of Valentinus who sought to push the negative conception of God to its utter extreme, and who therefore denied that even 'being' could be predicated of the Absolute. And obviously this is the logical consequence of the denial of all positive predicates, among which 'being' must be placed. This sect of Valentinians may have been influenced by Basilides, who was a more consistent thinker than

*Valentinus d. circ. 160; Basilides ft. circ. 120.

his contemporary Valentinus, though perhaps for that very reason he had fewer adherents. We have, therefore, in Basilides the purest expression of the Gnostic conception of God. Here is the account given by Hippolytus of his doctrine.

“ There was a time when there was nothing ; and when I say ‘ nothing,’ says Basilides, I mean to express in plain and unambiguous language, without equivocation of any kind, the idea that there was absolutely no being whatever. I have, indeed, made use of the term ‘ being ’ in saying that there ‘ was ’ nothing, but I employ the word only in a symbolical sense. Let it be clearly understood, then, that nothing whatever was. No doubt even this statement is inadequate ; for, even in saying that the First Principle is ‘ inexpressible,’ we imply that it is not altogether ‘ inexpressible.’ But what I mean is, that there is no term by which it can be expressed, and therefore that it cannot even be said to be ‘ inexpressible.’ Even when we are speaking of the known world, we find that language is unable to characterize the infinite differences of things ; for it is impossible to find precise terms for all things, and, though we can comprehend the distinctive character of things by thought, we are forced to employ current terms, having no proper words by which to designate them. This ambiguity in the use of words has produced perplexity and confusion in the minds of the uncultured..... There was, then, nothing, neither matter, nor substance, nor that which is non-substantial, neither the simple nor the complex, neither the unthought nor the unperceived, neither man, nor angel, nor God,—in short, nothing whatever that can be named or perceived or thought. The God who was not (*ὁ οὐκ ὄν θεός*), being without thought, without perception, without will, without purpose, without passion, without desire, willed to make a world. I say ‘ willed,’ however, merely because I am forced to use some word, but I mean that the God who was not ‘ willed ’ without volition, without thought, without perception ; and when I say ‘ world,’ I do not mean the extended and divisible world which afterwards came into being, with its capacity of division, but the cosmical seed (*σπέρμα κόσμου*). This ‘ seed ’ contained all things within itself, just as the seed of the mustard plant contains in minute form all at once roots, branches, leaves and the innumerable seeds of

future plants. Thus the God that was not made the world that was not out of what was not."*

Basilides, as you will see from this quotation, has the courage of his convictions. It would be difficult to express more fully the idea of the absolute transcendence and inscrutability of God, or the logical consequences of that idea. In considering the doctrine of Philo we came across a similar view, for Philo also maintains that it is impossible for man to comprehend the inner nature of God. But Philo, while he denies that we can predicate anything of God as He is in Himself, yet affirms that we can say that He *is*. Basilides is more consistent. Since God is absolutely incomprehensible and inexpressible, we must refuse even to say that He *is*. For to say that God *is*, or *was* before the creation of the world, is to apply to the Infinite a predicate which has meaning only in its application to the finite. Borrowing an argument common in the Peripatetic school of thinkers, Basilides seeks to show that the human mind cannot even adequately conceive or name the finite: and therefore, as he implies, it is not surprising that it cannot comprehend or express the nature of the Infinite.

In this doctrine of Basilides we have the first clear and unambiguous expression of a view which has exercised a very great influence upon Christian theology. That God absolutely transcends all knowable forms of being, and as a consequence is inconceivable and inexpressible, is a doctrine which, as Hatch points out, "was adopted at the end of the second century by the Christian philosophers of the Alexandrian schools, who inherited the wealth at once of regenerated Platonism, of Gnosticism, and of Theosophic Judaism." Clement of Alexandria, for example, affirms that God is "beyond the One and higher than the Monad itself." He cannot be named; we cannot say that He is "the One, or the Good, or Mind, or Absolute Being, or Father, or Creator, or Lord."

Now, the whole conception of God as transcending the knowable world is based upon the assumption that He is absolutely complete in himself prior to, or independently of, the universe. It is not difficult to understand how the first Christian theologians should have been led to adopt this view. Christi-

*Hippolytus, VII. 20-21.

anity was a development out of Judaism by the application of later Greek ideas, and therefore it naturally insisted strongly upon the infinite perfection of God. It is true that while in the earliest Christian teaching God is conceived of as invisible, He is not thought of as a purely spiritual Being; but it was inevitable that, with the rise of speculation, He should be conceived, if not as transcending all knowable forms of being, at least as existing beyond the visible universe; and when it was seen that God cannot be limited by space and time, the natural inference was drawn, that He is not only infinite, but is incomprehensible by the human intelligence in its normal exercise. Nor can there be any doubt that the first Christian theologians were influenced by such writers as Philo, who had already partially effected the combination of Jewish and Greek conceptions. Basilides, in his conception of "the God who was not," *i.e.*, the God who was still wrapped up in Himself and had not as yet created the visible universe, was only expressing the logical result of the negative movement from the world to God. But, when God is conceived of as beyond the world and as different in his essence from all that is known by us, He necessarily becomes a purely indeterminate being, of whom nothing can be said.

Now it would be a great mistake to undervalue the importance of this negative movement. As the source and principle of all being, God cannot be identified with any particular form of being. He cannot be simply one being existing side by side with others, but must be conceived as in some sense comprehending within himself all that is, and therefore as in his essence higher than the highest of the beings whose existence is dependent upon Him. But, while this is true, the transcendence of God cannot be admitted in the sense in which it was held by theologians like Basilides, unless we are prepared to admit that of God we know absolutely nothing. Yet this is the inevitable result of a self-consistent doctrine of the absolute transcendence of God. As Basilides says, no predicate whatever, not even the predicate of 'being,' can be applied in determination of that which is defined to be absolutely indefinable; and not only so, but we can make no assertion whatever about God, nor form even the faintest idea of His nature. Thus the name *God* comes to be little more than the deification of the word 'not,' and we are reduced to a condition of blank unconsciousness and utter speechlessness.

The motive for the purification of the idea of God from all the predicates by which we characterize known objects was undoubtedly a recognition of the absolute perfection of God. As Basilides maintains, the world as known to us is infinitely complex. No two things are precisely the same, or, in other words, each thing has its own individuality and is marked off from all other things. Our conceptions of things, and the names which we apply to them, only express what is common to all the members of a class, not what is characteristic of each. It is impossible to define, and therefore impossible to name, the individual, and we have to content ourselves with class names, which leave out all that is peculiar to each. We should only express adequately the nature of each thing if we had a special name for each, and indeed for each of the infinity of changes through which each thing passes. Hence thought, and language as its expression, is inadequate to the infinite multiplicity of objects and events. Now, this argument, if pressed to its logical conclusion, would seem to mean, when applied to God, that we cannot think or express the divine nature, because the very essence of thought and speech is to deal with the abstract, whereas God is infinitely concrete. And there is no doubt that, behind the denial of Basilides and others that God can be conceived, lies the idea that He is infinitely determinate. On the other hand, the explicit doctrine of Basilides is that God is absolutely indeterminate, and therefore cannot be conceived or expressed. Now these two conceptions are obviously antithetical and irreconcilable; God cannot be at once infinitely determinate and absolutely indeterminate, and we must make clear to ourselves which conception we propose to adopt, before we can advance a step in the construction of a true theology. It may therefore be allowed me to examine shortly the argument of Basilides for the inconceivability of God from the abstract or partial character of all thought and language.

We hear a good deal at the present day about the necessary abstractness of thought. "Experience," we are told, is concrete, including as it does all that is involved in feeling and will, as well as in thought. Hence, it is argued, those who suppose that reality can be grasped by thought do not observe that they are reducing the infinite wealth of the universe to a thin and unreal

abstraction, and substituting an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories" for the warm and breathing life of reality.

The first remark to be made upon this theory is, that it makes a summary end of all theology. No doubt *pectus facit theologum*—the heart makes the theologian—in the sense that *without* religious experience there can be no theology. But it is just as true to say, *pectus non facit theologum*, for a theologian without a head is an inconceivable monster. Theology, in other words, consists, and must consist, in a system of thoughts, and if thought can in no sense comprehend God, there is no theology. Now, I do not think that theology is merely the manipulation of abstractions, though it may be admitted that there have been theologians whose industry consisted in little more. But if it is not, there must be some fundamental error in the doctrine that thought can deal only with the abstract. That error consists, I think, in forgetting that thought, or at least reflective thought, is in all cases a comprehension of the *principles* which make the world of our experience intelligible, never an attempt to exhaust the infinitude of the particular. In other words, thought is the comprehension of the conditions without which there can be no intelligible universe. When the scientific man tells us that there is a law of gravitation, he does not pretend, or at least should not pretend, that he has characterized the world in all the fulness of its detail. If he is foolish enough to make such a claim, he may be immediately refuted by the simplest experience,—the experience, e.g., that a stone has characteristics which the law of gravitation does not express. What the law really states is, that, *whatever else* an external object may be, it owes its gravity to the system of things of which it forms a part. Let us apply this view of thought to the conception of God. To say that we have a true conception of the nature of God does not mean that we have a complete and exhaustive experience of all that God is. To have such an experience would be to realize all that is involved in the inexhaustible fulness of the divine nature; in other words, to be as perfect as God himself. No one in his senses will make so preposterous a claim. But, on the other hand, we may surely have a conception of God in the same sense as we have the conception of a law of nature: we may be able to tell that God is self-conscious, self-originating and self-manifesting,

though we cannot state in detail all that is involved in the infinite perfection of His nature. And if so, we have a conception of God which is absolute, in the sense that, while our experience of His nature is partial and incomplete, it yet is the experience of a Being who is self-conscious, self-originating and self-manifesting. Thus, theology becomes a science of the nature of God, and, indeed, in a sense the only science, since all branches of knowledge must be the gradual comprehension of the perfect and inexhaustible fulness of the divine nature.

There is another side to the First Principle of Basilides. His reason for maintaining that God transcends all being, thought and speech is that every form of knowable reality is separated from God 'by a whole genus,' as Philo puts it: in other words, that the world and God differ absolutely in their nature, the one being finite, the other infinite. Now, it is perfectly true that finite reality must be held to be absolutely different in nature from infinite reality, so long as the former is viewed as nothing but finite. The opposition of finite and infinite, as Hegel says, is "one of the most stubborn antitheses of the abstract understanding." But, before we pronounce the world to be finite and God to be infinite, it would be better to ask whether there is any form of being which can be truly declared to be finite. There is no doubt that in our ordinary way of looking at things we do assume that we have a knowledge of finite things. The tree, the mountain and the river are all, as we suppose, distinct and separate from one another, and therefore each is finite. Moreover, there was a time when each began to be, and a time when it will cease to be, and such limitation in time implies finitude. And if we turn our thought upon ourselves, is it not obvious that each of us is finite, both because each has his own peculiarities and because our life begins and comes to an end? The Infinite, on the other hand, must be absolutely self-complete, without beginning or end, and without limitation of any kind. When, therefore, any one challenges the assumption that there is an opposition of finite and infinite, common sense is up in arms and imagines that the objector is denying the plainest facts. But it is not really so. There is nothing which can be called finite in an absolute sense. It is certainly true that a tree is not a mountain, or a mountain a river, and it

is equally true that I am not you, or you me ; but it is not true that any object or any person is absolutely finite. Surely it is no perversity of speculation to say that the tree or the mountain could not be at all were not the whole physical universe what it is ; that you and I could not be, were there no physical universe and no human race from which we have sprung. Thus each thing involves the whole, without which it could not be. And is it not obvious that the whole universe cannot be finite ? On the other hand, there could be no universe without the individuals in which it is differentiated. It is therefore only when we separate one thing from another, without recognizing its relation to the whole, that it seems to have an independent existence. What we call the finite is but a special form in which the infinite—the universe as a whole—is expressed ; so that there is no finite apart from the infinite, and no infinite apart from the finite. This idea may be expressed in a way that is more readily apprehended, when we say that without God nothing can be. Were God not, the tree, the mountain, the individual man, could not be ; and it is at bottom atheism to affirm the absolute finitude of any particular thing. Now, if this is true, it is evident that we cannot oppose God to the world, as if He could be without the world. God is manifested in the world, and to suppose that He is outside of it is to make the world godless and to make any relation of God to the world an impossibility. Basilides, like many of his successors, imagined that, before the world was, God existed wrapped up in Himself and self-complete ; but the logic of his system compelled him to admit that of such a God nothing whatever could be said. It is little wonder that such a fiction of abstraction should be found unintelligible and inexpressible.

As none of the predicates by which existence is characterised are applicable to the Absolute, Basilides naturally denies that we can speak of God as thinking, perceiving or willing. Taken strictly, this would mean that God has no definite nature. But Basilides undoubtedly rather means to affirm that in God all real distinctions cease to be distinctions and are resolved into unity. Perhaps we may understand how he was led, in his endeavour to preserve the absoluteness of God, to deny of Him thought, perception and will by the following considerations.

The thought of anything, as exercised by us, seems to presuppose the independent existence of that about which we think. Thought, as we have already seen, was conceived by Basilides as an abstraction from the infinite variety of objects, qualities and events presented in experience. We fix our attention, as he supposed, upon the *common* element in a number of objects, and let drop the points in which they differ, and therefore thought can never take up into itself the nature of things. Now, if this is the nature of thought, it cannot be predicated of God, because we should be maintaining that objects existed prior to, and independent of God, and that God could not even comprehend the whole nature of those objects. Against such a doctrine Basilides protests. God is absolute, and there can exist nothing apart from Him, and certainly nothing which He does not completely comprehend. If we say that God is a thinking being, we must suppose Him to think a world which already exists independently of Him, and to think it imperfectly. Hence the nature of God must be such that it transcends thought. Nor can we predicate perception of God; for though perception, unlike thought, comes into direct contact with things and their qualities, it does not create the objects it apprehends, and it has this peculiar defect that it never deals with the whole, but only with a part. Perception, in other words, cannot create its objects, nor can it comprehend existence in its completeness. But God must be creative of all things, and therefore He can never be described as exercising a receptive faculty like perception. Lastly, *will* cannot be ascribed to God, because volition as we experience it in ourselves—and we know of no other—is the process by which we seek to complete our being by a transition into a new state; whereas God must be eternally complete. It was from such considerations as these that Basilides was led to deny thought, perception and will of God. He denied these predicates of God, because they seemed to him to destroy the unity and perfection of His nature, which must transcend all such limited forms of existence.

But, while it was the intention of Basilides to preserve the absolute perfection of God by denying of Him thought, perception and will, the logical result of his doctrine was to empty the conception of God of all meaning. He confuses the distinction

of thought, perception and will, and the distinction of subject and object, with their absolute separation. It is quite true that in God thought, perception and will cannot be separate modes of activity; but it is not true that the Divine Intelligence can be devoid of all distinction. It must be admitted that in God there can be no absolute separation between that which He is and that which He knows; but it is not true that there is within His nature no distinction between subject and object. That Intelligence is perfect in which all distinctions are the expression of unity, and there can be no Intelligence where there is no distinction of subject and object. God must be conceived as self-conscious Intelligence or Spirit, unless we are to fall back upon a purely indeterminate Being, blindly originating existence. Basilides is himself forced to admit that we have to think and speak of God as 'willing'; but he shelters himself from the consequences of this admission by saying that the term *will* is applied to God only in an analogical or symbolical sense. But this only conceals the inner contradiction of his doctrine. If 'will' is employed in an analogical sense, we must at least know that with which it is contrasted. We cannot know that 'will' is in any sense applicable to God, unless we know how far it is true, and how far false. Thus we are reduced to the dilemma: If we know what in God corresponds to 'will,' we must be able to comprehend the nature of God; if we do not, we cannot know that there is any correspondence whatever.

[Concluded in the next Number.]

JOHN WATSON.

THE CREATION NARRATIVES OF GENESIS IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN CRITICISM.

THIS is a large subject around which there has grown up an exceedingly varied and extensive literature, it will therefore be necessary to confine our attention to the latest changes in the apologetical situation and the more recent contributions of Biblical criticism. In the so-called conflict between religion and science, these chapters have formed the arena in which many a battle has been fought fiercely if not always wisely. Those dialectic contests were no doubt unavoidable at the time and must be judged as stages in a movement which has advanced all the more steadily because of its slowness. The latest controversy of this kind to attract wide-spread attention was that between Mr. Gladstone and Professor Huxley. From our standpoint the great statesman must be regarded as many years behind the times both as to his knowledge of physical science and his assimilation of Biblical criticism. The distinguished Professor was of course entitled to speak as to what was generally accepted by students of physical science, and on points of Old Testament Scholarship he quotes some of the most recent authorities but however much we may agree with his protest against the attempts to make the book of Genesis anticipate the latest discoveries of science we feel that those who desire to be loyal both to science and scripture need a treatment which is both more special and more sympathetic.

In justice to Mr. Gladstone it is only fair to recognize that, at the same period, orthodox theologians holding prominent positions expressed similar views. Dr. Bartlett, dealing with the subject in a special course of lessons given at Princeton shows that he has no hesitation in informing the students as to the method adopted by the author of Genesis I. He says "the narrative is foreshortened in an unparalleled degree," and that "on the lowest estimate" there is "half a million of years to every verse" in fact it is like an attempt to draw a map of North America in the space of a square inch. He has distinctly stated that the chapter is not poetry but narrative, narrative that is not scientific or technical but popular and phenomenal but he goes on to

maintain than in at least fifteen particulars, it is in harmony with the latest science. The same lecturer treats the second chapter in a similar manner; he remarks that "in the formation of woman we find the greatest apparent scriptural obstacle to the doctrine of Evolution." He says that many questions might be asked about the thing represented by the word "rib" and he himself asks this one which is sufficiently startling "Was it some portion of the frame originally added for the purpose of being removed?" A question which seems more in harmony with the mediæval than the modern attitude of mind. The following statement added a little further on does not seem to tend towards greater clearness. "If we understand this to be in all respects a literal and objective statement we still have remarkably sustained from the first, the law that now prevails through all life—that as Huxley would say the living protoplasm comes from living protoplean (?)—life from previous life the woman from the man." This kind of reasoning appears to have one disadvantage, namely, any one thing may mean any other thing, convenient no doubt for purposes of discussion but scarcely suited to produce either good theology or correct science.

It is not necessary to attempt a full review of this debate as to the scientific accuracy of Genesis as the books containing the opposite views of Gladstone and Huxley are quite accessible to those for whom the details of that controversy possess any interest. It may be well, however, to illustrate its effects by showing the impression made upon those who watched the conflict with very different feelings. Mr. S. Laing who seems to pose as an aggressive champion of "modern thought" says "Works like this of Mr. Gladstone's, however well intentioned, are in reality profoundly irreligious, for if—like the throw of the gambler, who, when the cards or dice go against him, stakes all or nothing on some desperate cast—religion is staked on the one issue that incredible narratives are true, and were dictated by Divine inspiration, there can be but one result."

"Mr. Gladstone's first essay having elicited a crushing reply from Prof. Huxley, he followed it up with a second one, entitled "Proem of Creation," which is chiefly remarkable for the rhetorical dexterity with which he withdraws under a cloud of smoke from the position rendered untenable by the Professor's

heavy artillery, while at the same time he defends an equally untenable position not within his opponent's line of fire."

"He admits that this pulverises his position that there was a scientific *consensus* as to a sequence like that of Genesis in the production of animal life as between fishes, birds, mammals and animals and men."

"He rides off by saying that the writer of the account of the creation in Genesis is not responsible for scientific precision, nothing can be assigned to him but 'a statement general which admits exceptions, popular which aims mainly at producing moral impressions, summary which cannot but be open to more or less criticism of detail.' 'In a word,' he says, 'I think it is a sermon.' But how is an account of creation evaporated into a sermon to prove a revelation?" This statement is sufficiently sarcastic and we have to admit that as a criticism of Mr. Gladstone's masterly retreat, it is substantially correct, though we do not think that the writer shows any real sympathy with the thought of revelation in any form.

Prof. H. Drummond held a chair in a Presbyterian College which was created for the purpose of dealing specially with the relation of physical science to theology. It came, therefore, quite naturally within his province to review this controversy and he offers us in his own vigorous style a solution of the difficulty. "The contest is dying out. The new view of the Bible has rendered further apologetics almost superfluous. I have endeavoured to show that in my article on creation. No one now expects science from the Bible. The literary form of Genesis precludes the idea, you might as well contrast Paradise lost with geology as the Book of Genesis. Mr. Huxley might have been better employed than in laying this poor old ghost. The more modern views of the inspiration of the Bible have destroyed the stock in trade of the platform infidel. Such men are constructing difficulties which do not exist and they fight as those that beat the air." According to Prof. H. Drummond, Mr. Gladstone's case may be summed up in the following three propositions:—

1. According to the writer of the Pentateuch the "water-population," "air-population" and "land-population" were created in the order named.

2. This is so affirmed in our time by Natural Science that it

may be taken as demonstrated conclusion and established fact.

3. This co-incidence shows that either the writer was gifted with faculties passing all human experience, or his knowledge was divine.

Prof. Huxley proves that the second of these propositions is incorrect, and affirms therefore that the third collapses of itself. Prof. Drummond accepted the statement that it is impossible to harmonize Genesis and science, but denies that the contradiction is fatal to the belief that Genesis contains a revelation from God. "The critics," he says, "find history, poetry, moral philosophy, lives and letters, mystical devotional didactic pieces, but science there is none." "Dating from the childhood of the world, written for children and for that child-spirit in man which remains unchanged by time, it takes colour and shape accordingly. Its object is purely religious, the point being not how certain things are made, but that God made them. It is not dedicated to science, but to the soul. It is a sublime theology given in view of ignorance, idolatry or polytheism, telling the worshipful youth of the world that the heavens and earth and every creeping and flying thing were made by God." To give these quotations was perhaps the fairest way of setting forth the latest phase of the apologetic. Dr. Marcus Dods, Prof. Elmslie and others took substantially the same position. From the critical standpoint it needs some modification, for "the critics" do not regard Genesis I. as pure poetic theology, and they do not think that it belongs to the "childhood of the world." If we accepted Prof. Drummond's statement as full and final, there would be no need to say anything more from the apologetic standpoint. In this essay it is not necessary to attempt to justify the theistic conception which lies behind the narrative. We might then dismiss the matter by saying that Genesis I. contains a sublime theology and is quite innocent of science, so that all this talk about a conflict between Scriptures and science is out of date. We feel, however, the need of attacking the subject in a different fashion and giving patient attention to small but significant details. Our investigation will at least teach us that Biblical theology and apologetics must be influenced by the most careful Biblical criticism. In fact, sympathetic and constructive criticism is in this case the real apologetic. If we admit our need of a less mechan-

ical view of inspiration and an apologetical treatment with a more correct historical perspective, we make this admission not because of pressure from those who claim to speak in the name of physical science, but on account of a reverent scientific examination of the documents. Before undertaking this more minute examination the writer of this essay was prepared to admit that it might be in a broad sense correct to say that there was science in the first chapter of Genesis, and that such science as there was is now out of date. If we view the Old Testament as part of a progressive revelation it follows that we should frankly acknowledge the fact that even the theology of the earlier portions is relatively imperfect. Though the oak comes from the acorn it is not wise to abolish the distinction between the seed and the full grown tree, you do not treat an acorn irreverently when you simply point out that it has not yet attained to the stature of the oak. It is scarcely correct to say that there was no science in those days, though the different branches of knowledge were not so clearly divided or so highly specialised as now. The first chapter of Genesis when it assumed its final form represented the latest science and noblest theology to which the Hebrew people had then attained, and it served in that capacity during many centuries for the great body of Christians as well as for the Jews. Men who have been taught in the school of Christ and are "the heirs of all the ages" may pass through it to a deeper thought of creation and a grander view of God's relation to the world. Belief in inspiration and admiration for this noblest of all cosmogonies, does not demand that we should claim infallibility for its external frame-work and finality for every detail.

How does this agree with the later more severe scrutiny that has been given to the narratives? We need not quote from Dillmann, as his commentary is now accessible to English readers. Take, then, this statement from one of the most recent commentaries. In the first chapter of Genesis "God is not confused with the world, it is not the fairy world of mythology, but the world as nature. God has shaped the world well that man may live in it. The religious and scientific treatment of the world are united. The interest of the writer is not mainly and certainly not merely religious. He will give a cosmogony, a series of events advancing from simple to more complicated.

This does not hinder him from building upon a given mythology." "It does not detract from this creation history that the picture of the world pre-supposed no longer corresponds in whole or in details to our knowledge of the world."—(Holzinger.) After pointing out many similarities in the Babylonian cosmogony he remarks: "These are now pictures of the nursery. When we realize the contrast between this and what is taught in our schools we see that clever attempts at reconciliation are out of date." "Our task is different, namely, to show that the thought of the supra-mundane God, so to speak, the leading motive of Gen. 1 agrees with the modern representation of the world its becoming and process even better than with the ancient world picture, since that was quite foreign to the thought of the supra-mundane God, while the origin of the modern treatment of the world has this idea, not only historically, but also really as a pre-supposition." This view, that the author of Genesis 1 while working upon ancient material treats this in a theological spirit that is comparatively modern, has in recent years gained ground among specialists. Though they are "made in Germany," we welcome such statements from one who has given a recent and careful examination of these two narratives in the light of all the knowledge which has up to the present been gathered from language and literature of the Hebrew people. The same work has been done in different ways by many scholars, and on several points there is a large consensus of opinion.

The problem is an exceedingly complex one. It involves an attempt to fix the date of the two narratives in their present form, a careful comparison of them as to their standpoint and style, a discussion as to whether there was a more original written form, an investigation of the ancient traditions which lie in the background, a comparison of these with the cosmogonies and theogonies of other peoples, and especially of those most nearly akin to the Hebrew race. As every line of this investigation calls for careful criticism, often based upon scanty sources, it will easily be seen that upon many details there must be room for great variety of opinion. Still it is wonderful how much has been accomplished by the patient toil of many workers who have confirmed or checked each other.

The most superficial reader can see that we have in the first

two chapters of Genesis two different narratives of creation, though it is only a careful study of the original that reveals the depth and breadth of this difference. At the basis of such literary criticism, as a science, there lies the belief, not only that every prophet spoke to his own time, but also that every living document is saturated with the life of the period in which it had its origin. A section may be small, its marks not very distinct, or our knowledge of the time may be too limited, hence our efforts to place it may be baffled, or produce only conjectures of the slightest probability. In such cases there is great room for the play of individual peculiarities; with regard to the present question many scholars working from the same principles have produced similar results.

The documentary theory means not only that we have here two narratives, but also that these belong to two different documents which are marked throughout by diversity of thought, language and historical background. In their present form they spring from different epochs and represent different schools. This is the result of a century's international labour, and the arguments for its correctness are too varied and technical to receive even the barest mention now, our business is to apply as briefly as possible to the matter in hand. The first chapter of Genesis belongs then to what is called "The Priestly Document," a book which deals largely with ecclesiastical legislation and has only a slight historical framework. It is supposed by many to be, in its final form, the latest element of the composite book which we call the Pentateuch, and it is certainly the least poetic. It is marked by a fondness for schemes, systems and frequently recurring formulae. In this section the poetic elements of the original cosmogony are largely subdued and in contrast with its companion story it is prosaic rather than poetic, but its regular march of statement combined with the grandeur of the subject gives it a certain air of sublimity. In harmony with this view of its origin we note its fully developed belief in the one God, who stands apart from the world conquers chaos and creates by the power of his word. The writer begins with chaos, or according to the view of some interpreters merely mentions it in parenthesis, and then sets it aside and creation proceeds in regular order. In some of the ancient cosmogonies there is the idea of a chaos and

of the world arising through a division of diverse elements by a process from within, by what we might call a process of evolution, if we take care to avoid the modern associations of that popular word. There seems to be here a pale reflection of something of that kind, but without reasoned reconciliation, the thought of the transcendent God is supreme. This is certainly one of the noblest products of Hebrew theology, with the view we now possess of the development of religious thought in Israel, we cannot conceive of it as existing in the time of Moses, it was there no doubt in the germ, but as worked out here it is comparatively modern. The writer of the narrative did not create this great truth of the supreme God, he does not on the whole display much creative genius, he received it as the result of a religious movement that has a long history behind it. This is one of Israel's greatest contributions to the religious life of the world.

Consistent with this is the absence of "anthropomorphism," there is only one trace of it, the rest of God on the sabbath day, and this results not from the writer's spirit or style, but from his scheme. It is a scheme of six-days into which eight works are compressed and the nature of the division has suggested to some scholars that probably the series of works existed before the scheme of days. All the trouble about the meaning of the word "day" has come from the exigencies of apologetics rather than from sound exegesis. The Hebrew word, as well as our own word "day," may under certain circumstances mean an indefinite period, in fact in the next narrative it is used in the sense of "when," but it cannot have an indefinite meaning when it is a member of a definite series. When we speak of the days of the week or month, we mean a definite and limited not an indefinite portion of time.

Holzinger gives his view of the character of the first narrative in these words—"A real description of process is avoided rather than given. We are informed in the most general manner that things came to pass in proper order and for a good purpose, according to the divine command," We cannot discuss in detail Wellhausen's view of the two narratives, neither can we follow him when he attempts at one point to make one a polemic against the other, these general statements from that quarter are however worth noting. "In chapter II. we find our-

selves in the enchanted garden of antiquity, the fresh antique earth-smell blows around us, in I it is different, there is no play of fancy to describe the process of the world-creation, but everywhere thoughtful reflective construction which can be followed with little trouble. The author merely gives the frame-work of creation which remains unfilled up. The scheme over-balances the contents so that instead of intuitive description we receive logical definition." According to his view chaos and the brooding spirit are traditional or mythological and the whole is worked out from that point. "Brooded over by the spirit of God chaos is prepared for the development from itself, but in the Hebrew narrative the immanent has given way to the transcendent God, and the evolution principle is pressed back by the creative word."

H. Gunkel, of Berlin, has devoted much attention to the detailed consideration and comparison of these two narratives. While accepting the dominant view as to the date of the first chapter of Genesis, *in its present form*, he finds many traces of traditional material which has the closest affinity with the ancient Babylonian cosmogony. It is instructive to note the course of criticism which first settles approximately the date of this "Priestly Document," showing the comparative modernness of its latest forms, and then goes back to show that it contains much old material which had long been working in the life of the people. This cannot be called "reaction," at least it is not "the irrational movement of reaction," but simply a further and fuller investigation in the light of results already gained. This writer, having made a special point of this, may sometimes have pressed it too far, but the more recent commentators, Dillmann and Holzinger, accept the same principle, though they may differ in some details of the application. As our space is limited, we will simply quote from Gunkel on one point, so that the reader may have a specimen of the manner of his investigation and judge as to its character. After mentioning several signs which seem to furnish satisfactory evidence that the narrative in chap. I comes from an earlier story, he elaborates the following point of contrast between the two narratives. "Further deductions may be made from the conception that the world was once water. This conception evidently arose under the impression of a particular climate. The myth represents to itself the first

arising of the world, as now the world arises every new year. At first there is water and darkness, the light arises and the water parts itself into waters above the clouds and in the sea. The conception is only intelligible in a land whose character is marked by great streams. In winter the rain streams from heaven and mixes itself with the water into a chaos, but the spring brings back the division of water above and below. This is made more certain by a comparison with those creation histories which are now bound up with the Paradise stories. There the earth is originally without vegetation, because it has no rain, II, 5, A variant from another tradition now mingled with the first says that Jehovah caused watery vapour to ascend from the earth. Both are Canaanite conceptions, the water is not the enemy which must be driven away in order that the world may appear, but the friend, the beneficence of God, without whose aid the field will not bring forth its produce. Gen. II. reflects this view of nature in characteristic fashion, in Gen. I. the Divinity conquers the water, in Gen. II. he creates it. The myth of I. would be quite intelligible in Babylon."

"In this connection it is instructive to note how the Hebrews and the Babylonians of the old time reckoned the beginning of the year. According to the old Hebrew tradition the year begins in autumn, according to the Babylonian in the spring. The rainy season was in Israel reckoned as the beginning of the new year, in Babylon as the end of the old. Now it lies in the nature of the case that the world was created in the spring-time. Therefore in Israel they would consider water as the first creation of God; but in Babylon as the first act of God that he made the rain to cease. The application of this to a judgment of Gen. I. and II. is clear. The creation history of Gen. II. agrees with the Hebrew beginning of the year and shows itself as old Canaanitish, but Gen. I. agrees with the Babylonian reckoning."

The second narrative is simpler and yet deeper, more poetic in form and more subtle in its handling of the life of man; its language and theological conceptions belong to an earlier stage in the life of Israel. It does not give us a broad, general scheme of creation, but a vivid picture of man's origin and the coming of misery into a world which must once have been so bright.

As Holzinger says, "We have to do with a story-teller of the first rank, who displays a wonderful knowledge of the human heart." The same scholar who will scarcely be suspected of reading later theological ideas into the story interprets it thus: "The traditional material is thoroughly penetrated with the mode of thought of the spiritual and ethical religion. God is not a pale abstraction, not the deity of a heathen myth, but the God of Israel's prophetic religion, a holy God who spurns wickedness, but at the same time a kind, sympathetic father, even if that expression is not used. Paradise is lost through sin." At this point it may be well to note that the "Prophetic Document" of the Pentateuch in its written form is supposed to belong to the time of the earliest writing prophets, so that the modern view does not, as its opponents say, represent these prophets as springing suddenly into being without any preparation. The spiritual ideas of this second narrative form an atmosphere in which a simple noble prophet might breathe freely. The narrative no doubt presupposes traditional material, which had circulated a long time among the Hebrew people; the original colours are not deadened to the same extent as in the first narrative, but crude, fantastic features have in large measure been cast away, while the poetic charm is retained and made the vehicle of the purest spiritual teaching. The material is here thoroughly Hebraised, though there may be reminiscences of foreign elements and of Israel's earliest days. It comes to us from a time when the people were thoroughly settled in Palestine. We have not space to dwell in detail on the differences between the two narratives and to discuss the many special questions that arise. That is the less necessary, as any one reading them carefully in the ordinary version can see their different treatment of God, man and the world—in the first the transcendent, in the second the anthropomorphic God; in the first man takes his place in the general scheme, in the second he is "formed" and placed in Paradise; in the first the animals are placed under their natural lord, in the second they are grouped round man as his intimate companions; in the first physiological facts are implied in a matter of fact style, in the second they are touched with a poetic pathos which makes us feel the burden of this weary, perplexing life; in brief, the first is a general statement, the second is full of ideas.

Two different treatments of one point in the second narrative may be noticed as giving an example of two different styles of exegesis. Holzinger views the serpent as a mythological feature, "exegetically we must regard the serpent as a beast, not as a demoniac being, an element given in tradition, not an artistic clothing of the lust by which the woman is tempted. The Satan-idea is a post-exilic Jewish one. In the mythological basis, however, the serpent may have been an instrument of a demon hostile to the creating God. If nothing of this can now be traced it shows how energetically the material has been worked over." Whether we accept this conclusion or not, we can appreciate the method of exegesis. The aim of exegesis is to discover the meaning that the writer had in his mind and intended to convey. The question is, when we set the writer in his place in history and take his language in its natural sense, what impression does it convey? We know that in the earlier time from which this document came the supremacy of Jehovah played such a great part in the minds of the religious teachers that heathen demonology would be repulsive to them. We know also that the conception of Satan became prominent in later Jewish theology. We are not now directly concerned with the dogmatic validity of these ideas, but with the correct interpretation of a given document. It seems to us that in the following statement by Dr. Davis, of Princeton, these two things are confused instead of being separately considered. "Eve saw a snake. It is not necessary to suppose that she opined more; but back of the snake was an evil spirit. (Cf. the swine, Mark v. 13.) This was the current interpretation in Israel when insight into religious truth was clear." (*Genesis and Semitic Tradition.*)

Whatever we may make of the details of the second narrative it is a wonderful picture of the coming of sin and sorrow into human life as a result of man's disobedience, the skill and inspiration of the writer are more powerfully manifested in presenting the truth in this concrete form than if he had set forth his faith in so many abstract propositions. The purpose of our brief sketch is attained if we have shown that in these narratives we have a fruitful field for devout study, and that they bring before us in miniature some great questions of Old Testament history and theology.

As to the sources of the original material of the two narratives there is general agreement among scholars that the cosmological basis of chapter I. is closely related to the ancient Babylonian cosmogony. The attempt to prove specifically Babylonian features in the second narrative cannot be said to have been successful. (See article by Dr. Morris Jastrow, *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, July 1899). The original material if not of pure Hebrew origin has been thoroughly Hebraised so that it is difficult to trace absolute connection with either Egypt or Babylon. Much skill and strength has been spent on this problem and it is still unsolved, it is an interesting problem no doubt, but its solution is not essential to an understanding of Israel's life.

"It would indeed have been surprising if such similarities had not appeared. The Hebrew people before and after Moses was a member of a larger group of nations, had already for a long time had intercourse with Semitic and non-Semitic people, and had, in its morality and customs as well as in its knowledge and ideas, grown up along with a larger circle of nations. Many of their old mythological ideas betray themselves in various forms long after Moses. Theories about the origin of the world, also, akin to those of the other peoples, must undoubtedly have long continued current among them."

"But it is quite evident that by the Mosaic faith in God those traditionary views as well as the life and thought of the people in other directions must have been purified and transformed, even if already the simpler consciousness of God prevailing in earlier times among the Hebrews had not had its effect. In fact the incomparable pre-eminence of the Biblical narrative lies not in the material sub-structure or physical explanations which it may give, but in the penetration of the traditional matter with the higher faith in God." (Dillmann.)

Dr. Driver also believes in the connection of chapter I. with the Babylonian cosmogony, but that in its present form it "comes at the end of a long process of gradual elimination of heathen elements and of gradual assimilation to the purer teachings of Israelitish theology carried on under the spiritual influence of the religion of Israel;" but we do not think that on this account it is fair to say that he is "hampered by the idea, that

there must be a natural development of religious ideas, from a degrading polytheism through long periods up to a sublime monotheism." (Prof. T. M. Lindsay, *Critical Review*, Jan. 1900, page 36.) These two statements are very different, but to discuss them at length would require a full review of the growth of Israel's religious life. In the one the fact of gradual growth is carefully stated and sympathetically presented, in the other it is put in a way likely to create prejudice and give to the ordinary reader an utterly false impression.

The present attitude of what is called "the Higher criticism," to this and similar problems may perhaps be set forth in the following brief summary. These two narratives which belong to two different documents show traces of revision and addition since they assumed a written form. The written form is based upon traditional material, and this material reflects reminiscences of early mythologies. The remarkable feature is the extent to which the faith and theology of Israel has transformed this early material, informing it with its own ideas and bringing it into harmony with its own life. We have here as elsewhere in the Old Testament a testimony to the tremendous power of Israel's religion, which while partly assimilating some, conquered so many hostile and inferior elements.

If it be asked how such a view affects our idea of inspiration, the answer must be that as the doctrine of evolution modifies the old argument from design, so this treatment of Scripture material leads us to take wider views. Instead of fastening upon small unessential details we must grasp the spirit of the whole. This religion shows in its earliest records a simple comparatively noble view of God, but what is more, it had the life to grow and advance to ever loftier thoughts of the divine; hence its teachers had the power to reject many things that were crude or coarse, and show their strength and wisdom in using their best traditions and purest poetry as vehicles of the loftiest spiritual instruction. Such a religion is inspired in the very deepest sense, for is not inspiration only another name for the purest, highest life? It came from God, it drew to God those who followed its teachings, and it has left to the world a heritage which we cannot prize too highly, and so prepared the way for Him who is the truest revelation of the Eternal Father. "God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions, and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son,"

W. G. JORDAN.

THE RELATIONS OF LEGISLATION AND MORALITY.

FORMAL legislation comes late in the history of most legal systems.

“It is a matter of historical observation that long before any supreme political authority has come into being, a series of practical rules determines the main relations of family life, the conditions of ownership, the punishment of the more violent forms of wrong doing, &c. Maine says codes succeed customary laws at certain stages of progress in each community. According to Plato past time is the maker of states; it is also the maker of laws. The legal rule of to-day is the last link in an historical series.” “Law is the record of human progress, the golden deposit in the stream of time.” Moses is a law-giver not a law-maker. He is the declarer of the Divine Laws and the Divine Judgments. To his own people he is their discoverer. Says the latest writer on this subject, “The truth must not be pressed too far, but a truth it is that even now, law is rather a thing to be discovered than a thing to be made. Law is made unconsciously by the men whom it concerns. It is the deliberate result of human experience working from the known to the unknown, a little bit of knowledge won from ignorance, of order from Chaos.”

And the radical defect in some of our legislation is that the legislator has not discovered the law which he is trying to formulate in a statute. Do these observations apply to legislation affecting morality? Spencer holds that there is “an ideal code formulating the behaviour of the completely adapted man to the completely evolved society.”

Are then the laws of good living to be discovered before they can be declared?

Lecky points out that a Roman of the age of Pliny, an Englishman of the age of Henry 8th, and an Englishman of our own day would all agree that humanity is a virtue and its opposite a vice, but their judgments of the Acts which are compatible with a humane disposition would be widely different. A humane man of the first period might derive a keen enjoyment from those gladiatorial games which an Englishman even in the days of the

Tudors, would regard as atrociously barbarous and this last would in his turn acquiesce in many sports which would now be emphatically condemned. Our moral progress has been slow and gradual. The institution of marriage, of the family, the idea of human freedom and property, are the product of ages of time. Almost within our own time the immorality of slavery has been discovered. In 1776 the British House of Commons debated a resolution that the slave trade was contrary to the laws of God and the rights of man, and the resolution was lost. It took nearly half a century of agitation to carry the abolition of slavery in the British Empire.

It has been said that the growth of every moral sentiment begins in the minds of thoughtful men, spreads from them to the Community, and finally becomes embodied in the law of the land. It was so in regard to slavery. Wilberforce and other thoughtful men devoted themselves to the cause. They awakened the people of England to the enormity of the evil and finally triumphed in the legislature. The history of prison reform is similar and other instances might be adduced showing the same sequence of movement.

Lecky says there is a natural history of morals, a defined and regular order in which our moral feelings are unfolded—"Our knowledge of the laws of moral progress is like that of the laws of climate. We lay down general rules about the temperature to be expected as we approach or recede from the equator and experience shows that they are substantially correct, but yet an elevated plain or a range of mountains or the neighbourhood of the sea will often in some degree derange our calculations. So to in the history of moral changes, innumerable special agencies such as religious or political institutions, geographical conditions, traditions, antipathies and affinities exercise a certain retarding, accelerating or deflecting influence and somewhat modify the normal progress."—"The moral unity to be expected in different ages is not a unity of standard or of Acts but a unity of tendency."

The same act may be regarded in one age as innocent, in another as criminal.

If we look through the British Statutes from the reign of Henry 3 to the time of George 3, we find comparatively little

legislation on moral questions apart from the Criminal Law proper. The only subjects dealt with are the Liquor Traffic, the Lord's Day, Gambling, Profanity, and Slavery. There was more legislation regarding heresy, up to the reign of William 3 than on any moral question. Slavery is a dead issue as regards our own time and country and the legislation respecting gambling and profanity might not prove a fruitful subject of investigation for our purpose. The two matters in connection with which the relations of legislation and morality may be studied with most profit are the Liquor Traffic and the Lord's Day.

Blasphemy is still unlawful. By a statute of 9 and 10 William 3 to deny the Trinity or to deny the Christian Religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures to be of Divine Authority is punishable.

53 G. 3 c. 160 excepts from the statute persons denying the Trinity.

In 1867 a lecturer had hired a hall to maintain in his lecture that the Character of Christ is defective, and his teaching misleading, and that the Bible is no more inspired than any other book. The owner of the hall refused, on learning the subject, to permit the lecture, and was sued for breach of contract. The court sustained his refusal, reaffirming the decision of Chief Justice Hale, that Christianity is part of the law of England.

The Commissioners on Criminal Law say that although the law forbids all denial of the being and providence of God or the Christian Religion, it is only when irreligion assumes the form of an insult to God and man, that the interference of the Criminal Law has taken place.

Profane cursing and swearing is made punishable by 19 G. 2 c. 21 which directs the offender to be fined 5s. 2s. or 1s. according as he is a gentleman, below the rank of gentleman or a common labourer, soldier, &c.

There have been laws against gambling since the reign of Henry 8th. They are amended from time to time to check the many ingenious inventions designed to evade them. Regarding gambling, swearing, and slavery there is probably practical unanimity. It is when we come to legislation on the liquor question and the Sunday question that we find serious conflict of opinion amongst thoughtful people.

Legislation regarding the liquor traffic begins in the reign of Edward 6th. Up to that date there had been free trade in intoxicants, but the policy of restriction was then adopted and has continued ever since. 5 and 6 Edward 6 c. 25 (1532) enacts that Justices of the Peace may put away common selling of ale and beer in ale-houses and tipling-houses, when they shall think meet and convenient, and none after 1st May next shall be suffered to keep any common ale-house but such as shall be thereunto admitted in open sessions by two justices, and the justices are to take bond against using unlawful games and for maintenance of order.

The next year another statute provides that no person shall sell wines in any town not corporate but by the license of the justices of the shire, and the number of such licenses is limited to forty in London, eight in York, and so on.

King James fifty years later follows with an act for the better repressing of ale-houses—"whereof the multitudes and abuses have been and are found intolerable, and still do and are like to increase." In the same session an act is passed for repressing "the odious and loathsome sin of drunkenness." It recites "Whereas the odious and loathsome sin of drunkenness is of late grown into common use within the realm being the root and foundation of many other enormous sins as blood-shed, stabbing, murder, swearing, &c., to the great dishonour of God and of our own nation, the overthrow of many good arts and manual trades, the disabling of divers workmen, the general impoverishment of many good subjects abusively wasting the good creatures of God."

And it enacts that every person "who shall be drunk" shall forfeit 5s.

There is a curious exception in this statute which may possess some academic interest.

It runs thus, "Provided always that this act or anything therein contained shall not be prejudicial to either of the two universities of this land, but that the chancellor, trustees and scholars, &c. may as fully use and enjoy all their jurisdictions, rights, privileges and charters as heretofore they might have done."

Seven years after, (1609) James returns to the subject in an act which recites that "notwithstanding all former laws and

provisions already made, the inordinate and extreme vice of excessive drinking and drunkenness doth more and more abound to the great offence of Almighty God and the wasteful destruction of God's good creatures." It then enacts that any ale-house keeper who violates the statutes regulating this trade shall for the space of three years be utterly disabled to keep such ale-house.

King James in 1623, and King Charles in 1625 pass other acts reiterating the former. In 1627 additional punishment is provided for him who keeps an ale-house without license.

In 1660 King Charles of joyous memory renews the license law as regards wines. No further legislation appears until 1753 (26 G. 2 c. 31) which recites that the laws concerning ale-houses are defective and insufficient for suppressing the abuses and disorders committed therein and for the conviction of persons selling without license and it requires the keeper of an ale-house to give bond with two sureties for the maintenance of good order in his house. No new license is to be granted without certificate that applicant is "of good fame and of sober life and conversation."

In 1774 Canada's first license law was passed by the British Parliament. It provided that for every license to sell liquor that should be granted by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Commander-in-Chief certain duty should be paid.

In 1793 the First Canadian Act is passed. "His Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Representatives of the people of the Province of Upper Canada in assembly met do most humbly beseech his Majesty that it may be enacted," and enacted it is, that an additional duty of 20s. be levied on all licenses for the retail of wines or spirituous liquors.

There had been previously an ordinance requiring a bond from the licensee to keep an orderly and decent house, and that is now re-enacted.

In 1819 the regulation of licenses was turned over to Justices of the Peace in Quarter Sessions.

In 1850 the power of fixing the number of taverns, beer shops, &c., is vested in the municipal authorities, and they are given power to limit the number. Under this act the Township of Darlington passed a by-law to prohibit the opening of any houses for the sale of liquors, but it was held that the municipality had only a power to regulate, not to prohibit.

The municipality step by step from that time forward has obtained complete control of the liquor traffic within it. In 1859 the amendment was made closing all licensed places from Saturday night to Monday morning. Then we have prohibition of sale to minors and apprentices, to weak-minded persons, to intoxicated persons. Scarcely a session of the legislature has passed since 1868, without an amendment tightening the restrictions.

Now drinking saloons have come to final end, and all municipalities have the right to establish prohibition within their own limits. But concurrently with this policy of restriction which has been so steadily pursued up to the present time there have been experiments in total prohibition by means of the statutes known as the Dunkin Act and the Scott Act, but in the majority of the localities where they have been tried, they have been subsequently repealed as unsatisfactory. What then is the lesson of history regarding legislation on this question? I think it is best summed up in the report of the Royal Commission on the Liquor Traffic. "The combined system of license and regulation which for centuries has been the rule of civilized nations should not be departed from." It has been said that the history of prohibitory legislation "is that of laws which are generally enacted rather from the high moral ends which they propose than from the sincere and settled judgment of the legislators, and which do not represent the average moral sentiment of the people." *XV. Enc. Britt.* 299.

The great moral progress which has been made in temperance is the result not so much of legislation as of the efforts of the moral reformer in teaching and inspiring self-control. It is here the great victories have been won and one great danger in prohibitory legislation is that it destroys the appeal to the spirit of self-restraint. Prohibition and persuasion will not go hand in hand.

The Royal Commissioners' report says "where prohibition has been adopted in many cases individual effort and the efforts of temperance organizations to promote sobriety have become less efficient." Temperance implies self-restraint and "self-restraint ends when coercion begins." This would seem to be inevitable, and when one considers the splendid achievements of Temperance reform in the past fifty years won by the appeal to

man's own higher moral nature, it is to be regretted that the methods which have proved so successful, have been to some extent dropped. Take this city e.g., in 1860 99 licensed places, to-day 32. For it is greatly to be feared that in abandoning the old weapons for the new the true law of progress is violated. The history of moral advance shows that there is in it a principle of unity and continuity of progress which cannot safely be ignored.

"Law is a thing to be discovered." More and more it has been found that the restriction of the liquor traffic is good and necessary, and legislation advances as discovery proceeds. It has been continuously progressive. Why not continue on this line? "The mills of God grind slowly." A wrong advance involves retreat, which is always more or less demoralizing.

Coming to legislation regarding the Lord's Day, different considerations arise. We are dealing not only with a question of morality but with an institution of the greatest antiquity. The fact of the Lord's Day being one of the great institutions of civilized society cannot be questioned. It is as much so as marriage, the family, liberty, property. As Dr. Goldwin Smith says, it is more than a law; it has become an article of human nature. This institution, so old that its origin is lost in antiquity, for the most part rests on its own impenetrable foundations, but the legislature has from time to time thought proper to guard its integrity against dangers which seemed to threaten it. The essence of the institution has always been rest from ordinary labour. That is the one explicit command in the first legal enactment to protect it of which we possess a record. The one definite thing in the Fourth commandment is "Thou shalt not do any work," and all the legislation which has been passed since Moses' time has aimed at the protection of this essential principle of the institution. Even the much-criticised Lord's Day Alliance of this Province in seeking legislation to-day is seeking this only.

How has legislation dealt with it? Prior to the Reformation, the Church regulated Sabbath observance, and Parliament did not interfere in regard to it. Edward the VI. and Elizabeth

tried to enforce Church attendance but that is subsequently abandoned.

Sunday travel is restricted by an Act of Charles I. and Charles II. passes a statute which in substance has been the law on this subject down to our own day, and the essence of it is that "no tradesman, artificier, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work of their ordinary callings on the Lord's Day. This is in 1677. Compare our own statute of 1897.

The aim of legislation then has continuously been to preserve the day of rest to every man, the most recent efforts are no exception. The last contest in the Ontario Legislature arose between the representatives of the Railway and Forwarding Corporations on the one hand, and on the other hand those who desire to obtain the insertion of the word 'corporation' in the Lord's Day Act. Corporations resist this strenuously. Lecky says it is always hazardous to argue from the character of the corporation to the character of the men who compose it. But the great question should be decided by the community at large. If it is wrong for individuals to work on Sunday is it right for corporations? What is a corporation? Any number of individuals not less than five who combine to carry on any business may form a corporation. If the corporations are not to be within the Lord's Day Act, then all men who want to work on Sunday may form themselves into corporations, the bakers, the butchers, the builders, the barbers, &c., and the law becomes a dead letter. The Lord's Day Alliance have been endeavouring to point this out and are asking the legislature to put the law once more where it has been in substance for thousands of years.

This is all they seek. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding and not a little misrepresentation of the facts in this matter, and it is important that they should be clearly understood. It has been said that every institution is a belief, and the belief of society about Sunday has been that one day in seven man should cease from the pursuits of the other days and try to realize his higher self. Wise men have said that the national greatness of England has come "because we have through many ages rested from our labours one day in seven." If this be true, then an institution of so great value, of such vital importance, must ever anew be guarded against all assaults upon its integrity.

If Sunday is an institution of human society handed down from a remote past, if it is "the corner stone of our civilization," it is also the birthright of every citizen, in the possession of which society should guard him for its own sake and his. But it is said that he may part with it for a sufficient consideration. This was doubtless Jacob's justification of his deal with Esau. But if society exists for the realization of the best life—if the highest interests of the whole community are concerned in the moral worth of the men who compose it, and if the Sabbath is necessary to the moral culture of man, then every man should have this day free. It is said that two millions of men in the United States have no Sunday—let us call it one million. If to-day in the United States one million of men have no Sunday, what about their families? What effect is this to have on the next generation? They must reap as we sow. What is the moral result for the community? What is the equivalent in Street railway stock of the solemn stillness of a Sabbath morning? What becomes of the "Cottar's Saturday night" when you take away the cottar's Sabbath?

But some one indignantly exclaims no one proposes to take away the cottar's Sabbath. No, you only propose to take away the engineer's, and the motorman's, and the shoveller's, and the factory hand's, and the new-boy's, and there is no poetry or sentiment about these people. Here again may be invoked the principle of the unity and continuity of tendency in moral progress—the integrity of moral progress. That which has been woven in the warp and woof of our highest life which has been handed down to us from the remotest past in all its integrity, which has done more than any other institution to make us men—do we owe it anything, or shall we let the first gang of corporate banditti in search of plunder despoil it.

It is said that in Canada we have the Puritan Sabbath. It has not come by any design or purpose of man. It is not the result of any legislation, the tide of tendencies has brought it hither. Along with it we have the new economic man. He is not a Sabbatarian, he is not the kind of man for whom the Sabbath was made. If he is allowed to dominate the community, all its interests will be subordinated to his dividends. He will rule us unless we firmly control him. He comes with soft speech

and pleads for the poor man, to be allowed to carry him on Sunday afternoon from the crowded city tenement to the fields and parks for fresh air, although the poor man answers that he has not the needful car-tickets and would therefore prefer to walk. Mr. Vanderbilt said a few years ago that his railway was not run in the interest of the 'dear public,' but to earn dividends. This was a perfectly accurate statement, and contains a universal truth as regards the new economic man. He is purely and solely a dividend-earning creature.

What ought to be done? The principle of the Sunday law which has stood for ages is cessation of daily toil. Sunday free from toil is the birthright of each citizen. A certain amount of necessary labour is unavoidable. If any modification of this law is to be made it should be made by the community, deliberately and consciously, and only on the initiative of the government of the day; certainly not in the interest, or at the instance, of any corporation. If a certain number of our fellow citizens are to lose their day of rest in the public interest let them be avowedly sacrificed to the public interest by the community. If a man gives up his Sunday for his fellow citizens at the call of duty, he is not morally injured, whereas if he does so for selfish gain it cannot but be otherwise. No corporation or organization of any kind should be allowed to exploit the day at its own will for its own purposes.

The conclusion arrived at in this paper is that the Lord's Day is the birth-right of every citizen in the possession of which he has the same claim to protection from society as for any other human right.

What has been the character of our legislation affecting morality?—The suppression of gambling, the restriction of the liquor traffic, the prohibition of Sunday work, the suppression of slavery. It does not suggest any attempt to make men moral by Act of Parliament. It does not touch the liberty of the individual apart from his relation to his fellow citizens and the state. It has regard to the promotion of good citizenship. It deals with man in his relation to the state. Even the statute which punishes a man for being innocently drunk does so on national grounds. But all the rest of the legislation may be shown to be by way of removing and restraining evils which are hindrances to

the best life of the citizen. One is surprised to find how little legislation there has been upon moral questions, and how moral progress has been allowed to make its way, unguided and untrammelled by the legislature.

On the other hand, what is the significance of the legislation that has taken place? What is all legislation? It is the expression of the will of the people, often imperfect and often mistaken and short-sighted, but building always better than it knows, for behind is the Divinity that shapes our ends.

“Law has always been the expression of social force. Whatever views men may have held as to the origin of those rules of conduct which they have felt themselves bound to follow, the force which has compelled their obedience has been the approval or disapproval of the community.” It has been said that the ordinary mortal is kept moral by the influence of his surroundings, by the standard of conduct in his set, by the fear of the public opinion, by reverence for the traditions of the past, and by the law of the land. In substance this again means the approval or disapproval of the community. It is when that sentiment of the community is sufficiently strong, active, and definite, that it takes shape in a law, and only then should it do so.

In a community like ours legislation which precedes, or forces, or anticipates, the governing moral sentiment of the people is a mistake. There must be as Westlake says, “A national persuasion or consciousness that a thing is not only morally right but jurally right and proper to be enforced by a man on his fellows.” This distinction is in danger of being overlooked. “Proper to be enforced by a man on his fellows”—Here the lawyer stops and makes way for the philosopher.

The philosopher who has spoken last on this subject, (Bosanquet) says, “No general principle will tell us how in particular to solve this subtle question apart from common sense and special experience.”

G. M. MACDONNELL.

A NEW POET AND A NEW PLAY.

MAN is by instinct a partisan, and usually extreme in his partisanship. Uncompromising judgments are apt to mark his opinions of all who do not agree with him. In literary criticism, as in other things, men take sides, and woe to him whose work bears not the marks of their standards. "This will never do," said Jeffrey of Wordsworth, a hundred years ago, and the critical spirit of the foremost critic of his time has been that of most of his successors. In praise and in blame alike, they are extravagant—hysterical flattery or absolute condemnation—for the most part there has been no middle course. True, Matthew Arnold did sound a protest, and honestly try to judge men and their works by the standard of the best things in literature rather than by any preconceived literary dogmas, but even he was too prone to include under the scornful name of Philistines all who saw not eye to eye with him.

So sure is the critic of the soundness of his judgment that he often gets into a trick of omniscience, and not content with assigning an author his place in his own age, is pleased to settle it for eternity. But omniscience in mortals is a doubtful quality, and time often leaves the critic sadly in the lurch. Who now reads Martin Tupper's "Proverbial Philosophy"? And yet, some thirty years ago, this work went into its fiftieth edition, and a leading critic said, "it will live as long as the English language;" while the *Spectator* assured its readers that "he has won for himself the vacant throne waiting for him among the immortals, and * * * * * has been adopted into the same rank with Wordsworth, Tennyson and Browning."

I hope a similar fate does not await England's latest literary lion, Stephen Phillips, but certainly the reviewers seem to have combined to praise him almost as Tupper was praised. Of his "Paolo and Francesca," the *Saturday Review* says, "It unquestionably places Mr. Phillips in the front rank of modern dramatists and of modern poets. It does more, it proclaims his kinship with the aristocrats of his art, with Sophocles and Dante. * * * * * He has given us a masterpiece of dramatic art, which has at once, the severe restraint of Sophoclean tragedy,

the plasticity, passion, and colour of our own romantic tragedy, a noble poem to brood over in the study, a dramatic spectacle which cannot fail to enthrall a popular audience and which would in mere stage effect, have done credit to the deftest of modern play-wrights. He has produced a work for which I have little doubt Mr. Alexander will have cause to thank him, and a work which would, I have as little doubt, have found favour with the judges who crowned the 'Antigone' and the 'Philoctetes.'

Such extravagant flattery, is surely the result of an emotional spasm which has momentarily paralysed the critic's sense of proportion. Before considering the play however, let us glance at some of poet's earlier work.

His chief interest is humanity, and certainly his work gives evidence that he has a natural gift for discerning the subtleties of character and reading the secrets of the soul. He loves, for instance, to pick out a face from the crowd on the streets of London and reveal the thoughts and emotions it but half conceals. Some of his efforts show the prentice hand, and while striking are not poetic, but his later work proves this to be merely the fault of youth. Indeed, the steady advance in the power and poetic quality of his work is its most promising characteristic. The tragedy of human life, and the faith which overcomes it, especially appeal to him and find expression in several poems, of which, perhaps, the finest is "The Wife," a gruesome but powerful tale. His two most ambitious efforts previous to "Paolo and Francesca," were "Christ in Hades" and "Marpessa." The former elaborates a striking conception of Christ's relation to man and the sorrow it involves for Him. There are several fine passages, notably that in which Prometheus foretells the sorrows of Christ. But the blank verse moves a bit stiffly as yet, and there is a certain lack of felicity in the working out of the idea.

"Marpessa" is a Greek Idyll, based on Marpessa's choice of a lover. Apollo and Idas are rivals for her hand, and she chooses the mortal. The form of the poem is evidently suggested by the famous passage in Tennyson's "Enone," describing the award of the apple of discord. The sentiments expressed, particularly Marpessa's reasons for her choice, are modern rather than Greek, but perhaps not more so than Athene's speech in

Tennyson. The imagery and setting are Greek, while the execution is always delicate, and often exquisite. The verse is flexible and musical, yet dignified—hardly the verse yet of 'Paolo and Francesca,'—but an immense advance on the earlier fragments.

There is a fine magic of style in Apollo's speech, which stirs the fancy; look for instance at the free mastery of rhythm in the following lines, and the large phrase, warm, ethereally imaginative like that of Keats:—

“ We two in heaven dancing,—Babylon
Shall flash and murmur, and cry from under us,
And Nineveh catch fire, and at our feet
Be hurled with her inhabitants, and all
Adoring Asia kindle and hugely bloom;—
We two in heaven running,—continents
Shall lighten, ocean unto ocean flash,
And rapidly laugh till all this world is warm.”

Idas' avowal of love is one of the finest passages in the book,—a few lines will serve to indicate the subtle suggestion and delicate phrasing which picture so finely to the imagination, the intangible charm of Marpessa.

“ Not for this only do I love thee, but
Because Infinity upon thee broods;
And thou art full of whispers and of shadows.
Thou meanest what the sea has striven to say
So long, and yearned up the cliffs to tell;
Thou art what all the winds have uttered not,
What the still night suggesteth to the heart.
Thy voice is like to music heard ere birth,
Some spirit lute touched on a spirit sea;
Thy face remembered is from other worlds,
It has been died for, though I know not when,
It has been sung of, though I know not where,
It has the strangeness of the luring West,
And of sad sea-horizons;”

Before passing to the tragedy, just one more quotation to illustrate another side of Mr. Phillips' talent. It is a love lyric, but in form it is the old lyric of the ciseleur school of France, the lyric of *Blaudelaire*, somewhat modified and perhaps enriched by the sentiment of the aesthetic school; it is deftly wrought though perhaps too dependent on that trick of iteration. There

is a touch of the same school in the sentiment too, a sick longing bred, I suspect, more of the fancy than the heart.

O to recall!

What to recall?

All the roses under snow?

Not these.

Stars that toward the water go?

Not these.

O to recall!

What to recall?

Not the greenness nor delight,

Not these;

Not the roses out of sight,

Not these.

O to recall!

What to recall?

All the greenness after rain?

Not this.

Joy that gleameth after pain?

Not this.

O to recall!

What to recall?

Not the star in waters red,

Not this:

Laughter of a girl that's dead,

O this!

'Paolo and Francesca' is a poetic tragedy in four acts written for the stage, at the request of Mr. Alexander, who is presenting it at his London theatre. It possesses the directness and simplicity necessary for successful stage production, is life-like in its action, and above all, has a clear, tragic plot-interest of sufficient depth and intensity to hold the attention and touch the sensibilities of the ordinary theatre audience. It is not a mere study play therefore. The theme is old, and yet ever new—it is that form of love which since the days of David and Bathsheba has offered perhaps the most fascinating inspiration to the poet and to the dramatist—the love for another man's wife.

Mr. Phillips is a bold man indeed to seek success with a subject to which Dante has given a setting for all time. It is the story of the lovers whose unhappy fate and lasting devotion so deeply touched the Italian poet. With his wonderful directness and brevity Dante tells their tale in a few lines.

“Love, that in gentle heart is quickly learnt,
 Entangled him by that fair form, from me
 Ta'en in such cruel sort, as grieves me still:
 Love, that denial takes from none beloved,
 Caught me with pleasing him so passing well,
 That, as thou seest, he yet deserts me not.
 Love brought us to one death: Caina waits
 The soul who spilt our life.”

cries Francesca, and then to the poet's eager questioning she answers

"One day,
 For our delight we read of Launcelot,
 How him love thrall'd. Oft-times by that reading
 Our eyes were drawn together, and the hue
 Fled from our alter'd cheek. But at one point
 Alone we fell. When of that smile we read,
 The wished smile so rapturously kiss'd
 By one so deep in love, then he, who ne'er
 From me shall separate, at once my lips
 All trembling kiss'd. The book and writer both
 Were love's purveyors. In its leaves that day
 We read no more."

Many others have tried the story, with but slight success. Mr. Phillips has chosen to treat it with the utmost simplicity, and throughout the play, there is a sense of calmly wielded power, of strength held in reserve which is admirable. The play opens abruptly, and from the first there is an atmosphere of impending tragedy which lends a sober background to the beauty of the action. The consciousness of fate grows upon one as the plot, swiftly and without unnecessary words, unfolds itself. One finds here the strong influence of Greek tragedy, so evident in the earlier volume. The dramatist never allows himself the pleasure of a poetic outburst, for the mere beauty of the poetry. Every speech springs from the action and is necessary for its development. On the other hand he does not bind himself by all the laws of classic drama. The influence of Shakespeare is evident in the lighter relief scenes, in the prose of the commonplace speeches and in the freedom and flexibility of the blank verse.

There are but four characters of much importance in the play:—Giovanni the stern warrior and ruler who would fain rest, but cannot, because

"Though I have sheathed the sword I am not tamed.
 What I have snared, in that I set my teeth
 And lose with agony; when hath the prey
 Writhed from our mastiff-fangs?"

and his younger brother, Paolo, the handsome young soldier of fortune whom Giovanni loves with all the warmth of a strong nature, confined for sentiment to this love alone.

"We are, Francesca,
 A something more than brothers—fiercest friends :

Concordia was our mother named, and ours
 Is but one heart, one honour, and one death."
 Then there is Francesca, pledge of peace between the tyrants
 of Rimini and Ravenna; a maid

"All dewy from her convent fetched,"
 a beautiful child who
 "— hath but wondered up at the white clouds;
 Hath just spread out her hands to the warm sun;
 Hath heard but gentle words and cloister sounds."

Lastly, there is Lucrezia, a childless widow, cousin to Giovanni,
 and hitherto his faithful house-keeper. She is a bitter, disappointed
 woman "Childless and husbandless, yet bitter-true."

The story is briefly this:—Giovanni, tyrant of Rimini, a
 famous soldier tiring of strife, makes peace with Ravenna, and to
 cement the alliance, arranges a marriage with Francesca, the
 young daughter of the Tyrant of Ravenna. Busy with affairs of
 State, he sends his younger brother Paolo to conduct his bride to
 her new home. It is the old story of Launcelot and Guinevere,
 each learns unconsciously to love the other. Paolo realises this,
 and true to his brother, seeks escape, on a pretext of war, but
 Giovanni demands that he remain and takes every opportunity
 of bringing the young pair together. *

"I'd have you two as dear now to each other
 As both of you to me."

They fight bravely their growing passion, but fate is against
 them. We feel that their struggle is vain and we love and pardon
 them, even as Giovanni did while he killed them.

The blank verse is handled with a flexibility and in the
 supreme moments with a nervous energy, that is most effective.

Gio. (Slowly releasing her arm.)
 Ah, gradual nature! let this thought come slow!
 Accustom me by merciful degrees
 To this idea, which henceforth is my home:
 I am strong—yet cannot in one moment think it.

Luc. (Softly.) You speak as in a trance.

Gio. Bring me not back!
 Like one that walks in sleep, if suddenly
 I wake, I die. (With a cry.) Paolo! Paolo!

Luc. Giovanni!

Gio.

Paolo! ah, no, not there!
 Not there, where only I was prone to love!
 Beautiful wast thou in the battle, boy!
 We came from the same womb, and we have slept
 Together in the moonbeams! I have grown
 So close to him, my very flesh doth tear!
 Why, why, Lucrezia, I have lifted him
 Over rough places—he was but a child,
 A child that put his hand in mine! I reel—
 My little Paolo! (He swoons off.)

The moulding of those opening lines and the psychological depth of passion they express are an evident reminiscences of the great master of dramatic language.

There are passages, of quieter beauty too, where we find the melody and tender grace which Tennyson first gave to blank verse.

Pao. (Reading.) "Now on that day it chanced that Launcelot,
 Thinking to find the King, found Guenevere
 Alone; and when he saw her whom he loved,
 Whom he had met too late, yet loved the more;
 Such was the tumult at his heart that he
 Could speak not, for her husband was his friend,
 His dear familiar friend: and they two held
 No secret from each other until now;

Several of the critics rank the play along with those of Shakespeare, but this is adulation run wild. "Paolo and Francesca" is an admirable work and of uncommon merit. It is, however, the work of a young man who while he promises great things must as yet confine himself within somewhat narrow limits both as regards dramatic movement and range of characterization. One misses, for instance, the wealth of close living characterization in Shakespeare. But four characters are at all carefully drawn; the rest are mere shadows. Then the plot is kept studiously free from those secondary intrigues and episodes which so add to the richness and interest of the older dramatist. Again, Shakespeare gives us not merely the plot, but a comprehensive picture of the time—its very life and thought, the questions and conflicts which then set men at variance. But here there is none of all that. The one deep ethical problem is sufficient, and fascinating enough it proves as the plot thickens.

Without foolishly belauding it, the play deserves the highest commendation. While filled with passages of rare power and beauty, it maintains throughout, a level excellence, that is exceedingly high. There is no bathos, and but little that is commonplace. The poet holds himself well in hand, never talks at the top of his voice and gives the impression always, of self control and power in reserve.

I know of few more moving passages, than the cry of the lonely Lucrezia.

“ My husband dead and childless left,
My thwarted woman-thoughts have inward turned,
And that vain milk like acid in me eats.
Have I not in my thought trained little feet
To venture, and taught little lips to move
Until they shaped the wonder of a word ?

* * * * *

I am a woman, and this very flesh
Demands its natural pangs, its rightful throes,
And I implore with vehemence these pains.
I know that children wound us, and surprise
Even to utter death, till we at last
Turn from a face to flowers : but this my heart
Was ready for these pangs, and had foreseen.
O ! but I grudge the mother her last look
Upon the cofined form—that pang is rich—
Envy the shivering cry when gravel falls.
And all these maimed wants and thwarted thoughts,
Eternal yearning, answered by the wind,
Have dried in me belief and love and fear.
I am become a danger and a menace,
A wandering fire, a disappointed force,
A peril—do you hear, Giovanni ?—O !
It is such souls as mine that go to swell
The childless cavern cry of the barren sea,
Or make that human ending to night-wind.

That is a true cry from a heart, sick with the yearning of a great desire unsatisfied. In contrast, note the lyrical swing and power of the picture of two souls in an ecstasy of satisfied love, defying alike human and divine vengeance. The passage indeed is a bold *absoluitur* pronounced by the young poet from the penalty

to which the stern justice of Dante dooms the pair in the Inferno.*

Pao. "What can we fear, we two?
 O God, Thou seest us Thy creatures bound
 Together by that law which holds the stars
 In palpitating cosmic passion bright;
 By which the very sun enthral's the earth,
 And all the waves of the world faint to the moon.
 Even by such attraction we two rush
 Together through the everlasting years.
 Us, then, whose only pain can be to part,
 How wilt Thou punish? For what ecstasy
 Together to be blown about the globe!
 What rapture in perpetual fire to burn
 Together!—where we are in endless fire.
 There centuries shall in a moment pass,
 And all the cycles in one hour elapse!
 Still, still together, even when faints Thy sun,
 And past our souls Thy stars like ashes fall,
 How wilt Thou punish us who cannot part?"

Franc. I lie out on your arm and say your name—
 "Paolo!" "Paolo!"

Pao. "Francesca!"

How those last broken sighings, of passionate delight melt upon the ear, and sink into the heart! He has a dainty touch in description too, this artist of the soul, and seems to have caught something of Dante's pregnant brevity, with a sweetness all his own.

Pao. "How fades the last
 Star to the East: a mystic breathing comes:
 And all the leaves once quivered, and were still.

Franc. It is the first, the faint stir of the dawn.

Pao. So still it is that we might almost hear
 The sigh of the sleepers in the world.

Franc. And all the rivers running to the sea."

The closing scene, has been criticised as too quiet and re-

*The stormy blast of hell
 With restless fury drives the spirits on,
 Whirl'd round and dashed amain with sore annoy.

strained after the intense passion immediately before, but here again, Mr. Phillips has preferred classical to more modern models, and the result justifies his decision. He scorns the factitious aid of the curtain at the supreme moment, and sinks to a quieter key at the close. After killing the lovers, Giovanni breaks into a wild frenzy but grows gradually calm and closes in a tone of sad reverie.

In his madness he calls in all the servants and sends some to bring in the bodies, then as he rushes wildly about, he cries :

“The curse, the curse of Cain !

A restlessness has come into my blood.

And I begin to wander from this hour

Alone for evermore.

Luc. (Rushing to him.) Giovanni, say
Quickly some light thing, lest we both go mad !

Gio. Be still ! A second wedding here begins,
And I would have all reverent and seemly :
For they were nobly born, and deep in love.

(Enter blind Angela, slowly.)

Ang. Will no one take my hand ? Two lately dead
Rushed past me in the air. O ! Are there not
Many within this room all standing still ?
What are they all expecting ?

Gio. Lead her aside :
I hear the slow pace of advancing feet.

(Enter servants bearing in Paolo and Francesca dead upon a
litter.)

Luc. Ah ! ah ! ah !

Gio. Break not out in lamentation !

(A pause.....The servants set down the litter.)

Luc. (Going to litter) I have borne one child, and she
has died in youth !

Gio. (Going to litter) Not easily have we three come to this—
We three who now are dead. Unwillingly
They loved, unwillingly I slew them. Now
I kiss them on the forehead quietly.

(He bends over the bodies and kisses them on the forehead. He
is shaken.)

Luc. What ails you now ?

Gio. She takes away my strength.

I did not know the dead could have such hair.

Hide them. They look like children fast asleep !

(The bodies are reverently covered over.)

E. R. PEACOCK.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Philosophical Theory of the State. By BERNARD BOSANQUET. London : Macmillan & Co. New York : The Macmillan Co. 1899.

This is the most recent, and on the whole the best, exposition of the idealistic conception of the State. It is described by the author as an application to the modern nation-state of the fundamental idea applied by Plato and Aristotle to the Greek city-state. Its main problem is the solution of the "paradox" of self-government, a problem which it seeks to solve without having recourse to such inadequate conceptions as "contract", "natural rights," etc. What will at once strike the reader is the sympathetic way in which the author interprets the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau, in whom he sees the working of a new and higher conception of society. Most writers, with the exception of Professor Ritchie in his admirable *Natural Rights* and the late Professor Wallace in his *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, have treated Rousseau as a pure individualist "in the worst sense of the term." Mr. Bosanquet shows conclusively how inadequate and misleading this view is. Perhaps one might even say that he has somewhat idealised Rousseau, a full treatment of whom demands an exhibition of the inadequacy of the ideas which he applies in explanation of the State, not less than insistence upon the essential truth of his conception of the "general will" as distinguished from the "will of all". Mr. Bosanquet, however, sins in the right direction: it is easy enough to show that the "state of nature" and the whole theory of a "social contract" are fictions; but, after all, what is of main importance is the new conception of society of which Rousseau was the half unconscious exponent.

The State, as Mr. Bosanquet contends, is not an aggregate of individuals, as Mill and others conceived of it: it is the true reality, because only in their union with one another are individ-

uals what their essential nature demands. Hence, when the individual sets up the claims of immediate desire against the demands of his true or social self, it is justifiable that he should be "forced to be free." The "force" upon which the State is based is the "force" of reason. This gives us the general law, that the State may, and indeed should, compel the individual to obey his "real will," as distinguished from what he immediately desires. The distinction is well brought out by a striking illustration of Mr. Bosanquet's. "Let us suppose that Themistocles had been beaten in the Athenian assembly when he proposed that, instead of dividing the revenue from the silver mines among all the citizens, they should devote this revenue annually to building a fleet—the fleet which fought at Salamis. It is easy to see that in such a case a relatively ideal end, demanding a certain self-denial, might appear less attractive to all the individuals—each keeping before himself his own separate share of profit—than the accustomed distribution of money. And if such a view had gained the day, history would never have told, and no free Europe would have existed to understand, by what decision the true general will and common interest of Athens might have transcended the aggregate private interests of all her citizens." (p. 115.)

Applying this principle, Mr. Bosanquet discusses, among other things, the limits of State interference and the system of rights and punishment. The former question is so much a matter of practical politics that no general rule can be laid down. Mr. Bosanquet is quite successful in showing that the danger of State interference does not lie in the intrusion of something originated by "others," as Mill supposes, but "in the intrusion, upon a growing unity of consciousness, of a medium hostile to its growth." But, while this is true, it does not seem to me that the author helps us very much in the solution of particular problems,—say, the proposed imposition of a Prohibitory Liquor Law—though it may perhaps be fairly argued that such a law is excluded on the principle that the use of force by the State is unjustifiable when it is hostile to the growth of the higher self-consciousness. This seems to me a much more defensible position than that which Mr. Bosanquet assigns, viz., that "the State is in its right when it forcibly hinders hindrance to the best life or common good." I doubt whether the Kantian distinction between *promotion* and *hindrance* of "the best life" can be consistently maintained. Is Prohibition, for example, positive or negative? An advocate of it may surely argue with a fair show of reason that, in removing the temptation to the vice of intoxication, the State would as much positively "promote" the "best life" as it does by removing the "hindrance" of ignorance

by education. The rehabilitation of this distinction between "promotion" and "hindrance" of the common good therefore seems to me unfortunate. Mr. Bosanquet would have done better to insist upon the principle that the State should not employ force, the only instrument at its command, when it would thereby endanger the "growing unity of consciousness."

Much more satisfactory is the discussion of the system of rights and of rewards and punishments though it may be doubted whether a more precise classification of criminals is not required. In general it may be said that the author is always instructive, and always able to give a reason for his beliefs. Every intelligent citizen ought to be familiar with a work of such force and comprehensiveness. He will not find in it a ready-made answer to all political problems, but he will find what is much better, the discussion of the principles by which those problems ought to be solved. Were one disposed to be over-critical, he might object to Mr. Bosanquet's view that political philosophy did not exist between the time of the Greek city-state and the rise of the modern nation-state. Is such a work as Dante's *De Monarchia* or Machiavelli's *Prince* to be ruled out? Or does Mr. Bosanquet assume that the "nation state" is the ultimate unit? This assumption would hardly be admitted by the modern Imperial Federationist, or even by those who believe in the English Empire in any form.

JOHN WATSON.

The Old Faith and the New Philosophy. By G. J. Low, D.D., Canon of Christ Church Cathedral, Ottawa, and Rector of Trinity Church, Billings' Bridge. Toronto; William Briggs, 1900.

It is a pleasure to find attempts being made in Canada to render the old faith consonant with new thought and knowledge. Dr. Low is to be congratulated on bearing a part in such efforts, and on the markedly progressive spirit he evidences. These efforts are not a day too soon. Principal Grant furnishes an admirable Introduction, in which he has wise words to say of needless breaks with the past, as well as of blind unthinking adherence to past phrase and precedent. Everyone will cordially endorse his sentiment that there should be "the utmost freedom for scholarship and thought," godliness with "brotherly kindness and mutual trust."

Dr. Low's work suffers from being addresses to the clergy, rather than the work of a theological thinker, cleaving out a path for his own thought through untraversed regions. But it has the compensation that it will be more widely read in its present form. It appears to me that Dr. Low would have made his work

yet more serviceable and effective, if he had cast the New Philosophy into relation with the Old Faith, as that faith existed half a century ago, and not in the days of the Nicene Creed. Men are not in these days drawn to the abstract and metaphysical Nicene symbols. We do not believe in the "Voicelessness" of the Church in any sense which would make Dr. Low's procedure in going back to the Nicene Creed necessary, and indeed we are glad to find that Dr. Low practically pursues this more excellent way, at least to a large extent. In his Introductory Chapter one is surprised to find certain relevant and helpful works omitted from those recommended. Here, too, many will not agree with Canon Low's saying that Drummond's phrase about Natural Law projecting itself into the Spiritual World is a "happy" one: we should sooner speak of Spiritual Law projecting itself into the Natural World. The second Chapter—on the Trinity—exhibits more power, and deals with points difficult as they are interesting. Dr. Low devotes himself mainly to Nature and God, content to remark the littleness of man before the vastness of Nature. Now it seems to me that Dr. Low would have realized more of the reconciler's function here, had he adopted another method. If, in the triad—Nature, Man, and God—he had taken Man as the crown and terminal fact of creation, he might have found him such a real moral personality as would have needed a correlative in God, the Infinite Moral Personality. Even Pascal was able to do for us here what neither Huxley nor Spencer has done—and what neither of them has undone—in bringing out the superiority of man, as "thinking reed," to the material universe. He could thus have shewn how the Theist accepts the Absolute of Spencer, and proceeds, on rational and spiritual grounds, to interpret it in terms of that Infinite Personality whom men call God. The analogies to the Trinity and the Holy Ghost which Dr. Low draws, in very clear and expressive form, from the scientific armoury, will have their effective force variously estimated by different minds, even though no one doubts the analogy between revealed religion and the constitution of Nature.

The first part of Chapter four—on The Person of Christ—would have had increased cogency and force, had Dr. Low concentrated attention more on shewing how the Incarnate Lord is the goal and culmination of all the world's antecedent processes of history and creation, and how this Divine Person is of cosmical significance. The second part of the chapter—on The Work of Christ—contains many needed correctives to current modes of presentation. But why should Dr. Low be here found "simply reverting" to Greek thought "back of a Latinized Christianity?" No doubt, writers like Prof. Allen and Bishop

Westcott encourage this attitude, but it is quite indefensible. Greek thought could not be such a resting place; it is too ill-defined and vague for that; Latinized Christianity had its own necessary work to do; we have more to do than "simply revert" to one or other of these: the true task of theology clearly is, to make a spiritual synthesis which shall in the deepest way take up into itself the truest elements in both.

It is really in compliment to Dr. Low's work that we have indicated some of the respects in which it could be made yet more effective. For, the reconstructive efforts of to-day carry, in our view, a prime value and significance, and must therefore be done in the best and strongest manner possible—a task always difficult of accomplishment. We hope Dr. Low's work will be widely read, and that he will give us work still more mature.

JAMES LINDSAY.

EARLY RECORDS OF ONTARIO.

(Continued from January number.)

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN
23RD JAN. 1798.

Present :—R. Cartwright, J. ———, P. VanAlstine, A. Spencer, J. W. Myers, A. Fisher, T. Dorland, C. Gilbert, J. Miller, P. Smith.

Henry Spencer of Richmond is appointed to seal measures.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that the sum of Eighteen Pounds be levied by assessment from the Counties of Lenox, Hastings and Northumberland, for Member's wages.

MONDAY, 19TH MARCH, 1798, AT A SPECIAL SESSIONS.

Present :—R. Cartwright, Thos. Markland, Wm. Atkinson, Esqrs.

[Apportionment of work to road overseers.]

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON, TUESDAY
THE 24TH APRIL, 1798.

Present :—R. Cartwright, Wm. Atkinson, R. Clark, Alex Fisher, T. Markland, D. Wright.

The Commission of the Peace was openly read. The Sheriff returned the Precept. The Grand Jury was called and sworn.

Robt. McCawlay, foreman, J. Cumming, Wm. Robins, T. Fraser, N. Briscoe, Wm. Fairfield Jun'r, M. Hawley, J. Miller,

F. Hugh, I. Hawley, G. Carscallen, J. Williams, J. Sharpe, C. Park, E. Phillip, W. Bell.

APRIL 26.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that a full [rate] be levied from the Midland District for the year 1798.

It is ordered that in future the salary of the Gaoler shall be £25 annually.

The Sheriff paid the fines of Micajah Purdy, and Barnabas Hough, Constables for non-attendance, eight dollars.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that the sum of Twelve Pounds Four Shillings and Tenpence Half-penny, be paid to the Sheriff of the Midland District.

That the sum of Fifteen Pounds be allowed to Allan McLean Clerk of the Peace.

That the sum of 13 Shillings be allowed to the town clerk of Fredericksburgh, Wm. Bell.

That the sum of 15 Shillings be allowed to the town clerk of Kingston, Jos. Pritchard.

That the sum of Ten Shillings be allowed the town clerk of Adolphus Town.

[Various other sums for objects not specified.]

Constables to serve for the year 1798 to April 1st, 1799.

[List similar to those already given.]

In pursuance of the statute a Jury was called to ascertain the value and damage done to Jno. Hart by altering and making a road through his improved ground.

Jury called and sworn.

The Court, having heard the evidence, charged the jury.

The Jury withdrew to consider of their verdict, and, having returned into Court, by their foreman Nicholas Amy, find the sum of Five Pounds due to John Hart in consequence of the alteration of the road through his improved ground.¹

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN,
JULY 10TH, 1798.

¹ By section IV. of 33rd Geo. III., Cap. IV., provision was made for the alteration of roads, where the necessity for it is sworn to by the majority of a jury of twelve principal freeholders of the District, summoned on the warrant of two Justices. Section VII of the same Act provides for the making of recompense to the owners of enclosed or improved lands, through which the altered road may pass. The Road Commissioners are authorized to agree with the owners as to the amount of recompense to be made, and in case they are unable to agree, the matter is to be referred to a jury of twelve persons empaneled in the usual manner.

Magistrates present:—A. Fisher, J. Miller, P. Smith, T. Dorland, P. VanAlstine, B. Crawford, A. Chisholm.

[Grand Jury sworn as usual.]

On application of Slight Sage, he is permitted by the Magistrates in session to keep a ferry across the river Nappane.

Foot passengers to pay 3d.

Horse and man 7d.

On application of John Smith he is permitted to keep a ferry from Murray at

8d. for a man and horse.

4d. for a foot passenger¹

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON, 9TH OCT. 1798.

Present:—R. Cartwright, T. Markland, A. Fisher, Wm. Atkinson.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in session that the sum of twenty-eight pounds ten shillings be allowed to Mr. David M. Rogers for his wages as member for the County of Prince Edward and part of the County of Lenox.

A warrant issued to Mr. John Cannon high Constable for ditto.

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HOLDEN AT ADOLPHUS TOWN,
22ND JANUARY, 1799.

Present:—A. Fisher, B. Crawford, A. Chisholm, J. W. Myers, S. Sherwood, J. Embury, J. Stinson, Jr, P. VanAlstine, A. Clarke, R. Clarke, A. Spencer, T. Thomson, D. Wright.

[A large docket disposed of during three days.]

AT A SPECIAL SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON, 25TH MARCH, 1799.

Present:—Richard Cartwright, Thomas Markland, Esqs.

[Apportionment of roads for overseers.]

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON THE
23D APRIL, 1799.

Magistrates present:—R. Cartwright, A. Fisher, T. Thomson, Wm. Atkinson, Thos. Markland.

On application of James Cannon, a bound apprentice to

¹ Up to 1797 no regulation had been made as to ferries, which in a region like that of the Midland District were necessarily numerous. In that year, however, an Act was passed (37th Geo. III. Cap. X) which authorized the Justices in Quarter Sessions to make and ordain such rules and regulations as should be deemed necessary and proper to be observed by persons keeping ferries, and also to establish and assess the rates or fees to be taken for ferrying. A table of these fees was to be posted up at the ferrying place, and penalties were appointed for overcharging.

Emmerson Busby a hatter of the town of Kingston, praying to be discharged from his indenture for want of sufficient food, and that he is employed as a servant and not at the trade of a hatter.

Mr. Peters counsel for James Cannon.

It appearing to the Magistrates in session that no regular process had issued from the Court, they could not take cognizance of the complaint until the opposite party had notice. But Mr. Hagerman as Counsel for Emmerson Busby, undertaking that he should be present to-morrow, the Magistrates did not issue any process to bring the said Emmerson Busby before them in session.

WEDNESDAY, 24TH.

James Cannon appeared.

Emmerson Busby appeared to answer to the complaint of the said James Cannon, and having proved nothing whereby to clear himself of the said complaint, but, on the contrary, the said James Cannon having given full proof of the truth of the said complaint to the satisfaction of the said Court. We, therefore, whose hands and seals are hereunto set, being four of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the Midland District in Sessions assembled, do order, pronounce and declare that the said apprentice shall be, and is hereby discharged and freed from the said apprenticeship, because it appears in evidence that the said apprentice has been employed by his said master Emmerson Busby rather as domestic drudge than in learning his trade, and further because he does [not] appear to have been provided with sufficient food.

And this is to be a final order betwixt the said master and apprentice, anything contained in their indentures of apprenticeship otherwise to the contrary notwithstanding.

Given under our hands and seals at Kingston, 24th April,
1799

R. Cartwright,

W. Atkinson,

T. Markland,

T. Thomas.¹

It is ordered by the Magistrates in sessions that a full rate be levied for the year 1799.

¹ The authority for this action of the Justices was derived directly from the famous Statute of Labourers, 5th Eliz. Cap. IV. Section 35, which provides that on complaint being made to a Justice of the Peace by an apprentice, against his master, the master may be required to appear at the next Sessions of the Peace; "And up on

25TH.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in sessions that the following sums be paid by the Treasurer of the District :

James Williams	-	-	-	-	-	£3	9	5d.
William Coffin	-	-	-	-	-	1	16	0
Town Clerk County of Addington and Ontario						15	0	
John Cannon	-	-	-	-	-	29	17	3
M. McLean	-	-	-	-	-	15	0	0
David Williams	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	3
Jos. Anderson	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	4
John Cummings to T. Ferguson, Jun.						8	0	1½
D. Plumm	-	-	-	-	-	2	18	0
Thos. Markland	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	0
Robt. Clark	-	-	-	-	-	1	15	0
N. Hagerman	-	-	-	-	-	10	0	0
Leonard Soper	-	-	-	-	-	6	8	0

Constables chosen for the Townships for the ensuing year.
[List follows.]

THE COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN,
THE 9TH JULY, 1799.

Present :—Alex. Fisher, B. Crawford, J. Miller, T. Dorland, J. Peters, J. W. Myers.

[At this session one of the Magistrates, J. W. Myers, defendant in a case, apparently of assault and battery, is found guilty and fined five pounds.]

It is ordered by the Magistrates in sessions that the sum of Fifteen Pounds be levied from the County of Frontenac for member's wages for the year 1797.

[The same sum is levied for 1798, and twenty pounds for 1799, from the County of Frontenac for member's wages.]

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON, 8TH OCT. 1799.

Magistrates Present :—R. Cartwright, A. Fisher, T. Mark- his appearance and hearing of the matter before the said justices, or the said mayor or other head officer, if it be thought meet unto them to discharge the said apprentice of his apprenticeship, that then the said justices, or four of them at the least, whereof one to be of the quorum ; or the said mayor or other head officer, with the assent of three of his brethren, or men of best reputation within the said city, town corporate or market-town, shall have power by authority hereof, in writing under their hands and seals, to pronounce and declare, That they have discharged the said apprentice of his apprenticeship, and the cause thereof."

It will be observed that the decision given strictly follows the requirements of this act.

land, T. Thomson, W. Atkinson.

The Magistrates fine James Jackson for non-attendance as a Constable, Twenty Shillings.

COURT HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN, 28TH JANUARY, 1800.

SPECIAL SESSIONS, 24TH MARCH, 1800. [KINGSTON.]

Present:—R. Cartwright, Thos. Markland, Wm. Atkinson.
[Receiving accounts of Road Overseers and assigning work.]

COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS, HELD AT KINGSTON,

22ND APRIL, 1800

Magistrates present:—R. Cartwright, T. Dorland, W. Atkinson, T. Markland, D. Wright, Alex. Clarke. D. Fraser, J. Miller, T. Thomson, J. Booth.

23rd. It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that three-fourths of a rate be levied from the Midland District for the year 1800.

It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that a sum not exceeding forty-pounds, be paid by the Treasurer of the Midland District to M. Dorland, M. Fisher, and Peter VanAlstine, Esquires for the use of the Court House in Adolphus Town.

24th. It is ordered that the following sums be paid to the undermentioned persons :

Thomas Markland - - - - -	£61	4	1¼
Titus Fitch - - - - -		12	0
Wm. Ashley - - - - -		18	0
Town Wardens, Kingston - - - - -	23	4	9
John Cannon - - - - -	2	0	0
Geo. Barns - - - - -	1	16	2
John Cannon - - - - -	31	10	0
Town Wardens, Sydney - - - - -	5	0	0
Clerk of the Peace - - - - -	15	0	0
Wm. Coffin - - - - -	1	12	0
R. Cartwright - - - - -	38	3	3½
Town Clerk, County of Addington - - - - -	15	0	
“ Marysburgh - - - - -	10	0	
“ Fredericksburgh - - - - -	15	0	
“ Adolphus Town - - - - -	10	0	
“ Kingston and Pittsburgh - - - - -	15	0	
“ Richmond - - - - -	10	0	
Town Wardens, Marysburgh - - - - -	17	9	3

Mr. John Cannon, high Constable for the year ensuing.

[List of township Constables follows.]

COURT OF GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE FOR THE
MIDLAND DISTRICT, HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN ON
TUESDAY, THE 8TH OF JULY, 1800.

Present :—Alex. Fisher, T. Dorland, C. Gilbert, A. Clarke,
J. Miller, D. Wright, A. Spencer, J. Embury.

[Long list of cases of assault and battery disposed of.]

JULY 10TH.

On application of Mr. Robert McDowall, a Presbyterian minister, a certificate was given him agreeably to the act of the Province.¹

COURT OF GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE FOR
THE MIDLAND DISTRICT, HELD AT KINGSTON ON
14TH OCT. 1800.

Present :—Richd Cartwright Esq Chairman, Alex. Fisher,
Alex. Clarke, J. Cumming, Arch. McDonell, T. Markland, P.
Smith. 15th. It is ordered by the Magistrates in sessions that
the sum of twenty-three pounds ten shillings be levied from the

¹ The question as to the form of a legal marriage was one which agitated the Province of Upper Canada from its first settlement. There being no clergymen in the western districts in the earlier days of their history, marriages commonly took place before one or another of the military officers at the various posts. But among the poorer settlers, or those at a considerable distance from the posts, the parties to the marriage sometimes dispensed with any ceremony, and simply "took each other's word for it," as one of them put it. Where, however, any question arose as to the inheriting of property by the children of the early settlers, no marriages but those solemnized by clergymen of the English and Roman Catholic Churches were regarded as legal. (See a Report on the Marriage Law in Upper Canada by Richard Cartwright, Jr., given in full in the Canadian Archives Report for 1891, p. 85.) In order to remedy this hardship, there was introduced in the first session of the first parliament of Upper Canada, a bill to legalize past marriages and make more liberal provision for the future. But Simcoe, regarding the English Church establishment as indispensable in securing the dependence of the colonies on the mother country, strongly opposed the measure. The result was that a compromise act was passed in the following session, 33rd Geo. III Cap. V. This rendered legal all marriages solemnized, according to the forms of the Church of England, by Justices of the Peace, where no clergyman of the Church of England was available within eighteen miles. All dissenting ministers, however, were denied the right to perform legal marriages until 1798, when the act, 38th Geo. III Cap. IV, was passed. In virtue of this act, ministers of the Church of Scotland and Lutheran and Calvinist ministers were allowed to solemnize legal marriages on certain conditions. They were required to appear before at least six Justices in Quarter Sessions, take the oath of allegiance, be vouched for by at least seven respectable persons of their congregations, and pay a fee of 5s. to the Clerk of the Peace, when they received a prescribed certificate or licence giving them the necessary authority. The act also rendered valid all previous marriages performed by such ministers. The Rev. Robert McDowall, here referred to, was the first Presbyterian minister in the district. His marriage register is preserved in the Library of Queen's University.

Counties of Lenox, Hastings and Northumberland for members wages for the year 1800.

AT THE COURT OF GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE,
HELD AT ADOLPHUS TOWN ON THE TWENTY SEVENTH
DAY OF JANUARY, 1801.

Present :—Alex. Fisher Esq Chairman, Thos. Dorland, A. Clark, J. Stinson, J. Cumming, J. Miller, J. Peters, B. Crawford, P. Smith.

A Licence from the Sessions was given to Mr. John G. Wigant, authorizing him to be a Lutheran Minister at the recommendation of William Beunier, Martin Fraleigh, Michael Smith, Jonas Amy, Ludovick Hartman, Conrad Borgand, Charles Keller.¹

28th Jan. It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that the sum of fifteen pounds ten shillings be levied from the inhabitants of the County of Frontenac for Edward Jessup, Esq for Member's wages for the year 1800.

[Eleven pounds levied from same County for same member for year 1799.]

It is ordered by the Magistrates in Sessions that the sum of Twenty-three pounds ten shillings be allowed to William Fairfield Esq for the County of Addington and Ontario for the year 1800.

[Twenty-two pounds from same Counties for same member, apparently for 1799.]

SPECIAL SESSIONS HELD AT KINGSTON, 30TH MARCH, 1801.

Magistrates Present :—R. Cartwright, T. Markland, P. Smith, Esqs.

The Road Masters were called upon to produce their accounts for the year 1800.

[Accounts follow and sections are assigned for following year.]

COURT OF GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE, HELD AT
KINGSTON THE 28TH OF APRIL, 1801.

Magistrates Present :—Richard Cartwright, Esq., Chairman, Alex. Fisher, Thos. Markland, Wm. Atkinson, Thos. Dorland, Caleb Gilbert, Bryan Crawford, Joshua Booth, John Cumming, Dan'l Wright, John W. Myers.

¹ See previous note. The names of seven persons required to testify to the minister's position are here given.

ALUMNI CONFERENCE—FEBRUARY 1901.

MONDAY.

- 3 p.m.—Interpretation of Modern Life by Tennyson. Rev. Armstrong Black.
4 p.m.—The Age of St Augustine. Prof. Glover.
8 p.m.—The Relation of Legislation and Morality. Professor Shortt, W. S. Morden, LL.B., J. R. Lavell, B.A., Rev. M. Macgillivray, M.A.

TUESDAY.

- 10 a.m.—The Chancellor's Lectureship. Dr. Watson. Subject, St. Augustine.
11-1—Persian Influence on Judaism. Rev. R. J. Hutcheon, M.A. Discussion opened by N. R. Carmichael, M.A., and Rev. M. Macgillivray, M.A.
3 p.m.—The Method of St. Paul's teaching. Discussion opened by Rev. R. Laird, M.A., W. N. Anderson, B.A., and Rev. Dr. Eby.
8 p.m.—The Function of Journalism in a democracy. J. G. Willison, J. G. Elliott, Rev. J. A. McDonald, John Marshall and the Principal.

WEDNESDAY.

- 10 a.m.—The Chancellor's Lectureship.
11-1—The Book of Ecclesiastes. Rev. Dr. Milligan. Discussion opened by Rev. J. A. Grant, B.A.
3 p.m.—Interpretation of Modern Life by Tennyson. Rev. Armstrong Black.
4 p.m.—The Book of Jonah. Rev. N. McPherson, B.D., and J. Young, M.A.
8 p.m.—Life, Organism, Environment. Rev. Dr. Lyle. Discussion opened by Prof. Knight, Dr. Clarke and Rev. J. Millar, M.A.

THURSDAY.

- 10 a.m.—The Chancellor's Lectureship.
11-1—The Maccabean Epoch and its Literature. T. A. Cosgrove, B.A. The Book of Daniel. W. W. Peck, LL.B.
3-5 p.m.—The Substance of St. Paul's Teaching. Discussion by Prof. McNaughton, Revs. S. G. Bland, J. Binnie, M.A., E. Thomas, B.A., and D. Strachan, B.A.
8 p.m.—Amos, the Desert Prophet. Prof. McFayden, B.A. Discussion opened by Prof. Jordan.

FRIDAY.

- 10 a.m.—The Chancellor's Lectureship.
11-1—The Literature of the 1st Century B.C. By Revs. J. Turnbull, M.A., and John Hay, B.D.
3 p.m.—What does the Documentary theory of the Pentateuch mean. Prof. Jordan.
4 p.m.—Students Meeting.
8 p.m.—Lecture on "The National Outlook." By Dr. Parkin, C.M.G.

SATURDAY.

- 11 a.m.—Meeting of the Alumni. Arrangement for the year following, etc.

CURRENT EVENTS.

IT is said that the difficulty of knowing the real mind of a woman is that she herself does not know it; but what is the depth of a woman's mind compared to that of a nation, especially if the nation be racially heterogeneous and scattered over half a continent! No wonder that for a time Canada was but dimly conscious of her own deepest thoughts and feelings. Annexation, plausibly disguised as "Manifest Destiny," or "the Continent to which we belong" theory, secession, attractively termed "Independence," commercial union, or a liaison which combined political allegiance to the Queen with trade subjection to rings at Washington, were advocated by seductive voices, all asserting too that the defenders of Imperial unity were quite as revolutionary as themselves. They certainly made as much noise and seemed to have as large a following. But, as in a great assembly, where different motions are submitted with each supported by two or three eloquent speakers, it seems to onlookers in the gallery as if the house were equally divided until the vote is called for, when perhaps half a dozen hands are held up for the amendments and thousands as silently for the main motion, and the strife of tongues at once subsides, so has it been in Canada. The Empire was insolently threatened; its territories were invaded at 48 hours notice; and almost as quickly, in an informal but none the less real way, there was a vote which declared the mind of Greater Britain so unmistakably that there remains now no doubt on the subject. As a people, Canadians reject, for ever, suicide, secession, and liaisons. We abide by our history and our Constitution; our flag, our Queen, and our world-wide Empire with its mission of liberty, justice and peace, each and all so precious that we must be ready to fight for each and all. On this occasion, we have given for the common cause two or three millions of money, and including the Strathcona horse and the Halifax and Esquimalt garisons—about four thousand men. Had there been need we would have given both men and money ten times over. Our population is as great as England's was in the days of Elizabeth, and far greater than Scotland's in the age of Wallace and Bruce. All the world knows the great things our fathers did then, and their children are not likely to forget. It always "pays," in a far higher than the vulgar sense of the word, to make sacrifices for national life or the honour without which life is not worth living.

But what of the attitude of the French-speaking section of our population, it is asked? On the whole, it has been admirable; but to understand it, one must understand them and their position. 'Put yourself in his place,' is always a righteous demand. Well, suppose that Canada belonged to France and not to Britain; that one Province was British and had been British for two centuries

The attitude of
French-speaking
Canadians.

before French settlers came to the country, and that the other six Provinces were French; would that one Province shout enthusiastically and give its children and its wealth lavishly for the glory of France, were France engaged in a distant war, on the merits of which our own Mother Country and the rest of the world were—to say the least—by no means clear? Not a bit of it. No one would expect anything so unreasonable from us. And, if a mob tried to ram the flag of France down our throats, it would not increase our love for that flag to any great extent. In such a case, we would jealously guard every constitutional right we had won. We would be true to the Sovereign to whom we had sworn allegiance, but above all we would be true to the Country which our forefathers had made and in the soil of which their ashes reposed. In time, doubtless, we would fuse with the new and more numerous Canadians and become one people with them; but they would need to have great patience with us and win our affections by legitimate means if they wished to bring about such a consummation. Could we, little more than half a century after we had fought for political rights, be expected to say more than Mr. Monet said the other day?—"I am a Canadian; I am not French, I am not English, but I am Canadian, loving this country because it is the land of our forefathers, who were Canadians, and I will defend inch by inch the bulwark of our political freedom?" Would not some of us rise and say with Mr. Bourassa;—"We have a written Constitution, and that Constitution is not only the legal form of our Government, it is also a solemn and sacred compact between the various Provinces of British North America. It may of course need reforms and additions. But when amendment is required, it will be made only by the free and independent action of both the Canadian and the British Parliaments and approved by the people of Canada." And if our Premier happened to be a man who raised every discussion in which he took part to a higher level, and who had given his whole political life to the promotion of unity, harmony and amity between the diverse elements of the country, what would we think of partisans who sought to excite prejudice against him in the other Provinces on the grounds of his being British and Protestant? Is it necessary to point the moral of the parallel which I have attempted to suggest?

It is well to get at your opponent's point of view, and quite necessary when he is worth converting; but it is difficult to arrive at intellectual sympathy with professed and protectionist lovers of Imperial unity who yet vote against the preferential tariff in favour of Britain. They say that it is a fraud, but how can that be if two is less than three? Both parties declare that as the Canadian manufacturer can not stand on the basis of free trade with Britain, he must have for a time the protection of a fence against all outsiders.

Tariff Preference
in favour of
Britain.

But, say some of our friends, the Government first made the fence higher and then lowered it in favour of Britain. Even if that were so, it proves nothing against the reality of the preference. Suppose they had made it 100 yards high, it was still only $87\frac{1}{2}$ against the British manufacturer, then only 75, and hereafter it will be only $66\frac{2}{3}$. It would be precisely the same if the fence were 100 miles high. The Canadian manufacturer having been encouraged to go into business has his rights; and the first of these is that the lowering of the fence must be gradual. As all admit that, how can it be said, even by people whose powers of counting are limited to their five fingers, that three and two are the same? What increases the difficulty of appreciating their position is that they contend that a preference in our favour by Britain of even one-fourth as much would be a wonderful boon. In a word, figures mean something on one side of the Atlantic and nothing on the other side. There is no sentiment in trade, says Dr. Montague. Certainly not, echoes Mr. Bourassa, and he stands up and votes with the ex-Cabinet minister. But the Quebecker adds, there should be no sentiment in voting away public money or in sending off our sons to a more distant and sterner fight than that of trade. Canada for Canadians alone, so far as trade is concerned, cries the Ontarian. Canada for Canadians alone, all through the piece, pleads the Quebecker.—Neither cry is worth a cent, but there can be no doubt which is consistent. Mr. Fielding is to be congratulated that the state of the revenue enabled him to make the duties on British goods lower; but as the previous lowering had increased the revenue, he should have held his old tone instead of hinting that he is weary in well-doing. "I do not think," he gently hints, "that the advocates of tariff revision would ask us to go, on that class of articles, below the rates we have now named," that is $23\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Will they not? We shall see. But, after all, it was perhaps necessary for him to throw a tub to the whale, and everything depends on what is meant by "a reasonable time in the future." $12\frac{1}{2}$ in 1897, and 25 in 1898, and $33\frac{1}{2}$ in 1900, and 40 in 1902, would that be "reasonable?" One point is clear, we are travelling on the only track by which a mutual preference will ever be reached. For, whether there is sentiment in trade or not, there is sentiment, lots of it and the best kind, in John Bull. And it will be wiser for us to trust to it than to worry and disgust the old gentleman by insisting that he shall turn his vast business topsy-turvy on the preposterous pretence of a possible slight increase in the 3 per cent. of it that he does with us. In dealing with a somewhat irascible multi-millionaire, it is at least prudent to press along the line of least resistance, instead of butting against the old stone walls he prides himself on possessing, he alone too of all the nations of the earth.

The admission of our securities into the rigidly guarded trustee list is a significant proof of the changed attitude of the British mind regarding Canada. We are no longer a Colony. We have taken our stand as a partner. Ever since Imperial Federation was talked of, Australian and Canadian Commissioners have pleaded that trustees should be entitled by law to invest in Colonial securities, but they were always met with a curt "*Non possumus.*" Now, the apparently insurmountable obstacles have vanished, and legislation is to be passed which will put our loans on almost the same footing as British consols. To a country which has to borrow a hundred millions in the course of the next ten years and will have to continue borrowing for an indefinite time, the value of this boon is enormous in itself, and as regards our general credit, while it is gratifying to our national self-respect. It is another illustration of the readiness with which sensible John Bull responds to deeds, and the little heed he pays to words. No doubt, Australia will receive the same privilege, when the Imperial Act to be passed this year constitutes it "The Commonwealth of Australia," in place of the old "Colonies" of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. West Australia seems disposed to remain outside for a short time, and New Zealand is strong enough to stand by itself and is in fact a separate Confederation, with a virile life of its own. It is the Great Britain and Australia the Europe of the Southern Seas.

Another General, and this time a man of distinguished ability, obliged to leave the service of Canada, because party insisted on extending the spoils system to the Militia, even amid the stern realities of war! It was known for some time that friction existed between the General and his Minister; but in view of the high qualities of the former and his boundless energy, people hoped that they might be able to work together as long as the war lasted. At such a time as this, the British Government might have been spared our domestic quarrels and Canada might have been allowed to retain the best General the Militia has ever had. With us the General holds the same position as the Commander-in-Chief at the War Office in London, and he, though subordinate to the civilian Secretary of State for War and the Cabinet, is responsible for the maintenance of discipline and for all appointments. Here, however, party claims everything, and against that, as a rule neither service nor fitness counts. The General is only an "adviser," and that is interpreted to mean receiving instead of giving advice. If he declines to take advice, which in his judgment is bad, regarding appointments or other matters, and throws the responsibility on the Minister of Militia, he is declared "insubordinate." This system, bad in any Department and shocking where the lives of men are

General Hutton
and the Minister
of Militia.

concerned, has the sanction of the present and past Governments but it has only to be fully shown up to be condemned by every one. A real man, an entity not "a non-entity," is needed for the post of General. Given that, it matters little whether he be English, Scotch, Irish, Australian, Afrikander or Canadian. But, as no man worth his salt will remain in the position when he discovers that he is expected to be only a figure-head and a screen for political log-rolling, the result must be to give us a non-entity, and behind his name and office abominations will go on while everything looks lovely. The present Government did well, in so increasing the salary of the General that they were able to secure a first-class man; but how could they expect such a man to be a slave and a fraud? Let them pass an Order-in-Council defining the sphere of the General, and declaring that party and personal claims shall not extend to our War power, before they ask a self-respecting man to succeed General Hutton. It would be the most popular thing they could do as well as the right thing; for no Government, now we are at war, can retain the confidence of the militia or of the people by adhering to the old system. This is one of the things that must be done, and not merely "taken into consideration."

Three months ago it was said in "Current Events," "far too much has been made of our reverses." It may now be said with equal truth that far too much has been made of our successes. The public always goes from one extreme

The War to the other, and the London press has proved itself little better than that of New York or Paris, as a restraining and steadying intellectual force. Because our two greatest Generals with 40,000 men at their command, including a sufficient force of superb cavalry, captured Cronje with his 5000 and entered Bloemfontein, a town on the open veldt incapable of being defended, shouts went up on all sides that the war was practically at an end, and "experts" announced that Roberts would enter Pretoria on May 15th! Last October, it was jauntily prophesied that Buller would eat his Christmas dinner in Pretoria. It is now denied that *he* ever said so. Next month it will be denied that Wolseley ever fixed on May 15th as the day for Roberts' entry into that city. Everyone wishes and hopes that the war will end soon, but can anything but evil come from shutting our eyes to facts as big as the Transvaal, which is a country somewhat bigger than France? Natal is not yet cleared of the enemy; Mafeking is not relieved; the main force of the enemy is intact; the Transvaal has not been entered even from the South, where the approach to it is easiest and by railway; and the burghers are still determined to fight rather than submit to British Sovereignty. In war, the unexpected usually happens and therefore possibly Kruger may wilt at any moment and sur-

render what he has stubbornly fought for all his life. Is it likely? As to the defence of Pretoria, what outstanding lesson should the war have taught the man on the street? This, that a place indifferently situated and fortified can be defended for months against overwhelming numbers. The Boers could not capture Mafeking, Kimberley or Ladysmith. But Pretoria is splendidly fortified, provisioned, supplied with modern cannon, magazine rifles, maxims, and with men who know how to shoot and who will fight knowing that Europe is with them at heart and that intervention may come in the autumn, when the Paris Exposition is over.

But, "the Free Staters are either surrendering or quarrelling with the Transvaal Burglers." The quarrels amount to no more than the jealousies between our rival cities, and a minority in the Free State, with its headquarters in Bloemfontein, have been traditionally friends to Britain and were opposed to the war. Indeed, the common opinion among European experts, when the Orange Free State ranged itself on the side of the Transvaal was that our task had thereby been greatly simplified. Had it remained neutral, its best soldiers could have quietly joined their kinsfolk, and we, obliged to respect the neutrality of the State, could not have made Bloemfontein our base of operations nor advanced across the open, high veldt to the Vaal. We would have been dependent on one line of Railway, and it would have needed an enormous force to guard it, especially along the borders, while fear of exciting so model a Republic into enmity would have paralysed our operations during the war, and our freedom when effecting a final settlement. The moral advantage of capturing the capital of one of the Republics is considerable, and the strategic value of Bloemfontein now that it is in our hands immense, but to suppose that the enemy's back has been broken is a delusion. The preposterous offers of peace made by the two Presidents ought to show this. They have no conception that they are near the end of their resources. Of course, their real object in offering terms was to "draw" Lord Salisbury. They have drawn him, but they must feel to little advantage as far as their moral position is concerned. Nothing could be in better tone than his answer. In substance he says, we were arguing disputed points, and while doing so—knowing that your armed strength was greatly in excess of ours on the spot—we took steps to strengthen our garrisons; and, just when it suited you, came the insolent ultimatum and an invasion of the Queen's territories so formidable that you are still entrenched within them. You now sanctimoniously propose peace on conditions which you would not have ventured to propose six or nine months ago!!

G.

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