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# The Volunteer Review

## AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

VOL. VI.

OTTAWA, (CANADA,) MONDAY, MAY 13, 1872.

No. 20.

### REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Sir,—In submitting the Annual Report on the state of the Militia, I have the honour to inform you, that many measures have been introduced during the past year, calculated to increase the efficiency of the Active Militia, and the Military Organization of the Dominion;—much remains yet to be done, but the progress already attained, has been as satisfactory, as could reasonably be expected, under the circumstances of the country, the limited period of time allowed for drill and the means at command.

Among the most prominent of the measures adopted, may be mentioned:—

1st. The inauguration of a uniform and systematic mode of carrying out the Annual Drill of the Active Militia in "Camps of Exercise," more in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare; the great majority of the troops assembled at these camps being concentrated with rapidity, paid and supplied as if on actual service, and placed in every district under the command of those officers appointed for the purpose.

2nd. Many Batteries of Garrison Artillery, (hitherto practised mostly in Infantry exercises) have, at the time of the Annual Training last year, gone through a short course of instruction in "Gun Drill" at various Forts and Batteries, firing credibly at Target Practice the annual allowance of shot and shell, the better inspection, and instruction more over of both Field and Garrison Batteries, being effected by, or under the orders of the Inspector of Artillery and Warlike Stores.

3rd. The establishment of two Schools of Artillery: one at Kingston, the other at Quebec, under the command of specially trained officers of the Royal Artillery; these Schools acting also as Batteries, serve to Garrison and guard certain Forts, Barracks, Magazines and Military Stores in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, in addition to affording means for the complete training in Artillery Exercises, of such officers and men, of Artillery corps, as are attached thereto.

4th. The performance, by nearly the whole of the Infantry, at the Annual training of a prescribed course of target practice with the Snider Rifle, under revised regulations, 584 Government money prizes, with appropriate badges, being awarded to the successful competitors.

During the past year the second periodical enrolment of the Reserve Militia has been taken, showing a large increase in the number of men available for the defence of the country; two other military Districts

consequent upon the Provinces of "Manitoba" and "British Columbia," having been admitted into the Dominion were added to the Militia system, which now extends through British Territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.

A Military Expedition to Manitoba, to assist Her Majesty's subjects resident in that Province, in repelling Fenian Invasion, was carried out, in a manner reflecting great credit not only on the Commander, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel F. Scott, a Major in the 42nd Battalion, (at present serving as Captain in the Manitoba Provisional Battalion,) and the officers and men composing the force, but on the character of the Canadian Militia generally.

This expedition, suddenly required—undertaken at an advanced and most trying season of the year, was organized, equipped and dispatched, with marked promptitude, and the force, without the loss of a man, arrived at its destination in a very short period of time, in face of unusual hardships and difficulties, incidental to the early setting in of a Northern American winter.

Proof has thus been conclusively afforded of the practicability of the "Dawson Route" for the passage of troops from Thunder Bay to Fort Garry, at almost any season of the year, contrary to the somewhat hasty predictions of inexperienced men.

1871 has witnessed the departure of the Regular Troops, from Quebec, that famous Fortress, having been garrisoned for more than a century by a portion of Her Majesty's Regular Army, is now (like the Forts at Kingston,) handed over to the Dominion Government.

The British flag that floats over those strongholds is as vigilantly guarded, and the morning gun, as regularly fired, by the Dominion Militia Artillery Corps, who have replaced the Regular Troops at those stations for Garrison duty.

With the exception of two Infantry Battalions, and some Artillery and Engineers stationed at Halifax, Nova Scotia, there are no Regular Troops at present in the Dominion, the Military charge, therefore of nearly the whole country, devolves on the Militia.

### ACTIVE MILITIA.

The accompanying return (marked No. 1) shows in a condensed form the strength and organization of the Active Militia on 31st December last, giving a total including all ranks of 43,174 officers and men. Out of this number 34,414 (officers and men) have performed the Annual Drill for the Military year 1871-72, of which 22,544 (officers and men,) with 1,996 horses, were assembled at Divisional or Brigade Camps of exercise, for

sixteen days continuous drill, paid, supplied, and maintained as if on actual service. 5,210 (officers and men) with 319 horses, were assembled in camps which were only in operation for eight days, under the ordinary regulations relative to pay and supply; the remainder of the Active Militia, numbering 8,760 (officers and men), performed their Annual Drill either at the Head Quarters of Corps, or, as in the case of many Batteries of Garrison Artillery, at certain Forts where instruction in gunnery could be more advantageously afforded, and shot and shell practice properly carried out.

Three Batteries of Garrison Artillery in the Province of Ontario embarked in succession on board the Gun boat "Prince Alfred" for eight days, and were practised at "Gun Drill," firing shot and shell, the vessel during the period cruising on Lakes "Erie" and "Huron."

1,189 Cavalry and the whole of the Field Artillery, (ten Batteries with 42 Field Guns,) have performed their drill for 1871-72 in the different Camps of Exercise.

### RESERVE MILITIA.

The following return, (No. 2) shows the result of the Enrolment of 1871, of the Reserve Militia, in the Nine Military Districts, comprising the four Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia,—from which it will be seen; that in these, four Provinces alone, there are nearly 700,000 men, within the fighting ages, liable by law to military service in defence of the Dominion; thus proving that there is in the country itself at least an ample supply of the most important element of defence viz: men. By this Return, it will be seen that there is a total increase of 37,942 men in the Reserve Militia since the first enrolment under the present law, a period of only two years.

### ANNUAL INSPECTION OF ACTIVE MILITIA.

#### Military District No. 1.

The present authorized strength of the Active Militia, in this district, (which is under the command of Lieut. Colonel Taylor D. A. G.), is limited, to 318 officers, 4,770 non commissioned officers and men. The actual number who have performed the annual drill of 1871-72, amounts to 311 officers, 3,952 non-commissioned officers and men, leaving a deficiency of 825 wanting to complete the ranks of the respective corps. The force in the district comprises:

Nominal Strength.	
Officers.	N. C. O. and Men.
14	135
10	140
6	110
288	4,385
<hr/>	<hr/>
318	4,770

The whole of the corps in this district, with the exception of the Sarnia Artillery Company, (which embarked for eight days gun drill on board the gunboat "Prince Alfred,") performed their annual drill at two Brigade Camps of Exercise.

The London Field Battery, 7th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 32nd, and 33rd Battalions, of infantry, assembled in a Brigade Camp at Goderich for sixteen days continuous drill.

The St. Thomas and London Cavalry, Moorstown Troop, Wellington Field Battery (attached for purpose of instruction to a portion of the London Field Battery,) 22nd, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th Battalions, in a Brigade Camp at Sarnia, for eight days drill; both camps being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Taylor.

The Brigade Camp at Goderich was formed on the 16th June, 1871, and the drill of the corps assembled carried out in accordance with the detailed instructions contained in the General Orders of 5th May, 1871, expressly drawn up for the guidance of commanding officers and all assembled for drill and practice at "Camps of Exercise."

On the 22nd of June last, I proceeded to inspect the corps assembled, at Goderich; on arrival there, I found the position of the camp well selected, situated on a plateau overlooking the Maitland River, which covered the front of the position, the right flank was protected by Lake Huron, and the rear by thick woods, whilst the side most open to attack, (viz., the left flank,) could have been readily protected by entrenchments.

The Brigade here assembled was mainly composed of the yeomanry, and agricultural population of the district, a fine body of men, in the prime of life—they appeared to enjoy, and, like most Canadians, seemed quite at home in "Camp Life." The tents were pitched with regularity, and surrounded as frequently seen in Canadian Camps, with branches of trees and evergreens, in such a manner as to produce a picturesque effect, while affording convenient shelter from the heat.

Remaining for several days in this camp, I inspected and personally mustered the whole of the officers, men, and horses, assembled, as well as witnessed and took part in several Brigade field days. The London Field Battery was inspected by the Inspector of Artillery, as to its regimental efficiency, and favorably reported on, the *material* was in good order, the horses of a superior and serviceable description, the men belonging to it were well trained to their duty, the supply of service ammunition was complete, and the general state of the battery reflected great credit on the commanding officer Lieut.-Col. Shanly, his officers, and men.

The infantry battalions, as far as concerns the *physique* of the men, was satisfactory, their *snider* rifles were in reasonably good order, the majority of the companies were badly uniformed the chief defect in equipment (a serious one,) being the want of a proper description of boot for marching.

The routine of drill consisted of, company drill before, and battalion drill after breakfast, carried out regimentally, with brigade drill in the afternoon; there being as a rule three parades daily. Every battalion in succession went to the rifle range, performing the prescribed course of target practice. At the brigade parades, the combined force was usually practiced in the mode of forming troops for attack and defence, (the different arms affording mutual support,) according to the nature of ground, and the imaginary presence of an enemy. Both officers and men displayed much intelligence and aptitude in acquiring instruction, and evinced great desire to learn their military duties.

This camp was visited by Lieut.-General Sir Hastings Doyle, K.C.M.G., commanding Her Majesty's Regular Troops in British North America, who, having inspected the brigade, was pleased to express a high opinion of the force assembled, and particularly complimented Lieut. Colonel Shanly, on the soldierlike appearance, and efficient state of the field battery under his command.

On the occasion of one of the field days, in which the gunboat "Prince Alfred" took part, it was computed that from 12,000 to 15,000 persons, chiefly belonging to the agricultural population, assembled to witness the review, many of whom had come long distances; the weather was favorable, and the military display appeared to gratify all present.

Lieut. Colonel Attwood, 26th Battalion, acted as the supply officer at this camp, and Major Smyth as camp quartermaster, the musketry instruction and "target practice" was superintended by Lieut.-Colonel Moffat, Lieut.-Colonel Service performed the duties of brigade major, and the district paymaster, Capt. F. B. Lyles, attended to the issue of and regulations concerning pay. Lieut.-Col. Taylor testifies to the satisfactory manner in which these officers performed their duties, and to the hearty support and co-operation he received from officers of all ranks.

Goderich is an exceptionally favorable place for a camp of exercise, there being plenty of open ground suitable for the manœuvring of all arms, and one of the best rifle ranges in the Dominion; ample supplies of all kinds are easily procurable, and there is communication both by rail and steam boat; moreover it is an important strategic position.

The Active Militia assembled at Goderich, consisted of the 2nd Brigade, Military District No. 1. with one Field Battery, and one Battalion, from the 1st Brigade, the remainder of the 1st Brigade, formed the Brigade Camp at Sarnia, on the 15th September, the following corps being assembled:

St. Thomas and London Cavalry.  
Moorstown Cavalry.  
Wellington Field Battery, (formed on London Battery) in course of formation, and to be attached to 2nd Brigade.  
22nd Battalion.  
24th do  
25th do  
26th do  
27th do

This camp being only in operation for eight days, and under the ordinary system of pay and supply, was by no means so popular, with officers, or men, as the sixteen days camp at Goderich, the time being very limited, it was with great difficulty that the infantry corps, could be put through, even the short course of musketry and target practice prescribed. I inspected the whole of the corps in this camp on the 19th and 20th September.

The situation of the camp itself, (although as well selected as circumstances would admit,) was far inferior to the one at Goderich, and too close to the town of Sarnia.

Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, was assisted by his Brigade Majors, Lieut.-Colonels Moffat and Service, in superintending the drill and duties performed.

It will thus be seen, that the available corps, in Military District No. 1. have been drilled for 1871-72, in the proportion of rather more than one half for sixteen days, the rest for eight days, the whole of the corps in the District, having performed the prescribed course of target practice in camp, during the Annual Drill.

The best shooting battalion, in the district, was the 27th Lambton Battalion, its shooting

figure of merit being 19 92, the best shooting company in the district was the "Widdor Company," or No. 3 Company, 27th Battalion, figure of merit 26-57,—the best individual shot, in the district, among the non-commissioned officers and men, for the military year 1871-72, and winner of the District Prize; being Sergeant J. R. Burwell, No. 5 Company (Iona) 25th Battalion, who made 45 points, out of a possible score of 60.

Lieut.-Colonel Taylor reports, that the whole of the men, who performed the Annual Drill, were *bona fide* enrolled members of the different corps, a great portion of them, having joined since the re-enrolment, which was ordered to be made within three months from the 1st October, 1868; he states that he cannot ascertain what number of men, are likely to claim their discharge, on the completion of their three years service, but from the enquiries he has made, he does not think that more than one-fourth will leave the force, provided the system introduced of the sixteen days brigade camps, be continued and extended to all corps.

On this point Lieut.-Colonel Taylor says, that from the additional experience acquired, he is confirmed in the opinion, in which he is supported by the commanding officers of Corps, "that the sixteen days camps are the only means of giving the force proper instruction in their duties, and that they are the most popular" also that the month of June, is the best and most convenient month in the year, for the Active Militia, in Military District No. 1, to go into camp for the performance of the Annual Drill. 825 men are required to complete existing corps in this District, and Lieut.-Colonel Taylor is of opinion, that, in order to maintain existing corps up to their strength continuously, recourse to the ballot is necessary, and that it is desirable upon "military grounds."

The average strength per company of the force in this district in 1871, was three officers, and fifty-three N.C. officers and men; the average strength in 1870, being three officers, and forty-nine N.C. officers and men; and in 1869, three officers, and forty-seven N.C. officers and men, which, considering the difficulties of recruiting the force by volunteering, is as high an average as could reasonably be expected.

Lieut.-Colonel Taylor calls attention to the necessity for, and suggests an increase of, three more troops of Cavalry in the district, and the amalgamation of all the troops into a regiment of Cavalry—the formation of two companies of Engineers, one company in each Brigade Division—the addition of a sufficient number of Infantry to complete the 24th, 25th, 27th and 29th Battalions—the posting of the two independent companies to the nearest located battalion, and, with a view to overcome the great difficulty that has always been experienced in horseing the Field Batteries, the granting of a yearly bonus of about \$10 per horse, to those owners who duly enrol and register their horses, for service in the batteries.

I concur in those suggestions,—and also recommend that the Cavalry troops, when there are a sufficient number, be formed into one District Regiment to be numbered the "1st Regiment of Cavalry," and that two additional companies of Infantry be raised in the County of "Bruce" and posted to the County Battalion (the 32nd).

If the ranks of the corps in this district cannot be filled up and maintained at their proper strength by voluntary enrolment, the number of men required to complete such corps, can be obtained out of the district regimental divisions, in the manner provided for in the law, by means of the Ballot.

Lieut.-Colonel Taylor's report, together with the detailed state of the respective corps submitted in the Tabular Annual Inspection Returns, will be found in the Appendix.

MILITARY DISTRICT No. 2.

The authorized strength of the Active Militia in this District, all arms and ranks, is 7,412, the actual number, all arms and ranks, who have performed the Annual Drill for 1871-72, 6,011; to complete corps in their proper strength 1,401 officers and men are required, there being a deficiency of sixty eight officers, and 1,333 N. C. officers and men. In this district there are seven troops of Cavalry, three Field Batteries of Garrison Artillery, fourteen Battalions and one Independent Company of Infantry, forming the following corps:—

Cavalry.

- Governor General's Body Guard Troop,
- Oak Ridges Troop,
- Markham do
- St. Catharines do
- Grimsbay do
- Burford do
- Queenston Mounted Infantry
- Barrie do do

Field Batteries.

- Toronto Field Battery,
- Hamilton do do
- Welland do do

Garrison Artillery.

- Toronto Garrison Battery,
- Collingwood do
- St. Catharines do

Infantry Battalions and one Independent Company.

- 2nd Battalion (Queen's Own)
- 10th do (Royals)
- 12th do
- 13th do
- 19th do
- 20th do
- 31st do
- 34th do
- 35th do
- 36th do
- 37th do
- 38th do
- 39th do
- 44th do

Sault Ste. Marie Independent Company.

The 20th, 31st and 35th Battalion, the Toronto Garrison Battery, and Barrie Mounted Infantry, performed the Annual Drill at their own head-quarters—the Collingwood and St. Catharines Batteries on board the gunboat "Prince Alfred"—the remainder of the corps were assembled in Camp at Niagara on the 6th June, and formed into a division for sixteen days' continuous drill. The division was under the command of Lieut. Col. Durie, commanding the Militia in Military District No. 2, and the Force was concentrated in camp at Niagara, on the immediate frontier, in one day (6th June), with the exception of one corps, the 39th Battalion, County Norfolk, which, having to come upwards of 120 miles from its regimental head quarters, could not join the division till the following day. Most of the corps were brought to Niagara by waggon, rail or steamboat, several of the Cavalry Troops, and a portion of the Field Artillery and Infantry, however, marching to camp. The Welland Field Battery marched a distance of twenty five miles from Port Robinson to Niagara during the night of the 5th June, reaching camp early in the morning. The arrangements for this rapid concentration were well planned and carried out in a

manner reflecting much credit on Lieut. Col. Durie, his staff, and commanding officers of corps, especially upon those officers of the Field Artillery who moved their guns, waggons, and horses by steamboat and rail with out any accident whatever. The average distance travelled by the different corps to reach Niagara was upwards of ninety miles, not only was this rapid concentration of the men effected easily and without confusion, but also the necessary large supplies of food and camp equipage, together with a very considerable supply of ammunition required for target practice. The Field Batteries came with their proper supply of service ammunition, and it may be said that this force of nearly 6,000 men, was concentrated in one day, at a strategic point of importance on the immediate frontier, almost in a condition to enter upon a campaign. A small portable medicine box was provided for every corps, and had the division been called on to undertake operations in the field, it would have been easy to attach a few waggons to every battalion and corps for the transport of provisions, ammunition, hospital equipment, camp equipage, &c., and to issue to the Infantry a proper description of boot for marching. On arriving at Niagara on the 7th June, I found this camp well formed and laid out according to annexed plan.

The position of the camp, in a military point of view, was well chosen; the front being protected by the Niagara River, the left flank by the town of Niagara and Lake Ontario, the right and rear by thick woods; the camp was laid out with regularity in the manner directed in the Militia Orders and Regulations, which is an approved method; it formed three sides of a large square, the front of the position being commanded by the field guns when parked; 600 bell tents were pitched, there being in addition many large marquees used as regimental canteens, or for officers' messes. Lieut. Col. Durie reported that he received great assistance in laying out this camp from Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Scoble, 37th Battalion, who is a zealous Militia officer. Circumstances permitted my remaining at Niagara during nearly the whole time the troops were there, and I was thus enabled not only to inspect every corps, and muster personally every officer, man and horse present, but also to watch closely the working of the system. Lieutenant Mason 13th Battalion, acted as supply officer, and no man could have performed his important duties with greater zeal and ability; from daylight to dark this officer was at his work, receiving and distributing the ration supplies: Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie, 35th Battalion (his own corps not being in the camp) acted as camp quarter master with equal zeal and activity, whilst Brevet Major G. H. Dartnell, 34th Battalion, Musketry Instructor to the division, performed his laborious duties with marked success; it was mainly to this officer's energy that the whole of the corps were put through the prescribed course of target practice within the time allowed; Lieutenant Goddes, of the Hamilton Field Battery performed the duties of orderly officer, and was most useful, the two permanent Brigade Majors of the District, Lt. Cols. Donison and Villiers, attending with customary efficiency to their own legitimate duties, ably supported Lieutenant-Colonel Durie in his command. It certainly was most creditable to the staff of this division, that a force of the strength and description assembled, could be concentrated so rapidly, supplied, drilled and maintained from day to day for a period of sixteen days, and then dispersed to their respective corps' head-

quarters as quickly, as they had been assembled, not only without any fuss or confusion, as frequently happens on such occasions, but without accident or injury of any kind occurring.

The routine of drill carried on by the corps in this, as in all the other camps, was similar to that observed at the Godorich camp, and as prescribed in the General Orders of 5th May, 1871. The Cavalry Corps (7 troops) were formed in a provisional regiment for drill and administrative purposes, under the command of the senior Cavalry officer, Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod—both officers and men presented a good appearance, were mounted on serviceable horses, and considering that they had never been previously brought together acquitted themselves creditably on parade. The three Field Batteries (12 guns), were placed under the command of the senior Artillery officer present (Captain Smith of the Hamilton Battery), and the Inspector of Artillery (who inspected these batteries regimentally) reports upon them as follows—"Gun drill good, driving fair, but some officers and non-commissioned officers not well up in field manoeuvres; shot and shell practice good; the batteries generally well horsed; the Welland Battery not as good at manoeuvring as the other two, but it has not the same advantages; this Battery marched twenty-five miles to camp in one day, and also marched back to its local Headquarters in the same time; the Hamilton Battery marched twelve miles to St. Catharines, from thence by rail. Capt. Groy who commands the Toronto Field Battery, is a very efficient officer." Of the Infantry Battalions (11 in number), four Battalions were in rifle, the rest in scarlet uniform clothing; the arms, generally speaking, were in good order, and the accoutrements, although of various kinds and some of obsolete pattern, were yet serviceable; many articles, however, were wanting which I was informed had been originally issued by the Department, but subsequently lost.

(To be continued.)

The rumor that the British Government had arranged with Canada to declare the independence of that colony in case of war with us, thus relieving the province from any share in the duel, is proved to be untrue. The only use that has been made of it so far as we know, is by the author of the "Invasion of Canada in 1874," published in the *Volunteer Review*, of Canada. It purports to be written in 1900 by a retired militiaman and the author seems to have anticipated his senility, for he has produced the most idiotic of the many dreary attempts at campaigning on paper, which have followed the "Battle of Dorking." Looking through the historians spectacles, we should judge the Canadian militia to be made up of an unrivalled collection of Jack the Giant-killers. The "Yankees" get an awful drubbing, and it would probably have been worse if the historian had not felt it his duty to expend a part of his space in letting the "Whig Radicals" who now govern England know whether they were tending. Since the folly of this "battle" business has now reached its extreme, we hope that the gentry who have devoted their talents to the task will suffer this effort of our contemporary to be the valdictory. It certainly is fitted to be the tail piece to any exhibition of stupidity that can be conceived of.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

## FIELD DAY AT BRIGHTON.

The London *Times* gives an interesting account of the field day of volunteers at Brighton. The problem to be worked out was based on the supposition that a foreign army had landed between Brighton and Shoreham, and had taken up a strong position on the Downs, in front of the Brighton race stand, looking eastwards. This army, which has been called the Brighton force, was led by Sir Alfred Horsford, and was faced at a distance of two miles by the Lewes or home force, also holding a strong position under General Lysons. The two armies were placed in these positions by directions from the Empire Staff, and were then left to fight it out under certain conditions—namely, that they must keep within a prescribed area, avoid "tabooed" ground, and maintain their communications with Brighton and Lewes respectively. According to the War Office plan, General Horsford's first line was drawn up along the Downs, from Bevendean to a point about 1,000 yards in rear of Ovenden. His position in front of the race course was a very strong one, and he had 12,082 men and 22 pieces of artillery. Against these General Lysons had 11,082 men and 20 guns. A large patch of "tabooed" ground, over which troops were not allowed to manoeuvre, and which, for practical purposes may be supposed to be a lake or swamp, lay in the centre of General Horsford's position, and had a serious bearing on the fortunes of the day. So long as General Horsford kept it in his front it was a source of strength, but when he advanced beyond it, he partly did, it became a source of weakness, separating his forces and rendering his centre liable to be broken through by an enemy who should make a strong assault along its edge. This was just what turned out to be the case, Horsford's forces being divided into two parts and beaten in detail. Each general began the day with the disadvantage of having practically no cavalry, and occupying a much too extended (three miles in width at the centre, to be held off factually in real war by 10,000.

The disposition of Sir Alfred Horsford's was complete by half-past 10 o'clock. The country allocated to him for defensive operations is by no means of a character that a general would select for a choice, yet it is not altogether destitute of eligible features.

The theory on which General Horsford disposed his forces was based on the assumption that the attack of the enemy would be delivered in form against his right. The contour of the ground as depicted on the staff maps certainly favoured the impression and the advisers of the gallant general held it to be confirmed by the circumstances that the enemy's artillery and columns of infantry had been seen against the sky line marching to the southward. It was held advisable then to be in position to meet with sufficient force any such attack.

There were, it is true, some who hinted that if Lysons meant to use those troops seriously he would take care to keep them off the sky line, instead of exhibiting them with an ostentation, with a man of his wiliness had in it a suspicious element. By half-past 10 o'clock Horsford's dispositions were complete, and he was ready for the beginning of the action. It had been intended that outposts should be thrown out on either side for the sake of practicing the volunteers in that species of military duty; but Horsford's dispositions were such that his main force virtually formed its own outposts, and no practice of the character alluded to was engaged in. Up till about 10 o'clock masses of watery mist had hung about the Downs,

and Lysons might have lit a bonfire on Newmarket hill without it being visible from Horsford's position; but after that hour the weather brightened and the sun came out. The interest in Lysons' movements was universal. A group of horsemen shewed on the High Barn Hill, and speculations at once became rife as to whether they were that general and his staff. A boy came across from the other side and reported that there were "thousands and thousands of soldiers" lying down in the valley between us and the High Barn. He was captured by a zealous bandsman, and conducted to a staff officer to impart to him what information he possessed. The boy's look of abject terror could scarcely have been stronger if he had apprehended that he was being led to summary execution. At length, at five minutes to 12 o'clock, Lysons asked the question whether his opponent was ready to begin, by a gun fired from Newmarket Hill. It was obvious, then, that not all his artillery had been moved away to the south. The reply was duly given in the same manner; and instantly as if by magic, the opposite heights were everywhere crowned by skirmishers. The question did not seem to be where was Lysons going to attack, but rather where was Lysons not going to attack? Our skirmishers were out at length, and down into the valley to confront the skirmishers of the enemy, and the action became warm, so far as skirmishing fire went all along the line. Acting on the defensive, Prince Edward's skirmishers did not exert themselves to drive in the skirmishers of the other side, only held their own against them, and waited for the issue. In anticipation of more vigorous measures, our artillery continued to pound away, and the whole of our first line, all along the right flank; came up to the summit of the ridge; so that this attack on our right, whether it was real or whether it was a feint, had forced Prince Edward to show his hand, and keep it shown. At length our right brigade threw off its torpor and moved forward just as a column of Lysons' force on his extreme left showed itself and headed down the slope towards our right. Another column was visible opposite our centre, and it appeared to be deploying with the intention to come down in line. The tactics were puzzling; but the demonstration, whether it was real or whether it was feigned, was sufficiently imposing to deter Prince Edward from withdrawing a man to any other portion of the field. How it was cannot well be told; but suddenly and without any more notice than a heavy covering artillery fire, a column of the enemy had pushed along the spur leading down from the Newmarket-hill right against the lower angle of the prescribed ground around the Warran Farm, and had turned the flank of our right centre, disconnected as it was by the imaginary morass from our left. The morass had indeed prevented Lysons from cutting straight through between the centre and the left, but it did not avail to prevent marching along its face and wedging Lord Bury's Brigade through the extreme edge of our right centre where it touched the prescribed ground. This manoeuvre placed the enemy in such a position as to be able to enfilade our whole right centre and right.

Then—but not till the success of this manoeuvre was assured—his left assumed the offensive in earnest, in order to ensure holding Horsford's right, employed with sufficient earnestness to prevent Prince Edward from detailing troops to oppose the movement that was breaking his centre. On the section of the field where Lyson's left and Horsford's right were contending, the latter

with its longer front and greater force, succeeded in turning the former's left flank. But the triumph, if it can be called a triumph, was a barren one. There is not much use in an army exerting itself on its flanks when an enemy is inside its centre. When the Prussian Guards at Koniggratz were in Chlum, Bendeck was fain to own that the line of his front was untenable. The quickness of the thing was very surprising. The gun which was the signal for commencing was fired at five minutes to one. In front of Lysons' penetrating column there was a great deal of confusion worse confounded among the astonished regiments, upon which he had dropped as if from the clouds. One regiment was firing to its front unconcernedly while the enemy was in its rear, and a detachment from the second division on the left, which had fronted inwards and slowed round the trails of its guns, was firing with enterprise and vigor into the crowd of friend and foe together. It would be too much to say that the thing ended in a heterogeneous jumble, so far as concerned the "Army of Brighton;" but the confusion was so great that it was impossible to realize anything except there was nothing but confusion so far as regarded the centre. The volunteers marched well throughout the day, and seemed to work more handily than in former years. There were fewer egregious blunders, although skirmishers still displayed a propensity occasionally to open fire at impossible ranges; and although masses of troops were in cases permitted to stand phlegmatically exposed to a fire of artillery for a length of time that, had the guns been shot, would have contributed materially to the sum total of widows and orphans in our land. The decision of the umpires was of the most amusingly negative character. It would seem to convey the idea that both sides had been impartially beaten, and that the "sovereignest remedy" for a thrashing is a march past. The following is the text of the decision: "General Sir A. Horsford's right centre having been broken through, and General Lysons' left flank having been turned, both sides take up fresh positions on the raccourse." Had the action been in earnest, it seems pretty certain that one side would have found it extremely difficult to comply with this order.

## REVIEWS.

We request our readers attention to the claims of a weekly Literary Journal published at Montreal by the enterprising publisher of the *Canadian Illustrated News*, under the title of the *Hearthstone*.

This Journal will supply a want felt in Canadian literature by furnishing reading matter of an entertaining and improving character, different from the sensational periodicals of the United States press. We bespeak a large share of patronage for the *Hearthstone*.

REMITTANCES Received on Subscription to THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW up to Saturday, the 11th inst:—

MANOTICK, Ont.—Capt. Geo. Cooke, \$2.00.  
BERRITT'S RAPIDS.—Lt.-Col. Geo. Shepherd, \$2.00.  
OSGOODE.—Lieut. J. Hanna, \$2.00.  
TORONTO.—Capt. E. W. Windeat, \$2.00.



## A PRINCESS AT WORK.

Our advertising columns to day contain the following somewhat novel announcement: "A *tailor d'habillements pour Dames*, tenu par la Princesse Pierre Napoleon Bonaparte, No. 97, New Bond Street." We find something so truly noble in this defiance of social and aristocratic conventions that we solicit for Madame la Princesse the special consideration of our fashionable readers, and particularly the patronage of our fair American friends, who, always regarding themselves as "sovereigns" may now be robed and "confectioned" at the hands of an Imperial Princesse. The reason for taking this step is very frankly avowed by the Princesse Pierre Bonaparte, and the motive is worthy of all commendation. It is simply to gain the means of an honest living, of which the revolution has suddenly deprived her, and to enable her to educate her three children, who, by the way, are remarkably beautiful and full of promise. The eldest, a fine lad of fourteen, is a devoted student *con amore*, and his sister of ten years is one of those charming buds of beauty that makes children men and women wish to adopt them at sight. If we were the Baroness Burdett Coutts we should have hundreds of such flowers in our human conservatory. To return to the *atelier* of Madame la Princesse, just opened at 97 Bond Street. The ladies will there find some of the best *couturieres* and *modistes*, just imported from Paris, with specimens of their artistic "confection." They will be served by a veritable princess of fine appearance and most agreeable manners, a fond mother and devoted wife, whose love for her husband and children has inspired her to brave the world by "setting up in business." What else could the poor lady do? If a woman in want resorts to dishonorable ways and means for livelihood, the saints of society pelt her with stones. If she honestly resorts to her hands and brains, the fashionable world is too apt to give her the "cold shoulder," with a shrug by way of emphasis. Let us hope it will not be so in the case of the Princesse Bonaparte, who has set an example worthy of imitation by ladies whom adverse fate or the misfortunes of war have thrown upon their own individual resources.—*London Cosmopolitan.*

The Washington *National Republican*, an organ of the Administration, contradicts the statement that the Government had under consideration the propriety of not receiving Admiral Polo, the new Spanish Minister. "We cannot take cognizance" says the *Republican*, "of his avowed sentiments or consider them a just cause for refusing to receive him. Judging of the character of the new minister the relations between the Spanish Legation and the State Department will be of brief duration. The change is important, and forbodes trouble between Spain and the United States. Admiral Polo is not a diplomat. He is not friendly to the United States, or any of its institutions. He holds in contempt the naval force of our country and entertains unbounded faith in the prowess of the navy of his own country, publishing over his own signature insulting remarks about the United States. He is sent here the representative of a policy at once defiant and disagreeable to our Government, and in place of the suavity of the diplomat, he is expected to substitute the brusqueness of the naval officer with the spirit of a Spanish zealot.

## AMERICAN SHIPPING.

The Americans are sorely troubled, and not unreasonably, with the present disastrously low condition of their mercantile marine. They state that the total tonnage of the merchantmen in 1850 was 3,535,454 tons. In 1860 it had increased to 5,353,868 tons, an increase of 35 per cent. In 1870 there was the extraordinary decrease to 4,240,507 tons being a decrease of one-fourth. In 1860 seventy-one per cent of the shipping entered at the United States ports were American ships. In 1870 only one thirty-ninth belonged to the States. In 1860 the American ships carried over 2,000,000 against 1,000,000 carried in British bottoms. In 1870, the tonnage carried by American ships was less than 1,000,000 tons against more than 2,000,000 carried by the British shipping. The Americans naturally ask themselves the cause of this singular revolution. The note that of the host of ocean steamers leaving New York every day for Europe not one flies the American flag except it be as a "derisive compliment" to the nation which has permitted the whole of her commerce to pass out of her hands into those of foreigners. They argue that the destruction to the mercantile marine during the war has but little to do with this.

Rather is it to be attributed to the tariff placed upon the material necessary for the ship building trade. As usual in America when a difficult question is raised the blame is laid on Congress and this body is castigated as the cause of the present deficiency. But Americans forget that the great tonnage mentioned above was for the most part on English bottoms. The American people have never shown any real enterprise in shipping. Almost every company started under American auspices was mainly established with English money, and the probability is this will continue to be the case. Marine enterprise and skill is an essentially English trait that it is almost impossible to take the supremacy from her.

In accordance with the present Militia system the various Volunteer Battalions of the Province are required to be reorganized previous to the first of June of the present year. Nearly all the non-commissioned officers and men, comprising the 15th Battalion, having served the time prescribed by law are entitled to their discharge, and it is therefore necessary that a re-enrollment should take place. Orders having been issued, from headquarters to that effect. Lt.-Col. Campbell, called a meeting of his officers at his residence last evening, at which some eighteen were present. After consulting together it was resolved as the 15th had been in existence so many years, and occupied a prominent position among the Battalions of the Province, it would be creditable to themselves and to the Town to allow it to be disbanded and those present pledged themselves to use their utmost endeavors to reorganize it, and place it in an efficient and permanent footing. Various grievances complained of by the men while in camp at Kingston last summer, were discussed, and the Colonel was requested to represent the matter to headquarters. Immediate steps will be taken to secure a sufficient number of men to place the Battalion in an efficient condition, and we hope when the Volunteers are called out for their annual drill, the 15th Battalion will occupy the proud position it has hitherto held among the Volunteer Battalions of the Province.—*Intelligencer.*

Between the years 1857 and 1662 the needle at London, England, pointed due north. After this it began to shift slowly to the westward until 1815, when it pointed nearly 24 degrees away from the north. It is now on its way back to the north, which it will reach in the course of the next century, after which it will begin to point eastward of north. Besides this are daily changes of this variation, and other changes due to different periods of the year, which seriously complicate all efforts at explanation of this mystery.

From some experiments made by Mr. Stevenson on the west coast of Scotland which is exposed to the fury of the Atlantic Ocean, it appears that the average pressure of the waves during the summer months is 600 pounds on the square foot, while during the winter months it is 2,086 pounds,—or more than three times as much. During one tremendous storm in March, 1845, the pressure rose as high as 6,010 pounds on the square foot. In the storm which wrecked the Royal Charter, such was the power of the sea that masses of rock 14 tons weight were torn from their beds and bowled along the surface, and this noble vessel of 3,000 tons ton, and one rigid mass of the toughest iron, when struck by two opposing seas, was snapped asunder just as the engineer remarked, as "he could snap a stick across his knee."

THE NEW ROUTE FROM ENGLAND TO INDIA.—A new scheme for accelerating traffic between England and India has come into prominence since the undoubted success of the Suez canal; this is by connecting Egypt with the Persian Gulf. A railway from Ismailia to Bussurrah, through Syria and the Euphrates valley, besides shortening by five days the transit of mails between England and India, would connect Egypt with Persia or Africa with Asia, if larger terms are necessary. Ismailia is mentioned in preference either to Port Said or Suez, because it is about midway through the canal, and is already in railway communication with Alexandria, and is, moreover in the direct line to Cairo. This scheme seems a trifle less delusive than its predecessors. A railway passing through Palestine, to join the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf, might not be a good dividend line, but the expense would not be preposterous, and the saving in time for mails and passengers would be important. If the gain of twenty-four hours by the Mont Conis Tunnel has been felt as such a boon in India, how much greater would be the rejoicing if the time occupied in transit was shortened by five days?

WASHINGTON BRIGADIERS.—During the early months of the warlike year of 1863 the Senate was blessed with a rare and independent Committee on Military affairs. Two of them were Pacific—we mean from that coast—Latham, of California, the Nesmith, of Oregon. Much pressure was brought on Lincoln to appoint brigadiers. Much delay and reflection were had. "Old Nez," as Senator Nesmith was called, lost his temper on that question. During a heated debate he attacked their inefficiency and wardice of a class of brigadiers who always congregated about the hotels in Washington when there was an imminent danger of a battle at the front. "Senators!" said he, "go down to Willard's Hotel! observe the fluctuations our conflict! If a battle is near, the brigadiers are afar off: they snuff it at a safe distance. I past Willard's last night at dusk. An unruly dog was besieged by unruly colored boot blacks. Stones were thrown at the dog, and sixteen brigadiers lay on the gory pave, and it wa'n't a good night for brigadiers either."—EDITOR'S DRAWING, in *Harper's Magazine for March*

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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, MONDAY, MAY 13, 1872.

LIEUT-COLONEL WAINWRIGHT GRIFFITHS, at present on a tour through British Columbia, has kindly consented to act as the Agent for the VOLUNTEER REVIEW in that Province.

TELEGRAPHIC news apprises the people of British North America that the London Times discussing the attitude Canada has assumed towards the Treaty of Washington, censures the Imperial Government for its treatment of the Dominion and hints that it would be highly beneficial to the world if England were to absolve Canada from her allegiance.

There is no doubt that the Times representing the monied interest of Great Britain alone would be favorably disposed to facilitate the disintegration of the Empire, under the delusion that such an operation would enable English stockholders to collect their dividends without fear of interruption, but the Times should remember that Canada is not accountable for the consequential damages nor for the Alabama Claims; although English diplomats bartered away her territorial rights in order to render the settlement for damages brought about by their own folly and incapacity less onerous to English ratopayers and especially the very class the Times represents.

When it becomes necessary to sever the tie that binds this country to the British throne, it will not be a condition of the arrangement that a mere section, however important, of the English people will be alone consulted, especially a section whose patriotism is measured by per centage and of whose rule the majority of the British nation is heartily tired.

If Englishmen wish to know the feelings of the Canadian people on this question they may rest assured that nine-tenths of them look on the Washington Treaty as a disgraceful surrender of every principle for which a high spirited people should contend.

That they are the best judges of their own local affairs, that the disposition of the fisheries is tantamount to the acknowledgment of defeat, and that no adequate compensation whatever has been or will be received for such a shameful and imbecile surrender of national rights.

They cannot conceive any national exigency would warrant the course pursued by the English portion of the Joint High Commission, and they are quite certain the honor of the Empire and their rights have been sacrificed to the supposed interest of the monied class.

Knowing well the utter faithlessness of the United States politicians, their dishonest grasping and encroaching spirit, (of which Englishmen have already had a specimen in the consequential damages) they desire above all things to keep clear of all political or treaty relations with that country, and if British Statesmen studied the interests of the Empire they would follow a similar course.

The most extraordinary portion of the whole affair is that this surrender and sacrifice has been made to a people wholly impotent to enforce redress for injuries even from such a power as Spain, and that it has made in the face of the well-known facts that they had no right to make any claim whatever.

It is not a matter for much wonder if the Canadian people were thoroughly dissatisfied, or that they hesitated to commit themselves to a policy whose tendency is to bring about a conflict which they well know to be inevitable at a time when they and Great Britain may be far less prepared for it than at present, and it requires no extraordinary spirit of prophecy to foretell the effect of releasing Canada from her allegiance; within a year after British power in North America and the West Indies would be merely an historical fact.

It is quite possible the Times and Whig Radicals are working together for that end, Gladstone is fond of climaxes and theatrical coupes, and he might essay that *coup d'Etat* before he is consigned to the role which fits him best of local demagogue, but the day it is consummated will add an

unexpected page to the world's annals, and that page will proclaim the near advent of the downfall of Great Britain.

As a sacrifice to our position, as a dependency of the British Empire, we shall have to accept the Treaty of Washington; but it is as well to state distinctly at once that it is the last surrender the people of Canada will ever make; to this they are partly reconciled because they are aware that the sword will finally adjust all questions of boundaries and rights and they have no fear of the consequences of appealing thereto.

Our relations to Great Britain will have to be better defined, but we must await the advent to power of Statesmen who are not the tools of Manchester cotton spinners or London stockholders.

In a national and patriotic sense there is no sacrifice the Canadian people are not prepared to make to maintain the integrity of the Empire and uphold the honor of Britain, but they must be beaten in actual conflict before they will consent to a surrender of territorial rights, and that is a sensation they have yet to experience.

This country is no burthen politically or otherwise to the Empire: England would have to maintain a far larger squadron to protect her own commerce if the connection was severed, and we ask nothing from her in any quarrel which may occur and which will not be of our making, but to act by her naval force.

The Canadian people will not hear of separation but they will insist that their heritage and rights shall not be bartered away by doctrinaires or neglected by imbecile envoys.

"Lad the galled Jade wince,"  
"My withers are unwrung,"

If an individual cries out very loudly it is a certain indication that he has been hit very hard. Our very amiable contemporary, the United States *Army and Navy Journal*, in a short concise article evidently inspired by, and covering concentrated rage, devotes the author of the "Invasion of Canada in 1874" to the purgatory of unsuccessful writers, in terms singularly elegant and well chosen.

Our contemporary feels exactly like an irascible old gentleman on whose gouty toe a lively youngster has designedly trodden, and evinces his dislike of the operation by unintelligible choleric growls, not the less amusing because they are the expressions of powerless rage.

One thing is very evident, however, the result arrived at by the talented author of the "Invasion" is exceedingly displeasing to our contemporary.

It does not matter so far as the object which the author proposed to accomplish is concerned in what light the *Army and Navy Journal* viewed his efforts, the actions portrayed are sufficiently life like to give our contemporary a fit of the blues, and as the

narrative merely travels over historic ground repeating with trifling variations the scenes of 1812-15 it is no wonder it should elicit a howl of impotent rage.

Our people have proved themselves before now, not "an unrivalled collection of Jack the Giant-killers" but men that could look any force the "Yankees" could bring into the field in the face without reproach, and that is all the author claims for his countrymen.

It is not our desire to exchange compliments of a certain description with our own temporary, but we would like just to ask the question as to whether it were a greater "exhibition of stupidity" to write a sprightly narrative of possible occurrences; or to spend months in boasting of a paper army and a navy that was nothing better than a heap of "old scrap iron," and trying to bully a friendly power into a dishonest bargain by the dread of both scare crows.

We are of opinion that the majority of our readers will easily decide the question, from the one instruction may be derived certainly amusement, although that is below its merits, the other may be sharp practice for a Yankee attorney, but not exactly the style of ethics on which national honor or honesty is or will be founded.

We do not wonder at any irritation displayed by the people or Press of the United States on the subject of their desire to accomplish the annexation of this country by force or fraud, for they have resorted to both, it is a sore subject each defeat being more humiliating than its predecessor, and the inevitable result of the attempt so closely portrayed by our author, especially as it ends in the disintegration of the so-called Union, is sure to call forth exhibitions of spleen such as our contemporary exhibits.

In order to show how cleverly he has been drawn out, his article in full will be found in another column, and it will certainly repay perusal for the sake of the laughter it will provoke.

With the desire to restore our respected contemporaries equanimity we beg leave to say that "the Yankees" will only get that "awful drubbing" in case they provoke it, and we are perfectly willing to allow them to go on as long as they please, selling off all the old rubbish of "scrap iron" making war on the Indians which is about their greatest effort just now, manufacturing bass wood hams and wooden nutmegs, and doing any amount of peddlery generally as long as they don't meddle with us.

Horace Greely is accountable for the following mot, on the occasion of a convention of the veterans of 1812 at Albany some eighteen years ago, "that they had great reason to be proud of their actions because the Canadians had beaten them so badly they never stopped running till the Treasury at Washington brought them up."

Horace must be guilty of an anachronism

because the Treasury had been burnt by the British about that time. It is pardonable, however, and our friend will be quite safe to reckon on a repetition of the operation whenever it is convenient to try.

Our gallant correspondent "Rollo" again returns to the charge on the subject of the Ballot, in his communication (published in to-day's issue) he accuses the VOLUNTEER REVIEW with assuming "to represent the ideas and sentiments of the Active Militia," thus at once placing that body as a separate class in the State, a position and status we were always careful to avoid giving it.

If he had said we assumed to represent the interests of the Canadian Army it would simply be assigning to this Journal the position of his cupid since its first number was issued, we have always endeavoured to give publicity to the ideas and sentiments of those members of the Active Militia who wisened to avail themselves of the privileges afforded by our pages, but we felt that a very difficult and delicate task had devolved on us, in the necessity for reconciling the theories of individuals with the interest of the country.

Our gallant correspondent is not happy in the endeavour to make us say that a class of cowards is to be found in Canada, if he reads our article carefully he will be able to perceive that an individual genus which he allows to exist forms one of a class which his ballot system would force into the ranks; we have affirmed that much and nothing more.

As to the question of a substitute it is merely a local privilege accorded in time of peace, and the money provision is quite as heavy as any could be exacted under a poll tax, the amount being \$30.

We quite agree with our correspondent in the difficulty of enforcing a poll tax because it will be resisted by the monied interest and by the very class the ballot would force into the ranks, but it forms no good reason why such a course should not be tried; if we know anything of Canada it is the agricultural class governs the country, the vast majority of our Active Force is drawn from that class and it rests with them alone to say what shall be done.

Putting aside the opinions of all the authorities quoted and for which by the way we entertain a profound respect, there is one question we would wish our ingenious correspondent to answer relative to the working of the ballot system, and it is this, provided the Volunteer Force was abolished and the ballot enforced, should officers and men of the Regular Militia only serve three years?

The provisions of the Militia Act provides for the gradual training of the whole population to arms, in nine years 120,000 men would be trained according to "Rollo," it is evident that the number of officers capable

of handling 40,000 men would be wholly inadequate for the wants of the larger number.

Seeing that we have under the present system a well trained and intelligent body of officers would it be wise to change them every three years as the new levies supplied the place of the old?

It is evident the more this question of the ballot is studied the greater will be the difficulties attending its application to our circumstances; it is admirably fitted for a state of war but must be supplemented by volunteering at least in Canada in time of peace, so that so far from our position being weak, and necessitating an early change of base, we are confident the weakness rests on the side of the advocates of the ballot.

There is no necessity for endeavouring to strengthen the arguments for it by the example of Prussia, that country has a standing army of large proportions always under pay, through the ranks of which its whole population is filtered and whose officers are an aristocratic as well as exclusive class.

The enforcement of the ballot in such a country may be a hardship, but it would be attended with far less difficulty than in Canada, "Rollo" may rest assured that his pet panacea would be ushered in by the retirement of the whole of the regimental and staff officers of the Volunteer Force, and that is a measure for which the country is not yet prepared.

It is always a matter of regret to us to be obliged to differ in appearance from the expressed opinion of an officer of the high ability, great experience and acknowledged talent of the Adjutant General, but it is evident in uttering the proposition "that the strongest military organization is that which is founded on the principle of obligatory service," he had the experience of Prussia alone in view, its application to our condition forming no part of the problem.

The opinions of the Deputy Adjt.-Genls. as quoted by "Rollo" are correct as matters of fact so far as the present organization is concerned, but the remedy proposed is that to which we most emphatically demur, not because it is impracticable or visionary, but simply from the fact that it would in no way obviate the evil complained of, which, as we understand it, is the unequal pressure of military service, and it is inapplicable in our circumstances.

The remedy proposed, the poll tax, is the true way out of the difficulty, it is no doubt a bitter pill but it must eventually be swallowed, and we think "Rollo" has done the State good service by agitating the question; we must remind him that the onus of proof does not rest with the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

We are enabled to-day to place before the readers of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW a portion of the "Artillery Retrospect of the Franco-Prussian War," by Lieut.-Colonel T. B. Strange of the Canadian Artillery.



Apart from its merits as a scientific exposition of the professional views of that distinguished officer, its literary excellence is beyond question; it is one of those readable productions which clothes the dry bones of a statistical skeleton with attractive flesh, breathing life, intelligence and beauty into the ordinarily least interesting of subjects generally.

A synopsis of the contents would deprive the readers of the real pleasure to be derived from its perusal; in addition to its literary excellence it possesses scientific merit in no ordinary degree.

Dealing with the great question of the position Artillery holds in the economy of modern armaments the details are worked out with rare skill, and made not only interesting but capable of comprehension by the dullest intellect.

In fact we have never read any treatise containing so much real instruction in a small compass, and its value to Artillery officers cannot be measured by the few and simple principles it enunciates; it is the style of article which makes a man think and desire to learn more.

It is a curious coincidence that Lieut.-Colonel Strango points out the necessity for good topographical maps and shows that "artillery concentration"—the *prime factor* of success—is in a great measure due to the correctness of their details, and that not only were they supplied to the artillery commands but also the Infantry Officers on outpost duty.

It is well known that the want of this kind of information caused disastrous loss to the French by the surprise of detached corps and the facilities afforded the Prussians to organize at strategical points wholly unsuspected by their adversaries who never saw their artillery till they felt its effects.

France possessed the most complete topographical survey of any country in the world, it had been preparing for years and embraced an exactitude as well as minutæ of detail complimentary to the scientific and artistic skill of the French people.

It would appear, however, that a staff corps did not exist in the French service, because such an organization would be able to turn the valuable material at hand to account, and Prussian information was derived from the copies of the plans of the great French *Cadastre*.

Lieutenant-Colonel Strango has not only conferred a great boon on the young officers of the Canadian Army by his able treatise on strategical tactics and artillery, but he has incidentally pointed out a want of the most grievous kind in the Organization of that Army inasmuch as a staff corps finds no place therein.

There is not a good topographical map of any portion of the Dominion in existence, nor one that would enable a commanding officer to move his force twelve miles from head-

quarters without a previous reconnoissance.

This omission has been repeatedly pointed out in the columns of the *VOLUNTEER REVIEW*, we are informed that an effort is about to be made to remedy the evil by the training of officers at the Artillery Schools as Military Engineers, so that some fifty years hence the Dominion may have a corps of Topographical Engineers.

It is well to make a beginning any how, but with the material at hand it is inconceivable that no effort has been made to utilize it: when soldiers are wanted it is not thought necessary to give them a training in higher mathematics in order to induct them into the mysteries of propulsive explosive force or trajectory, the practical application of mechanical skill is all that is required. Now, with regard to the Engineer Corps of the Canadian Army, as the immediate want is not elaborations of systems of defence, nor even the mechanical application of the principles of fortification, but good topographical maps of the country, we can see no reason why the existence of a large number of civil engineers and surveyors in each Military District should not be taken advantage of to give the country the description of staff corps its necessities require.

It could by no possibility interfere with the developments of a staff college at Kingston or elsewhere, and that institution should not be allowed to interfere with the practical working of the artillery schools.

Indeed the mechanical and scientific skill of our organization should be entirely concentrated on the latter; we need large numbers of trained artillerymen, not (as Col. Strango points out the French artillery officers to have been) adepts in "the higher mathematics, but with the practical knowledge necessary to enable them to manoeuvre a gun in action.

Such officers as Colonel Strango by imparting useful knowledge on practical subjects will do more to make the Canadian Army effective than any number of mere theorists; the service has already benefitted by his labors in no ordinary degree.

Lieutenant-Colonel French has also been doing good service at Kingston, but the routine duties of a school will not have much effect in leavening the Canadian Artillery Force with trained officers; a few papers such as that we have been reviewing would render material aid in disseminating useful and valuable knowledge.

In proof of the value of the services the Civil Engineers can render our organization, we have only to refer to the speech of Lieut.-General Lindsay at the annual banquet of the "Institution of Civil Engineers," of London, on the 24th April last.

In replying to the toast of the Army Gen. Lindsay said. "That if the Civil Engineers who, under Sir Marton Peto, went out to make a railway during the Crimean War

had been sent out earlier they would have saved half the British Army, when they did go out they doubled the resources at the command of the British Government."

One of the most important statistical documents ever issued by our department is the "Report of the Secretary of State," a copy of which should find its way into every cottage in the British Isles, that the English people may understand from official sources the area of the vast inheritance which the people of Canada are endeavouring in the midst of discouragement to hold as an appanage of the Empire and the heritage of the British people.

The want of such information has, no doubt, led English Statesmen into grave mistakes and tended to the direct injury of British North America by leaving mischievous theorists to deal with all the great questions affecting this country and the integrity of the Empire according to their imaginations.

Even the leaders of public opinions or class interests, such as the *London Times*, have always been dealing with the affairs of this country and its place in the economy of the British Empire in utter ignorance of all the facts on which any opinion connected therewith should be based.

We believe the Privy Council should direct the Secretary of State's Report to be attached to all papers on emigration, to be circulated in the British Islands, for the purpose of showing the extent and general character of the Territory extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the heritage awaiting occupation by their surplus population.

The following are the areas of the *North West Territory* west of the 93rd degree of west longitude, not including the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec or Ontario:

1st. Unavailable for cultivation, being the portion of the Great American Desert, which extends into British Territory. Square miles, 50,000. In acres, 32,000,000.

2nd. Prairie country. The greater part of which is unsurpassed for agricultural purposes, with occasional groves, and belts of timber. Square miles, 120,000. In acres, 78,000,000.

3rd. Timber land, with occasional large prairies as in (Peace River District) adapted for the growth of wheat and other cereals. Possesses abundance of timber. Square miles, 466,225. In acres, 298,334,000.

4th. Belt lying outside of No. 2 and 3, (or agricultural zone proper), in which potatoes, barley and grasses, may be successfully cultivated. Sufficiently supplied with timber. Square miles, 928,200. In acres, 594,048,000.

5th; Rock and swamp, barren lands, in which the timber growth extending up from the south gradually disappears. Fur producing region. Square miles, 620,300. In acres, 411,072,000.

Showing a total area of 2,206,726 square miles, equal to 1,412,304,000 acres, of which saying nothing of tracts 1 & 4 above, (which are of more or less value for grazing and

other producing purposes) we have two and three, containing 375,184,000 acres of agricultural land, and the greater part of which is beyond question especially well adapted for wheat growing.

The winter climate is somewhat severe, but not more so than in parts of Ontario and Quebec; on the other hand the country is undoubtedly one of the healthiest in the world, and the particular portion to which allusion has just been made, is calculated to sustain a farming population of many million souls.

Over thirty years have elapsed since the vexed question in practical mechanics known as, "the battle of the gauges," was scientifically and practically decided by the best engineering talent of Great Britain as far her own railways and indeed those of all her colonies with trifling exceptions are concerned.

Living beside a people whose most noted characteristic is the insatiable desire for Radical and experimental change by which they are possessed, it is not matter for astonishment that the subject should be reopened in Canada and that the crude theories on which the accidental narrow gauge system was supported should be revived for its economical fallacies as affording immense and certain gains to anxious shareholders, or that the result so far should not be wholly satisfactory, but rather foreshadowing the inevitable failure of such an experiment in every point of view.

While it is easy to account for theoretical speculation respecting what should govern the conditions of traffic on our system of the great commercial highways of Canada, a conclusion respecting the motives which governed the designs of those reaches of artificial navigation connecting our great Riparian and Lacustrine highways is not so easily arrived at.

Ordinary mortals would think that whatever motives might govern the construction of a railway the design for a canal should be limited by the actual capacity of the water way to which it gave access, but should any such individual wish to have living evidence of how much mistaken common sense frequently may be they have only to inspect our Canadian Canal System to satisfy themselves of that interesting fact.

The Canadian Canal System as it at present exists consists of:

1st. The Chambly Canal opening the navigation of the River Richelieu from Sorel at its embouchure in the St. Lawrence to Lake Champlain. It is 11½ miles long with nine locks each, 120 feet in length, twenty-four feet wide and six feet of water on sills, the canal is thirty-six feet at bottom and 60 feet at water surface, it overcomes a difference of level of seventy-four feet.

2nd. The St. Lawrence Canals, built to overcome the rapids in the river between Montreal and the foot of Lake Ontario, they overcome a total elevation of 207 feet their aggregate length, bay 4¾ miles.

This system is naturally divided into three sections, viz.: the Lachine, Beauharnois, and Cornwall Canals. The locks on the first and second being 200 feet in length, forty-five wide with nine feet water on the sills. In the latter six of its twelve locks have a width of fifty four feet between gate posts.

3rd. The Wolland Canal connecting Lakes Ontario and Erie, difference of level say 330 feet. It is twenty-eight miles in length, has twenty-seven locks, three of them being the same size as the St. Lawrence, twenty-three of 180 feet long, 20½ feet wide each, and one at Lake Erie 240 feet long by forty-five feet in width with ten feet of water on sills.

4th. The Southern branch of the Ottawa River joins the St. Lawrence at Lake St. Louis between the head of Lachine Canal and the foot of the Beauharnois Canal. As rapids occur on this river it has a system of artificial navigation which may be called the Ottawa Canals.

These are naturally in three groups rendering the river navigable to the Capital of the Dominion, and one the St. Anne's Lock 190 feet long, forty-five wide, overcomes a difference of level of 3½ feet has six feet of water on the sill; the Carrillon Canals are three miles in length, the summit level is the North River a tributary of the Ottawa, it ascends to the level of the former, 26 feet above the latter and descends thirteen feet so there is 39 feet of lockage to overcome a fall of 13 feet, it has 3 locks each 128 feet long, 32½ wide, with 5 feet water on sills. The Chute a Blondeau canal has one lock is one sixth of a mile in length, its size is similar to the foregoing and the difference of level 3½ feet. The Grenville Canals are 4¾ miles in length, the difference of level is 45 feet, of which 4 locks rise 32½ feet, they vary in size from 31½ to 32½ feet in width, by 129½ feet in length, and 3 locks overcoming 13½ feet difference of level, varying in size from 106½ to 103½ feet in length, by 19¾ feet in width, with five feet of water on the sills.

The system such as it is opens 110 miles of the Ottawa River for navigable purposes, the canal was built in 1819 by Royal Engineer officers assisted by the artificers corps; the faults of location which are grave were governed by Military considerations, as it was then thought the country between the Ottawa and St. Lawrence was practicable for troops, it became a necessity to locate the canals, on the north bank of the river thus placing a dangerous rapid between them and attack.

5th. Fifty-four miles above the head of the Grenville Canal the Rideau Canal system (the best engineering design on this continent) joins the Ottawa River and Lake Ontario at Kingston.

Constructed by the Late Lieut. Colonel John By, R. E., for strategical purposes it is the only canal on the Canadian system that fulfills all the necessary conditions of a successful practical work, using the streams

of two rivers, one a tributary of the Ottawa from which it takes its name, the other of the St. Lawrence, as its navigable channel, by a series of well-planned dams and weirs restoring them to their normal regime, a navigation absorbing the powers of both streams was secured at a minimum of cost and labor.

The length of this magnificent canal is 126½ miles of which just 16 miles is artificial it has 47 locks, each 134 feet in length by 32 feet wide, with five feet of water on the sills.

Of these locks 33 ascends from the Ottawa River to the summit on West Rideau Lake and 14 descends to Kingston on Lake Ontario.

It is evident from the above list that variety has at least been consulted in designing our Canal system, nor has experience rendered us any wiser, because the enlargement of the narrow locks on the Grenville Canal will be adapted to a navigation of 200 feet in length by 45 wide, with 9 feet of water on the sills, the river being perfectly capable of giving 12 feet, while a vessel drawing 11 feet of water can enter all the Lake ports.

The enlargement of the Grenville canals has been entrusted to Mr. James Goodwin of this city, and he has built one of the most magnificent locks, it has ever been our good fortune to see; the walls are of well houghed limestone, built with a battise of half an inch to the foot, there are no gate piers the recess being formed in the wall, a very decided improvement; the breast wall being outside the gates a vessel 200 feet in length can be locked through.

The gates are built solid each leaf weighing 50 tons, the mitre sills and aprons of oak, the gates will be worked with windlass and chains, the lock walls are about 30 feet high and reflect great credit on every one concerned in their construction.

Since the reorganization of the British Navy under the Whig Radicals it has been impossible to get at a correct list of the armament, tonnage of gun boats and smaller armoured vessels now in use, and therefore cannot say what value our heterogenous system of canals might be in the event of hostilities.

Perhaps some of our English Military and Naval exchanges would kindly publish a list of the vessels now borne on the registers of the British Navy, and let us see what we would have to expect.

FOREIGNERS IN THE UNITED STATES.—In view of the approaching Presidential election, statistics have been prepared showing the number of foreigners according to their nationalities in the United States. It appears that the colored population is 4,835,100, of whom 803,000 are voters; the Irish population is 1,838,678, of whom 306,446 are voters; the German-born population is estimated at 1,679,025, of whom 279,837 have votes; the Welsh 71,004; Scandinavian 206,556, the Swiss 73,954, being the nationalities chiefly noticeable on the list.

### THE ROBINS HAVE COME.

There's a call upon the house-top, an answer from the plain,  
There's a warble in the sunshine, a twitter in the rain.

And through my heart, at sound of these,  
There comes a nameless thrill,  
As sweet as odor to the rose,  
Or verdure to the hill;  
And all these joyous mornings  
My heart pours forth this strain  
"God bless the dear old robins,  
Who have come back again."

For they bring a thought of summer, of dreamy,  
luculent days,  
Of kingcups in the meadow, making a golden  
haze;

A longing for the clover brooms,  
For roses all aglow,  
For fragrant blossoms, where the bees  
With droning murmur go,  
I dream of all the beauties  
Of summer's golden reign,  
And sing: "God keep the robins,  
Who have come back again."

### ARTILLERY RETROSPECT OF THE LAST GREAT WAR.

By LIEUT.-COL. T. B. STRANGE, DOMINION AR-  
TILLERY.

"*Pends toi, Francois; nous n-us sommes  
battus et tu n'y etais pas,*" was the laconic  
letter of the royal soldier *Henri Quatre* to his  
comrade—the same soldier king who gave  
the right royal response, when asked for a  
standard:

"Where'er you see my white plume shine,  
"Amid the ranks of war,  
"There be your oriflamme to-day  
"The helmet of Navarre."

A great war—alas! I fear, by no means  
the last great war—has passed into history;  
and as I was not there to see, how can I ven-  
ture on a retrospect without craving your in-  
dulgence?—which you may be more likely  
to give when I tell you that, to gratify no  
idle curiosity, but simply as a soldier to  
learn, I asked and obtained the sanction of  
H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge to join ei-  
ther of the contending armies, but was given  
to understand that political reasons forbid  
me or any of my brother-officers availing  
ourselves of the permission, even at our own  
risk and cost.

Permission was subsequently granted to a  
few newspaper correspondents; but no  
English artillery officer was present at the  
great drama of the Prussian siege of Paris.  
We were disappointed; but, not inclined to  
follow the advice of Henri to his friend, we  
did not hang ourselves. At the conclusion  
of peace I visited the remains of both armies  
and many of their battle fields. Had some  
friends among the officers of the French ar-  
tillery, acquaintances made in happier days  
at Chalons. I never saw them again; and  
in spite of the contempt heaped upon the  
unsuccessful by the unthinking, I cannot  
but feel, from what I saw and heard from  
their enemies, that they did their duty.

Without further apology, I will aim at my  
object, and try, like a good gunner, to hit it.  
My subject divides itself into—

1st. Salient artillery operations in the  
field, and the lessons we may draw from  
them;

2nd—The sieges and their lessons;

3rd—The artillery personnel and materiel  
of the contending armies;

4th—The general deductions we may  
draw;

#### SALIENT ARTILLERY OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD.

It is commonly supposed that the superi-  
ority of the Prussian artillery was the princi-  
pal cause of the German success and, in  
deed, the Emperor Napoleon himself attrib-  
uted his final disaster at Sedan to the pre-

ponderating influence of the German field  
artillery; but it was not altogether so; the  
artillery was but the keystone of that arch  
of triumph under which the German Emper-  
or marched to victory.

It is easier to blame the grooves of a gun  
than the heart of a great nation. The  
French people (for I hold people responsible  
for their government) preferred a standing  
army and a system of substitutes to a nation-  
al force and universal service; therefore  
they were utterly outnumbered; and their  
centralized system of dealing with war ma-  
terial, of which the English controls a copy,  
rendered it impossible for them to equip  
and mobilize their armies as quickly as the  
Germans, who habitually decentralize and  
delegate the responsibility of equipment to  
the commanders of their local *corps d'armee*,  
and lastly, they were out-generalled, be-  
cause their *etat Major* and system of military  
instruction was inferior to the Prussian.  
Notwithstanding the war-cry, "*a Berlin*,"  
they found themselves on the defensive, ex-  
tended over a long arc from Thionville and  
Metz to Strasbourg; while the Germans  
operated on the shorter chord of that arc by  
the valley of the Saar and the Wissenburg.  
The French advanced posts, too far from  
their supports, hugging the frontier, yet  
not feeling beyond it, knew not of the vast  
German concentration in the wooded coun-  
try close to their front. It is very difficult  
to unravel the thread of artillery action  
from the tangled web of battle, because ar-  
tillery plays a double part in the great game  
—1st, divisional or merely supporting and  
acting with the other arms; 2nd, concentrat-  
ing and striking terrible and decisive blows  
as a separate arm. Moreover, the first ac-  
counts of battles reach us from the pens of  
journalists, generally men of great energy  
and ability; but tall talk is their metier,  
and they are obliged to supply the public de-  
mand for blood and thunder at so much a  
line; even soldiers themselves engaged are  
the poorest narrators of the outline of an ac-  
tion, being so entirely engrossed with what  
passes in their immediate front. Waterloo  
veterans still wrangle as to whether the  
final repulse of the last French column was  
due to the advance of the 52nd or the  
Guards. Comparing small things with great  
I have been unable to recognize the official  
accounts of actions in which I had the honor  
to be engaged.

The first great battle of the last great war  
was at Wissenburg. We cannot linger over  
the historic reminiscences of the old fortress  
that once rolled back the tide of war under  
Marlborough.

In the same locality, the Crown Prince of  
Prussia, with more than forty thousand men  
surprised and destroyed the corps of General  
Douay, only 8,000 strong. While the French  
were cooking their morning soup, the mass  
of Prussian guns having gained the heights  
of Schweigen, suddenly opened a heavy fire  
on the enemy's camp and the village of  
Wissenburg; with the old impetuosity of  
their race, the French sprang to arms, but  
were ordered by General Douay to remain  
as much as possible behind Wissenburg.  
The precaution was useless; the Prussian  
guns, from their commanding position rained  
death upon them, whether they advanced  
or sought shelter. The French artillery con-  
sisting only of three light field batteries and  
one of mitrailleurs, was soon overwhelmed;  
and, according to an official account, "the  
mitrailleurs fired only a few rounds, and  
were easily silenced by the Prussian guns."  
The overwhelming numbers of the Crown  
Prince outflanked and took the hill of Geis-  
burg; the outnumbered French, still pur-  
sued by the deadly Prussian shells, and har-

rassed by the Black Brunswick Hussars,  
turned retreat to rout. Wissenburg was  
quickly followed by Wörth. The French  
position was salient, almost semicircular;  
thus offering to the Prussians the opportu-  
nity over coveted by artilleryists, *viz.*, the  
chance of enfilading both wings from a point  
nearly opposite the centre. The Prussian  
guns were thus massed on the heights south  
of Gorsdorf and north-west of Gunstadt,  
and, as usual, they were felt before they  
were seen. Those on the Gorsdorf heights  
commenced the action by enfilading the  
whole French left, and compelling Marshal  
MacMahon to change the front of the first  
division; the manoeuvre was brilliantly ex-  
ecuted by the French. Later in the day,  
fourteen German batteries (84 guns) near  
Gunstadt, were launched upon the French  
right wing, enfilading it in the line of its  
greatest depth; and not only the fourth di-  
vision, but also the unfortunate second,  
which stood behind them, and had already  
borne the brunt of battle at Wissenburg. A  
battery of the 5th corps, north of Spachbach  
occupied the French guns; these latter are  
said to have been well served but poorly  
handled, for the gallant French artillery  
seem to have forgotten the tactical lessons  
of their great artillery chief, Napoleon I.;  
they, however, nobly sacrificed themselves  
at the close of the action in endeavoring to  
save their broken infantry. At this battle  
also the French were greatly outnumbered,  
and failed to receive assistance from De  
Faily's corps. MacMahon's position was  
strategically good, as fairly covering the two  
important railway communications with  
Strasbourg through Hagenu, and with  
Metz via Bitsche. On the same day that the  
Crown Prince thus severed the French  
army and cut off its right wing, some forty  
miles distant, in a north westerly direction  
from the field of Wörth, the first Prussian  
army, under Steinmetz, assisted by part of  
the second, also cut the French line at  
Spichern, thus hopelessly dividing MacMahon  
and Bazaine. The ridge of Spichern over-  
looks the village of Saarbrück, the scene of  
the *baptême de feu* of the Prince Imperial.  
As usual, the French were surprised by the  
opening of the Prussian artillery six batter-  
ies, from a hill overlooking the valley from  
which a part of Frossard's force had not  
been withdrawn. The leading artillery fea-  
tures of the battle are the rapid bringing up  
and concentration of guns, in some instances  
galloping along the roads to the front, while  
the infantry of their divisions were partly  
sent by rail. This mobility of field artillery  
is possible only to the Prussians—not to the  
French, from a defective system on which I  
shall touch. It is said that the Prussian  
guns, after advancing over the plain, pro-  
duced little impression, firing up hill on the  
French infantry extended on the ridge, from  
the fact that shells fired with percussion  
fuzes either buried themselves in the face of  
the abrupt slope, or flew harmless over the  
heads of the defenders.

The French guns massed on the left to op-  
pose the flanking movement on Sterling, dis-  
lodged the mass of Prussian cavalry, who  
were sent under cover to the other flank,  
this should have been a great gain, because  
the road to Forbach was the strategic line of  
French retreat and support. But the crow-  
ing artillery achievement was the daring  
advance of two batteries of German  
guns up a steep mountain track, on the  
summit of a ridge on the French right,  
where they enfiladed the whole line. I was  
informed through a Prussian general, that  
the French line, who had resisted so gallantly,  
were first shaken by the fire, which drove  
them from their entrenchments, and ren-

dored possible the final advance of German infantry, whose previous losses, while supported only by direct artillery fire, had been terrible; also, at this critical juncture a mass of German guns advanced, and firing across the road and rail, entailed the French left, and threatened to cut off the line of retreat. In the earlier part of this battle the French had the superiority in number and position; but were left by their generals with a most inadequate supply of artillery.—one of these unaccountable mistakes which marked French generalship. While Frossard's force fought splendidly all day, seven divisions of Bazaine's stood inactive ten miles from the valley of the Saar. The Germans having turned the French left by Forbach, the 2nd division, sent by Bazaine, could not cover the retreat of Frossard's utterly disorganized force, which retreated to the south west, leaving open the road to St. Avold and Metz. Then the German armies with a cloud of cavalry in their front, gradually brought up their left flank. The small fortresses of Phalsburg and Bitsche, especially the latter, whose guns commanded the line of rail to the west, compelled them to make a considerable *detour*, and leave behind a masking force. They held out for a long time, and show the advantage of even a small fort on a strategic line of road or rail. The French commanders proposed to abandon the line of the Moselle, leaving a garrison in Metz with orders to defend or die,—the scattered divisions concentrating at Chalons (the only safe point for concentration) there to fight on their well known exercising ground, where, history tells us, the fate of France has before been decided in her favor. With Paris as a base, and reinforcements to swell the army, the result of the war might have been different; but politicians stepped in, and decreed her ruin. Bazaine, appointed to the chief command remained at Metz (where the Emperor also lingered), hoping to fall upon the divisions of German armies crossing to the north and south of Metz; but their whole force passed to the south at Ars, and Pont a Mousson, while Steinmetz had occupied the attention of the French by the battle of Courcelles. This was an obstinate soldier's battle, without any particular display of tactical skill. Bazaine committed an error in fighting at all; having previously determined to retreat towards Verdun, he should have done so, and left the protection of his rear to the fortress, instead of fighting a battle with his army astride of the Moselle, and an enemy whose object it was to detain him. The French engineers had unaccountably neglected to blow up the bridges over the Moselle, to the south, though they destroyed some in their own line of retreat. Bazaine's first march was a very short one, and impeded by an enormous quantity of baggage; he gives a further reason for delay in the fact that the French intendants, or control department, had stowed away six million of cartridges without telling him where to find them, and moreover, had forgotten their whereabouts. This gave the Germans time; they pushed forward as far as Mars-la-Tour with cavalry and guns, and struck the head of the French advance, also cavalry, apparently without guns. The French prepared to charge; but the German cavalry, who masked their guns, wheeling right and left, opened out and left the guns to work their deadly destiny, and thus turn the tide of French retreat.

At Vionville and Rezonville, in a somewhat similar manner, the French columns were fiercely struck, and held by cavalry and artillery until the infantry came up. The success of the final infantry onslaught is attributed by Captain Hosier to the Prussian

artillery being as usual massed on their enemies' flank. The extraordinary mobility of the Prussian field artillery, principally due to their system of carrying sufficient men on limbers and gun-axle seats, rendered possible their style of vigorous artillery action, impossible to the French with their antiquated system of carrying gunners on the wag-gons, or leaving them away behind out of breath.

The Prussian cavalry sacrificed themselves with the same heroic gallantry, as the English at Balaclava, with the difference that their self sacrifice had a strategic object and result, viz., holding the French for their comrades to come up. One terrible charge was made through two French batteries with bodies of infantry in their rear, to be finally met by the hostile cavalry. A little more than a fourth of the horsemen responded to the regimental call at that night's bivouac.

The French fought with the determined fury of their race, and inflicted terrible loss on their enemies, considering that they had gained a victory; but as corps after corps came into position on their left, and wheeled up, the German army, which at first looked northward, finished the fight with its front to the Rhine; while Bazaine had been compelled to fight with his face towards Chalons and Paris his line of retreat, just a fortnight from the opening affair at Saarbruck. After these bloody struggles at Mars-La-Tours, Vionville and Rezonville, Bazaine took up a position at Gravelotte. He had been nearly taken prisoner by the rapid German advance whose guns actually opened fire on the rear of the Emperor's escort as he left the army with his son. The tactical advantages of Gravelotte as a defensive position shewed skill in the selection of ground, for which Marshal Bazaine is famous. It is a long ridge the top of which forms an open natural glacis; the crest was strongly entrenched, and his artillery there posted; the left rests on densely wooded ravines, running down to the Moselle; and one of these parallel to the face of the position, is difficult to cross except by the road running at right angles to the French front, which was swept with guns, and the fire of a fortified farm-house. The Prussians lost terribly in repeated attempts to attack by this road. The difficulties of assault on the left of the position rendered it almost entirely an artillery action, where 84 Prussian guns were deployed by a most spirited manoeuvre. They galloped up a lane through one of these ravines, which concealed them till they reached the plateau south of Gravelotte. The guns were crowded, to avoid drawing fire by extending in front of the village, which was used as a field hospital; and the loss of the Prussian artillery here is evident from the mounds of earth that mark their resting place—"man and horse in one red burial blent." The three leading batteries were met by the fire of four *mitrailleurs*; but concentrating their whole fire on the nearest, there remained nothing but wreck after a single round. The second and third were treated to a similar dose of concentration, and the fourth retired precipitately to avoid annihilation.

This concentration of fire, to be produced in the heat of battle, must be inculcated and practiced in peace. The whole 84 thus concentrated on the French guns, silenced them in succession. This sort of advance of the right men, at the right time in the right place, was in a great measure due to the excellent maps served out to artillery commanders by the Prussian War-Office. I was favored with the loan of one of these that belonged to a captain of artillery; it was a photograph-copy of the map of the French survey. They were turned out in Prussia

by thousands long before the war; and, though it folded up so as to fit the pocket, it was so clear that by its aid any average artillery commander could act with trenchant certainty. Among the sayings of soldiers worth remembering is that of Marshal Saxe, that "the first requirements of an army were legs, the 2nd logs, and the 3rd logs." It is equivalent to that of Wellington, who reiterated "boots;" with us it might possibly be "snowshoes." Prussian officers reiterate "maps"—accurate maps distributed to squadron-leaders, and battery commanders. The infantry working in larger units, do not require so many, except on outposts. The French resisted every assault, until as usual outflanked by the Prussians—the Guards and Saxons—whose artillery, occupying the hill at St. Privat, at right angles to the French position, enfiladed it, and rendered possible the steady advance of the infantry. It is worthy of note that the isolated attempts of German artillery to advance in the open to close range, 600 yards, against infantry in shelter trenches, resulted in artillery destruction. On one of these occasions, a single gun, one officer and three gunners alone remained; and when ordered to retire, the young subaltern's reply, from the midst of his dying comrades, was: "Tell General Steinmetz, that where guns have advanced, there also can infantry; let him send supports to me; I will not retire to them; rather will I die on my gun-carriage and rest here with my comrades." He was as good as his word: he did not retire from his position until he had expended his last shot, and brought his gun, which he had worked with the assistance of his three gunners, safely out of action, for the infantry did not come forward until much later.

The final catastrophe of Sedan was the greatest triumph of the German artillery. When that fatal morning dawned the unfortunate French saw, from every gentle hill of the amphitheatre that surrounded them, the white puffs that showed the trial shots of the German guns. Their concentrated fire was unendurable, and enfiladed each face of the old fortress situated in a basin; and thus a fortress and an army fell before the field guns of an army wielded with strategic skill. Of course we must not forget that it was political interference that dictated a movement on a line that ended in a fight with a neutral instead of a friendly territory in the rear.

Not much artillery incident of value is to be gained by following the struggles of the brave but ignorant and undisciplined levies, *en masse*, who organised by eloquent *avocats*, tried in vain to oppose the national army of a people who for half a century had patiently practised the art of war in peace, and were not too effeminate to ignore the duty of personal service without exception, for peasant, peer or prince.

(To be continued.)

POWER OF THE PRESS.—I love to hear the rumbling of the steam power press, better than the rattle and roar of artillery. It is silently attacking and vanquishing the Malakoffs of vice, and Rodans of evil, and its parallels and approaches cannot be resisted. I like the click of the type in the composing stick, better than the click of a musket in the hands of a soldier. It bears a loaden messenger of deadlier power, of sublimer force, and surer aim, which will hit its mark, though a thousand years pass away!—*Chapin.*



## CORRESPONDENCE.

[The Editor does not hold himself responsible for individual expressions of opinion in communications addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.]

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

Doubtless the world would be a dull place to live in were there no such thing as diversity of opinion; nevertheless, I cannot but regret, that as Editor of a Journal which assumes to represent the ideas and sentiments of the Active Militia, you should on this question of the Draft take up a position which, I will venture to say, is dissonant with the views thereon of nineteen twentieths of the officers of that force, who can lay claim to any lengthened experience.

Your editorial remarks, however, on my letter of the 29th ult., show that the position is a very weak one; so much so, that I trust ere long to see you abandon it as utterly in defensible.

I can hardly think you serious when you declare yourself opposed to the Ballot "because it would force into the ranks the man incapable of acquiring the habits or discipline of a soldier, the coward, &c." I have lived pretty much all my life in Canada, but if there is a class of our young men such as you speak of, I have as yet failed to recognize it. An individual dull and stupid, and with no great stomach for fighting, may, no doubt, be found here and there. I know we occasionally meet them in the present force, as they will always be found in any and every force. But I deny emphatically, that in the Dominion, any such class exists, sufficiently large to form the ground of an argument against putting the Ballot in force. To think otherwise would be a reflection, and a very serious one, on the manhood of our budding nationality. Unless we are more stupid and cowardly than other people, your objection, if an argument against the draft in Canada, might have equal weight in every other country. The Prussian authorities, however, do not appear to have ever recognized the force of it.

Pardon me, if I do not consider you more happy in the objection which you attempt to illustrate by the case of Herr Krupp. If the Ballot is put in force, it is wrong to state that every man must serve. Every man of a certain age would be liable to serve, just as under the old Militia system every such man was liable to serve in case of emergency. With the Ballot enforced, not every man, but a very small per-centage of the men of the country would have to serve in order to keep on foot a force of 40,000, more or less, probably some two per cent of the male population would give the necessary quota. Nor need any Canadian Krupp dread getting into trouble through the Ballot. There could be no well grounded objection to allowing him to provide a fit and proper substitute, (indeed, you appear to have lost sight of the fact that the Militia Act of 1868, has already made ample provision for this contingency,) if his usual avocations were of sufficient

magnitude to justify him in doing so—or if thought more desirable, he might be exempt on the payment of a suitable fine into the public exchequer. But though few men, whose time was of great value, would, if once Balloted, object to being obliged to furnish a proper substitute, or pay a certain sum in money. I fear that a great many, so many indeed that their name is legion, would object, and object very strongly indeed, to having a poll tax placed on their property, because they were unwilling to volunteer for the defence of the country. Let the Government attempt it, and I am mistaken, if they do not awaken such a tempest as they will not readily forget.

That the Ballot was devised for use in case of war, is quite true. But, Mr. Editor, can you point to any system of enrolment which is not devised, ostensibly at least, for use in case of war? I differ with you, however, *to loco caelo*, when you assert that for such a contingency it should be reserved. Unless there is some radical objection to its use in time of peace, (which most certainly I consider you as yet have failed to show) unless it is manifestly inferior to some other system, I am unable to see why it should necessarily be reserved for the contingency which you specify. That those best fitted by position and opportunity to form a correct opinion on this point, do not agree with you, is evident from the fact that the different Deputy Adjutant Generals of the Dominion, without a solitary exception, have, in their respective reports to Colonel P. Robertson Ross, lately published, given expression to their conviction that the time has arrived when the Ballot should be put in force. Lt.-Col. Taylor, D.A.G., No. 1 District, says:—"I am of opinion, that presuming it is required, that every corps shall assemble for annual drill in the full authorized strength—the aid of the Ballot will be required to effect this."

Lt. Col. Durie, D.A.G., No. 2 District, referring to this subject remarks:—"The Regular Militia on the other hand would give less trouble to all concerned; the musters of the men would be sure, companies full strength, and the community at large would be drilled in detail, year after year. There is no doubt but that this system is the most just and fair to all.

In connection with this district, the Adjutant General himself remarks that the majority of officers commanding corps in it, appear to consider it necessary and desirable to fill up the ranks by means of the Ballot."

Lt.-Col. Patterson, D. A. G. No. 3 District, thus expresses himself, "I do not think that corps can be kept up to their establishment by the present system of volunteering, I believe the time has arrived when the Ballot must be resorted to to fill up."

Referring to the subject of recruiting corps in No. 4 District, Lt.-Col. Jackson informs the Adjutant-General—"that without the assistance of the Ballot it cannot be done satisfactorily." And again Lt.-Col.

Jackson remarks:—"Captains find so much difficulty in recruiting, that they think the labor too great to undertake, to maintain their companies purely by the volunteer system, and the frequent resignations of the officers show the desire to escape so laborious a task."

Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith, C. M. G., A. G.; No. 5 District, states as follows:—"As a large number of men in this District, will complete their service before the conclusion of the present financial year, I have endeavored to obtain by communication with officers commanding corps, whether they consider it probable that recruits or re-enlisted men are likely to fill up the ranks of the respective Battalions. With very few exceptions the answers are in the negative, and a strong desire is expressed that the Ballot be enforced."

Lt. Col. Harwood, D. A. G. No. 6 District, reports thus:—"In more than one locality on account of the floating population, it would not be prudent to rely on even half of the men regularly enrolled. After having consulted with the officers commanding corps in my district, I have come to the conclusion that the Ballot must be resorted to."

Lt.-Col. Duchesney, D. A. G. No. 7 District, speaks as follows—"The three years having expired for the service of companies in this District, I may state that with certainty that two thirds of the Volunteers enrolled in 1868, will claim their discharge. I find by the opinions of the several officers commanding Battalions in the District, that they all concur in stating that it will be impossible to fill up the rolls anew by the Volunteer system."

Lt.-Col. Maunsell, D. A. G., No. 8 District, is of opinion—"that in some instances, chiefly in cities and towns the necessity and desirability on military grounds for completing the deficiencies in the ranks by means of the Ballot as prescribed and authorized in the existing Militia Law, is now apparent." He then goes on to observe that—"having in compliance with your instructions, placed myself in communication with officers commanding corps, you will observe, that the majority of these gentlemen bear me out and endorse the above opinion."

Lt.-Col. Sinclair, D. A. G. No. 9 District, referring to the Brigade Camp at Aylesford, says:—"All the captains but one state they cannot keep up their strength except by the Ballot, which they recommended."

The Adjutant General of the Dominion, Col. P. Robertson Ross, makes no secret of his own opinion, in his annual Report for 1871, he observes:—"A feeling appears to prevail in the force in favor of a Regular instead of a Volunteer Militia. Experience proves that the strongest national military organization, is that one which is founded on the principle of obligatory service."

The foregoing brief extracts from the various reports, leave no room for doubt as to what is the opinion of those who have had most experience in the practical working of the Volunteer system *pur et simple*. A more unanimous verdict in favor of the Ballot it would be difficult to imagine.

As this letter is already much too long, I must reserve any further remarks for a future occasion.

Yours, &c,

ROLLO.

L'Orignal, 6th May, 1872.