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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — WORKING PAPERS (WP)

1987



WP

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1988

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — WORKING PAPERS (WP)

1987

PREFACE

This volume covers the working papers submitted at the Conference on Disarmament during the 1987 sessions relating to the subject of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It has been compiled to facilitate discussion and research on the outer space issue.

WP

43241-443

**ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA**

FEBRUARY 1988
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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

1987

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Date</u>
CD/733 (extract)		Letter Dated 14 January 1987 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament adopted by PREFACE	14.01.1987
CD/742	USSR	Letter Dated 2 March 1987 from the Acting Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of a Statement Made by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 18 February 1987	02.03.1987
CD/746 (extract)	USSR	Letter Dated 18 March 1987 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Text of a Declaration Adopted by the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States Held on 24-25 March 1987 in Warsaw	17.03.1987
CD/738 (extract)	Mongolia	Letter Dated 6 April 1987 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent	06.04.1987

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1987

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CD/733 (extract)		Letter Dated 14 January 1987 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its Forty-First Session	19.01.1987
CD/741		Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee Under Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament Entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	26.02.1987
CD/742	USSR	Letter Dated 2 March 1987 from the Acting Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of a Statement Made by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 28 February 1987	02.03.1987
CD/748 (extract)	USSR	Letter Dated 26 March 1987 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Transmitting the Text of Documents Adopted by the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States Held on 24-25 March 1987 in Moscow	27.03.1987
CD/750 (extract)	Mongolia	Letter Dated 8 April 1987 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent	08.04.1987

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Date</u>
		Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic Transmitting a Statement Made by the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic Dated 4 April 1987	
CD/751 (extract)	USSR	Letter Dated 13 April 1987 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Text of the Foreign Policy Section of the Statement Made by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Rally Held in Prague on 10 April 1987	13.04.1987
CD/755 (extract)	GDR	Letter Dated 1 June 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Text of the Communique on the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Held in Berlin on 28 and 29 May 1987, and the Statement of the Military Doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Issued at the Session	02.06.1987
CD/758	Argentina India Mexico Sweden	Letter Dated 16 June 1987 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Text of a Joint Statement Made by the Five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the First President of Tanzania on 22 May 1987	17.06.1987

<u>Reference</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Date</u>
CD/759	USSR	Letter Dated 17 June 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting the Response, Dated 11 June 1987, of M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Joint Statement Made on 22 May 1987 by the Leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania	17.06.1987
CD/767 (extract)	China	Working Paper on Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Realization of Nuclear Disarmament	06.07.1987
CD/773	Canada	Summary Report of the Outer Space Workshop Held in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987	20.07.1987
CD/777	GDR Mongolia	Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects	31.07.1987
CD/783 (extract)		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	20.08.1987
CD/786		Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	24.08.1987

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
1964

The Conference on Disarmament was held in Geneva from 1978 to 1984. It was the first multilateral conference on disarmament since the 1945-46 Conference on Security and Disarmament. The Conference was convened by the United Nations Secretary-General and was held in Geneva, Switzerland. The Conference was held in Geneva from 1978 to 1984. It was the first multilateral conference on disarmament since the 1945-46 Conference on Security and Disarmament. The Conference was convened by the United Nations Secretary-General and was held in Geneva, Switzerland.

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1964

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/733
19 January 1987

Original: ENGLISH
(Extract)

LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 1987 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS
ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
FORTY-FIRST SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the resolutions and the decision, adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament in 1987. The relevant provisions of those resolutions and the decision are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Conference, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and a decision dealing with or relating to disarmament matters which were adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(A) Resolutions and decision that entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament

At its forty-first session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

...

41/53 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

...

"R

41/86 O "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

...

(6) In resolution 41/53, operative paragraph 5 reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space; operative paragraph 7 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1986 session of the Conference and at the forty-first session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 8 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 9 urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work; and operative paragraph 12 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

(21) In resolution 41/86 O, operative paragraph 5 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war, to intensify negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction; and operative paragraph 7 invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation

negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

/...

(B) Other resolutions and decision dealing with disarmament matters

At its forty-first session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters:

/...

CD/733
page 10

41/86 A "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"

...

41/86 K "International co-operation for disarmament"

41/86 N "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"

...



II. Resolutions relating to disarmament matters

It should be noted that, at its forty-first session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are relating to disarmament matters:

/...

- 41/64 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 41/65 "Principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth from outer space"
- 41/66 "Question of the review of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space"

/...



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/41/53
7 January 1987

Forty-first session
Agenda item 54

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/41/837)]

41/53. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1/ have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

1/ Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984 and 40/87 of 12 December 1985 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 3/ held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament, 4/

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex.

4/ See Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982 (A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2), para. 426. The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

Convinced that further measures are urgently needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and in their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, 5/ of working out effective agreements aimed, inter alia, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question, 6/

Welcoming the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

1. Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;
2. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;
3. Emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;
4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of

5/ A/40/1070, annex.

6/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27), sect. III. E.



maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1986 session of the Conference and at the forty-first session of the General Assembly;

8. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1987 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

10. Calls upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to convey to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the wish of the Member States for the early completion of the Institute's study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequences of extending the arms race into outer space;

12. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/41/86
9 January 1987

Forty-first session
Agenda item 62

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/41/842)]

- 41/86. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Noting its resolutions 38/183 P of 20 December 1983, 39/148 B of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 B of 16 December 1985,

Noting with satisfaction that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, 1/

Noting that in their joint statement of 8 January 1985 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America agreed that the subject of the negotiations was a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship, 2/

1/ See A/40/1070, annex.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/642/Appendix II/Vol. II), documents CD/570 and CD/571.

Noting that at the further meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986, although no comprehensive agreement was reached, intensive discussion of far-reaching arms-control understandings took place,

Noting also that a large measure of agreement was reached on a number of issues,

Noting further with satisfaction that the two sides remain committed to further progress in their bilateral negotiations, building on what has been achieved so far,

Expressing its appreciation to the two Governments concerned for their readiness to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility, and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of their agreed objectives in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament;
2. Urges the two Governments to make early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground;
3. Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

96th plenary meeting
4 December 1986

... that at the further meeting of the Commission on Disarmament and International Security, which was held in Geneva on 12-13 October 1986, the Commission was requested to continue its work on the agenda item on disarmament and to report to the General Assembly at its next session.

Noting further with satisfaction that the two sides remain committed to further progress in their bilateral negotiations, building on what has been achieved so far,

Expressing its appreciation to the two Governments concerned for their readiness to keep open the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with paragraph 10 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and its appreciation to the two Governments for their continued efforts to achieve a comprehensive and balanced agreement on disarmament,

K

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to expedite the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

/...

1 December 1986

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 23/ and its resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981, 37/78 B of 9 December 1982, 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, 39/148 M of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 I of 16 December 1985,

Stressing the vital need to proceed to concrete measures towards halting the arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interests of all States in the adoption of concrete effective disarmament measures, which would, inter alia, release considerable material, financial and human resources to be used for peaceful purposes and particularly for overcoming economic underdevelopment, especially in the developing countries,

Stressing the importance of the appeals and proposals of the group of six States of five continents and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of their unswerving efforts to achieve genuine disarmament,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/

Stressing that international co-operation for disarmament should, as a matter of priority, be aimed at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, the discontinuation of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space and at confidence-building as an indispensable component of relations among States,

Believing that the two nuclear-weapon States that possess the most important nuclear arsenals should jointly take the lead and show a good example in curbing the nuclear-arms race while mutually refraining from launching weapons into outer space,

Conscious that in the nuclear space age the reliable security of all countries can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all States,

1. Invites all States to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, so that they may prevent qualitative enhancement and quantitative accumulation of weapons, as well as the development of new types and systems of weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction;

2. Stresses the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;
3. Emphasizes the necessity of refraining from the dissemination of any doctrines and concepts endangering international peace and justifying the unleashing of nuclear war, which lead to the deterioration of the international situation and to the further intensification of the arms race and which are detrimental to the generally recognized necessity of international co-operation for disarmament;
4. Declares that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 24/ constitutes a phenomenon incompatible with the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;
5. Reiterates its profound conviction that outer space should be excluded from the sphere of military preparations and used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind;
6. Appeals to States that are members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in the spirit of international co-operation for disarmament, the gradual mutual limitation of military activities of these groupings, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;
7. Calls upon all Member States and the international organizations concerned to continue to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;
8. Calls upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, while observing the principle of undiminished security, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war.

96th plenary meeting
4 December 1986

N

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/18 of 18 November 1985,

Recalling also the Harare Appeal on Disarmament, 25/ adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned over the continuing escalation of the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that this increases the risk of nuclear war and endangers the survival of humanity,

Convinced that the alternative today in the nuclear age is not between war or peace, but between life and death, which makes the prevention of nuclear war the principal task of our times,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

1. Appeals to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to conduct, pursuant to their special obligations and responsibilities as leading nuclear-weapon States, their bilateral negotiations with the greatest resolve with a view to achieving agreements on concrete and effective measures for the halting of the nuclear-arms race, radical reduction of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

2. Invites the two negotiating parties to keep the General Assembly duly informed of the progress of their negotiations.

96th plenary meeting
4 December 1986

25/ See A/41/697-S/18362, annex, sect. I.

0

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions
of the tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 12/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981, 37/78 F of 9 December 1982, 38/183 H of 20 December 1983, 39/148 O of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 N of 16 December 1985 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of more than eight years since that session, that in the mean time the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, has gained in intensity, that there has been further deployment of nuclear weapons in some parts of the world, that annual global military expenditures are estimated to have reached the staggering figure of \$1,000 billion, that mankind is faced with a real danger of spreading the arms race into outer space, that urgent measures to prevent nuclear war and for disarmament have not been adopted and that continued colonial domination and foreign occupation, open threats, pressures and military intervention against independent States and violations of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations have taken place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security,

Convinced that the escalation of the nuclear-arms race, in both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

Believing that the preservation of the existing bilateral, regional and global system of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the strict observance of such agreements by their parties are important elements of disarmament efforts at all levels,

/...

Noting with great concern that no real progress in disarmament negotiations has been achieved in the course of several years,

Stressing once again that the active participation of Member States in effective disarmament negotiations is necessary for discharging their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, that all States have the right to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future and that all States should refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retains all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. Expresses its grave concern over the acceleration and intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, which increase the danger of nuclear war and constitute a threat to the continued survival of mankind;
2. Calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;
3. Invites all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;
4. Calls upon the two leading nuclear-weapon States to pursue their negotiations with renewed determination and taking into account the interest of the entire international community in order to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals, prevent the arms race in outer space and undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament;
5. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war, to intensify negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

/...

6. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

7. Invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session".

96th plenary meeting
4 December 1986

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Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the
agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled
"Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1987 Session.

CONFIDENTIAL
25 February 1955

Original - CONFIDENTIAL


Agreement for an All-Union Conference on Disarmament
Agreement for an All-Union Conference on Disarmament
Agreement for an All-Union Conference on Disarmament

In the course of the negotiations on the subject of disarmament, the Soviet Union and the United States have reached an understanding on the need for a conference on disarmament. The Soviet Union has proposed that the conference should be held in Moscow, and the United States has agreed to this proposal. It is understood that the conference will be held in Moscow in the near future.

The conference will be held in Moscow, and it is expected that it will be a very successful one. It is hoped that the conference will lead to a reduction in the arms race and to a more peaceful world.

The conference will be held in Moscow, and it is expected that it will be a very successful one. It is hoped that the conference will lead to a reduction in the arms race and to a more peaceful world.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/742

2 March 1987

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1987 FROM THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, ON 28 FEBRUARY 1987

I transmit to you herewith the text of a statement made by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 28 February 1987. I should be grateful if you would circulate this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Jarkov

STATEMENT BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

On 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union put forward an historic programme, a programme for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. In suggesting it, we proceeded from the firm conviction that future security is nuclear-free security. The Soviet leadership and the country's Defence Council, which it is my function to head, have the problems of the security of our country, of the security of our allies and of universal security constantly at the centre of their attention. We have not the slightest doubt that the security of the world and the survival of humanity must be ensured by joint efforts and political means, not by weapons.

The common sense of peoples, the overwhelming majority of parties and movements and the natural instinct of self-preservation refuse to accept the logic of the suicide of humanity. Guided by awareness of a great responsibility to the world, the Soviet Union is in favour of finding mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of a nuclear-free, non-violent world.

At the recent Forum in Moscow, we once again felt the expectations, concerns and intense quests of outstanding representatives of science, culture, politics and religion, we were once again acutely aware of the crucial nature of our times.

Reykjavik showed that nuclear disarmament is an entirely realistic policy. In the Icelandic capital, we were one step away from agreement on a whole range of decisions that would, in sum, have meant a deep breakthrough on the front of nuclear danger. Therein lie the greatness and the tragedy of Reykjavik. Greatness because there was opened up the attainable prospect of a nuclear-free world. Tragedy because powerful forces still held captive by a mentality of nuclear strength opposed accords.

Everyone knows what has happened since Reykjavik. The American Administration has backed away from what was achieved. Despite our efforts to impart to them dynamism and specificity, the Soviet-American negotiations are again being deliberately blocked. And those same leaders who considered it logical to examine in Reykjavik the entire package of proposals covering strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles, space weaponry and nuclear tests are now engaged in sabotaging agreements in each of these areas, pleading that the Soviet Union insists on their resolution as a package. In actual fact, the negotiations are being blocked by narrow, selfish interests, by unwillingness to forgo counting on military and technological superiority, by illusory calculations about being able to get ahead, primarily through outer space.

To us, such an approach is alien and, more than that, it is unacceptable. Our policy of principle is tirelessly to seek solutions that will open up the way to mutually acceptable agreements, to equal security.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, having recently considered the package of issues connected with the implementation of the programme for a nuclear-free world, has decided to make yet another major step in this direction.

Today, I wish to announce, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, that our decision was the following:

The Soviet Union suggests that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe should be singled out from the package of issues, that a separate agreement should be concluded on it and that that should be done without delay. For such a step, there is not merely a basis, but an agreement that is actually ready. In Reykjavik, it was agreed that the USSR and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe over the next five years. During that period, the number of Soviet missiles of this class in the Asian part of our territory would be reduced to 100 warheads, on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of medium-range-missile warheads in its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe has been signed, the USSR will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the Governments of those countries, the extended-range theatre missiles that were deployed there in response to the deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles in western Europe. As far as other theatre missiles are concerned, we are willing to begin talks immediately with a view to their reduction and complete elimination.

Thus, there is a real possibility of freeing our common European home from a substantial proportion of the nuclear burden within a very short period of time. That would be a real and major step towards the complete liberation of Europe from nuclear arms. We are putting our proposals on the table of the negotiations with the United States in Geneva.

We have been assured more than once that, if the USSR singles out the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, there will be no difficulty in agreeing to their elimination from Europe. Now there is a good opportunity of proving that in practice. That is awaited by the Europeans and the peoples of other continents, that is required by the interests of the present and of the future.

In singling out now the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Government continues to consider it extremely important to reach agreement on the substantial limitation and then the elimination of strategic arms. Of course, the conclusion of such an agreement, as has repeatedly been emphasized, is bound to be subject to a decision on the inadmissibility of the deployment of weapons in outer space, in view of the organic interconnection between these questions.

The Soviet Union is again demonstrating its will - notwithstanding all the difficulties and artificial obstructions - to resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament. The new way of thinking means an ability to heed the voice of public opinion, in Europe and the world, to comprehend the concerns and interests of other peoples and not to divorce one's own security from that of neighbours in our interconnected world.

The historic chance must not be missed! We await a speedy and positive reply.

Today, I wish to announce, on behalf of the British people, that our decision was the following:

The British people have decided that the British Empire shall be a permanent and indivisible Empire. It shall be a free Empire, a just Empire, a peaceful Empire, and a united Empire. It shall be an Empire in which the rights of all peoples shall be protected, and in which the interests of all peoples shall be served. It shall be an Empire in which the British people shall be free to live and work as they see fit, and in which the British people shall be free to defend their Empire as they see fit.

It is the policy of the British people to support the United Nations, and to work for the peace and stability of the world. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of democracy, and to work for the freedom of all peoples. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of justice, and to work for the well-being of all peoples.

It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of international law, and to work for the maintenance of world order. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of self-determination, and to work for the independence of all peoples. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of non-interference, and to work for the sovereignty of all peoples.

It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of mutual respect, and to work for the understanding of all peoples. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of good will, and to work for the friendship of all peoples. It is the policy of the British people to support the principles of peace, and to work for the happiness of all peoples.

The British people are proud of their Empire, and they are proud of their role in the world. They are proud of the achievements of their Empire, and they are proud of the values of their Empire. They are proud of the strength of their Empire, and they are proud of the unity of their Empire. They are proud of the future of their Empire, and they are proud of the hope of their Empire.

STATEMENT OF DISARMAMENT

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the arms and munitions mentioned in the schedule attached to this statement are the property of the Government of the State of [State Name] and are being disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Arms and Munitions Act, 1953.

The arms and munitions mentioned in the schedule are being disposed of by the [Department Name] and the proceeds of the sale are being deposited in the [Treasury Name].

I hereby certify that the arms and munitions mentioned in the schedule are being disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Arms and Munitions Act, 1953.

[Signature]
[Name]
[Designation]

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/748
27 March 1987

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
(Extract)

LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1987 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF DOCUMENTS ADOPTED BY THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES HELD ON 24-25 MARCH 1987 IN MOSCOW

I have the honour to transmit the texts of documents adopted by the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held on 24 and 25 March 1987 in Moscow. The documents are the Communiqué, the Statement for furthering the CSCE process and bringing the Vienna follow-up meeting to a successful conclusion and the Statement of the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I should be obliged if you would make the necessary arrangements to have these texts circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Y. NAZARKIN
Ambassador
Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Conference on Disarmament

COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES

A regular meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held in Moscow on 24-25 March 1987.

The meeting was attended by the following Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Peter Mladenov, of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Peter Varkonyi, of the Hungarian People's Republic, Oscar Fischer, of the German Democratic Republic, Marian Orzechowski, of the Polish People's Republic, Ioan Totu, of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Eduard Shevardnadze, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Bohuslav Chňoupek, of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs exchanged views on the state of affairs in Europe and in the world as a whole. The discussions centred on the cardinal issues of our time: removal of the nuclear threat, ridding mankind of the burden of nuclear and other arms, strengthening European and universal security, and development of international co-operation.

The participants in the meeting, having expressed the concern of the countries over the fact that the complex international situation persists as a result of the intensification of the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, through the actions of the United States and NATO, emphasized the need to intensify and combine the efforts of all countries for the purposes of disarmament, and resolutely to press for the establishment of a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

It was pointed out at the meeting that the large-scale proposals which had been put forward by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik signified a qualitatively new approach to disarmament issues and were a further development of the programme set out in the 15 January 1986 Statement by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, for the establishment of a nuclear-free world. The Warsaw Treaty Member States are resolved to work to make further headway from the ground gained in the capital of Iceland, to seek deep, radical cuts in and the elimination of nuclear weapons, to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space, and to press for strict observance of the terms of the ABM Treaty. It is essential to do everything to enable the accords which had begun to emerge to become embodied in specific agreements. In this connection the Warsaw Treaty Member States again advocated the continuation and deepening of political dialogue between countries.

The States represented at the meeting emphasized the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to sign without delay a separate agreement, under which United States and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe would be fully eliminated. They support the Soviet Union's proposal on this score and welcome its readiness to withdraw longer-range theatre missiles from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the Governments of those countries, immediately after a Soviet-United States agreement is signed. As far as other theatre missiles are concerned, the USSR is prepared immediately to begin talks with a view to reducing and completely eliminating them. The conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles as soon as possible would open the way for the complete deliverance of Europe from nuclear weapons.

The participants in the meeting called for the immediate termination of the implementation of the SDI, as well as of the development of projects such as the "European Defence Initiative", bearing in mind the extremely dangerous consequences of the realization of such plans.

The Warsaw Treaty Member States reaffirm their determination to seek a general and complete ban on nuclear tests, and are in favour of the start of talks with a view to concluding an agreement on this issue as soon as possible.

/...

8. The Warsaw Treaty Member States are fully resolved to press for the formation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security in co-operation with other countries, and will continue to contribute to expanding and deepening international co-operation in all fields -- military, political, economic, and humanitarian -- with a view to establishing such a system. The development of a constructive dialogue, both bilateral and multilateral, in the international community concerning principles for a world that would be safe for everyone would make it possible to determine the most effective ways and specific measures for the restructuring of international relations in accordance with the aspirations of all peoples in conformity with the realities of the nuclear and space age.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/750
8 April 1987

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

(Extract)

LETTER DATED 8 APRIL 1987 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE
BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC DATED 4 APRIL 1987

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement made by the
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's
Republic dated 4 April 1987.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of this statement as
an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(signed) Luvsandorjiin BAYART
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic attaches great value to the results of the regular meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States which was held in Moscow on 24-25 March. The important documents produced at the meeting contained constructive and practical proposals aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation, implementing genuine measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, furthering pan-European détente in all areas, and strengthening peace and security in Europe.

This is evidence of the steadfast determination of the Warsaw Treaty Member States to accumulate their pressing efforts in favour of the implementation of the major peace initiatives put forward by the socialist countries, in particular the Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986 and the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty Member States of 11 June 1986 concerning the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of conventional armaments, the prevention of the militarization of space, the shaping of a comprehensive system of international security, and the creation of a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/751
13 April 1987

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
(Extract)

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1987 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AT THE CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP RALLY HELD IN PRAGUE ON 10 APRIL 1987

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the foreign policy section of the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship rally held in Prague on 10 April 1987.

I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to circulate this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. Nazarkin
Ambassador

Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT MADE BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF
THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AT THE CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET
FRIENDSHIP RALLY HELD IN PRAGUE ON 10 APRIL 1987

(Foreign policy section)

Distinguished comrades! The age in which we live is confronting us with difficult, not to say brain-racking questions concerning the fates of peace and of the future of humanity.

The interdependence of the modern world is such that all peoples are like climbers roped together on a mountain slope. They can either climb on together, towards the summit, or fall together into the abyss. If that is not to happen, political leaders must rise above narrowly-perceived interests and realize how dramatic the present situation is. That is why the need for a new political outlook in the nuclear era is so acute. Only such a new outlook can bring all the participants in international relations to take urgent measures to prevent the nuclear disaster that threatens to destroy humanity.

It cannot be said that the idea of a new outlook has not elicited any response. On the contrary, the number of people in the world who share it is growing. They include scientists, doctors, the representatives of many other professions, and artists, as was demonstrated yet again during the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" held recently in Moscow.

In these and other matters we are seeing evidence of a new approach to international issues on the part of a number of leading Western politicians and statesmen too. But those are only the first shoots. In the West, old stereotypes are still strong and are leaving their imprint on foreign policy. Truly to say that the new political outlook has become a real force will be possible only when the disarmament process has finally been set in motion.

Can we hope for that? What are the prospects today?

I will say at once that there is hope, the danger of war can be reduced. That conviction is based both on the growing realization around the world that a nuclear conflict would have fatal consequences for humanity and on the chances revealed at Reykjavik of reaching agreement on drastic cuts in and the elimination of the most destructive types of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has, conscious of what its action entails, been declaring its desire to seek mutually-acceptable solutions to the entire range of nuclear disarmament issues. The fundamental problem remains radical cuts in offensive strategic weapons. We, as is well known, are ready to take the most resolute steps in that respect, including both a 50 per cent cut in such weapons over five years and complete elimination over 10 years -- on, of course, the indispensable condition that the ABM Treaty is strictly complied with and that no arms race begins in outer space.

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CD/755
page 10

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/755
2 June 1987

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

(Extract)

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1987 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE
COMMUNIQUE ON THE SESSION OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY HELD IN
BERLIN ON 28 AND 29 MAY 1987, AND THE STATEMENT ON THE
MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY
ISSUED AT THE SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Communiqué on the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin on 28 and 29 May 1987, as well as the Statement on the Military Doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, issued at that session.

Upon instructions from my Government, acting on behalf of the participants in that session, I hereby request that the above-mentioned Communiqué and Statement be circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Harald Rose
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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2. The participants in the Session consider that it is now possible to adopt the following practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament in order to stop humanity from drifting towards a nuclear disaster:

- Immediate conclusion of an agreement on eliminating all American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe on the basis of the fundamental understanding reached at Reykjavik. Following upon its signing the Soviet missiles emplaced in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe will be withdrawn with the agreement of the governments of these countries.

- Simultaneous elimination of the Soviet and US shorter-range missiles in Europe and negotiations on such missiles stationed in the eastern parts of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the United States.

- Settlement of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, including tactical missiles, in Europe through multilateral negotiations as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty States at their meeting in Budapest.

- Agreement on radical reductions in offensive strategic weapons coupled with a strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime. The allied socialist countries advocate a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive strategic weapons of the USSR and the USA within a period of five years and negotiations on subsequent reductions.

- Comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing as a high priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of nuclear arms and to bring about their reduction and elimination. The Warsaw Treaty States propose that extensive negotiations be started without further delay to work out pertinent accords.

The participants in the Session firmly support the idea that outer space be kept free of weapons, that the ABM Treaty be strictly observed and that agreements be concluded banning anti-satellite systems and space-to-earth weapons and preventing an arms race in space, that all activities in outer space be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, on a rational basis and for the benefit of all mankind.

The leaders of the allied socialist States advocate the elaboration of key provisions for agreements between the USSR and the USA on offensive strategic weapons, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime and the conducting of nuclear tests. Along with the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range missiles, they could be the subject of agreement between the USSR and the USA at the highest level and provide the basis for the preparation of legally binding Soviet-American accords.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider it important for all European States, notably the members of the two alliances, to contribute actively towards nuclear disarmament and the success of pertinent negotiations. They are doing everything in their power so as to achieve concrete accords, bilateral and multilateral, with the aim of removing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century.

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The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider it their paramount duty to provide effective security for their peoples. The allied socialist countries do not seek to have a higher degree of security than other countries, but will not settle for a lesser degree. The state of military-strategic parity which currently exists remains a decisive factor for preventing war. Experience has shown, however, that parity at ever increasing levels does not lead to greater security. For this reason they will continue to make efforts in order to maintain the military equilibrium at progressively lower levels. Under these circumstances, the cessation of the arms race and measures geared towards real disarmament are assuming truly historic significance. In this day and age, States have no option but to seek agreements that would radically scale down military confrontation.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are unswervingly committed to these tenets. In full conformity with the defensive nature of their military doctrine, they are vigorously pursuing the following fundamental objectives:

First, general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing without delay as a high priority measure to halt the development, production and refining of nuclear arms, the gradual reduction and final elimination of these weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space:

Second, prohibition and elimination of chemical and other categories of weapons of mass destruction:

Third, reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where neither side, maintaining its defence capacity, would have the means to stage a surprise attack against the other side or offensive operations in general:

Fourth, strict verification of all disarmament measures through a combination of national technical means and international procedures, including the establishment of appropriate international bodies, the exchange of military information, and on-site inspections;

Fifth, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free and chemical-weapon-free zones in various areas

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1. Introduction

2. Theoretical Framework

3. Methodology

4. Results

5. Discussion

6. Conclusion

7. References

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1987 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA, INDIA, MEXICO AND SWEDEN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT MADE BY THE FIVE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO, SWEDEN AND THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA ON 22 MAY 1987

As we are sure you are aware, the five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania issued a Joint Statement on 22 May 1987, the third anniversary of the appeal they issued in 1984, not to jeopardize the opportunity to start a process of nuclear disarmament. In this statement they urged the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to conduct their current negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion during 1987.

We would appreciate that the text of this Joint Statement be reproduced and distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mario Cámpora
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Argentina for Disarmament
Affairs

(Signed) J. Singh Teja
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
India to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

(Signed) Alfonso García Robles
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
México to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed) Rolf Ekéus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Sweden to the Conference on
Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT

Three years ago, on 22 May 1984, we demanded that humanity's survival should not be jeopardized by the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Today we make an appeal not to jeopardize the opportunity to start a process of nuclear disarmament.

Since our first appeal, we have welcomed the resumption of the dialogue on nuclear and space issues. At the Geneva summit in November 1985 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". At Reykjavik, there was clear demonstration that, given political will, far-reaching agreements on nuclear disarmament measures could be achieved.

Disarmament negotiations are now at a crucial point. There is a real possibility for an agreement in at least one important area. A breakthrough on the issue of nuclear arms in Europe appears to be within reach.

An agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from Europe would be of considerable significance and would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold, since, for the first time, it would lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of fully operational nuclear weapon systems. We, therefore, urge the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their current negotiations with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion during 1987.

However, an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces would be only the first step towards our common goal: the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. In the Delhi and Mexico Declarations, we had called for two important measures - a halting of all nuclear testing and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We reiterate the crucial importance of these measures.

In Mexico, we made a concrete offer on verification of a halt to nuclear testing. That offer remains.

For too long, fear and mistrust have prevented progress in disarmament. Arms and fears feed on each other. Now is the time to break this vicious circle and lay the foundation for a more secure world. The present momentum should not be lost.

We urge President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to live up to this challenge so that future generations are spared the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust.

Raúl Alfonsín
President of Argentina

Andreas Papandreou
Prime Minister of Greece

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
President of Mexico

Ingvar Carlsson
Prime Minister of Sweden

Julius Nyerere
First President of Tanzania

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1987 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESPONSE, DATED 11 JUNE 1987, OF M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, TO THE JOINT STATEMENT MADE ON 22 MAY 1987 BY THE LEADERS OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO, SWEDEN AND TANZANIA

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the response, dated 11 June 1987, by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to the joint statement made on 22 May 1987 by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.

I should be grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to have this text circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. NAZARKIN

RESPONSE BY M.S.GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, TO THE JOINT STATEMENT
BY THE LEADERS OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO,
SWEDEN AND TANZANIA

I have studied the joint statement of 22 May 1987 by the leaders of six States with great interest. I fully share the impassioned appeal that rings out in it to begin, at last, the process of nuclear disarmament, and thereby to lay the foundation for a more secure world in order to spare future generations the nightmare of a nuclear catastrophe.

There is no doubt that, given political will, it is possible to attain far-reaching agreements in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has, by its practical actions and large-scale initiatives, convincingly demonstrated that it has that will. The most concrete and eloquent evidence of this is, perhaps, to be found in the approach by the USSR to the problem of medium-range missiles.

One might have thought that our recent proposals on this score, as well as on shorter-range missiles, in which maximum account is taken of the wishes and interests of the United States and its West European allies, had removed all the obstacles and taken the negotiations on medium-range missiles into the finishing straight. However, the nervousness with which some people in the West have reacted to the genuine prospect of the achievement of agreement on medium-range missiles has engendered serious doubts about the sincerity of the earlier assertions by a number of West European governments of interest in the complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles within the European area.

Nevertheless, we have not lost hope that common sense will prevail and that the prospect to which I have referred will become a reality. That would mean the accomplishment, for the first time since nuclear arms appeared on the scene, of an extremely important step on the difficult but, for humanity, the only sensible road towards the full, the universal elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union will spare no efforts rapidly to secure the elaboration and signature of a mutually acceptable Soviet-American agreement on medium-range missiles on the basis of the agreement in principle that was reached at Reykjavik. That is precisely the task that has been set for the USSR delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. The matter now depends on our partners, from whom we await reciprocal movement.

I have more than once had occasion to set out the Soviet Union's position concerning the total inadmissibility of the extension of the arms race to outer space and our assessment of America's "Strategic Defence Initiative" programme and the extreme danger it represents for peace. The truth here is unequivocal: the deployment of weapons in outer space would lead inevitably to the growth of mutual distrust, would whip up the arms race and would make peace still more vulnerable.

We firmly reject the "Star Wars" plans and have put forward in opposition to them a set of initiatives aimed at instituting extensive co-operation in the peaceful exploration and conquest of outer space in the interests of all humanity.

The Soviet Union is striving to convince the United States of the need for comprehensive strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime, which constitutes the fundamental basis for agreements on substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. It must be absolutely clear that without the complete preservation of that Treaty in its entirety, such reductions would be impossible.

In order to prevent an agreement on strategic offensive arms from being undermined by the deployment of weapons in space, we consider that the USSR and the United States must pledge not to withdraw from the Treaty for 10 years and must, in addition, agree on the list of space-based devices, the placing of which in space, including for test purposes, would be prohibited for the duration of that period.

I think that international public opinion is also well acquainted with our position of principle of the issue of nuclear tests. I will repeat what I have said before: the termination by the Soviet Union of its over 18-month-long unilateral moratorium was a decision that was forced, imposed upon us.

We have invited the United States again and again to begin full-scale talks on the complete cessation of nuclear tests under strict international control, including on-site inspections. One of the first steps towards that major goal in the course of such talks might be to examine the questions of the ratification of the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 and of a substantial lowering of the yield threshold for nuclear explosions for which those agreements provide, with the simultaneous limitation of the number of such explosions. With a view to promoting the speediest possible ratification of those agreements, the USSR is willing to come to an arrangement with the United States for the conduct of appropriate calibration experiments at each other's test sites. We are in favour of use being made for such experiments both of the two countries' national seismic apparatus and of the seismic monitoring devices of the States comprising "the Six", providing, of course, they agree to that. We are also prepared to take immediate practical steps in connection with these talks: to reach, for example, an intermediate agreement with the American side on restricting the yield of underground nuclear explosions by means of a one-kiloton threshold, and on limiting the number of nuclear weapon tests to two or three a year.

In a word, the Soviet Union has no shortage of good will. We are open to all constructive ideas that go in the direction of genuine disarmament.

The noble aspirations of the leaders of the six States that are reflected in their joint statement not only have our full understanding and active support, but also strengthen our confidence in the ultimate victory of human reason and spur us on to still more energetic action on behalf of the realization of the dream of a nuclear-free world, on behalf of the preservation of human civilization.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/767
6 July 1987

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE

(Extract)

CHINA

Working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and realization of nuclear disarmament

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the realization of nuclear disarmament are common desires of the people of the world. The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament pointed out explicitly in its Final Document that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority". It expresses the strong demand of the people for early nuclear disarmament. Resolution 41/59 F adopted at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly once again urged the United States and the Soviet Union to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and to take the lead in this regard. This resolution, enjoying support from all the United Nations Member States, including the Soviet Union and the United States, pointed out the correct and effective way to the realization of nuclear disarmament.

Having declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", the United States and the Soviet Union have each made proposals for a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and conducted many rounds of bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but so far progress has been slow except on individual issues. The United States and the Soviet Union should, in the light of the desire of the people of the world for peace and disarmament, negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament that is truly conducive to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the relaxation of international tension, and without detriment to the interests of other countries, and should implement the agreement as soon as possible.

Despite the fact that nuclear disarmament has always been placed on its agenda as an important priority item, the Conference on Disarmament has yet to play its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament, as it has been unable to establish an ad hoc committee on this item.

China has all along been opposed to the nuclear arms race, and has advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to promote early achievement of this goal, the Chinese delegation submits its propositions as follows:

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7. To promote nuclear disarmament, great importance should also be accorded to the following two issues:

(a) Conventional disarmament is closely related to nuclear disarmament, and along with nuclear disarmament it is necessary to pursue conventional disarmament. The two super-Powers, which possess the largest and the most sophisticated conventional arsenals, have also to take the lead in drastically reducing them, and should withdraw all their armed forces and military bases from abroad. Conventional disarmament should result in reducing the conventional armaments of all countries to the lowest level. The military forces of all countries should be used exclusively for the purpose of self-defence;

(b) The development of space weapons has resulted in a qualitative escalation of the arms race, and made the issue of nuclear disarmament even more complicated and difficult. Therefore, the immediate curbing of the arms race in outer space is of great significance. Both the United States and the Soviet Union already possess and are vigorously developing space weapons. They should immediately take action in real earnest to stop all forms of an arms race in outer space. On this basis, negotiations should be held to conclude an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons.

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CANADA

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE OUTER SPACE WORKSHOP HELD
IN MONTREAL ON 14-17 MAY 1987

As part of its contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Canada invited heads of the CD and observer delegations to attend an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987

The purpose of the Workshop was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal régime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also provided an opportunity to introduce to the members of the CD, the results of Canadian research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

Attached as an annex to this document is a report that provides a summary of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during discussions at the various segments of the Workshop.

1/ A limited distribution of this report in English only has been made to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada at Geneva.

CANADA

Report on a Workshop on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space held in Montreal, Quebec, 14-16 May 1987

1. Introduction

As part of its contribution to the work of the present Conference on Disarmament (CD) session, Canada invited heads of CD and observer delegations to attend an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987.

The purpose of the Workshop was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focussing in particular on the current legal regime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also provided an opportunity to introduce to the members of the CD, the results of Canadian research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification.

2. Programme

In addition to Canadian officials, thirty-nine representatives from thirty-five other countries, including eleven ambassadors, plus a representative of the CD secretariat, attended the Workshop. The programme consisted of the following main segments:

- A presentation of two papers on the outer space legal regime at McGill University and a discussion chaired by Ambassador J. Alan Beesley.
- A presentation on Canadian PAXSAT research at Spar Aerospace Ltd., a discussion presided over by Mr. G.A. Branchflower, Vice-President, Spar Aerospace Ltd. and a tour of Spar's facility.
- A banquet speech delivered by the honourable Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.
- A roundtable discussion of relevant issues, chaired by Ambassador J. Alan Beesley.

The following documents were made available to participants of the Workshop. The first two are the texts of the presentations made at McGill University.

- "Preventing An Arms Race in Outer Space: An Academic Perspective". Paper by Dr. Nicolas Mateesco Matte, Director, Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University.

- "Preventing An Arms Race in Outer Space: Selected Legal Considerations". Paper delivered by Mr. Peter McRae, Deputy Director, Legal Operations Division, Canadian Department of External Affairs.
- "The PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification".

3. Synopsis

(a) Papers and Discussion on Legal Aspects

The session at McGill University was chaired by Ambassador J. Alan Beesley. After a welcoming address by Dr. MacLachlan, Vice-Principal of Research at McGill University, Dr. Nicolas Mateesco Matte, Director of the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law presented a paper entitled "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space: An Academic Perspective". He concluded that there was an urgent need for the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space to continue its work in order to enhance confidence-building steps, by making prudent and constructive suggestions towards strengthening consensus on generally agreed subjects and towards improving existing treaties. He also expressed the hope that the Committee would, by crystallizing and highlighting constructive norms, create a world-wide awareness of the need to ensure that outer space remains a peaceful environment.

Discussion of this paper initially focussed on the suggestion that the Ad Hoc Committee create a small working group or a group of experts charged with achieving specific pragmatic goals. Interest was expressed in this idea by several participants. It was also suggested that there was a need for both consideration of the risks of an arms race in outer space and for concentrated work across a whole spectrum of political, scientific, technical and economic issues rather than a concentration of scope along the lines that would occur in an experts group.

A second issue which was raised during the discussions was the role of customary law in emerging space law. It was noted that in the area of outer space, technology is evolving so quickly that customary law does not have a chance to develop. Loopholes are being created in already existent treaties because of developing technology and policy makers must try to catch up with this rapid evolution.

Another important issue raised was whether or not there were arms already existent in outer space and consequently whether we should be talking about the cessation of an arms race in outer space as opposed to the prevention

of such an arms race. It was suggested that the question should be put directly to the space powers in the Ad Hoc Committee. Another suggestion was that the term "weaponization" needed to be defined with care before such a question was posed. There seemed to be a widespread feeling that an authoritative, systematic study of this question remained to be undertaken, although some participants referred to the work being done under the aegis of SIPRI.

Professor Matte's idea that a future verification agency could initially comprise a limited number of countries, was taken up during the discussion. The suggestion was made that any country should be able to participate in an international organ on outer space even if it did not have its own extensive technical capabilities. Others pointed out that only a relatively small number of countries would be needed to get the agency started. Moreover, it was important that the technologically strong powers take the initiative. It was also suggested that given the considerable financial resources required, the countries with the technology might well be those that provide the necessary financing.

It was affirmed by one participant that we had about 10 years to put a regime in place to avoid an arms race in outer space and that this task ought not to be left to the two leading space powers alone.

There followed a presentation by Peter McRae of the Legal Operations Division of the Department of External Affairs of a paper entitled "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space: Selected Legal Considerations". The paper focussed on the central problem of the significance of the extension of state activity into areas where there was previously no national jurisdiction. The paper also noted the possible relevance of the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to the efforts in the CD toward preventing an arms race in outer space. In the final section it focussed on areas where the CD could perform useful work. It concluded that when space activities involve the security of the whole world, the latter should have a say in how these activities are carried out.

Initial discussion of the paper focussed on the definition of "peaceful" and "aggression". The fact that the former was often defined in terms of the latter and that a number of treaties related to certain classes of "acts", as opposed to weapons systems, was discussed.

Discussion also focussed on the relevance of what was being done in COPUOS and other work done by the Brundtland Commission. The discussion concluded that it was becoming increasingly difficult to compartmentalize various activities in outer space. The use of nuclear power sources in outer space was cited as an example.

(b) The PAXSAT Concept

The presentation at Spar Aerospace described research undertaken under the auspices of the Department of External Affairs concerning the feasibility of applying commercially available space-based remote sensing technology to arms control verification. Two PAXSAT studies were covered: (1) PAXSAT 'A', which examined whether a space-based observation system could help verify an outer space arms control regime; and (2) PAXSAT 'B', which examined the application of space-based remote sensing for verifying controls on conventional forces in a regional context, using Europe as a case study. Following the presentation there was a discussion period after which participants were given a tour of the SPAR facility.

During the discussion period at Spar, several rough cost estimates were given that depended on a number of assumptions about information distribution and processing of the data. It was clear that the ultimate cost of a PAXSAT system would be several billions of dollars. The hardware would be designed for five years but its actual lifetime would depend on how it would be used and whether it could be refuelled.

A number of queries were raised about the kind of verification regime envisaged in the PAXSAT concept. In response, it was indicated that actual development of the PAXSAT concept was predicated upon the existence of a multilateral treaty requiring verification and it would be difficult to give an estimate as to the timeframe for its establishment or a completely accurate idea as to the cost.

As to tasking of PAXSAT, the study assumed that the tasking would be done by a treaty-specific authority. A long discussion took place on the orientation of the tasking function. The central purpose of the PAXSAT 'A' study was to assess whether, using existing, non-classified technology, it would be possible to determine the function of any satellite. Given the need to optimize both the form of a space vehicle and its orbit, it was concluded that one could, through observation, determine with a high degree of probability the function of a satellite.

In response to a question as to whether a multilateral agreement on ASAT weapons, if signed tomorrow, could be verified, it was stated that the definition of "ASAT" was crucial. For example, would "ASATs" be confined only to objects that have an extended stay in space? It was pointed out that PAXSAT 'A' was not designed to certify that each and every space object was launched for particular purposes. Rather, it was designed for the situation where there was doubt as to the purposes of a particular space

object. A PAXSAT 'A' satellite could then be launched or retrieved from a parking orbit to determine the function of the space object in question. Having accomplished that task, it could then be parked in orbit until the next operational requirement. It was also noted that the PAXSAT system was not a stand-alone verification regime but was designed to work in conjunction with other verification measures.

In response to a question concerning the use of PAXSAT 'B' outside Europe, it was reiterated that PAXSAT could be used wherever there was an agreement to be verified.

c) Roundtable

The Roundtable discussion saw a number of issues raised which served to underline some of the points made in earlier segments of the program. It opened with the several observations by Ambassador Beesley, the Chairman, to the effect that there were no quick-fix solutions, that there was a need for contextual updating of international and space law, in view of technological changes, and that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should have broad scope for it to accomplish constructive work.

One theme which emerged in the ensuing discussion concerned the role of custom and state practice in the development of international law relevant to outer space. It was affirmed that state practice was both evidence of customary law and a major element contributing to its development. Several participants pointed to the difficulties of using state practice in this context. An analogy between outer space and the law of the sea was in the view of some only partially applicable. There seemed to be a widespread view that customary international law was only of limited assistance to development of an outer space legal regime.

The question also arose as to whether it was best to seek consciously to construct a comprehensive legal regime for outer space or to allow any legal regime to develop in an incremental manner. Some participants advocated working on comprehensive and limited regimes simultaneously. Other members, while favouring an eventual comprehensive regime, felt that efforts should first concentrate on selected measures, notably a ban on ASAT deployment. One participant wondered whether problems in outer space could be separated from those on earth, and whether a limited legalistic approach could be successful in outer space.

The separate roles and the interrelationship between the COPUOS and the CD were also discussed. It was pointed out that certain of the deficiencies and lacunae in existing space law could most appropriately be addressed by

the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee whereas the CD had a specific mandate for disarmament. While there clearly was an overlap in responsibilities, the distinction must be maintained between the responsibilities of the two organizations. Exploration of some link between the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS and the CD was suggested by one participant. Another participant indicated that there were difficulties in how the CD could pursue its mandate because of a lack of detailed experience on the subject, coupled with a deficiency of factual information. Legal expertise must follow technical expertise and it was advocated that a group of experts to study the technical aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space be set up.

Concern was expressed by some participants that the CD was focussing too much on definitions when the deployment of weapons into space seemed imminent. There was a need to accelerate CD efforts, to discuss types of agreements whether comprehensive or specific. The world was moving rapidly towards more complex space technologies requiring more stringent legal controls. Fortunately, the sophistication of the means of controlling these technologies has also increased.

Others felt that this approach was too alarmist since no early deployment of weapons into space is in prospect and such deployment would need to be subject to agreement. Realistically, any agreement between the USA and USSR would be the mainstay of an outer space arms control regime.

Another question raised was the difference between the "common heritage of mankind" concept and that of the "province of all mankind". It was pointed out that some states rejected the "common heritage" concept. There was also a legal distinction between "common" and "province" in that the former specifically denotes common ownership and equal rights by everyone.

A number of speakers addressed the question of verification. One participant favoured space-to-ground and on-site means (pre-launch notification and the checking of ground instrumentalities) over space-to-space verification which was considered too costly. It was pointed out that while it was conceptually possible to camouflage a satellite on the ground to fool an inspector, it would be very difficult and costly to do so.

Several participants noted that PAXSAT would be only one part of a wider verification scheme. It was thought that PAXSAT might offer an opportunity of maintaining a certain degree of secrecy with a minimum loss of sovereignty. PAXSAT 'A' would identify that satellite X is doing function Y, and would then enable states parties to seek any required clarifications.

One participant noted the relationship between the PAXSAT and ISMA ideas. The former focussed on the technological aspect, the 'tool', whereas the latter was more concerned with the institutional context. Both aspects required attention and the concepts of PAXSAT and ISMA were not competitive. Additional issues concerned sharing of information with third countries, competition with military observation satellites and cost. Regarding the latter, it was suggested that money might be drawn from military budgets and that the use of time-sharing on multi-purpose satellites could provide savings. Another participant mentioned that the cost of a PAXSAT type system was similar to that of ISMA, perhaps \$6 billion over ten years, and this cost should be compared to that spent on armaments each year.

It was pointed out that PAXSAT was not a military approach; its lower grade specifications would mean it could not be used effectively for military intelligence purposes. The effectiveness of PAXSAT in increasing security was more important than cost-effectiveness.

One participant noted that verification was vital and should be both cost and security effective. Verification must deter non-compliance. PAXSAT, pre-launch verification and check-out of production lines could complement other verification procedures.

Another participant expressed the view that the workshop had shown that the issue of verification must be examined by the CD. Cost effectiveness of PAXSAT should not be the first issue. Other methods of verification, including on-site inspection, should be examined.

4. Conclusion

The Workshop was not intended to produce definitive conclusions concerning the issues discussed. Rather, the participants were able to engage in serious exchange of views, in a less formal setting, covering a broad range of topics relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In addition, the participants were able to learn of some of the findings of Canadian research into the feasibility of applying civilian space-based remote sensing technology to arms control verification.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/777

31 July 1987

Original: ENGLISH

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects

The prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and the destruction of anti-satellite systems that may already exist will help ban all types of weapons and achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Such a treaty should be based on the obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and on the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

A. Scope

1. The States Parties to this Treaty shall undertake not to resort to the use or threat of force against any space object orbiting the earth or deployed on the moon or on other celestial bodies or in outer space in any other manner.
2. The States Parties to this Treaty shall undertake not to deliberately destroy, damage or interfere with the normal functioning of any space object owned by other States or change its trajectory.
3. In accordance with articles 1 and 2, the States Parties to this Treaty shall agree:
 - (a) not to develop, test or deploy in outer space, the atmosphere, on earth or in any other place anti-satellite systems designed to destroy, damage or interfere with the normal functioning of any space object,
 - (b) to destroy under international control any anti-satellite system already in their possession,
 - (c) not to utilize any space object orbiting the earth or deployed on celestial bodies or in outer space to destroy, damage or interfere with the normal functioning of any space object owned by other States or change its trajectory,

(d) not to modify space objects or other devices for anti-satellite weapons purposes;

(e) not to test or use manned spacecraft for anti-satellite weapons purposes.

4. Each State Party shall undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State or group of States or international organizations to engage in activities prohibited under this Treaty. Each State Party shall bear international responsibility for ensuring that all national space activities, whether conducted by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in this Treaty.

B. Compliance with the Treaty

I. National Technical Means of Verification

1. For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party shall undertake not to interfere with the normal functioning of the national technical means of verification of other States.

3. Each State Party shall undertake not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification of compliance by national technical means.

4. The States Parties in possession of national technical means of verification shall make available to the appropriate organ established under this Treaty or, if necessary, to other States Parties any information obtained through those means and relevant to the purposes of the Treaty.

II. Consultations, Consultative Committee and International Inspectorate

1. A Consultative Committee, comprised of all States Parties to the Treaty, shall be established. The Committee shall deal with all issues pertaining to the implementation of the Treaty, encourage international consultation and co-operation among States Parties and carry out verification measures, including international on-site inspections. (The relationship between the Consultative Committee and a possible universal space organization might have to be defined as well.)

2. The Committee shall decide to establish the subsidiary organs it deems necessary, including an International Inspectorate.

3. The States Parties to this Treaty shall consult and co-operate directly among themselves or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international channels on any matter that may be raised in relation to the objectives or the implementation of the Treaty.

4. The States Parties to this Treaty shall make every effort to clarify and resolve, through information exchanges and consultations, any issue which may cause doubt about compliance with the Treaty or give rise to concerns about any related matter of an ambiguous nature.

5. The States Parties to the Treaty shall exchange information on the launch parameters and the general function of space objects.

III. On-Site Challenge Inspection

1. Each State Party shall have the right at any time to request that an ad hoc on-site inspection be sent to any other State Party if the requesting State considers that, in the exceptional circumstances of the case, such a measure is necessary in order to clarify and resolve a situation which gives rise to doubts about the other State's compliance with its obligations under article 3 of this Treaty.

2. In the event of such a request, each State Party shall be obliged to provide satisfaction, as early as possible but not later than 10 days after the receipt of such a request, to the requesting State Party that it has been and is at the present time in full compliance with its obligations under this Treaty. This shall comprise arrangements for access by international inspectors and, in the exceptional case that access to the location in question would jeopardize national security interests, satisfactory alternative arrangements.

C. Negotiations to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space

Each State Party to the Treaty shall affirm as a recognized objective the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, to this end, undertake to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

D. Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space

1. The States Parties to the Treaty shall undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exploration and peaceful use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

2. The implementation of this Treaty shall not hamper the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, for peaceful purposes.

E. Concluding Provisions

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. The signatories to the Treaty shall work out the provisions governing the entry into force, accession to, and withdrawal from, the Treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/783 (Extract)
20 August 1987

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

.../...

...the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to keep in view the following:

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CD/783
page 3

Annex

[Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

[Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

.../...

...the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to keep in view the following:

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George J. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES

(SECRET) 1950
1951 August 22

CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES

REPORT OF THE 20th CONFERENCE OF THE
COMPARATIVE PROGRAMS OF DELEGATES

5. Negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed consciousness of their special responsibility for maintaining peace and have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate the work at their bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations has been widely welcomed. In this context nations of the world have endorsed the proclaimed objective of these negotiations and have stressed the importance of their being pursued with utmost dispatch with the objective of reaching early agreements. In this regard the United States and the Soviet Union should also continue to keep in view the following:

SECRET

CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES

(a) The objective to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth as well as limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

(b) The need to take fully into account the security interests of all States.

(c) The need to display a spirit of flexibility and to maintain equal and undiminished security for all at constantly decreasing levels of armaments and the principle that neither side should seek to achieve military superiority over the other.

(d) The requirement for effective measures for verification of compliance with agreements.

(e) The fact that while reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR are directly to be negotiated and effected by the two sides involved, the overall subject of nuclear disarmament is of world-wide concern since nuclear weapons and their accumulation pose a threat not only to their possessors and their allies but every other nation.

(f) [The United Nations General Assembly has reiterated its belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.]

[The fact that bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.]

(g) The need to keep the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the state of negotiations, inter alia, in view of the responsibilities entrusted to these bodies as well as the universal desire for progress towards disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States, having agreed to accelerate the pace of their bilateral negotiations, should exert every effort to achieve agreements on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals to be implemented during the initial phase of the disarmament process, which should be as brief as possible. In this context, the two sides have already agreed on the principle of 50 per cent reductions in their nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During this initial phase other agreements helpful to the overall disarmament process should also be concluded and put into effect.

Following is the text of the Joint United States-Soviet statement which was issued on 8 January 1985, regarding their negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

"As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George P. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

/...

E. Related measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account, as appropriate, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.

3. */ In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. **/

To this end all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally. [, taking into account the importance and urgency of the subject].

In this regard bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The two parties are requested to continue to keep the

*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

**/ Some delegations reserved their position on the first two paragraphs until the language of this entire section is completed and its placement resolved.

Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly informed of the progress made in their bilateral sessions in order to facilitate multilateral work on this subject.

Efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and which has a primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. */

*/ Many delegations consider that the first paragraph, which reproduces paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should be supplemented to reflect that present urgency and importance of the subject. They further consider that it should occupy a more prominent place in the Programme and, to that end, propose that it be included as subsection B in the section "Disarmament measures", under the heading "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Other delegations are considering the placement of this paragraph pending the balance of the overall document.

[DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.]

Intermediate Stage */

- [1. The intermediate stage should start no later than 1990 and last five to seven years.
2. The USSR and the United States should go on with the reduction agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.
3. Other nuclear-weapon States should pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons and also not to station them in the territories of other countries.
4. All nuclear-weapon States should eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, i.e. weapons having a range (or radius of action) of up to 1,000 km. This measure should be taken after the completion by the USSR and the United States of the 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory.
5. The Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space-strike weapons should become multilateral with the mandatory participation in it of major industrial States.
6. All nuclear-weapon States should cease nuclear-weapon tests.
7. There should be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.] **/

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

**/ Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.

REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 392nd plenary meeting on 24 February 1987, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1987 session."

In that connection, the President of the Conference made the following statement:

"I have conducted informal consultations with members from different groups, and in putting this Working Paper CD/WP.268 before the Conference for decision, I wish to state that, as is known to all members of the Conference and as reflected in the 1986 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/732), consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268."

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTS

2. At its 394th plenary meeting on 5 March 1987, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Aldo Pugliese (Italy) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as the Committee's Secretary.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 18 meetings between 13 March and 24 August 1987.
4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
5. In addition to the documents of the previous sessions 1/, the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents relating to the agenda item submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the 1987 session:

- CD/741 Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space";
- CD/758 Letter dated 16 June 1987 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a joint statement made by the five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the First President of Tanzania on 22 May 1987;
- CD/773 Summary Report of the Outer Space Workshop held in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987, submitted by Canada;
- CD/777 Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic.

In addition, the Committee had before it the following working papers:

- CD/OS/WP.17 Programme of work;
- CD/OS/WP.18 Proposal for a Structured Discussion of Item 3 of the Programme of Work: "Existing Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", submitted by the German Democratic Republic.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1987 SESSION

6. Following an initial exchange of views and consultations held by the Chairman with Members of different groups, the Ad Hoc Committee, at its 2nd meeting on 7 April 1987, adopted the following programme of work for the 1987 session:

- "1. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
2. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

1/ The list of documents of the previous sessions may be found in the 1985 and 1986 reports of the Ad Hoc Committee, which are an integral part of the reports of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/642 and CD/732, respectively).

3. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In carrying out its work, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Committee in 1985."

In that connection, the Chairman made the following statement:

"... I wish to recall that in carrying out this programme of work consideration will be given to the declaration made by the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of February, on the occasion of the adoption of the mandate ... with the understanding that the programme of work covers the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

7. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that in discharging the tasks set forth in its mandate, it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered therein. Accordingly, the Committee further agreed to allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects, namely, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, existing agreements and existing proposals and future initiatives. At the last substantive meeting, some delegations took the opportunity to sum up their positions.

A. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

8. Many delegations, reiterating that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful uses to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations, stressed the overriding importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. They recalled that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding. They stated that military competition between the two major powers was being extended into outer space, leading to the development, testing and possible deployment of weapons systems and their components adaptable for use in or from space. In their view, the introduction of weapons into space would result in an irreversible competition in the field of space weaponry which would have dangerous consequences for international peace and security, give the arms race a qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing agreements and jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole. It would also, in their opinion, create obstacles to the peaceful uses of outer space to promote scientific, economic and social development. They, therefore, believed that the priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee should be the immediate prohibition of the testing, production and deployment of weapons systems and their components adaptable for use in, towards, or from space. To that end, in their opinion, attention should focus on the question of the measures that should be adopted. In that connection, they noted the significance of the statement made by the President of the Conference at the time of the re-establishment of the Committee. These delegations also pointed to the military uses of space that were already taking place as an extension of weapons systems on Earth. In that connection, it was noted that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites had been used in support of military operations against developing countries. The view was expressed that to guard against such uses, satellite reconnaissance and

surveillance activities should be entrusted to an international agency. The view was also expressed that, in the interim, space powers should give assurances to non-aligned and neutral States against the discriminatory and inequitable use of satellites.

9. Delegations of a group of socialist countries continued to believe that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, its exploration and use should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries. They stressed the overriding importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. They once again pointed, however, to the impending danger of the extension of the arms race to outer space which would, in their view, step up the arms race in other areas and make reductions in nuclear strategic arsenals impossible. In this respect, these delegations expressed serious concern at the continuing implementation of the SDI programme, which had, reportedly, entered a stage of planning to carry out specific tests and deploy some components of a BMD system, both on Earth and in outer space. These delegations were of the view that the stage of exploring the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space had been passed and that the Ad Hoc Committee should proceed to more practical and concrete work. In that connection, they welcomed the statement by the President of the Conference at the time of the Committee's re-establishment. They believed that the most important aspect of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space in the present circumstances was preventing the introduction of weapons in space through the prohibition of space-strike weapons. Their understanding of the term was that it included: first, space-based ABM systems of any principle of action, second, space-based systems of any principle of action designed to strike from space targets in the atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth and, third, systems of any principle of action and however based to strike space objects. Accordingly, they pointed to the wide-ranging character of the concept of space-strike-weapons, which, as seen from the proposals for respective definitions advanced by delegations of socialist and non-aligned States (CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1 and Add.1), covered all possible threats to destroy, damage or interfere with the normal functioning of objects in space. They considered that the prohibition of such weapons would be an effective and secure way to prevent all possibilities for the introduction of weapons in outer space. In this connection they recalled that one State had declared and observed a moratorium on the first launching of anti-satellite weapons into outer space. These delegations noted that, although satellites were being used in a variety of support missions and were playing an important role in the strategic relationship, there had been no weapons permanently deployed in outer space up to the present time. They also observed that ballistic missiles having their launching sites and targets situated on Earth, were not space strike weapons either. They underlined the importance of assuring that the non-deployment of weapons in space would be effectively verified and to that end supported the establishment of an international inspectorate, as discussed below in paragraph 45.

10. Some delegations, while attaching utmost importance to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, stated that for 30 years space had appeared as an appropriate environment for national security activities like the Earth and the atmosphere. They stressed that the issue of the role of the military uses of space in the maintenance of international peace and security had to be considered thoroughly. They noted that military systems deployed in

space accomplished a variety of support missions and that they played a vital role in the strategic relationship of the two major Powers, and they rejected the concept of "space strike weapons" for being part of a selective approach which did not give an accurate picture of the threats against space objects and of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space. They criticized attempts to define categories of "space strike weapons" which were at the same time too broad, because they placed in the same category systems with different functions and implications, and too narrow because they excluded weapons and other means which have the capability to disrupt the normal functioning of space objects. They further noted that outer space was not immune from utilization by existing weapons systems such as ballistic missiles. They considered that, while the Ad Hoc Committee had had very substantial discussions, fundamental divergences persisted and the work was still in an exploratory phase. In their view, the prevention of an arms race in outer space was linked to and should take into account progress in other fields of arms limitation and disarmament, in particular the reduction of nuclear weapons. These delegations continued to underline the importance of issues relating to verification of and compliance with existing and future agreements and held that those issues required a more thorough examination. They also stressed the need for detailed information on national space programmes that have military implications.

11. One delegation considered that the two major space Powers, which were the only ones that at present possessed and were developing space weapons, should assume a special responsibility for halting the arms race in outer space. In its view, they should adopt practical measures by undertaking not to develop, test and deploy space weapons and, on that basis, an international agreement should be concluded through negotiations on the complete prohibition of space weapons. It believed that work in the Conference on Disarmament should centre on the study and solution of the issues that were most directly related to preventing the "weaponization" of outer space.

12. There was general recognition of the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Some delegations, while stressing that there was clear need for the Conference on Disarmament to play a role with respect to problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, held that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of the bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, they believed that multilateral disarmament measures in this area could not be considered independently of developments at the bilateral level. Other delegations, emphasized that ongoing bilateral negotiations in no way diminished the urgency of multilateral negotiations and reaffirmed that, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 41/53, the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

13. Some delegations drew attention to a number of issues which, in their view, had been identified in the course of the work carried out in the previous years. Among them, the following were mentioned: that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that an arms race in outer space should be prevented, that as yet no weapons have been deployed in space and that agreements that may be concluded

in this field should contain effective provisions for verification. Other delegations stressed the importance of issues such as the identification of the threats to which space objects are confronted, the relationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other areas of disarmament and the problem of verification.

B. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

14. There was general recognition that, as provided for in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

15. Some delegations underlined the central role that the Charter of the United Nations plays in the legal régime applicable to outer space. In that connection, they stressed the special significance of the Charter provisions on the non-use of force -- Articles 2(4) and 51 -- which, taken together, prohibit any act of aggression in outer space. Accordingly, they believed that these provisions afforded a substantial degree of protection to space objects. Other delegations reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations Charter, but, at the same time, reiterated that its provisions concerning the non-use of force could not, in and of themselves, be sufficient to preclude an arms race in outer space -- just as they had not done so on Earth -- since they did not address the question of the development, testing, production and deployment of weapons in space. For example, these delegations recalled that the legal provisions of these articles had not prevented the arms race on Earth, nor did they diminish the universally recognized need to negotiate disarmament agreements and even to ban specific types or whole classes of weapons, such as biological, nuclear, chemical, radiological weapons. In their view Article 51 of the Charter could not be interpreted as justifying the use of space weapons for any purposes or the possession of any type of arms based on the use of space weapons. They also stressed that Article 51 could not be invoked to legitimize the use or threat of use of force in or from outer space. In this context, they noted that the objective agreed upon by consensus, both at multilateral and bilateral levels, was not to regulate an arms race in outer space but to prevent it, and that any attempt to justify the introduction of weapons in that environment contradicted that objective. Accordingly, these delegations believed that in the context of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee the value of statements on the existing degree of protection to space objects should be assessed against their relevance to the achievement of the common objective to prevent an arms race in outer space.

16. Delegations examined various multilateral and bilateral instruments, inter alia, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1971), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977) and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1979). In the examination of existing agreements, some delegations referred to documents CD/OS/WP.6 and 7.

17. It was noted that under the multilateral agreements in force: (1) it is prohibited to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction and to install such weapons on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; (2) the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conducting of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies are forbidden; (3) the testing of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosions in outer space is prohibited.

18. Various delegations, while acknowledging the value of the restraints imposed by the existing legal régime, which placed some barriers to the arms race in outer space through limitations on certain weapons and military activities in that environment, reiterated that in some areas there were loopholes. They noted that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, because of its limited scope, left open the possibility of the introduction of weapons in space, other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in particular anti-satellite weapons and space-based anti-ballistic missile systems. Furthermore, in their opinion, current developments in space science and technology, coupled with ongoing military space programmes, underscored the inadequacy of existing legal instruments to prevent an arms race in outer space. They, therefore, held that there was an urgent need to supplement and amplify the existing legal régime and that, consequently, it was urgent to strengthen, improve and broaden the legal régime applicable to outer space with a view to the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Some other delegations stressed that as long as the analysis of the existing legal prescriptions remained restricted to the continuously repeating and deploring of deficiencies and lacunae without attempting to agree upon the real need for and adequate approach to the improvement and completion of a comprehensive legal régime, the work of the Committee would remain selective, deliberately incomplete and without substantial reward.

19. One delegation stated that it proceeds from the necessity to preserve the ABM Treaty in its integrity as a document of unlimited duration, forming the necessary basis for agreement on substantial cuts in strategic offensive weapons. Such cuts would be impossible without preserving the Treaty in its integrity. It offered practical measures to strengthen the régime of the ABM Treaty, above all, an agreement between the parties concerned not to use the right to withdraw from the Treaty for at least ten years, while strictly complying with all its provisions. It also noted that the system of the ABM Treaty provisions does not allow to develop, test or deploy a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Article I(2) of the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits the deployment of ABM systems protecting the entire territory of a State party to the Treaty. Article V(1) of the Treaty explicitly prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems

which are, inter alia, space-based or include space-based elements. Thus, in all respects the SDI programme constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty. The same delegation emphasized that its State had been observing fully and precisely the ABM Treaty and that no work similar to the work on the SDI programme was being conducted by it. Nor is this State engaged in the development of an ABM system outside the framework of the 1972 Treaty. It carries on basic research in the exploration of outer space. This has been stated on numerous occasions by the political leadership of this State.

20. With regard to those weapons that are ABM systems or their components, one delegation noted that paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or their components as defined in Article II of the Treaty. With regard to those weapons that are ABM systems or their components, this delegation stated that the ABM Treaty prohibited their deployment either in earth orbit or in outer space generally, unless there is agreement between the parties to permit such deployment.

21. Delegations of a group of socialist countries stated that stationing weapons in outer space would inevitably lead to growing mutual mistrust and whip up the arms race and make the world still more vulnerable. They resolutely rejected so-called "Star Wars" plans, proposing instead a series of initiatives aimed at establishing wide-ranging co-operation in the peaceful exploration and development of outer space in the interests of all humanity.

22. One delegation noted that from the above commentary, one might conclude that no other country had any programmes comparable to the SDI programme. Such a conclusion would be far from correct in this delegation's view. One other country has also been pursuing since the 1960s research into advanced technologies for strategic defence which were precisely the same types of technologies being researched in the SDI programme. This delegation also noted that its country's strategic defence research efforts would last for some years and that there were no preconceived notions about the options that the research will generate. It was therefore obvious just how preposterous the aforementioned criticisms directed solely against the SDI programme were.

23. Some delegations considered that the examination of existing agreements revealed the continuing need to resolve conflicting interpretations with a view to arriving at a common understanding of what is forbidden and what is permitted under the legal régime applicable to outer space. They noted that basic terms such as "peaceful purposes", "militarization", remain to be defined in a satisfactory and generally acceptable fashion. They stressed that there already exists a considerable body of international law applicable to outer space and that the arms control régime in that environment is much more comprehensive than that on Earth. These delegations also believed that broader participation in existing multilateral agreements and strict observance of both multilateral and bilateral agreements would strengthen the legal régime applicable to outer space. They noted that many elements of the existing outer space legal régime were relatively simple; the more complicated any arms control agreement for outer space is, the more difficult it would be to verify compliance with it. These delegations believed that there was need for in-depth consideration of the question of terminology to arrive at greater precision in the use of terms, and referred to document CD/OS/WP.15 as a good basis for work. In this regard, one delegation

commented that the variety of views which existed on the meaning of a number of terms had introduced a wide area of uncertainty and ambiguity into attempts to establish what were permitted or prohibited uses of space. One of these delegations circulated a two-volume dictionary of terms relating to space science and technology, which was generally welcomed.

24. Other delegations pointed out that complicated agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space could be verifiable at present and that rapid development of technology was helpful in devising increasingly reliable technical means of verification. These delegations also believed that the process of consideration of and negotiation on specific proposals to prevent an arms race in outer space would reveal which terms might need to be clarified or even strictly defined, in order to eliminate any unacceptable degree of uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in the interpretation of their meaning.

25. One delegation, in addition to sharing the views reflected in paragraph 23, considered that the existing legal régime for arms control in outer space was equitable, balanced and extensive and that it could be said that it had been far more successful in preventing an arms race than any comparable legal régime on Earth. Moreover, the existing régime did not contain gaps and holes, instead, it placed strict legal controls on virtually any possible type of weapon in outer space and has several significant accomplishments to its credit. It further believed that if all nations were to comply fully with all existing agreements there would be no doubt that outer space would be used only for peaceful purposes.

26. Many delegations were of the view that all States, in particular the space Powers, should become parties to the multilateral treaties in force that contain provisions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in particular the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

C. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space

27. Various delegations noted that in addition to the proposals made during previous sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in CD/OS/WP.16 and Add.1, inter alia, the following proposals and views were submitted during the 1987 session:

1. Establishment of an international inspectorate.
2. Ways and means of strengthening the Registration Convention.
3. Prohibition of activities contributing directly or indirectly to an arms race in outer space by amending the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
4. Declarations on non-deployment of weapons in outer space.
5. A possible approach for a treaty on ASAT weapons.
6. Elaboration of a Code of Conduct.

7. Possible mandates for an expert group.

8. Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of ASAT weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects.

28. Some delegations reiterated that the overall objective of the Conference on Disarmament should be the complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. Pending the realization of that comprehensive objective, they considered that efforts should be concurrently directed towards the adoption of partial measures, especially to deal with the most urgent problems such as a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

29. Delegations of a group of socialist countries considered that the Ad Hoc Committee had accumulated a wealth of ideas and proposals and that a good basis had been established for concrete and goal-oriented work. Noting the continuing validity of the proposals for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the Earth, they expressed readiness to consider partial measures leading to the prevention of the deployment of space weapons. They suggested that the first step could be the elaboration of an international agreement to ensure the immunity of artificial satellites not carrying weapons of any kind. At the same time, in their view, consideration should be given to the possibility of a prohibition on the development of new types of ASAT systems and the elimination of existing ones. They also proposed to discuss the possibility of taking measures aimed at banning space-to-space, space-to-Earth and Earth-to-space weapon systems. Underlining that the non-deployment of weapons in outer space should be effectively verified, they elaborated on the proposals for the creation of a world space organization and for the establishment of an international inspectorate. In order to facilitate the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, a document (CD/777) containing provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects was submitted to the Conference.

30. Other delegations were not in favour of proposals calling for an immediate ASAT ban, immunity for all satellites, a ban on so-called space weapons and other similar approaches. In their view, these approaches did not take adequately into account objective political, strategic, military and technical factors. Nor were such proposals helpful in fulfilling the Committee's mandate, and in particular in assisting delegations to widen and deepen their understanding of the complex issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

31. Other delegations pointed out that those delegations which rejected proposals on an ASAT ban or on other ways to ban outer space weapons, had advanced no other comparable proposals on their part aimed at achieving the common objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

32. Various delegations considered that existing proposals for the definition of space weapons (CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1 and Add.1) shared common elements and thus provided a good basis for further work towards the objective of prohibiting the emergence of space weapons. Other delegations,

were not in favour of this approach since, in their view, it did not give an accurate picture of all the threats confronting space objects and also overlooked other significant factors of the military and strategic situation relevant to outer space.

33. Various delegations discussed proposals concerning the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and the protection of satellites. It was suggested that one possible structure for an instrument on the subject would be in the form of a general treaty with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites. Reference was made to the suggestion that, in order to assure the verifiability of treaty commitments, untested anti-satellite systems could be prohibited, i.e., those capable of attacking satellites in high orbit. Commenting on proposals for the protection of satellites, it was noted that it would first be necessary to establish as clearly as possible within the context of existing international law and established international practice which satellites perform functions that are in the common interest, what these common interests are and how these satellites contribute to them, following which it would be necessary to identify how these satellites could be protected. In this regard it was also recalled that a proposal had been made that active discussion be entered into on measures to protect from attack all satellites -- and their associated ground stations -- that contribute to strategic stability and to verification of arms control arrangements. Another view was that a treaty on the subject should, ban the use of force against any space object; prohibit the deliberate destruction, damage or interference with the normal functioning of space objects; proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and provide for the destruction under international control of any existing ASAT weapons. Some delegations commented in detail on a wide range of means that were available to interfere with the functioning of satellites which, in their view, demonstrated that in the examination of proposals to prohibit ASAT systems it was clearly necessary to take into account that the concept involved much more than weapons systems specifically designed and intended to destroy satellites.

34. Commenting on proposals for the elaboration of an agreement on the immunity of space objects, some delegations noted that the majority of satellites perform military missions and held that to grant them immunity would be tantamount to legitimizing the military uses of space. In their opinion, any move to grant immunity to space objects should be accompanied by a strengthening of the 1975 Registration Convention to assure that the functions and purposes of protected space objects are clear. It was suggested that the Convention should include provisions to verify the accuracy of the information provided thereunder and that the verification of the nature of space objects could be carried out at the launching sites.

35. With reference to the proposals contained in paragraphs 28, 33 and 34, many delegations recalled that the Harare Declaration adopted at the Eighth Non-aligned Summit called on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of an arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. In particular, they stressed the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space and of ensuring that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer

space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances. It further invited the United Nations Secretary-General and the Conference on Disarmament to explore the ways and means of bringing satellites for military purposes under international control, particularly when it puts at stake the security of the non-aligned countries. In this connection, it called upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to adhere strictly to the existing legal restrictions and limitations on space weapons, including those contained in the Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Soviet Union-United States Treaty on Antiballistic Missiles, and to refrain from taking any measures aimed at developing, testing or deploying weapons and weapon-systems in outer space.

36. Other delegations stressed that proposals, beside the basic criterion of usefulness should be judged in terms of their contribution to international peace and security and of their verifiability and they questioned the credibility and the balance of proposals contained in paragraph 35 linked to selective and partial approaches.

37. Some delegations, while noting that the Ad Hoc Committee was still at an exploratory stage of its work, considered that some ideas that had been put forward deserved study, such as the possibility of multilateralizing the provisions of existing bilateral agreements relating to the immunity of satellites, the role which the international monitoring of satellites might play, the possibility of placing constraints on some elements of anti-satellite activity, consistent with the security interests of all States, and a "rules-of-the-road" agreement for space. Some delegations also stressed the importance of, and made proposals for, confidence-building measures and the need for transparency in space activities. They also mentioned as worthy of consideration the elaboration of a code of conduct.

38. Other delegations held that the Ad Hoc Committee had passed the exploratory stage of its work and had exhausted the consideration of the first two points of its programme of work, it having been clearly established that the central question that the Committee should consider under agenda item 5 was the identification of concrete measures to prevent, in a general and comprehensive manner, an arms race in outer space.

39. Referring to proposals for banning the use of force in outer space, immunizing satellites from attack, immunizing satellite ground stations from attack and banning anti-satellite weapons, one delegation held that such proposals were either redundant or perhaps even prejudicial to the legal controls that were already in place. In its view, all uses of force except in self-defence were currently prohibited by law, all satellites and the ground stations associated with such satellites were already protected from attack except in cases of self-defence, the existing legal régime placed many restraints on the nature, deployment and uses of ASATs, and a comprehensive ASAT ban would raise many complex problems.

40. Various delegations recalled, however, that these legal restraints were not comprehensive enough to prevent the emergence of non-nuclear ASAT weapons in outer space and should, therefore, be supplemented by agreements which would preclude the introduction of such weapons in that environment.

41. A proposal was made that the Members of the Conference on Disarmament should accept to declare, through the Ad Hoc Committee's report, that none of them has deployed weapons in outer space on a permanent basis. While some delegations, including the delegations of socialist countries, supported this proposal, others questioned its usefulness because, in their view, such a declaration was not verifiable and might interfere with the bilateral negotiations.

42. A presentation was made to the Ad Hoc Committee on the results of an ongoing research programme, known as PAXSAT, concerning the feasibility of the application of remote-sensing techniques to the verification of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements and covering both space-to-space and space-to-ground remote-sensing. Delegations, in general, expressed their appreciation for the valuable contribution this project made to work in the area of verification.

43. Some delegations considered that verification did not raise insurmountable obstacles to the conclusion of agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space since, in their view, it should be possible to assure verification of compliance through a combination of national technical means and international procedures. Attention was drawn to the proposals for the creation of a world space organization and the establishment of an international inspectorate. Reference was also made to the possibilities offered by the PAXSAT concept and the proposed international satellite monitoring agency for further exploring the feasibility of multilateral means of verifying a non-arms régime in outer space. A number of delegations were of the view that verification functions should be entrusted to an international body, so as to provide the international community with an independent capability to verify compliance. Some delegations held that issues relating to verification needed to be considered in greater depth. They believed that such issues were particularly sensitive and complex in this area because, on the one hand, vital national security interests were at stake and, on the other hand, the vastness of space and the possibilities of concealment on Earth posed special problems. One such special problem related to proposals for a verification system that did not take into account that an operational ASAT system and an operational ABM system already exist. Another such problem related to the number of direct and indirect ways to attack a satellite and the other elements of a satellite system. A further problem arose from divorcing classes of "space weapons" from the context in which they are developed and might be deployed. Other delegations maintained that monitoring all launches of objects to be stationed in space, through an international inspectorate, would greatly reduce the relevance of such factors, particularly in the absence of any weapons permanently deployed in that environment. They also recalled that the experience being acquired in verifying some far-reaching disarmament measures on Earth, including SALT and other agreements, would help deal also with concealment problems in space disarmament context. More specifically, these delegations pointed out that some proposals to ban ASAT weapons provided also for the elimination of all existing weapons of this class, both the air-launched systems based on F-15 fighters and, the land-based one which was still not operational, these ASAT systems would be destroyed under strict international control, as provided for by the concept of international inspectorate. They recalled that the definitions of ASAT weapons proposed by various delegations covered all possible ways of attacking satellites or the other elements of a satellite

system. These delegations believed that the complex problem of effective verification procedures, acceptable to all, should be seriously addressed in a co-operative manner. Finally, they pointed out that dealing with separate classes of weapons was already an established practice, universally recognized in other disarmament fields. Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the establishment of a world space organization was not within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament.

44. Delegations of the group of socialist countries suggested proceeding, without awaiting the conclusion of the relevant agreement on space, to the establishment of an international verification system -- an international inspectorate -- for the non-deployment on outer space of weapons of any kind. The principal purpose of this verification will be to make sure that objects launched into space are neither weapons, nor are equipped with weapons of any kind. The suggested verification system would envisage the permanent presence of inspection groups at all sites for launching space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to the representatives of the inspectorate. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from the specially-designated observatories and also conduct, if necessary, an on-site inspection. Should the future agreement envisage a complete ban on space strike arms, inspections could be extended to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc. Launches of ballistic missiles unrelated to putting any space craft into the artificial Earth satellite orbit or on a flight path toward other celestial bodies should not be covered by verification.

45. Some delegations foresaw substantial technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate. In this regard, they believed that one had also to keep in mind that virtually any space object, if controlled and manipulated properly, is capable of serving as a weapon. They stated that this basic fact plus many technical, definitional, organizational and political obstacles bar the way to a successful international verification inspectorate.

46. Other delegations believed, however, that the actual capacity of using such space objects as weapons could become militarily significant only after extensive field testing in such a mode, and that the possibilities offered by an international inspectorate, combined with existing methods of monitoring space objects, would effectively ensure verifiability of an agreement not to introduce weapons in outer space. In this regard, they pointed out that the technical, political and organizational difficulties referred to could be overcome in a co-operative manner, as had been done with respect to many other disarmament agreements.

47. Some delegations, expressing concern at restrictions being placed on the transfer of space technology, reiterated that it was necessary in the consideration of proposals to contemplate ways and means of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, so that all States would have access without discrimination to space technology to promote

their economic and social development according to their needs, interests and priorities. In this connection, these delegations underlined the need to further the objectives of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.

48. Some delegations emphasized that all aspects of the arms race in outer space should be dealt with in order to achieve a comprehensive régime to prevent an arms race in outer space. Three possibilities were suggested to achieve a complete prohibition of all activities that could directly or indirectly contribute to an arms race in outer space: amending Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, an additional protocol thereto, or the elaboration of a new comprehensive treaty.

* * *

49. Some delegations supported the idea of establishing a group of experts to provide technical expertise and guidance in the consideration of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The view was expressed that such a group could assist the Ad Hoc Committee with respect to problems of definition. Another idea was that the group could be entrusted with the task of defining the nature of the information that should be provided pursuant to the 1975 Registration Convention in order to permit that a distinction be made between military and non-military space objects. Some delegations shared the view that the participation of experts made a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee and believed that it would be useful for experts to be included in delegations. In their opinion, however, at this stage of the work, the Committee was not yet in a position to establish a group of experts with a specific mandate. Some delegations suggested that, with a view to reaching a common approach to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, it would be desirable that the Committee draw up an open-ended list of questions and, at an appropriate stage, identify those that needed further elaboration by experts under a clearly-defined mandate.

50. Some delegations considered that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee should be oriented towards the elaboration of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. They believed that there were sufficient areas of consensus in the ideas and suggestions that had been put forward which could serve as points of departure for multilateral negotiations. In their view, the proposal for a structured discussion of Item 3 of the programme of work (CD/OS/WP.18) provided a basis to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee's work. They emphasized that the 1988 mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should adequately reflect that view. Other delegations considered that it was necessary to continue the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a view to reaching a level of common understanding that would permit the Committee to arrive at a common definition of the scope and specific objectives of multilateral efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

IV. CONCLUSION

51. The work carried out in 1987 contributed to the accomplishment of the Ad Hoc Committee's task. In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussions held contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems

and to a clearer perception of the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space, as such, is not sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. During the discussions, there was once again recognition of the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In this context, the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies", was recognized. A preliminary consideration was given to a number of proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind.

52. There was general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that common objective. Consequently, it was agreed that no effort should be spared to assure that substantive work on this agenda item will continue at the next session of the Conference. It was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1988 session, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work of the Committee since 1985.



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