





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


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
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THE  
MAN'S MISTAKEN,  
Who thinks  
THE TAXES so GRIEVOUS  
As to render  
The N A T I O N  
Unable to maintain  
A W A R.

---

To which are added,

An *Englishman's* Advice, in the Year 1701, how we ought to act in Case of a New WAR: with the Opinion of a *Dutchman*, touching what the *British* and other Nations might hope from relying on FRENCH FAITH.

*PAX QUÆRITUR BELLO.*

OLIVER CROMWELL'S Motto.

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By an OLD ENGLISHMAN.


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T H E  
P R E F A C E.

**T**HOUGH I may have said nothing more in what is here offered to the Publick than many knew before, yet perchance (seeing the present State of our Affairs in the *East* and *West Indies*) some may find Matter in it worthy of Observation, which, till the late Discoveries, they did not think were of so much Consequence as to take up any Part of their Attention.



Therefore, all that can be said by way of Apology for this Publication is, — If the Facts here brought forward are truly stated, it may serve to help others to make easier Conclusions from them, and at the same Time refresh the Memories of Men of superior Genius, whose greater Affairs might not permit them to keep such MEMORANDUMS.

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THE  
MAN'S MISTAKEN, &c.

**H**IS MAJESTY's admirable Wisdom and his Fatherly Affection for the Welfare of his Subjects have been so conspicuous for more than Twenty seven Years, that we ought justly to be accounted one of the most ungrateful People in the World, should we ever fail in our Duty and Acknowledgment of the Blessings we enjoy under the Government of so good and amiable a Prince\*.

The

\* The Writer heard with the greatest Satisfaction what was declared in a G—d A——y the other Day, *i. e.* Their firm Resolution of standing by and supporting the present Royal Family and the Rights and Priviledges of the *British* Nation, in Opposition to any that should dare to attempt to destroy them; and that if needful, they would spend their last Shilling in so glorious a Cause: and that Men were greatly mistaken who weakly think the Nation is unable to maintain a War. — And this, says an old *British Nobleman*, we desire all the World should know.

The universal Talk of War, and the Occasion of it, would certainly make a Man appear stupid should he attempt to dispute that our Ministers will in the least be wanting (under the Direction of so mild and gracious a Royal Master) to assert the just Rights of the Imperial Crown of *Great Britain*, whereforever they shall find it attacked, either in Home *Britain* or in the *East* or *West Indies*, let the invading Prince be ever so great and potent; and that naturally leads us to conclude, they will with the same Spirit be as watchful to support our Trade and Navigation against any Attempt that may be made to destroy either one or the other.

This being our happy Situation at Home at this Critical Conjunction, which cannot but be extremely pleasing to every Loyal and Faithful *Briton*.— Still as some give out, that our Taxes are already so grievous that we are unable to maintain a War, and that it would be more adviseable to accept of the best Terms we can get, than to enter into one with so crafty and so politick an Enemy as that we are likely to meet with.—— I shall therefore undertake to shew the Falseness of this Assertion, for two Reasons.

*First*, Should this Doctrine be believed by our Enemy abroad, it must necessarily make him the more unwilling to do that Justice which the Nation has a Right to demand.

*Secondly*, Such a Belief will make the People at Home very uneasy and impatient even so far as to make them apprehensive of our being upon the Eve of ceasing to be a Free People.—We hope our Countrymen have had Experience enough of Negotiating : Witness what happened in the Reign of *James I*; whilst we were so employed, the Emperor stripped the poor unfortunate King of *Bohemia* of all his Dominions.

But before I enter upon the Enquiry as to those who are most affected by the Taxes, this I am assured for a Truth, that the People would rather pay much more, than stand by and see our Nation tamely submit to any Insults, from what Quarter soever, without properly resenting it, becoming a Free and Warlike People; hoping THRO' THE BLESSING OF HEAVEN, by making such Stands, not only to reap from it great and lasting Advantages to these Kingdoms in respect to Wealth, but above all the further Security of the Protestant Religion and our Liberty and Properties in Times to come upon a more solid and lasting Foundation.

To prosecute therefore what I propose, shall proceed to consider the whole Body of the People under these Six Classes, I. The *Landed Men*; II. The *Clergy*; III. The *Merchants*; IV. The *Manufacturers*; V. The *Shopkeepers*; and, VI. The *Farmers*.

FIRST, The *Landed Men*, it is true, have in Time of War been taxed 4 Shillings in the Pound, and which by the Way they have generally paid without repining, when they were satisfied the Necessities of the State required it.— But it is to be remembered, that tho' the Tax is called Four Shillings in the Pound, it is very well known that in several Parts of *England* the Land is not even then rated at Two Shillings in the Pound, whatever it may be in *London* and some of the Counties round it. Now, for Argument sake, suppose, as in this Case, should the full Four Shillings in the Pound be paid, is not the Land theirs for ever? does it not belong to them to defend it? — for this is not a Quarrel of Ambition and Humour, but to assert the Nation's just Rights in the most essential Part; for should our Enemy prevail in conquering and destroying our Settlements in the *East* and *West Indies*, how long will HOME BRITAIN be free from those Invaders? — I shudder at the very Thoughts of it, — and therefore make no Doubt of the Readiness of the *Landed Men*, to assist on so arduous an Occasion; for if otherwise, GOD knows who may become Possessors of their Lands, and consequently in such a Confusion the glorious Names of FREEMEN and FREEHOLDERS will be soon buried in the Ruins of their Country.

SECONDLY, The *Clergy*, some say, have a Right to complain of the Land Tax, because they are only Tenants for Life; this I can by no Means agree to, nor do I believe those Reverend Gentlemen desire to be free from paying any Land Tax, when they see the Cause of their Country requires it; but I suppose and hope the Assessors and Commissioners take their Cases into Consideration when the Tax is laid, remembering their Situation, and that their Condition is not upon a Foot with the *Hereditary Freeholders*: — and here I must observe, to the Honour of the *Clergy* of the *Church of England*, that no Body of Men whatever are more ready to contribute towards the Support of the Temporal Government than they are in Time of Need, well knowing that if our happy Constitution should be destroyed (*which HEAVEN of its infinite Mercy avert*) that of our holy Religion must at the same Time perish with it.

THIRDLY, The *Merchants* may at first View think the Duties burthensome that are laid upon the Imports and Exports, and that War is extremely hurtful to them, by interrupting their Commerce abroad; which I agree is in some Measure true; and it would be well if the Necessities of the State did not require it. As to the Restraint on Trade, by Losses in Time of War, I answer, The Price of the Commodity that comes in safe

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sells

fells of Course dearer, which in some Sort makes Amends for the Loss, and that the Duty paid is always considered with Interest in the Sale of the Goods to them that buy them. Add to this, which I believe no Body will deny, — If there should be a War, it will be undertaken to protect our Settlements abroad, and to get restored what has been unjustly severed from them, either in Peace or War; in which are included that of supporting our Trade and Navigation in the most sensible Parts: For, surely, it cannot be denied that the *Merchants* are highly concerned in the Event, especially if it be true what has been lately asserted, that our Trade to the *West Indies* only amounts to no less than Four Millions Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds yearly; and by that Branch no less than 300000 Seamen are employed. — In short, I think it useless to speak further, as to the *Merchants*, because former Experience has shewed that none of their Fellow Subjects have been more ready to assist with their Purse\* and Persons whenever any Attempt has been made to infringe on the Rights and Liberty of these Kingdoms than they; so there

\* Witness the Readiness of the late Sir *Theodore Janssen* and other eminent Merchants to assist the Government, when they were distressed during the Wars in the Reigns of the late King *William* and Queen *Ann*: And the same glorious Zeal to support the Public Credit was shewn by the *Merchants* of this great City in the late Rebellion.

there is no Doubt, should their Aid be again requested, they will as readily assist with the same Zeal as heretofore.

FOURTHLY, The *Mechanicks* or *Manufacturers*; these may suffer by Duties on Coals and Candles, especially those who are obliged to make long Days-work in the Winter, and perform it by Fire; and even in those Cases I believe it will be allowed they make themselves Amends by raising the Prices of their Labour. — As to Excise upon Liquor, which is called the GREAT ONE, is not a very grievous Tax, nor that of Malt and Hops, being the only expensive Ingredients from which it is made; yet it is to be remarked, that the Two-Peny Pot before the additional Excises were laid on was not much above a fourth Part bigger than the Three-halfpeny Pot is now\*: And for the additional Duty on Small Beer, it is so inconsiderable as scarce to be worth mentioning. — But supposing they should for a Time suffer some further Inconveniencies by a War, is it not the Duty of the meanest of his Majesty's Subjects to lend their utmost Assistance in Time of Danger in common with their Masters, whose Duty and Loyalty there is not the least Doubt of; for, to carry it yet further, should our Enemy prevail, will not our

B 2

Ma-

\* Those Two-Peny Pots are now used in *Ireland*, where there is little or no Excise.



Manufactures be destroyed, and our People made Slaves to Foreigners? that, I believe, will be sufficient to induce every Man (let his Condition be what it will) who wishes well to his native Country to use in his Station his utmost Zeal in Defence of it against her open or secret Enemies.

It has been urged, that the Window Tax is a large Duty upon those *Manufacturers* who are obliged to have large Houses to carry on their Business in; to this it is answered: There was heretofore a Tax called Chimney Money, and that this and other Taxes were imposed at the Time we were under a Necessity of carrying on a War for the Preservation of these Kingdoms, when our Rights and all that was dear to us were endeavoured to be subverted through the Wickedness of our Domestick as well as the Artifice of our Foreign pretended Friends.

Taking it at the worst, that we cannot by fair Means get Satisfaction for the Injuries we have suffered, and War should ensue, Has is not been found, from former Experience, that though some Manufactures have for the present been hurt by it, have not others been greatly increased, and some new ones introduced into the Nation even in the Time of War? Have we not greatly improved in the following Manufactures since the Revolution, to wit, that of making fine Glass, Hatts, Paper, Linnen, Wrought Silks,

Silks, and diverse other Home-made Goods, which we now export in great Quantities, that before we were obliged to purchase with our Money, and bring into *England* from Foreign Countries? Can any One deny the Care that his present Majesty and his Royal Father always took to encrease and preserve our Shipping, the Bulwark of the Nation? and it is to be hoped, if Occasion requires, our Enemies will find our Maritime Affairs were never in a better Condition than at this Day: And must not every One own that we are greatly indebted to this Royal Attention for it, as well as a prodigious Increase of our Mercantile Shipping and Trade to the remotest Part of the World, and that by the Increase of the former? Have not our Masters of Ships been employed at Times as the common Carriers of Goods for the different Nations of *Europe*? In short, I cannot help repeating it again, What would not a brave and Free People hazard to support the Independency of these Islands against the Machinations of a secret Enemy?

FIFTHLY, The *Shopkeepers*, which are a very large Body of Men; These to be sure, say some, will suffer by a War, particularly thro' the *Gentry's* lessening their Expences, from being obliged to pay additional Taxes; and what, say they, must further add to the *Shopkeepers* Prejudice, will be that of the People's keeping their Money in the Funds,  
and

and by such Means neglect to pay their Tradesmen, and likewise make others forbear buying several Things which they would otherwise have done, not knowing what Occasion they might have for their Money; and that by high Duties imposed on the Goods they sell will encrease the *Shopkeepers* Stock (if not his Loss) without that of his Profit: And lastly, that the Poor by a War will be greatly increased, towards whose Maintenance the *Shopkeepers* must contribute very largely. As to the *Gentry's* not buying so much as in Time of Peace, may be true; but then others who may be Gainers by the War will naturally buy of the *Shopkeepers* several Things; and that will make some Amends. And as to Persons keeping their Money in the Funds and neglect paying their Debts, the Law will compel them should they refuse so to do. — As to the Increase of the High Duties, this is to be observed, that in former Wars the *Shopkeepers* were so far from falling off, that it was taken Notice that their Shops were better stocked than before the Wars begun; which is to be accounted for no other Way I know of, than either they became more industrious, or their Gains encreased by some other Means which they could not come at in Time of Peace. — As to the Encrease of the Poor, whenever that happens in Time of War, it is more owing to the Wilfulness of some Manufacturers, when

when their own falls off, in refusing to be-  
take themselves to other Business, that they  
might be employed in, than to the War; so  
that upon the Whole, in respect to the *Shop-*  
*keepers*, the Taxes certainly are not so hurt-  
ful to them as to deter us from entering into  
a just War: On the contrary, I rather be-  
lieve that all the principal *Shopkeepers* in  
these Kingdoms would rather we should en-  
ter into one, and contribute as largely to-  
wards the Support of it as any of his Majes-  
ty's Subjects, than abate one Jot of our just  
Rights, wisely considering, that it is much  
better to contribute a Part, than stand by  
and see the Whole swallowed up thro' our  
Negligence and Inactivity.

There is one Matter which I have omit-  
ted to mention, The Complaints in respect  
to Bankrupcies in Time of War; that if the  
War is concerned in respect to Bankrupts, it  
is but obliquely; for the Losses at Sea are the  
Reasons for very few of them, and those of-  
ten owing to the Hardiness and Temerity of  
unskilful Traders who make too much haste  
to grow rich. As to the wealthy *Merchants*  
who carry on Foreign Trade, they in Time  
of War act very cautiously, contenting them-  
selves with small Profits with Safety, rather  
than run too great Hazards; nor do they for-  
get to assist in the Manner I have before men-  
tioned: add to that, every one knows how  
readily they contributed in the last War to-  
wards

wards fitting out several Privateers that greatly annoyed the Enemy, and were of great Service to their Country, as there was certainly some Chasm in Trade: By the rich Merchants acting so cautiously, Pray, how was it filled up? why, by Persons of small Stocks and little Skill; (though some of them perhaps well cas'd in Knavery) if such as those soon run themselves a-ground, it is not much to be wondered at. In short, this with Truth may be asserted; that some have remarked that there have been more Bankrupts in Time of Peace than in Time of War.

SIXTHLY, and Lastly, The *Farmer*, let us consider how far he will be affected by a War, and that of the Publick Taxes: As to that on Malt and Hops, it may be said properly to belong to him; but then it is well known he repays himself, by raising the Prices of those Commodities: and I believe no Body will deny but that Corn generally sells better in Time of War than in Peace, especially where there are large Armies and Fleets employed in different Parts; so that, as to that valuable Body of useful Men, there does not seem to be the least Colour to decline a just War on their Account: and, as far as I can learn, they are ready and willing to assist in supporting the Honour of the Nation as any Set of Men whatever.

I hope therefore, from what is here offered, I have plainly demonstrated that our  
Taxes

Taxes are not so grievous as render us unable to enter into a War; and it is likewise to be hoped that no People under the Sun will be more zealous, upon this Occasion, to defend his Majesty's, the present Royal Family and the Nation's just Rights and the Liberty of their Country, than those of *Great Britain*, in Opposition to any Power, let it be ever so great, that shall attempt to injure or destroy either the One or the Other: And that HEAVEN in its Divine Goodness may maintain in us the Spirit of Union, Strength and Courage, which is now more necessary than ever, are the hearty and ardent Prayers of all his most Sacred Majesty's dutiful and loyal Subjects.

Here I shall subjoin, as *Memorials* never to be forgot by all the Faithful in these Kingdoms, the ADVICE of an ENGLISHMAN, in the Year 1701, how we ought to act in Case of a New War: — Together with the Opinion of a *Dutchman*, in the Year 1713, touching what the *British* and other Nations were to hope from relying on FRENCH FAITH.

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T H E  
ENGLISHMAN'S ADVICE, &c.

**T**HE Year 1701 was productive of very great Events; the Death of the unfortunate *James II*, and the Acknowledging by *France* the Title of his pretended Son, in direct Violation of the Treaty at *Ryswick*, were none of the least. — *France* did not stop there; as she had placed one of her Grandsons on the Throne of *Spain*, she began to act more openly, by plainly shewing that she had nothing less in View than to subject all the other Powers in *Europe* to her arbitrary Will: to stem therefore the further Progress of so dangerous an Enemy was the chief Reason that induced those Powers to enter into the Grand Alliance, and that produced almost a general War in *Europe*; happy if the Conclusion had been equal to the Success that attended it for ten Campaigns! a Success scarcely to be paralleled in ancient or modern Relation, and raised the Reputation of the *British* Arms to a Height not known before.

But

But before the Commencement of this War several Pamphlets were published; One, speaking of the Condition of *France* in respect of carrying on a War against so many *Allies*, He proceeds to point out how *England* ought to act on that Occasion; one Part of which we too fatally neglected, and which I fear is one of the principal Causes of the present Contest.— But to attend our Author :

‘ Taking it for granted that some Powers  
 ‘ in *Europe* will bring into the Field large  
 ‘ Armies — to bear against *France*, let us  
 ‘ see how he is able to furnish out a suffi-  
 ‘ cient Force to encounter them, and at the  
 ‘ same Time provide for the Defence of a  
 ‘ Coast several Thousand Miles in Extent?  
 ‘ To make as near as may be a true Estimate  
 ‘ of his Wealth and Power, I shall give my  
 ‘ Reader an Account he may depend upon of  
 ‘ some Particulars relating to his Revenues,  
 ‘ and the Number of his Forces at different  
 ‘ Times.

‘ His whole Revenue did in the Year 1666  
 ‘ amount to 126 Millions of Livres, which  
 ‘ reduced to *English* Money according as the  
 ‘ Exchange went then, that is, reckoning 13  
 ‘ Livres to the Pound Sterling, would make  
 ‘ Nine Millions and about Six hundred thou-  
 ‘ sand Pounds; it produced the two last Years  
 ‘ 1700, 1701, only One Hundred and Seven  
 ‘ Millions, which reduced to *English* Money



according as the Exchange has gone for that  
 Time, *viz.* at Fifteen Livres to the Pound  
 Sterling, (which Difference of the Exchange  
 has been occasion'd by the raising the Stan-  
 dard of his Coin) make about 7140000 Li-  
 vres; by which Computation, 'tis evident,  
 they are sunk above Two Millions Four  
 Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling, that is  
 at least one fourth Part of what they were  
 at the Time before mentioned; which plain-  
 ly shews that the People and Wealth of  
*France* are decreased since that Time, at least  
 in the same Proportion, since we may rea-  
 sonably conclude, that the King's Reve-  
 nues have been managed as carefully, and  
 collected as rigorously in his late Times of  
 Need, as they were heretofore.

The King's Income is diminished in a far  
 greater Proportion, it being clogged with a  
 Debt of Five Hundred Millions only to the  
*Hôtel de Ville* or Town-house of *Paris*, for  
 which he pays Interest at Five *per Cent*,  
 Twenty Five Millions, that is near 1700000  
 Livres Sterling. He pays besides another  
 sort of Interest, by way of Salaries, for a  
 considerable Multitude of new Offices erect-  
 ed and bought, many of them since the Be-  
 ginning of the last War, which amounts at  
 least to so much as will make the Interest  
 Money already mentioned exceed Two Mil-  
 lions Sterling; so that he has coming in clear  
 not full Five Millions Sterling:

'Tis

' 'Tis true that, besides his ordinary Reve-  
 ' nue, he has had extraordinary Ways of rai-  
 ' sing Money; as the Sale of Offices already  
 ' mentioned, frequently raising and falling the  
 ' Standard of his Money, *Dons Gratuits* which  
 ' People are made to pay *per Force*, Registring  
 ' Titles of Gentility, Taxing Partizans, that  
 ' is, those who have had the Managing of his  
 ' Revenues, who were last Year forc'd to re-  
 ' fund near a Million Sterling; and many o-  
 ' ther Expedients, which in Time we may be  
 ' better acquainted with, if we are pleas'd to  
 ' let him go on quietly; but these have all  
 ' been so often made Use of, that they will  
 ' be found to be of very small Ressource for  
 ' the Future in a Country so much exhausted  
 ' by them already.

' What has stood him in greatest stead for  
 ' some Years, during the last War, was the  
 ' Capitation, which brought him in above  
 ' three Millions Sterling yearly, and which he  
 ' must again have Recourſe to: But how  
 ' grievous an Imposition that was thought,  
 ' and how ruinous that must prove to his  
 ' Country, if he should be under a Necessity  
 ' of continuing it but a few Years, I appeal  
 ' to any who have been there, and heard the  
 ' heavy Complaints it occasioned. But a  
 ' stronger Proof cannot be required to shew  
 ' how destructive the Continuance of it would  
 ' have proved, than that the King took it off.  
 ' For his Most Christian Majesty has generally  
 ' been

' 'Tis

' been observed to lay as great a Load on his  
 ' People as they could bear. Since then he  
 ' was pleased to ease them of this Tax when  
 ' he wanted not so specious a Pretence to con-  
 ' tinue it as the great Debts he had contract-  
 ' ed, we may be sure he knew it could not be  
 ' done without utterly ruining and disabling  
 ' them to pay at all.

' Having thus briefly touched upon the  
 ' present Condition of *France*, therefore, if  
 ' they should make a successful Land-War,  
 ' must be oblig'd, besides the necessary Gar-  
 ' risons of his Sea-Ports, to maintain Two  
 ' Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Men."

Here the Author points out how they  
 should be employed, which not being the  
 Case at present shall not repeat it here ; and  
 then he goes on, — " As to a Sea War, says  
 ' he, He must fit out a prodigious Fleet, and  
 ' that in the last War he shewed his Power  
 ' to be matchless by maintaining no less than  
 ' 400000 Men by Sea and Land, why there-  
 ' fore may he not do the same again?

' Now as to *England*, if we raise Three  
 ' Millions more yearly than in Time of Peace  
 ' to carry on a War, that will be prodigious,  
 ' considering the Debts we owe, and which  
 ' every *Englishman* ought to desire to see  
 ' pay'd off, rather than encreased. And yet  
 ' the Parallel will not fully hold between  
 ' *England* and *France* ; because *England* ne-  
 ' ver has been, and I hope never will be scru-  
 ' up

' up like *France*, to pay to the utmost Ex-  
 ' tremity of what it is able, and for that  
 ' Reason might comparatively with Ease get  
 ' rid of a far greater Debt than it now owes;  
 ' whereas *France*, unless it shall by our Inac-  
 ' tivity get the *West Indies*, will never be  
 ' able to pay its Principal Debt, but daily  
 ' increase it to its utter Ruin. Before I con-  
 ' clude shall take only Notice of the most  
 ' material Objections which can be made a-  
 ' gainst a War.

' Either the necessary Expence 'twill draw  
 ' on us, or the Prejudice we may sustain by  
 ' the Interruption of our Trade.

' To the First I answer, That in the Man-  
 ' ner it has been propos'd, that *England* shall  
 ' make a War, we may do it at an Annual  
 ' Expence, at most of One Million Eight  
 ' Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pounds more  
 ' than would otherwise be levied. For we  
 ' will take it for granted, that tho' we re-  
 ' main in Peace, we should find it necessary  
 ' to maintain at least as great a Sea Force, as  
 ' was done the first Year after the Peace,  
 ' that would cost us Eight Hundred Thou-  
 ' sand Pounds, to which we shall add One  
 ' Million Two Hundred Thousand Pounds  
 ' for the War, 'twill abundantly strengthen  
 ' our Fleet. If we now make it Two Milli-  
 ' ons, it will be better.

' I will not then suppose that any *Englisch-*  
 ' *man* will think the Preservation of his Re-  
 ' ligious

' ligious and Liberty too dearly purchased at  
 ' that Rate. Such an Undervaluing of those  
 ' Blessings none can be capable of, whose  
 ' Hearts are not hardened, and who are not  
 ' doomed to utter Perdition. As to what  
 ' may be objected concerning Trade, I an-  
 ' swer, That granting our Trade to the  
 ' *Streights* should suffer an Interruption by  
 ' the War, such an Inconvenience would be  
 ' far less than the total Loss of it, not only  
 ' thither, but to the *West Indies*, besides the  
 ' Loss of the Manufacture of our fine Dra-  
 ' pery, which it has been proved, will be one  
 ' of the necessary Consequences of our sit-  
 ' ting still.

' Yet I can see no Necessity of granting  
 ' that our *Turky* and *Italian* Trades will  
 ' suffer by the War, if we will suppose our  
 ' Maritime Affairs to be well managed. The  
 ' War we are to make must be altogether by  
 ' Sea, and consequently implies a Necessity  
 ' of our having every Summer a strong Fleet  
 ' in the *Mediterranean*, to harrass our En-  
 ' mies there, which we shall be now in a  
 ' much better Condition than at that Time,  
 ' seeing we are in Possession of *Gibraltar* and  
 ' *Port Mahon*; why then our Traders thi-  
 ' ther may not be protected by that same  
 ' Force, I cannot see. And if strict Prohibi-  
 ' tions be made against any Ships going thi-  
 ' ther, but under the Convoy of our Men of  
 ' War at set Seasons; 'tis probable, much  
 ' fewer

' fewer will be lost than were during the last  
 ' War. For the Convenience of being shel-  
 ' tered in *Spanish* Ports proved a Temptation  
 ' then for many Merchant Ships to run with-  
 ' out Convoy: whereas none will now be so  
 ' adventurous as to hazard a Run to *Turky*  
 ' or to *Italy* along so vast a Tract of an Ene-  
 ' my's Coast. It is true some of our Trade,  
 ' which I own to be very considerable, will  
 ' indeed be at a Stand till some Success at-  
 ' tends us; but then a proper Strength well  
 ' managed in *America* will abundantly com-  
 ' pensate for that Loss.

' Seeing our Plantations are so convenient-  
 ' ly situated that not a Galleon coming or  
 ' going can escape us, consider then of what  
 ' Consequence those Plantations are to us.  
 ' How much such an Interruption of all  
 ' Commerce thither would distress *Spain*, is  
 ' apparent; and it probably might be none  
 ' of the weakest Reasons to incline that Peo-  
 ' ple, in a New War, to side with us.

' The Wealth we shall thereby acquire  
 ' will not only defray the Expence of the  
 ' Force we shall maintain there, but, with  
 ' good Management, may go a great Way  
 ' towards the Charge of the whole War: and  
 ' it will be Fault of our Commanders if all  
 ' the *French* Colonies there be not rooted out,  
 ' which for these Reasons we ought chiefly  
 ' to aim at:

‘ *First*, IT WILL GREATLY WEAKEN THE  
 ‘ FRENCH POWER AT SEA, BY DESTROYING  
 ‘ SO GREAT A NURSERY OF THEIR SEAMEN.  
 ‘ *Secondly*, WE SHALL LOSE A DANGEROUS  
 ‘ RIVAL IN OUR SUGAR TRADE AS WELL AS  
 ‘ SOME OTHERS, WHICH THEY WILL HAVE  
 ‘ COMMON WITH US, BY MEANS OF THEIR  
 ‘ COLONIES IN THE SOUTHERN ISLES. And  
 ‘ *Thirdly*, THIS WILL VERY MUCH INCREASE  
 ‘ OUR TRADE IN AFRICA, FOR NEGROES,  
 ‘ AND RUINE THAT OF THE FRENCH \*.  
 ‘ For every One knows that none can carry  
 ‘ on a Trade for Negroes but such as have a  
 ‘ Footing in *America*. The Consequence  
 ‘ therefore of our expelling the *French*, will  
 ‘ be, that the *Spaniards* must depend abso-  
 ‘ lutely upon us for their Negroes, without  
 ‘ which their Mines will be barren, besides  
 ‘ that our Power being freed from such a Ri-  
 ‘ valship will be so much superior to any  
 ‘ Thing in those Parts of the World, that the  
 ‘ *Spaniards* can have no Ballance nor Force  
 ‘ there to protect them against us : so that,  
 ‘ for Fear of their Plate Fleets, and of their  
 ‘ very

\* It was remarked by the *Italians*, after the *French* had got Possession in their Country, that they were continually involved in Wars and Disorders ; which caused One of them to say, —  
 “ We shall have no Peace in *Italy* while the *French* have any Footing among us : ” and that raised so fierce a Hatred against them, that, when Opportunity offered, they were sure to be destroyed. From that, and other Causes, *Italy* has been called, THE GRAVE OF THE FRENCHMEN. And, we hope, in Time that of the *Indies* will be so called, since they will not let us peaceably enjoy our just Rights in those Parts of the World,

' very Empire in *America*, t'will be always  
 ' in our Power to obtain greater Privileges  
 ' from them in our Trade thither, than any  
 ' other Nation could pretend to; for which  
 ' Reasons I submit it to every ENGLISHMAN,  
 ' whether it ought not to be one of our great  
 ' Aims, by this War, utterly to extirpate the  
 ' *French* out of *America*? Such an Under-  
 ' taking will appear more feasible if we con-  
 ' sider that Matters may be so carried, as to  
 ' deprive the *French* of any Assistance from  
 ' the *Spaniards*, which I believe may be  
 ' done by consenting to a Neutrality with all  
 ' the *Spanish* Continent and Islands, on Con-  
 ' dition that they shall, during the War, al-  
 ' low us a free Trade with them.

' If such a Neutrality can be manag'd, we  
 ' shall not only with greater Ease destroy the  
 ' *French* there, which ought to be our Prin-  
 ' cipal Aim, but probably be greater Gainers  
 ' by a Free Trade, than by the Plunder of  
 ' their Country; if we make War upon it,  
 ' it would certainly prove more beneficial to  
 ' the Trading Interest and Manufactures of  
 ' *England*: for if by our Naval Power there  
 ' we hinder that vast Country from being  
 ' supplied with any European Commodities  
 ' from any other Hand, shall we not have a  
 ' prodigious Vent for all the Manufactures  
 ' of our own Growth, as well as for our *East*  
 ' *India* Commodities and Linnen, &c.



‘ May not the Access we shall thus get to  
 ‘ those People introduce a Vent for many of  
 ‘ our Commodities which the *Spaniards* have  
 ‘ always industriously kept from their Know-  
 ‘ ledge? Shall we not likewise trade to a far  
 ‘ greater Advantage than has been done hi-  
 ‘ therto, since we have always been obliged  
 ‘ to trust the *Spaniards* at *Cadiz*, who cer-  
 ‘ tainly shared the Profit with us? besides  
 ‘ the exorbitant Indulto’s or Duties exacted  
 ‘ by the Government both in *Europe* and *A-*  
 ‘ *merica.*”—— So much for this Author.

It is likely what was proposed against the *French* was not so strictly attended too as could have been wished, owing to some other Affairs at Home, which probably required a more immediate Attention \*. However, it may not be improper to look back and see what were the first Steps the *French* took upon their Planting in *America*, after the *Pyrenean* Treaty with the *Spaniards*, in 1659; No sooner had they made Peace than they proceeded to make Settlements in that Part of the World; nor could they forget to intrude on their Neighbours, and (which they immediately did after the Restoration) by forming Settlements in *Nevis* and *St. Christophers*, which was soon a Matter of Complaint, as appears by an Impeachment against the late Earl of *Clarendon*, in 1667, where there is this Article.

‘ That

\* That might be some reasonable Excuse for the Neglect before mention’d.

‘ That He did reject and frustrate a Proposal and Undertaking approved by His Majesty, for the Preservation of Nevis and St. Christophers, and the Reducing the French Plantations to His Majesty’s Obedience, after the Commissions were drawn for that Purpose, which were the Occasion of our great Damage and Loss in those Parts.’

I do not bring this forward by way of Reflection on the Memory of that great tho’ unhappy Nobleman, who was very unjustly used in many Respects thro’ the Artifice of his Enemies; but only to shew, that our Ancestors were early apprised of the *French* Encroachments. However, from what followed it appears pretty plain, that this was rather introduced in order to foment the popular Prejudice against the Earl, than any Design of Service to the Nation. — As to his Character, take it from his Son, Mr. *Lawrence Hyde*, who said in the *House of Commons* some Years after, *That, for his Comfort, he had heard he was a good Protestant, a good Chancellor; and that we had had worse Ministers since.* — But to suppose this Nobleman altogether faultless, were to place him beyond the Level of frail Mortality; for it must be allowed for an uncontested Truth, that he carried himself in his Station with somewhat a greater Reserve and Haughtiness than became him or was useful to him, seeing it created him many Enemies; there being nothing on Earth so disagreeable

to

to humane Nature as Neglect and Contempt: a Fault laid to the Charge of another great Man, who in Proceſs of Time ſucceeded to his high Office, and is now no more; I wiſh I could ſay was not ſtrictly true, or that it did not hurt him upon a remarkable Occaſion.

Now, to return to our preſent Purpoſe,— I believe almoſt every One is ſatiſfied from what the *French* having been doing for near 100 Years; they have nothing leſs in View than to eſtabliſh their Empires in both *Indies* upon the Plan of what they have ſo well accompliſhed for themſelves, to the Injury of their Neighbours in *Europe*. — But it is to be hoped, as our Eyes are at laſt ſufficiently opened, it will make us, before it is too late, turn our chief Attention thoſe Ways, in order as much as poſſible to prevent it. — For, tho' this Breach may be amicably made up, in regard Peace is more deſirable than War, yet we ought to have in continual Remembrance how dangerous it is to live near potent Princes, to be off our Guard; Witneſs the *Venetians*, in the Reign of *Henry VII*, who, by neglecting to take proper Care of their own Security, tho' fully warned of the Danger they were in by loſing a Battle, in one Campaign were ſtrip-ped of all their Dominions, to the ſingle City of *Venice*.

As to our Caſe, We ſhould not forget to follow the Advice of a certain great Man, who the other Day publicly ſaid, '*Conſidering*

'ing what an enterprizing Neighbour we  
 ' have near us in both Indies, it behoves us al-  
 ' ways to keep up a respectable Force both by  
 ' Land and Sea in those remote Parts of the  
 ' World, ready to resent any unjust Injuries  
 ' we may receive from them, without resor-  
 ' ting tedious Negotiations\*, which often, in-  
 ' stead of healing the Breach, give the Enemy  
 ' an Opportunity to recruit so as to enable  
 ' him at last to keep by Force what he had  
 ' taken from us by Surprise; which, if we  
 ' had not so acted, we might otherwise have  
 ' immediately wrested out of their Hands, and  
 ' by that Means have put an End to any fur-  
 ' ther Trouble.'

Still if there must be a War, we have the  
 pleasing Prospect to find (and I believe every  
 Body will own it) that the Board of *Admi-  
 ralty* was never better filled with more ex-  
 periented Gentlemen in Naval Affairs than it  
 is at present; and therefore it is not in the  
 least to be doubted but great Care will be  
 taken whom they recommend to his Most Sa-  
 cred Majesty for Commanders and Officers to  
 be employed in the Fleets fitting out, with-  
 out any Regard to Parties; then certainly  
 none will be intrusted with any considerable  
 Com-

\* It is presumed the NATION thinks, We have had enough  
 of that Way of acting, when we only consider how long our  
 Commissaries at *Paris* have been employed to settle the Limits,  
 which some say "It never will but by the longest Sword, if they  
 " go on no faster than they have begun."

Command whose Courage and Conduct have not been sufficiently experienced; which will give great Satisfaction to his Majesty's loyal Subjects in general, and the more so when they learn that none of those Commanders have taken *French* Servants on Board, whether called Valets or not.

But if we should have any Officers contrary to Expectation, serving in any of his Majesty's Ships of War, who should neglect their Duty thro' Cowardice or otherwise, it is to be wished immediate Justice may be done to the Offender or Offenders, without Regard to Families, in order to deter others from being guilty of the like in Time to come. So on the other Hand, it is well known that no Prince in the World is more ready and willing than his present Sacred Majesty, to reward the faithful Services of those who by their gallant Actions have deserved well of their Country.

The OPINION of a *Dutchman*, &c.

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### The Opinion of a DUTCHMAN.

**N**OW let us see what Opinion a *Dutchman* had of FRENCH FAITH, about the Time of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, in the Year 1713, when it was propos'd to have King *Philip* in the Possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*, which I shall extract from a Letter to a Member of the *English* Parliament.

*No Peace* (says the *Dutch* Gentleman) *will be honourable, safe and lasting, while the French King is in a Condition to break it.*

What can I say more forcible, more convincing, and more to our present Purpose? Shall I call you back to *Experience*, the surest, tho', at the same Time, the dearest of all Ways of Information? we have a sad Experiment of above fifty Years, which I reckon from the Peace of *Munster*; for before that Time, there was less Reason to be upon one's Guard against *France*; and that her Power, abstracted from any Alliance, was less to be feared; but consider then, I beseech you, since that famous Treaty, which, restoring Peace to the Emperor and our Republick,

E seemed

seemed to have restored the Balance we pursued, and secured the Liberty of *Europe*, see with what Success she carried on the War against King *Philip* in *Italy*, *Spain*, and the *Low Countries*. Behold upon what disadvantageous Terms she forced that Prince to make Peace in the Year 1659.

I will venture to tell you a Thing, tho' contrary to that Opinion which I find at present in *ENGLAND*, is nevertheless very true; that as soon as that Peace (the *Pyrenean Treaty*) was signed the Balance of the two Powers was destroy'd. FROM THAT FATAL DAY THE INFLUENCE OF *FRANCE* REACHED FROM ONE END OF THE *WORLD* TO THE OTHER, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION. IT WAS FELT IN THE *EAST* AND *WEST-INDIES*, BY THE ENLARGING OF THEIR TRADE, AND THE SETTLEMENT OF SEVERAL COMPANIES; which is the principal Cause of our present Complaint in the *East* and *West-Indies*. In *Lorraine*, by the Oppression of Duke *Charles*, and his Subjects; in *Spain*, by the solemn Reparation *France* exacted from King *Philip*, about the Dispute that happen'd between the two Ambassadors; in *England*, by the Sale of *Dunkirk*; at *Genoa*, by the Necessity that was impos'd on that Republick, to expel Cardinal *Imperiali*, one of their Nobles, who had taken Sanctuary there; in *Africa*, by the Wars against *Tunis*, *Algier*, and *Tripoli*; at *Rome*, by the Treaty

Treaty of *Pisa*, the Erection of the ignominious Pyramid, and the Legation of Cardinal *Chigi*, the Pope's Nephew; all which happen'd within the Space of seven Years. Then came the War of 1667, in which we saw eleven Towns taken in one Campaign; and the whole *Franche Comté* in a few Days. This occasion'd the *Tripple Alliance* in 1668; but the same was broken two Years after.

In 1670, *the most Christian King* seiz'd upon all *Lorraine*, nor durst any Body oppose him. In 1671, the bare Progress he made into the *Netherlands*, to fortify *Dunkirk*, cast all *Spain* into Alarm. In 1672, he fell on our Provinces, and penetrated beyond *Utrecht*. *The King*, (says Count *Rabutin* in his History) *did not vouchsafe to send an Herald to the* *Hollanders*, *as the Custom is with equal Enemies*; *he treated them as Rebel Subjects*. A Detail of what has happen'd since would be tedious; and then you are so well acquainted with it, that there's no Need to swell this Letter with it. You know upon what Conditions the Peace of *Nimeguen* was made; and how well it was observ'd; under what pretences *Strasburgh* was taken; *Casal* bought; *Luxemburg* conquer'd; *Genoa* bombard'd; and afterwards oblig'd to send their Doge into *France*, to beg the King's Pardon, and express their Sorrow for the Misfortune they had to have incurr'd his Displeasure. You are not ignorant upon what Foot the Truce



was made in 1684; nor how powerful and dreadful the Influence I just now spoke off was in *Germany*, in *England*, and here. Call to Mind the Business of the *Palatinate* and *Cologne*; the Transactions in *England*; and at *Rome* from the Year 1685 to 1689. Then take a Review of the Events of the last War, and of the haughty Carriage of *France* in the Treaty of *Ryswick*. Attend the steps of that Crown in the Execution of that Peace; in her Treaties of Partition; and in the general Invasion of the *Spanish* Monarchy. Consider, with all these, her State, her Splendor, her Loftiness, her Credit, her Power: View the Riches of her Commerce; her vast Revenues; the great Number of her fortified Towns; the Extent of her Conquests; and the Strength of her Armies and Fleets. Certainly, if you attentively reflect upon all these; if you consider, that since the Peace of *Munster*, *France* is only beholding to her own Forces for all her Advantages and the Predominance she has usurped over the rest of *Europe*; that she always made War with our Allies; that her Hands, like those of *Ismael* have been lifted up against all, and of those all against her; that she has set up her Tents in Sight of other Nations; that she has defeated their Armies, forced their strong Towns, and conquered their Provinces; and that she never made any Treaty with them without retaining Part of her Conquests.

If

If you fix awhile your Thoughts on all these Things, with an unprejudiced Mind, the Necessity which the Empire, *England* and *Holland*, besides other States, have been under to join their Forces and Counsels for their common Safety; the small Success the united Armies had in King *William's* War, and the Danger they were in of a total Subversion the Beginning of this, you will undoubtedly agree to take from the House of *Austria* one half of her Dominions, and give it to a Prince of the House of *Bourbon*; which must be the Means of restoring the Balance, and securing the Liberty of *Europe*; for certain it is, the more you take from the Weak and give to the Strong, the further we go from the Point of Equality, especially if the Forces of the Stronger be united, and those of the Weaker be divided and dispersed.

They do not deny the settling the Balance of Power between the two Houses; but, say they, that the House of *Austria* is not sufficiently weaken'd by her Losses; and upon this Supposition they now propose to us, as a *wonderful Expedient*, the taking from that House all *Spain* and the *West Indies*, and to leave her only the *Low Countries*, the Kingdoms of *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Sardinia*; the Dutchy of *Milan*, and the Places on the Coast of *Tuscany*.

Now let us see how the *French* behaved to us, when they found the war was carried on very

very successfully against them; all Methods were taken to separate us from our Allies; they would seem to have made us Arbiters of their Fiats; and in 1707, one of the *French* Ministers took to himself the Title of a Counsellor of *Geneva*, and under that Name gave these three important Advices. 1. That *France* was our ancient and best Friend. 2. That the House of *Austria* watch'd only for a proper Occasion to invade us. 3. That we were raising within ourselves a Power, whose Interest it is to deprive us of our Liberty, and would take all Opportunities to destroy us; that none but *France* could deliver us from the Danger, and that it concerned us, as we valued our own Safety, not to put her out of a Condition to assist us against you in Case of Need. These Suggestions, and all the rest which *France* made use of to break us off from the grand Alliance, were ineffectual; nay, they fill'd us with Indignation against those who, addressing us thus, thought us capable to abandon our Allies, for any particular Advantages that the Enemy could offer us; perceiving then, that the good Sense and Probity of the *Dutch* render'd them Proof against such Arguments, *France* turn'd them upon *England*, where they were better relished than with us, tho' for what Reason I know not.

Are you fully convinc'd of the Force of this Argument, that the true Way to reduce the exorbitant Power of *France*, is to give her all  
 she

she demands, and considerably to enlarge her Dominions?

Are you fully persuaded, that when *Spain* and the *Indies* are taken from the House of *Austria* and given to the House of *Bourbon*, that the former will be in a better Condition than before, to balance the Power of the latter, and to protect the other Powers of *Europe* against her Designs?

Do you think it a Demonstration, that the House of *Austria*, which while she possess'd the whole *Spanish* Monarchy was not able to resist *France*, and found herself under a Necessity to press for the Assistance of the two Maritim Powers, in order to preserve her Dominions, will be all on a sudden so reinforc'd, when above half of the Monarchy is taken from her, as to be able to secure and defend the Liberty of *Europe*? I'm almost asham'd to put such Queries to a Man of so much Sense, Wisdom, and Love to his Country, as you are reputed to be; but Passions are rais'd so high with you, that the most demonstrable Truths have as much Need of being prov'd as the most abstracted Notions.

How far was I two Years, or only a Year and a half ago, from thinking that at this Time, I should be oblig'd to prove to an *Englishman*, that the Welfare of *Europe* did not consist in the weakning the House of *Austria*, and aggrandizing that of *Bourbon*; and that for establishing a Balance of Power betwixt them,

them, *Spain* and the *Indies*, was not to be taken from the former, and much less to be given to the latter?

The *French* Minister is in the Right to say, That in order to come to a true Knowledge of an Equilibrium betwixt the two Houses, we must endeavour to get a good Estimate of the Strength and Weakness of both: But the Method which he proposes is not proper to come at it. 'Tis not by the Diversity of Provinces and Languages, or by the Extent of Dominions, that the Power of Princes is to be known; for if so, the Grand Seignior alone wou'd be more potent than all *Europe* together. Nor is it to be known by the Number or Majesty of Crowns, for Power and Dignity don't always keep Pace together.

The Power of Princes is to be known,  
I. By the Greatness of their Revenues ordinary and extraordinary.

II. By the richness and extent of their Trade.

III. By the Number of their Troops in Time of Peace and War.

IV. By the State of their Marine and Naval Forces.

V. By the Number and Goodness of their Fortresses.

VI. By the unnecessary Expences which they defray.

VII. By their Victories and Conquests.

'Tis not necessary to enter into deep Inquiries, nor to know the Secrets of the two Houses,

Houses, to be convinc'd that the House of *Bourbon* has in all those Respects infinitely the Advantage of the House of *Austria*.

As to the first, this is not a proper Place to Treat of Funds from whence the *French King* draws his Revenue, nor of the Time when, nor the Method how; I shall content myself to say in general, and I hope no *Frenchman* who understands these Affairs will deny it, that the fix'd Revenues of the King of *France* did in 1688, amount to near sixty millions of Crowns, and that the extraordinary Sums he has rais'd since that Time, were never less than forty millions of Crowns; nor will it be disown'd, that sometimes they exceeded two hundred Millions, as at the Time when he set up his Mint Bills, to which we must add the Capitation, and the tenth Penny, which has chang'd the Constitution of the Finances, but certainly have not lessen'd them; in short, 'tis certain that the King of *France* does actually levy above a hundred millions of Crowns *per Ann.* Those of the Monarchy of *Spain*, were formerly valu'd at thirty six millions of Crowns, including the Revenues of the *Indies*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and the *Netherlands*, and the Concessions or Grants upon the Clergy; but they have been so alienated, mortgag'd, and over mortgag'd, that there is not a Man in the World, who can give a clear and certain State of them: As to extraordinary Revenues, the Kings of *Spain* have few more

but free Gifts, which they obtain on certain Occasions, and the Half-years of the mortgag'd Revenues, which they detain, in Cases of pressing Necessity, from those to whom they are mortgag'd; but be that how it will, no King of *Spain* can ever be able to raise from his Dominions above twenty millions of Crowns *per Ann.* I am not so well able to give an Account of the Revenues of the House of *Austria* in *Germany*, but believe I am not mistaken if I say, they don't exceed twenty millions of Crowns *per Ann.* including all the extraordinary; so that the two Branches together, cannot exceed above forty millions of Crowns *per Ann.* which, in Proportion to the Revenues of the House of *Bourbon*, makes only two Sevenths against five Sevenths.

As to the second Point, if we examine their Commerce, the Proportion will be much the same: That of *Spain* is very little; that of *Naples* and *Sicily* still less; and that of the *Netherlands* nothing at all. The Treasures of the *Indies*, which supply the Luxury of all *Europe*, don't enrich the *Spaniards*; if the Kings of *Spain* take no more of them than what's their Due, they'll scarce be able to make a Million and a half of Crowns *per Ann.* by which we may easily guess how much of it returns into the Commerce of *Spain*. I say nothing of the hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria* and *Germany*, because every one knows that they are not proper for Commerce,

Commerce, neither by their Situation nor Product. The Gold Mines of *Hungary* can't produce 15 *per Cent.* Profit to those who farm them; and if you except the Mines and Cloth of *Silesia*, which is now in the Hands of the King of *Prussia*, the rest signify nothing.

As to the third Point, the House of *Austria* is so far from being equal to *France* in Number of Troops, that all the Confederates together are scarce able to equal her, or at least not without extraordinary Efforts. 'Tis very well known, that the King of *France* maintains two hundred thousand Men in Time of Peace, and three hundred and fifty thousand in Time of War. The House of *Austria*, when she made her greatest Efforts, could never exceed two hundred Thousand. The late King *Charles II.* in the last War, kept only thirty five Thousand in *Spain*; fifteen Thousand in the Dutchy of *Milan*; sixteen Thousand in *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, *Majorca*, and *Minorca*; two Thousand in the Places of *Tuscany*; and twenty thousand in the *Netherlands*; in all, eighty five Thousand. I know that the present Emperor has on Foot above a hundred and thirty thousand effective Men, of which a hundred and ten Thousand serv'd against *France*; but then it must be granted, that he exerts his utmost Efforts, and that he not only employs all the Revenues of *Italy*, but those of *Bavaria* for their Maintenance; and he has likewise been obliged to



incredible good Husbandry and Retrenchments of Expence. In the last Place, I don't disown but that for about sixty Years past, the House of *Austria* has in Time of War maintain'd two hundred thousand Men, and, including the Troops of the Empire, above two hundred and fifty Thousand; and I agree that she may entertain as many in Time to come, provided the *Spanish* Monarchy be not taken from her. But what Proportion is there betwixt two hundred thousand Men dispers'd throughout *Europe*, and three hundred and fifty Thousand collected together in the Kingdom of *France* alone? Where then do we find this exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*, against which we must take such Precautions?

As to the fourth Point, perhaps it may be found in her Maritime Forces? How do we know but the Court of *Vienna* may equip a Fleet on the *Danube* capable to bombard *Brest* and *Toulon*? For *Spain*, 'tis matter of Fact, that King *Charles II.* never had fifteen Men of War together, and it is certain, that the King of *France* had in 1689, a hundred and twenty of the finest Men of War in the World, forty five Gallies, and Arsenals, that were not to be match'd elsewhere.

The same Thing should be said of the fortified Places. There are to the Number of 130 in the Kingdom, the least of which is able to hold out against a royal Army; and

sixty

sixty of them are such Master-pieces, that they are justly admir'd by all that see them. I don't doubt but that the House of *Austria* has as many, and more, but the Difference is, that those of *France* lie so contiguous, that they seem so many Bastions round its Continent, and the Court having its Residence fix'd in the Centre, is always near enough to dispatch Orders, and send immediately the necessary Succours; whereas those of the House of *Austria* are dispersed in *Spain*, at *Naples* in *Sicily*, in the Dutchy of *Milan*, in *Barbary*, in the *Low Countries*, in *Hungary*, in *Transylvania*, in *Carinthia*, in *Austria*, in *Bohemia*, in *Silesia*, in the *Tyrol* on the *Rhine*, and elsewhere, which in some manner bars any Communication; besides the Frontiers which are guarded by these Places are ten Times of greater Extent than those of *France*; and which is more, are to receive their Garrisons out of two hundred thousand Men, which is the All the House of *Austria* can keep: So that it were to be wish'd, that these Places were fewer in Number.

VI. Unnecessary Expences don't at all contribute to the Greatness of Princes, but they may serve as Indexes to form a Judgment thereon. Now there never was a Prince more expensive than his Most Christian Majesty, witness the Magnificence of his Furniture, his sumptuous Palaces and Gardens; the Lead only whereof, which is hid under Ground (as

is said) cost more than would pay fifty thousand Men a Year entire. The enchanting Festivals, of which we have seen so many lavish Descriptions; the prodigious Number of his domestic Officers; and the immense Riches which he has heap'd on those that have serv'd him, on themselves, their Relations and Friends; the so-much-boasted Works of *Maintanon* and *Languedoc*, Mountains levelled, and Canals cut, for the Communication of Seas. And lastly, the vast Number of Pensions, which he gives to all Sorts of People, both within and without his Kingdom, which amounts to more than four Millions of C.owns. You'll find nothing like this in the House of *Austria*, not but they have great and magnificent Hearts; but the continued Expences of a defensive and indispensable War, has left them no Funds for such Magnificence.

VII. I have yet to speak of the Victories and Conquests, which Article alone would require a Volume. I shall therefore not mention their Victories, the Enemies have themselves sufficiently taunted them, both in Verse and Prose; but I think myself obliged to give you a short List of their Conquests. In this I shall not mention any of those Cities, or Provinces, which have been first conquer'd, and afterwards lost or restor'd. Nor that those being acquired by one Treaty, have been restor'd by another. You shall not see in this,  
*Lorrain*

*Lorrain* groaning twenty seven Years under the Yoke of *France*; nor the half of our Provinces subjected in less than a Month; nor *Sicily* submitted to His Most Christian Majesty by the revolted People. No, in this List, you shall only see those Conquests whereof his Most Christian King remained in full Possession, after the Treaty of *Ryswick*, whether such as have expressly been granted him, or such as were not then thought proper to mention, or those that he has kept contrary to the Treaty.

From the Empire and the House of *Austria*, by the Treaty of *Munster*.

*Metz, Toul, Verdun, Moyenic*, and the Countries depending thereon; the *Langravedom* of the *Upper* and *Lower Alsace*, and the Provincial Prefecture of ten Imperial Cities, situate in *Alsace*.

Since and against the Treaty of *Munster*.

The Sovereignty over the ten Imperial Cities, over all the Princes, Counts, and free States of *Alsace*, and of all the Fiefs of the three Bishopricks.

From the House of *Bouillon-Auvergne*, by a Contract of Change in the Year 1651.

The Sovereignty of *Sedan*, with the Town, the *Demesnes*, and all the Dependencies, provided

vided that there should be an Equivalent, which was never made good.

From the House of *Austria* by the *Pyrenean Treaty*.

*Arras* with the Government and Bailiwick; *Hesdin* and its Bailiwick; *Bethune* and its Government; *Lilliers* and its Bailiwick; *Lens* and its Bailiwick; the County of *St. Poll*, *Terouane* and the Bailiwick thereof; *Pas* and its Bailiwick; in short, all the Country of *Artois*, except *Aire* and *St. Omer*.

*Gravelin*, *Fort Philip*, and its *Chatelanie*, or *Castleward*, *Landrecy*, *Quesnoy*, and their Bailiwicks, Provostships and Castlewards.

*Tbionville*, *Montmedy*, *Damvilliers*, with the Appurtenances, Dependancies, and Countries annex'd; the Provostship of *Ivoy*, *Charvancy*, the Castle and its Provostship, the Town and Provostships of *Marville*.

*Marienburg*, *Philippeville*, and *Avesne*, between the *Sambre* and the *Meuse*.

All the County and \* *Viguiery* of *Rouffillon*, on this side the *Pyrenees*: The County and *Viguiery* of *Confluence*; with the County, Cities, Forts, Castles, Towns and Villages that compose it; with thirty three Villages of the Country of *Cerdagnia*, situate on this side the *Pyrenees*.

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\* A Sort of Magistracy in some of the Towns in *France* and *Spain*.

From the House of *Austria* against the *Pyrenean* Treaty.

The County of *Charleroy*, with all the Appurtenances and Dependances.

From the House of *Austria*, by the Treaty of *London* the last of *October* 1662.

The Town and Citadel of *Dunkirk*, in the Condition they were then in.

From *Lorain*, by the Treaty of the last of *Feb.* 1661.

The County of *Clairemont*, with its Demefnes: The Towns, Provostships and Lands of *Stenai*, *Jamets*, and all their Territories; the Fort of *Sirk*, with thirty Villages; the Forts and Posts of *Cofignan*, *Sarbourg* and *Phalsbourg*. That part of the Provostship of *Marville*, that belong'd to *Lorain*. The Sovereignty of the Abbey of *Gorze*; the Sovereignty of the Fort of *Maletom*; all that could belong to the Duke of *Lorain*, in *Marcheville*, *Harville*, *Mabenville*, and *Mezeray*; the Sovereignty of *Sisbef*, *Franshof*, and *Moutelen* on the *Saar*.

From the House of *Austria*, by the Treaty of *Aix La-Chapelle*.

*Doway*, *Fort Scarpe*, *Tournay*, *Lisle*, *Armentiers*, *Bergues*, *St. Wenox* and *Furnes*, with all the Extent of their Bayliwicks, Castle-

wards, Territories, Governments, Provostships, Appurtenances and Dependances.

From the House of *Austria*, by the Treaty of *Nimeguen* with *Spain*.

All the County of *Burgundy*, comprehending the Towns of *Dole*, *Besancon*, *Grey*, *Salines*, and *Vesoul*, with the Forts of *St. Ann*, and *foux*, and more than one hundred and twenty Market Towns and Villages.

The Towns and Forts of *Valeciennes*, *Bouchain*, *Conde*, *Cambray*, *St. Omer*, *Ipres*, *Warwick*, *Warneton*, *Peringue*, *Balleul*, *Cassel*, *Bavay*, *Charlemont*, and *Maubeuge*, their Bayliwicks, Castlewards, Governments, Provostships, Territories, Demefnes, Lord-ships and Countries annex'd.

From the House of *Austria*, by the Treaty of *Reswick* with *Spain*.

Seventeen Villages or Fiefs of the Provinces of *Hainault*, and four hundred and fifty others, of the Dependance of *Maubeuge* and *Quesnoy*.

From the Empire, by the Treaty of *Reswick*, with the Emperor and Empire.

The Town of *Strasburg*, and all that depend thereon, on the Left of the *Rhine*, and Fort *Lewis*, with the Isle of *Rhine*; in which it is situated.

From

From *Lorain* by the same Treaty.

The Citadel of *Sar Lewis*, with a Territory of half a League in Circuit.

The City and Perfection of *Longwi*, and Passage for the Troops of his Most Christian Majesty, thro' the Estates of his Royal Highness.

From *Lorain*, since, and contrary to the Treaty of *Reswick*.

The Forts of *Bitch* and *Homburg*, *Sarguemines*, *Saralbe* and *Baulai*, the Town of *St. Hipolito*, the promis'd Equivalent for the Prefecture of *Longwi*, and the Sovereignty of *Arches*.

All this comprehends, eight sovereign Provinces, two Archbishopricks, nine Bishopricks, thirty of the strongest Places in the World; seventy Cities, some of which are reckon'd amongst the finest in *Europe*, and more than three thousand Market Towns or Villages: Is there any Thing more wanting to make a Crown complete, whose Friendship all the other Estates find themselves interested to manage with Prudence.

Such is the King, of whose being too much weaken'd you are so apprehensive; such is the House, to which you will give *Spain* and the *Indies*, to make a Balance of Power between it and the House of *Austria*.



I know what you are ready to answer me, the Letters which you honour'd me with, after the Death of the Duke of *Burgundy*, have prepossess'd me sufficiently; I know you'll say, that the Death of the Emperor *Joseph*, has very much chang'd the Face of Affairs in *Europe*, and principally in Relation to the Point of Balance. That all those vast Dominions of the House of *Austria*, finding themselves re-united with the Imperial Crown, in the Person of one Prince, will form in him a much greater Power than when they were divided into two Monarchies. And that this Change happening in the Things themselves, the same ought necessarily to follow in the Measures. You'll add, that there's no Fear, that the Interest of *France* and *Spain* will be united; that the most Christian King is now in the 74th Year of his Age, and probably can't live long. That in all Appearance the Crown will descend to a Minor; and the then governing Regents (not having the same Authority, nor Forces, nor the same Revenues which the present King has) will have no further Views than to preserve the Kingdom entire, and won't think it adviseable to trouble the Repose of *Europe*. That the Duke of *Anjou*, on his Side, will pursue a Plan of Politicks different from what has been already follow'd; and will find himself necessitated to keep in with the Maritime Powers. That he'll court their Friendship; and to obtain it,

will

will restore them the Freedom of Trade, highly satisfy'd to enjoy peaceably the Crown which he has obtain'd. Would to God that this Appearance was real. But tho' the earnest Desire of a Thing goes a great Way to the believing of it, yet I protest to you, I have no Notion of this. I comprehend clearly that the Monarchy of *Spain*, join'd to that of *Germany*, will form a new Monarchy, equal in Power to the two former; but I do not conceive that by this Union, the new Monarchy will become more powerful than the two were before. There are even a good many Reasons to fear the contrary. For the Cause why the Kings of *Spain* were not powerful, in Proportion to their Dominions, is, that the greatest Part of them were distant from the Places of their Residence, and oblig'd to be govern'd by Viceroys: An Inconvenience which will be doubled in the Person of a single Monarch. I am willing to believe, that after the Example of *Charles V.* he might divide his Residence, according to the Necessity, between *Germany* and *Spain*: But whatever his Prudence might dictate to him, to act in that Regard, his Dominions won't be more join'd, nor the People more rich; neither will Commerce be more flourishing, nor the Fleets increase in Number: The Revenues wont be larger, nor the Exchequer less engag'd. How then will it be more powerful! All that is said on the Subject of the Imperial

Imperial Dignity concludes nothing. It's notorious, that it brings no Revenue to the Possessor; and that it is not true, that the Emperor moves, agitates, and determines at his Pleasure the Estates of the Empire, even without consulting them. The History of the two last Electors of *Cologne*, and that of the Elector of *Bavaria*, Son-in-Law to the Emperor *Leopold*, and Brother-in-Law to the Emperor *Joseph*, clearly prove the contrary. But this is not the Matter. The Question is, to know whether this Authority, such as it is, join'd as it has been for these 200 Years past, in the hereditary Power of the House of *Austria*, in the two Branches of that Family, will make so great and excessive a Difference in the Balance of *Europe*, that to make the Balance just, they must be obliged to take away a Part from thence, and put it on the Side of *France*. On which, without further arguing, I refer myself to Truths known to all *Europe*. Is it not a Jest, to call that the lesser Power, which oppresses the other? Takes Towns and Provinces, and actually detains them; and has carry'd on a War these ten Years past, too powerfully, not only against the other Power mention'd, but against the Half of *Europe*, united for the common Defence of their Liberty?

If after this you would have farther Proofs, I'll give you the Opinion of those Potentates that made the Treaty in 1689. They were

so far from thinking, that the Union of the two Monarchies of the House of *Austria*, in the Emperor of *Germany*, would make him too powerful, that they entered into an Alliance to preserve the whole to the House of *Austria*, in the Person of the Emperor, after the Death of the King of *Spain*. Howsoever, *England* afterwards came to be of another Opinion.

Now as to what you have said in respect to the Prince succeeding upon the Death of the present King of *France*, I am satisfy'd to believe, that during a Minority, the Maxims of that Crown will be less active, and will be less sensible to the rest of *Europe*. I'll believe that the Good-will and Pleasure of the Regents, let them be who they will, will not be so forcible as that of *Lewis* the Great, to open the Purse of the Kingdom. In short, I'll believe that the Minority may procure us some Peace; but then that Peace will last but ten or twelve Years at most: After which a new King will appear upon the Throne, equally ambitious and undertaking as his Predecessors. A long Peace will have refill'd his Exchequer. Trade will have brought Plenty into his Dominions, and his People will have forgotten their past Miseries. Old Maxims will be then new vamp'd up. The Seas will be cover'd with Fleets, and the Fields with Armies. And according to all Appearance, they then will crush us, either all together, or one after another.

Not-

Notwithstanding this dismal Prospect, which the Gentleman has here exhibited, let the rest of *Europe* in God's Name look on, then let our Enemy, if he will not do us Justice, come out when he pleases — Mark the Event — Since the Muzzle is off, *it's probable the Fox may tremble when the Lyon roars.*

F I N I S



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