

LATEST ISSUE

DERNIER  
NUMERO

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E  
3 5036 01063725 7

CA1  
EA55  
D31  
1993  
no. 21

DOCS

Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures

JUN 14 1993

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY  
REVENIR A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

# The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 21 - Summer 1993

NON - CIRCULATING  
CONSULTER SUR PLACE

## Canada Deplores North Korea's Withdrawal from NPT



International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at work. North Korea's unwillingness to submit two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection has prompted it to withdraw from the NPT.

IAEA photo

Canada has expressed grave concern about North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "By withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea is isolating itself from the international system put in place to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall on March 12, the date North Korea deposited its notice of withdrawal with the UN Security Council. "Canada rejects as clearly ridiculous the North Korean government's rationale that the move is a measure against aggressive American military manoeuvres. I call upon North Korea to rescind this retrograde move."

The withdrawal will take effect June 12. In the meantime, North Korea remains subject to the NPT and to its associated safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Prior to its decision, North Korea had resisted the IAEA's efforts to conduct a "special inspection" of two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities, as provided for under its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

On March 31, the IAEA Board of Governors met and passed a resolution — co-sponsored by Canada — finding North Korea in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and referring the matter to the UN Security Council.

## Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Progress and Prospects

One year ago, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (May 21, 1992), Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called for stronger international efforts to stop nuclear proliferation and outlined an agenda for action. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks at the progress made and the prospects for future action in a number of areas identified by the Prime Minister, including IAEA safeguards reform, preparations for the NPT Extension Conference, cuts in existing nuclear arsenals, controls on ballistic missile technology, a nuclear test ban and regional security cooperation.

### Inside

Briefly Noted .....	2
START Stalled .....	2
Study on Verifying Non-Proliferation .....	3
Preparing for the NPT Extension Conference .....	3
Stopping Proliferation: IAEA Safeguards Reform .....	4
Missile Technology: Beyond Supply-Side Control .....	5
Security Competition Results .....	6
Towards a Nuclear Test Ban .....	6
Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation .....	9
Canada's Peace and Security Agenda .....	12

Canada Contributes to Mozambique Operation .....	13
First Committee Considers Disarmament Machinery ..	14
Can UNDC Make a Credible Contribution? .....	15
UN Should Integrate Efforts .....	15
Need to Expand CD Membership .....	16
Symposium Looks at Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence-Building and Peacekeeping .....	17
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council .....	17
CSCE Conflict Management .....	18
Focus: On IAEA Safeguards .....	18
Acronyms .....	20
Forecast .....	20

External Affairs and  
International Trade Canada

Canada

Twenty-eight countries voted in favour of the resolution. Two (China and Libya) voted against and four (India, Pakistan, Vietnam and Syria) abstained.

On April 6, the depositary powers of the NPT (the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) issued a joint statement urging North Korea to reconsider its withdrawal and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and safeguards obligations. Mrs. McDougall expressed Canada's full support for the statement. "The NPT is a cornerstone of international security," she said. "It is entirely in North Korea's interest to remain as a member. Withdrawal from the NPT and refusal to permit international inspections will jeopardize stability in the Korean peninsula and in the entire region. If Pyongyang is truly interested in good international relations — as it claims — this is the wrong way to go about it."

Some 156 countries are parties to the NPT. North Korea is the only party to have withdrawn in the Treaty's 25-year history. ■

tanks, fighter aircraft, warships, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, and missiles and missile launchers. In addition to providing information about transfers, Canada submitted a report on its holdings of these seven categories. Canada is a strong advocate of the register's early expansion to include military holdings and procurement through national production. The register was established as a result of a Canadian-sponsored resolution at the fall 1991 UN General Assembly.

### **Canada Funds Nuclear Safety**

With a contribution of \$7.5 million, Canada is one of the first countries to fund the newly-created Nuclear Safety Account of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The multilateral fund is an initiative of the G7 aimed at improving the safety of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The funding is provided under the ongoing \$30 million Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative.

### **Middle East Arms Control**

The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace process will meet in Washington from May 18 to 20 after an eight-month hiatus. The Working Group will continue its discussion of arms control and confidence-building proposals and concepts as they pertain to the Middle East. The Canadian delegation will outline Canada's experience in the arms control field and encourage the states of the region to identify and pursue those concepts most applicable to their security needs. ■

### **START Stalled**

At their summit meeting in Vancouver on April 3 and 4, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to direct efforts towards the entry into force of START I and the ratification of START II as soon as possible. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) I, which was signed July 30, 1991 between the US and the USSR, limits each party to a maximum of 1,600 long-range nuclear launchers and 6,000 "accountable" warheads. START II, signed by the US and

Russia on January 3, 1993, calls for further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This represents a cut of roughly 70 per cent from current levels. START II's entry into force is dependent on that of START I.

In May 1992, in a document called the Lisbon Protocol, the four former Soviet republics that retain strategic nuclear weapons — Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia — became parties to START I in place of the USSR. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also committed themselves to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states "in the shortest possible time." Since then, Belarus has voted to ratify START I and to accede to the NPT, Kazakhstan has ratified START I but has not yet acted on the NPT, and Ukraine has begun legislative debate on the two treaties but has not ratified or acceded to either. Russia has ratified START I. It has said, though, that the Treaty cannot enter into force until the other three former republics fulfil all of their Lisbon obligations.

The US ratified START I in October 1992. It has offered substantial financial and technical assistance towards easing the other parties' dismantlement and destruction burdens and has indicated that it is prepared to offer Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine certain security assurances. Ukraine, in particular, has expressed concern about the costs of nuclear disarmament and about its future security vis-à-vis Russia.

Canada, which welcomed the signing of both START I and START II, has emphasized that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine must abide by their Lisbon Protocol commitments. Canada fully accepts the security and economic concerns of Ukraine, but does not accept any effort to use those concerns to postpone indefinitely or to preclude Ukraine confirming its non-nuclear-weapon state status.

Canada has repeatedly and at the highest levels advised the Ukrainian authorities that the full development of friendly relations between our two countries will depend on Ukraine fulfilling its nuclear weapon commitments.

In a speech in Moscow on February 4 to the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall observed that Rus-

## **Briefly Noted**

### **CWC Implementation**

Preparations for the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continue, with a plenary meeting of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Preparatory Commission in the Hague from April 19 to 23. The OPCW will oversee the destruction of all chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, stockpiles and most production facilities according to the terms of the CWC. The CWC was opened for signature in Paris on January 13. To date, some 140 countries, including Canada, have become signatories and two have ratified. The Convention will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by at least 65 countries, but no earlier than January 13, 1995.

### **Report to UN Arms Register**

Canada submitted its first report to the UN arms register, covering calendar year 1992, by the April 30 deadline. The register requests information about exports and imports of seven major conventional weapons systems, namely main battle

sia could ease the process by responding to the legitimate security concerns of its neighbours. "Confidence-building is a cooperative effort, requiring a sustained commitment by all four nuclear successor states," said Mrs. McDougall.

She indicated that Canada would be prepared to join an international program to assist the countries of the former Soviet Union in destroying their nuclear weapons. Canada has explored and wishes to continue to examine areas where it can assist with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and nuclear safety.

Mrs. McDougall also called on the nuclear-weapon states — which include China, France and the UK as well as the US and Russia — to go beyond "build-down" and provide non-nuclear-weapon states with security guarantees in addition to those implicit in the NPT. ■

## Study on Verifying Non-Proliferation

The current restructuring of the international system has had significant effects on verification. As old threats melt away and new security concerns emerge, the process of verifying arms control obligations will have to be increasingly flexible, responsive and cost-effective. While many studies have evaluated specific verification techniques, procedures or agencies, relatively little has been written about the synergies among these processes — that is, about the ways in which operations and data from several sources can combine to produce a result that goes beyond what could be achieved by each of the inputs alone.

EAITC's Verification Research Program recently invited four distinguished scholars to explore the synergistic effects among various methods and approaches to verification. Their report — "Constraining Proliferation: The Role of Verification Synergies" — has been published as the fifth major study in EAITC's *Arms Control Verification Studies* series and is being distributed to libraries and research institutes in Canada and abroad. In addition to evaluating past verification synergies, the authors identify how such effects could be harmonized to enhance verification, particularly in the context of curbs on proliferation. Their report is unique and comprehensive, breaking new conceptual and practical ground. It is also timely in view of the priority assigned by governments, including Canada's, to efforts to deal with proliferation.

## Preparing for the NPT Extension Conference

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear-weapon states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China). Article X mandates that 25 years after the NPT's entry into force, a conference must be held to decide "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." As the NPT entered into force in 1970, the decision will be taken in 1995.

Given its importance to the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is already the subject of much national and international attention. A UN General Assembly resolution in the fall of 1992 mandated the formation of a Preparatory Committee for the Conference, open to all NPT parties, with its first meeting to be held in New York from May 10 to 14.

For Canada, the overriding objectives are indefinite extension of the NPT in unamended form and universal accession to the Treaty. In working with other states towards these goals, Canada is emphasizing the need to:

- ensure the continuation of the arms reduction process involving the US and the former Soviet Union. By the same token, accord due recognition to the


- progress that has been achieved;
- shift the focus of attention away from the US and Russia towards the other nuclear-weapon states, and towards the "threshold" and "pariah" states that are seeking nuclear weapons;
- reinforce the absolute essentiality of the NPT, from the standpoint of stemming horizontal proliferation as well as of maintaining the foundation for nuclear commerce;
- seek progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), which will improve the climate of the extension process. However, point out that the NPT and a prospective CTBT are separate and distinct issues; and
- create a process for the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 1995 Conference that is clear and unambiguous. This means procedurally separating the decision to extend the NPT from the NPT review process, and from the conclusions at which that process might arrive. Two of the four earlier NPT review conferences did not produce agreed final statements.

To permit independent progress on the two sets of issues at stake in 1995 (extension and review), States Parties should establish a Review Committee and an Extension Committee. The Review Committee should be the umbrella for three sub-com-

mittees: one to review the provisions relating to non-proliferation; a second to review the provisions relating to transfers of technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and a third to review the provisions relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament and confidence-building measures. An emphasis on the period since the last Review Conference in 1990, coupled with a review of the preceding five-year periods, seems the most efficient and productive. The mandate of the Extension Committee should be limited strictly to drafting a resolution on whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

The Preparatory Committee's work should include the preparation and review of papers and other procedural matters. The deliberation of substantive issues should be left to the 1995 Conference. Canada believes that while the Preparatory Committee meetings could take place in Europe, the Extension Conference should be held in New York to ensure the greatest possible attendance. Many smaller states that have UN missions in New York do not have diplomatic representatives in Geneva. Every effort should be made to encourage participation by all States Parties in this decision of utmost importance to the security of all states. ■

## Stopping Proliferation: IAEA Safeguards Reform



The Vienna International Centre, which houses the IAEA headquarters. Petr Pavlicek/IAEA

The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq has raised questions about the international community's ability to detect violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prompted a flurry of proposals for safeguards reform.

The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to renounce the nuclear weapons option and to put all of their nuclear activities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA also safeguards some nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and in non-NPT states. Regular inspections by the IAEA verify that no non-peaceful uses of declared nuclear material, equipment, technology or facilities are taking place. However, despite regular inspections of Iraq's declared facilities for over a decade, the IAEA did not discover Saddam Hussein's secret nuclear bomb program. For those who believe the Agency's reputation has been tarnished by the Iraqi episode, only a tangible strengthening of safeguards will restore confidence in the IAEA.

Study of safeguards reform is taking place at the Agency itself, both internally and under a group of outside experts convened by IAEA Director Hans Blix. Mr. Mark Moher, Director General of EAITC's International Security, Arms

Control and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Affairs Bureau, is participating in this group in a private capacity. Proposals for reform are also being put forward by states and by groups of states. All of these efforts will start to come together in the summer, when reform options will be discussed by the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Canada has been strongly encouraging and actively participating in efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. In Canada's view, the main objective of safeguards reform should be to improve the capacity of the Agency to uncover undeclared nuclear activities, thus enhancing the *effectiveness* of IAEA safeguards. A second objective should be to improve safeguards *efficiency*, i.e., their cost/benefit ratio.

### Effectiveness Measures

Canada believes that priority should be given to the detection of clandestine efforts to evade non-proliferation responsibilities. This will require the provision of resources and the marshalling of collective will to exercise to the fullest the inspection rights inherent in the IAEA Statute and in individual safeguards agreements.

States under full-scope safeguards should be encouraged to accept the Agency's right of access "at any time, at any place" to declared or undeclared nuclear facilities. States should be reassured, however, that IAEA inspections do not threaten their legitimate military, scientific and industrial secrets, and that they in fact bolster sovereignty by enhancing security.

Canada thinks that the concept of "managed access," found in the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be adapted for some inspections in non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Managed access would allow states under inspection to protect secrets unrelated to undeclared nuclear activities. Another CWC-inspired reform would be the use of environmental sampling, especially to uncover reprocessing activities.

It will also be important to attain near-universal acceptance of transparency measures by states and by the Agency. Significant transparency measures include:

- the reporting of transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related items;
- the reporting of production of nuclear materials;
- the early provision of design information on nuclear facilities; and
- the creation of new reporting instruments by the Agency.

To be able to reach conclusions about the possible presence of clandestine nuclear activities, the IAEA must be endowed with sufficient capacity and competence to analyze information. This includes interpretation of data from open sources, from voluntary declarations, from inspection reports and from national intelligence means.

Nuclear-weapon states could agree to implement IAEA reforms, including access "any time, any place," on their civilian nuclear programs. They could consider accepting special inspections in any part of their territory, except on their declared military sector.

Non-NPT states could also voluntarily accept transparency measures, the "access any time, any place" principle and even special inspections. If special inspections are not possible, greater transparency, wider access and better intelligence could still enable the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in these states.

## Efficiency Measures

Safeguards reform has to be performed in a situation of scarce financial resources, as the IAEA remains under a directive of zero real growth. This has led to demands to streamline the system.

For instance, many states have proposed that, to save money, the future safeguards regime should rely heavily on verification activities performed by local State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSACs). Canada is willing to participate in the elaboration and implementation of this model if it does not undermine the trust that the Agency must foster and maintain to achieve its non-proliferation goal. Close attention will have to be paid to the possibility of a perception of discrimination between advanced states and less developed ones, since in such a system the former would enjoy more autonomy than the latter in their safeguarding activities.

Canada would welcome an alternative safeguards model that enhanced the Agency's role through greater reliance on resident IAEA inspectors, who would take charge of most of the inspection work. It would be based on guaranteed "any time, any place" access. Improved automatization and real-time transmission of data for material accountancy, surveillance and containment should also be important features of this model. Canada thinks that significant savings and security gains could be obtained from such a system. Moreover, this model would not discriminate between states with advanced SSACs and those without.

Any new safeguards system will require real-time or near-real-time transmission of production, transfer and inspection data. Containment and surveillance will also have to be improved. Canada is willing to devote non-IAEA budgetary resources to research, development and testing in safeguarding, as it has always done through its Safeguards Support Program, and is urging other developed states to do the same. However, this is only a partial solution to the financial demands that an enhanced safeguards system will impose.

It will be impossible to increase effectiveness without increasing the IAEA safeguards budget, particularly in the face of new safeguarding duties as a result of the inclusion of former Soviet republics and some developing states. This will inevitably come up against the zero-real-growth

constraint and raise questions for the balance between the IAEA's verification activities and its activities in promoting cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses. Canada has argued in favour of breaking with zero real growth, specifically as it pertains to safeguards.

To reduce costs, the number of routine inspections on declared materials in NNWS could be decreased. This, however, will be acceptable only if the Agency is able to uncover clandestine nuclear activity through transparency, "any time, any place" access, intelligence and special inspections. If this condition is met, the Agency might need only a few random inspections per year, complemented by "managed" special inspections or genuine special inspections, if needed.

Canada will continue to support endeavours to achieve cost savings in safeguards without compromising their efficacy. However, enhancing effectiveness should remain the primary objective of safeguards reform. ■

## Missile Technology: Looking Beyond Supply-Side Control

Members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held a productive meeting in Canberra, Australia from March 8 to 11. They welcomed Iceland as the newest member of the Regime, bringing the number of MTCR partners to 23. They also welcomed applications from Argentina and Hungary to participate in the Regime and agreed to invite the two to become partners. Participants noted with satisfaction that the decision to extend the Regime's guidelines to include missiles capable of delivering *all* weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological, as well as nuclear) — taken at the MTCR meeting in Oslo in July 1992 — was fully implemented by January 7. Partners were also pleased to observe that a number of countries outside the Regime have declared their intention to continue to abide by the MTCR guidelines and they jointly appealed to all states to do likewise.

Discussion at the Canberra meeting was influenced by a Canadian proposal to consider future directions for the MTCR. During its six-year history, the MTCR has successfully slowed the overall rate of proliferation of ballistic missile technology. However, the Regime faces many challenges, including:

- the enhanced risk of proliferation brought about by the weakness of enforceable export controls in the states emerging from the former Soviet Union;
- the failure of key current suppliers to join the Regime; and
- the growing sophistication of production capability in many potential suppliers, who also remain outside the MTCR.

Beyond this, the MTCR is limited by the fundamental inability of any supply-side control effort to halt proliferation completely. In most cases, proliferation is fuelled by chronic regional instability and perceived military vulnerabilities. Efforts to reduce regional instability must be seen as a necessary complement, and indeed the *sine qua non*, of future progress in thwarting proliferation of all types of weaponry. Even then, there will continue to be pariah states who remain committed to the acquisition, diffusion and development of missile technology at almost any price.

If the MTCR is to continue to be an effective non-proliferation regime, it will have to adapt to the changing international environment. MTCR partners will have to consider how to attract key current and potential suppliers to fulfil the non-proliferation objectives underlying the Regime, including determining the best way to increasingly isolate those states that continue to seek a missile delivery capacity for weapons of mass destruction. They must also find more positive ways of addressing commercial concerns in the expanding international market, given that the use of missile technology for the peaceful exploitation of space is a legitimate scientific/commercial activity. Finally, they should consider how the Regime might evolve from being a pure export control regime to a broader, more formal multilateral non-proliferation arrangement that develops and promotes international norms in the transfer and control of missile technology.

In Canberra, partners agreed to meet next in Switzerland at the end of November to give further detailed consideration to future directions for the Regime. ■

## Security Competition Results

On March 4, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announced the results of the first Cooperative Security Competition Program. The Program provides financial assistance to projects that advance understanding and public discussion of issues related to cooperative security, one of Canada's central foreign policy objectives.

The Program received over 90 proposals for research studies, conferences, publications and other projects. After a careful review, 47 projects totalling \$1.2 million were chosen. Preference was given to projects dealing with significant international issues from a Canadian perspective or with direct relevance to Canada, projects promoting cooperation between individuals or institutions across Canada, and projects promoting consultation and the dissemination of ideas or information.

The concept of cooperative security recognizes that true peace and security depend on dialogue and cooperation between states across the entire range of their relations, from political and social issues to military and economic matters. Projects selected in the first competition include studies on cooperative security in the post-Cold War era, the politics of peacemaking and peacekeeping, environmental security and freshwater resources, multilateral missile defence regimes, nuclear non-proliferation, and security and conflict issues in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Other successful projects include conferences and publications on such issues as peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, maritime security and middle powers in the new world order.

The Program welcomes further applications. Deadlines are April 30 for an August decision and October 31 for a February decision. To obtain an application form or a list of recipients, contact: Cooperative Security Competition Program, 55 Metcalfe St., Suite 1180, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6L5. Tel: (613) 233-4448. Fax: (613) 238-2062.

## Towards a Nuclear Test Ban

*The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason at a United Nations Regional Conference on "Disarmament and National Security in the Interdependent World," held in Kyoto, Japan from April 13 to 16.*

Proliferation, of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, has become one of the greatest perils facing the international community in the post-Cold War period. Though we have long been concerned about the dangers of proliferation, we now live in an environment in which rivalries that had been suppressed, contained, or in some cases merely masked by the frozen surface of the Cold War landscape, are now re-appearing around the globe. The recent decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a stark reminder of the dangers we face. Meeting in Kyoto, we cannot but recognize the implications of this retrograde step for regional and international stability.

In perhaps what is a supreme and tragic irony, just as decisive steps have been taken to halt and to begin to reverse the "vertical" nuclear arms race, the "horizontal" dimension of nuclear proliferation seems to be accelerating at an alarming rate.

### **Significance of a CTBT**

Where does a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) fit into this post-Cold War proliferation scenario — for perhaps no single disarmament objective has so preoccupied the United Nations for so many years as the goal of an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time?

Despite the failure of United Nations efforts throughout the Cold War period to engage the nuclear-weapon states in meaningful negotiations towards a global test ban, the international community did manage to keep the issue front and centre on the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda. The convening of the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference and the role the

test ban issue played in the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference to reach an agreed Final Declaration are but two of the most dramatic examples of the pre-eminent status the test ban issue has achieved.

Now that the Cold War is over and with it superpower military competition, many would argue that the "symbolic value" of the CTBT far outweighs the concrete benefits that might flow from it. What then are those benefits? If proliferation poses a grave danger to the maintenance of international peace and security — as my government believes it does — what role will a CTBT play to curb that danger?

Clearly a CTBT will *not* impede the ability of existing nuclear-weapon states to manufacture additional weapons using old designs, nor will it have any effect on delivery systems. Considerable progress has already been made between the US and Russia in this regard in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), START I and START II treaties. Nonetheless, a CTBT is not a substitute for further negotiated reductions in existing nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia and for similar actions by the other three nuclear-weapon states...

As the examples of Iraq and North Korea vividly demonstrate, we face perhaps as never before the potential for a dramatic increase in the number of states both capable of, and inclined towards, producing nuclear weapons. And the reluctance of threshold states to give up their nuclear weapon option is based largely on

---

**Despite its symbolic value, a comprehensive test ban treaty is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal.**

---

their own geostrategic assessments of regional political and military rivalries. Therefore, while a cessation of tests — by de-emphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons — could affect the views of the threshold states, a nuclear test ban is unlikely to be sufficient in and of itself for their definitive renunciation of nuclear weapons.

Hardest of all to assess is the impact that a CTBT would have in reinforcing the NPT — and with it the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime — by providing potent evidence of the determination of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfil a key aspect of the “basic bargain” between the nuclear haves and have nots that underlines the NPT.

While this benefit may be as unquantifiable as the global norm of non-proliferation itself, at the very least it can be said that the moral authority of the nuclear-weapon states — that is, of the United Nations Security Council five permanent members — would be strengthened, and along with it, their ability to exercise effective leadership in response to countries seeking to stand against this international norm.

A comprehensive test ban treaty then is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal. As important as it is, it is not a substitute for sustained action by the international community on all fronts, from the strengthening of global non-proliferation norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to rigorous implementation of national export controls.

Central to the process of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995 of the lynchpin of that regime, the NPT, together with the relentless pursuit of its universal adherence. Particularly important as well is the work underway in the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime to permit “anytime, anywhere” inspections. Equally urgent is the need for Ukraine and Kazakhstan to follow the lead of Belarus and to unambiguously and unequivocally formalize their status as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT.

At the same time the international community has the right to expect, and the duty to demand, from the five nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued progress towards their fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament objectives enshrined in Article VI.

One thing we cannot afford, however, is to make progress in one area of non-proliferation conditional on progress in another — what Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky has called counterproductive “linkage diplomacy.” In my view, the

cause of international security is ill-served by arguments and stratagems that have the effect — however unintended — of shielding, rather than exposing, would-be nuclear proliferators. The danger of nuclear proliferation is all too real. What is required is an acceleration of efforts along as many tracks as possible to get the job done. Again, to use Petrovsky’s words, what is required is “constructive parallelism.”

It is from this perspective then that I now turn to the prospects for a CTBT.

cause the UK tests only in the US, the result was an involuntary moratorium for that country as well.

The legislation under the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act pursuant to which this American action was taken — however grudgingly by the then Bush administration — marks a watershed in international efforts to achieve a global test ban. Critically important are the provisions of the legislation that require the Administration to submit annually to Congress a plan for achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nu-



*The mushroom cloud from an atmospheric nuclear explosion. Above-ground nuclear tests were banned by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, as were tests in outer space and under water. Canada has long advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to prohibit nuclear tests in all environments for all time.*

*Photo courtesy of the Canadian Centre for Global Security*

### **Prospects for a CTBT**

I think it is no exaggeration to say that the need for a CTBT has not been greater, or the prospects for achieving one brighter, in a very long time indeed. All five declared nuclear-weapon states are now party to the NPT. Russia has been observing a testing moratorium since October 1991 and France since April 1992. In July of that year, the US renounced modernization as the basis for any of its nuclear tests. Next came its decision in October 1992 to join France and Russia in declaring a nuclear testing moratorium. Be-

clear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.

In a letter to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell dated February 12, 1993, President Clinton rejected as totally inadequate the report submitted in January by the Bush Administration. He then went on to indicate that he would submit a new report as soon as his review was completed of “questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB and the related question of resuming a limited program of US nuclear testing after July 1, 1993.” The significance of the quoted por-

tion of the letter is its focus, not on *whether*, but on *how* to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.

Most recently, at the Vancouver Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date and that their governments would consult each other accordingly.

Of course, the situation, while promising, is not unequivocally so. Two nuclear-weapon states — the UK and China — have not declared nuclear testing moratoria. The US legislation foresees the possi-

---

### ***The focus is no longer on whether to negotiate a CTBT, but on how.***

---

bility of a resumption of a limited number of tests for safety and reliability purposes only after July 1. Such a resumption by one nuclear-weapon state could lead to similar actions by the others. This would be particularly troubling in light of the fragile Arctic environment of Novaya Zemlya, the site of the last Soviet test...

With the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is now in a position to tackle another major subject and there is none more pressing than a CTBT. I might add, parenthetically, that the CD would be in an even stronger position to proceed were it to act decisively on the membership issue and open its doors to all UN Member States that wish to contribute to the negotiation of a global test ban treaty or any other multilateral disarmament issue.

Of course, the CD has undertaken extremely useful work on specific aspects of the nuclear test ban issue for many years. The Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), for example, has made important contributions to our understanding of the verification requirements of a test ban. But none of this can substitute for the negotiations themselves. The time is now ripe to move from the preparatory to the negotiating phase of our work.

### ***Immediate Steps***

What then, would be the most useful and practical steps that could be taken immediately in such negotiations? In the field of verification, I believe that we must build upon the considerable work done by

the GSE to date. This remarkable group was formed in 1976 with a mandate to develop concepts for an international seismic data exchange system. The purpose of this system would be to assist the parties to a CTBT to monitor compliance by providing data for their own national verification purposes.

The GSE has held two international seismic data exchange experiments, in 1984 and in 1991, and has developed and refined a series of concepts that would form the backbone of a future international seismic verification network. In addition to the purely seismic aspects of the challenge, the Group has looked at such areas as communications procedures and the joint analysis of seismic data.

The GSE is now moving to implement the results of earlier studies. For example, one of its working groups is actually selecting the existing high quality seismographic stations that should be included in the global network, and is beginning site investigations in regions that will require new stations. Another working group is assessing the capabilities that will be achieved by various networks, so that the GSE will be able to provide some general cost-versus-capability options to the CD. Importantly, the GSE has established a target date of January 1, 1995 to have a sufficient global system implemented to begin full-scale testing.

Though it is generally recognized that a seismic exchange system would be the most important technical monitoring verification measure for a CTBT, other potential measures exist. For example, one could consider the following:

- a) "National Technical Means" of data collection, including aerial and space surveillance techniques. In this context, I would note that the first multilateral aerial surveillance agreement, the Open Skies Treaty, was signed last year. This practical, cost-effective regime puts aerial surveillance within the technical and financial grasp of many countries that could not otherwise have afforded it. At this time, four of the five nuclear-weapon states are covered by this Treaty.
- b) Other aspects of access to, and analysis of, remotely-sensed imagery as may be negotiated.
- c) Collection and analysis of atmospheric radionuclides, usually stated as a means

of monitoring venting from underground tests, but obviously useful for detecting atmospheric tests. Once again, I would note that the parties to the Open Skies Treaty have agreed that they will develop that regime for purposes of environmental monitoring.

- d) On-site inspections, with all of the protocols and allowed technical measurements that might be associated with the inspection teams.
- e) The overall financial and administrative aspects of the treaty, particularly the bureaucratic means of dealing with a suspected violation.

The GSE could take up these important topics, but a more direct way of accomplishing the objective would be to have the CD, or its Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee, initiate discussions on the non-seismic aspects of CTBT verification. This step would serve to get the CD itself engaged in discussions over a concrete aspect of an eventual CTBT.

Another step we could take would be to have the CD urge the GSE to proceed with the installation and testing of the global seismic system. It seems to me that we have reached the stage where it is important to develop a real, rather than a hypothetical, system. Such a system would allow the GSE to gain experience with its real capability, and to present clear choices to the CD as to the projected costs, capabilities and types of network that would be most suitable.

It would also help the GSE to have an explicit acceptance by the CD of its target date of January 1, 1995, since by this date or sooner the GSE is going to require guidance from the CD on the type of system it wants pursued. The overriding point is that a decision on which verification system should be pursued can only be reached through negotiations. The sooner the negotiations proceed in earnest, the sooner the CD will be able to "overtake" the work of the GSE and begin to lead it.

### ***Conclusion***

We have now come to the point where the only way forward is to commence negotiations. Let us get on with the task. Let us ensure that we make the most of this singular opportunity to achieve an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time. To quote Ambassador Goodby in his earlier presentation to this conference, "Let us now be wise." ■

## Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation

*A key component of Canada's non-proliferation action plan is strengthening regional security cooperation to reduce underlying causes of tension, particularly in such chronic hot-spots as the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Canada is bringing its experience and expertise in verification to the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace talks. We have also been instrumental in encouraging the countries of the North Pacific to consider ways to enhance their security through cooperation and dialogue.*

*The following is the text of an address by External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Conference in Vancouver on March 21. Scholars and officials from nine Asia-Pacific countries participated in the Conference, which was organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies.*

Last month I addressed the Vancouver Board of Trade and the Asia-Pacific Foundation prior to my trip to Japan. I chose as my topic that day "Canada and the Pacific Century," and I emphasized the remarkable pace of economic growth in Asia-Pacific and Canada's role within this dynamic region. Today, I want to address the evolving security agenda in Asia-Pacific and Canada's objectives in the region.

We are at a pivotal moment in Asia-Pacific security. The past three years have seen enormous progress in a variety of forums. But where do we go from here? It is worth taking as our starting point the stark reality that only a few years ago Asia-Pacific was locked in the stalemate of the Cold War. A series of initiatives by countries in the region, beginning in 1986, opened up the issues of Asia-Pacific security to wider discussion.

True, many of these early proposals were steeped in the logic of Cold War thinking. Ultimately, too, most were unworkable in the absence of any regional forum to advance debate. Canada drew two early conclusions:

- that it is almost impossible to rely on unilateral or bilateral approaches to address what are essentially multilateral questions; and
- that, though the end of the Cold War removed many of the reasons for security

arrangements in Asia-Pacific, new worries almost certainly would emerge.

In addition, there were concerns shared by many in the region that US political and military withdrawal would create a subsequent power vacuum and that local rivalries would persist. These concerns triggered new debates about the relationship between regional and sub-regional security, and how to create stability.

Our own examination of the Asia-Pacific security agenda three years ago resulted in our conclusion that a sub-regional approach to building institutions was necessary before constructing a larger regional institution. We began by focusing on the North Pacific. We created a two-track approach, governmental and non-governmental, to encourage the broadest possible interchange of ideas.

While the focus of much of our efforts was on the North Pacific, we did not neglect the other regional security dimensions. Some two and a half years ago, at a special Canadian-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting in Jasper, we suggested to ASEAN foreign ministers that they consider security issues for the agenda of the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference — the PMC. Two years ago at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, I spoke openly about Canada's interest in discussing security issues with our partners. Many in ASEAN also sensed the sea change in international security issues and the need for new approaches.

As you know, in 1992 the ASEAN-PMC did place regional security issues on its agenda. This dialogue was expanded through the recent decision by ASEAN to host security discussions with ASEAN and Dialogue Partner senior officials outside the PMC.

Even more broadly, Canada is consolidating a consistent and balanced involvement in the region that addresses not only political and security issues, but also trade and economic questions.

In promoting dialogue, we have focused on our strengths. We have used our multilateral credentials to advantage, for example, through our activities in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to seek greater inclusiveness and institutionalization, as the process of multilateral cooperation matures. We have also used our official development assistance to work with others to foster dialogue on regional issues — the Spratly Islands question has been a prominent case in point.

We are prepared to use imagination and flexibility to defuse tensions or to advance cooperation in arms control and disarmament issues and participation in regional policy planning discussions. For example, Canada recently called for a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, an issue of great concern to China's neighbours and the Asian subcontinent.

Another example is the Canada-Japan



*External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall (right) with Yuan Ming (centre) of Peking University and Paul Evans (left) of the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies at the Vancouver North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Conference in March.*

*Photo courtesy of the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies*

Forum 2000, which conducted a comprehensive review of the Canada-Japan bilateral relationship and potential joint approaches to multilateral issues. The recommendations of the forum, now under active consideration by the two governments, include a call for the creation of a Joint Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution on Vancouver Island, which could eventually draw wider participation by other countries in Asia-Pacific and elsewhere.

Finally, we have worked hard in the United Nations, the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries (G7) and other institutions to encourage all countries in the region to adhere to their international commitments to arms control, non-proliferation measures and human rights. In the United Nations, our aim is to use the authority of the UN on global initiatives to help ensure positive and reinforcing interaction between the global and the regional levels. Our call for an international arms register is a good example of this approach.

Other governments are, by definition, our natural partners, but we realize that there are many other stakeholders with a contribution to make — and a responsibility to do so. We are firmly committed to working together with academic communities, non-governmental organizations and commercial organizations as well.

We will continue to support academic research on the topic: first, through funding for a consortium of Canadian universities dealing with Asia-Pacific security issues; and, second, by continuing to support initiatives bringing non-governmental and governmental experts into the same forum to address the key concerns of the region.

As one could expect, despite recent pro-

gress, the security agenda is long and tensions in some parts of the region are increasing. This underlines the need to move quickly from the focus on "process" to a greater concentration on "substance." We believe it will be prudent to build security forums now before the need becomes more urgent.

I believe the most important issue in the region is Russia. It must be included within the regional Asia-Pacific system. The political uncertainty graphically illustrated by this weekend's events could adversely affect the progress of President Yeltsin's cooperative foreign policy, with very significant implications for Asia-Pacific. All of us have an interest in advanc-

forthcoming withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I issued a statement urging the North Korean government in the strongest possible terms to reconsider, and to allow inspections of all facilities.

Ensuring full respect for the NPT is of paramount importance to Canada. North Korea's withdrawal is a retrograde step that poses a serious challenge that will further isolate that country from the world. Active consultations are underway bilaterally, at the International Atomic Energy Agency, and multilaterally at the United Nations.

You are, of course, aware of the self-imposed absence of the North Korean team from this particular meeting, an absence we regret. There can be no reasonable prospect of confidence and reduced tensions while the region is held hostage to the threat of a covert nuclear weapons program. We believe a more developed multilateral regional security dialogue might have offered an opportunity to avoid the current crisis.

Another difficult issue is the broad and gradual integration of China into the wider world. We have never believed that an isolated China was in anyone's best interest.

Equally, however, China must realize that Canada will be faithful to our fundamental policy of advancing the principles of human rights and democratic government, whether in Beijing, Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

We remain deeply concerned that China's military budget continues to increase at a greater rate than its rapid economic growth. The mutual confidence and respect fundamental to regional security can never be advanced while there are egregious violations of human rights, or political processes that preclude demo-



*A Canadian peacekeeper with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).*

*Canadian Forces photo*

ing the process of political and economic reform in Russia — and President Yeltsin is its only champion.

A stable Russia with confident leadership would allow serious new bilateral discussions with Japan, which is the only way that the Northern Territories issue can be settled. Its resolution would pave the way for closer economic cooperation in the North Pacific, ease residual anxieties and move the region forward.

Another current issue is North Korea, where the threat of nuclear proliferation is immediate and pressing. On March 12, when we received word of North Korea's

cratic participation, or blatant accumulation of arms.

We fervently believe that economic reform, political progress and enhanced security are totally integrated. Regional security must entail building equilibrium between economic progress and political development in every aspect.

Another challenge of unprecedented proportions is Cambodia. Canada is there, on the ground, as we have been with every United Nations peacekeeping force. But the nation-building process in Cambodia — the transition from an economic and political wasteland to a flourishing democracy — will be long and arduous. The key question is how we ensure that all parties in Cambodia — especially the Khmer Rouge — come, however reluctantly, to an appreciation of the rights of all.

South Asia, like other regions, must find ways to attack root causes of regional tensions. The nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan are largely a symptom of ancient distrust and rivalry. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most important security issue on the international agenda. We must be prepared to confront its implications in South Asia, as we are determined to do with respect to North Korea.

Until recently, there has been no intensive effort to deal with urgent security problems and there is no regional framework. Such a framework would have to include China, Russia and the United States, and perhaps others as well.

In addition to these sub-regional problems, we must address a series of common issues affecting many countries of the region. The proliferation of conventional arms sales, unresolved border disputes, civil and ethnic conflict, and increased military capabilities are not yet being addressed successfully, within an established framework for discussion or negotiation. The region now consists of a number of countries with substantial economic weight — and that number is growing every day. They must now play a political role commensurate with their new economic stature. Only a concerted effort by the major powers — the US, Japan, Russia and China — can ensure the development of rule-based systems that will foster long-term stability in the region. But their efforts must be matched and encouraged by others.

We recognize that security structures

and mechanisms are no panacea. Witness the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia continuing despite the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But cooperative dialogue can result in avenues for cooperation, the acceptance of shared obligations, and the resolution of conflict. So then, where do we go from here? How do we move forward?

Let me express my own vision. I see an Asia-Pacific in which there is a web of interdependence at different levels, motivated by a common recognition that our individual futures are linked. It would be a region committed to habits of dialogue and cooperation. It would have a series of interlocking, mutually supportive, formal and informal mechanisms to expand dialogue as political circumstances required:

- a truly engaged ASEAN-PMC;
- a form of Five Power Dialogue in South Asia; and
- a formal mechanism in Northeast Asia dealing with the Korean Peninsula and providing the framework for a Russian-Pacific partnership.

While we see an opportunity now to extend intergovernmental dialogue, there is clearly a role for major contributions from outside government. Some have proposed a broader “track two” agenda embracing all of the region. This would be an enormous practical and intellectual contribution, which Canada would support, either focused on Northeast Asia or more broadly.

Governments now come together at the ministerial level in the ASEAN-PMC. There is a need for a more substantive agenda for these discussions. The proposals made by Australia at the last PMC offer an opportunity to build a consensus approach to regional confidence- and security-building mechanisms. I emphasize that these approaches are useful also for the region as a whole, and for their extension beyond Southeast Asia.

Canada has no strict preconditions about the next steps. But four main principles are relevant for the immediate future:

- first, inclusiveness. There can be no hidden agenda. All key stakeholders must be involved, as well as those with significant economic stakes in the broader community;
- second, any new regional framework must allow for differentiation in sub-re-

gions, recognizing distinct security approaches;

- third, a broad multilateral framework in the ASEAN-PMC, and possibly in APEC, must build on — not replace — those bilateral relationships that are indispensable to establishing a sense of confidence in the region; and
- fourth, as the building of appropriate institutions proceeds at the government level, a stronger pattern of cooperation among other communities — notably academic — must develop, since many of you have been at the cutting edge of the Asia-Pacific security dialogue. You must continue to press governments on hard regional issues. We need you to bring your ideas to bear on wider issues of global stability, and on how the region can make a real contribution to world peace.

Over time, we expect Asia-Pacific will acquire the stability and sense of self-confidence that would permit it to play a more active and more effective role in global affairs, equal to its economic strength. Today, Asia-Pacific is the most dynamic area of the world. It has become a model to others in the economic field. But its potential for security cooperation has yet to be achieved. An outward-looking, confident Asia-Pacific has much to offer others in helping to manage global affairs.

Canada's commitment to Asia-Pacific is strong. For many years now, our trade across the Pacific has surpassed our trade with Europe. Fifty percent of new Canadians are from Asia and Chinese is now the third most widely spoken language in Canada.

We take our responsibilities as a regional partner seriously and we are prepared to bring our skills and expertise to the table. We will continue to support initiatives that ensure that Canada and Canadians are closely involved with others in developing new frameworks for Asia-Pacific cooperation.

When I spoke a few weeks ago about “the Pacific Century,” I emphasized Canada's belief in multilateral approaches to peace and security and our willingness to back up these beliefs with substantial commitments of human and financial resources. Let me reinforce that pledge today.

As a Pacific country, Canada will be part of the Pacific century. ■

## Canada's Peace and Security Agenda: A Seminar Report

On February 8 and 9, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall hosted a seminar on the topic "Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security." Forty-nine participants, representing non-governmental organizations, academia, business, labour, government and Parliament, attended the session, which was held in Ottawa.

Disarmament Bulletin 20 included excerpts from Mrs. McDougall's address to the seminar. The following are excerpts from the seminar report prepared by Alex Morrison, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

If there was one theme that emerged as a result of the discussions it was that there is being forged in Canada a new peace-keeping coalition composed of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Department of National Defence, other interested government agencies including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Elections Canada, and a wide variety of non-governmental organizations and interested citizens.

It was apparent that the scope, intensity and frequency of peacekeeping activities carried out around the world by representatives of Canada are much greater than many had realized prior to the seminar.

It was generally argued that a more comprehensive public education and information program ought to be instituted and maintained on a wide scale, not only to ensure that Canadians are aware of the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability, but also to foster a continuing and informed discussion...

### State of the Post-Cold War World

Participants generally agreed that the world has not entered the period of peace, harmony and tranquillity that we were expected to enjoy at the end of the Cold War. All segments of Canadian society must be involved in a national discussion to determine how to respond effectively to the new challenges. It is clear that the nationality, religious and ethnic differences kept in check during the Cold War have now burst through the surface. Once the



A Canadian with the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF).

Canadian Forces photo

current situations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia are resolved, however that comes about, it is certain that United Nations resources will be required in many other areas of the world.

### Definition of Peacekeeping

It was acknowledged that, until recently, the single term "peacekeeping" has served to cover a multiplicity of United Nations activities. However, the recent dramatic increase in the types and numbers of peacekeeping operations has given rise to the more frequent use of such terms as peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace-enforcement, peace-restoration and peace-establishment.

There are those who hold that each of these terms ought to be defined precisely and related to a spectrum of action. Others, trying to avoid a definitional morass, believe that peacekeeping has such a positive reputation that it ought to be the only term used. The latter group uses the illustration of a "peacekeeping umbrella," under which stand missions ranging from an observer type, through the classic interpositional model of Cyprus, all the way to operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The umbrella also

covers an expanding range of tasks, including those of an environmental, anti-crime or maritime nature.

Some participants expressed the need for a philosophical, intellectual and conceptual framework to be used in determining and refining future approaches. The "aggression-anarchy" spectrum could be a starting point.

### Public Education

The seminar itself was a good indication of the wide range of Canadians — individuals and organizations — that ought to be involved in determining the future foreign policy direction of peacekeeping. Parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, academics and research institutions all have a vital role to play.

While Canadians take great pride in our country's peacekeeping record, the details and extent of our participation are unknown to many. A comprehensive program of informational materials is needed. Canadians ought to be better informed of the peacekeeping activities carried out not only by the professional men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, but also by humanitarian organizations, Elections Canada and the RCMP.

One participant described the project of an Arctic Council, bringing together eight Arctic countries. Such a council could be expected to further the discussion of strategic issues, particularly as these relate to the North.

### Canadian Commitment

There is no doubt that Canadians want our future contributions to peacekeeping to be as significant as those of the past. It was asked whether Canada should continue to "cover the waterfront" of peacekeeping or whether it should concentrate in the areas where Canada has the most expertise.

In the past, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping has consisted mainly of personnel and financing. In the current climate of continuing reductions in the strength of the Canadian Armed Forces and with the declining budget, it is probable that more emphasis will be placed on peacekeeping expertise and on the non-military activities of humanitarian assistance, election supervision and policing.

The best peacekeepers are those who have been trained to a general-purpose combat capability level. Peacekeeping requires professionals. A good deal of confidence was expressed in the professionalism of Canadian troops, but participants were reminded that peacekeeping requires more than military skills. At times, it requires knowing how to harness "the power of CNN." There were also participants who pointed to the risk of Canadian soldiers getting involved in others' internal conflicts. For the most part, however, those attending the seminar shared the view that participation in peacekeeping will continue to be in Canada's best interests.

### Capacity of the United Nations

Many felt that the United Nations is in a period of flux as it reorganizes to deal with the rapid extension of peacekeeping requirements. It will need to develop methods and procedures to enable it to command and control effectively the over 50,000 military and civilian personnel currently employed on peacekeeping operations. Although there is a strong case against the United Nations possessing its own standing military force, there are still some who believe this is desirable. Others hold that what is needed is a commitment by governments to maintain certain forces on a standby basis, to be committed to the United Nations in accordance with national interests.

### Role of Major Powers

In his opening remarks, Professor Albert Legault of Laval University said the United Nations can serve as an interface between the small and the very powerful. The question was nevertheless raised as to whether one country or a very small group of countries should be able, by means of offering or withholding personnel, goods and/or services, to determine the effectiveness of the organization in meeting its challenges. There was concern that repeated exercise of such perceived powers might have a negative impact on the international legitimacy of the United Nations.

It was contended on the one hand that the United States is the only country in the world capable of mounting the operations required by the extended definition of peacekeeping. On the other hand, participants were reminded that the US has no intention of providing mercenaries for the world.

## Canada Contributes to Mozambique Operation

On February 12, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall and Defence Minister Kim Campbell announced that in response to a request from the UN Secretary-General, Canada will contribute up to 15 military observers to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

ONUMOZ will deploy up to 7,500 troops, police and civilians to implement the peace agreement signed by the Mozambique government and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) last October, ending 16 years of civil war. Four key elements in implementing the peace agreement are: troop demobilization and reintegration into civilian life; refugee repatriation; humanitarian assistance for displaced victims of war and drought; and preparations for national elections.

Other peacekeeping developments since the last issue of the *Bulletin* are listed below.



Armoured personnel carriers driven by Canadians with the UN Protection Force pass through the checkpoint at "B" company headquarters in Dragovic, Croatia. The Canadians were in a staging area in Croatia prior to moving south into Bosnia.

Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret Reid

### Ex-Yugoslavia

The 2nd Canadian Battalion with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has been deployed from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina to assist in the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. The company of the 2nd Battalion that had been assigned to Macedonia has rejoined the battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Iraq-Kuwait

Twenty-nine Canadian engineers have come home from the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Currently there are four Canadian military observers and one officer stationed at UNIKOM headquarters.

### Angola

Due to the renewal of the Angolan civil war, the Secretary-General scaled the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) down to approximately 30 people. Only one Canadian observer is still assigned to UNAVEM.

## Sovereignty

A number of participants alluded to the developing view within the international community that governments ought not be allowed to mistreat their citizens, deprive them of basic human rights or resist international aid on the basis of national sovereignty. The question was posed: "Who decides when a country's sovereignty can be breached?" Participants were reminded that it is only the media that make us aware of gross excesses on the part of governments...

## Suggestions for Canada

The plenary discussion revealed the necessity of informing all Canadians of the wide range of humanitarian and other activities currently being carried out by non-governmental means, which quite appropriately deserve to be placed under the peacekeeping umbrella. The importance of the media in stimulating public awareness was stressed. Also emphasized was the positive result to be gained through cooperation with organizations currently

working in the field, and through the implementation of effective follow-through programs. Some participants spoke of the need for an early warning system involving the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of information.

It was suggested that Canada:

- 1) take the lead in ensuring that the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs better coordinate its activities;
- 2) participate in the much-needed redesign of UN agencies' mandates, to take into account the changing international situation;
- 3) spearhead the creation of a UN organization to deal with internally displaced persons, who now outnumber refugees; and
- 4) play a greater part in the lifting and detonation of land mines. It was mentioned that ten people (seven in Senegal, three in Somalia) have been lost to land mines in the last 30 days.

Though the enormity of the difficulties confronting the UN was not discounted by participants, some "success stories" were also brought up in discussion. Notable

among these were the UN operations in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Namibia.

## Rapporteur's Remarks

Clearly we are in a new peacekeeping age. New, enhanced and innovative approaches to education and training are required. The diversity of approach and backgrounds of members of the new peacekeeping coalition ensures a rich diversity of skills upon which the Canadian government can call.

There were a number of good suggestions for future research and action. Proposed subjects for research included a peacekeeping early warning system, techniques of preventive diplomacy, and sovereignty and peacekeeping. Ideas that could be translated into projects include the development of prototype peacekeeping training and more interchanges between the Canadian Forces and humanitarian organizations. Most important, seminar participants demonstrated the firm conviction that Canada should continue to make a significant contribution to international peace, security and stability. ■

## First Committee Considers Disarmament Machinery

The UN First Committee met from March 8 to 12 in New York to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, including ways and means of enhancing its functioning and efficiency. The reassessment was driven in part by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's October 1992 report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*. This report and Canada's written response to it (see *Disarmament Bulletin* 20) formed the

basis of much of the discussion at the March session.

Canada found the session disappointing insofar as there was little movement towards better integrating arms control and disarmament issues into the broader international peace and security agenda. Canada argued that arms control is part of a wider process of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on coopera-

tive mechanisms for creating and enhancing peace and security. We put forward suggestions on how to better join the consideration of disarmament and political-security issues in a single General Assembly committee.

However, several states expressed reluctance to more clearly engage the arms control process with broader issues. They also hesitated at trying to improve integration of the various components of the arms control machinery — the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — to improve functioning and efficiency, although the consensus resolution produced by the session does call for enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the three.

On the positive side, the First Committee made progress in reinforcing reform within the UN disarmament bodies. There was support for continued rationalization of the First Committee's work. There was also strong support for the UNDC's cur-

rent role and its reform campaign. Definition of the CD's role, agenda and composition, and its place in the disarmament machinery, proved more complex. The First Committee resolution encourages the CD to reach early agreement on the expansion of its membership.

The resolution also urges the Secretary-General to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs to carry out its mandated tasks. The Secretary-General must report to the 48th session of the General Assembly, scheduled for this fall, on what measures he will take. There was some discussion of whether the Office should remain located in New York or be moved to Geneva. Canada strongly favours keeping the Office in New York.

The First Committee also considered the Security Council's role in disarmament but came to no agreement. The Secretary-General's suggestion that the Council should play a more pro-active role, particularly on non-proliferation, received the support of many countries. However, others argued against overloading an already busy Council. ■

## Resumed session produces mixed results.

basis of much of the discussion at the March session.

Canada found the session disappointing insofar as there was little movement towards better integrating arms control and disarmament issues into the broader international peace and security agenda. Canada argued that arms control is part of a wider process of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on coopera-

## Can UNDC Make a Credible Contribution?

*The 1993 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was held in New York from April 19 to May 10. The following are excerpts from the plenary statement by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason on April 20.*

The Disarmament Commission is a UN body of universal membership, which has as its mandate the focused consideration of a limited number of items. Its subject matter comprises issues that need more in-depth consideration than is possible in the First Committee, but that are not yet ready for negotiation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

During the resumed session of the First Committee, this basic mandate of the UNDC was reaffirmed and support given to the ongoing efforts to enhance the functioning of this body. In particular, an earlier agreement in principle on a three-item phased agenda was confirmed, to ensure that the subject matter before the UNDC would have both an element of predictability on the one hand and flexibility on the other. However, while agreement was reached in principle, it was not reached in practice and the result is that our efforts to move to a three-item phased agenda with one item in the first, one item in the second and one item in the third and final year of consideration, have been put in jeopardy. We shall have to give careful consideration to this problem at the 1994 Organizational Meeting later this year in order to determine how we can get back on track. In particular, we may have to consider whether one of the new items — if and when they are agreed upon — can be successfully concluded in two, rather than three, years.

Turning to this year's agenda, as many speakers have already pointed out, we have a considerable amount of work ahead of us if we are to successfully conclude the items on "regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" and "the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields." Yet successfully conclude them we must if we are to demonstrate that a three-week meeting of the Disarmament Commission can make a credible contribution to the increasingly difficult search for

international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

With respect to the time available to us, Canada has observed in the past that three weeks is far too long for a mere exchange of formal positions but relatively little time in which to reconcile broadly divergent views on complex and sensitive issues. This is why we have advocated preparations in advance of the session with a view to developing working papers jointly presented by countries with quite different perspectives on the issues at hand. And this is precisely what Canada and Brazil have tried to do with respect to the agenda item on science and technology. The result is a joint working paper on "the transfer of high technology with military applications" which we hope will help the deliberations of Working Group IV. This paper will be formally introduced in the working group itself. Let me now briefly set out Canada's overall approach to the science and technology issue.

We strongly believe that this item merits our close attention because it offers us an opportunity to broaden international agreement in a particularly difficult area of non-proliferation — the transfer of sensitive technologies. In Canada's view, we must find ways to ensure that technology developed for peaceful purposes does not find its way into the hands of those seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. At the same time, the application of such technologies for economic and social development must be encouraged.

In Canada's view, the way to attain

both objectives is to make the commitment to, and fulfilment of, comprehensive non-proliferation norms or standards a *sine qua non* for the promotion of international cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technologies. Once this framework for cooperation has been established on a government-to-government basis, the way is then clear for the respective commercial sectors of the countries in question to pursue mutually advantageous arrangements.

The international community — whether it be in the context of the IAEA or the Second Preparatory Meeting of the OPCW or the ongoing work of the BTWC Experts Group — is engaged in a wide variety of efforts to develop global, comprehensive, effectively verifiable non-proliferation regimes to regulate the transfer of material, equipment and sensitive technologies that have the potential for use in research, development, acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Disarmament Commission can make a tangible contribution to these broader efforts if agreement can be reached on guidelines that genuinely enhance the prospects for transferring sensitive technologies solely for peaceful purposes.

As a country that has conducted extensive research in the area of verification, Canada also hopes that the guidelines will support the strengthening of international cooperation in — and greater access to — disarmament-related technologies.

Canada has devoted increasing attention to regional disarmament and international security questions over the past year

### UN Should Integrate Efforts

*The following is an excerpt from the March 8 statement of Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason to the resumed session of the First Committee in New York.*

The UN cannot hope — over the longer-term — to reduce the time it devotes to crisis management if it does not expend some considerable effort on nurturing workable mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes long before they reach the crisis stage. This is conflict prevention in its most fundamental sense. The regional activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) should be seen as an integral part of the early warning apparatus of the UN. Likewise, the arms control database, including the arms register, should be seen as part of the arsenal of information, techniques and expertise that the UN can call upon in its early warning, good offices and other preventive diplomacy efforts. In our view, the work of the ODA — and indeed of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission — should be more closely integrated into the other preventive diplomacy efforts of the UN.

## Need to Expand CD Membership

The following are excerpts from a statement by Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 18. The CD has a limited membership (39 countries), though non-member states may be invited to participate as observers.

Canada has recognized for some time that the current Conference on Disarmament membership no longer reflects the changing international security environment. We in Canada think exclusivity is no longer acceptable. Collectively, as Conference on Disarmament members, we are now in the process of defining criteria for changing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. However, many problems regarding membership need first to be answered: how can the limited membership being advocated by some be justified in 1993? Why should countries be excluded because they are situated in a certain geographic region? And who is to judge that countries should be excluded because they are not directly involved in the problems emerging from the new international security environment?

The United Nations funds the operations of the Conference on Disarmament and all United Nations members have assessed costs. In our view, it is unthinkable in this new age of international cooperation and democratization that United Nations Member States can be called upon to fund a multilateral organization but be excluded from its membership. Canada believes strongly that any interested state that applies for membership in the Conference on Disarmament should be welcomed as a full member.

as it becomes more and more apparent that a host of post-Cold War problems are best addressed at the regional level. At the same time, it is equally clear that regional approaches must be consistent with, and supportive of, global norms. In our statements during both the regular and resumed sessions of the First Committee, we have focused on the unique role that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs is playing in promoting a mutually reinforcing interaction between the regional and global levels.

It is our hope that agreement can be reached in Working Group III on language that will provide concrete support to the "regional role" of the United Nations as well as to other, complementary, efforts at regional security building.

Regarding the subject matter of Working Group I, nuclear disarmament, Canada shares the hope of our Chairman, Ambassador Castro, that our general exchange of views this year lays a solid foundation for conclusion of this item in 1994. In that discussion Canada will call not only for further reductions by the US and Russia but also for meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament on the part of China, the United Kingdom and France.

The time has also come for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning all nuclear test explosions in all envi-

ronments for all time. The US has enacted legislation calling for a negotiation and, more recently, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at the Vancouver Summit that "negotiations on a multilateral test ban should commence at an early date." In Canada's view the negotiations should proceed forthwith in the Conference on Disarmament. In the working group, we will elaborate some ideas on how the CD might proceed to tackle verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

I would also note that, in Canada's view, the CD would be in the best possible position to proceed were it to act decisively on the membership issue and open its doors to all UN Member States that wish to contribute to the negotiation of a CTBT or any other multilateral disarmament issue.

Turning to the 1994 session, Canada strongly supports inclusion of the item on non-proliferation. We attach singular priority to sustained action by the international community on all fronts, from the strengthening of global norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to rig-

orous implementation of national controls. Central to the process of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the indefinite and unconditional extension of the lynchpin of that regime, the NPT, together with the relentless pursuit of its universal adherence. In that regard, Canada deeply regrets and deplores the decision of the DPRK to quit the NPT. At the same time, we congratulate Belarus for its accession and call on Ukraine and Kazakhstan to do the same.

Canada also looks forward in 1994 to starting discussions on international arms transfers, with particular reference to illegal activities. The establishment of the UN register of conventional arms is an important first step in bringing international scrutiny to bear on the problem of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional armaments. We intend to submit our report to the register in full by the April 30 deadline and we urge others to do the same.

In supporting the addition of this item to the UNDC agenda, we are cognizant that the CD and the UN Experts Group will be examining the expansion of the register in 1994. We will need to ensure that our discussions in this forum focus on unique aspects of the problem and do not repeat the efforts of others. In this regard, the issue of the role of private arms dealers, highlighted by the Secretary-General in his *New Dimensions* report, may warrant examination by the Commission. Such an approach may also allow us to successfully conclude this item in two years, thus enabling the Commission to finally begin a fully phased approach.

In conclusion, the post-Cold War era abounds with urgent challenges to international peace and security. What role can

---

***The way forward lies not in language "fixes" or in lowest common denominator texts, but in a genuine broadening of multilateral agreement.***

---

the Disarmament Commission play in helping to meet these myriad demands? One thing seems clear — the way forward does not lie in language "fixes" or lowest common denominator texts. What is needed is a genuine broadening of multilateral agreement on the items before us. Canada believes that the objective is both attainable and worthy of the effort. ■

## Symposium Looks at Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence-Building and Peacekeeping

Governmental and academic experts from eight countries took part in the Tenth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium, entitled "Proliferation and International Security: Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence-Building and Peacekeeping," held in Montebello, Quebec, from February 24 to 27. A key theme of discussion was the future involvement of the United Nations in these fields, a topic of growing interest in view of the Secretary-General's reports on *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Document A/47/277) and *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (UN Document A/C.1/47/7).

Since the demise of the Cold War, states have been demonstrating a greater willingness to consider multilateral approaches to security issues, as opposed to national or bilateral approaches. As states come to recognize the advantages of multilateral approaches — including cost-effectiveness — they are increasingly likely to assign verification, confidence-building and peacekeeping roles to international organizations and regional bodies. This is already happening to some extent in the United Nations Special Commission on



Participants at the Tenth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium.

Iraq (UNSCOM), the CSCE and other organizations.

A heightened role for international bodies in these areas and related security fields is consistent with long-held Canadian policy. Symposium participants considered ways in which Canada and other states can facilitate this process, as well as

the growing integration of verification, confidence-building and peacekeeping.

The Symposium was sponsored by EAITC's Verification Research Program and organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies. The latter will publish the proceedings in the near future.

## Fostering Democracy and Security in the Ex-Warsaw Pact: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO has consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.

To foster a sense of security and confidence and to make democratic change irrevocable, NATO first sought to build a new relationship with its former adversaries by extending its hand of friendship and establishing regular diplomatic liaison and partnership, including high level visits and military contacts. Then, at the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO leaders agreed to establish NACC — the North Atlantic Cooperation Council — as a forum for developing "a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political issues."

NACC membership now totals 38 (in-

cluding all of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Albania). Finland attends ministerial meetings as an observer.

NATO allies and the NACC cooperation partners meet regularly at expanded sessions of virtually all of the established NATO committees, including the Political, Economic and Military Committees. Foreign ministers attend ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and defence ministers meet in the Group on Defence Matters. In addition, a NATO embassy in each cooperation country serves as the NATO information office. The Canadian Embassy in Warsaw, for example, is responsible for NATO liaison with Poland.

In December 1992, NACC ministers ap-

proved an expanded program of consultation and cooperation. The 1993 Work Plan features activities on a wide range of issues including peacekeeping, defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air-traffic management, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" in scientific and environmental programs.

In addition, NACC ministers discussed contentious security issues such as withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states, control of Russian and Ukrainian nuclear weapons, and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Peacekeeping and the situation in the former Yugoslavia

were also discussed.

Most recently, the Group on Defence Matters met and reviewed defence cooperation activities, including a number of peacekeeping seminars and training sessions planned for 1993 by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

Canada's contributions to date include: hosting a seminar on the role of the military in democratic societies (Montebello, February 1992); funding for NACC training sessions on civil and emergency planning (NATO School, Germany, 1992-93); and funding for the Canadian NACC internship program at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

NACC consultations and cooperation are intended to help meet the legitimate security concerns of cooperation partners and thereby to enable them to focus their resources on consolidating their democratic institutions. NACC has been particularly helpful in establishing contacts with senior level defence and military officials in the cooperating countries. The time, however, has come to move from contacts to substantive practical cooperation and assistance.

Some cooperation partners, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, continue to press NATO for security guarantees and full NATO membership. NATO's response to date has been that the expansion of NATO membership at this time would not enhance European security and that the security interests of non-NATO countries — including Russia — should be taken into account. ■

## CSCE Conflict Management

At the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe decided to further strengthen its role in conflict management. The Summit established a wide range of instruments to this end: mechanisms for fact-finding, rapporteur and CSCE-mandated peacekeeping missions; early warning mechanisms (e.g., the High Commissioner on National Minorities); and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes (such as the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, approved by the CSCE Council

meeting in Stockholm in December).

Since the Helsinki Summit, in addition to dispatching a large number of short-term rapporteur missions, the CSCE has established a number of missions on the ground in Eastern and Central Europe, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. These missions, initiated relatively quickly with minimal infrastructure and modest costs, have established an international presence in potential conflict areas and, in some cases, initiated or supported a framework for political dialogue.

As a strong proponent of a more vigorous CSCE role in conflict management, Canada views these "preventive diplomacy" missions as a great success, providing the CSCE with an additional instrument for addressing tensions and managing crises. CSCE missions are deployed in the following areas:

### Georgia-Ossetia

In November 1992, the CSCE established an eight-person team composed equally of civilian and military personnel in Ossetia, Georgia to undertake discussions with all parties to promote civil order and political reconciliation. The mission is to maintain contact with local authorities and military commanders of the Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping forces. The mission is also tasked with facilitating a political solution to the conflict in Abkhazia. The size of the mission was recently enlarged to eleven members and its mandate extended to August.

### Moldova-Trans-Dniestr

The initial six-month mandate of the CSCE mission, which began in March, is to facilitate a lasting and comprehensive political settlement to the conflict between forces from the Republic of Moldova, forces of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniestr Moldovan Republic, and Russian soldiers stationed in the region. Last June, more than 1,000 people were killed and over 100,000 displaced in the fighting.

### Estonia

Established in February, the initial six-month mandate of the CSCE mission is to promote stability, dialogue and understanding between Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities in the country.

### Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina

In September 1992, the CSCE established "Missions of Long Duration" to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro). The missions' mandate is to promote dialogue between the various parties, to attempt to resolve specific local differences, and to collect information on human rights violations. The three regions are considered vulnerable to "spillover" from the conflict elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The size of the missions has recently been increased and their mandate extended to August 31.

### Skopje

Also in September, the CSCE established a "Spillover Mission" for six months in Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mission's mandate is to attempt to prevent the spillover of the conflict elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The mission's mandate was recently extended to August 31.

### Sanctions Assistance

In addition, the CSCE has deployed "Sanctions Assistance Missions" to a number of states neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to assist them in implementing UN sanctions. Such missions are deployed in: Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. ■

## Focus: On IAEA Safeguards

Desire to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy combined with concern about the spread of nuclear weapons led countries to conclude the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the late 1960s. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is widely regarded as the world's most important multilateral arms control agreement. It has done a great deal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and has become the cornerstone of peaceful nuclear trade, especially for countries such as Canada.

Despite the NPT, however, worries about the spread of nuclear weapons still exist. A number of countries with nuclear programs have not signed the NPT. Furthermore, it is always possible that nuclear material used in peaceful nuclear research and the electricity-generating industry could be diverted by any country — even an NPT signatory — to develop a nuclear

explosive device. Guarding against this possibility requires effective verification.

It is only reasonable that countries that sign an arms control agreement want some means of determining whether or not other countries are abiding by their commitments. In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, in particular the NPT, this job is primarily undertaken by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through its system of nuclear safeguards. Safeguards are procedures — such as on-site inspections, audits and inventory controls — designed to provide assurance that nuclear material intended for peaceful activities is not diverted to military purposes.

## Background

The IAEA was founded in 1957 with a two-fold mandate: to promote the benefits of nuclear energy and to establish a system of international safeguards. The first IAEA safeguards system was introduced in 1961, covering small electric power reactors of up to 100-megawatts capacity. In 1965, a revised system covering all reactors was introduced and in 1966 it was extended to include nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Provisions covering conversion and fabrication plants were added in 1968. As the IAEA system developed, many nuclear suppliers and recipients gradually transferred to the Agency responsibility for verifying the peaceful uses commitment under their bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.

Under the NPT, which came into force on March 5, 1970, States Parties that do not possess nuclear weapons — including Canada — are required to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA drew up a model NPT safeguards agreement which was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors before the end of 1970. Agreements based on this model are now applied in over 100 countries, including most of those having significant nuclear activities.

As one of the world's earliest nuclear suppliers, Canada was deeply involved in the process of developing the IAEA and its safeguards system. Canada concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 1972, at which time inspection of Canadian facilities commenced. Since 1976, Canada has required

all countries with which it engages in nuclear trade (except the nuclear-weapon states) to have either:

- ratified the NPT, and thereby accepted NPT safeguards on all their present and future nuclear activities; or
- made an equally binding commitment to non-proliferation by accepting NPT-type full-scope safeguards — that is, safeguards on the *entire* nuclear program in each country, not just on those aspects in which Canadian materials would be used.

Canada's domestic and international safeguards commitments are administered by the Atomic Energy Control Board.

## How Safeguards Work

The main political objectives of safeguards are to:

- gain assurance that countries are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful use undertakings; and
- deter the diversion of safeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives, and the misuse of safeguarded facilities to produce unsafe-guarded nuclear material.

To achieve these political objectives, the IAEA has set itself the technical objective of the "timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection." The "significant quantities" of nuclear material used as the IAEA's detection targets are 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of highly enriched uranium. These are the amounts required to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. "Timely detection" refers to the time required to convert diverted material into components for an explosive device.

To meet this technical objective, the IAEA has established a process for verifying the continued presence of nuclear material placed under safeguards. The process consists of comparing the accuracy of reports and other information provided by a country against independent, objective information collected by IAEA inspectors and from containment and surveillance equipment, such as cameras and seals, installed by the IAEA at the country's nuclear facilities. To date, the IAEA has never concluded that material under safeguards has been diverted.

## Problems with Safeguards


The IAEA safeguards system has several limitations. Most of these have been a focus of international attention ever since it was discovered that Iraq — an NPT signatory — managed to conduct a clandestine nuclear program despite IAEA safeguards.

First, key installations in countries of proliferation concern are not under the IAEA system. A number of these countries have not signed the NPT, and some that have signed the Treaty have not concluded the required safeguards agreement.

Second, the Agency's definition of "significant quantities" may be too large. Iraq's hidden production was at the gram level. In addition, measurement techniques are not sufficiently accurate to keep complete track of nuclear materials in bulk form (i.e., as powders, liquids or gases). This makes it theoretically possible for a country to divert a small percentage of material for military purposes without detection, since this could appear to be a normal operating discrepancy. The problem is especially dangerous at fuel fabrication, reprocessing and enrichment plants.

Third, although the IAEA has the right to conduct "special inspections" of undeclared sites, it has — until recently — limited itself to regular inspections of declared facilities. Low IAEA budgets and human resources have also meant that far fewer inspections are conducted than are needed to fully meet the IAEA's safeguards objectives. Although the IAEA is responsible for monitoring over 900 installations in over 50 countries, some 70 percent of the safeguards budget is spent on just three countries — Canada, Germany and Japan; these have numerous safeguarded installations but are not of proliferation concern. Other problems include the fact that it is almost impossible for Agency inspectors to make unannounced visits to safeguarded installations. States are also permitted to reject particular IAEA inspectors.

In view of the Iraqi experience, steps are being taken to strengthen the safeguards system. Canada is pushing the process (see pp. 4-5). However, even if IAEA safeguards functioned perfectly, their usefulness might still be limited when applied to highly enriched uranium and plutonium, materials directly usable for nuclear weapons. Even if the IAEA reacted instantaneously to diversion, the



IAEA inspectors at work in a nuclear power station.

IAEA photo

state appropriating this material could in theory manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks if all the non-nuclear components had been prepared in advance. In such a setting, safeguards cannot provide "timely warning" sufficient to allow the international community to react in advance of the *fait accompli*.

The IAEA itself has no authority to impose sanctions in the event of non-compliance with a safeguards agreement. The Agency's Board of Governors is authorized to notify the UN Security Council. It is then up to the Council to take appropriate action, if desired.

### Conclusion

The IAEA safeguards system is still evolving and incorporating advances in technology to improve containment, surveillance and other techniques. The system is not perfect and there remain many political, legal and technical difficulties to surmount.

Limitations notwithstanding, the deterrent value of safeguards remains strong, since would-be diverters could not have confidence that their misuse of nuclear materials would go undetected. It has been estimated that without the NPT and associated safeguards, there could be as many as 30 nuclear-weapon states by the year 2000, rather than the present five. While the cost of safeguards is appreciable — the IAEA's safeguards budget for 1991 was US \$65.1 million, out of a total budget of US \$196.9 million — it is a small burden to bear in comparison with the considerable contribution to international security that IAEA safeguards provide.

### Forecast

*Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, June through September 1993.*

**Ongoing:** CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

**Ongoing:** CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

**Ongoing:** Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

**May 24 - June 4:** meeting of experts on BTWC verification, Geneva

**May 10 - June 25:** CD in session, Geneva

**July 10 - September 2:** CD in session, Geneva

**September 13 - 27:** concluding meeting of experts on BTWC verification, Geneva

## Acronyms

- APEC — Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- ASEAN (PMC) — Association of South-east Asian Nations (Post-Ministerial Conference)
- BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- CD — Conference on Disarmament
- CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)
- CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention
- EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
- GSE — Group of Scientific Experts
- G7 — Group of Seven leading industrialized nations
- IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
- INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces
- MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
- NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council
- NNWS — non-nuclear-weapon states
- NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- ODA — (UN) Office for Disarmament Affairs
- ONUMOZ — UN Operation in Mozambique
- OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
- SSAC — State System of Accounting and Control
- START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
- UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Bulletin is published four times per year by External Affairs and International Trade Canada. If you would like to be placed on our mailing list or require additional copies (free of charge), please write to:

The Disarmament Bulletin

Non-Proliferation

Disarmament

External Affairs

International Trade

125 Sussex

Ottawa, Ontario

K1A 0G2

— ISSN 07

Cette publication

également en

