






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

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ANNEXATION,
OR
UNION WITH THE UNITED STATES,
IS THE
MANIFEST DESTINY
OF
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA.

BY
ALEX. MUNRO, ESQUIRE,
AUTHOR OF SEVERAL WORKS ON THE HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND
STATISTICS OF THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES.

SAINT JOHN, N. B.
PRINTED BY BARNES & COMPANY,
PRINCE WILLIAM STREET.
1868.

SUBJECTS.



Introduction.

British North America is not climatically and geographically adapted to form a Nation.

Nearly all the best lands in the Colonies are granted.

Union with the United States would give life to manufacturing industry in the Colonies, and extend the commerce of both countries.

The Provinces are defenceless.

Annexation proclivities.

Political necessities for an union of these Colonies with the Republic.

The shortest and most convenient winter outlet for the trade of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec to the ocean is *via* Portland and other United States routes; and the shortest route from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Montreal is *via* the United States.

Concluding Remarks.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN the following pages, we purpose showing that centralization and political union is the manifest destiny of British North America and the United States ; that the physical character of the country, and the genius of forty millions of people, clearly point to the union of these two countries.

To describe the early settlements and governments, to trace the gradual changes which converted immense tracts of forest country, inhabited by unnumbered tribes of savages, into communities of free men, is not our present intention, however pleasing it would be to pay our humble tribute of gratitude to those who laid the foundations on which the towers of social, moral, intellectual, and political strength have been erected.

This is an highly eventful period in history. Some of the events, however, are like dissolving views, before we have fairly made out what they are, their outlines begin to fade. There are others ominous, and keep the national powers trembling in the balance. Each nation is distrustful of the others ; and, consequently, mighty armies are organized, and terrible weapons of warfare are invented for the defence of civil rights and the preservation of national independence. A general restlessness pervades all countries. Reforms in morals, philosophy, manners, institutions, instruction, and laws. The old dynasties of the world, whose governments have been stereotyped and stamped with a Medo-Persian seal for centuries, are in a transition state. Even Great Britain, whose Monarch and monarchy is the best in the world, is changing. Some of its aristocratic land marks are becoming effaced, and many of its old forms, usages, and laws, which grew accidentally with the nation, are being remodelled, and new prin-

ciples of vitality are being infused. The masses of society, in all countries, are beginning to assume their status in the scale of liberty and progress. It is only, however, as light dawns, that radical changes take place. Ignorant and despotic nations generally remain unchanged until an appeal is made to the "sacred right of insurrection," involving the sacrifice of thousands of lives and millions worth of property. Countless passions and motives stir to action. Like the tidal waves, society is continually in motion; the final aim, however, of life, activity, and change, is to raise the standard of society—to secure a higher development of human forces.

AMERICA, north and south, has not escaped the changing hand of time. Internecine conflicts, political factions, revolutions and bloody wars, have marked the pages of its history. Slavery has been abolished in the United States; not, however, without shedding the blood of more than a million of human lives, and entailing an immense debt on the nation. Thus even in Republican America, disorganization and bloodshed has preceded reconstruction and consolidation.

In the BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES a revolution has been effected. Complications with the conterminous Republic, arising out of the recent civil war in that country, gave rise to a general feeling of insecurity throughout British America. This, along with numerous conflicting interests between the colonies themselves, and in the Province of Canada in particular, gave rise to the consolidation of three of the principal Provinces under one general government. In this act, Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have shown great wisdom, in radically changing their constitution without bloodshed. Trusting to the Great Disposer of events, in whom we have an abiding faith, these Provinces have been guided through an eventful step; eventful, as a precursory step to an union with the United States of America.

These Provinces have been for many years preparing, as it were, for this change. Their constitutions grew with their peoples; each held its course amidst a family of colonies, acknowledging allegiance to the throne of Great Britain. Each differed, however, from the others, and the Parent State; but little friendship or fraternal feeling for each other existed. They taxed the products of each other, and imposed separate and conflicting tariffs; and foreign and imperial goods, carried from one Province to the other, were subject to duty. Their currencies, postal, and quarantine management also differed; indeed, there was not as much harmony among them as there was between the colonies and the United States.

In Canada, the old feelings that gave rise to the rebellion of 1837, were ready to burst forth. The union of 1840, which arose out of that rebellion, had failed to secure justice to both sections of the country. At the time that union was formed, Lower Canada had one-third more inhabitants than Canada West. But in consequence of the more genial soil and climate of the West, nearly all the emigrants to the country settled in the upper section, until in 1861, Upper Canada contained nearly one-third of a million more inhabitants than Lower Canada; while the parliamentary representation from each section was equal, under the authority of statutory law. The long existing differences, arising out of two distinct nationalities—English and French—and the “peculiar institutions” of the latter, guaranteed to them in the early history of the country, were approaching a crisis. The legislative union of 1840 became politically effete; and the two parties were so evenly balanced in the Legislature, that neither could form a government sufficient to carry on the business of the country. Upper Canada claimed parliamentary representation, based on population; while Lower Canada claimed political equality, based on the constitution. And the difficulties in governing the

country, were increased by recalling the historical differences between the two races, which were intensified by their being the historical offspring of opposite nationalities—differing in language, religion, and habits of life; nationalities who had fought against each other in the early history of the country. Thus, the political necessities of the country—the stern duties of the time called for a change in the constitution. And the war in the States gave rise, as might be expected, to complications of a serious and threatening nature between the Republic and the British Government. The Provinces became an asylum for those in the States who, through the accidents of war, were thrown on their shores. Hence, misunderstandings arose between the States and the colonies also. The “Trent” and “Alabama” cases, and the supposed sympathy of the colonists with the Southern confederacy, led Congress to abrogate the reciprocity treaty, which had been twelve years in successful operation to both countries. It also laid heavy restrictions on colonial trade. Fenian aggressions were made on Canada and New Brunswick by some of the citizens of the Republic, which cost both Provinces large outlays, and Canada a number of valuable lives.

The British Government urged the union of the Provinces as the best security against invasion; and, as a means of relieving the mother country of a part of the heavy taxes her people have to pay for keeping bodies of troops in the Provinces. Canada urged the union of the colonies as the only means of relieving her from the parliamentary “dead locks” of the past; for, in the short space of two years, previous to June, 1864, five governments had been in power in that Province. A crisis was evidently at hand, such as might have convulsed the country, and led to serious complications.

In the Maritime Provinces, the subject was advocated on various grounds. The Imperial Government

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strongly urged it; the commercial requirements and interests of the several Provinces required remodeling; and militia organizations required to be systematized and rendered more efficient. Indeed, there were many plausible grounds assumed in favour of an union of the Provinces.

A large party in the Provinces were in favour of annexation to the American Republic, as the only safeguard from invasion, and the surest means of securing commercial progress and the development of the resources of the country. After nearly three years incessant labour, Canada, divided into two Provinces—Quebec and Ontario—with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, has been federately united into one dominion, called the *Dominion of Canada*. The first session of the first Dominion Parliament closed in 1868. The acts of this memorable Parliament—memorable for wasting the resources of the country, and imposing onerous taxes on the people; indeed, nothing but general dissatisfaction has ran throughout the maritime colonies. Contrary to the pledges made by the union leaders in the Lower Provinces, and in accordance with the predictions of the anti-unionists, newspaper postage, stamp and excise duties, and other heavy fiscal burthens are imposed which the people, especially in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, are very unwilling to bear.

British North America is not climatically and geographically adapted to form a Nation.

The productive parts of British North America are comprised in a few isolated spots, scattered along a ridge or belt of land, varying in width from one hundred to two hundred miles, and stretches across the American Continent, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, three thousand miles in extent. On the southern boundary of this ridge, lies the United States; and its northern side is bounded by a great

extent of uninhabitable country, sealed in frost and snow for the greater part of the year. From this *terra incognita*, the cold is driven over the Provinces and adjoining States, with chilling effects on agricultural and other operations. A careful examination of the country, clearly shows that British North America is not adapted to constitute a nation, and maintain its independence. Its boundaries are not rightly adjusted for national existence, and for the extension of the human race—the arts of industry, commerce, and for protection. Its chief rivers, lakes, mountains, and other attributes, are so interwoven with those of the conterminous States, that it is almost impossible to develop the resources of the Provinces, except by permission of the adjoining Republic; of which, by nature, British North America forms a part. The Columbia River on the Pacific; the Red and Saskatchewan Rivers in the interior; and the great chain of lakes on the St. Lawrence, connect both countries.

The natural outlet for the products of the ten millions of inhabitants who now occupy the Western States—a population which, in a few years, may be doubled, is by the St. Lawrence. This is the way ships of a thousand tons might, by enlarging the canals, be brought from Chicago, the grain mart of the West, to the ocean, in place of by the long route by the Erie Canal. Unite the two countries under one government, and the St. Lawrence would at once become the highway of nations to the centre of North America. And by a divergence from the St. Lawrence route to Lake Champlain, the Eastern States could also be supplied with Western produce much cheaper than at present. And the river St. John, in New Brunswick, for a part of its distance, is in both countries; so that nearly all the great natural arteries of communication form a part of both countries.

The most extensive tract of fertile land in British North America, is said to stretch along the banks of

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the Red and North Saskatchewan Rivers. The only outlet from "this remote country," as the Secretary of State for the Colonies terms it, is by Red River, and roads to Pembina, Crow-wing, St. Paul, and other settlements in the States. Numerous explorations have been made of the country lying between the settled districts in Ontario and Red River, a thousand miles through a cold, rocky waste, unfit for settlement, with a view of obtaining a line of road communication. Captain Pallissier, who explored a large part of the country in 1857 and three following years, under the authority of the Imperial Government, says in reply to the question, "What means of access exist for British emigrants to reach this settlement," asked by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied: "The manner in which natural obstacles have isolated the country from all other British possessions in the east, is a matter of considerable weight; it is the obstacle of the country, and one, I fear, almost beyond the remedies of art. The egress and ingress to the settlements from the east, is obviously by the Red River Valley, and through the States." This is confirmed by other explorers.

The only route across British territory, at present, is along Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods, and Dog Lake, and over various land routes of one hundred and fifty miles in the aggregate. It is only during a short period in the year, that this northern section can be navigated; so that the only practical way to this "fertile belt," which lies on both sides of the parallel of fifty-three degrees north latitude, is by way of the United States, which has already extended lines of settlements to the international boundary. The south branch of the Saskatchewan interlocks with branches of the Mississippi River. The north branch, on which the fertile lands are situated, is about twelve hundred miles in length, and is navigable for nearly one thousand miles. Both branches take their rise near the base of the Rocky Mountains.

The eastern slope of these mountains probably act as a reflector of the solar heat to the valley; which, with other causes, renders the climate in these high northern latitudes—latitudes five degrees further north than New Brunswick and the settlements near Quebec, of about the same isothermal character as these settlements. The greater part of Red River is in the United States, whence it takes its rise. It has a navigable water line of eight hundred miles. Both these northern rivers discharge their waters through lake Winnipeg and its outlets into Hudson bay at the northern end of the continent.

Most all the lands lying between the settlements in Ontario and Red River are barren and rocky; and the country is extremely cold. The cold is driven from the Hudson bay over the stunted forests that lie between lake Superior and that vast inland sea, two hundred and fifty miles, with chilling effects; in a similar manner, the cold has a clear sweep from the Labrador over the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to the north-eastern parts of New Brunswick, and Gaspe; indeed, the Province of Quebec, and the Maritime Colonies generally, are affected by the chilling blasts that roll uninterruptedly over the Gulf from the northern regions. And the rocky and cascade mountain country to the Pacific Ocean, is chiefly unfit for settlement.

From the facts here adduced, it is obvious that a large part of British North America is not adapted for continuous ~~operation~~ ^{occupation}; its fertile districts are comparatively small, and separated from each other by extensive tracts of barren lands. Still, its natural resources are vast and varied, which, in union with the United States, would be developed, and the country become the seat of manufacturing industry; money would be more plenty; and emigrants would flock to the country by thousands, in place of leaving it, as at present, by hundreds.

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**Nearly all the best Lands in the Colonies
are granted.**

Recent reports of the Crown domain of these Provinces, show that the quantity of good land still ungranted is confined to a few comparatively small tracts. The Commissioner of Crown Lands for Canada, in his Report for 1862, says: "It is the fact that the best lands of the Crown, in both sections of the Province, have already been sold. . . . The new townships between the Ottawa and Lake Huron contain much good land, but they are separated from the settled townships on the St. Lawrence and north shore of Lake Ontario, by a rocky, barren tract, which varies in width from ten to twenty miles, and presents a serious obstruction to the influx of settlers. Moreover, the good land in these new townships is composed of small tracts, here and there, separated from each other by rocky ridges, swamps and lakes."

In his place in the Dominion Parliament of Canada, the Hon. Mr. McKenzie said, referring to the Saskatchewan Territory, "that an outlet would thereby be afforded for the energies of our young men, who are now compelled, in consequence of the limited field for settlement offered in Canada, to seek for homes for themselves in the United States." And referring to the Red River Settlement, "He admitted that a rocky, sterile belt intervened between it and Canada." This rocky, sterile belt is "the obstacle of the country."

In Nova Scotia, the Crown owns but little land fit for cultivation.

In New Brunswick, there are several small tracts of good land still ungranted.

There are, however, in all the Provinces, except Newfoundland, large tracts of a class of soils that we have been in the habit of designating "good lands" for settlement—lands far superior to a large part of the New England States—far superior to much of Scotland and other parts of the British Islands. It

is principally the settlers on this class of soils, however, or those who will not settle on them, in consequence of their insufficient productiveness, that are annually leaving the Provinces by hundreds for the West, California, New Zealand, Australia, and other countries.

It is only the best lands of the Provinces, which are comparatively limited in extent, that produces remunerative returns for labor. The peninsular part of Ontario, which stretches South to latitude forty-two, is the garden of British North America. This is the only part of the Provinces capable of sustaining a large population. It exports an annual surplus of flour and grain sufficient to supply the present deficiencies of the Maritime Provinces. In the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, the best lands are limited to comparatively small tracts, which, along with a large part of Prince Edward Island, produce nearly enough food for the settlers on those limited areas.

The half-productive lands of these Provinces—which are very extensive—will not be settled until manufactories spring up in the Provinces. It is by means of capital, introduced through the manufacturing hives of industry scattered over the British Islands, on the other side of the Atlantic, and over the New England States on this side, that has given life to those countries, and made much of their semi-productive soils highly productive. It is by means of wealth—wealth not acquired by the cultivation of poor land, but obtained through other channels of industry—that has enabled farmers and amateurs to convert third class soils, such as a large part of British North America is composed of, into fruitful fields. The inhabitants of these Provinces are not inclined to settle on soils, where, after working hard and living poor for twenty or thirty years of the prime of their lives, have to purchase a large part of the necessary food for their families. And emigrants

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from Europe to this country nearly all pass on to the "far West;" but very few of them settle in the Provinces, except in Western Canada, where the better classes of them purchase lands, "at the hands of private owners."

It is obvious that the agricultural capabilities of these Provinces will not be developed until the country becomes the seats of manufacturing industry, which it is highly capable of; and this cannot be done, as we shall attempt to show, without the Provinces are united to the States. Agriculturally considered, these Provinces are far inferior to the United States; while in a commercial point of view they have resources, equal if not superior to the Republic. But without the States for a market, the resources of the Provinces will not be developed, the history of the past clearly proves. It was during the existence of the Reciprocity Treaty that the Provinces made the greatest progress.

Union with the United States would give life to manufacturing industry in the Colonies, and extend the commerce of both Countries.

While the West supplies increased stores of agricultural wealth—feeding millions besides its own population; the mines of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick contain exhaustless stores of coal, that important combustible which gives life to the steam engine—propelling in a thousand forms the mechanism of modern society.

No part of the American continent is so favorably situated for manufacturing industry as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Their coal fields lie immediately on tide water, and are the only deposits on this part of the continent that do. The nearest coal fields to them are those of Pennsylvania in the States, which are situated at one hundred and twenty miles

from tide water ; the coal has to be conveyed by railway and canal boats to the seats of manufacturing industry in Massachusetts and other places in the States. It is otherwise in these two Provinces, ships can be brought almost to the mouths of the coal pits.

The more important coal fields of Nova Scotia are those of Pictou, which lie immediately upon tide water, the veins have a thickness of twenty-six feet of workable coal. In the eastern part of Cape Breton, contiguous to the harbour of Sydney, the deposits of anthracite coal underlie an area of two hundred and fifty square miles, and are of great thickness. And in the county of Cumberland, contiguous to the waters of the Bay of Fundy, there are extensive coal fields ; there are other coal beds in the Province. In New Brunswick there is a large coal area, but the veins, so far as known, are comparatively thin. There is however, near the deep waters of Petitcodiac River on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, one of the most valuable deposits of oil and gas—producing coal and shale—on the American continent. In other parts of the Provinces there are deposits of excellent coal.

These great coal fields are only partially opened ; they form reserves, waiting the time when the Maritime Provinces will become the centre of manufacturing industry for half the North American continent. There is no country in the world so favorably situated as Nova Scotia ; no where has nature bestowed her mineral wealth more abundantly, and placed it more advantageously than in that Province. With coal, gold, and iron and copper ores, and with a climate favorable to continuous exertion, Nova Scotia, under fair political advantages, is calculated to occupy a prominent place among the North American communities. In New Brunswick, coal, copper and iron ores, manganese and other economic minerals are abundant ; gold has also been found.

The Provinces of Quebec and Ontario contain iron and copper ores in great abundance. In the former

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gold has been obtained in considerable quantities ; and Ontario is famed for its oil wells. In those Provinces there are numerous other minerals used in commerce, but no coal.

Like the great rivers and lakes of North America, the coal deposits seem to be common property. Those of the Maritime Provinces are placed so as to accommodate a large extent of the Atlantic communities of this section of America ; indeed, the manufactories of Massachusetts can obtain coal from them cheaper than from the mines of Pennsylvania. During the reciprocity treaty these mines supplied a large part of the States with coal : the chief part of this trade ceased at the expiration of that treaty.

From the coal mines of Pennsylvania, which are near to and in direct communication with Lake Erie, the Province of Ontario, and the north western part of the Eastern States can get their supplies. Quebec and Montreal get the principal part of their coal from England : it comes out in ballast, and on board ships which go there for timber and deals. It comes cheaper than it can be obtained from the States or Maritime Provinces. Indeed the Province of Quebec might be supplied with coal cheaper from the States than from Nova Scotia.

Coal is said to exist near the Saskatchewan River ; and at Vancouver Island on the Pacific, coal is abundant. Thus, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, there are six great coal areas, admirably situated, and awaiting the time when the forests of the country shall cease to supply fuel—awaiting the time to give life to manufacturing industry.

But the want of compactness in the colonies, and consequent concentration of their population, with climatic obstructions, and the want of homogeneity of the two great races, English and French, with numerous other causes, unfit the colonies to develop their resources. The country is so fragmentary in its geographical character, and the great distance the po-

pulations are apart—the centre of Nova Scotia is twelve hundred miles from the centre of the Ontario population ; consequently, the trade between the Upper and Lower Provinces will only be limited. We may be told that Western Ontario can supply flour, and the Maritime Provinces have to purchase annually between five and six million dollars worth, which may be partly paid for in fish by the Lower Provinces. In this the trade must be largely on one side. For the great lakes adjoining Ontario are stored with a great variety of fish—large quantities of which are caught ; and on the river St. Lawrence, below Montreal, there is a numerous and hardy race of fishermen, who supply the West with large quantities of fish from the river and Gulf of St. Lawrence, much cheaper than the Maritime Provinces can possibly do. So that the flour purchased by the Maritime Provinces from Ontario must be paid for chiefly in gold.

Previous to the Reciprocity Treaty between the Republic and the Provinces, the trade of the latter was unprofitable, indeed, in a depressed state, as it has been since the abrogation of that treaty. Though the treaty was considerably one-sided, it gave the Republic important advantages over the Provinces ; still, during its existence, the trade of the Provinces was brisk ; life was infused into most every department of provincial industry. The commerce of these Provinces with the States rose, in the ten years of the Reciprocity Treaty, from seventeen millions to eighty-two millions of dollars. The coal, limestone, gypsum, grindstones, building stones, lumber, fish and other products of the Provinces were sent to the States in large quantities, and highly profitable returns were received.

It is clear without a return of that trade, the Provinces will not progress : their union will do but comparatively little to advance their trade. Without a free coasting trade between the Maritime Pro-

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vinces and the United States for vessels from port to port of both countries; without the fish, coal, stone, gypsum, timber, lumber, ships, beef, butter, potatoes, oats, and other products of the Maritime Provinces are allowed into the States, free of duty; and without the flour and other products of the United States are admitted as free into the Provinces, as they are between State and State of the Republic, these Provinces will not progress: this, the history of the past clearly proves.

The fisheries of the American States are limited, while those of the Maritime Colonies are unparalleled in extent and variety. The States send from six hundred to eight hundred vessels, of an aggregate of about two hundred thousand tons, annually into Provincial waters to fish. On these vessels they now pay two dollars a ton annually to the Dominion of Canada; the most of which is wasted by the Dominion, in forcing American vessels to pay, and observe the fishing regulations. They return to the States with about ten millions of dollars worth of fish; which is nearly half the value of the fish annually caught in these waters.

This great fishery is the native heritage of the Maritime Provinces, and could be prosecuted by them to a greater extent and advantage than by any other community on this continent; only give these colonies free market in the States for their fish.

Shipbuilding, another important branch of our colonial industry, would revive if the Provinces had the States for a market for their vessels. The wood-work of vessels cost from a quarter to a third more in the States than in these Provinces. At present, and for many years past, shipbuilding has been unprofitable to the builders in consequence of the low price of vessels in Great Britain, which is the chief market for our colonial vessels. The demand in Great Britain is principally for iron and composite vessels, which can be built cheaper in Europe than in these Colo-

nies, where labor and iron is much more costly than in Europe. And the kind of wood used in the construction of composite vessels can be obtained fully as cheap as in these Provinces. Still, timber of good quality for shipbuilding is very abundant in these Colonies ; indeed, the stores of it are exhaustless, but of little profit, for the want of a wider market for vessels. In no part of the world are better vessels built, both as to model and workmanship than in British North America. Open the markets of the American Republic to the vessels of these Colonies ; and allow them to sail from port to port of that country, and this now dwindling branch of industry would revive and become highly profitable. The British Islands afford good markets to buy in, but poor ones in which to dispose of the products of our industry.

There are few countries in the world whose free trade with each other would be of more benefit than a reciprocal trade would be between British North America and the United States. The Provinces have the products in abundance the States really require ; and the latter have hundreds of articles needed by these Provinces. So that a free trade between these conterminous countries could not fail to be of mutual benefit. Nature has constituted them one country and with one destiny.

The Provinces are defenceless.

The territorial formation of British North America presents an insurmountable obstacle to its defence against the United States. With three thousand miles of a frontier bordering upon a populous nation, with whom a *casus belli* might arise at any time, it would be utterly impossible to defend this country. This view of the subject is corroborated by numerous reliable authorities. The Government of the two Canadas in 1862, in reply to a despatch from the Imperial

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Government requesting Canada to erect defences and organize her militia, declared, that "No portion of the Empire is exposed to sufferings and sacrifices equal to those which would inevitably fall upon this Province in the event of a war with the United States. No probable combination of regular troops and militia would preserve our soil from invading armies; and no fortune which the most sanguine dare hope for would prevent our most flourishing districts from being the battle field of the war. Our trade would be brought to a stand still, our industry would be paralyzed, our richest farming lands devastated, our towns and villages destroyed; homes, happy in peace, would be rendered miserable by war; and all the result of events for the production of which Canada would be in no wise accountable."

The Parliament of Canada concurred in the foregoing statement of the Ministry. The conclusion here hinted at is,—the country is defenceless, and therefore, it would be useless for Canada to expend her revenues in the training of her Militia and in the erection of fortifications, when it held that no probable combination of regular troops and Militia could save the country in the event of a war with the United States. And this despatch further states that Canada was "not prepared to enter upon a lavish expenditure to build up a military system distasteful to the Canadian people, disproportionate to Canadian resources, and not called for by any circumstances of which they at present have cognizance." And his Grace, the Minister for the Colonies, says this despatch, "while promising liberal assistance, contends that any available supply of regular troops would be unequal to the defence of the Province."

In Great Britain, the defenceless state of Canada is also entertained. *Lord Derby* said, in Parliament, that "the long frontier of Canada is peculiarly open to aggression." And *Col. Jarvois*, who a short time ago reported to the Imperial Government as to the

best means of defending Canada, seems only to have recommended the fortifying of a few prominent places. He says, "It is a delusion to suppose that force can be of any use for the defence of the country, without fortifications to compensate for the comparative smallness of its numbers." In all this "peculiarly open" frontier, he only recommends the fortifying of Quebec, Montreal, and a few other vital points below the City of Hamilton. He makes no mention of protecting the Western Peninsula of Canada where the population is most dense. This peninsular range has a frontage of more than five hundred miles, bordering on lakes Erie, Huron, and their connecting waters, without defences. The city of Kingston is feebly defended. And the other day, the *Hon. Mr. Aytoun*, in his place in the Imperial Parliament, said, "He never had met with any man not a member of the Government who considered that it was possible to defend Canada against an attack in force by the United States." The New Brunswick section of the international frontier is two hundred and fifty miles in extent, and also "peculiarly open to aggression." The *Hon. Mr. Couchon*, in his work of 1858, says:—"The nearest to Canada, New Brunswick, is connected with us solely by a narrow strip of territory at most but a few leagues in width, and bordered throughout by the menacing frontier of the American Union."

Still, the Dominion of Canada out of a revenue of sixteen millions of dollars, proposes to train forty thousand militia-men to fight the States, if required; and expend five millions of dollars in erecting fortifications; involving literally an enormous waste of money. A chain of continuous forts along this utterly defenceless frontier, would cost more than the Provinces are worth, and still be no protection to Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, with a frontage together of fifteen hundred miles.

Indeed, no country is more exposed to another, in a defensive point of view, than British North America

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is to the United States. From the Bay of Fundy to Lake Ontario, six hundred miles, there is only an imaginary line, without a natural or artificial barrier to obstruct the passage of the armies of the Republic into the midst of the most flourishing towns and settlements of these Provinces. The country adjoining the great lakes is also defenceless. And the North-West or Saskatchewan territory, which is about to be incorporated with the Dominion of Canada, is utterly defenceless. The latter territory is connected with the United States by the only social, commercial, and natural ties and interests existing; and it is separated from all other British possessions by a thousand miles of inhospitable regions, through which winter communication is impracticable. And over a large part of British Columbia, east of the Rocky Mountains and adjoining the international boundary, the snow falls to a depth of from seven to ten feet, and even to greater depths, and lies on the ground during more than half the year; and the country is insufferably cold. Imagine then, all communication between the Pacific and the Saskatchewan territory, and also all the Lake Superior region, obstructed by deep snow for half the year, the St. Lawrence and all the internal waters sealed by ice, and the Mother Country thousands of miles from the battle-fields, and one's faith must far exceed itself, to believe that this country can be defended against the United States in force. But we may be told that our Republican neighbor is so good natured; that the international comity now happily existing will continue; and that the Republic will not invade these Provinces. This, the history of the States, their present and prospective interests, and the events of the times, fully contradict. If British North America cannot be defended, it cannot exist as a dependant or separate state. The history of all countries clearly show the correctness of this principle.

What could four millions of people, scattered over

a territory stretching from ocean to ocean, three thousand miles apart, do in defending such a frontier? Simply nothing. All the defences they could erect, and all the militia they could train would be powerless compared to the million and a half of armed men, that the thirty-five millions of conterminous people, with all the appliances and accustomed to all the hardships of war, could at a short notice rush into these Provinces. And England, three thousand miles from our borders, and the St. Lawrence sealed in ice for half the year, could not bring her fleet to aid the interior Provinces. The proposed Intercolonial Railroad, skirting the enemy's country for hundreds of miles, would be liable to be destroyed at numerous places, and rendered useless as a means of conveying men and munitions of war from Halifax to the interior.

The costly conscription and fortification systems of Europe are not adapted to young countries like British North America, or indeed, to any part of North America, whose aspirations are consolidation, progress and civilization. Such systems are contrary to the genius of the people, and detrimental to the interests of the country. Even if we continue dependant on England, or assume a national existence, there is no necessity, except under the exigencies of actual war, for importing the military systems of Europe into this country, whose people are struggling for an existence. All the defences we really require, are a few volunteers to protect our towns in the event of riots, which seldom occur.

The surest system of defence the Provinces can adopt is a Union with the United States. Then, and not until then, will the Colonies be safe from invasion; and be able to arrest the stream of adolescent population which is continually flowing from their shores. As soon as our young men arrive at manhood they emigrate in large numbers to the Republic. Even the armies of the States, during the recent rebellion

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in that country, were largely composed of our provincial youth—the bones of a large number of whom lie in the battle-fields of the Republic. The only legitimate course these Provinces can adopt, in order to promote their contentment and prosperity, and retain their own population, and attract emigration to the country, is in union with the United States. How much better such a policy would be than that of raising a war-cry, erecting forts as a standing menace to our neighbors, and establishing military conscriptions, calculated to drive our people from the country, and deter others from coming to it.

A war with the States would be fruitless and fratricidal in the extreme. Even the very thought that such an event is probable is injurious to the interests of these Colonies. That such is highly probable at no distant day both the Parent State and the Dominion of Canada believe, or the people would not be urged so strongly to erect fortifications.

Public opinion in Great Britain however, is changing as to the defence of this country. The people, press, and Parliament of the Mother Country, are beginning to see that the tie that binds these Colonies to the Empire is one of formality. They begin to see that the real interests of these Provinces are so interwoven with those of the conterminous States, that our loyalty, at most, is but a mere passive sentiment. Consequently, leading statesmen in England have recently stated in Parliament, that whenever these Colonies “wish to separate the connection, and if they prefer to be absorbed by the United States, we,” they say, “might terminate our connection with dignity and without disaster.”

One of the strongest arguments in favor of an union of these Colonies was their defence. The following extract from a speech delivered in the Parliament of the Canadas, by the late lamented *Hon. D'Arcy McGee*, points, in a forcible and eloquent manner, to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the duties

of the Colonies, and the military and naval power of the United States. *Mr. McGee* said :—

“England warned us by several matters of fact, according to her custom, rather than verbiage, that the Colonies had entered upon a new era of existence, a new phase in their career. She has given us this warning in several different shapes—when she gave us ‘Responsible Government’—when she adopted Free Trade—when she repealed the Navigation laws—and when, three or four years ago, she commenced that series of official despatches in relation to militia and defence which she has ever since poured in on us, in a steady stream, always bearing the same solemn burthen — ‘prepare! prepare! prepare!’ These warnings gave us notice that the old order of things between the Colonies and the Mother Country had ceased, and that a new order must take its place.—(Hear, hear.) About four years ago the first despatches began to be addressed to this country, from the Colonial Office, upon the subject. From that day to this there has been a steady stream of despatches in this direction, either upon particular or general points connected with our defence; and I venture to say, that if bound up together, the despatches of the lauded Duke of NEWCASTLE alone would make a respectable volume; all notifying this Government, by the advices they conveyed, that the relations—the military apart from the political and commercial relations—of this province to the Mother Country had changed; and we were told in the most explicit language that could be employed, that we were no longer to consider ourselves, in relation to defence, in the same position we formerly occupied towards the Mother Country. Well, these warnings have been friendly warnings; and if we have failed to do our part in regard to them, we must, at all events say this, that they were addressed to our Government so continuously and so strenuously that they freed the Imperial power of the responsibility for whatever might

follow, because they showed to the colonies clearly what, in the event of certain contingencies arising, they had to expect. We may grumble or not at the necessity of preparation England imposes upon us, but, whether we like it or not, we have, at all events, been told that we have entered upon a new era in our military relations to the rest of the Empire. (Hear, hear.) Then, sir, in the second place, there came what I may call the other warning from without—the American warning. (Hear, hear.) Republican America gave us her notices in times past, through her press, and her demagogues and her statesmen; but of late days she has given us much more intelligible notices—such as the notice to abrogate the Reciprocity Treaty, and to arm the lakes, contrary to the provisions of the addenda to the treaty of 1818. She has given us another notice in imposing a vexatious passport system; another in her avowed purpose to construct a ship canal around the Falls of Niagara, so as “to pass war vessels from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie;” and yet another, the most striking one of all, has been given to us, if we will only understand it, by the enormous expansion of the American army and navy. I will take leave to read to the House a few figures which show the amazing, the unprecedented growth which has not, perhaps, a parallel in the annals of the past, of the military power of our neighbors within the past three or four years. I have the details here by me, but shall only read the results, to show the House the emphatic meaning of this most serious warning. In January, 1861, the regular army of the United States, including of course the whole of the States, did not exceed 15,000 men. This number was reduced, from desertion and other causes, by 5,000 men, leaving 10,000 men as the army of the States. In December, 1862—that is, from January, 1861, to January, 1863, this army of 10,000 was increased to 800,000 soldiers actually in the field. (Hear, hear.) No doubt there are exaggerations in some of

these figures—the rosters were, doubtless, in some cases filled with fictitious names, in order to procure the bounties that were offered ; but if we allow two-thirds as correct, we find that a people who had an army of 10,000 men in 1861, had in two years increased it to an army of 600,000 men. As to their ammunition and stock of war material at the opening of the war—that is to say at the attack upon Fort Sumpter—we find that they had of siege and heavy guns 1,952 ; of field artillery, 231 ; of infantry firearms, 473,000 ; of cavalry firearms, 31,000 ; and of ball and shell, 363,000. At the end of 1863—the latest period to which I have statistics upon the subject—the 1,052 heavy guns had become 2,116 ; the 231 field pieces had become 2,965 ; the 473,000 infantry arms had become 2,423,000 ; the 31,000 cavalry arms had become 369,000, and the 363,000 ball and shell had become 2,925,000. Now, as to the navy of the United States, I wish to show that this wonderful development of the war power in the United States is the second warning we have had, that we cannot go on as we have gone. (Hear, hear.) In January, 1861, the ships of war belonging to the United States were 83 ; in December, 1864, they numbered 671, of which 54 were monitors and iron-clads, carrying 4,610 guns, with a tonnage of 510,000 tons, and manned by a force of 51,000 men. These are frightful figures for the capacity of destruction they represent, for the heaps of carnage that they represent, for the quantity of human blood spilt that they represent, for the lust of conquest that they represent, for the evil passions that they represent, and for the arrest of the onward progress of civilization that they represent. But it is not the figures that give the worst view of the fact—for England still carries more guns afloat even than our war-making neighbors. (Cheers.) It is the change which has taken place in the spirit of the Northern States themselves which is the worst view of the fact.”

“ The Americans are,” said the *Hon. Mr. Brown*,

in 1865, "now a warlike people. They have large armies, a powerful navy, an unlimited supply of warlike munitions, and the carnage of war has to them been stripped of its horrors. The American side of our lines already bristles with works of defence, and unless we are willing to live at the mercy of our neighbors, we, too, must put our country in a state of efficient preparation. * * Our country is coming to be regarded as undefended and indefensible—the capitalist is alarmed, and the immigrant is afraid to come among us." From these and other facts, it is obvious that our defence is clearly a forlorn hope.

The *Hon. John Rose*, now Minister of Finance for the Dominion of Canada, said, in the Canadian Legislature in 1865, "It cannot be denied that there is a state of public opinion growing up in England just now—not confined, as it was a few years ago, to a class of extreme theorists—that the connection which subsists between the Colonies—Canada especially—and the mother country, is a source of expense and danger. It cannot be denied that that kind of opinion has obtained a good deal more force within the last few years, than those of us who desire to maintain the connection between these Colonies and England would like that it should have obtained; and we cannot ignore the consequences which that increasing volume of public opinion may have upon the legislation of England. * * * The enormous military power which the United States have shown" in the recent rebellion, gave rise to the question, how far in the event of a war between the States and England, "it would be possible to protect this remote dependency?" And this view of our relations to Great Britain is fully corroborated in the following extracts from a number of the *Edinburgh Review* for 1865. "It is not unnatural," says the writer, "that the desire to maintain a connection with the power and wealth of the Mother Country should be stronger on the side of the Colonies than it is on that of the Bri-

tish public, for they owe almost everything to us, and we receive but little from them. * * * It might puzzle the wisest of our statesmen, if he were challenged, to put his finger on any single item of material advantage resulting to ourselves from our dominions in British North America, which cost at this moment about a million sterling a year. * * * * The people of England have no desire to snap asunder abruptly the slender links which still unite them with their trans-Atlantic fellow subjects." However, "we are led," says the writer, "irresistibly, to the inference that this stage has been well nigh reached in the history of our trans-Atlantic Provinces," and therefore, "Retainers who will neither give nor accept notice to quit our service, must, it is assumed, be kept for our service. * * * Probably, the best and most equitable solution would be the session of the whole region to the Northern Federation for a fair indemnity." Such, then, is the view of our situation, and relations to the Mother Country, taken by the writer in an influential organ of a large number of the ablest statesmen of Great Britain.

And after the foregoing matter was in type, the *London Times*, who generally proclaims the voice of the Imperial authorities, comes to us, declaring that "it is confidently reported in military circles at Chatham," that a part of the British troops in these Provinces are to be immediately called away, "with a view to the whole of the British troops being withdrawn from those Colonies at no distant date, in compliance with the growing feeling in this country of throwing the burden of the military defence of those rapidly increasing colonies on the colonists themselves."

Annexation proclivities. Political necessities for an Union of these Colonies with the Republic.

Separation from a state, and union with another, does not always imply hostility to the country separated from. Separation may be founded upon those material considerations which exercise, and must continue to exert a more powerful influence over the minds of intelligent communities, like those of British North America, than any mere profession for any particular form of government. Situated, as these Provinces are, for three thousand miles, alongside of one of the Great Powers, whose territorial policy is, to rule North America; connected as they are to the Republic by natural and artificial highways of commerce; with common interests and homogeneity of races, it is only natural to suppose, that there should be a mutual desire for a common union. It is only natural for these colonies to desire more intimate connection with that rich and powerful nation whose springs of internal government and external defence are sufficient to protect and maintain them intact. The inhabitants of these Provinces are really American; their modes of thinking and speaking, their habits of living and acting, their moral attributes and general progress in civilization, has made them one with the people of the States. And politically, the inhabitants of these Colonies are fast losing sight of the symbols of European royalty; not, through any hostility to Great Britain. There are no rebellious feelings in the Colonies against the Parent State, neither should there be. If these Colonies desire union with the conterminous States, it cannot be through hostility to the Imperial State, but to secure their peace, improve their condition, and hasten the development of their vast latent resources.

“What about the future” of these Colonies, is the great question of questions? During the recent discussions on their Confederation, this question was

asked by thousands, and variously answered. Some argued that they should remain separate intact. Others looked on their isolation as retarding their progress and general prosperity ; and on their union, as a means of raising their standing in the rank of communities ; developing their resources ; and of qualifying them, with the aid of Great Britain, to defend themselves against the United States ; and ultimately, to take a place in the family of nations. Many opposed their union, fearing it would retard annexation ; while others opposed the union of the Colonies on the ground that it would hasten annexation to the States.

Annexation however, has frequently been openly advocated by thousands in the Provinces ; many of them persons of influence and high position, some of whom now hold distinguished stations in the political departments of the Provinces. In 1849, an *Annexation Manifesto* was framed in Montreal by gentlemen of influence and high standing in Canada. They petitioned the Sovereign to allow Canada to withdraw from its connection with Great Britain, and annex itself to the American Republic. And at present the desire for annexation is prevalent throughout these Colonies. In the Lower Provinces, where much dissatisfaction exists with reference to Confederation, and the legislation of the Dominion at Ottawa, a large part of the people are in favour of a union with the Republic. Indeed, there is a general subterfluent feeling throughout British North America, in favor of a union of the Provinces with the United States. There is, however, a sentimental loyalty abroad that breathes loyalty to the Throne, and with the next breath to the Republic. Depression in trade, such as existed in Canada in 1849, and such as has existed in the Maritime Provinces since the repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty ; fears of a war with the United States ; the defenceless state of this country ; and its comparatively slow march in the scale of ge-

neral progress, have stimulated annexation feelings and desires. And recently, these Provinces have had to suffer severely for the political ravages done to Ireland. Fenianism, a deep-rooted Irish Association, fostered in the United States, has brought mourning into our midst. Besides, there is a deep-rooted hostility against these Provinces in some parts of the Republic, arising, not out of any wrongs done by these Colonies, but out of long-standing prejudices, in the United States, against Great Britain. The encouragement given by many in the United States, to Fenian aggression on these Provinces was highly impolitic. The people of these Provinces are high-minded, and could be much easier persuaded than forced to join the Republic. All the threats by the press and legislatures of the United States, have only retarded the union of the two countries, in place of hastening it. A more conciliatory and friendly course would have a much more favorable effect.

The union of the Provinces with the States would save both these Colonies and the Mother Country a large annual outlay; and very much lessen the chances of war on this continent. One of the chief objects of the British Government in urging the union of these Colonies, was to make them more self-reliant and self-protective. And viewing the subject of defence from an Imperial stand-point, it appears fair that the Provinces should erect fortifications, and train their militia. But looking at the matter from a Colonial point of view it presents a different aspect. The population of the colonies is sparse; the country defenceless; and struggling for an existence. In a war with the United States these Colonies would have to be the principal battle-fields; their soils would be drenched with the best blood of the Colonies; their country destroyed; and all their revenues wasted in a fratricidal war, for which the Colonies would be in no wise responsible. And the ill-feeling that such a war would give rise to would not be forgotten by

these adjoining peoples for generations afterwards. However, the logic of transpiring events—the shadows which the signs of the times are casting around us—points to a new epoch in our future Colonial history. And the present Confederate union considerably diminishes the difficulty in securing a separation of these Colonies from the Mother Country, and their union with the Republic. They will have more influence in union than by single provinces, and would be in a position to obtain better terms of union. From recent speeches in the Imperial Parliament, we infer, that when these Colonies ask for their separation from the Imperial State, it will be granted. England can have no interest in interfering in the reconstruction and consolidation of North American institutions. Such interference in Europe has cost her the greater part of her eight hundred millions sterling of national debt; and would be followed, in a war with the United States, with serious results.

The national debt of the United States rose from less than ten millions before the civil war, to six hundred millions in 1866. This was a marvellous debt to incur in four short years. However, it has since been reduced below five hundred millions sterling.

It is the payment of this debt, and the consequent heavy taxes, that presents the greatest obstacle to the union of these Colonies with the Republic. However, the debt of the Colonies, though comparatively small, is increasing at a great rate. The five Atlantic and St. Lawrence Colonies owe, exclusive of about \$8,000,000 by Quebec and Ontario, seventy-three and a quarter millions of dollars, the annual interest on which is over four millions. To this amount will shortly be added thirty-seven millions more, to be expended in training militia, building fortifications, and in constructing the Intercolonial Railroad, and other unproductive works. Thus, the debt of these Colonies will soon reach one hundred and ten millions of

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dollars ; the interest on which will exceed six millions of dollars annually.

When this heavy debt is incurred, which it will be, as provision is made for the most of it by statutes, the Dominion people cannot fail to be heavily taxed, without means to pay, except a large trade shall be opened with the United States.

It is a question, however, if the States are not better able to pay their debt, than the Provinces are to pay these heavy amounts.

To effect an union of the two countries without involving these Colonies in the payment of the debts of the States, might be easily accomplished on the *Zollverein* principle ; of having a uniform rate of customs in the several States and Provinces. Or, let each country use its own revenues, and pay its own debts ; until the debts of each are equalized per capita, when the whole revenues of the country could be placed in one fund for general use. In the meantime the Colonies could pay the cost of their own Legislators in Congress, and defray all their own local outlays. Other stipulations might be suggested on which an union could be based, which would be just to both countries.

Besides, the great stimulus that would be given to trade and the development of the resources of the country by the union of the States and Provinces, a large amount would be saved to the Provinces in the cost of defences and maintaining their civil Governments. The following are the salaries of the Governors of some of the States, together with the population of each State ; which we extract from a speech delivered in the Canadian Parliament, by *J. B. E. Dorion*, in 1865. These salaries show how much more economically the States are governed than these Provinces are.

*Notice
question
1858*

States.	Population.	Salaries.	States.	Population.	Salaries.
1.—Maine, ..	628,276	\$1500	15.—Ohio, ..	2,889,502	\$1800
2.—New Hampshire, ..	226,073	1000	16.—Michigan, ..	749,113	1000
3.—Vermont, ..	815,093	1000	17.—Indiana, ..	1,350,423	3000
4.—Massachusetts, ..	1,281,066	3500	18.—Illinois, ..	1,711,951	1500
5.—Rhode Island, ..	174,620	1000	19.—Missouri, ..	1,182,012	3000
6.—Connecticut, ..	460,174	1100	20.—Iowa, ..	674,942	2000
7.—New York, ..	3,880,785	4000	21.—Wisconsin, ..	775,881	2000
8.—New Jersey, ..	672,035	3000	22.—Minnesota, ..	173,855	1500
9.—Pennsylvania, ..	2,906,115	4000	23.—Kansas, ..	507,206	2000
10.—Delaware, ..	112,216	1333	24.—California, ..	379,994	7000
11.—Maryland, ..	687,049	3600	25.—Oregon, ..	52,465	1500
12.—West Virginia, ..	393,234	2000			
13.—East Virginia, ..	1,261,307	3000			
14.—Kentucky, ..	1,155,684	\$2500			
			Total cost, ..		\$58,883

Thus, it will be seen that the State of New York, which is nearly as populous as the Dominion of Canada and the other St. Lawrence Provinces together, and more wealthy than all these Provinces, only pays four thousand dollars to her Governor, while these Provinces pay to the Governor General \$48,666, and to other Governors as follows :—

Provinces.	Population.	Salaries.
1.—Ontario,	1,396,091	\$8,000
2.—Quebec,	1,111,566	8,000
3.—Nova Scotia,	330,857	7,000
4.—New Brunswick,	252,047	7,000
5.—Newfoundland,	124,288	11,000
6.—Prince E. Island,	80,857	7,500
Total,		\$48,500.

In union.
about this sum.

Add to this the cost of maintaining four Local Governments, four Legislatures, and four set of Departmental establishments, and the cost of governing the Dominion of Canada exceeds a million and a half of dollars per annum. Previous to the organization of the Dominion, sixty thousand dollars were paid to the Governors within its boundaries. Now, it costs within a fraction of seventy-seven thousand dollars per annum to pay the five Governors of the four Provinces of the Dominion of Canada ; which is a much larger sum than is divided among the Governors of the twenty-five States above cited. Even the Governor General's Privy Councillors at Ottawa have an allowance of sixty-five thousand dollars per annum, which also exceeds the aggregate amount paid to the twenty-five Governors of the States referred to. In the official estimates of the Dominion of Canada for the year

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1869, the cost of its civil government at Ottawa is set down at \$550,000, and that of the Parliament at \$448,518—together, nearly a million per annum. Before Confederation, the legislative representation of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, numbered, in the aggregate, 227 Members of Assembly, and one hundred Councillors; now, they number 407 Members of Parliament and Assembly, and 136 Senators and Councillors. The United States, with about the same population as is in the Dominion of Canada, began with twenty-six Senators; while we, with about three and a half millions of people, have begun with seventy-two, which is the same number of Senators the United States now have with their thirty-five millions of inhabitants. And British North America is not yet half united. The House of Commons in Great Britain, has 650 members; being only 250 more than Canada. And in playing out our own political farce, we have five Legislatures sitting, in the aggregate, nine or ten months in the year. No where does the government of so young a country, with so sparse a population, and so deeply in debt, cost half so much. And in its legislation the Dominion Parliament has been most unhappy so far as the Lower Provinces are concerned. On this point we prefer the opinion of well-informed Confederate papers to that of our own. The *Morning Journal* says: Confederates “see with regret and disappointment, that the burdens of the Dominion are much larger than was anticipated by the leading statesmen of Canada, and this too before any expenditure has been made on behalf of the Intercolonial Railroad, the North-West Territory, or any great public undertaking. They see that it is actually necessary to impose taxes, numerous and somewhat onerous, previously unknown in the Maritime Provinces.” And in reference to the refusal of the Imperial Government to comply with the Act of the Dominion Parliament, reducing the Governor-General’s salary from forty-eight thousand

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dollars to thirty-two thousand, the *St. John Weekly Telegraph* says: the taxpayers "see the country already saddled with every description of taxation, offices and officials multiplied on every hand, and monies squandered on sinecures, or frittered away to maintain the dignity of some great magnate." Evidently, we have began the career of government in the most senseless and prodigal manner. In a country like this where are no titled ancestry, nor any special regard for stars, garters, and titles, the recent 'precedence' order of the Imperial Government to these Colonies is impolitic and childish in the extreme; especially that part which establishes clerical or denominational precedence in these Provinces.

Both the machinery of government and the Parliament Buildings at Ottawa are on the most extravagant scale. These buildings have cost nearly three millions of dollars. One half the wealth of art in their structure might suffice in a young and comparatively poor and thinly populated country like this, for generations to come. Those buildings cover, in the aggregate, nearly four acres of ground, and are sufficiently spacious to accommodate the Legislative Assembly and government of thirty millions of people. And it costs five hundred and fifty thousand dollars per annum to support the three hundred officers within their walls. The Parliament buildings of the Dominion situated only about fifty miles from the boundary of the United States, while they are near fifteen hundred miles from the capital of Newfoundland; a thousand miles from Halifax; a thousand from Red River, and more than two thousand miles from Vancouver Island. And the only practical way from some of the local centres to the Dominion Parliament, is either through the United States or over extensive waters.

It is obvious, that the climatic character and territorial formation of British North America, presents insurmountable obstacles in the way of governing it. And when we are officially informed that no proba-

ble combination of forces could save the country from destruction, in the event of a war with the United States ; and when we know that the foundation of disaffection has been deeply laid, we conclude, that British North America, either as a dependancy or as a separate state never can have a prosperous history : it never can pass through this formative and critical period, and consolidate its remote parts. The geographical formation of the country does not admit of it, or adapt it for a nation. And the conflicting interests of its parts ; their dependance on the United States ; the aggressive character of the latter, taken in connection with the inability of the Provinces for defence, combine to show that the only means of securing peace, prosperity, and the development of the resources of the Provinces, is by uniting their destinies with those of the United States. Then, the markets of thirty-five millions, soon to be increased to fifty millions of people, would be thrown open to the Provinces. The latter would be placed on political equality with the most populous States in the Senate of a great country. Three millions of dollars, at least, would be saved annually to the Dominion alone ; and an equal amount per annum to the tax-payers of Great Britain. Trade would revive, and every branch of industry would be developed, both in the Provinces and in the Republic. Money would flow into the Provinces, in place of being drained out of them, as in the past. This especially applies to the Lower Provinces, where money is generally scarce, in consequence of being sent out of the country to pay for flour and other importations. The natural wealth of the country is locked up for the want of free trade with the United States ; and must continue so until the trade between the States and the Provinces is as free as it is in the States themselves. Unite the two nationalities, and the St. Lawrence canals would be enlarged, and become the highway, during half the year, for the vast and increasing,

trade of the Western States ; and the Saskatchewan territory would soon teem with hundreds of thousands of people. Consolidate the two countries, and a ship canal would at once unite the waters of the St. Lawrence with the Bay of Fundy ; the valuable fisheries of our coasts would become a source of profit to the country ; and the vast and varied mineral resources of the Provinces would be rendered profitable. Unite the two countries, and the Lower Provinces would become seats of manufacturing industry for a large part of the American continent. Without such consolidation, there is no prospect of these vast resources being developed for generations to come. Since the repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty, these Provinces have been progressing backwards. Taxes, debt, and disaffection are increasing at a great rate. The vital energies of the country are being exhausted, without producing commensurate returns, or fixedness in the public mind.

The shortest and most convenient winter outlet from the St. Lawrence Provinces to the Ocean is via the United States. And the shortest and most practical route from the Maritime Provinces to the States and Montreal is via " Western Extension."

One of the chief subjects of provincial interest, during the last thirty years, was the construction of the Intercolonial Railroad. Since however the construction of the Western Extension has been determined, connecting the City of St. John with Portland and Montreal, and hence with the great network of United States and Canadian railways, the Intercolonial Road has comparatively few advocates. But as the " British North American Act" provides for its construction, it may be built.

The Confederation Act has relieved the St. Lawrence Provinces from their political embarrassments, while it has involved them in the payment of the

principal part of the cost of constructing the Intercolonial Railroad, from which they will derive comparatively little benefit. This railroad will be of little more use than as a way through the wilderness. It is reported that a loss of seventy thousand dollars has already been sustained, in the traffic returns, on the section between Quebec and River du Loup. In summer the Intercolonial Railroad will be advantageous to the country along the lower part of the St. Lawrence and the eastern coast of New Brunswick. The chief advantages however to be derived from this road, will be from the amount of money which will be expended in its construction, equipment and maintenance. Twenty or twenty-five millions of dollars is a large sum to expend in the construction and equipment of such a work, without the least prospect of it ever paying, direct or indirect.

The travelling public are sure to travel by the southern routes in winter ; and the St. Lawrence is most obviously the natural outlet in summer for the products of the West—for the trade of all the countries bordering on the great lakes. New York is only 537 miles by railroad from Stratford, while the latter, which is near the centre of the wheat-producing section of Ontario, is 1278 miles by the Intercolonial route from Halifax. Toronto is 1190 by the latter route from Halifax, while it is only 625 miles from New York. And the City of Montreal is over five hundred miles nearer the ocean at Portland or Boston, than it is to Halifax. Montreal is within 334 miles by railroad of Boston, 404 of New York, and 297 miles of Portland. Therefore the Intercolonial Road never can compete with these routes. But as the tendency of ocean travel is to the shortest ocean route, Portland, St. John and Halifax are favorably situated. Continuous steam communication between Europe and these ports would afford great advantages to travellers to and from the West. Halifax being the nearest continental port to Europe, can hardly fail to

be the chief port of debarkation. And the line by the Western Extension, which passes through the chief places of business, will be the principal land route. The Intercolonial Railroad, says the *Globe*—the leading organ of the liberal party in Ontario—speaking on behalf of the interest of that Province, “will leave us just where we are now. In the summer, when navigation is opened, we can send produce down the river and gulf, and to some extent compete with the Americans. But in winter to suppose we can send flour and wheat over this long route cheaper than the Americans can send it from the eastern ports, is an absurdity which no man acquainted with the trade will commit.” This railroad “cannot under any possible circumstances, bring any profit or returns, directly, or indirectly.”

The cost of constructing this railway will be a burden upon the Dominion of Canada for a generation to come. Already a large sum is being wasted in the construction of the short section between the boundary of Nova Scotia and the Shediac and Moncton Railway. The distance between these two places is, by Major Robinson's survey, twenty-seven miles, and by Mr. Beatie's survey, only twenty-four miles, through a remarkably level country, and where a railroad would accommodate the country generally. Still it is being constructed where there are, says the Engineer's Report, “real difficulties of construction,” and on a line thirty-seven miles in length, and as crooked as possible. In this short distance, ten miles are added to the length of the Intercolonial Railroad, and over half a million of dollars to the taxes of the Dominion. However, the cost of this political dodge is neither here nor there in the estimates of the Dominion of Canada.

On the completion of the line from Halifax *via* St. John to Portland, the Maritime Provinces will connect with the United States and Canadian Railways. The following distances are compiled from Mr. Flem-

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ing's Railway Report, and the "Time Tables" of the Grand Trunk Railway Company :

Montreal to Portland,	297 miles.
City of Quebec to Portland,	317 "

Deduct the distance from Portland to Danville, and it is :

Montreal to Danville,	270 miles.	
Danville, <i>via</i> Bangor, to St. John, N. B.,	310 "	344
St. John to junction near Moncton,	30 "	89
Moncton junction to Truro, N. S.,	109 "	
Truro to Halifax,	61 "	

Total—Montreal to Halifax, 870 miles. 890

The distance from the City of Quebec to Halifax, by the Portland route, is 866 miles. The distance from Halifax to the City of Quebec by the Northern or Bay Chaleur route, which is the line adopted for the Intercolonial Road (Fleming's survey), is 695 miles; total to Montreal is 858 miles. From other sources of information, we find the distance from Halifax *via* Windsor and Annapolis Railways, and by steamer to St. John, and by proposed railway *via* Danville to Montreal, as follows :

Halifax to Windsor,	45 miles.
Windsor to Annapolis,	88 "
Annapolis by steamer to St. John,	46 "
St. John, <i>via</i> Danville, to Montreal,	580 "

The total distance from Halifax to Montreal by this route is 758 miles; being one hundred miles shorter than by the Bay Chaleur route. Consequently the western part of Nova Scotia is only, by this route, 600 miles from Montreal, while it is 965 miles, by the Intercolonial route, from the latter city; therefore, this will be the line of travel between the western half of Nova Scotia and the States, and St. Lawrence Provinces, for three quarters of the year. And passengers from Europe to the West will find this decidedly the shortest route. The City of St. John is only 337 miles from Portland, and 580 miles by the same route from the City of Montreal, while it is nearly eight

hundred miles by the Intercolonial route from the latter city. Portland is connected by railroad with Boston, 108 miles ; and New York, 341 miles.

The routes between the Provinces and the States are not only preferable in regard to distance, but highly so in regard to commercial operations. The Intercolonial Railway will run for a great part of its distance through an unbroken forest. It will traverse the French settlements of the St. Lawrence, as far north as forty-eight and a half of latitude, which is the coldest part of the settled section of the Province of Quebec. For nearly five hundred miles of this northern railway route the snow falls to a depth varying from four to six feet. With regard to the effects of snow on this railway, Mr. Fleming, C. E., in his Report, says : " In the central and northern parts of New Brunswick, and northerly to the St. Lawrence, the snow invariably remains on the ground, from the beginning to the end of winter." And the " snow-drifts where they happen to occur are serious obstacles to railway operations ; they are found to be the cause of frequent interruptions to the regular running of trains, besides often the necessity of a heavy outlay. Every winter in Lower Canada the trains are delayed for days at a time on account of these drifts ; the mails are in consequence stopped, and traffic is seriously interfered with." From these facts we infer, that if the trains are delayed for days at a time in this short distance, they will be delayed for weeks at a time, when the River du Loup railway is extended four hundred miles, through a country where the snow falls equally deep. Besides the prospects of settlement in this northern region are far from encouraging. Our experience in the progress of settlement in other sections of the Provinces prove that the third class lands along the Intercolonial Railroad route will not be settled while good lands can be obtained in more southern climes. The line from Halifax to St. John is comparatively free from the deep snows of the north. And

it will pass through the most fertile and settled parts of the country; and touch at harbours open at all seasons. And the distance to and from the West being the shortest by this railway, shortly to be in operation, it cannot fail to be the main line of travel and traffic between the Provinces themselves.

Like the dream of a British North American nationality, we have also dreamed of constructing a railway, connecting the railways of Ontario with the Pacific ocean, through British territory. The shortest route between these points is a mixed route—by land and water: the land route is about 2500 miles in length. The country between the settlements in Ontario and Red River, 1200 miles, is a barren rocky region. Passing north of Lake Superior, it is extremely cold, and snow lies in great depths more than half the year. The cold is so intense that the forest trees are stunted. Red River settlement is in fifty degrees north latitude; the winters there are longer and colder than in the Province of Quebec; consequently this settlement makes slow progress. The region west of the Saskatchewan country is the most mountainous, barren, and rocky region in America. On the western slope of the Rocky Mountains the snow lies, in great depths, for three quarters of the year, and the thermometer falls to forty degrees below zero.

“The Union Pacific Railroad from Omaha, Nebraska, across the Continent,” is about 1700 miles in length. The distance from Omaha to the State of California is 1565 miles, estimated to cost one hundred and twenty three millions of dollars. This line, to be in operation next year, will accommodate the northern part of this continent. Taking the coast of this line as a standard, a railway from Ontario to the Pacific would cost one hundred and sixty millions of dollars; and when built, it could not be used half the year. Therefore its construction is only a dream. The inclination of trade and travel is in a north and south direction, and not through thousands of miles

of inhospitable northern regions. The most useful railroads are those southern lines connecting the northern parts of the States and Provinces with Portland, Boston, New York, St. John, and Halifax.

Concluding Remarks.

In the foregoing pages, we have placed before the reader a few statements relating to the future of British North America. Not being prescient, man cannot unfold the purposes of that wisdom by which the world is veiled. Still, from apparent, natural, social, and political causes, we deduce ordinary effects. We have shown that the habitable parts of the country are comparatively limited outskirts of the fertile districts of the United States, which extend across an imaginary boundary towards the frozen regions of the north; and that they are geographically and commercially isolated. That the Maritime Provinces are a thousand miles from the wheat producing section of Ontario, two thousand from the North-West Territory, and three thousand miles from Vancouver Island. And that the chief part of the region between the latter and the North-West Territory, and also that part between this territory and the settlements in Ontario are barren, rocky, and unfit for settlement. Also, that a very large proportion of the country between Ontario and the Atlantic ocean is unfit to support a population. In a word, we have shown that the four habitable districts of British North America,—the Atlantic, St. Lawrence, Saskatchewan, and Pacific, are widely disconnected; and that some of them are inaccessible to the others, on British territory, for more than half the year.

To form a nation out of such remote and widespread northern regions is visionary; and reminds us of Sir Thomas More's ideal commonwealth in the imaginary island of Utopia. There is no case on re-

cord, where a national unity ever developed and shaped itself out of so many widely separated countries. The different vitalities that must ever exist never can be bound together by ties of self-interest. It is therefore utterly impossible, under such conditions, to establish a national unity with a deep and broad foundation, on which to erect a political and social commonwealth like unto that of the United States, or that of any other independent State in existence.

This view of the subject is taken by the leading organ of Great Britain, the *London Times*, which says of the Dominion of Canada, that "political faith overreaches itself in a conception so vast and so loose in frontiers so extensive, and in conditions so infinitely various. It supposes a nationality able to command the two oceans it touches, and to raise a barrier of law and moral force extending near three thousand miles between itself and the most powerful aggressive State in the New World. We look in vain for the body, the vital organs, the circulation and the muscular force that are to give adequate power to these wide-spread limbs." And in regard to the defence of this country, it says, "the weakness of the immense frontier is confessed by those who ask defences, and proclaimed by those who think all defences vain." And the *Hon. Joseph Howe*, one of the ablest statesmen in British America, in reply to an able Washington correspondent, *Acadia*, says: "There is not a sane man on either side of the Atlantic who does not believe that if the government of the United States were to put out its military strength, it could take these Provinces from England." But the latter, he says, "has money, coal, iron and labour cheaper than they are in the Republic," and "could cover the ocean with such a fleet of iron-clads and war vessels as the world has never seen, and make her great rival, if disposed to be aggressive, pay more for the Provinces than they would ever be worth." It is impossible to

compare with any degree of certainty the naval and military strength of "these two great branches of the British family." England however, with her acknowledged naval power, is four thousand miles from the States and Provinces; she has Europe to watch, and her fifty colonies to protect. The United States on the other hand, has a rapidly increasing population, that may soon double that of the Parent State; she has unlimited resources—"money, coal, iron and labour" in abundance, and "such a fleet of iron-clads and war vessels" as astonished the world in 1864.

Believing the facts stated by Mr. Howe, that there is not a sane man on either side of the Atlantic who does not believe that the United States could take these Provinces from England; and believing, as we do, that it is utterly impossible to fortify them so as to defend the country against the Republic, it certainly would be the height of folly in the Provinces to take up arms merely to assist in making the United States "pay more for the Colonies than they would ever be worth." Such a step would not fail to devastate and ruin the country, "carry cripples into every street, mourning into every hamlet, and heavy taxes into every house," and subject the Provinces to the dictation of a power against which they had fought. And England could not gain by such a contest. Indeed, considering the indefensible state of British North America and the great cost that it is to the empire, it is doubtful if the British people would allow a gun to be discharged, certainly not against the will of this country, to prevent the latter from forming a part of the Republic. The trade of these colonies is no more benefit to England than it would be if they formed a part of the Republic. On this subject, we often impose duties contrary to the interests of England, and against her expressed will.

To attempt to defend this immense frontier against the United States in force would be madness. Our weakness is our strongest defence. The Republic is

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bound by the "Munroe doctrine"—bound to consolidate its dominions, and extend their boundaries. When the boundary between the United States and British North America was established, Canada and New Brunswick lost a large extent of valuable country. The boundary line is within, only a few gunshots of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. And opposite Ontario, the river St. Lawrence, and the centre of the three most northerly of the great lakes, is the boundary; and west of Lake Superior, the boundary line is as near to the north pole as American diplomacy could run it. On the Pacific side, the United States has wedged us in, by the purchase of Russian America. In Europe, to keep the balance of power rightly adjusted has hitherto been the policy of its nations. But in America the weight is on one side—the preponderance is largely in favor of the United States. If, in the recent American rebellion, the independence of the Southern States had been acknowledged by England, British North America might enjoy a national existence, and play an important part in keeping the balance of power, on this continent, rightly adjusted.

The American States have grown, in a remarkably short time, to be one of the Great Powers of the world. It numbers about thirty-five millions of people, and is still increasing and progressing with marvellous rapidity. Europe and these Provinces are annually supplying it with hundreds of thousands of people, a large part of whom are tied to us by kin and country; still they prefer making homes for themselves in the United States, rather than settle upon the most fertile of the public lands of the Provinces.

These Colonies commenced a war on the forests of America at the same time the "old Colonies" did. The latter declared their independence long ago, while the Provinces remained loyal to the Throne, by whom they were long ago regarded as mere things which existed for the exclusive benefit of the Crown, and to

be disposed of *en block*, as some of them were, at its pleasure. Whether the development of the resources of the Provinces has been retarded by their connection with Imperial Britain or not, we cannot fully determine. Considering however, our limited and scattered population, and our commercial limitations and restrictions, it must be acknowledged that we have made great progress. But when we compare our progress with that of the United States, it is obvious, these Colonies have only "hastened slowly." It is generally agreed that free and independent countries whose inhabitants are elevated in the scale of moral and intellectual cultivation, progress more rapidly than countries politically fettered and dependent. In place of four millions, British North America should now number ten millions of inhabitants. The United States will probably contain fifty millions before British North America contains six millions of people, scattered over its isolated provinces and territories. It seems impossible to arrest the great stream of human life which is continually flowing to the West. The youth of these Provinces, like their birds in autumn, are leaving them in large numbers for the Republic. Such has been the run of population from Quebec, that the Legislature of that Province, at its last sitting, was asked "to devise some means for the arrest of the same." And a large part of the moneys of the Provinces is sent to the United States. Without manufactories are established in the Provinces, and the markets of the Republic freely opened to us, it is vain to expect these Provinces to progress. The Provinces however have drawn heavily upon the States. Many of their enterprises are in the hands of their American neighbours, who work our mines and telegraph lines, who found our factories, manufacture a large part of our lumber, and supply the farmers and mechanics with the chief part of their implements, and the masses of our people with the greater part of the necessaries of life.

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1881

Since these pages were written
1868 - a million of Canadians
have gone to the States

To examine the position of our country, the relation of part to part, and the whole to the Mother Country, and to the neighboring States; and duly estimate our relation to those countries, and the nature of the events which are casting their shadows around us, is our duty. To defend ourselves in a dis-united state, it is evident we could not; consequently our only means of satisfying England, and our only chance of being defended against the United States in force, even with the whole resources of the British Empire brought to our aid, is in Colonial Union. But our prospects of defence are disappearing. Both Great Britain and Canada Proper have declared that no probable combination of forces could save the country from destruction, in the event of a war with the United States. This fact is now being generally understood and conceded in Great Britain; consequently, her people, press, and parliament have greatly changed, within the last decade, respecting the future of this country. There is a growing desire among the tax-payers of the British Islands to get rid of the cost of erecting fortifications, supplying munitions of war, and supporting regiments of soldiers in our country, a fleet of war-ships on our coasts, and of defraying other heavy charges arising out of our geographical position, and frequent embarrassments. Besides, it is obvious, that our Colonial dependance and political relations to the Republic embarrass England and endangers the peace of the Empire. "It cannot be too distinctly stated," as *Mr. Gladstone* said in the English Parliament, "that the defence of the British North American Colonies is a very heavy charge indeed, and it is our duty in every way to get rid of it." And "it is in this view that we look upon the plan of uniting them."

We cannot, by any possible means, reconstruct our frontiers, so as to consolidate, and form a compact country out of what nature has scattered far and wide; we cannot ameliorate or change the icy hand of

nature ; and we cannot erect barriers sufficient to prevent invading armies from the South, from laying our country waste ; nor can we create convenient markets for our people within our own wide-spread territories. Hence, the growing desire of the Colonists to form more intimate, social, commercial, and national relations with the United States. These facts, connected with our isolated position and defenceless state, are leading thousands, who once dreamt of a British North American nationality, to believe that annexation, at no distant day, is a foregone conclusion ; and that the present confederate union is merely a transition stage, ancillary to that event.

There are some things however connected with the government, institutions, and usages of Republican America that do not suit the genius of a part of our Colonial population ; though hundreds of thousands of our fellow-countrymen seem pleased with them and enjoy them. Some are not willing to adopt the motto :

" As to forms of government let fools contest,
Whatever is best administered is best."

A part of the opposition in the Colonies to annexation is based on social grounds. The incessant growth of new parties in the United States perplexes us ; the blustering and virulent language frequently used by a part of its press in relation to these Colonies seem to us uncalled for, and inconsistent with the spirit of the age ; and the captious temper of the Washington Government, in its dealings with these Provinces, annoy us. However the Provinces are not always so perfect, as to be in a position to cast the first stone at their Republican neighbor.

Losing sight of the foibles on both sides, the United States and Provinces cannot fail to see in each other, free and intelligent peoples, animated by the same progressive spirit, and connected by seas, rivers, and lakes—by roads, railroads, and telegraph lines ; speaking the same language, with the same sympa-

thies of race ; worshipping at similar altars ; and inhabiting a conjoint country. For such countries to live in strife, and at every adverse turn in the wheel of political events, point their guns across the boundary line with deadly aim at each other, seems contrary to the nature of things. The ties and interests that bind these countries together, present a standing argument in favor of their union which no mind of ordinary fairness can either gainsay or contradict ; so that " any man," as the *Hon. Joseph Howe* said in his speech on the organization of the Empire, " who sincerely and honestly advocates annexation to the United States, has powerful arguments in his favour."

The Provinces admire the progressive character of the American States—the freedom of their institutions—the application of their laws to the advancement of civilization, and the progress of development. And the States now entertain a high regard for the Provinces. Therefore, no hostile policy—no suspicious diplomacy or pretended indifference should be allowed to exist, through which the union of the two countries may be delayed. But on the contrary, every legal and constitutional means should be used by both countries, to secure their union at as early a date as possible. The union of the two countries is a positive necessity for both. And the sooner there is a fusion of their legislative and administrative arrangements, with one form of civil polity—one code of general laws—one tariff—one currency, and one educational system, the sooner will the immense territories of North America be subdued to the highest state of civilized industry, and fully peopled by its predetermined hundreds of millions. Let such an union take place, and let the people put implicit trust in the Great Dispenser of events and Ruler of nations, and we have the best guarantee of prosperity.

In the foregoing pages, we have viewed the subject of an union of British North America with the United States, chiefly from an Imperial and Provincial stand-

point. Much, did space permit, might be said in favor of a union of the two countries from an United States point of view.

The writer is free to state, that in consequence of having recently obtained more enlarged knowledge of the character, attributes, and wants of these adjoining States and Provinces, and of the genius of their peoples; and having carefully followed the train of political events, his opinion has been materially changed with regard to the future of this country. He has come to the conclusion that the *Union* of British North America with the United States is the probable, best, and the inevitable result.

ERRATA.

Page 21, line 16, for "east" read *west*.

" 31, " 3, for "ravages" read *wrongs*.

