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


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# **IMPERIAL DEFENCE**

The Record of  
The Liberal Party

Persistent opposition to any proposals which  
would bind Canada closer to  
the Motherland.

Refused to Share the Burden

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# Imperial Defence.

## Introduction.

*“To all the loyal hearts who long  
To keep our English Empire whole!  
To all our noble sons, the strong  
New England of the Southern pole!  
To England under Indian skies,  
To those dark millions of her realm!  
To Canada, whom we love and prize,  
Whatever statesmen hold the helm.  
Hand all round!  
God the traitor’s hope confound!  
To this great name of England drink, my friends,  
And all her glorious Empire, round and round.”*

—Tennyson.

In days gone by the argument was often heard on the political hustings that Canada did not owe any debt of gratitude to Britain. Never again can any responsible public man make such a statement. False to facts, false to the teachings of history, such an assertion has been forever buried by the terrible truths brought home to Canadians in the recent colossal upheaval of the civilized world. WE OWE ALL THAT WE ARE AND HAVE TO BRITAIN.

Her heroic work throughout many centuries, the wonderful achievements of so many of her brave and brilliant men, their sacrifices in blood and treasure, have reared the temple of our Liberty, have made this Dominion of Canada, and all that it stands for, possible.

What is it that has given and maintained for us the boon of self-government? What has given us the blessings of civil and religious liberty? What is it that maintains unimpaired our commercial prosperity and our financial stability? Why is it that merchant fleets from every nation and from every quarter of the globe come into our ports? What is it that gives to us this privileged position among the nations of the world?

Ask Spain! Ask France! Ask Portugal! Ask the United States! And, **LAST OF ALL, ASK GERMANY!**

Yet in spite of the lesson history teaches, in spite of the sacrifices which the Motherland has made for us, in spite of the fact that her blood and treasure have been freely expended to guarantee for us the privileges we enjoy, there are those to be found in Canada who have steadily set their faces against any attempt to pay our debt of Empire—men who for party gain would gamble with the destinies of our civilization—who, with rash, inconsiderate hands, would pluck down upon our heads the temple of our liberty and our glory.

It is as much the duty of history to punish as to instruct. In the pages which follow is given a summary of the fight which the Canadian Liberal party has maintained for many years against assisting the Motherland / sharing her burden of naval defence. It is a story sufficient to bring a blush of shame and indignation to the cheek of every patriotic Canadian man or woman. Canadian history may contain pages of which we are now ashamed, but none so disgraceful as these which follow:—

### Discreditable Years.

The history of Canada's naval controversy may be said to date back to 1902. At that time Australia, less wealthy and populous than Canada, had naval forces amounting to nearly 2,000 men. She had one "harbour defence ship," three gunboats, and four torpedo boats. She was spending about \$360,000 a year on these local forces,—and she was not satisfied. In addition, she was paying £106,000,—more than half a million dollars—annually to the British Admiralty as a contribution towards the upkeep of the squadron maintained in Australian waters.

Little New Zealand was contributing as its share \$100,000 a year.

Cape Colony was paying \$150,000 a year.

Natal was paying \$60,000 a year.

Newfoundland was contributing men in the form of a Naval Reserve force, recruited from among the fishermen and seafarers of the colony.

Such was the state of affairs in 1902, when a colonial conference assembled in London and patriotic Canadians were beginning to demand that Canada take her rightful place among the daughter nations and shoulder her share of the Empire's defence.

Canada was represented at that Conference by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and certain of his advisers. The Government of Australia and New Zealand—already doing their part—urged that more be done to strengthen the naval forces of the Empire. The result of their splendid appeal was:—

Australia increased her annual contribution to £200,000—nearly one million dollars—and also undertook to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.

New Zealand increased her annual contribution to £40,000—two

hundred thousand dollars—and likewise undertook to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.

Canada doing nothing, Sir Wilfrid Laurier making the non-committal statement that the Government was "prepared to consider the naval side of defence."

But the consideration of naval defence, of Canada's duty to the Empire, was overshadowed by the larger consideration of how to remain in office. Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his cabinet made not a solitary effort to have Canada play an honourable part, and, five years later, he and his cabinet advisers again crossed the Atlantic to take part in the Conference of 1907, once more to humiliate Canadians by throwing cold water on a scheme of Empire defence by sea.

At the Conference of 1907 Australia and New Zealand once again raised the question of naval defence, and expressed a desire that the overseas Dominions should contribute a greater share. The Australians were anxious to establish a local navy; the New Zealanders to contribute toward strengthening the British navy at home; the South Africans preferred to raise a local force which could be used anywhere in the world in case need.

Hon. L. P. Brodeur, then Minister of Marine and Fisheries in the Laurier cabinet, spoke for Canada. He told the Conference that Canada would do nothing further than she was doing, pleading as a reason for this that she policed her own fisheries, did some surveying, and had taken over the dockyards at Esquimaux and Halifax.

Finally, the Premier of Cape Colony, Dr. Smartt, offered the following resolution:—

"That this Conference, recognizing the vast importance of the services rendered by the navy to the defence of the Empire and the protection of its trade, and the paramount importance of continuing to maintain the navy in the highest possible state of efficiency, considers it to be the duty of the Dominions beyond the seas to make such contributions towards the upkeep of the navy as may be determined by their local legislatures—the contribution to take the form of a grant of money, the establishment of the local naval defence, or such other services, in such manner as may be decided upon after consultation with the Admiralty, and as would best accord with their varying circumstances."

True to his record, Sir Wilfrid Laurier replied:—

"I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot agree to the resolution. . . . We have too much to do otherwise. . . . For my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion, I should have to vote against it."

Dr. Smartt attempted to urge the desirability of the Empire presenting a united front, but the Prime Minister of Canada tartly replied: "I have said all that I have to say on the subject."

Thus did the leader of the Canadian Liberal party give expression to the Imperial aspirations of the people he was chosen to represent. Thus was a powerful blow struck at the chain which binds the "Empire of the Seven Seas."

### Laurier Forced To Take Action.

The aspirations of the Oversea Dominion, checked by the attitude of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his Ministers, the naval question reached an impasse and remained there. Australia continued to pay the cost of the

British squadron in the Pacific, New Zealand continued its annual contribution. Cape Colony and Natal kept on paying a money subsidy to the Imperial chest. Canada alone did nothing. The official creed of the Laurier Administration was that the building of railways and the granting of free lands to British immigrants was a form of Imperial defence. It forgot that the railways were built very largely with money borrowed from the British investor, and that the land was given away, very profitably for Canada, to anyone, British, Polish, or Hungarian, who cared to settle on it.

As time went on it became more and more evident that the Canadian people were chafing under the lack of patriotism displayed by the Laurier party, and awakening more and more to the importance of the question of naval defence. In January, 1909, the Conservative party, to its everlasting credit, made a move. Sir George Foster gave notice of the following resolution when Parliament met that year:—

"That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."

Let it be noted that this resolution affirmed the same principle as that which had been embodied in the Smartt resolution against which Sir Wilfrid Laurier had declared so sharply at the Imperial Conference of 1907, two years before. Sir George Foster introduced and discussed his resolution in the House of Commons on March 29th, 1909. In the interval there had arisen alarm in Great Britain and throughout the Empire over the relative position of Britain's sea power. New Zealand and Australia came to the front once more and offered Dreadnoughts. Sir George Foster's great speech dealing with the question of Canada's duty to the Motherland awakened unbounded enthusiasm throughout the country, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier's hand was forced in spite of himself. He moved the famous resolution of March, 1909. It was a pronouncement, vague, half-hearted, halting, but at least it was a pronouncement, and as such it received the support of the Conservative party. The Government, which only two years before refused absolutely to do anything, was made to acknowledge that Canada realized her responsibility in regard to Imperial naval defence; and, furthermore, were compelled to promise action of some kind.

But it is one thing to lay down a General Policy, and quite another and different thing to carry it out by devising a Special Policy. It was in the latter case that the Canadian Liberal party turned its back upon the considerations of Empire and paltered with a question that challenged the attention of the clearest, the best, and most patriotic minds.

## The Laurier Special Policy.

The resolution of March, 1909, and the interest shown by Australia and New Zealand resulted in the calling of another Conference in London, the Conference of 1909.

The Admiralty met the delegates from overseas with a definite proposition. In effect, they told the delegates that the Imperial navy could look after the Atlantic, but that it had been compelled virtually to abandon the Pacific, an ocean in which Canada was considerably, and Australia and New Zealand were wholly, interested.

Accordingly, they suggested that all parties unite in establishing an Imperial Pacific Fleet; the proposal was that Canada and Australia should each contribute a Fleet Unit, and that New Zealand and the Mother Country should co-operate in providing two additional Units, so that there would be a fleet of four battle-cruisers, a dozen light cruisers of the "Bristol" type, 24 large destroyers, and a dozen submarines. Thus the several Dominions would have had their own naval forces, and these would have been combined into a splendid fleet in the Pacific. Based probably at Hong Kong, it would have protected all three Dominions, so far as their Pacific seaboard was concerned.

**But once again Sir Wilfrid Laurier stood in the way.**

He refused point blank to have Canada become a partner in the Imperial Pacific Squadron, and suggested that this country provide a limited number of cruisers on the Atlantic and Pacific instead.

Defeated in its strategical scheme of a Pacific Squadron, there was nothing left for the Admiralty to do but to accept Canada's grudging half-way offer. It suggested that if the naval force which Sir Wilfrid promised to provide would be capable of use in its component parts in time of war, it should be nothing smaller than a fleet unit, with one battleship.

A Fleet Unit, if provided by Canada, would have meant:—

One Battle Cruiser.

Three Light Cruisers.

Six Destroyers.

Three Submarines.

**This is the force which the British Admiralty asked the Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to provide in 1909.**

#### **WHAT WAS LAURIER'S ANSWER?**

He refused absolutely to go in for the Pacific Ocean scheme.

He refused to contribute a solitary dollar for naval purposes outside of Canada, or to admit the principle of contributions.

He refused to accede to the principle of full Imperial control in time of war.

He resolved on two small, cheap, separated naval forces, and asked the Admiralty, not for a scheme that would fit in with the needs of the Empire, but what sort of forces could be provided for £400,000 or £600,000 a year.

In the end he disregarded the Admiralty altogether, and resolved on two light cruisers and six destroyers for the Atlantic, and two light cruisers for the Pacific.

### **Two Years More Of Paltering.**

Thus at the end of 1909 Canada promised to build four light cruisers and six destroyers. Australia agreed to build a whole Fleet Unit. New Zealand decided to build a battle-cruiser. All three Dominions started even. Let us see what progress the three countries made with their programmes.

In October, 1911, when the Laurier Government went out of office, Australia had two destroyers on the sea, and a battle-cruiser and two light cruisers well advanced in construction.

New Zealand had a battle-cruiser launched, and three destroyers ready for action.

Canada had nothing but a lot of plans and tenders upon which the Liberal Government refused to take action.

Months before the Laurier Government called for tenders, two Australian destroyers were guarding the harbours of Australia, and the hammers were ringing on the New Zealand battle-cruiser. While the ships of Australia and New Zealand were patrolling the Pacific, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his Ministers sought to make petty political capital by promising to build their ships, first at St. John, N.B., then at Halifax, at Montreal, at Sydney and at Quebec.

The Australians and the New Zealanders meant business, and were resolved to do their duty to the Motherland, but Canada's navy was meant for political, and not for naval warfare.

To make a long and miserable story short, this is what the Laurier Government did to provide the country with sea defence. It agreed on a General Policy which laid down the following principles:—

### What They Agreed To.

1. Regular and periodical contributions to the British navy are regarded as inadvisable.
2. But special contributions to the British navy, to meet special circumstances, are approved.
3. Canada should organize a naval force which should:—
  - (a) Be on lines suggested by the Admiralty.
  - (b) In time of war be under one command with the Imperial navy.
4. This force was to be organized speedily.

### What They Actually Did.

The Special Policy which the Laurier Government devised to carry out this General Policy presented the following features:—

1. It made no provision for the immediate needs of the naval defence of the Empire.
2. It rejected the advice of the Admiralty.
3. It provided for a force which should not be under the one Imperial command in time of war unless or until the Government of Canada should pass a special order-in-council. This was advocated in separatist language by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and several of his followers.
4. The Government dawdled about organizing the forces:—
  - (a) It mismanaged the recruiting of men.
  - (b) It did not order the ships. It did not even call for tenders till the Australians and New Zealanders had made substantial progress with their programmes. It had the tenders before it for the whole of May, June and July, 1911, without ordering the vessels, though it did not contemplate an election until the very end of July, 1911.

### A Separatist Policy.

We have seen how Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his Government, year after year, steadily and brazenly refused to render naval assistance of any kind to the Motherland; how at last it was forced to take action by public sentiment; how it refused to co-operate with the other Dominions in the creation of a Pacific squadron; how it disregarded the advice of the Admiralty; how it refused to provide a fleet unit; how it paltered with the small cheap force it grudgingly consented to give. Fir

a moment let us examine one of the most damning features of that offer—sufficiently damning to nullify whatever good features that miserable policy may have presented—the idea put forward by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and incorporated in his Naval Act, that when Great Britain is at war Canada may, or may not, participate in the conflict.

Let us understand just what this doctrine means in order that we may better realize how disastrous its recognition would be to the future of the Empire. The claim advanced by Sir Wilfrid Laurier was that in a British war, the Dominions,—Canada, for example,—would decide whether they propose to enter the struggle as the allies of Great Britain, or to keep entirely aloof from it. It is not here a question of petty wars against the hill tribes of India, or punitive expeditions, naval or military, that are launched against the cannibals of the Caroline Islands, or the bushmen of Borneo. It is self-evident that there is no need to discuss whether or not forty-six million people of Great Britain are prepared to undertake these enterprises without aid from Canada. What was meant was, that in a real war—a war between Britain and a foreign power—Canada would only participate provided the Government of the day decided to do so in each particular case as it arises.

In other words, Canada would only participate if a majority of the particular party in power voted in favour of war, no matter what might be the views of the rest of the Canadian people.

Anybody who wants to verify the accuracy of this interpretation need only read over the Laurier Naval Act of 1909, sections 22, 23, 24, and interpret them in the light of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's own statements at the Imperial Conference of 1911, as recorded in the official report.

What happened at that conference was this: In the discussion of the rules of warfare under the Declaration of London, Sir Wilfrid expressed the opinion that Canada ought not to be consulted, nor to wish to be consulted, about the manner in which the British people proposed to conduct war. He used these words:—

“If you offer advice on such a subject, it implies of necessity that you should take part in that war. How are you going to give advice and insist upon the manner in which war is to be carried on, unless you are prepared to take the responsibility of going into war. We have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war, and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases.”

The meaning of these words is perfectly plain. The Declaration of London was not framed, nor discussed, with reference to a mere punitive expedition. It referred to real wars—as between one great power and another—and it was this kind of conflict that Sir Wilfrid had in mind when he said that “we are not prepared to take part in every war.” Thus it will be seen that Sir Wilfrid meant, and his Naval Act meant, that Great Britain might be involved in a great war, and Canada might or might not go to her assistance, but remain neutral.

**Can any Canadian worthy the name think such a course possible?**

Let us see what such a step actually meant.

It presumed, in the first place, that the hostile nation, in its war

against Great Britain, would leave our citizens, our territory, or ships, our commerce, unharmed and unmolested.

The present war with Germany, and the presence upon our coasts of German warships, ready to strike and paralyze our commerce, strikingly exposed the falsity and foolishness of any such presumption.

But even if the belligerent nations were willing to recognize Canada as a neutral, keeping outside of the combat, reflect a moment what it would mean.

We should have to observe all the obligations of neutrals.

We must permit no enlisting of our young men—public or private—to join the armies of the Motherland.

We must send no money, we must offer no men, we must give no shelter, we must forward no supplies.

In the darkest hour of adversity we must utter no syllable of sorrow; in the moment of victory we must raise no shout of joy.

If a British ship be driven, hard pressed and torn with the disaster of a naval conflict, into a Canadian port, its powder spent, its guns dismantled, its hold filled with the dead and dying, we, as a neutral nation, must, inside of twenty-four hours, drive it forth unaided to its destruction, and watch it sunk by the guns of an overpowering enemy within the very sight of our cliffs.

Only let such a thing take place, and witness what would happen! Government or no government, ministry or no ministry, our people would be up in arms, with the law or without it. Let any Government try to hold the people of Canada from Britain's war, and our streets would run red with the blood of civil conflict, and the Confederation of Canada would be instantly smashed asunder.

*"We do not think that we are bound to take part in every British war!"*

Is it possible that one who was called Prime Minister of Canada for fifteen years knew so little of the temper of its people?

Is it possible that there are those in Canada today who would seriously contemplate giving to this man the reins of power once more?

### **Policy of the Borden Government.**

We now come to the last chapter of the Liberal opposition to effective naval aid to the Motherland—the most disgraceful chapter of all.

In 1911 Sir Robert Borden became Prime Minister, and the following summer he proceeded, as he declared he would do if elected to power, to Great Britain, to consult the British Government and the Admiralty as to the best means by which Canada could render effective aid to the fighting forces of the Empire.

On his return, Sir Robert Borden made his first pronouncement on December 5, 1912. This was at the earliest moment possible; Parliament

was called on November 21; no business could be done until the debate on the Address was concluded, and the Opposition kept that alive until December 3. Sir Robert's speech, in making his announcement, was of peculiar importance. He based it on a Memorandum on the naval situation which the British Admiralty had drawn up. This Memorandum:—

1. Drew attention to the extraordinary increase of the Germany navy.
2. Proved that this had not been provoked by British naval increases.
3. Explained the gravity of the new German naval law of the spring of 1912.
4. Drew attention to the manner in which this great fleet was kept massed close to the shores of Great Britain.
5. Examined the situation as it will be in 1915 and 1916.
6. Concluded as follows:—

“The Prime Minister of the Dominion, having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering, after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances, that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.”

Acting on this official information, Sir Robert Borden proposed that Canada build three large battle-cruisers.

“These ships,” he said, “will be at the disposal of His Majesty the King for the common defence of the Empire. They will be maintained and controlled as part of the Royal Navy; and we have the assurance that if at any time in the future it should be the will of the Canadian people to establish a Canadian unit of the British Navy, these vessels can be recalled by the Canadian Government to form part of that navy, in which case, of course, they would be maintained by Canada and not by Great Britain. In that event there would necessarily be reasonable notice of such recall.”

Sir Robert Borden made two things clear:—

1. This was not a permanent policy; it was the “immediate and effective assistance” of which he had spoken repeatedly.
2. It was not to constitute the beginning of a permanent policy of regular and periodical contributions. He said:—

“In presenting our proposals, it will be borne in mind that we are not undertaking or beginning a system of regular and periodical contributions.”

## **Liberals Again Refuse Aid to the Motherland.**

The Liberal party offered a prolonged and desperate resistance to the attempt of the Conservatives to respond to the request of the Admiralty for three of the largest and most powerful ships “that science

could build or money supply." The story of that resistance is familiar to most Canadians. Every trick that the ingenuity of the politician could devise was used to defeat the Government's proposals. The garbage barrel of vituperation was delved into to the bottom for slurs, taunts and jeers to hurl at Sir Robert Borden and Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, the brilliant and courageous First Lord of the British Admiralty. With no policy but politics, with no argument but abuse, they resorted to every conceivable ruse to embarrass the Government, and, if possible, to defeat the scheme of rendering assistance to the Empire.

### **Laurier and the Admiralty Memorandum.**

The most damning indictment of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's refusal to lift a hand to aid the Motherland can be found in his own words, uttered in the House of Commons on December 12, 1912, in the course of that speech in which he outlined a policy of obstruction and opposition to the Borden Naval Aid Bill. The Admiralty memorandum submitted to the Government was clear and explicit. It frankly admitted that for the first time in the history of the Empire, Britain's sea supremacy was threatened. There could be no doubt as to what that admission was intended to mean. It showed that whereas in the past England was supreme on the seven seas, she was at that time supreme on one alone; that the gigantic strides of her greatest rival in sea power compelled her to concentrate her forces in the North Sea. It was a frank admission that an emergency faced the Motherland, and a straightforward demand for aid—a request for three of the largest battleships that "science could build, and money supply."

### **His Own Words Condemn Him.**

After reading this memorandum, Sir Wilfrid Laurier stood up in the Commons and uttered these words:—

**"This is not new. The memorandum which my Right Hon. friend submitted the other day disclosed nothing which we did not know before. Every word that is there we knew; every figure we knew. I say more: every figure in that memorandum we discussed four years ago."**

Here we have the astounding admission from the mouth of Sir Wilfrid himself, that the Admiralty had made known to him the grave situation which confronted the Empire as far back as 1908. Yet it was not until 1910, two years later, that he made the unwilling move, the paltering effort, represented by what has been termed the Laurier Naval Act. And let it not be forgotten, that even then it was not Laurier or the Liberal party who took the initiative. The Naval Act of 1910 was forced upon the Laurier Government by the patriotic speech of Sir George Foster and the rumbling of discontent which was heard throughout the length and breadth of the land.

## Four Years of Indecision.

Thus the Laurier Naval record from 1908 to 1912 may be accurately summed up as follows:—

In 1908 Sir Wilfrid Laurier knew that the Empire was facing an emergency, and he did nothing.

In 1909 he still knew that there was an emergency, and he continued to do nothing.

In 1910 he introduced a Naval Act which contained the germs of separation from the Empire.

In 1911 he made no effort to carry out the small inconsequential policy which he outlined in 1910.

In 1912—when, according to his own statement, the situation in Europe was unchanged—he again refused effective aid in defence of the Empire, and proposed instead to commit this country to a wild expenditure of \$150,000,000 to build battleships in Canada.

### “ Mr. Facing-both-ways.”

At the conference of 1909, Sir Wilfrid fought tooth and nail against the proposal that Canada should build a fleet unit on the Pacific. In 1912, with the situation unchanged, he proposes to build a powerful fleet unit on the same ocean. **Why the change of heart, the change of policy?**

There is no use in mincing words. The plain truth is that Laurier had set his heart against rendering aid of any kind to the Motherland.

He showed that in 1907. He showed it in 1909. He showed it in 1910. And he showed it more plainly than ever before in 1911-12. The difference was that in 1911-12 he fought with the weapons of deceit. He offered an insult to the understanding of the people. His fleet unit proposal was a clumsy confidence trick. His naval yards were spectral yards, his vessels were phantom ships.

### Their Record when in Power.

To better comprehend the depths of political trickery to which Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his followers descended, we will recall their attitude on the naval question while in office:—

On March 9, 1910, it had voted down a proposal to submit a permanent policy to the people.

On March 9, 1910, it had voted down a proposal to submit a permanent policy to a plebiscite.

On December 1, 1910, it had voted down a proposal to consult the people on a permanent policy.

Such was the record of the Liberals in office.

## Their Record in Opposition.

What was their attitude in 1913—in opposition?

On February 13, 1913, it voted for Mr. Verville's sub-amendment, that before Parliament consented to the proposition it should be submitted to the electors. As the Liberals voted against a subsequent amendment demanding a plebiscite, it is plain that Mr. Verville and the Liberals meant a general election. Thus they voted that the session should end with no action taken; that there should be a general election, and that the new Parliament should guide its action by the result of the contest.

On the same evening, twenty minutes later, the Liberal party voted for Sir Wilfrid Laurier's amendment, which, among other things, demanded that the Government should go ahead with a permanent policy "at the present session," and "without further delay," i.e., without any election.

Thus on the same day, within the same hour, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party voted on both sides of the same question. They first voted that nothing should be done, that not even a temporary policy should be authorized, until a general election had been held, and they then voted that a permanent policy should be pushed on before a general election should be held.

Thirdly, on February 27, after having voted that \$35,000,000 should be appropriated in a lump sum for the purpose of immediately strengthening the naval forces of the Empire, they voted that the bill to that effect be abandoned until there had been a general election.

Fourthly, they voted against a plebiscite on the subject.

Thus the record of the party is:—

1. They voted to do nothing till a general election had occurred.
2. They voted to spend \$35,000,000 before a general election.
3. They voted to go ahead with a permanent policy before a general election.
4. They voted to do nothing until a general election had occurred.
5. They voted against a plebiscite.

It only needed a vote for a plebiscite to make this double-faced policy complete.

## Nine Distinct Propositions.

Or, to put it in another way, the Liberal party in the House of Commons voted for the following propositions:—

1. That \$35,000,000 be voted in a lump sum, to be applied over a series of years to the immediate increasing of the naval forces of the Empire. (Voted on February 13, 1913.)
2. That the money needed for the foregoing purpose be not voted in a lump sum, but by yearly vote. (Voted on May 15, 1913.)
3. That Canada should "enter actively upon a permanent policy of naval defence," and do so "without further delay." (Voted on February 13, 1913.)
4. That nothing in the way of naval defence be done until an election had been held. (Voted on February 13.)
5. That the Government should be condemned for not carrying out a permanent naval policy at once. (Voted on February 13.)
6. That nothing in the way of naval defence should be undertaken until redistribution had been effected and an election held. (Voted on February 27.)

7. That measures be taken during the session, i.e., in advance of any election, to carry out the Naval Service Act, i.e., a permanent policy. (Voted February 13.)

8. That two fleet units be established, as speedily as possible, i.e., without waiting for an election. (Voted on February 13.)

9. That there be no plebiscite. (Voted on February 27.)

## Liberal Senators Kill Naval Aid Bill.

The strangling of the Naval Aid Bill by the Liberal majority in the Senate need not be dwelt upon here. That act was a blot upon our British citizenship the sharpest blow that has ever been dealt at the foundations of Canadian democracy. At the dictation of Sir Wilfrid Laurier—a man who claims to be of the political school of Fox, of Bright, of Gladstone and O'Connell,—a body of men, a chamber that cannot be defended upon any of the fundamental grounds of Liberalism or democracy, trampled under foot the will of the majority of the people of Canada.

And thus for the time ended the attempt of a powerful Government to give expression to the overwhelming sentiment of Canadians.

In the light of what has taken place since then, in the shadow of the most awful war that the British Empire has ever known, the records of the Liberal party in regard to co-operation with the Mother Country in matters of common defence, cannot and must not soon be forgotten.

The lack of patriotism of Charles James Fox during and preceeding the Napoleonic wars kept the Whigs out of office in Great Britain for nigh upon a quarter of a century. Yet the offences of Fox pale in comparison with the veiled treason of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party.

## Some Final Reflections.

When the history of Canada in the present century comes to be written with clearness and authority, its darkest chapters will be those which tell of the attitude of the Liberal party on the question of Naval Defence. The Empire is safely emerging from a period of trial and tribulation—from a cataclysm burdened with human tears. At a frightful price in blood and treasure, our liberties have been maintained. The lessons of this titanic struggle have been many, but none were greater or clearer than this: **That the safety of Canadians, the safety, the very existence of the Empire, rests with the British Navy, England's "twenty miles of might at sea."** Had Germany destroyed the British navy we would have known much more of the scourge of war. Had political history been different, had veiled disloyalty and base political partizanship not dwarfed our sense of duty to the Empire and ourselves, the pride and

satisfaction of knowing that Canadian ships were at Jellicoe's command in the North Sea, would have been ours. Because we failed in a sacred duty that privilege we were denied. Now, when the struggle is over, when the one great truth of the war is uppermost in our minds, we would be unworthy of ourselves, unworthy the memory of Canada's and Britain's sons who have found a last resting place in the soil of France, if we failed in our obligation to the Motherland, in sharing the burden of Naval Defence.

There is no country upon the face of the earth that exists under the same happy conditions as the people of this Dominion. We have perfect civil and religious liberty. We have unbroken order and complete freedom. We have a country governed, not by force, but "by the people for the people"—governed by a singular series of traditional influences, which, generation after generation of Britishers treasure, because they know that they embalm custom and represent law. We are a great part of the greatest Empire the world has ever seen. We have wealth, happiness, contentment, prosperity. **All this we have enjoyed, and will enjoy, because of the existence of one thing—the British navy.** Destroy that fleet and the very pillars of our social creed of liberty will crumble.

Why, then, with the lesson of this last terrible conflict still ringing in our ears, should we hesitate to pay the debt we owe the Empire and ourselves?

If our forefathers could see us hesitating at this crisis, what would they think of us? Those men, the bravest of the brave, with keen clear eyes, and grip like winter's frost, built up this Empire sword in hand, and christened it with their blood. They did not whine about the cost; our lap-dog apathy they never knew. No force could have held them back when England called. History may be forgotten in time, but their names will live on in legend as the type of men who **DO**. We, if we do not awaken, shall lose the prize that has been bought with blood, shall be remembered but as masterless mobs of sentimental spongers on the Empire, who sought relief instead of duty, and lost their heritage for love of selfish ease.

