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CELSUS: THE FIRST PAGAN CRITIC OF CHRISTIANITY, AND HIS ANTICIPATION OF MODERN THOUGHT.

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III. *Conclusion.*

BUT if Celsus uses the critical or rationalistic method, it is not as an end, but as a weapon. He was about to follow it with an ethical appeal. Far more than the pressure of the scientific spirit did he feel the pressure of the social revolution and the political danger. He sees the rise of what he regards as a secret organization without any national character, without unity in itself, a hodge-podge of quarrelling sects. It had its origin among a lot of Galilean fishermen. It is distinguished by arrogance and ignorance. It is hostile to the temples and symbols of the ancient religion. It defies man; it is a hot-bed of superstition. It is the Salvation Army of his day, and Celsus does not see any salvation in it. Viewed from the lofty height of Platonism, it is atheistic and materialistic. As Pelagaud, comparing it with our own time, has said, Celsus might have adopted for his treatise the title used by a modern writer, "Atheism and the Social Peril." If it sounds strange to us to hear him stigmatize Christians as atheists or non-theists, we may cool our indignation by reflecting that Christians in their controversies with each other have visited similar reproaches upon the heads of their opponents. But, standing in the position in which he did, it is not strange that this Pagan should have been blinded a little by the mote in his own eye. He looked upon Christianity as an American Christian may look at Mormonism, as something which religiously and politically is opposed to the genius of American institutions, as a deluded lot of ignorant people setting up a hierarchy of their own. But he hopes that they will listen to the voice of reason.

His eloquent appeal to the Christians in behalf of the established order of government and religion is most completely given in the seventh and eighth books of Origen's reply. Previously Celsus has stood in sharp antagonism to the Christians. But now his tone is one of reconciliation. His apology for Pagan idolatry is that which a cultivated man would make. He shows that the Christians are unreasonable in their opposition to images, which are after all only symbols.

"For who, unless he be utterly childish in his simplicity, can take these for gods and not for offerings consecrated to the service of the gods or images representing

them. The Christians do not discriminate. But the Christians say that the beings to whom they are dedicated are not gods but demons, and that worshippers of God ought not to worship demons."

Celsus explains: all things are ordered according to God's will; his providence governs all things; everything which happens in the universe, whether it be the work of angels or other demons or of heroes, is regulated by the will of the most high God. He believes that God has assigned to the lower order of agencies, popularly called gods or demons, various departments of authority and activity and various nationalities. Jesus, he remarks, said, "No man can worship two masters." But Celsus submits whether it is not just that he who worships God should serve those also to whom God has assigned such power. His argument is simply the divine right of kings applied to an order of invisible beings. In honoring the king you do not dishonor God; and in honoring one of the king's officers you do not dishonor the king. The way in which he reproaches the Christians with inconsistency will be interesting to modern Unitarians: "If those people worshipped one God alone and no other, they would perhaps have some valid argument against the worship of others; but they pay excessive reverence to one who has but lately appeared among men, and they think it no offence against God if they worship also his servant." His argument is essentially: "If you are going to worship Jesus, why can you not pay respect to the other heroes and messengers? What is to hinder those who are most devoted to the service of Jesus from taking part in various public offices?"

That Celsus was not a man without faith in the prevailing religion is shown in his earnest defence of oracles. It might almost be published to-day by Dr. Wallace as a defence of modern spiritualism. And Origen accuses him of being quite as superstitious in his way as the Christians. But Origen here, as often before, misses the point. Celsus does not disbelieve in spiritual communication and what we call the supernatural; but to him there is no gap between the natural and the supernatural; it is all a part of a divine order. But in another passage he does not hesitate to warn people against being too much influenced by the demonology and the spiritualism of the day, to the neglect of higher things. After reading this passage, we have thought it possible that Celsus might have written the book against magic of which Lucian speaks. Celsus has first used the similarity of Christianity to other religions to show that it cannot establish exclusive claims to inspiration. Now he uses the same fact to urge a reconciliation with the prevailing religion.

"Just as you believe in punishment after death, so do the priests who interpret the sacred mysteries. The same punishments with which you threaten others, they threaten you. It is worthy of examination which of the two is more firmly established as true, for both parties contend with equal assurance that the truth is on their side."

Celsus is tolerant; he is willing to submit everything to the tests of reason and examination. In an earlier part of his work (6, 42) he has attacked the Christian doctrine of the devil, and expresses his opinion

that it is the devil who ought to be punished rather than those who are deceived by him. But he declares his own conviction that those who live well in this life shall be blest in the next, while the unrighteous shall be punished hereafter. From that doctrine he hopes that neither Christians nor others will swerve. We are reminded here of the words of Paul: "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man who does evil; but glory, honor, and peace to every man who worketh good." He brings out his own lofty view of God: "Of him are all things. He is not to be reached by word. He cannot be expressed by name." He quotes substantially from Plato:

"It is a hard matter to find the maker and the father of this universe. And after having found him it is impossible to make him known to all. But wise men endeavor to set before us that which it is impossible to express in words."

There is another passage in which he says:

"Truth is the object of knowledge, and if you think that the divine spirit has descended from God to announce divine things to man, it is doubtless this same spirit that reverences the truths. It was under the same influence that men of old made known many important truths."

(Origen was much impressed by the passage and confesses that Celsus has a glimpse of truth.) Again he says in a noble sentence, "We must never in any way lose our hold of God, whether by day or night, whether in public or in secret, whether in word or in deed, in whatever we do or abstain from doing."

Advising them to shun deceivers and jugglers, he has a beautiful passage about seeing God:

"If instead of exercising the senses alone you look upward with the soul; if, turning away the eye of the body, you open the eye of the mind, thus and thus only will you be able to see God."

Only once has this been said any better. It was by the very man whom Celsus misunderstood. Jesus put it in ten Greek words: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

These are the words of a deeply reverent soul. They show that the keenness of the satire with which he repudiates the deity of Jesus is only because of the purity of his own idea of God. And when he finds a lofty place from which undisturbed by passion or sensuality he may contemplate God, it is side by side with Jesus in the sermon on the mount. Celsus was nearer to Jesus than he himself knew; and if he had published the book of practical rules of life which he promised, or if it had been preserved to us, might we not have found it to be the sermon on the mount translated from the dialect of Jesus into the language of Plato?

Celsus then earnestly exhorts Christians to fulfil their duties to religion and the state:

"It is our duty to protect what has been enacted for the public advantage. Christians

can make a choice between two alternatives, either to render service to the gods and respect those who are set over this service, or else let them not come to manhood or marry wives or have children or take any share in the affairs of life, but let them depart hence with all speed and leave no posterity behind them. If, on the other hand, they will take wives and bring up children, and taste the fruits of the earth, and partake of the blessings of life and bear its appointed sorrows,—for nature herself has allotted sorrows to all men, for sorrows must exist, and earth is the only place for them,—then must they discharge the duties of life until they are released from its bonds.”

To show that he does not ask the Christians to do anything wrong or impious he says :

“ If any worshipper of God should be ordered to do anything impious or to say anything base, such a command should be in no wise regarded ; but we must encounter all kinds of treatment or submit to any kind of death rather than say or even think anything unworthy of God. But if any one commands you to celebrate the sun or to sing a joyful triumphal song in praise of Minerva, you will by celebrating their praises seem to render the highest praise to God ; for piety in extending to all things becomes more perfect.”

If the opinion of Keim and the majority of modern critics that Celsus wrote about 177-8 be accepted, his work appeared about the time that Marcus Aurelius was engaged in the second Marcomanic war. This explains the strenuousness with which Celsus urges Christians to come to the help of the emperor. “ Help the king with all your might ; labor with him in the maintenance of the laws and the support of religion.”

It is with this patriotic appeal that Celsus closes his remarkable work. The question which may be passing through the mind of the reader is, how much of the argument of this brilliant Greek remains valid to-day ? But there is a previous question : How much did Origen himself refute ? According to some of the church theologians, Origen annihilated him root and branch. Froude, on the other side, does not do justice to the intellectual strength of Origen when he compares him to a pigmy in the hands of a giant. Origen was no pigmy, even when measured against Celsus. We must not forget that, while Celsus attacked Christianity on its weakest and worst side, Origen stands for Christianity on its best and strongest side. He had some advantages of position. He was given to what in the orthodox circles of our day, indeed in those of his own day, were considered dangerous speculations. But his heresy was only a help to him in answering a man like Celsus. Nevertheless, with all his breadth and learning, he was no match for his opponent, simply because the Pagan had first choice of position, and he chose it so well that seventeen centuries have not succeeded in dislodging him. Then, as now, there was no unity in the Christian body, and it was not possible to say which branch of the Christian sects was best entitled to the Christian name.

Occasionally, Celsus attacks a belief which has dropped out of sight because the sect that represented it has perished ; but that he did succeed in getting at the beliefs which are common to the Christians is evi-

dent from the fact that the things which he attacked are held by the largest number of Christians to-day. In answering his complaint that the Christians worshipped Jesus as well as the Father, Origen brings out his own heresy of insubordination and says :

" Grant that there may be some individuals among the multitudes of believers who are not in entire agreement with us, and who incautiously assert that the Savior is the Most High God, however, we do not hold with them, but rather believe him when he says : ' The Father, who sent me, is greater than I. ' "

Sometimes Origen completely misses the point of Celsus and actually strengthens his argument, as when he tells him that he need not complain of the Christians for believing in appearances after death, because there are many instances recorded by the Greeks themselves of persons having risen from the tomb. If Celsus could himself have risen from the tomb after reading this reply of Origen, he might have said : " Well, my dear man, that is just what I have been telling you. " The very point of Celsus's argument was, that these phenomena were not the special property of Christianity.

Again, Origen sometimes quoted the prophecies of the Old Testament as if they were evidences of the very fulfilment which is disputed. He is far above much of the gross literalism which Celsus attacks. In replying to the demand for evidence that the dove descended upon Jesus, he treats it simply as a waking dream—a subjective impression. He thus unconsciously applies the same method which Celsus applied to the resurrection of Jesus when the Pagan suggests that that may have been a waking dream of a distracted woman. The story of Eve's creation from a rib of Adam, Origen considers to be simply allegorical, and asks whether the Christians shall not have the privilege of allegorizing their scriptures as well as the Greeks. In regard to the ark, he readily admits that, according to the general opinions of its dimensions, it was impossible that it could contain all the animals that were upon the earth. But by a process of allegorical mathematics, he concludes that the ark was ninety thousand cubits long, twenty-five hundred cubits in breadth, and that it was as big as a whole city. Such an argument would have made Celsus smile in his tomb.

The intellectual insufficiency of Origen's argument is everywhere apparent. Where, then, does its strength lie ? Wholly on its ethical side. Here Origen is simply impregnable. He chose his position with an instinct as unerring as that of Celsus, and we may say of him as of the Pagan, that sixteen hundred and fifty years have not dislodged him. The unanswerable fact with Origen is, that Christianity converts multitudes from a life of wickedness to one of virtue, from cowardice to courage. He points to the moral reformation which Christianity wrought in the homes and in the cities over which it had obtained sway. The churches of God are moral beacons in the world. Origen could not prove against Celsus that Christianity was the way, he could not prove that it was the truth, but he could prove that it was the life. Standing on the moral

side, Origen was invincible; and Froude, though not doing full justice to his intellectual power, confesses his moral strength. Origen was too great a man to deny moral power to the other religions. He confesses Celsus had glimpses of truth; and after the Pagan has quoted some beautiful precepts of Plato against injustice, Origen cannot withhold his assent, and says: "It is no objection to the principles of Christianity that the same things were said by the Greeks." But Plato, he says, addressed only the cultivated few; Jesus adapted himself to the common people. Plato spoke in abstract terms; Jesus in concrete. He thus admits that Christianity stands on the same ethical basis as Judaism and Platonism, but finds its moral mission to be to the whole world.

In this magnificent duel, the first ever fought in the arena of Christianity, we see the combatants pausing now and then to clasp each other's hands. It is the same light of the spirit which plays over their swords. Externally, they stood in irreconcilable positions. Christianity could not then exchange its symbols for those of Paganism. Its democratic heritage stood opposed to the aristocracy of the empire. But when each of these men leaves his metaphysics and the forms of his philosophy and comes down to the universal principles of religion and the universal principles of ethics, then they stand side by side. It is Origen who joins the hand of Plato with the hand of Jesus; it is Origen who, recognizing the diffusion of the divine word even before the advent of Jesus, says: "For no noble deed has ever been performed among men where the divine word did not visit the souls of those who were capable of it." Throughout, Origen is as sweet and magnanimous as the religion he defends; and the very last sentence he writes is to request Ambrose to send him the book of Celsus on "Practical Living," "if Celsus ever carried out his intention of writing it; that we may answer it as the father of truth may give us ability, and either overthrow the false teachings that may be in it, or, laying aside all jealousy, we may testify our approval of whatever truth it may contain."

One thing let us remember to the everlasting credit of Celsus, that the weapon he used against Christianity was a pen and not a sword. There is not a hint of persecution in his treatise. He summons these Christian socialists to the ordeal of laughter, to the bar of truth. Would that Christianity had never employed any harsher weapon than the pointed pen of this Pagan! It is Christianity which comes with dyed garments from Bozrah, and the blood that stains them is that of her own children.

Could we bring Origen and Celsus together again to-day, which one of the twain would be more surprised? Origen would be delighted to find how the little grain of seed had grown and spread into the heavens; but would he not feel a little hurt to find his own effigy hanging like a criminal from one of its boughs? This noble and sweet defender of the Christian faith assailed by the councils of the Christian church; branded as a schismatic by the Roman Pope in 498; while Protestant Luther joins his curses in sonorous Latin to the anathemas of the church? Would he not be amazed to find in the nineteenth century that a vigorous

branch of the Christian church refuses to send men to India to preach the gospel to the heathen because they believe in the possible salvation of deceased Pagans? But imagine his astonishment at learning that a few years before our own age a great subject of discussion was not the salvation of the heathen, but whether he himself had been saved or not; that several books had been written on this burning question, and one of their authors (Picus Mirandulanus) had magnanimously concluded that, on the whole, it was more rational to believe that Origen was saved than that he was lost.

And what would Celsus find? That the empire in whose defence he wrote had broken into fragments; that its religion had gone with it; that the Greek language in which he wrote had ceased to be the principal medium of modern thought; that the religion of these fishermen and cobblers had nominally taken possession of Europe and a hemisphere to him unknown. But with his keen discernment he would see that the victory was not one for Christianity alone. Paganism had its share of the spoils. Celsus could go into a Roman Catholic cathedral, and find in its priestly services enough of Paganism to make him feel quite at home. He could see that the Pagan doctrine of demons had been transmuted into the Christian doctrine of angels, and the Virgin Mary simply transferred from the Grecian Pantheon into the Christian. He might say: "Well, Origen, how could your Christianity have conquered so much of the world without the help of Paganism, its symbols and its sword?" Origen would be forced to confess that monotheism, after all, could hold a good deal of polytheism. And Celsus might add: "You see, Origen, that in reality Christianity has spread over relatively but a small portion of the globe. In the vast section of the East it has made scarcely a dent on the globe. Much of that which you call Christianity is nothing but the result of political conquest. How can Christianity conquer the world when it has no unity in itself?"

Celsus himself, too, would be obliged to confess humbly to the presiding genius of human history that he was mistaken in supposing that nothing good could come out of Nazareth; for civil and intellectual liberty had been the final outcome of the ancient communism. In the light of history, he would be forced to abandon his position that God would not be likely to send down his spirit to a low-born Galilean peasant. He would be impelled, perhaps, to seek some extant copy of his work, that he might add to it a foot-note that the Savior of the American Republic was a man born in a log-cabin. If it were humiliating to find that not a single copy of his own work existed, that it was only to be found scattered in patches through the work of an opponent, he would still have this consoling reflection: "The empire has gone; my book has gone; but my thought still lives, and was never more living than it is to-day." He might point to scores of modern works, to Socinus and Erasmus, to Priestley's "Corruptions of Christianity," to Channing's "Moral Argument Against Calvinism," to the works of the English Deists, to Theodore Parker's "Discourses," to Bishop Colenso, to Huxley

and Darwin, all of whom, together with an endless number of German critics, have repeated with excusable plagiarism some of the points of his indictment against popular Christianity and its conception of the universe.

What parts of his argument might Celsus justly claim as still valid to-day?

1. His arraignment of the deification of Jesus.
2. His scientific objections to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.
3. His demonstration on scientific grounds of the untenability of the Mosaic cosmogony.
4. His exhibition of the mythical character of the Eden legends on which Christian theology is built.
5. His argument that the Hebrew prophecies were not fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth.
6. His belief that mythology was a comparative science, and that Jewish and Christian mythology must be tested by the same laws which are applied to the mythology of other religions.
7. His claim that the miracles of Christianity must be tried by the same tests which we apply to all similar manifestations.
8. His protest against the claims of Judaism or Christianity to exclusive inspiration.
9. His claim that Jesus must be regarded, not as a special incarnation of God, but as one of many messengers sent for the inspiration and guidance of mankind.
10. His recognition of a universal basis and a universal inspiration for all religions.

These seem to us but modern re-affirmations of the thought of Celsus.

If we ask what is still valid in Origen's refutation, we shall find it, not in his allegories, not in his philosophy, not in his speculations, not in his tedious exegesis, but in his claim that the moral fruits of Christianity are the best vindication of its place in human history. The divinity of any religion is best shown in its worth to humanity. Not through its metaphysics, but through its ethics, has Christianity reached the heart of men.

Here they stand, the living thought of Celsus and the living moral faith of Origen; and the revolution that is going on in Christianity to-day is simply the attempt to reconcile the intellectual and scientific rationalism of Celsus with the moral faith of Origen.*

FORESTRY IN THE WINNIPEG DISTRICT.

BY T. W. FISHER, WINNIPEG.

THE conclusions which many years of observation have established as to the importance of forests in the general economy of the globe may be briefly summed up as follows: Forests influence the humidity of the air and soil, mitigate the extremes of heat and cold, regulate the supply of water in water-courses, prevent the erosion of the soil during excessive rains, afford protection to man and beast, and supply fuel, building timber, and the raw material for innumerable articles of commerce.

With extensive forest resources, the productive capacity of a nation may be greatly increased; and these resources may be so utilized as to become a permanent factor in the development of its industries, as I shall attempt presently to show; while the evils resulting from deforestation are so great as to have forced the subject on the attention of all the most advanced nations.

Professor O. W. Gibbs, President of the Academy of Sciences of the United States, says that no other economic problem confronting the Government equals in importance that offered by the present condition and future fate of the forests of Western North America. Public opinion in the United States, following that in Europe, is rapidly advancing towards a true appreciation of the fact, that only by some general and far-reaching system, based upon an adequate scientific and practical grasp of the whole situation in all its aspects, can the United States avert the evils which have overtaken other lands as the result of the disappearance of the forests.

Russia, still one of the most heavily-timbered countries in the world, affords a striking illustration of how destructive to national interests the absence of any restriction on the denudation of forest lands may prove. From Mr. Alexander Kirkwood's instructive report on Forestry for 1893, and that of Mr. Thomas Southworth for 1896, published by the Crown Lands Department of Ontario, I am enabled to give some interesting facts as to the causes of the impoverishment and distress which followed the abolition of serfdom in Russia, and which resulted from the indiscriminate cutting of the timber. The following embodies some of the salient passages in the authorities from which these writers quote:

When treating of the Russian famine of 1891-92, it was remarked that this was not to be regarded as a passing incident, but rather as the inauguration of a chronic condition of affairs, traceable to unsystematic farming, to the general withdrawal of capital from the land for investment in manufacturing enterprises, under the ægis of a protective tariff, and to the general deforestation of the country, in great part to provide fuel for railways and protected enterprises. The fatal consequences of this deforestation are now generally appreciated; the shrunken state of

the once noble rivers of the country, and the increasing aridity of the climate, affording evidence that can neither be overlooked nor gainsaid. The regions of the mighty rivers, the Don, the Volga, and the Dneiper, the great arteries of Russia, were formerly fringed with wide-spreading forests along their whole middle and upper courses, which sheltered their sources and tributaries from evaporation throughout the year. These forests have now for the most part disappeared; the "Mother Volga" grows yearly shallower; the steamers find scarcely seven or eight feet of water in mid-stream, and the ferries pursue their snake-like course from bank to bank in search of the ever-shifting channel. The Don is choked, as are its tributaries. The sources of the Dneiper creep downward, and its chief tributary, the once noble Worskla, with a flow of 220 English miles, is now dry from source to mouth. The city of Poltawa lies on its banks; and it was at its mouth that the Swedish army surrendered to Peter the Great. This stream, which once fertilized a broad region, supporting a numerous population, exists no more—not temporarily run dry, but with all its springs exhausted, so that in future it may be stricken from the map. Of the Bitjug, another river in the Don region, the upper course has wholly disappeared—valley and bed are filled to the banks with sand and earth. As if by magic, wide, fertile lands are buried under the sands and whole villages are desolated. There has been an unparalleled revolution of natural conditions, which threaten a great part of the country with the heat and aridity of the steppes of Central Asia. There is perfect unanimity in attributing this threatened catastrophe to the denudation of the forests.

There is much more worthy of quotation. The evils resulting from deforestation in Germany, in Denmark, and in many other countries, might also be noted if space permitted.

The physical history of every country proves that a moderate extent of forest promotes its general welfare; and this is now so well understood that in nearly all civilized countries forestry is a department of the government. In Germany—that country of thoroughness—there are several academies devoted exclusively to the study of forestry; and candidates for government service must first pass the standard of the higher school or gymnasium, afterwards assisting in the practical work of a forest district, under the direction of several professors, the forest curriculum extending over two and a half years.

In Great Britain, if no similar legislation exists, it must be remembered that forest lands are, for the most part, in the hands of large territorial magnates, whose interest it is to maintain a due proportion of woodland. Where felling takes place, the land is generally re-forested by the owner, who looks to the distant future and the interests of his successors, instead of making present profit the sole consideration. Many landowners in England have of recent years planted large sections of land, as much as fifty acres in one block, in Norway pine, with the view of improving the value of their estates. Though the proportion of woodland in Great Britain is small, the conditions of climate, due to its insular position

and the precipitation of vapour from the Atlantic ocean, the abundance of coal, and the facilities for the importation of timber from abroad combine to reduce the necessary quantity of woodland to its lowest expression.

In Ontario, once covered by dense forests, the primary object of the pioneer settler was to get rid of the trees, that he might put the land under other crops; so that he looked upon a tree as an enemy to be destroyed wherever found; an idea which the descendants of these pioneers, so many of whom are settled in Manitoba, have not as yet entirely got rid of, in spite of the greatly altered conditions which confront them.

It is to be regretted, though not greatly to be wondered at, that in Canada—a comparatively new country, whose timber for the most part has been supplied so bountifully by nature—the necessity for a fuller knowledge of sylviculture should not have received the recognition its importance deserves. Be that as it may, the time has now come when legislative enactments looking to the better protection of our forests must be vigorously enforced, and the wasteful deforestation so long in vogue prevented by all the resources at our command.

Mr. H. M. Eckardt, in his admirable paper on "The Future of Banking," in the *Journal of the Bankers' Association* for October, amongst other things, says:

"Coming to the forests, we see an industry that is doomed, like the fur-trade, to extinction, as population increases. Lumbermen are obliged already to search in many regions, before considered inaccessible, for timber. It is only a question of time when our lands are all clear. Perhaps some other material will supplant wood in housebuilding, as coal has already supplanted it for fuel."

Mr. Eckardt, like most people who have not made a special study of the question, seems to regard forest preservation as incompatible with the development of agriculture. Needless to say, the writer of this paper does not share that opinion. Owing to the opulence of nature beyond all present requirements, and the early necessity of clearing the woods to provide for the cultivation of other crops, Canadians have become accustomed to wasteful methods of lumbering. But it is estimated by the best authorities that the increment in the ordinary proceeds of nature is amply sufficient to maintain the timber supply. Mr. Southworth, in his report already referred to, says:

"Practically all that needs to be done in order to maintain our timber supply in perpetuity, and secure all the other advantages accruing from the presence of large forest tracts, is to retain in the possession of the Crown all such timbered land as is not well adapted for agriculture, and to protect it adequately from fire. Were this done, the apprehension of the exhaustion of our timber resources would no longer be even a remote possibility. Large as the demands upon our forests are, their reproductive capacity, provided the ravages of fire can be suppressed, is many times greater."

I dare say this statement will challenge the credulity of many of my

readers, but I have endeavored to verify it from other authorities, and believe it to be true. So, it will be seen, the pessimistic view held by Mr. Eckardt is not justified by present conditions.

Public sentiment in Canada is not sufficiently advanced for the introduction of the highly scientific methods of forestry in vogue in France and Germany, nor are they necessary here. What is primarily required is, as has already been said, to maintain in timber such portions of the public domain as are unfitted, either from considerations of locality or soil, for the purposes of agriculture.

This may seem a somewhat lengthy introduction to an article entitled "Forestry in the Winnipeg District," but so long as the public remain indifferent to a study of the principles of forestry, no contribution to the subject should be considered superfluous.

The traveller on the Canadian Pacific Railway, who has formed his impressions of the timber resources of Manitoba and the North-West Territories from the window of a car, will probably be surprised to learn that there are tracts of timber of considerable value in the Winnipeg district.

This district, it may be necessary to explain, includes the whole of Manitoba and that part of Assiniboia lying east of the third meridian, its length from east to west being 486 miles, with an area of 103,904 square miles, or more than double that of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island combined. The District is under the charge of an officer styled the Crown Timber Agent, whose reports from time to time appear annually in the blue-book issued by the Department of the Interior. From these and from private sources and personal observation, I have been able to gather some information as to the timber resources of the district.

The timber lands of the Crown have yielded an average revenue during the last ten years of about \$45,000 per annum; but in the earlier days of railway construction the receipts were much greater. The value of the timber, which is the question that most concerns us here, it is difficult to estimate with anything like accuracy; but from the data at my command, I put the yield at about one million dollars a year. This includes the timber on which dues have been paid, as well as that given away by the Government to new settlers; while the value of that annually destroyed by fire probably falls not far short of two million dollars. This is necessarily only a loose approximation, but it is sufficiently close to show that, with a rapidly increasing population, the loss of so much timber, in a country already inadequately supplied, is one which might without exaggeration be described as calamitous; and, unless the fostering care of the Legislature, supported by public sentiment, intervenes to prevent it, the total disappearance of our forests is an eventuality not unlikely to occur. The devastation which has already taken place is very great indeed.

A correspondent at Russell, in Township 21, range 28 west of the first meridian (a perfectly reliable authority), to whom I appealed for infor-

mation as to the timber conditions coming within his range of observation, thus writes me :

" In 1887, heavy timber was found about seven miles east of here, in what is locally known as the ' Big Bush,' it being really part of a belt of timber extending from the Little Saskatchewan River over the Riding Mountains, and across the head-waters of the Birdtail to Shell River, and over the Duck Mountains. This is now all open prairie, and solid timber cannot be found for a distance of at least fifteen miles from here ; and then only burnt timber is found. This retrogression has been going on along the whole front of the timber belt, for hundreds of miles in length."

Again :

" I have lately been in the Gilbert Plains country, some twenty miles north and forty or fifty east of here. The road passes over the Northern end of the Riding Mountain, and between that and Duck Mountain, through the heart of what was a very few years ago solid timber, extending for hundreds of miles along and between both mountains. The timber consisted of poplar, spruce and tamarac. This tract had all been burned over at different times, and only comparatively small patches of green timber are now discernible ; in most places, dead trunks of trees, still standing, or blackened stumps and half-burned fallen logs, show where, not more than four or five years ago, a magnificent forest stood. Two or three more fires will leave the country open prairie. The country now known as Gilbert Plains was, not many years ago—ten or fifteen, I should judge, from the rotting remains I saw—covered with forest."

And from other timbered tracts of country—Turtle Mountain in the south and Moose Mountain in the west—the same melancholy record comes. In the south and west, however, the losses have not been quite so severe, as the country is more closely settled, and the municipalities are under rather better organization than those in the northern districts. Nevertheless, the danger of almost complete deforestation is neither distant nor imaginary, but imminent and real.

Should the countries where the tributaries to the Assiniboine and Qu'Appelle rivers take their rise be denuded of timber, these streams, which exercise such a beneficent influence over a vast tract of country, would dwindle in summer to mere rivulets, if they did not become entirely dry.

It has been repeatedly and truthfully said that Manitoba is nothing if not an agricultural country. But an agricultural country it will cease to be, unless some well-considered and comprehensive scheme for the conservation of our forests be taken up in a practical manner by the whole people, with the view of united action on the part of the Dominion and Provincial Legislatures and county municipalities. No other question could more worthily engage the attention of the Patrons of Industry and the farmers of this North-west country.

(To be concluded.)

EVOLUTION AND THE IDEA OF GOD.

BY B. F. UNDERWOOD.

GENESIS OF THE GOD IDEA.

THE idea of God is a production of evolution. It had its genesis in man's attempts to interpret the objective world in terms of the subjective; to explain phenomena by investing objects with knowledge and volition like his own. All the qualities ascribed to God, everywhere and at all times, are derived from man. Anthropology is the key to theology. As Schiller says: "Man paints himself in his Gods." What man worships is not the piece of wood or stone, the mountain, the sky, the sun, moon and stars, but the intelligence, such as he himself is conscious of possessing, imagined to exist in these natural objects. The evolution of the God-idea has depended upon and corresponded with the evolution of the human mind. Man has sought for causes of natural occurrences which have impressed him most deeply, and knowing no higher being than himself, he has, without being aware of the fact, projected his own mental and moral nature into the external world. The God of the design argument of Paley's "Natural Theology," is an evolution of the conception of the fetichist in regard to the object which he invested with his personality, as certainly as the mind that can reason as Paley did is an evolution from mental conditions represented by fetich men of the remote past.

IDEA OF GOD NOT INNATE.

Thus evolution disposes of the theory that the idea of God is innate, by showing that it is an acquired conception which has arisen in experience and undergone changes like other conceptions.

In positing personality, to account for natural phenomena, man acted naturally, of course, as he did in trying to avert calamities by prayer and sacrifice; but the idea of divine personality has no claim to acceptance simply because it is one of the primitive, fundamental conceptions of religious systems. It must be tested by its reasonableness alone.

DEANTHROPOMORPHIZATION.

The evolution of religious thought has consisted in a process of deanthropomorphization, to use Dr. John Fiske's very long but also very appropriate word. Deity is no longer thought of by enlightened minds as having body, parts or passions. Such words as intelligence and design are still used by theologians in referring to God, but thinkers see that they are inadequate and inapplicable. Intelligence implies perception and external objects perceived; ideas, or impressious based upon perceptions; reflection and reasoning, dwelling upon what has come into experience, or may be beyond experience, and comparing ideas and reaching conclusions thereby; imagination, the power of summoning

before the mind ideally objects and events distant in time and space, etc. Intelligence implies organism and environment, genesis and growth, new experiences, added knowledge; and since these are characteristics of finite beings, products of evolutionary processes, when God is invested with them, as John Fiske says, "the eternal power whereof the web of phenomena is but the visible garment, becomes degraded into a mere strand in the web of phenomena, and the cosmos, in exchange for the loss of its infinite and inscrutable God, receives an anomalous sovereign of mythologic pedigree."

A LARGE VIEW OF GOD.

Those who invest the Ultimate Reality with volition, feeling, and all their own mental characteristics, thus forming God in their own image, and making an idol, not out of wood or stone, it is true, but out of the phenomena of their own minds, regard as atheists those who reject these anthropomorphisms, much the same as the Indian or Negro regards as denial of God the denial of his crude conceptions of the supernatural as adequate representations of the Infinite and Eternal.

A larger and deeper view seems to warrant what the eminent physicist, Haeckel, said in an address at a meeting of German naturalists and physicians:

"This kernel (of true religion) does not consist in the special form of one's confession of faith, but rather in the critical conviction of an unknowable common ultimate ground of things, and in practical ethics springing immediately from the purified theory of nature. In this confession, that with the present organization of our brain the last ultimate ground of all phenomena is unknowable, the critical philosophy of nature comes athwart dogmatic religion. The faith in God, however, of course assumes endlessly different degrees of the knowledge of nature. The farther advances we make in the latter, the more we approach that unattainable ground, the lower will be our ideas of God."

Of an absolute beginning of things or of their ending, we have no knowledge and no proof. Forms and conditions change, but substance persists. As that clear-headed scientist, Tyndall, put it:

"As regards knowledge, physical science is polar. In one sense it knows, or is destined to know, everything. In another sense, it knows nothing. Science understands much of this intermediate phase of things which we call Nature, of which it is the product, but science knows nothing of the origin or destiny of Nature. Who or what made the sun, and gave to his rays their alleged power? Who or what made and bestowed upon the ultimate particles of matter their wondrous power of varied interaction? Science does not know. The mystery, though pushed back, remains unaltered. To many of us who feel that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the present philosophy of science, but who have been also taught, by baffled efforts, how vain is the attempt to grapple with the inscrutable, the ultimate frame of mind is that of Goethe:

"Who dares to name his name,
Or belief in him proclaim,

Veiled in mystery as he is, the all-enfolder?
 Gleams across the mind his light,
 Feels the lifted soul his might,
 Dare it then deny his reign, the all-upholder?"

WHAT GOETHE SAID.

Conceptions of God change; the eternal power persists through all changes, and gradually it is divested, in the minds of men, of all those human qualities which men, in conceiving God as a man, have bestowed upon it.

The more ignorant a man is the more he thinks he knows about God. With unshackled thought on the subject one comes to recognize the wisdom of what Goethe said:

"Since the great Being whom we name the Deity manifests himself not only in man, but in a rich and powerful Nature, and in mighty world events, a representation of Him framed from human qualities cannot, of course, be adequate, and the thoughtful observer will soon come to imperfections and contradictions which will drive him to doubt—nay, even to despair—unless he be little enough to let himself be soothed by an artful evasion, or great enough to rise to a higher point of view."

WORDS INADEQUATE TO DESCRIBE THE INFINITE.

While the words used to describe an organism—a mere product of evolution—are inadequate to describe or define that which is not an organism, which has no environment, which had no genesis or growth, but is the cause and basis of all phenomena; and while intelligence, volition, personality, as known to us, cannot be predicated of Deity, the student of evolution is at liberty to hold, in the reverent spirit in which he once worshipped a personality, that greater than any conceivable personal being, greater than any known intelligence, is the Ultimate Reality, in which all phenomena, psychical and physical, have a common basis—the foundation of the cosmic order we observe, and of that marvellous series of evolutionary processes by which from star dust have been produced myriads of worlds with their inhabitants, the brain and heart of man, his conscience, his hopes and aspirations, his wonderful achievements, his chequered history, his possibilities for the future.

PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM.

Philosophical materialism, which ascribes sensation and thought to physical causes, and assumes that matter is the ultimate cause of phenomena, finds as little justification as does anthropomorphism, in the teachings of modern science. There is no proof, but all the proof the case admits of is opposed to the view that a motion or a collision of material atoms is ever transformed into feeling or thought. Feeling and thought are subjective phenomena; motions and collisions of matter are objective. That two or more insentient atoms, by moving and changing space-relations to one another, should give rise to the consciousness of "I," or to a feeling of pleasure or pain, is a fancy as wild as any of the fancies of the old mythologists.

A PSYCHICAL BASIS.

Indeed, the qualities and states of matter, so regarded by us, are names for different ways in which our consciousness is affected. Light (luminousness) is a fact of consciousness, and does not exist where there is no eye. Professor Newcomb proposed to abolish the word light from physical science, since light is a psychical and not a physical phenomenon. There is no musical quality in the waves of the air, save as the mind through hearing constructs it. There is no fragrance in the rose, the word standing only for the sensations produced in us through the sense of smell by an object, the ultimate nature of which is inscrutable. When we say that iron is hard, we mean that if we press against it we experience a feeling of resistance, which is distinguished by the word hardness, a word that describes our feeling, and the iron. If, as Huxley says: "The force of the muscles of the body were increased a hundred fold, our marble (or other hard substance) would seem to be as soft as a pellet of breadcrumbs." Even the conceptions of vibrations among the particles of matter as the objective factor in the production of sound and color are but inferences from states of consciousness—subjective experiences produced in us by some unknown cause.

Hæckel, and others before him and after him, have been so impressed with the necessity for a psychical basis for psychical phenomena, that they have assumed that the atoms possess sensation and consciousness, and thus endeavor to escape the conclusion that mind is the motion and inter-action of insentient atoms. When matter is assumed to be eternal and it is invested with sentience and consciousness, it must be regarded as psychical or spiritual in its nature, and mind, according to this view, being eternal, and mental phenomena due to it, the materialistic theory that sensation and thought are products of material combinations and motions is necessarily abandoned.

Our position is, that that which underlies phenomena—that which is not seen and is known only as revealed in consciousness, is such that given a perceiving, thinking mind, it manifests itself objectively as matter and force, and subjectively as feeling and thought. Man in his essential nature belongs to it, for the substance and basis of his being is in the noumenal world of which the world we see is but the appearance, the shows of things, the symbolical representation.

PURPOSE AND DESIGN ?

Does the universe visible to us afford any indications of a divine purpose? Prof. Asa Gray regarded all beneficial variations as providentially designed. Mr. Darwin asked him whether each variation in the rock-pigeon, in the change to a pouter or fan-tail pigeon, was thus designed; and added that, if such variations were not designed, he could "see no reason why he should rank the accumulated variations by which the beautifully-adapted woodpecker has been formed as providentially designed."

These speculations about design involve us in perplexities of thought, from which, so far as I can see, the conception of evolution gives no

relief, if we insist upon interpreting all the phenomena of nature as though behind them, and the cause of them, were an anthropomorphic being, who reasons, decides, and acts like man. A man is killed by lightning; a city is devastated by a tornado. Is this destruction of life and property designed? A swallow devours a gnat; a hawk kills a chicken; large fish eat smaller ones. Is all this designed? If the death of any particular insect or animal is not designed, was its birth designed? If a child's death at the age of one or two years was not designed, was its birth designed? Is the transmission of disease designed? Was the birth of all the descendants of the woman Jukes designed? The history of life on this globe is a history of struggle and suffering, the destruction of the weak and the survival of the fittest. Has there been design in this? With an improving environment, the survival of the fittest has resulted, generally speaking, in the survival of the best. There is little doubt that the earth, in time, will become a desolate waste; that gradually the higher forms of life will die out, and that the survival of the fittest will then mean the survival of the lowest, until, perhaps, all living creatures disappear, before our planet, now so fruitful and the scene of man's great triumphs, returns to the great mausoleum of worlds. Will there be design in all this?

AN INTOLERABLE THOUGHT.

We cannot help sympathizing with Darwin when he says:

"Believing as I do that man in the distant future will be far more perfect than he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all other sentient beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued slow progress. To those who fully admit the immortality of the human soul, the destruction of our world will not appear so dreadful."

Yet Darwin could not accept as proven the doctrine of immortality; and in the honesty of his heart, when lesser minds dogmatized about God, he said:

"The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us, and I, for one, must be content to remain an Agnostic."

There are evolutionists who see in the painful evolution of the human race through countless ages, and in the intellectual and moral conditions and achievements which have been attained, and in the certain ultimate physical extinction of the race as well as of its individual members, a strong argument for the spiritual immortality of man, and with Darwin these considerations had some weight.

SOME GREAT END.

If every birth and every death and every event were not designed, may we at least find reasons for the belief that the laws under which all creatures exist and all the operations of nature occur, are the methods or modes of action of Divine Power, by which is to be attained some

great end, that will justify the enormous and appalling sacrifice and cost involved,—

“ One far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves ” ?

Is there, as Huxley intimates, a possible wider teleology than that which assumes that the eye was, with the precise structure it exhibits, designed to see,—a teleology, to quote from Huxley, “ based upon the fundamental proposition of evolution ? This proposition is that the whole world, living and not-living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces (powers) possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulousity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor, and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules, have predicted, say, the state of the fauna of Britain in 1879, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapor of the breath on a cold winter's day.”

Prof. Huxley never intimated that he had any faith in this “ wider teleology,” but his admission of its possibility has given a little comfort and consolation to some who, though they have been compelled to reject as worthless the old familiar arguments for design in nature, would be glad to believe confidently that Wisdom controls the universe, and

“ That somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill.”

VISIBLE NATURE A VEIL.

Prof. Wm. James, in a paper in the *International Journal of Ethics* for October, 1895, after referring to nature worship in language not less severe than that used by J. S. Mill in his “ *Essay on Nature*,” says :

“ There were times when Liebnitzes, with their heads buried in monstrous wigs, could compose theodicies, and when stall-fed officials of an established church could prove by the valves in the heart and the round ligament of the hip-joint the existence of a ‘ Moral and Intelligent Contriver of the World.’ But those times are past, and we of the nineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know Nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly any god of whose character she can be an adequate expression. Truly, all we know of good and beauty proceeds from Nature, but none the less so all we know of evil. Visible Nature is all plasticity and indifference—a multiverse, as one might call it, not a universe. To such a harlot we know no moral allegiance ; with her as a whole we can establish no sentimental communion ; and we are free in our dealings with her several parts to obey or destroy, and to follow no law but that of prudence in coming to terms with such of her particular features as will help us to our private ends. If there be a divine spirit of the universe, Nature, such as we know her, cannot possibly be its ultimate word to man. Either there is no spirit revealed in nature, or else it is inadequately revealed there ; and (as all the higher religions have assumed) what we call visible Nature, or this world, must be but a veil and surface-show, whose full meaning resides in a supplementary unseen or other world.”

Professor James, on the whole, accounts it gain that

"The naturalistic superstition, the worship of the God of Nature as such, has begun to loosen its hold upon the educated mind. Rebellion against such a conception of God is the initial step toward getting into healthy relations with the universe."

According to the writer, a man's religious faith is his faith in an order in which the riddles of the observed order may be found explained: an unseen universe in which spiritual forces are eternal, a dimension of Being that we now have no organs for apprehending, but the reality of which is necessary to give significance to this life, and faith in which is required to meet the inner needs of our nature. I think Professor James' criticism of mere Nature-worship is none too severe. The dark side of nature cannot be ignored. The rattlesnake, the tarantula, the tornado or the earthquake is as much a part of nature as is the gentle dove or the refreshing shower. The religious sentiment and the moral nature of enlightened man can find no satisfaction in contemplating as ultimate the order in which exists whatever is hideous, frightful and cruel.

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.

The religious sentiment is a part of man's nature. As Tyndall said in his Belfast address:

"You who have escaped from these religions into the high-and-dry light of intellect, may deride them; but in so doing you deride accidents of form merely, and fail to touch the immovable basis of the religious sentiment in the nature of man. To yield this sentiment reasonable satisfaction is the problem of problems at the present hour."

Feeling is deeper than thought, and the demands of the heart are more imperative than those of the intellect. Neither is satisfied with recognizing the external world, visible to us, as complete and ultimate being.

Philosophy requires the postulation of an invisible universe or an order of being of which the world cognizable by us is but a phenomenal manifestation—"an infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed," of which the visible universe is a sign or symbol only. And the inscrutable reality manifested in the phenomenal world, even though it is left undescribed and undefined, meets, as the mind advances, the requirements of man's religious nature.

The mass of mankind will, no doubt, continue to find satisfaction in concreteness in religion, as in everything else, and will continue to contemplate God only as a personal being, only as a man enlarged and divested of the grosser qualities of human nature; but the thinker who penetrates beneath the surface of things, and uses language to express ideas, and not to represent the absence of ideas, will be cautious in making affirmations as to the personality of the Universal Power, or in applying to the Ultimate Reality and the Basis of All Activity terms which but inadequately describe our own sense-bound thoughts and feelings. We may call it the Divine Spirit, to distinguish it from our conceptions of matter, and to describe it in the terms of the highest and

best that we can conceive ; but, remembering that conceivability is not the limit of possibility, we may regard the Universal Ultimate Being as unpicturable, unimaginable, yet greater—infinately greater—than any creature subjected to the limitations of organic form and material environment, to the conditions of birth, growth, and physical surroundings.

In his essential nature man, I believe, belongs to the noumenal or ultimate order of being, but the conception of that order unconditioned by the organically imposed limitations of sense is impossible. As Emerson says :

“ Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Always our being is descending into us from we know not whence. . . . I am constrained every moment to acknowledge a higher origin for events than the will I call mine.”

[Mr. Underwood's paper was his second address given before the Conference of Evolutionists at Greenacre, Me., August, 1896. It was the opening address at the last session of the conference, and it formed the basis of an able and animated discussion, in which C. Staniland Wake, the ethnologist ; Horace W. Dresser, of Cambridge, Mass ; Dr. Lewis G. Janes, of Brooklyn, N.Y. ; and Miss Sarah J. Farmer, of Eliot, Me., among others took part.

On the occasion of the closing symposium of the conference the interest was very marked, and the parlors of the Greenacre Inn, the papers reported, “ were crowded to the doors and all available standing-room was occupied.”]



ON THE SHORE I STOOD AT EVEN.

BY WALT. A. RATCLIFFE, LISTOWEL, ONT.

ON the shore I stood at even,
Where the wild winds whirled around me
From the hollows leaves of autumn,
Sere and dry,
And the great lake lay before me,
Like a restless giant cradled,
With his long white fingers clutching
At the pinions, stooping pinions
Of the sky.

Lower drooped those wings and lower,
As of angel foster-mother
O'er a lov'd one fondly bending
In the night ;

And the glad lake roll'd and revell'd,
 And his laugh grew loud and louder,
 As he gaily toss'd toward her
 From his bosom foamy feathers,
 Soft and white.

Lo! the Spirit of Polaris
 Had that mighty cradle girdled
 With a wreath of rarest crystal
 From his throne,
 And the Sea-sprites sang in chorus
 To the wingèd tempest's music,
 Till my world of care had vanished,
 And I knew no soul had gladness
 Like my own.

Night perennial gathers o'er me,
 And I name it Spring or Autumn
 As my feet disperse the hoar-frost
 Or the dew ;
 Still the zephyrs softly kiss me,
 And the roses breathe upon me,
 But sweet Summer's slumb'rous sonnets
 Reach me but in dreamy echoes
 From the blue.

So I love the Storm that thunders
 Through the naked nodding forest,
 Beating measures with the billows
 Wild and white,
 For my life was ever stormy,
 And my soul doth chafe within me,
 Like a scion of the tempest
 That would roar beyond the confines
 Of the night.



THE ETHICS OF THE SINGLE TAX.

BY GEORGE BARNARD.

It is only too probable that to the greater number of the readers of this REVIEW, the title which I have placed at the head of this article will seem self-contradictory and absurd. For we are so often told that the Single Tax is the embodiment not only of all that is economically unsound, but also of everything that is dishonest and mean, that an essay on the Ethics of the Single Tax might be expected to rival in shortness and conciseness the famous chapter on Irish snakes.

But while this view of the matter does not lack the support of some plausible arguments, it appears to me to be due to a somewhat superficial consideration of the question. Very few men examine a subject of this kind for themselves; they are content to take on trust whatever may be the prevailing popular opinion. And when an attack is made upon ancient wrongs, or powerful vested interests, the chorus of denunciation from platform and press is sure, at first, to be practically unanimous. The reception given to the single tax proposition has been by no means an exception to this rule, but rather a striking illustration of it. Flouted by politicians ridiculed by smart journalists, anathematised by teachers of religion, "refuted" by economists and misrepresented by all, it may indeed serve as a warning to all advocates of reform.

But in spite of all this, I think it may be possible to say something on the other side, to show that the single tax, when examined from the ethical standpoint, is not altogether so black as it is painted, and that we who support it have, at any rate, an arguable case.

I do not propose to enter into any economic questions, but shall confine myself as strictly as possible to the consideration of one point—Is the Single Tax, in principle, right and just? For this is indeed the touchstone by which all proposed reforms should be tested; this the final court to which they must all appeal. If the decision here be not in their favor they are, *pro facto*, condemned. All other considerations are as nothing, in the face of the crucial question—Is it right?

In the case of the Single Tax it is especially important that a clear and decided answer should be given. It would interfere to a considerable extent with what are known as "vested interests," and if not in itself right would do a great wrong. And such radical changes in the conditions which surround and fashion human life would be involved in its adoption, that it is not too much to say that the whole character of the community of the future would depend upon it. And as a nation lives and thrives only by justice, it behooves us, who upon the foundations of the past are raising the structure of the future, to see that our

building is four-square. As we sow, our children will reap; upon the use we make of our time of power, depend the welfare and happiness of children yet unborn. Great is our shame if we do not fully accept the responsibility.

What we have, then, to determine is, not whether the Single Tax would be for the apparent good of the existing community, taken as a whole, but whether it would be just towards each individual member of the community, present or future. For if the good of the whole be not based upon the rights of each, it can never stand. The supposed blessing will prove a curse, and, now as ever, the attempt to make expediency run counter to justice can end in nothing but disaster.

Widely as men have differed in its application, the principle of justice is everywhere the same. As said the Stoics: "*Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi*;" and this is to-day, as of old, its simplest, truest and most comprehensive definition. By the light of this principle,—the giving to each his due,—our examination into the Single Tax will be guided.

As a preliminary, let me state briefly what the proposition really is. Put as concisely as possible, it is this,—“To gradually substitute for all other taxation, direct or indirect, a ‘Single Tax’ upon land values (not land area), taking ultimately the whole annual value of the land, as nearly as may be practicable, for the use of the State.” The term “land,” as thus used, includes every kind of land, and all natural opportunities. It excludes all buildings and other improvements resulting from the application of labor and capital upon the land. The value to be taken is what is sometimes known as “site-value,”—the value of the bare land, apart from all improvements on it. Now, this plan is the practical embodiment of a great principle, with which it must stand or fall. It is this:

“That every man has rights in the earth equal to those of every other man; that those rights begin at birth and end with death; that they are inalienable and that any laws, customs or traditions which may assume to deprive any man of his equal rights are, *de jure*, utterly null and void.”

This, again, rests upon what may be called our first principle:

“That all men are born with equal rights to life; that each man owns himself and his faculties; that he has the right to use those faculties in his own way, provided always that he injures no one, and does not infringe upon the equal rights of others; that what he produces by the use of his faculties is his, no other person having the shadow of a title to it.”

Most of us, I think, will give a general assent to this. Very few will now be found to maintain the negative,—to assert that some men have at birth rights to life superior to those possessed by other men, and that the former have rights to themselves and to the use of their faculties which overbear any rights possessed by the latter. So that it is probably unnecessary to offer any formal justification of this doctrine of the equality of rights to life. The great majority, at all events, will admit it, but should it be seriously attacked, I will do my best to defend it.

Granted, then, that each man has, equally with every other man, rights to life and to the exercise of his faculties, it follows with all the certitude of a geometrical demonstration, that he has equal rights to the use of the earth. For, clearly, equal rights to life imply equal rights to those natural opportunities by the use of which alone can life be maintained.

Here, on the one hand, are men with equal rights to life ; here, on the other, is a vast storehouse of raw material, sufficient for all, accessible to all, by the use of which all can support life, but without which none can live. And it is not merely the only means by which they can live, but it is the condition precedent of their very existence. Of it they are formed, on it they must live, and to it their material elements will some day return. Take away the earth, and where is your man ? He has vanished, he is simply non-existent.

How shall a man who has no rights in the earth retain the right to himself and to the use of his faculties ? Where shall he exist, where use those faculties, if not on the land ? If his rights in the earth are not equal to those of every other man, then his rights to life are not equal to those of every other man. If he has no rights in the land, he has no right to be here at all. His title to life is no longer a right ; it is a privilege, a concession granted by those who are in possession of the means of sustaining life.

If you allow equal rights to life you must necessarily allow equal rights to the only means by the use of which it is possible to live. Those who deny this must show in what other way equal rights to life must be maintained.

But whilst many are ready to admit, in the abstract, this doctrine of equal right in the land, they have very serious objections to any attempt to give it practical application. "Here," they say, "is a society in which private ownership of land has existed for generations, and where it forms, indeed, the base upon which the whole social structure rests. The title deeds of most of the land of our own country run back to comparatively recent grants from the Crown, and our laws have decreed that private property in land shall be at least as secure as private property in the results of labor. Under those laws, the wealth of the capitalist, the savings of the laborer, and the portion of the widow and the orphan have been invested in it. Surely, no one but a 'preacher of unrighteousness' would advocate the taking of the whole value of land in taxation, and that, too, without giving any compensation to its present owners ? That would, indeed, be too gigantic a villany to be even seriously contemplated."

Let us admit even more than our opponents would affirm. Let it be granted that individual ownership of land has an antiquity which cannot be questioned, and that it was in the first place deliberately adopted as the result of a profound conviction that, both in justice to the individual and in advantage to the community, it was the best arrangement that could be desired ; granted, also, that the original distribution was in every way equitable, and that the State formally

handed over to the first owners a title in perpetuity, under which the present owners claim,—granted all this, what then?

“The land belongs in usufruct to the living, the dead have neither part nor lot in it.” Our ancestors in their time had control of the land, and did with it what seemed to them good. Their time has passed, and with it their rights; upon us now falls, not only the right but the duty to do with the land what seems to us just, regardless of any conclusions which they may have reached. Did the land belong to them in any greater measure than it now belongs to us; were their rights superior to ours? Neither one man nor any number of men can rightfully dispose of that which belongs to another: how, then, could our predecessors sell our rights?

“If the present generation, or any other, are disposed to be slaves it does not lessen the right of the succeeding generation to be free: wrongs cannot have a legal descent.” (Paine: “Rights of Man.”)

As we can give no right or title to individual ownership of land in the future, so we can recognize none given in the past. A man’s rights to life and to the material means of sustaining life rest upon his existence and end with that existence.

“A certain former generation made a will to take away the rights of the commencing generation and all future ones, and convey those rights to a third person, who afterwards comes forward, and tells them that they have no rights, that their rights are already bequeathed to him. . . . From such principles, and such ignorance, good Lord deliver the world.” (“Rights of Man.”)

The whole of the historical argument which assumes to uphold private property in land is based upon the preposterous assumption that a man may sell or bequeath that which is not his, and that a title which was invalid in the first place becomes valid by transfer.

We are not concerned with what took place in the past; what we have to deal with is private property in land here and now. Does it, or does it not, conflict with the equal rights to life possessed by the people now living; is it, or is it not, in conflict with the equal rights to life possessed by the people now living; is it, or is it not, just? If it is, it needs no help from history; if it is not, of what use is historical sanction? If it is unjust, then a wrong is now being done, day by day, and every day, to those who are deprived of their own. It is none the less a wrong because this generation is not primarily responsible for it, and it is none the less our duty to strive by every means in our power to end it.

But although it is thus clear that appeals to the actions of our ancestors are entirely irrelevant, it is undoubtedly true that the question of how best to deal with the “vested interests” which they created is perhaps the most serious problem that we have to face. What are we to do with the present landowners? In one way or another they have come legally and peaceably into the possession of the lands they now hold, and their responsibility for the laws under which

they acquired them is no greater than that of the rest of us ; why should they be the only sufferers ?

The whole question turns upon the original one,—to whom does the land of right belong ? If to the landowners, we have no right to it, whether with compensation or without. So long as those who are in possession of it do not actively injure us, we may not interfere with them, or with any use they may make of it, and we can only be thankful to the owners of our country if they will allow us to live and work in it on their own terms. But if, on the other hand, the land belongs of right to the people at large, if we all have equal rights in it, where is either logic or justice in asking us to buy that which is already our own ? If the land belongs to the people it is theirs without money and without price.

If it is suddenly discovered that A has for years been innocently enjoying that which rightfully belonged to B, is A justified in continuing the wrong, or, as the alternative, has he a good claim on B for compensation ? But that is the landowner's case at its best. The question of compensation can only arise when the State takes that which is admittedly the property of the person from whom it is taken. In that case, compensation would be for the discontinuance of a right ; to the landowner it would be for the discontinuance of a wrong.

The fact that England considered it necessary to recompense the West Indian slaveowners for the loss of their slaves is often cited in support of compensation to landowners. But the two cases are not analogous. When England forced abolition on the slaveowners, she did not ask the slaves to buy their freedom, but paid for it herself. This, if it pleased England, could not be called unjust to the slaves. So, too, if the Single Tax should be imposed on us from outside, we could raise no valid objection to the compensation of landowners by those who compelled the change. But current argument holds that those who for years have been deprived of their rights are themselves bound to buy off those who are at present enjoying those rights. It is as if it had been enacted that a slave should be free as soon as he himself could pay his market value to his owner.

Suppose that the matter had been settled solely between the slaves and their owners, that the former had refused to work any longer except for their own benefit, and that they had successfully resisted all attempts to keep them in slavery. Shall we be told that they would have been morally bound to give compensation for the loss of such future produce of their labors as their owners had expected to appropriate ? Surely not !

But that is what we are told now. Our proposal is, in effect, that we should refuse to work any longer for the benefit of the landowners, but we find that if we do so refuse we are expected to pay them for the loss of whatever they had expected our labor to produce for them in the future. When we scout such an absurd idea, no epithet is too harsh for us.

And not only does justice not require compensation, but she sternly forbids it. What, indeed, would it be but payment of the annual tribute in another form,—paying land-owners for the right to discontinue paying them? For full compensation would necessitate ensuring to landowners an annual income at least equal to that which they now derive from their land; that is to say, we should take from them with one hand and restore with the other. In what way should we have bettered our position? Any income we might allot to them would, like the present one, come out of the earnings of the community; so that, instead of having abolished a wrong, we should have given a formal sanction to it.

The injustice of compelling a man to pay for that which is already his own, to buy off those who are in possession, is so monstrous, so glaring, that it is hard to understand how any one can be found to support it. That landowners should deprecate any inquiry as to the tribute they have exacted in the past, that they should ask that by-gones be by-gones, is intelligible, though not altogether equitable, but that they should demand payment for ceasing to take that which is not theirs is absurd.

Let us, by all means, be solicitous for the rights, the genuine rights, of the landlords, but let us also remember the rights of the landless. Compensation—yes, if you wish it, compensation in full,—but for the man who has been deprived of his rights, not for him who has been enjoying the rights of others.

“Pay ransom to the owner,

And fill the bag to the brim.

Who is the owner? The slave is owner,

And ever was. Pay him.”

If, then, landowners are wise, they will not ask for compensation, lest the cry be taken up in earnest by those who can establish a better claim to it. But if they persist, they will have to be shown that there are debits as well as credits in their account, and that if they insist upon the balance being struck, the settlement will not be in their favor. Do not let me be misunderstood. My quarrel is with private property in land as an institution, not with the particular men who may profit by it. Whilst I believe that the Single Tax would reduce scarcely a landowner to actual poverty, it might possibly have that effect with a few; and if, in righting a great wrong, these had to suffer, no one would regret it more than myself. Personally, I would have the community deal liberally (as a matter of grace) with any to whom the adoption of the Single Tax brought real suffering.*

*If it could be shown that within the lifetime of the present generation, say 30 years, the State had received valuable consideration in return for a grant of land, it might be advisable, under certain circumstances and with well-defined conditions, to return whatever had been thus received. In this country, landlordism is yet young, and its evils are felt far less than in old and populous lands. As the wrongs done to the community are less than elsewhere, so also are the unjust privileges which the landowners enjoy. Consequently, a readjustment now would be comparatively easy, and would involve far less disturbance of “vested interests” than will be necessary if we leave the task to those who come after us. But whatever that disturbance may be, it will some day have to be faced.

I would not have a single landowner reduced to the condition in which countless thousands of the landless are to be found to-day. But, at the same time, we must not permit our sympathy for landowners to warp our judgment or to lead us into injustice. We cannot allow a wrong to continue because those who have derived advantage from it will sustain a loss when it is brought to an end. The fact is, that long usage has blinded us to what is right and just, has dulled our perception, and confused our understanding. We think that whatever exists is necessarily right, and woe betide him who tries to change it.

We who uphold the Single Tax would give to each man his own. We hear that we have erased the eighth commandment from our Tables; we, who are the strongest, the clearest, and the most logical defenders of property, are denounced as its destroyers; we, who would have our social institutions rest on the firm base of equal rights to all, are told that we wish to overturn society.

W. H. Mallock somewhere tells us how he divided life into happiness, misery and justice. "Then," he says, "I at once discovered that the rich represented all the happiness of which we are now capable, and the poor all the misery, while justice was that which set this state of things going and enabled it to continue." I fear that the justice thus ironically described is worshipped in solemn earnest by many to-day. Learned professors support it, articles in our leading papers uphold it, and the words of the Just One are wrested from their plain and literal meaning to buttress it up. But we of the Single Tax will have none of it. Far off, it may be, in a time which shall be long after we, dead and forgotten, have been granted a resting place in that earth to which our rights during life are denied,—far off, perhaps, but already dimly visible, we see the approach of a "strange, new, wonderful justice,"—strange and new, no doubt, but still old and natural; a justice under which it shall be so ordered that,—

"Men in that time a-coming shall work and have no fear
 For to-morrow's lack of earning, and the hunger wolf anear!
 I tell you this for a wonder, that no man then shall be glad
 Of his fellow's fall and mishap, to snatch at the work he had.
 For that which the worker winneth shall then be his indeed,
 Nor shall half be reaped for nothing by him that soweth no seed!"

* * * * *
 Why, then, and for what are we waiting, while our brothers drop and die,
 And on every wind of the heavens a wasted life goes by?

They are gone; there is none can undo it, nor save our souls from the curse!
 But many a million cometh! And shall they be better? or worse?
 Come then, let us cast off fooling, and put by ease and rest:
 For the cause alone is worthy, till the good days bring the best!
 Ah, come! Cast off all fooling! for this at least we know,
 That the dawn of the day is coming, and forth the banners go!"

WOMEN ON JURIES.

BY ELLIS MEREDITH.

[In Colorado, women are now eligible for jury duty. Upon this subject, the author, a brilliant newspaper woman, wrote as follows in the *Denver News*.]

I SAT alone in the jury-box,
 A "provisional juror," too ;
 And I had been badgered, and lashed, and probed,
 To find out how much I knew.
 A gentleman took me in hand at first,
 And praised my intelligence,
 But afterwards held me up to scorn
 As a man without common sense.
 Another gentleman proved me a fool
 And a liar—conclusively—
 But afterwards said that the jury-box
 Was exactly the place for me.
 The judge gave a long, hypothetical charge
 In a brilliantly positive style ;
 It sounds like "Alice in Wonderland,"
 And Browning, and Thomas Carlyle.
 But in spite of these troubles I took my seat,
 Serene, quite happy, and cool ;
 I knew that my chair would be wanted soon
 For another and bigger fool.

"I SEE," said the man to the woman, "that the question of women jurors is agitating the public mind. Of course you believe women should serve on juries."

"Of course," said the woman, gravely.

"I knew you would ; all of you new women are crazy to do all the things that men do."

"I thought men never sat on juries when they could lie out of it ?"

"That is rather a bald way of putting it, but still it remains a fact that reputable men dislike jury service above all things ; it remains for women who are fond of being sensational to take it up. Of all the disagreeable things a man can be called on to do, there is nothing that is much more disagreeable than jury duty. But you women never know when you are well off. You want to be mannish at any cost."

"What did you call this service ?" asked the woman.

"Jury duty, do you mean ?" said the man.

"Yes ; I thought you said something about the word duty. I believe serving on juries is one of the duties of the citizen, isn't it ?"

"Certainly. To pay taxes, to bear arms, to serve on juries, to vote—"

"Not wisely, but too often," murmured the woman.

"These are a few of the duties which devolve upon the citizen," finished the man. "I suppose you will be content when you take them all away from us ?"

"I thought you just said that jury duty was something every business man got out of if possible ? Do you think it manly to evade your duty just because it is disagreeable ?"

"Great Scott ! You can't expect well-to-do men to let their business go to

rack and ruin while they draw a dollar and a half a day for listening to other people's squabbles. That isn't common sense."

"It must have been in a Fourth of July speech that I heard something about the jury system being the bulwark of our liberties. The bulwarks of our liberties in this country are not in a very good state of repair these days, it seems to me," said the woman.

"Well, perhaps you will be good enough to tell me how women serving on juries are going to help the country."

"Oh, no," said the woman; "I don't think women will materially improve matters. The jury system itself needs overhauling, it seems to me. It is a very old custom, but the modern jury is by no means to be compared with the kind of juries they had in Athens in the days of its glory."

"When prisoners were tried by all the people in 'convention assembled,' as Aristides was?" said the man.

"Yes, and very much later. The English jury did not consist of just twelve men, neither was it necessary that their verdict should be unanimous. At the time of Henry II. the brilliant idea of trying cases before men who didn't know anything whatever about any of the questions involved had not occurred to the people. The sheriff chose four 'knights of the shire,' who chose twelve more knights 'who were fully conversant with the case,'—this was in civil procedure—and they tried it. If they couldn't agree, more jurors were chosen and added to the original number, but whenever twelve men did agree they brought in their verdict and it was accepted. They believed in the rule of the majority then."

"I don't remember when the unanimous jury of twelve was first instituted," said the man, "but I know it was an English custom."

"Yes," said the woman, "it was first established by Edward III., and ever since then it has been the cause of no end of trouble. The judges used to starve the juries into finding unanimous verdicts."

"It was Pope who wrote—

"The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,
And wretches hang that jurymen may dine,"

Or something very like that," said the man. "Yes, I've seen cases where one obstinate man would keep the eleven locked up until they'd agree to anything."

"Do you remember the McLaughlin case? They got one jurymen the first day. He had to swear that he was not a member of Dr. Parkhurst's church, of the Society for the Suppression of Vice, of the Society for the Prevention of Crime, of the Society for Ethical Culture, of the University Settlement, of the City Vigilance League, of the Church Temperance Society, of the American Sabbath Union, of the New York Sabbath Committee, of the National Christian League for the Promotion of Personal Purity, of the Society for Improving the Condition of the Poor, or of any Good Government Club. Do you think that kind of thing is calculated to bring the jury system into respect?"

"Well, no," said the man. "But, still, I don't see how making women serve on juries is going to improve matters, and it will certainly be very objectionable to nice women."

"Oh, I'm perfectly willing to admit that, but women are so used to putting up with things that are disagreeable just because they happen to be their duty, that that could hardly be called an argument. There are lots of things about the house that a man wouldn't do because they are disagreeable, and so the woman has to do these disagreeable duties. But there is this to be gained by making

women serve on juries : It would infallibly lead to a change in the system ; me n would recognize the necessity, and just as soon as any question is agitated it means that before long there will be a change.'

The woman stopped to get her breath, and the man said, rather sneeringly : " Oh, yes ; you women think you are the natural reformers of everything on earth, but you don't live up to what you preach."

" No, we take after our fathers," said the woman ; " but just consider this jury question for a moment. The majority elects every officer in the land, from dog catcher to president ; the majority decides most of our legislation. Two-thirds of the Senate can impeach the President of the United States—and I wish to goodness they would—or a cabinet officer, or a chief justice ; but in a case of comparatively far less importance, the verdict must be unanimous, or else the taxpayers must bear the heavy cost of a new trial."

" It wouldn't be so bad," said the man, " if the jurors were drawn from a different set of people. Why, a juror was rejected the other day in New York because it was found out that he didn't understand English, and it was well known that he was a professional jurymen, and had been serving for thirty years in that capacity in that very city."

The woman smiled. " Yes, it may be necessary to recruit the jury-box from the list of intelligent women taxpayers. But if you don't want to do that, how do you like the Scotch system ? "

" I don't think I know what it is," said the man.

" Well, in Scotland they have fifteen instead of twelve jurymen. One-third of these men are drawn from a special jury-list of men of education and high standing ; the other ten are drawn from the ordinary ranks ; but the majority, eight men, are competent to find a verdict "

" I can't say that I like the Scotch verdict, ' Not proven,' though," said the man.

" It is not the kind of verdict one would prefer," said the woman ; " but it is a more intelligent verdict in many cases than the hard-and-fast guilty or not guilty ; it leaves a kind of stigma which makes it an object for the accused to prove his innocence if by any means he can do so. You remember Wilkie Collins' story, ' The Law and the Lady,' turns on that point."

" I'm willing to admit all that you say about the evils of the jury system as it is now conducted, but I don't see that women can do anything ; for I don't suppose even you would claim that there is any real reason why women should serve on juries ; in the interest of justice for their own sex, I mean," said the man.

" I've told you," said the woman, " that I don't want to be a jurywoman ; I should hate every minute of it ; in fact, I'm almost certain it must be my duty, I hate the idea so. Still, if you must know, if I had been on the jury that tried Mrs. Jane Shattuck, in San Francisco, that jury would be out yet. I would never have brought in any verdict but justifiable homicide if I had stayed out till doomsday."

" I don't remember the case," said the man.

" Oh, yes, you'll remember if you think for a moment. Mrs. Shattuck shot and killed her daughter's betrayer when he refused to marry the girl. I don't believe any father or brother was ever found guilty of murder in such a case in this world. Take the case of Mrs. Phipps, of South Dakota. She had seven women on her jury ; her husband was divorcing her on the ground of incompatibility ; she didn't want the husband, but she did want her child. In order

to get possession of it she was obliged to prove the unfitness of its father to bring up a child. It wasn't agreeable to her or the jurywomen or the jurymen or the judge, but, there was no 'hung jury' over the case. Phipps got his divorce, and she got her child."

"Well," said the man, disagreeably, "I've got my opinion of women who will sit in a jury-box and listen to all kinds of disgusting testimony."

"It's not well at all," said the woman: "but when it comes to that, I have my opinion of men and women who crowd court-rooms to listen to evidence that is unprintable; I've got my opinion of the men and women, and especially of the fathers and mothers, whose sons and daughters attended the Hayward and Durant and Parson Brown trials. I've my opinion of the crowd that attended the trial of the murderers of Pearl Bryan. If the delicate sensibilities of women do not serve to keep them away from such scenes, then they're not too sweet and good for jury duty. If they must be in the court-room, let them be of some use there! I don't approve of making public spectacles of trials. I saw the other day that in the Jachon trial, it was with great difficulty that laughter was suppressed and order preserved. That kind of thing strikes me as outrageous. However, that is what might be expected when we make a man swear that he is a fool before we permit him to serve as a juror in a petit larceny case."

"I agree with what you say, in a measure," said the man, "but still I can't see why you want to be a juror."

"I don't," said the woman.

THE THEORY OF VISION.

BY PROF. A. E. DOLBEAR.

WHEN it was discovered that the sensation of whiteness could be produced by combining three different colors—red, green, and violet,—it was inferred that there were probably three sets of nerves that were spread as a fine net-work over the retina, so that either of these rays might fall upon it at any point in the field of vision, and so produce the sensation. At the same time, when one or two of them were absent, the other nerve ingredient would be present to be affected; and, furthermore, each one of these three nerves was sensitive to quite a wide range of wave-lengths, and their overlappings gave perception without any break from the extreme red to the extreme violet. In this way color-perception could be explained. This view was adopted as a working hypothesis; and there was no other proposed, although there was no evidence whatever for the existence of three sets of nerves having different properties. It has, however, lately been discovered that the retina secretes a substance—called purpurine, on account of its purple tint—which is very rapidly bleached or decomposed by the action of light. That is to say, it possesses photographic properties in a marked degree. This discovery has led to the view that vision may be altogether due to photographic action, the older view being about abandoned. The details of this theory are not yet all worked out, but the purport of it may be briefly stated.

Given the purpurine spread over the retina, this would be its sensitive coating corresponding to the silver preparation upon the photographic plate. The action of the light upon it, being the same in character, decomposes it into simpler molecular compounds. The optic nerve is certainly spread over the retina, and the purpurine is in its meshes, and any disturbance taking place in this substance must correspondingly affect the ends of the nerves embedded in it. Given the disturbance that can affect the optic nerve, and it is transmitted at once to the base of the brain and there interpreted as light sensation. The differences there might be in the amount of disturbance would be the differences that are called brightness or intensity. If molecules are disintegrated, as in photographic action, there must be a relatively large amount of free-path motion resulting from the wave-action in the eye, and the amount of it proportional to the energy expended. Such an effect would give a general sensation of light; probably also effects of light and shade; so that forms of bodies would be readily enough seen. It would account also for persistent effects; for, when molecules are made to move fast or slow, they do not cease to move instantly on the removal of the source of the motion, but they continue to thus move until their energy has been reduced to that of the surrounding medium. With simple purpurine there appears to be no more possibility of chromatic effects than there is in the common silver preparation on the photographic plate. Suppose, however, the purpurine to be not a simple kind of a body, or made up of only a single kind of molecules, but instead made up of as many as three different kinds, having as many different molecular weights, and, therefore, capable of being reacted upon by three different wave lengths. Call these three substances *a*, *b*, and *c* purpurine. Let *a* be such as red waves can decompose, *b* such as green ones can decompose, and *c* such as only the short purple ones can break up or shake up. If these are uniformly mixed together and spread over the eye, then red waves would shake up the red constituent, but would leave the others alone, and the same would hold true of the others: If one has been looking at red-light wave-lengths, the *a* purpurine would be used up, but the *b* and *c* would still be present unimpaired; and now, when white light is again looked at, the *b* and *c* would be acted on strongly, because they are present in greater quantity. The resulting sensation would be the compound of these two reactions, which, as is well known, is a greenish tint. In a like manner, each of the others, when used up, would leave the same field fresh with the other constituents, and so give the complementary tints: and in this way chromatic effects of all sorts can be accounted for.

Some persons are color-blind; that is, they are unable to distinguish some colors; and this defect is usually for red rays. Such a color-blind person will be unable to see the red end of the spectrum, and the colors of it will appear to leave off in the yellow or orange. The old explanation was that the red sensation nerves were absent. The newer explanation is that the *a* ingredient of the purpurine is wanting either partially or altogether.

THE STAGE AND ORCHESTRA.

THE STAGE IN TORONTO.

EXCEPTING the visit of the Garrick Theatre Company we have had a most uneventful theatrical month in Toronto ; and the question before us would appear to be not so much what is coming here, but whether before long anything at all worth seeing is to be procurable in this city if public indifference—or whatever it may be—continues to be manifested in the manner it was last season, and is being manifested in even a more marked degree now. During the month we have had at the Grand Opera House several fairly good entertainments,—that is to say, entertainments above the average of the better kind of theatrical attraction we expect at our leading theatre ; and none which could be properly called bad. And what has been the financial result ? Night after night the same painful spectacle—painful of course to those on the stage and to many in front of it also—of a company of ladies and gentlemen playing to houses of one hundred and one hundred and fifty dollars ! Are we going back to the quiet days of the Theatre Royal on King Street, and of Mrs. Morrison's management and stock companies ; it really looks that way. The regular patronage of deadheads and "ladies and gentlemen of the press" is flattering, no doubt ; these patrons dress well, go in on time, are attentive and critical, never (or scarcely ever) applaud—they grace, no doubt, the auditorium, but do not, as a rule, add much to the treasury receipts. Whether it be want of money, weariness of seeing the same people and the same plays come round season after season, or a change in public sentiment, matters not. A good travelling theatrical company has a salary list averaging one thousand dollars a week ; if the company be an extra good one the list is of course much higher. As an example of what attractions cost I will only give a few instances. When Loie Fuller played at the Toronto Opera House recently, Loie was paid as her individual emolument ten per cent. of the net receipts ; this was outside the price paid her sister and the company ; Miss Loie took to herself for that one week's work over seven hundred dollars. Mrs. Shaw and her two daughters appeared last week in the same house and did a whistling turn that does not last ten minutes ; the price was \$200, and first-class return fare for three to New York. In the same show appeared Mlle. Jarbeau, who received \$250 and her fare to and from New York. The wonder is when times are good how these travelling companies pay ; and the certainty is that, if matters continue as at present, the on tour business will to a large extent drop out. And those among us who like the stage as a form of intellectual enjoyment, and who believe in it as a powerful educating agency, are seriously concerned in such a calamity as this not occurring. But a change for better or worse must certainly happen soon ; our places of amusement are (with scarce exceptions) on the ragged edge of bankruptcy, and the paying patronage has to be more liberal, or some of our principal theatres and concert halls will be "closed for repairs."

That the slack business at the theatres is not due to any sentimental nor puritanical reaction in the public mind is clear from the fact that the best musical events among us are receiving no better support. We had the International Opera Company at the Princess ; it gave us grand opera at one dollar ; it cannot be made to pay at the price with a full house—the house was not half filled ; the operas were "Lucia di Lammermoor" and "Il Trovatore," and lost heavily. We had the Gilmore band here ; apparently a better organization than

ever, but they played to non-profitable though enthusiastic audiences. We had Elijah at the Massey Hall; it has been nearly a twelvemonth in preparation, was played to perhaps a couple of thousand people, but was—I am assured—a financial loss.

The visit of Mr. John Hare and the London Garrick Company has been, of course, an interesting dramatic event, and the Grand Opera House has been filled every evening,—or, it would be more correct to say, at every performance, as there were two afternoon performances during the week. The company was of course an excellent one—but not equal to the company Mr. Hare brought with him last year. Miss Neilson and her husband, Mr. Terry, are both absent and were missed. Mr. Hare has no one—perhaps he wants no one—that can compare at all with Miss Neilson for personal magnetism, personal beauty, and for dramatic art and emotional power. Mr. Hare's repertoire consisted of "A Pair of Spectacles," T. W. Robertson's "Caste," and Pinero's "Hobby Horse," with a curtain-raiser entitled "When George the Fourth Was King." In saying Mr. Hare's company was not equal to that of last year I am not fault-finding, but simply stating a self-evident fact, Mr. Hare's support to-day is admirable, but last season he gave us something that was super-excellent, and we appreciated it so much then as to miss it now. The difference to some tastes between turtle and mock turtle may be subtle, but the difference is there. However, it does not do to be hypercritical these times, as our dramatic feasts this season will usually be barmecide feasts, so that on the few occasions when we can sit down to a royal meal we may as well make much of it and digest it, not forgetting to make plea in a manner of graceful suppliancy for all other treats to come.

WILFRID WISGAST.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES AND GOSSIP.

Sousa is at work on another opera, the title of which is "Ontario."

Sir Arthur Sullivan has been elected president of the English Orchestral Association.

"The Gay Parisienne" has passed its 150th performance at the London Duke of York's Theatre.

Anton Lux, leading tenor at the Weimar opera house, is eighty years old, and has sung at that house since 1855.

Sardon has been credited with many bright *bon mots*, but there is none that for trenchant truth surpasses his criticism of Fanny Davenport, after seeing her go over a scene in one of his plays. "She doesn't act," said the great dramatist, "she suffers."

C. W. Coudock, the oldest actor in America, and Henry C. Jarrett, the oldest manager, met on Broadway a day or two ago. The death of James Lewis was referred to, when Jarrett said: "Well, old man, it's nearly time for us to go." "'Sh, Harry," whispered Coudock, "they've missed us."

Irving's magnificent revival of "Cymbeline" at the London Lyceum was received with great enthusiasm. Irving's Iachimo and Ellen Terry's Imogen were greatly praised. In response to a call for a speech, Sir Henry announced that before producing "Madame Sans-Gené," he intended a short revival of "Richard III.," an announcement which was loudly cheered.

FROM OUR OWN OBSERVATORY.

The Manitoba Schools Settlement.

WE print below the text of the terms agreed upon between the Manitoba and the Dominion Governments for the settlement of the Manitoba Schools question. It will be seen that they comprise the terms offered by the Manitoba Government to the Ottawa commissioners, with the addition of provisions for the employment of Catholic teachers under certain circumstances and for teaching the French or other language needed by a sufficient number of pupils:

1. Legislation shall be introduced and passed at the next regular session of the Legislature of Manitoba embodying the provisions hereinafter set forth in amendment of the "Public School Act," for the purpose of settling the educational question that has been in dispute in that province.

2. Religious teaching to be conducted as hereinafter provided: (1) If authorized by a resolution passed by a majority of school trustees, or (2) if a petition be presented to the board of school trustees asking for religious teaching, and signed by the parents or guardians of at least ten children attending the school in the case of a rural district, or by the parents or guardians of at least 25 children attending the school in a city, town, or village.

3. Such religious teaching to take place between the hours of 3.30 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and to be conducted by any Christian clergyman whose charge includes any portion of the school district, or by a person duly authorized by such a clergyman, or by a teacher when so authorized.

4. Where so specified in such resolution of the trustees, or where so required by the petition of the parents or guardians, religious teaching during the prescribed period may take place only on certain specified days of the week instead of on every teaching day.

5. In any school in towns and cities where the average attendance of Roman Catholic children is forty or upwards, and in villages and rural districts where the average attendance of such children is 25 or upwards, the trustees shall, if required by the petition of the parents or guardians of such number of Roman Catholic children, respectively employ at least one duly certificated Roman Catholic teacher in such school.

In any school in towns and cities where the average attendance of non-Roman Catholic children is 40 or upwards, and in villages and rural districts where the average attendance of the children is 25 or upwards, the trustees shall, if required by the petition of parents or guardians of such children, employ at least one duly certificated non-Roman Catholic teacher.

6. Where religious teaching is required to be carried on in any school in pursuance of the foregoing provisions, and there are Roman Catholic children and non-Roman Catholic children attending school, and the school-room accommodation does not permit of the pupils being placed in separate rooms for the purpose of religious teaching, provision shall be made by regulations of the Department of Education (which regulations the board of school trustees shall observe), whereby the time allotted for religious teaching shall be divided in such a way that the religious teaching of the Roman Catholic children shall be carried on during the prescribed period on one-half of the teaching days of each month, and the religious teaching of non-Roman Catholic children may be carried on during the prescribed period on one-half the teaching days each month.

7. The Department of Education shall have the power to make regulations

not inconsistent with the principles of this act for carrying into effect the provisions of this act.

8. No separation of the pupils by religious denominations shall take place during the secular work.

9. Where the school accommodation at the disposal of the trustees permits, instead of allotting different days of the week to different denominations for the purpose of religious teaching, the pupils may be separated when the hour for religious teaching arrives, and placed in separate rooms.

10. When ten pupils in any school speak the French (or any language other than English) as their native language, the teaching of such pupils shall be conducted in French (or such other language) and English upon the bi-lingual system.

11. No pupil to be permitted to be present at any religious teaching unless the parents or guardians of such pupils may desire it. In case the parents or guardians do not desire the attendance of the pupils at such religious teaching, then the pupils shall be dismissed before the exercises, or shall remain in another room.

From the fact that the word "bishops" does not appear in the agreement, which is one intended to satisfy reasonable men and not to hand over education to priestly control, it may be anticipated that the Ministers will have some little difficulty in squaring accounts with the hierarchy. The Catholic papers and the Catholic bishops as a body are of course bitter in their denunciations of what they call treachery. Mr. Langevin, in preaching at St. Boniface, Winnipeg, after appealing to his hearers not to accept the settlement,—for how could such an arrangement be a settlement when the chief of the aggrieved parties, the bishops, had been left out in the cold?—told them that it "practically reduced to nothing the decisive homage seemingly rendered to religious instruction." As to what this "decisive homage" is we are told: "We wish, in the first place, the control of our schools; secondly, Catholic school districts everywhere; thirdly, our Catholic histories and reading-books at the least; fourth, our Catholic inspectors; fifth, competent Catholic teachers, instructed by us; sixth, our taxes, and exemption from taxes for other schools." Mr. Langevin says that, like Paul, he appeals to Cæsar, but when he says that "We ought to be Catholics first and Canadians after," he gives but a poor cry with which to make the appeal.

M. Tardival, editor of *La Verité*, just returned from Rome, says he knows the views of the Pope and of the Canadian bishops, and they "will never approve a settlement which does not give to the minority all the rights recognized by the highest civil authority of the empire." Like most of the extremists, M. Tardival overlooks two simple facts—(1) That the Privy Council declared the Act of 1890 to be perfectly constitutional, and (2) that it did not recognize the right of the minority to any remedial measure whatever. These facts were overlooked by most of the speakers in the great Remedial debate. The Privy Council decided that the minority had a right of appeal from its own Government to the Government of Canada: this "appeal to Cæsar" is of course an appeal to the Canadian people, and if the settlement of the Laurier Government is sustained in the next session, the appeal will be finally decided.

The line seems to be very sharply drawn between the clericals and extreme partisans on the one side, and the moderate men of all parties on the other. The result cannot be doubtful. There will be a large amount of wrangling, but the bigots will have to try to become Canadians first and Catholics afterwards.

Mr. James Fisher, M.P.P., says: "When the settlement is satisfactory to such representative Catholics as Mr. Laurier and Mr. Tarte, surely it is not insufficient." Of course, it will not be unsatisfactory or insufficient to the men who have made it. The point is, will these men turn out to be truly representative Catholics? We sincerely hope they will.

The Rev. Alex. Grant thinks the settlement "contains the obnoxious feature of what to me is practically a Separate School." Where there is a large number of Catholic pupils, religious teaching necessarily entails separation to some extent. Mr. Grant should advocate purely secular schools if he wants no sort of separation.

Mr. Dickey thinks the agreement would eventually lead to separate schools, and no doubt it may do so; but the separate schools would only be supported by the irreconcilables; the bulk of the people will no doubt choose a superior education, less taxes, and some independence of the clergy under public schools, in preference to supporting the separate schools. They have largely done so already.

Mr. Ewart very naturally does not look upon the settlement as a valid one. His friends are not in it, and besides, to continue the fight will pay better. With a very large number of Protestants, he said, he "resolutely opposed the elimination from what are usually termed secular studies of the religious element." The same old story. It is not enough to have God in the school. You must have him in the algebra and geometry lessons, in handwriting and drawing classes, in geography and anatomy. If the way is not very plain, the priest or teacher has plenty of time to straighten it out, and the children will only learn a little less of some things that are "not of much use without a knowledge of God." No, friend Ewart, as you say, it "does not require a prophet's eye to foresee" the outcome of such teaching as this. The people in Quebec form an object-lesson about which there can be no mistake.

Mr. Paul G. Martineau, avocat, says the settlement, to be final and unappealable, must be ratified by similar Dominion legislation to that to be passed by Manitoba. But, like the others referred to, he forgets the point of the last decision of the Privy Council—that the minority had the right of appeal to the Governor-General in Council. If the "Governor-General in Council" hears the appeal and decides upon it in the sense of the agreement, and in a manner satisfactory to the Manitoba Government, no Dominion legislation is necessary. It is only in the event of the Governor General in Council deciding in a way adverse to the Manitoba Parliament that Dominion legislation would be necessary.

The *Patrie* blames Archbishop Langevin for not accepting the school settlement, and it says: "In the interest of our race and even of our faith, we cannot follow the Archbishop of St. Boniface; we are unwilling to follow him on the dangerous ground where he wants to carry our whole province."

Mr. St. Pierre, the Montreal *Herald's* correspondent who is investigating the condition of the schools throughout Quebec, tells the story of his visit to Abbé Perus, of St. Tite, a young parish with a large population and a magnificent stone church. The correspondent stated his mission, but the Abbé looked at him in horror as he replied: "Sir, education belongs to the bishops. Laymen have no business to meddle with the schools. It was to the bishops that Christ said: 'Go forth and teach all nations.' *Comprenez-vous?*" He did, and left.



GRAVE AND GAY.

RUDYARD KIPLING IN HEAVEN.

*THE following lines, "Envoi," are from Rudyard Kipling's last volume.

When Earth's last picture is painted, and the tubes are twisted and dried,
When the oldest colors have faded, and the youngest critics have died,
We shall rest, and, faith, we shall need it—lie down for an aeon or two,
Till the Master of all Good Workmen shall set us to work anew!

And those that were good shall be happy; they shall sit in a golden chair;
They shall splash at a ten-league canvas with brushes of comets' hair;
They shall find real saints to draw from—Magdalene, Peter, and Paul;
They shall work for an age at a sitting and never be tired at all!

And only the Master shall praise us, and only the Master shall blame;
And no one shall work for money, and no one shall work for fame;
But each for the joy of the working, and each in his separate star,
Shall draw the Thing as he sees it for the God of Things as They Are!

Parishioner—What does the Bible mean when it says, "He was clothed with curses as with a garment?" Parson—Oh, it means that he had a habit of swearing.

"Ah, good morning," said the early bird to the worm. "Looking for a job?" "That's what. Anything I can do for you?" "Yes, you'll about fill the bill, I think."

An old man was breaking stones one day on a country road in Wales when a gentleman came riding along. "Bother these stones! Take them out of my way!" he said. "Where can I take them to, your Honor?" "I don't care where; take them to Hades if you like." "Don't you think, your Honor," said the old man, "that I'd better take 'em to heaven? They'll be less in your Honor's way there!"

Mr. Augustus J. C. Hare, in his recent book, tells a good story of Father Healy, who was breakfasting with Mr. Gladstone lately. Mr. Gladstone said to him, "Father Healy, I went into a church in Rome once, and was offered a plenary indulgence for fifty francs. On what principle does your church grant such things?" Father Healy replied: "Well, Mr. Gladstone, I don't want to go into theology with you, but all I can say is, that if my church offered you a plenary indulgence for fifty francs, she let you off very cheap."

According to a recently-returned missionary from China, Rev. Dr. J. F. Masters, the Chinese word for heaven is "teen," with an aspirate on the vowels. He once got into trouble over this word. He left out the aspirate, with the result that the word meant "crazy." After Dr. Masters had studied Cantonese a few months he endeavored to preach a sermon. He wrote it out carefully, but made so many blunders in tones, vowel quantities, and aspirates that some of the Chinese remarked how much the English language resembled the Chinese. They supposed that he had been preaching in English! On another occasion he meant to order a roast chicken, and told his cook to go out and set fire to the street.

A Winnipeg correspondent sends us this story: A certain Anglican divine, locally very well known, was asked one day by his little son for a bicycle for his birthday. "Pray for it," the father said, "and perhaps God will send you one." Earnestly the boy prayed; but on coming down to breakfast on the morning of his birthday, he found beside his chair an inferior tricycle such as very small boys use. Looking at the machine for a minute in silence, the lad exclaimed, in a voice of mingled disappointment and scorn, "Why, God, don't you know the difference yet between a bicycle and a tricycle?" In mitigation of the double fraud thus practised by the divine upon his son, it is perhaps only fair to say that the former had wit enough to appreciate the humor of the thing, and "gave it away."