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

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
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
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HOW BRITISH INTERESTS
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CANADIAN LIBERAL PARTY

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CANADA AND THE NAVY

THE REAL EMERGENCY

**The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance
and
Some of its Consequences**

**How British Interests Have Been
Sacrificed to Serve Party Ends**

What Policy Should Canada Adopt?

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

THE LIBERAL POLICY—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office
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1913

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N369

1913

C. 2

THE NATIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND SOME OF ITS CONSEQUENCES.

What is the explanation of Mr. Borden's present proposal of an expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battle-ships in the world, to be owned by Canada, but to be given to the British Admiralty, as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later? It is not to be found in any "emergency" in Britain, it is not to be found in any expressed desire of the Canadian people. It is, in fact, in open defiance of the wish of the people's representatives as given expression to in the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909, approving of the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service, to which further endorsement was given in the enactment by Parliament in May 1910 of the Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada. It is a complete reversal of the hitherto accepted policy of co-operation in defence between the Mother country and the Dominion, and a deliberate attempt at abandonment of rights of self-government on which alone imperial unity with local autonomy can be maintained. It is in complete opposition to Mr. Borden's own previously expressed convictions as to what is most in the interests of Canada and the British Empire. How can so extraordinary and far reaching a change in principle and policy be explained?

The explanation lies unhappily in an alliance contracted for the sake of gaining office, as unpatriotic as it was for the time being successful, but which for a year or more paralysed the hand of the Administration it helped to bring into being.

It is and will ever remain a reproach to the Conservative Party in Canada, and though of necessity openly avowed for some time past, it is without defenders among many loyal Conservatives even to-day. If it be true that a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, then the hybrid policy born of this unholy alliance is doomed, once the will of an enlightened electorate is given an opportunity of pronouncing upon it.

To appreciate the present situation aright, it is necessary to trace briefly the several steps by which it has been brought about. It is not necessary however, to go back earlier than the resolution of March 1909, which embodied the unanimous expression of opinion of the parliament of Canada as to the policy which, wholly irrespective of party, should be pursued by Canadian statesmen with respect to Naval defence.

How the question of Naval Defence Arose.

The Resolution of March 1909 owes its introduction to a motion by the Hon. George E. Foster which expressed the opinion that "in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports." It was the responsibility and financial burden of the protection of Canada's coast lines, and Can-

Canada's great seaports, that out of a spirit of self-help and self-respect Canadians were to take their proper share in assuming. It was this object that members of the House of Commons had in mind when later, in the spirit appealed to, they voted unanimously to approve of any necessary expenditure towards the speedy construction of a Canadian Naval Service, which was the main feature of the resolution as finally adopted.

Prior to the passing of this resolution, Canada's recognition of her obligation in the matter of defence had been limited to defence on land. The resolution extended the obligation to defence at sea, of Canadian coasts and trade routes, and the provision thereby, should the need arise, of more effective means of co-operation with the other forces of the British Navy, in the common defence of the Empire at sea.

All the outlying Dominions concerned.

But Canada, of the outlying Dominions, was not the only one to assume a larger measure of responsibility at that time. It will be remembered that one result of the discussions which took place at that time in the parliament at Westminster was an immediate response from all the self-governing Dominions to what then appeared to be an increasing need on the part of the Motherland. On the 22nd March, the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type, and of a second of the same type, if necessary. On the 29th March, the Canadian House of Commons passed its resolution. On the 15th April, Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the British Empire, so far as Australia was concerned, this object would be best attained by the encouragement of naval development in that country.

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was opportune for the holding of a conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom, in regard to the question of Imperial Defence, and on the 30th April sent an invitation to the Dominion Ministers of the four Dominions and to the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the Empire with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

Canada and Australia to organize Naval Services.

The Conference was held in London in the summer of 1909. There were present representatives from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the Canadian representatives being the Hon. Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, the Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major General Sir Percy Lake, and Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill. The question of naval defence was specially discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd, 5th and 6th of August, the Earl of Crewe being in

the chair. As a result of this Conference an agreement was come to as respects Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the obligations they were to assume. Canada and Australia were to begin the organisation of Naval services of their own, New Zealand to contribute to the British Navy, on condition of British ships being placed in her waters.

When the Ministers who attended the Conference on Imperial and naval defence returned from England in the fall of 1909, a bill for the creation of a Canadian Naval Service was immediately prepared by the Government with the aid of Admiralty experts and submitted to parliament at its next session.

After considerable discussion, it received the Royal assent on March 4, 1910 and passed into law as "The Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada."

How the Naval Question was dragged into Party Politics.

Mr. Foster's motion respecting the defence of Canadian coasts and trade routes was introduced, as has been mentioned, on March 20th, 1909. The resolution as finally adopted was passed during the evening of the same day. The discussion in parliament was therefore, brief. Case, however, the Laurier Administration began to give effect to the resolution, and it became apparent that it was to mean something more than a pious expression of goodwill on the part of Canada towards the Mother Country, popular agitation was started in the country against it. In the Province of Quebec especially, attention was drawn to what was looked upon as a new departure, and exaggerated and alarmist statements as to what it might involve were widely circulated. It soon became apparent that naval expenditure, like increased expenditure on the militia, was not likely to meet with ready acceptance on the part of the people of the Dominion, and that a government undertaking the carrying out of a permanent policy in this connection was certain to incur great political risks. On the other hand, the growing sense of national self-respect was felt to demand that something be done which would relieve Canada of the reproach that notwithstanding her position among the outlying Dominions and her great development, she was prepared to rest for her security in a position of dependence upon the Mother land, at a time when the burden of sea defence was beginning to weigh heavily upon the tax payers of the British Isles. It was known, too, that a strong patriotic sentiment could be easily aroused whenever it could be made to appear, as was true in the case of the South African war, that the Mother country was in real need of assistance.

With this knowledge of the situation, the leaders of the Conservative party decided to turn to their party advantage the difficult position in which the Laurier Government had been placed in consequence of its endeavours to give effect to the unanimous resolution of parliament. Indifferent to the demands of a disinterested patriotism, they decided to drag the question of naval defence into the realm of contentious party politics, to reap a party advantage wholly regardless of its effect upon national honour or duty, or the larger "imperial claims" to which in their speeches, they were so

ond of alluding. They knew the resolution had placed the Laurier Government in a position where entering upon a permanent naval policy was a necessity, and they believed that with the apathy, and in some parts, open hostility throughout the country, to anything in the nature of a permanent obligation, it might be possible to embarrass the Administration once popular opinion became sufficiently aroused. They said, "this is our chance, let us take advantage of it."

One Attitude for Quebec Another for Ontario.

The lack of enthusiasm over any naval policy was general throughout Canada. At best, it was looked upon as the discharge of a duty, and electors generally speaking are not as much concerned with duties as with rights. Liabilities are never as popular as assets. But it was in the Province of Quebec that the opposition to a permanent policy was strongest. There the people were led to believe that any permanent Naval policy involved more than the fulfilling of a national duty; it was held to include imperial obligations of a wholly new and in some respects dangerous kind. The whole thing was represented as a deliberate design on the part of British Imperialists to draw Canada, and especially French-Canadians, into the vortex of European militarism.

Entertaining the view that the policy was not popular in Quebec, and that once submitted to the people in that Province the popular vote would be against it, the Tory Leaders decided that when the government brought down its measure, they would meet it by a **proposal to do nothing** involving permanent expenditures without first submitting the permanent policy to the people. On the other hand, it was well known that this purely negative attitude would not prove sufficient, and that such a course, by itself, would beget the active opposition of the jingo element, who were loudest in their insistence on something being done, and that without delay. While numerically this element in the population is by no means the most considerable, the wealth it commands, and the control it exercises over a considerable portion of the press, places it in a way, if it so desires, of making its voice heard and its influence felt. **How to retain the support of this jingo element and at the same time appear to be doing nothing of a permanent nature, became therefore the all important question. The way out was found in the device of an "emergency".** Let an "emergency" be proclaimed, and the British flag sufficiently waved, and the natural impulse of loyal affection for the Mother land might be counted upon to carry through such proposals as might be made and at the same time conceal all ulterior designs.

The Device of "An Emergency" Used to Serve Party Ends In 1910.

There is no longer any room for doubt, that this was the plan the Conservative Leaders worked out after the session of 1908-09 and decided to begin putting into operation just as soon as the government brought down its measure.

In the belief that a plebiscite would result in his province in a

veto upon all proposals, Mr. Monk, the French-Canadian leader of the Conservative party, was to ally himself with the Nationalists of Quebec, become their parliamentary leader, and oppose anything being done until the people were first consulted by plebiscite or otherwise. Mr. Borden, as leader of the party for the Dominion, was to hold to opposition to any permanent policy until the people were consulted, but in order to retain the support of the jingo element was to raise the cry of an "emergency" and demand an immediate contribution of "money" or "dreadnoughts"! This, it was believed, to those who desired some recognition of Canada's obligations, would serve as an evidence of Canadian loyalty, and of Canada's desire to assist the Mother land, while to those who had little or no liking for the recognition of any permanent obligation, the emergency contribution could be pointed to as a means of getting rid of this obligation, and incurring no future liability. How this combination was worked out is familiar to all who followed the debate.

Mr. Borden and Mr. Monk Work Together While Appearing to Oppose Each Other.

On January 12th, Sir Wilfrid brought down the government's measure, an Act to provide for a Canadian Naval service. Mr. Borden took up the role he had been assigned. He pictured the "emergency" in words as graphic as language could command. Having quoted Mr. Foster's remarks of the previous year to the effect that "peril stands today at the gateway" he asked, "Has the peril passed?" and replied, "No, Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year. Has Germany's policy been modified in the meantime? No, on the contrary, Germany has put forward the greatest Naval Budget in her history."

Mr. Borden went on, "It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. The war has already begun, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle. Does the dissolution of the Empire egg nothing to Canada and her people?"

"When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also and with it there departs every constitutional guarantee which it contains. All beyond is chaos and darkness....."

"I say to my Rt. Hon. friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him: Go on with your naval service. Proceed cautiously and surely..... Lay your proposals before the people and give them if necessary opportunity to be heard, but do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend the Empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary. We have no Dreadnought ready: we have no fleet unit at hand. But we have the resources, and I trust the patriotism, to provide a fleet unit, or at least a Dreadnought, without one moment's unnecessary delay. Or, and in my opinion this would be the better course, we can place the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the admiralty to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Jan. 12, 1910, pp. 1815, 1816, 1817 and 1818.)

On February 3rd, Mr. Borden moved an amendment embodying these suggestions which he put in the following words.

"That no permanent policy should be entered upon involving large future expenditures of this character until it has been submitted to the people and has received their approval.

"That in the meantime, the immediate duty of Canada and the impending necessities of the Empire can best be discharged and met by placing without delay at the disposal of the imperial authorities as a free and loyal contribution from the people of Canada, such an amount as may be sufficient to purchase or construct two battleships or armoured cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type, giving to the Admiralty full discretion to expend the said sum at such time and for such purposes of Naval defence as in their judgment, may best serve to increase the united strength of the Empire and thus assure its peace and security."

Mr. Borden concluded at 6 o'clock. When the House re-assembled Mr. Monk rose and performed his part, by moving as an amendment to Mr. Borden's amendment that the Bill ought "to be submitted to the Canadian people in order to obtain at once the nation's opinion by means of a plebiscite."

Mr. Borden voted for Mr. Monk's amendment, but Mr. Monk voted against Mr. Borden's. Mr. Borden was keeping an eye to all of Canada, Mr. Monk to Quebec alone. Both voted against the Naval Service Bill, which, notwithstanding, passed the House of Commons, and on March 4th, received the royal assent and became law. The Laurier Government then began to give effect to its provisions. This was the signal for taking up actively throughout the country the line of campaign commenced in Parliament. The first opportunity of testing popular opinion came with the by-election in Drummond-Arthabaska which took place in November 1910.

The Beginning of the Nationalist-Conservative Alliance.

What occurred in connection with the Drummond-Arthabaska election will not soon be forgotten. It was important in more ways than one. The Government candidate was defeated and the means taken to bring about this defeat mark the beginning in the constituencies of the alliance secretly formed at the outset, but later openly proclaimed, between the Nationalist party of the Province of Quebec with its anti-British sentiments and propaganda, and the Conservative party of Canada with its profuse protestations of loyalty to the Empire and the flag, and which in the Province of Quebec, became the outstanding feature in the general elections of September 1911.

The Nationalist party as is generally known came into being in the Province of Quebec under the leadership of Mr. Henri Bourassa and Mr. Armand Lavergne, ostensibly for the purpose of championing the rights of the French-Catholics in the Dominion. There being little in the way of encroachment on the liberties of any class of citizens in Canada, this party might have failed of notice in Canadian politics, had it not been for the alliance with it for political purposes of the Conservative party. The alliance was effected, as has been indicated, to bring about the defeat if

possible of the Laurier administration upon the naval policy unanimously agreed to in March 1909.

How the Conservatives Aided the Nationalists in Their First Anti-British Appeal.

The constituency of Drummond-Arthabaska had long been looked upon as a Liberal stronghold. The by-election which took place November 3, 1910, was occasioned by a vacancy which occurred upon the elevation of the sitting member from the House of Commons to the Senate. When the Liberal party placed its candidate in the field, he was immediately attacked by the Nationalists because of his being the supporter of an administration which was working out a measure of naval defence along lines approved by the British Admiralty, and which was seeking to create a Canadian Naval Service which in time of stress might co-operate with the other forces of the British navy in the maintenance of British supremacy upon the high seas. The Nationalists then placed a candidate of their own in the field to oppose him and the granting of assistance to Britain, by the establishment of a Canadian Naval Service was made the ground of attack.

Under circumstances such as these, one would have supposed that the Conservative party, so fond of boasting of its loyalty, would have seen well to enter the field with a candidate of its own, in support of Mr. Borden's idea of an "emergency contribution," or failing this, would have given its support to the candidate, who stood for at least some assistance being given Britain. Instead the Conservative party not only refrained from placing a candidate in the field, but secretly did all in its power to aid the candidate of the Nationalists. As a result the Nationalist-Conservative alliance carried the day. The forces opposed to any assistance being given to Britain triumphed. The Liberal candidate was defeated and Mr. Arthur Gilbert, the nominee of the Nationalists, was returned to Parliament as their first elected representative.

The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance Secret at First.

On the occasion of Mr. Gilbert's entry in the House of Commons, he was presented to the Speaker in the customary formal manner, the introduction being made by Mr. Monk, but in painful contrast to the rousing reception usually given a member who has carried a riding in a by-election, Mr. Gilbert was compelled to take his seat in absolute silence, not a member of the Conservative party dared to openly avow the new alliance which had been formed, or to extend a welcome to their newly elected fellow member.

When the Drummond-Arthabaska election took place, it was not anticipated that there would be a general election for two or three years at the earliest. The question of reciprocity, which became the main issue later, had not come up at that time. When, in 1911 it became apparent that a general election on this question would be held, what had been achieved through the alliance of Nationalists and Conservatives at the Drummond-Arthabaska election was naturally recalled. The effectiveness of this alliance for political

purposes had been so completely demonstrated in this by-election, Liberal defeat had been so pleasing, the taste of victory so alluring, that what had been entered upon light-heartedly enough and mainly as a test, in this one particular instance, became irresistible as a temptation, when the prospect of a general election loomed in sight. What for a single occasion had been a secret understanding, became all along the line, a binding compact for the sake of gaining office. "Anything to win" became the watch-word, and the method of the Conservative party. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's effort, to do his part as a citizen of the Dominion, and a British subject in meeting Canada's obligation respecting naval defence, were forged into a weapon to be used against him in a different fashion in the several Provinces.

The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance An All Important Factor In The Elections of 1911.

In Quebec the "loyal" Conservative party left it to Mr. Bourassa, Mr. Lavergne and Mr. Monk to stir up and play upon the fears and prejudices of their French-Canadian fellow-citizens, telling them that because of his efforts to consistently carry out the naval resolution of Parliament, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was too British, his policy too imperial, and that he was doing too much for England. Whilst in Ontario, and in other parts of the Dominion, Mr. Borden and his colleagues denounced Sir Wilfrid as anti-British, or not British enough, sought to discountenance the efforts he was making by referring to the proposed naval service as a "tin pot" navy, and alleged that his Government's policy on the trade question was one of annexation with the United States.

This appeal to passion and prejudice, unpatriotic as it was, had its results. In the Province of Quebec, the Nationalists came out of the struggle with 20 seats 4 of which had previously been held by Conservatives, but 16 of which represented gains over the Liberals. It is generally conceded these 16 seats were won by the Nationalists, partly because of the adherence of the Liberal party to a policy which recognized Canada's obligation in the matter of naval defence, and partly because of pledges given in the name and upon the alleged authority of Mr. Borden that if returned to power he would repeal the Naval Service Act and would adopt no policy as respects naval service without first submitting it to the people for approval. The latter undertaking, in the absence of any reference by Mr. Borden to the need for an emergency contribution, was taken to mean before anything at all would be done.

The Lengths to Which the Conservatives Went in Helping The Nationalists.

But the Nationalist Conservative alliance was carried further than this in the general elections of 1911. By mutual agreement, the constituencies were divided between them so that where Nationalist candidates were most likely to carry, no Conservative candidate was put up, but Conservative support was given to the Nationalist, and where it was thought a straight Conservative was

most likely to carry, no Nationalist candidate was proposed, but Nationalist support was given the Conservative upon his agreeing to Nationalist conditions. As in the case of the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election the Conservatives did all in their power to elect the Nationalist candidates. But they went farther than in the case of the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election. The alliance in many ways was openly proclaimed. Conservatives in some instances appeared upon the Nationalist platform, and in the Province of Ontario in constituencies where there were a large number of French-Canadian electors, the alliance was evidenced to the extent of Mr. Bourassa, Leader of the Nationalist party, appearing and speaking on behalf of Conservative candidates. Even English-speaking Conservatives who were supported by Mr. Borden in person, but who happened to be in constituencies where there was a considerable French-Canadian vote, came out openly in the presence of Mr. Borden declaring their intention to withhold support from any Government which would attempt to carry out the purport of the resolution of March 1909, without first giving the people an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. For example Mr. James Davidson, of Montreal, a wealthy manufacturer and Conservative candidate in the County of Shefford in the province of Quebec, issued a manifesto which after mentioning that he had been absent from the convention on the day of his nomination, went on to express his desire to declare the course he would pursue if elected. This was set forth in the following words:

"Electors, you are called to pronounce yourselves on two great questions: the Reciprocity and the Navy....."

"I declare that if I am elected on the 21st of September next, I shall work and vote against any Prime Minister of whatever party he may be, who shall continue the present policy of the navy, as voted in 1910, without having previously given to the Canadian people the occasion of pronouncing themselves upon this question by way of plebiscite or special referendum"

Similarly Dr. Pickel, another English-speaking Conservative in the constituency of Missisquoi, where there are many French-Canadians, in an address to the voters in this constituency published in *Le Devoir* August 12th, 1911 said:

"If I am elected, I will give my word and my vote—I declare it emphatically in advance—to obtain the repeal of the Naval Bill. I will vote against any Prime Minister, whether Mr. Borden or anybody else, who will not repeal this Bill in its entirety."

Mr. Borden's Own Attitude Through the Campaign of 1911 and Present Policy Designed to Further Nationalist Ends.

Mr. Borden himself during the whole of the campaign, very carefully refrained from making anything in the way of a definite promise of assistance to Britain in connection with naval defence. He attacked the Laurier policy, but did not propose one of his own. During the contest he published two important manifestos. In the first, issued to the electors of the Dominion, on the day Parliament dissolved, and the general elections were proclaimed, there was no reference to the navy and much was made of this circumstance in

Nationalist and Conservative organs in the Province of Quebec. In the second, published in the Montreal Gazette and other newspapers of August 15th there was a reference to the Laurier Naval service, but no promise of assistance to Britain by Mr. Borden himself. Referring to the policy of a Canadian Naval Service, the manifesto read, "It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip, and maintain, it will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives and it will not add an iota to the fighting strength of the Empire." From the plan of campaign followed it is now apparent, unbelievable as it may seem, that the words "It will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives", in this manifesto were put there by deliberate design, to enable his followers to work upon the fears of the French-Canadians. That Laurier's policy meant conscription, that it meant taking sons from their parents, and fathers from their children to sacrifice them in England's wars in Europe or Asia was the line of campaign successfully pursued through the Drummond-Arthabaska election and these words beyond a shadow of doubt, appear now to have been put there, that they might be quoted and the same kind of campaign carried on in all the Quebec ridings in 1911. A circumstance which strongly justifies this view, is that it has since been shown, that while these were in the manifesto as printed in the Quebec papers, they were omitted from the manifesto as printed in the Halifax and several other papers.

There are grounds for believing that even today, it is this, among other reasons, which has led Mr. Borden to adopt the "emergency" expedient and refrain from bringing down a permanent policy. His followers are telling the habitants of Quebec that a gift of dreadnoughts, so long as England is obliged to man and maintain them, means that we pay for our defence, but run no risk of any lives being sacrificed. If there are to be wars, Englishmen not French-Canadians, will be killed. Reading the speech on Mr. Borden's proposals delivered on December 13th, 1912 by the Hon. L. P. Pelletier, the Postmaster-General, one of the Nationalist members of Mr. Borden's Cabinet, it will be readily seen that what Mr. Pelletier was aiming at in his comparisons with the Liberal policy, was to convey the impression that a Canadian Naval Service meant "conscription" a word he repeatedly used, and that Mr. Borden's proposals meant the hiring of others to do the fighting should such ever become necessary. The speech was delivered within the hearing of Mr. Borden and his colleagues.

While in the campaign of 1911, Mr. Borden was issuing his manifestos in English for the whole Dominion, Mr. Bourassa, his Nationalist ally was issuing in French, appeals specially designed for the voters of Quebec, their distribution being aided as has since been shown, by funds supplied from Conservative sources. The translation of the concluding paragraph of a manifesto issued by Mr. Bourassa is as follows:

"We will prove, in the first place, that the Laurier-Brodeur navy is essentially an imperial institution, foreign to Canadian interests."

How the Conservative-Nationalist Ministry came to be formed.

Sowing to the wind in this reckless fashion, Mr. Borden was sooner or later to reap the whirlwind. In the meantime more immediate consequences had to be satisfied; the conditions of the compact had to be fulfilled, a Conservative-Nationalist Ministry had to be formed. The first political act of the Leader of the Conservative party after his election as Prime Minister was in the nature of an embrace of the Parliamentary Leader of the Nationalists. Mr. Borden had little dreamed when he associated himself so intimately with the Nationalists at the beginning of the campaign, that the result could be more than a possible reduction of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's substantial majority in the House. He was prepared to risk a more or less doubtful association, but as the campaign proceeded he became more and more involved, and as has already been said it was "anything to win" and, the "anything," it now appears, included an understanding or pledges that if returned to power there would be in his Government ample Nationalist representation, and in any course of policy which he might follow, full recognition of the Nationalist point of view.

The sacrifice of British interests as respects immediate action and permanent policy, the basis of Nationalist-Conservative union in Mr. Borden's Cabinet.

The basis of union of the Nationalist-Conservative Ministry is apparent enough. The Nationalists held firmly to their position as dictated by Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Lavergne, that there should be no permanent policy without an appeal to the people, and Mr. Borden, notwithstanding his insistence in 1909 on the insertion of the word "speedy" before the words "organization of a Canadian Naval Service" in the resolution of March 29, whether by silent or open consent, yielded absolutely. It now appears that he is prepared to abandon the idea of a Canadian Naval service altogether, if only he can retain enough of his Nationalist following, and at the same time find some means of satisfying the jingoists.

Hon. L. P. Pelletier, Postmaster General, speaking at Jeune Lorette, before his electors of Quebec County, on October 27th, 1911, when re-elected by acclamation as a Minister in the Borden Government said: "It has not been necessary in order that I might accept a portfolio in this new Government that I should retract one word of what I said when I was a candidate before. As a re-elected Minister I am here before you on this question (the Navy) with the same ideas, the same words, the same programme as formerly. . . . I have declared that if there were a plebiscite and the majority of the electors pronounced in favour of this new orientation in our politics that I would submit to that verdict, and I still hold to this declaration. In two words I was for the plebiscite I remain for the plebiscite. If better were offered me it goes without saying I should not refuse it." (L'Evenement, Quebec, October 28th, 1911.)

But there are evidences that there were even further conditions either tacitly or avowedly made, in the union effected between the Conservatives and the Nationalists at the formation of Mr. Borden's Cabinet. It will be remembered that the position of the out-and-out

Nationalist was that nothing should be done, no permanent policy, no emergency policy, without a reference to the people, and that pledges to this effect were given by many Nationalists to their constituents. It is plain that Mr. Borden could not hope to hold the jingo end of his Cabinet on any such undertaking. **To do nothing at all is too far removed from doing a great deal, as the jingoes wish.** Some compromise between the two had to be made. It is now pretty apparent that there was a compromise and that it was effected on a basis of time. Are there not grounds for believing that there is something more than a coincidence, in the circumstance that Mr. Borden's Ministry was formed on the 10th of October 1911 and that Mr. Monk's resignation took place on the 18th of October 1912? **It was evidently agreed that for a year at least nothing should be done, and no proposal either of a temporary or permanent kind brought forward.** It is now an open secret that no concrete naval proposal was ever laid before his Cabinet by Mr. Borden, till within a very few days of Mr. Monk's resignation, and rumours of Mr. Monk's intended resignation began then to circulate at once. Time is a healer of many ills, and it was evidently believed that a way out of the difficulty would be found in the course of a year's time. Naturally some price had to be paid for such a compromise as this, something had to be sacrificed, and **Canada's duty to herself and obligation to the Mother country in the matter of naval defence was made the sacrifice,** and with this such principles and views on the question as the Prime Minister, Mr. Borden, and his followers may have entertained.

How the Nationalists have made sure of their position.

It is perfectly clear that Mr. Monk's first stipulation was that **the majority of the Cabinet for Quebec should be Nationalist, not Conservative;** that, as it was to the Nationalist campaign in that province Sir Wilfrid owed the loss of 16 seats, on the theory that "to the victor belongs the spoils," Nationalists rather than Conservatives should be given the portfolios. Accordingly, Mr. Nantel, who had been in the House for one parliament and followed Mr. Monk when the latter became the parliamentary leader of the Nationalists, was given the portfolio of Inland Revenue. Mr. Louis P. Pelletier, who had never been a member of the federal House but who on account of the anti-naval campaign was glad to join in vigorously with Messrs. Bourassa and Lavergne, was made Postmaster General and taken in to the exclusion of old time Conservative members of Parliament. In this way, **Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies succeeded in having the entire French-Canadian representation in the Cabinet of new-made Nationalist rather than of old-time Conservative persuasion.** Mr. Blondin, another Nationalist follower of Mr. Monk during the previous parliament was rewarded with the office of deputy speaker. This wholesale recognition of Nationalists in the Cabinet, out of all proportion to their numbers in the House, and to the exclusion of all French Canadians who had remained loyal to Conservative principles and refused to desert the old-time Conservative for the Conservative-Nationalist camp, must have caused Mr. Borden some concern, but Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies knew that Mr. Borden was a weak leader, and that, in the alliance which had been contracted, he

had seriously compromised himself, and they were determined that he should be made to pay to the last exaction possible the price of the compromise effected.

The "Do-Nothings" and Jingoism In The Cabinet.

This Nationalist representation to the exclusion of out-and-out Conservatives in the French-speaking element in the Cabinet had its intended and inevitable effect, namely, **the complete paralysis of the Administration so far as Naval aid or policy was concerned for the period of a year and more after the Ministry was formed.** To have had this paralysis continue for a longer period of time would have meant a revolt of the opposite faction, the jingo element, of which Colonel, the Hon. Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence is the recognized leader. During the summer of 1912 Col. Hughes gave public expression in British Columbia to the fears that were agitating his own mind, and the minds of those of his colleagues in the Cabinet who think like him. Speaking at a public meeting in Vancouver under the auspices of the Conservative Club, on August 7th, the Minister of Militia is reported to have said:—

"They pooh-pooh the idea that this country will ever be invaded. Gentlemen never under-estimate your foe. More unlikely things have happened. Remember that the British Empire is the mother of civil and religious liberties the world over. It stands for law and order and decent living; it is a trite saying that the British bayonet and the British missionary have reformed the world, but our great curse at present is apathy and laziness. Look at our crowded jails, and we call ourselves civilized! Gentlemen we are no more than half civilized to-day, and **war is closer than you dream.** The great peril is from Germany. Why? Because Germany must have colonies within a generation or she will begin to go down. She is building ships on borrowed money and must seek new territory. She has large numbers of citizens in the South American countries, and there are only two fields where she can find the needed outlet for her surplus population. One is along the South American seaboard, the other is in British colonies.

"It is well known that Germany made a tentative offer to stop the ship-building race in return for concessions of British colonies. But this will never happen so long as the old flag floats. There was grave danger last year. The world awoke one morning to find Germany established at Agadir, a port in Morocco. She meant to establish a naval base there, but Britain told her to get out. For two days war was very near.

"**Germany has to be taught a lesson, and the lesson to be taught her is that Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand are behind the Mother Country.** We know that Germany was behind Kruger, and that there was a definite scheme to oust Great Britain from South Africa, but the fact that the colonies sprang to arms and sailed from all quarters of the globe to the assistance of Great Britain caused the scheme to be frustrated.

"Now gentlemen the time has come when a definite plan of Empire defence must be adopted. Let it take the form of a full partnership with the Mother Country."

The Device of an "Emergency" again employed to reconcile Nationalist Conservative Differences.

It is clear that with men entertaining views such as this sitting side by side in a Cabinet with other men holding diametrically opposite opinions, and pledged to do nothing without an appeal in the first instance to the people, a prime minister who feels insecure in office, and wishes above all else to avoid an election, has no bed of roses and no easy path ahead. **Here is the real emergency.** On the one hand, pledged not to adopt a permanent policy in the matter of Naval defence before submitting it to the people, on the other, unable to retain the support of his jingoist colleagues without doing something, what is Mr. Borden, whose desire is office at all costs, to do? **Nationalists and jingoes have both to be satisfied, or one or other of these elements in Mr. Borden's Cabinet will separate from him and a fatal dismemberment of the Administration take place.** Fall back on the idea of an "emergency" confronting British Naval supremacy is his one and only recourse and this he has done in the hope that, by adopting a course which will permit of a continuance of the Conservative-Nationalist alliance, he may be enabled to ret. in a sufficient Nationalist following to hold power a little longer without the necessity of appealing to the people.

Mr. Borden's visit to England to help himself rather than Britain out of an emergency.

That this is Mr. Borden's object is abundantly apparent from his attitude while in England during the summer of 1912 and the question he put to the British Admiralty. **Mr. Borden did not go to England to consult the government on the best course of policy for Canada to pursue. He did not go even to ask if there were an emergency. He went to find a means of raising an emergency cry to serve his own party ends, and to meet the emergency in his own Cabinet.**

According to the words of the Admiralty Memorandum which Mr. Borden presented to parliament his inquiry was not; is there an emergency? Do you want an emergency contribution? but, "in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective" or to quote his own words in the House of Commons on December 5th, 1912 "in what form temporary and immediate aid can best be given by Canada." **Mr. Borden returned, not with any expressed opinion of the Admiralty or the British government to the effect that immediate aid was necessary, or that an emergency of any kind existed, but with the same purpose he had in mind when he left for England, namely, a determination to make it appear that his visit to England had disclosed the need for an emergency contribution which would be granted on behalf of Canada without an appeal to the people.**

Mr. Borden had first of all to get his Cabinet to consent to this somewhat doubtful course. But here he encountered opposition at once. Having been told all the premier knew, the **Hon. F. D. Monk, the Minister of Public Works** was unable to see any necessity for the course he proposed, and tendered his resignation rather than be a party to it. He did so in the following words,

contained in a letter, a copy of which was given to parliament on January 14th.

Ottawa, October 18th. 1912

My dear Premier:--

I regret to find I cannot concur in the decision arrived at by the Cabinet yesterday to place on behalf of Canada an emergency contribution of \$35,000,000 at the disposal of the British government for naval purposes, with the sanction of Parliament, but without giving the Canadian people an opportunity of expressing its approval of this important step before it is taken. Such a concurrence would be at variance with my pledges, and the Act proposed is of sufficient gravity to justify my insistence that it goes beyond the scope of the Constitutional Act of 1867. Holding this view as a member of your Cabinet I feel it my duty to place my resignation in your hand. Permit me to add my decision has been reached with regret on account of my agreeable relations at all times with yourself.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) F. D. MONK

The British Cabinet Drawn in to Help Out Nationalist-Conservative Intrigues.

The next difficulty Mr. Borden had to be prepared to meet, was not the opposition of his own Cabinet, but the opposition of the two Houses of parliament. To help him out in this he hit upon the device of presenting to parliament a state paper which might make it appear that he was carrying out the expressed wish of the British Government. Accordingly when parliament met, he introduced into the debate on December 5th a Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty. The impression Mr. Borden sought to convey in his speech was that the Cabinet had this Memorandum before it at the time of deciding upon its policy, and that they had decided to ask a large expenditure for ships because the British Admiralty had requested it.

It now appears on the most conclusive evidence that the truth was quite the reverse. Mr. Monk the Minister of Public Works resigned from the Cabinet on October the 18th, 1912. His resignation was tendered Mr. Borden in the letter above quoted which expresses Mr. Monk's regret at not being able to concur in the "decision reached at the Cabinet meeting yesterday" (October 17th). This makes it perfectly plain that the Borden Cabinet decided upon its policy on October 17th. The communication from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Hon. Lewis Harcourt, forwarding the Admiralty Memorandum to His Royal Highness the Governor-General, is dated Downing St. (London), October 25th, 1912 a week after Mr. Monk's resignation, and eight days after Mr. Borden's Cabinet had reached a decision as to what course it would take.

What transpired in the interval, is very readily surmised. Mr. Monk's resignation on the ground that he saw no need for an

emergency contribution after having heard all that Mr. Borden and his colleagues had to say, made it perfectly plain to the Cabinet that it would be next to impossible to expect parliament in the face of Mr. Monk's resignation to acquiesce in the policy decided upon unless in some way something could be obtained from the British Admiralty which could be used in a manner that would help to support the decision reached. The Hon. George E. Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce had left for England just about the time that Mr. Borden and his colleagues returned to Canada. He was in England at the time of Mr. Monk's resignation and Mr. Borden having communicated with him by cable, there can now be little doubt that he spent the week following in having the British government prepare the Memorandum which Mr. Borden would have the people of Canada believe was the document on which the decision of the Cabinet and himself was based.

The Admiralty Memorandum being dated Downing Street, October 25th, could not have left England before that date and as a consequence, could not have reached Ottawa until early in the month of November fully a fortnight after Mr. Monk's resignation, and the decision of the Cabinet to vote \$35,000,000 as an emergency contribution without an appeal to the people.

"How was this document used by Mr. Borden? Here are his own words quoted from Hansard, on December 5th.

"We have asked His Majesty's Government in what form temporary and immediate aid can best be given by Canada at this juncture. The answer has been unhesitating and unequivocal. Let me again quote it." Having given the quotation which served his purpose from the memorandum which he had previously read aloud in full to the House, he proceeded precisely as he had done in February 1910, nearly three years before, to use language which would convey the impression of some great impending calamity, and thereby conceal the ulterior purposes and ends in view. He even held to the same metaphor as in 1910, the only difference being that instead of speaking of all beyond as "chaos and darkness," he confined himself to the storm itself, making its presence about as vivid as the English language would permit. Here are his words after requesting parliament to vote \$35,000,000.

"To-day while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until the impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster."

How grotesque these words sound when one remembers the Nationalist-Conservative alliance and the consequences which they are intended to conceal!

The Nationalist-Conservative Alliance controls Mr. Borden and his Cabinet to-day.

The situation to-day as respects Conservatives and Nationalists, and as respects permanent policy and emergency, is just the same as in 1910 when this double game was worked for the first time. With this difference only. In 1910 the "emergency" cry was raised to help Mr. Borden and his followers to get into office, to-day it is being raised to enable them to retain office. The great advantage

if the emergency device is, that it can be brought out when it is wanted, and put away quickly when its presence is embarrassing, and it lends itself to a kind of oratorical display unsurpassed by less spectacular, though probably infinitely more important situations.

The "emergency" was needed in 1910 to reconcile the Nationalists and jingoes in the country. Now in 1912-13 it is required to reconcile the Nationalists and jingoes in the Cabinet and parliament. There has been a slight change in the use to which "the appeal to the people before the adoption of a permanent policy" attitude is being put. It was used in 1910 and 1911 as a means of leading the people to believe that the Conservative-Nationalist alliance had their interests at heart and that the people would be therefore given a chance to express their view. To-day it is being made to serve the interests of members of the alliance in the cabinet and parliament to prevent an appeal being made. It is stated that it is impossible to frame a permanent policy for years, notwithstanding that parliament in March 1909 unanimously agreed on the permanent policy Canada's Ministers should carry out. A resolution respecting an appeal to the people almost in identical words to that moved by Mr. Borden in 1910, and supported by himself and his following while in Opposition, was when proposed by Mr. Verville, representative of Labour in the House of Commons almost as unanimously voted against on February 11th of this year, by Mr. Borden and his followers including several Nationalists.

How the Game of Deception Continues to be Worked.

The means adopted in 1910 to form the alliance, and the compromises effected, are serving to hold the alliance together so far as parliament is concerned, and thereby enable Mr. Borden to retain office without an appeal to the people. Mr. Borden refuses to bring down a permanent policy, and his Nationalist friends are led to believe that he thereby remains true to his Nationalist pledges, that no permanent policy will be adopted. To those who think that the permanent policy should be one of contribution to the Imperial Navy his proposals are pointed to as the first step in a permanent policy of contribution. The "emergency" has been brought out, and an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world is sufficient for the moment to satisfy the jingoes.

One Minister, the Honourable F. D. Monk, and 7 Nationalists have remained true to their pledges, the former by resigning from the Cabinet, because after hearing all Mr. Borden had to report, he saw no evidence of an emergency and was unwilling to go back on the pledge that the people should be consulted before any course involving large expenditures was entered upon, the others for probably the same reason, by voting on February 13th, against Mr. Borden's proposals. Of the 20 Nationalists in Parliament, the remaining 12, three of whom, Mr. Coderre (who succeeded Mr. Monk), Mr. Nantel and Mr. Pelletier, are in the Cabinet, have continued their support of Mr. Borden, so the Nationalist-Conservative alliance continues for the time being to hold its own.

Mr. J. C. Guilbault, member for Joliette, one of the Nationalists

who voted against Mr. Borden's proposals on the night of February 13th, and moved an amendment that a plebiscite should be taken before effect was given to these proposals, gave as his reasons for so doing that in the last electoral campaign he had said "We condemn the Laurier law, and we shall condemn later on, when the occasion presents itself, the project of contribution." In order to be consistent with myself I have believed it my duty to propose the amendment which is now submitted to the Chamber. For me it is a point of honour, since I have engaged my word to my electors, that which I wish above all is to be faithful to engagements which I have taken in the past, and that is why I take my present attitude.

"I know that I shall disappear before any long time. Since I have an enemy much more dangerous than the Liberal party, that is the malady which will finish me before long by triumphing over me. I wish that it should be said in the time to come that the member for Joliette has been faithful to his pledged word, that he has kept the promises he had made, and that he had been consistent with himself.

"There in a few words are the reasons which have led me to propose the amendment now before this Chamber. . . . What I hold above all is the approbation of my own conscience, and the satisfaction of a duty accomplished."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates: February 13 1913, p. 3354.)

Mr. Borden's Loyalty Not to be Taken Seriously.

Whether the Nationalist in and out of the Cabinet who continued their support of Mr. Borden on the night of February 13th, were less scrupulous in their sense of honour, or had other reasons for going back on similar pledges made during the general elections of 1911 does not appear since very few of them gave any reason to parliament for their course of action. Be this as it may, the general public will be able to admire a man like Mr. Guilbault, who according to his light makes a pledge to the electors, and prefers the approbation of his own conscience in maintaining it to the blame of lesser men; but the people of Canada will find it difficult to reconcile the action of Mr. Borden in making and continuing an alliance for political ends with men whose pledge as respects British supremacy at sea has been "We condemn the Laurier law and we shall condemn later on when the occasion presents itself, the project of contribution" with his position at the time of leader of His Majesty's loyal opposition, and his present position as Prime Minister of a British Dominion.

In the light of his past and present compromises, with the Nationalists, in the circumstance that through the whole of the campaign of 1911, Mr. Borden never once spoke of a contribution of either money or ships, and when allusion was made to Naval policy, laid emphasis rather on what was to be done being placed in the first instance before the people; in the further circumstance that for more than a year after his Ministry was formed he did and said absolutely nothing towards assisting Britain in Naval defence, in view of the fact that in parliament since he has become premier, he has never once taken exception to Nationalists tactics and

utterances, it ill becomes Mr. Borden to-day to talk of loyalty, and by a kind of compulsion to seek to force through parliament on the plea of there being an emergency which "may rend this Empire asunder," a contribution from the taxpayers of Canada of \$35,000,000 for the three largest battleships in the world. Those who really understand the situation know that this is **only a device to enable him to retain power by further compromises**; a means of holding together the **Nationalist-Conservative alliance** by satisfying for the time being the jingo element in his Cabinet and party, and appearing at the same time to be holding to his pledge to the Nationalists, that nothing of a permanent character will be done without first submitting the question to the people.

The Present Position and Question.

In the light of the facts as they are, the present situation resolves itself into the question: Is not the Liberal party justified in doing all in its power by constitutional means to compel Mr. Borden to carry out the policy of a Canadian Naval Service as unanimously agreed to by parliament in 1909, and to prevent a complete departure from this position simply that by further compromises of an unpatriotic nature, he and his followers may be enabled to share the emoluments of office? **In the absence of anything save deception to justify the course on which Mr. Borden is now proposing to embark, should not the people of the Dominion be given an opportunity of pronouncing upon the policy to be followed by Canada in respect of Naval defence, and to say whether they prefer the carrying out of a policy on which both parties have been agreed in parliament, or the entering upon a policy which, not less from its origin than the ends it is intended to serve, is fraught with most serious consequences to the whole Dominion?**

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