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SEVENTEENTH SESSION

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STATEMENT BY GENERAL E.L.M. BURNS  
CANADIAN DELEGATE - FIRST COMMITTEE  
October 11, 1962

Mr. Chairman,

In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation there is nothing before this Assembly which is more urgent or fateful than the question of how to put a final stop to the testing of nuclear weapons. This is an object for whose achievement all members of the organization should stand united, for all of us will suffer if these experiments continue. The United Nations General Assembly cannot legislate an end to nuclear tests but it can and should use the immense moral force of its decisions to press for a speedy solution of the problem.

Mr. Chairman, my Government remains unequivocally opposed to all nuclear weapons tests. That virtually all delegations also oppose them has been made clear by the statements which we have listened to in the general debate in plenary. This can be taken as proof that nuclear testing is opposed by the vast majority of men and women all over the world.

Canada is opposed to further testing for two good reasons. In his statement in the general debate, the Secretary of State for External Affairs emphasized that first of all, we are gravely concerned by the dangers to human health which result from nuclear testing. In our view, which we believe is supported by scientific findings, the bodily health of everyone is endangered by exposure to additional radiation. But what is more disquieting, increased radioactivity resulting from nuclear tests can have incalculable effects on future generations. This

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generation would therefore perpetrate a grave moral wrong on posterity by continuing nuclear testing.

It may be said that from the humane and moral standpoint, these arguments are sound, but that, if considerations of defence and national security require them, nuclear weapons tests must go on, notwithstanding their undesirable effects. But does continued testing improve the security of any nation? In the short term, it may be claimed that nuclear testing is required in order to effect or restore a balance in weapon power. But is there any reason to think that national security can be maintained over the years in this way? In my view, there is not. A protracted competition in this sphere -- between super-powers already armed to a degree hardly imaginable -- can only increase international tensions, and the ultimate danger of nuclear war. The major nuclear powers are themselves in agreement that continued testing increases the pace of the armaments race. In a joint statement released last August 27 by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of USA we read the following sentences: "USA and UK cannot emphasize too strongly the urgency we attach to the problem of ending all nuclear testing once and for all. For the safety and security of all of us, this deadly competition must be halted and we, again, urge <sup>the</sup> Soviet Government to join with us in meaningful action to make this necessity a reality".

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR has been equally firm in spelling out the grave consequences of continued testing. In a letter addressed by him to Prime Minister Macmillan in April of this year, he wrote as follows: "Throughout the world the peoples are justly expressing their indignation not only because nuclear tests lead to the fouling of the atmosphere and may in some degree have a harmful effect on peoples' health and their moral and physical condition, but also -- and this is the most important point -- because the race

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to build up nuclear weapons will be accelerated even more by the new series of experimental nuclear explosions".

Clearly then dangers of further experimentation in this field are admitted. It may have grave effects both on our own health and on future generations; it is ultimately a threat to the security of mankind; it increases international tensions and reduces the possibility of agreements in other fields. If this is the belief of the leading statesmen of the nuclear powers, why can they not stop the tests? But it is not only the responsibility of the nuclear powers; nuclear testing affects all nations; to deal with it is the responsibility of all of us represented here. Can we not, as rational beings, act in our own interest?

The advantages of a test cessation agreement are many. Such an agreement would not give a special advantage to this or that country or alliance, but would be in the interest of all humanity. Let me summarize the truly impressive gains which a nuclear test ban agreement would achieve.

First, as the major powers themselves recognize, it would significantly reduce radiation hazards and improve international security.

Second, it would inhibit the development of more and more destructive nuclear weapons.

Third, it would arrest the development of nuclear weapons by an increasing number of nations, a danger whose gravity can be recognized by all, and one may say, especially by the present nuclear powers.

Fourth, it would be a start on disarmament. My Delegation entirely endorses the view expressed by the Acting Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report, in which he emphasized that the first step toward disarmament is to stop nuclear testing. We share his sincere hope "that the nuclear powers will realize that the whole world is hoping and praying that an agreed first step may be taken soon".

The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country. It is noted that the economy is showing signs of recovery, but that inflation remains a serious problem. The government has implemented various measures to control prices and stabilize the currency.

In the second part, the focus is on the agricultural sector. It is observed that crop yields have improved due to better weather conditions and the use of modern farming techniques. However, the lack of irrigation facilities remains a major constraint on agricultural production.

The third part discusses the industrial sector. There has been a steady increase in industrial output, particularly in the manufacturing of textiles and machinery. The government has provided incentives to attract foreign investment and to modernize the industrial base.

Finally, the report touches upon the social and educational aspects. The literacy rate has shown a significant upward trend, and the government has made substantial investments in building schools and colleges. The overall social environment is becoming more stable and progressive.

In short, an agreement to end nuclear weapons tests would be a first clear proof that the many declarations by the great powers that they want to end the arms race are not mere words, but will result in real and effective action.

I have reviewed so far the weighty reasons in favour of putting a stop to nuclear tests. In my opinion these factors, taken together, should convince every rational man that the need for a solution is urgent. It remains, however, to devise practical means for achieving this goal. In recent months several suggestions have been made which, my Delegation believes, should be endorsed by this Assembly.

In the first place, we strongly support the proposal put forward in the 18 Nation Committee for an early cut-off date by which all testing would be ended: January 1, 1963, or, we would hope, earlier. The acceptance by this Assembly of a target date should provide added incentive to speedily resolve the remaining differences.

Second, Canada endorses the proposal for an immediate ban on all testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Such a proposal is common to the draft treaties advanced by both sides, and an agreement would be a substantial step in the direction of a comprehensive ban. It would greatly reduce or even remove the health hazard resulting from nuclear testing. Moreover, differences over inspection do not constitute a barrier to agreement in this field.

Third, my Delegation wishes to underline the importance we attach to the contribution of the eight unaligned nations represented at the Geneva negotiations in putting forward compromise proposals on a verification system. The Canadian Delegation has taken the stand at the 18 Nation Conference -- and we reaffirm it now -- that the eight nation proposals provide a sound basis for an agreement satisfactory to all concerned. A system based on existing national networks of

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice to ensure transparency and accountability.

2. The second section outlines the procedures for handling discrepancies between the recorded amounts and the actual cash received. It states that any such variance must be investigated immediately and reported to the appropriate authority.

3. The third part of the document details the process of reconciling the accounts at the end of each month. It requires that the total amount recorded in the books must match the total amount shown in the bank statements.

4. The fourth section discusses the role of the auditor in verifying the accuracy of the financial records. It notes that the auditor has the right to request any documents or information necessary to perform their duties.

5. The fifth part of the document addresses the consequences of non-compliance with these regulations. It states that any individual found to be deliberately falsifying records may face severe penalties, including fines and imprisonment.

6. The sixth section provides information on the resources available to staff members for further guidance and support. It includes contact details for the internal control department and external legal counsel.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of ongoing training and education for all employees involved in financial management. It encourages a culture of continuous learning and improvement.

8. The eighth section outlines the process for updating the financial policies and procedures to reflect changes in regulations and best practices.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the role of the board of directors in overseeing the financial management of the organization. It emphasizes the board's responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting process.

10. The tenth and final section of the document provides a summary of the key points and reiterates the commitment to high standards of financial integrity and transparency.



observation posts with new posts if necessary: an international scientific commission to process and examine data from these stations: and the obligation of states parties to the agreement to furnish the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event on their territory -- these are the main elements of the Eight Nation proposal which we believe should be incorporated, without further delay, in a draft treaty for ending all nuclear tests.

Agreement on these points would narrow the differences separating the two sides to one major question: What is to be done if there is a dispute as to the nature of an event which has taken place in the territory of one of the parties to the agreement? It appears from new scientific data submitted last August at Geneva by the USA and Great Britain that the area of uncertainty where doubtful events could arise has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, controversy persists over the question of how to verify that no underground testing takes place. Technical problems which have been raised in the examination of this subject could not usefully be discussed in this Committee. However, there is a fundamental matter of principle which my Delegation is firmly convinced must be borne in mind by the nuclear powers in their negotiations in this field.

It is agreed, I think, that no foreseeable inspection system will fully meet the occupations of all parties to a test ban agreement. What is needed then is a reasonable assurance that their interests will be protected. But this criterion cannot be applied exclusively to the risks which may be inherent in the treaty itself; it is equally important not to lose sight of the grave risks which humanity continues to run in the absence of such an agreement.

It has been alleged, for example, that a verification system involving on-site inspection could mean that espionage



data would be collected by the inspectors. In my opinion, the possibility that the international inspectorate could be used in this way is exceedingly remote. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union would seriously contend that this risk compares in any way with the dangers which they themselves agree are inherent in continued testing.

It is also argued that the risk of a state evading its obligations under a nuclear tests agreement must be reduced to a minimum. My Delegation fully recognizes the importance of this requirement, since a treaty which would not give assurances that states were living up to their commitments would be cause for continuing concern and tension rather than diminishing these factors as an effective agreement is intended to do. But the risk of evasion should also be balanced against the dangers mankind must live with in the absence of an agreement. If it is feared that states might sign an agreement and later conduct secret tests, the nuclear powers must not only ask themselves whether this risk is acceptable in principle. They must also assess with equal care whether the military significance of such evasions would be greater or less than the dangers to health and security resulting from continued testing and an accelerated arms race.

This balance of risks and advantages has to be kept in mind in order that the negotiating parties may assess the real significance of possible espionage or evasions. As long as the negotiators concentrate their attention on the disadvantages to their security which might result from a particular system of inspection, it is doubtful whether any real progress is possible. But when these disadvantages are seen in their proper perspective, against the graver prospects of continued testing, the necessary conditions will exist to bring an effective test ban to reality. If the negotiating

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parties can readjust their thinking in this way, new compromises, acceptable to both sides, could be achieved without delay.

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me review briefly the main considerations which will guide my Delegation in dealing with the questions to be decided under the present item: First, we wish to see a halt-by January 1, 1963 or earlier -- to all nuclear weapons tests: second, as a means of achieving this end, we support the proposal for an immediate test ban in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater: third, we desire an effective international agreement which will provide assurances that no further tests are carried out and that all states live up to their obligations under the treaty. We are convinced that these objectives demand urgent attention, and we sincerely hope that this Committee will act quickly and forcefully to assist in their realization. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Canadian Delegation will give its full support and active co-operation in the endeavour.

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Dear Mr. [Name]

I have received your letter of the 15th and am glad to hear that you are interested in the [Project Name]. The [Project Name] is a very important project and we are very glad to have your interest in it. We are currently in the process of [Project Description] and we are looking for people who are interested in [Project Description].

If you are interested in [Project Description], please let me know and I will be glad to provide you with more information. We are currently looking for people who are interested in [Project Description] and we are looking for people who are interested in [Project Description].

Very truly yours,  
[Name]