



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

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EIGHT LETTERS
ON THE
P E A C E;
AND ON THE
COMMERCE
AND
MANUFACTURES
OF
GREAT BRITAIN.

BY
SIR FREDERICK MORTON EDEN, BART.

His ego nec metas rerum, nec tempora, pono. VIRG.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. WRIGHT, PICCADILLY.

1802.

Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a title or header.

Second line of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of entries.

Third line of handwritten text, continuing the list or entries.

Fourth line of handwritten text, possibly a sub-section or a specific entry.

Fifth line of handwritten text, continuing the list or entries.

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature or date.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following pages contain a series of Letters, which were originally addressed to the Editor of the Porcupine, and published in that news-paper, in the course of the last three months, under the signature of "Philanglus." With the hope that, in their present form, at the present crisis, they may prove acceptable to the public, I have carefully revised the various documents which they contain, and brought them down to the latest period on which information could be procured. They were all derived from Official Accounts, or from Parliamentary Papers: the values, however, of Imports and Exports in the year 1800, which I have stated from a Custom-House Account made out since the commencement of the present year, differs from the values in the Trade and Navigation Account, laid before the House of Commons in June last.

*It may possibly be asked, why, in presenting a prospect of our future Commerce, I have omitted to notice the Revenue, which is intimately connected with it. I answer, that, though our financial resources are confessedly great, no satisfactory Estimate of the probable amount of the future Income and Expenditure of
the*

the country can be formed, until it is settled whether any, and which, of the taxes imposed on the spur of the occasion, during the last nine years, shall be lessened, increased, or repealed, and until the Expences of the War are wound up, and the Peace Establishment of the Army and Navy is determined on.

In the mean time we may reflect with pleasure, that, although a new Debt of £.300,000,000 has been incurred, the nation has strength to support the burthen, and means to lighten it; that the Sinking Fund this year will produce more than £.6,000,000; and that, if to this be added that part of the income tax which may be applied in aid of the Sinking Fund, it will, altogether, yield more than £.10,000,000. The Commerce which, supported by an improving Agriculture, and thriving Manufactures, enables us to preserve these resources inviolate, amounted, according to the actual value of Imports and Exports in the year 1800, to the sum of £.110,000,000. The amount of the last year cannot yet be ascertained.

F. M. E.

Lincoln's-Inn Fields,
11th Jan. 1802.

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F. M. E.

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The Reader is requested to correct the following

ERRATA:

Page 35, line 15, for "brave" read "great."

59, note - - for "£.662,529" read "£.695,862."

103, line 3, for "species," read "spices."

LETTER I.

ON THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

SIR,

10th *October*, 1801.

FEW political events can occur that will please all parties. On none can a greater diversity of opinion be expected than on the Peace recently concluded with the French Republic. The interests of commerce, the thirst of military glory, the pursuits of ambition, nay even the unalloyed feelings of loyalty and patriotism, will, each in their way, give a peculiar tinge to the sentiments which public writers will express. I, therefore, am not surpris'd that the Tyrtæus of news-papers, who has warmly urged us to persevere, has cheared us under our difficulties, and has joyfully joined in our Pæans of victory, should notice the return of Peace with the language of despondency. Our German ancestry discuss'd all questions of State, both when they were inebriated, that their counsels might not want vigour, and when sober, that they might not be deficient in wisdom. If, coolly and dispassionately, you, too, should review your opinions, and re-examine the conduct of Ministers, when it has received such explanations as Ministers are most com-

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petent to give, you will (I doubt not) candidly acknowledge that the terms, on which we have consented to sheath our swords, are such as hearts made of the best British stuff must approve. It is not to be expected that the swelling theme of the combatant should immediately subside into the quiet reasoning that should mark the peace maker : we can make allowances for your language ; though it is the language of enthusiasm, as extravagant as that which you admit “ the Peace has excited among every description of people ;” but (to use your own words) “ enthusiasm is the creature of feeling and not of judgment ;” its existence “ bespeaks the absence of reflection.”

If, however, you must continue to be enthusiastic, I hope that you will not cease to be impartial ; that your columns will invite fair and manly discussions respecting the best means of preserving our dearest interests ; and that a few remarks on the **PORCUPINE** of the 5th instant may find admittance, although those remarks should be offered in vindication of measures which that paper has pointed out and decidedly condemned.

It might, perhaps, have been more decorous if the news papers in general had abstained from all comments on the Peace till the Preliminaries had been announced and explained to Parliament ; but such extraordinary propriety, I must confess, would have been an offence “ against the canon laws of
 their

their foundation:" to gratify public curiosity by detailing and explaining interesting news is, and ever must be, the *suprema lex* of daily chroniclers in a free country.

Having allowed the importance of the colonies secured to us by the treaty, you contend that we cannot appreciate its conditions " by shewing the " value of the acquisitions made by one of the " parties, without either referring to the situation " of that party, previously to the conclusion of such " treaty, or without putting into the account the " acquisitions made by the other ;" that " the only " fair and rational mode of considering the ques- " tion, as a question of *terms*, is by referring to the " respective situations of the two countries pre- " viously to the war; and by looking at the map " of the world as it now stands. We shall then " find that, while we have added Ceylon and " Trinidad to our former possessions, the French " Republic has acquired the Austrian Netherlands " at one extremity of her territory, with the con- " tinental dominions of the Sardinian Monarch at " the other, and the possessions of many of the " German Princes in the center of that line of " frontier which extends from Holland to Italy ;" that " in short, she has completely succeeded, not " only in obtaining for her empire what the first " revolutionists were pleased to term her *natural* " boundaries, the Rhine and the Alps, but she has

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" gone

“ gone much farther, and by the establishment of
 “ tributary republics (which, whenever she may
 “ choose, will be made to form integral parts of
 “ France) has acquired an almost absolute domi-
 “ nion from the Adriatic Gulph to the German
 “ Ocean.—Nor have her acquisitions been con-
 “ fined to Europe; the entire possession of the
 “ most valuable Island of St. Domingo, in addition
 “ to her former colonies, gives her a decided pre-
 “ ponderance in the West Indies.”—You conclude
 with observing that “ the gigantic plans, which
 “ the republic has realized, sink the boasted pro-
 “ jects of the Fourteenth Louis into dwarfish in-
 “ significance.” *

I admit, that if we consider the question merely as a *question of territorial acquisition*, we must examine it in the way you propose; (yet; even then, I should object to many of your conclusions;) but in order fairly to appreciate our present situation, we should recollect what was the chief object that induced France to attack us, and how far she has accomplished it. It was *to revolutionize us*. That the war, on our part, was purely defensive, that we had no views of conquest or aggrandizement, that we armed only to succour our antient allies, to vindicate our independence, and to protect our invaluable constitution from foes, both foreign and domestic, no one, who has studied Mr. Marsh's

* Porcupine, 5th October 1801.

collection of authenticated facts, respecting the politics of Great Britain and France, can entertain a doubt. If we failed in the first object, our failure was not ascribable to want of zeal, exertion, or perseverance. We fought and negotiated for the powers of Europe long after they had ceased to fight or to negotiate for themselves. But if we could not save others, we saved ourselves. We have exhibited a spectacle which will be fought for in vain among the humbled nations around us; we have successfully resisted the force of France; we have not been corrupted by the insidious arts of democracy; we have shewn the value we set on our liberties by our pertinacity in defending them: and we have been rewarded for our constancy; for, whilst war has desolated the continent, the peaceful shores of Great Britain have been exempt from its ravages. Nor have we shrunk from the contest, when, after eight campaigns, we found ourselves, "deserted in our utmost need by those our former bounty fed," attacked by a new and formidable confederacy. Grateful posterity will remember that our negotiations at Petersburgh, which confirmed our maritime rights, were preceded by our naval victory at Copenhagen, and that our gallant army had vanquished *the invincibles* in Egypt before we signed the preliminaries with France.

It is well observed that "to improve the golden moment of opportunity, and catch the good that

is

is within our reach, is the great art of life"*. This is precisely what our Ministers have done. Entering into office with the most pacific dispositions, they contended with the Northern Powers, till our violated rights were recognized; but they contended no longer. They persevered in the war with France, till they had rescued from her gripe (not indeed a British colony, for Britain had lost no territory whatever, but) a country that had long been deemed (I conceive erroneously) the direct road to Indian conquest; but, having liberated Egypt, they improved the golden moment by concluding a peace, which secures some of the fruits of victory, and all the praise and advantage of successful resistance. We have indeed ceded to the original possessors more colonies than we have retained. So did France in 1783; but no rational politician was led from this circumstance to contend that she deemed the Peace of Versailles either inglorious or unprofitable. She had succeeded in her object; and tore away a limb from the mother country. In the *last war* (may it long bear this designation!) she has failed most completely in a similar attempt; and the blow by which she hoped to dismember, has consolidated, the British Empire.

Peace, I admit, has been the result of necessity; but it is a necessity forcibly felt by both parties.

* By Dr. Johnson.

France,

France, by a continuance of hostilities, must have prolonged her internal distresses; and have protracted the long-wished-for period, in which renovated commerce may, possibly, repair the excesses of revolution; excesses which she must deplore, and from which war alone has preserved us: our coasts, our colonies were inaccessible. Britain, by another year of war, must have added thirty millions at least to a debt, which, though not intolérable, should not be wantonly increased. The blockade of Brest, or the bombardment of Boulogne, (and such only would have been the operations of another campaign) might have injured France, but would have yielded us no equivalent.

I consider the islands which have been ceded to us by the Treaty of Peace to be (what you term the ravaged, ruined, St. Domingo) *most valuable* acquisitions. Ceylon, whether we regard its situation at the southern extremity of the Peninsula of India, its excellent port of Trincomalé, (the only good one near our settlements,) or its rare productions, will increase the security, and extend the commerce, of our Indian empire. Nor should it be forgotten (though you seem to have forgotten it) that our provinces in Asia have been strengthened on their most vulnerable side, by the annihilation of our most powerful and inveterate enemy; and that the partition of his territories has enabled

us to narrow our frontiers, to form very beneficial alliances; and to bid defiance to the jealousy of Indians, and the ambition of Europeans. If you deem the annexation of Belgium to France a valuable one, allow us to compute our gains in the Myfore. They are held by the best possible tenure—good government. Nor will any reasonable mind feel alarmed because the French are to receive back Pondicherry, and the Dutch are to re-occupy their *Comptoirs* in the East. Mere places of trade, circumscribed by our settlements, may excite our vigilance, but can never prove formidable to our power. In India we are lords paramount; and, though we permit the huckster and the chapman to erect their booths in our market, we do not fear that the grant will enable them to strip us of our demesnes, or to besiege us in our castles.

In the West-Indies we retain an island, more extensive than all the islands we restore: more advantageously situated, both for commerce and defence, than Jamaica; less exhausted by cultivation, less exposed to Jacobinism. Yet, whatever may be the importance of Trinidad, I entertain too high an opinion of the morality of our government, to suppose that, among their reasons for retaining it, they wish to obtain, what Johnson calls Falkland's Islands, "a station for contraband trade, a nursery of fraud, and a receptacle of theft."

Ministers

Ministers must comply with some of the prejudices of commerce. The possession of the French Windward Islands, as military posts, was indispensable to us in war. They were the *point d'appui* of our sugar colonies. But I do not regret the cession of Martinique and St. Lucie to France, or of Demerara and Surinam to Holland. When we contemplate the fate of St. Domingo we should not wish to fatten more victims for sacrifice. The noxiousness of a climate more fatal to Britons than the sword, the proximity of the States of America, and the spirit of insubordination (a spirit, I fear, that will not cease, even with the abolition of the Slave Trade) have much lessened the value of Transatlantic property.

Of the acquisitions of France I entertain very different sentiments from those expressed by the Porcupine: but neither your limits nor my leisure will allow me to compare her gains of population and of territory with her losses, both moral and political. The account would be a long one. In less distracted times, France herself may probably strike a fair balance, set down her losses with correctness, and compute her gains without exaggeration.

It is no objection to peace, that by it much must be hazarded; for more would be hazarded by a prolongation of the contest. All great political measures, war and peace more especially, are experiments,

riments. Our statesmen well know that more than mere parchment is required to cement the amity of nations: that time, the most powerful of agents, the chief improver of human institutions, must co-operate with political wisdom to render peace a blessing; that self-interest will soften ancient animosities; and that commerce, "the golden girdle of the globe*," will bind us together, when our fiercer passions would disunite us.

It is a narrow policy to suppose that our prosperity must be advanced by the ruin of France. A commercial nation will be benefited by an increase of her best customers. The more industrious France becomes, the more sensible she will be of the blessings of peace, and the more anxious to preserve them. Nor will her advances in social arts, though they may add to her strength, diminish our security. It seems to have been wisely ordained by Providence that the wealth of nations should not dispose them to aggression, though it may furnish them with defence. The poorest and most uncivilized tribes have ever been the greatest conquerors.

You seem to apprehend that what the Republic cannot effect by force, she may accomplish by craft, and that we may fall, like the Trojans,

"—Captivæ dolis, lacrymisque coacti;

"Quos neque Tydides, nec Larissæus Achilles,

"Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinæ."

* Cowper.

I entertain

I entertain no such apprehensions: I consider our undisputed sovereignty in the East, and our union with Ireland, (another beneficial consequence of the war which you have passed over,) as some "indemnity for the past, and security for the future." To these most valuable acquisitions, but above all, to the activity of British industry, and the energy of British spirit, which (under the blessing of Providence) have conducted us through war with honour, I look with confidence for resources, that may preserve us in peace without humiliation.

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LETTER II.

ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS.—STATE OF ST. DOMINGO.

26th October 1801.

REALLY, Sir, you have done me a distinguished honour in exhibiting me to the public on a scaffold, erected for the purpose, in the most conspicuous part of your Paper. Without meaning to compare myself to Lowth, I cannot do better than return my acknowledgments to you in the language in which he thanked Warburton for having made him the subject of an Appendix to "the Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated." In expressing his obligations for the notice conferred on him by so solemn a process and so formal a chastisement, Lowth observed, that he acted "as Sir John Owen did to my Lord President Bradshaw, of insolent and brutal memory: having, together with several Peers, received sentence of condemnation in the High Court of Justice, the honest Knight made a low reverence to his mock Lordship, and gave him humble thanks for the great honour done him, in being condemned to lose his head like a noble lord; for, being but a poor Gentleman of Wales, he swore he was afraid he should have been hanged*." I, too,

* Letter to Warburton.

Sir,

Sir, ought to thank you for the sentence you have passed on me, in the same breath with which you condemn our greatest statesmen; for I did not flatter myself that an advocate for peace, as a panacea for our ills, would have been deemed by you to be better than a political quack, or worthier of a more prominent station in your columns than the rearward which you usually allot to the Cardiac Tincture, and Antiscorbutic Drops. I could, however, wish, that in your future literary executions, you would permit the poor culprits to come forth undecorated with the *san-benitos* of your holy office. To scatter me piece-meal on your causeway of criticism is a proceeding fit only for an infuriated Medea. Quartering is out of fashion, except in the Republic of the Seven Islands. You should, in fairness, print a correspondent's letter (if not too long for insertion) by itself; and let your comments follow, as copiously as you please, by themselves. I am content to be gibbeted in a note, or to be pilloried in a postscript. *

Having thus made my obeisances to your awful tribunal, I shall proceed to notice some of the animadversions of the Porcupine, and to offer some further considerations on the Peace. You introduce my first Letter with observing, that "Ministers did not mean to rest their case upon the flimsy arguments of their advocates," the Daily

* Porcupine, 21st Oct. 1801.

Papers : “ a champion of different cast,” you say, “ has now thrown down the gauntlet, and challenged us to the field.*” If you mean this as an assertion that I am employed by Government, be assured that you are mistaken ; if you mean it as a compliment to my abilities, it is one of little value ; for in your subsequent remarks you charge me with gross contradiction and consummate ignorance ; with contradiction, because I suppose the Porcupine has been both desponding and enthusiastic ; and with ignorance, because I have called St. Domingo “ a ravaged and ruined island.” To the first charge I shall only reply, that I still think that there is no absurdity in terming you both enthusiastic and desponding : you are an enthusiastic advocate for war ; and therefore you notice the return of peace with despondency. You are enthusiastic in thinking we possess means by which “ better terms might and ought to have been obtained ;” you despond (I trust time will shew you have desponded without reason) when you prognosticate that speedy disappointment, humiliation, and disgrace, must follow the cessation of hostilities. I, with pleasure, profess myself a friend to the Porcupine, and its principles : and I write with no view to disparage or bring into disesteem your exertions in the public cause : but, in that spirit of independency, which you have so laudably la-

* Porcupine, 19th Oct. 1801.

boured to raise and cherish in us, I cannot help thinking you have carried, or are in danger of carrying your dislike of the peace too far; and that, in your anxiety to keep down the exultations and insolence of Jacobinism, you run no ordinary risk of exciting a no less dangerous spirit, that of despondency. I am not insensible of your merits, in other respects: were this the proper place I should most willingly compliment you on them, and particularly on the altered and improved language of your Paper, in which you have, in good time, substituted British and monarchical urbanity, for American and republican coarseness and vulgarity.

Your *critique* respecting St. Domingo, is of so curious a nature, that I must transcribe it entire. You say, that “ in his allusion to the ravaged, “ ruined St. Domingo, our correspondent betrays “ consummate ignorance. Damaged and desolated “ as that island has been by the ravages of War, “ and the rage of civil contention, we risk little in “ the assertion that, the very next year its produce “ will be greater than the united produce of all “ the islands in the possession of Great Britain. It “ may, possibly, not be known to our correspondent, but it nevertheless is a fact, that that part of “ the island of St. Domingo, which belonged to “ the French before the war, has yielded, in a “ single year, produce to the amount of *thirteen* “ *millions*

boured

“ millions sterling !” * How the fact of this island’s having *formerly* produced a crop worth thirteen millions sterling, proves me consummately ignorant for stating that it is *now* ruined and ravaged, I am at a loss to discover. If by “ produce,” you mean “ produce exported,” your statement is erroneous. The following accounts, from high authorities, will furnish you with a more correct idea, than you seem at present to possess, respecting the benefits which the mother country formerly derived from this colony. A French Minister of France informs us that St. Domingo contained,

In 1779 - -	32,650 whites	
	7,055 people of colour	
	249,098 slaves	
	288,803 †	Total population -
There were in 1790 - -	30,831 whites, exclusive of European troops and seafaring people.	
	434,429 negro slaves	
Exclusive of - - - -	46,000 domestic slaves and negro mechanics.	
And about - - - -	24,000 free people of colour.	
	535,260 ‡	

The Spanish part of the Island is very thinly inhabited : its population does not exceed 20,000 persons. §

* Porcupine, 21st Oct. 1801.

† Necker, sur les Finances, tom. i. c. 13.

‡ Edwards’s History of the West Indies, vol. iii. p. 164.

§ Ibid, p. 221.

The French colony, thus, appears to have contained, eleven years ago, above 530,000 inhabitants. It was, however, computed, in the year 1793, that the class of negroes alone had sustained a diminution of more than 100,000. Mr. Edwards says, that "since that time the mortality has been still "more rapid; and including the loss of whites by "sickness and emigration," he reduces the population of St. Domingo, in June 1796, to "two-fifths of the whole number of inhabitants (white "and black) which it possessed in the beginning of "1791"*.

According to this calculation, upwards of 300,000 human beings have miserably perished in this devoted country within the short period of six years. Of the cultivation and commerce of the island we may form an adequate idea from the same authority from which it appears that the average exports from the French part of St. Domingo previously, to the Revolution, were rather more than 5,000,000l. † In 1791, they were upwards of 5,500,000l. ‡ In 1800, (according to an official report of the Minister of the Interior, made in May 1801,)

Livres. Sterling.

The imports into France from all the French colonies in the East and West Indies were	1,483,800	or	£.61,825
The exports from France to all the French colonies in the East and West Indies were	282,300	or	11,762

* Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. iii. p. 257.

† Ibid. p. 165. ‡ Ibid. p. 231.

In 1788, St. Domingo imported French goods to the amount of more than 3,500,000*l.* in 580 vessels belonging to France, carrying 189,679 tons, exclusive of 98 vessels engaged in the African trade*. In 1800, I believe, (though I will not state this as a positive fact,) not a single French vessel cleared out from France for this island.

Produce cannot be raised without cultivators; how the loss of 300,000 negroes, an agricultural capital, which cannot be replaced for 10,000,000*l.* sterling, is to be supplied in order to raise the vast produce which you prophetically anticipate, is not very obvious. Monkeys and mackaws, which you deem to be my only Anti-Jacobins at Trinidad, I should suppose were your chief inhabitants in St. Domingo. Such advantages would result to our colonies from the revival of agriculture, and its concomitant blessings, subordination and tranquillity, in St. Domingo, that every humane and reflecting mind must wish that your prediction could be realized; but the decrees of Consuls, black or white, will not, I fear, fill up the gaps in her population. The negroes who remain, many of whom have retired into the natural fastnesses which the country affords, will not be disposed to work double tides; the soldier will not, without coercion, once more become the villein regardant;

* Edwards's Hist. vol. iii. p. 233.

the Maroon will not, till his instructors arrive from Old France, lay down his musquet and take up his hoe. The latest accounts from St. Domingo justify me in thinking that its whole exportable produce last season was not one-third of what it was in 1789. She will long exhibit the marks of depopulation and ruin, unless you can furnish her with a Deucalion, who may turn her pebbles into people, or an Amphion, whose *ça iras* may rear the prostrate walls of the ravaged Cape Français.

You condemn me as a libellest of the Minister for having expressed my opinion that, if the war had continued another campaign, our military operations must have been confined to objects of no greater importance than hopeless sieges and impotent attacks; such as "the blockade of Brest" or "the bombardment of Boulogne." In answer to this, you inform us, that "had another campaign" taken place, more vigorous and more extensive "operations than any which have been undertaken" during the present year" (I am sorry you have so soon forgotten our expeditions to the Baltic and to Egypt) "were certainly in contemplation; and a serious attempt would, no doubt, have been made on the Spanish settlements in South America*."

Is this, Sir, then, the great object which would have compensated for 30,000,000*l.* additional ex-

* Porcupine, 21st Oct. 1801.

penditure? Is the invasion of Mexico and Peru the mighty lever for overturning the French Republic? You have read that Canada was subdued in Germany, and by a very ingenious analogy suppose that the balance of Europe may be settled in South America. Eldorado conquests would have attracted the gallant Knights of Britain two centuries ago; but, whatever you may know of the secret intentions of Ministers, I should have deemed myself a libeller of them if I had supposed that they meant to consign our gallant seamen and soldiers to the useless enterprizes and dishonourable graves of Drake, Cavendish, and Hawkins. Had we continued the war for such projects, well might Mr. Fox have exclaimed—"O calumniated crusaders, " how rational and moderate were your objects! " O much injured Louis the Fourteenth, upon " what slight grounds you have been accused of " restless and immoderate ambition! O tame and " feeble Cervantes, with what a timid pencil and " faint colours have you painted the portrait of " a disordered imagination!"*

* Letter to the Electors of Westminster 1793, p. 40.

LETTER III.

ON THE BALANCE OF POWER.

6th *November*, 1801.

EXPERIENCE is "the prime wisdom"* of political science. The experience, however, which the Statesman derives from the times in which he lives is necessarily imperfect. It may, sometimes, shew him the causes of events; but, it can rarely enable him to trace them much beyond their immediate effects. History in some degree supplies the defects of experience, by furnishing us with complete examples of the beginning, progress, and completion of various systems of policy; and by connecting every cause with its consequence, it instructs us, if similar causes should occur, to divine what consequences will follow.

Thus, from unfolding the page of History, we may confidently determine that laws tempered by freedom, and favourable to industry, will render a people prosperous and happy; that distracted and corrupt administrations must produce misery at home, and weakness abroad; that military govern-

* Milton.

ments, after some time, fall into impotence and languor, and that pure democracies usually end in anarchy or despotism. These and similar truths we recognize as axioms of state, and (though sometimes disappointed) we make them the rules of our public conduct: they are either buoys to point out our danger, or beacons to direct us to safety.

If we apply political experience to the consideration of our present circumstances, and from an investigation of the past, attempt to anticipate the future, we may possibly discover, that in times less prosperous Britain had no reason to despair; and that confidence becomes her now. We may find precedents to shew that an advantageous peace has created dissatisfaction, but we shall find none to prove that a peace, like the present, has been the forerunner of ruin. Ill omened birds, vain foretellers of tempests, may perch on our masts, but the vessel of the state will hold on her course. We should be vigilant; we ought not to be fearful. Our navigators still plough the sea and grow rich by commerce, amidst all the dangers of climates, storms, rocks, and quicksands.

Many of the objections which have been, and are likely to be, urged against the Preliminaries of Peace, may be included in this short though comprehensive proposition—that by sheathing the sword we have ratified the subversion of the Ba-

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lance

balance of Power in Europe*, on the preservation of which our existence as a nation essentially depends.

The Peace, indeed, may be considered in other points of view; but, for the present, I shall limit my attention to enquire what alterations this Balance has experienced, since its preservation has been deemed important to our interests; and how far these alterations are likely to affect the future safety of Great Britain. To pursue such an enquiry to any useful purpose, we must have recourse to that guide, from whose instructive lessons Statesmen acquire political proficiency. We must recur to History; we must (as I have already observed) study what has been, to guess what will be.

It is generally agreed, that the origin and foundation of the balance of Europe are to be sought for in the treaty which in 1648 terminated a thirty years war, and defined the rights, privileges, and authorities of the different members of the Germanic body. It is, however, remarkable, that the treaty of Munster, the corner stone of modern diplomacy, in some degree, countenanced those schemes of spoliation and aggrandizement, which we are apt to suppose to be peculiar to our own times. Secularizations and indemnities, the system which now threatens to annihilate the empire,

* It was Fontenelle, I believe, who said that the follies of Cabinets constituted the true Balance of Europe.

then

then originated. Crafty negociators, whether Catholic or Protestant, carved eagerly for themselves. "Some asked for manors, others for acres, that lay convenient for them."* France, in particular, was a considerable gainer. Brisac, with its dependencies, the Landgraviats of Alsace, Metz, Toul, Verdun, and Pignerol, (not to mention inferior acquisitions,) were surrendered to her. At this period Great Britain was too much occupied with domestic calamities to interfere in the general politics of Europe. Her only possession on the Continent was Dunkirk. The other principal powers were the house of Austria, (of which one branch held Spain and the Netherlands, and the other the fairest portion of Germany,) and the republic of Holland, a state, small, indeed, in extent, but wealthy, brave, and free; active in negotiation, and formidable in war. Prussia was then, and long after, a petty Electorate. Russia had not emerged from barbarism:

The ambition of Louis the Fourteenth, within a short period after the peace of Westphalia, by conquest or by treaty, added new frontiers to France. By the Pyrenean treaty, concluded in 1659, after a short war with Spain, he not only acquired several places in Flanders and Luxemburg, the greatest part of Artois, Landrecy and Quefnoy in Hainault, the Duchy of Bar, and other places in Lor-

* Swift and Arbuthnot's History of John Bull.

rain, and Rouffillon, Conflans and Cerclagna on the borders of Spain, but laid the foundations of uniting the French and Spanish monarchies under the house of Bourbon. From this time to the year 1700 (a period of 40 years) he never lost sight of this great object. In 1662, he purchased Dunkirk from our profuse and venal Monarch, Charles the Second. By the peace of Aix la Chapelle, which in 1663 terminated another contest with Spain, Tournay, Lisle, Courtray, Oudenard, Aeth, Charleroy, and Douay, very important points in what has been since denominated the iron frontier of France, were ceded to him. His northern and eastern frontiers were still further improved at the peace of Nimeguen in 1678, by which Spain received back Charleroy, Binch, Aeth, Oudenard, and Courtray, but ceded to France, Besançon, Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Cambray, the remainder of Artois, several other places on the northern frontiers, and the whole of the country of Burgundy or Franche-Comté.

It is worthy of remark that, during the progress which Louis was making towards what has been termed Universal Monarchy, this country either viewed with indifference, or promoted with zeal, the attempts of her ambitious neighbour to subjugate the Continent. The Prince of Orange, however, profiting by the Revolution, which by placing him on the throne of James extended his influence to Great Britain, called forth our ener-

gies; and in 1689 we joined the Continental Confederacy, consisting of Spain, a debilitated monarchy, Holland, a still vigorous republic, and the Emperor, much weakened by the distracted state of his hereditary dominions, and a war with the Turks. This grand alliance proposed to reduce Louis to the terms of the Pyrenean treaty, (which stated the capitulation of marriage, by which Maria Theresa, the Queen of France, renounced her pretensions to the Crown of Spain, as the chief part of the Treaty, and the most worthy, as well as the greatest and most precious, earnest of the surety of its duration,) and to secure the succession of the Spanish Crown to the House of Austria. Neither object, however, was accomplished. The French Monarch's conquests from the Allies on the right bank of the Rhine, and Mons, Courtray, and Aeth, on the Flemish frontier, were restored to Spain at the Peace of Ryfwick in 1697;* but Strasburgh, a most important fortress on the side of Germany, was definitively ceded to him.

* The 4th Article of this Treaty is somewhat similar to one introduced into the Treaty between Bonaparte and Russia. Louis XIV. engages his honour, upon the faith and word of a King, that he "will in no manner whatsoever favour the conspiracies or plots which any Rebels, or ill-disposed persons may, in any place, excite against the King of Great Britain," who enters into a similar stipulation on his part. Notwithstanding this precedent, I should lament to see any similar clause introduced into the Treaty negotiating at Amiens. The internal tranquillity of Great Britain will not, I trust, depend on the guarantee of the First Consul.

Of the state and sentiments of Great Britain, at the close of this war, Lord Bolingbroke appears to have given a faithful picture. As a Tory and a strenuous opponent of King William and Queen Anne's Whig Ministers, he is to be perused with caution when he describes events in which they were concerned; yet, in the following remarks, if compared with impartial historians, he will be found not to have deviated from truth. Those who doubt the veracity of this narration, will at least admit that modern times have shewn that it is not to be rejected on account of its improbability.

“ Our people” (he says) “ believed, and were encouraged to believe, the war could not be long, if the King was vigorously supported: and there is a humdrum speech of a Speaker of the House of Commons, I think, who humbly desired his Majesty to take this opportunity of reconquering his ancient Dutchy of Aquitain. We were soon awakened from these gaudy dreams. In seven or eight years no impression had been made on France, that was besieged as it were on every side; and, after repeated defeats in the Low Countries, where King William laid the principal stress of the war, his sole triumph was the retaking Namur, which had been taken by the French a few years before. Unsustained by success abroad, we are not to wonder that the spirit flagged at home; nor
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“ that the discontents of those who were averse to
 “ the established Government, uniting with the
 “ far greater number of those who disliked the
 “ Administration, inflamed the general discon-
 “ tents of the nation, oppressed with taxes, pil-
 “ laged by usurers, plundered at sea, and disap-
 “ pointed by land. As we run into extremes
 “ always, some would have continued this war at
 “ any rate, even at the same rate; but it was not
 “ possible they should prevail in such a situation
 “ of affairs, and such a disposition of minds. The
 “ generality of people grew as fond of getting out
 “ of the war, as they had been of entering into
 “ it; and thus far, perhaps, considering how it had
 “ been conducted, they were not much to be
 “ blamed. But this was not all; for when King
 “ William had made the peace, our martial spirit
 “ became at once so pacific, that we seemed re-
 “ solved to meddle no more in the affairs of the
 “ Continent, at least to employ our arms no more
 “ in the quarrels that might arise there: and
 “ accordingly we reduced our troops in England
 “ to seven thousand men.”*

The King, however, persevered in his plan to
 reduce the power of France, and exerted himself
 during peace, to negotiate a new grand alliance
 with Holland and the Emperor. In the midst of
 these preparations he died: but, “ though the

* Sketch of the History and State of Europe. Letter viii.

“ man was dead, the grand alliance survived;”^{*} hostilities commenced against France and Spain in May, 1702, and did not terminate till April, 1713.

Mr. Burke mentions this war as a proof of the energy of our ancestors; but here he stops; for it proves no more. Glorious as it was to our arms, and unequivocally demonstrative of our national resources, it added little to our power; but more than tripled the national debt, which, in 1702, amounted to 16,000,000*l.*; but in 1714, exceeded 54,000,000*l.* The acquisition of Gibraltar, Minorca, half of St. Christopher's, and the Assiento trade, were no equivalent for such of the conquests of Louis, on the side of Germany and Flanders, as the peace of Utrecht allowed him to retain, and the establishment of the Bourbon family in Spain.

After the lapse of a century, in which the feuds of Whigs and Tories have given way to other controversies, unambitious and dispassionate politicians may doubt whether, on the whole, the war of Queen Anne was advantageous to the country. A writer, who has examined the most authentic documents respecting this period of our history, observes, that, “ there were certainly many strong arguments for restraining that precipitancy of

* Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, p.88.

“ deter-

“determination with which England rushed into
 “the war, and which ought to have suggested
 “such reserve and precautions as might, with-
 “out violating the honour of King William,
 “have prevented the extravagance with which it
 “was carried on, and perhaps have brought it to
 “a more speedy conclusion. But the general
 “desire of the nation, the state of parties, and the
 “private influence of a family, which the Sove-
 “reign, at this time, was incapable of resisting, not
 “only diverted her attention from pacific counsels,
 “but induced the administration to prepare for
 “hostilities with an ardour, out of all proportion
 “to any provocation received, and with exagge-
 “rated expectations of the benefits likely to result
 “from a successful war*.”

It may be said, on the other hand, that if we
 had not entered into the grand alliance, our Laws,
 our Liberties, and our Government would have
 been subverted; and that to the war of Anne we
 owe our subsequent existence as an independent
 nation. I cannot believe this; for the very cir-
 cumstance we so much dreaded, the acquisition of
 Spain by a Prince of the House of Bourbon, ac-
 tually took place without producing any calami-
 tous consequence to Britain. Still less shall I feel
 inclined to admit, that the thirty years peace,

* Somerville's Reign of Queen Anne, p. 3.

which

which succeeded the Treaty of Utrecht, was owing to the decrepid state of France: her public bankruptcy was expected in 1708; yet in four subsequent campaigns she continued the war with vigour, and in some instances with success. It was not owing to the decrepid state of France; for France, in 1730, was able to undertake, and actually did undertake, a new war with Germany; and reaped the solid fruits of conquest, in 1736, by annexing the valuable province of Lorraine to her wide extended territories. The long continuance of peace which we enjoyed during the whole of George the First's reign, and thirteen years after, may, with more probability, be ascribed to the long minority of Louis the Fifteenth, the internal dissensions of France respecting the Bull *Unigenitus*, the intrigues of the Spanish Minister Alberoni, which forced France and Great Britain for a time to unite, but above all, to the pacific dispositions of Fleury and Walpole.

Let us now advert to the balance of European power as it appeared at the French Revolution in 1789. In the course of the eighteenth century Holland had gradually declined. Unable to stand singly against either England or France (in her prouder days she has held them both at defiance) she has, in all modern wars, been obliged to act the humble part of a feeble confederate. Verging towards the insignificance of Venice, she may expect

which

expect to experience a similar fate, and to become the prey of some formidable neighbour. After a single gleam of national spirit, the sun of Spain had long before 1789 set for ever. The proud Castilians had long ceased to think for themselves. Of late years a war with Spain has rather been courted than dreaded. Mr. Burke truly describes her. "She is not a substantive power;" but if neither the Monarchy of Charles the Fifth, nor the Republic of De Witt, can now regulate the fate of Europe, two formidable States have arisen, whose voices are heard in the Council of Nations. Russia, which at the peace of Westphalia, was as dust in the balance, is now a great commercial and military Power. Prussia, from being the feudatory, is become the rival of the Cæsars. The rescripts of her envoys are received with deference at Ratisbon. The mandates of Prussia in 1787, opened the gates of Amsterdam; the mandates of Russia may soon open the gates of Constantinople.

Such are the principal alterations which have taken place within the last one hundred and fifty years in the territorial division of Europe; and still more important changes appear to be in contemplation. It has been seen that various acquisitions, during this period, have rounded and consolidated the French Monarchy. In point of extent, the British dominions in Europe are now (with the addition only of Gibraltar) precisely what they

were

were at the Treaty of Munster. Nature has fixed the boundaries of the United Kingdom. An ambitious Continental power may add a contiguous province to her frontier: an insular one can only enlarge the bounds of empire, by acquiring detached provinces. But whilst our neighbours have extended their limits, Britain has increased her power (the power I mean of defence, for all other is precarious and illusory) by improvements in internal organization, which have doubled her population; by colonization, by agriculture, by manufactures, and by commerce, the parent of naval power.

With these means, and these motives, to preserve her independence, she has five times, during the last century, been opposed to France. Some wars she has carried on alone; in others she has acted with confederates; in all she has shewn that her station in the scale of Europe depends not on a fanciful equilibrium which a congress of nations can adjust, but on resources which can be created, and energies which can be exerted, by herself. Diplomatic interference, negotiation, and treaty, may sometimes preserve a feeble state from immediate dissolution; but when did they inspire a timid people with manly sentiment and vigour; or make those powerful who had no confidence in themselves? Of all nations in Europe, Britain has the least occasion to dread the interposition, or

to court the mediation, of neutral states. Her insular situation renders her inaccessible to all, except the maritime, powers. Her unsuitness for Continental conquest secures her from jealousy. She can only affect Europe by alliances and subsidies. Nor are these means of war, now, of much consequence to her; for, as Germany is divided between two great monarchies, Austria and Prussia, whose mutual antipathies are not softened even by a common interest, we cannot court the one without displeasing the other. Austria was our ally in the war of 1742, and Prussia was against us; in that of 1756, Prussia joined, and Austria opposed us; and in the last, though, from being both interested to resist the revolutionary system, they had joined against France, Prussia soon withdrew from the contest in which Austria persevered.

In mentioning these Powers, let me remark, that they are singular instances that, notwithstanding the supposed balance of power, systems of aggrandizement will still prevail. By two treaties of partition, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have parcelled out to themselves the extensive republic of Poland; Russia, too, in the early part of the last century, stript Sweden of her most valuable province, and, towards the latter end of it, not content with a territory stretching from the Baltic to China, she advanced to the Crimea, and now, perhaps, extends her views to the Mediterranean. Yet

Russia

Russia might whisper in our ears, that we, too, have taken our share in the division of empires: she might set off our two treaties for the partition of the Mysore against the two treaties for the partition of Poland. In one point, I trust, they would own the treaties materially differed. The Northern Confederacy dethroned a lawful prince because his territories were convenient for them: the Indian Confederacy overthrew an usurper, and an implacable foe; and, in carving out an indemnity for themselves, they restored a lawful prince to his subjects.

Notwithstanding these various changes in the state on the Continent, Britain has long flourished "brave and free, the dread and envy of them all." History shews that the rise of one nation is not necessarily accompanied with the destruction of its neighbour. The French Republic may possess the Rhine, and yet not annihilate the commerce of the Thames. England may be free, though Holland is in chains. Whether the terms of peace are such as we are entitled to, or whether it would have been more advantageous to us to have continued the war, are considerations very distinct from the question, whether our preservation depends on the balance of Europe being preserved. To this subject I have confined my present remarks; and shall conclude my letter with a translation of a paragraph in a periodical work, published at Ham-

burgh,

burgh, which, I think, furnishes an answer to one reason, at least, for continuing the war.

“ The restoration of the balance of power,” it is said, “ is as chimerical as the dreams of conquest with which the coalition against France have been flattered.—It is the philosopher’s stone in politics. The negociators at Munster thought they had obtained it ; but what has it produced ? Wars have succeeded wars : some states which were then powerful, have been reduced to insignificance ; others have been annihilated ; others from mere existence have risen into consequence : empires have been erected ; kingdoms have been destroyed ; the weak have been oppressed ; the strong have abused their power ; these are the consequences of this memorable system. What new scheme of policy can we devise that shall be safe ? The birth of a great man, the licentiousness of a mob, may set human wisdom at defiance. We think that when we have placed equal, or nearly equal, portions of territory, population, commerce, revenue, and military force, in each scale, we have secured the balance. But these are the mere elements of chaos ; how shall we duly appreciate human wisdom which must combine them for use ? From the mere materials, we estimate what the fabric will be without consulting those who are to be the architects. We determine what tools
 8 “ will

“ will produce without knowing what hands will
 “ use them. Calculate as we may, the future will
 “ frequently elude our grasp, and our conjectures
 “ be frustrated by the appearance of a Peter, a
 “ Frederick, or a Bonaparte.

“ Yet, as alchemy has led to some useful dis-
 “ coveries, the attempt, however visionary, to set-
 “ tle the balance of power in Europe may, pos-
 “ sibly, prove beneficial to mankind*.”

* *Le Spectateur du Nord*, Juillet, 1801, p. 142.

LETTER IV.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE PEACE—
CONQUEST OF EGYPT.

SIR,

20th November, 1801.

DISCUSSION often elicits truth. I shall, therefore, without apology, pursue my observations on the Peace; and, in addition to the remarks with which I have already troubled you, endeavour to shew that its consequences will be highly beneficial to Great Britain.

In the Parliamentary debate on the Preliminaries, which has taken place since I first addressed you, they have been defended nearly on the same grounds on which I thought them defensible.*—Ministers, however, have denied that the termination of the war was the result of necessity: yet, I trust, I shall not be deemed to have been guilty of a solecism, if, whilst I bow to such great authority, I persist in my opinion, that a Peace may be the result of a necessity forcibly felt by both parties, and yet be honourable and safe. It appears to me to be a very possible case that two belligerent powers may be so circumstanced, that a continuance of hostilities, like a long protracted

* By the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, and by Lord Hawkebury in the Commons.

law-suit, may be ruinous to both. If such was the situation of France and this country, though I may deny that such a situation placed us at the feet of the First Consul, I must contend that the late necessary war has been concluded by a no less necessary peace. Nor shall I, as an Englishman, feel any humiliation if this plea, among others, should be brought forward to justify the treaty with Mr. Otto. You have quoted one of Æsop's Fables to point out the dangers of Peace: * permit me to quote another, to shew the inconvenience of War. Whilst the lion and the bear lay panting over the fawn they had killed, a crafty fox stepped in, and scampered away with the object of contention. Whilst France and Britain were wasting their strength in impotent attacks neutral nations were extending their commerce and consolidating their power.

If, however, Peace is to be considered as a question of policy, and to be appreciated from the terms on which it has been concluded, you will inform me that some of our greatest statesmen have decided on its merits; that some of the principal members of the late administration (an administration which strenuously supported the war) have censured the peace, either as bad in terms, or as objectionable altogether; and that the other

* The wolves, the sheep, and the dogs. See Mr. Cobbett's Letter in the Porcupine, 3d Nov. 1801.

members of that administration, who defend the Preliminaries, are glaringly inconsistent, because they thought it impolitic to enter into a negotiation with Bonaparte, in 1800. These points have been discussed, very fully, in Parliament; and I shall not investigate them farther than to observe that at the beginning of last year our circumstances were very different from what they are at present. Russia had, then, not wholly withdrawn from the Continental Confederacy; Austria was preparing to act with vigour; the Royalists, though not stimulated by us, were assembling in the Western Departments of France. Those, therefore, who, eighteen months ago, thought with Mr. Windham that the chances of war were preferable to the chances of peace, may now, without any dereliction of principle, think the experiment of another campaign inadvisable. Let me add too, that, however grateful we must feel to Mr. Pitt for having impressed us with a just sense of our danger, for having developed our resources, and for having conducted us, I will not say *through*, but *nearly through*, a long and expensive contest with foes both foreign and domestic, however readily we must acknowledge his great abilities as a war minister, and his still greater abilities as a minister of finance, it does not follow that peace ought to be rejected, because he may be (though I do not think it has been proved that he is) inconsistent

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sistent. Neither his empassioned and eloquent speech delivered in 1800, *flagrante bello*, nor Lord Grenville's official communications in 1797, will furnish us with a diplomatic code, by which the present peace can be tried. It is not to be vindicated merely by resorting to the *argumentum ad hominem*. If the peace is a bad one, it is no consolation to learn that "*fecerunt idem multi alii et boni*;" if it is safe and honourable it will bear the test of examination without reference to the negotiations at Lisle. If it places us in a state of insecurity it is no justification of Lord Hawkesbury, that Trinidad, Ceylon, Cochin, and the Cape, possessions which his predecessor attempted to secure to us by treaty in 1797, are less valuable acquisitions than Trinidad, Ceylon, and the Mysore, which are actually secured to us: it is no justification that Lord Grenville's peace existed only in a *projet*, which, if it had been listened to by the Directory, might, very possibly, have been cut down to terms much below Lord Hawkesbury's *ultimatum*: it is no justification that our future security was as much affected by the treaty proposed in 1797, which allowed the French to retain all their colonies, as it is by the treaty concluded in 1801, which restores them all their colonies which we have conquered during the war.

In truth, "the form and pressure" of the two periods cannot, in any respect, be deemed to be

the same. Four years ago the French rulers were avowedly hostile to peace; now, a mutual disposition to conciliate animates the contracting parties. In 1797 we negotiated with a faction; we now treat with a state. I am assured by persons who lately visited France, and who were well acquainted with the character of Frenchmen during the monarchy, that they are now as averse as can be imagined to the original ideas and principles of the revolutionary system; that they sigh for the blessings of repose; and not only tolerate, but approve, those acts of government, which, twelve years ago, would have been deemed oppressive and despotic. They are no longer clamorous for universal suffrage; or even for the freedom of the press. Their 6000 justices of the peace have not taught them the value of an *Habeas Corpus* act. Royalists and republicans at length coalesce, like travellers, who, having gone round the world in different directions, meet at the same point. The Catholic worship (I will not say the Catholic religion) is re-established. Whilst I am addressing you, a squadron is fitting out in the ports of the republic, to convey troops to St. Domingo, to correct the ideas of negroes respecting civil liberty. Who, three years ago, could have supposed that the French would become such instructors? No part of this picture is such as an Englishman, whether he be a genuine Whig or a zealous Tory, can

can approve: but, with reference to the possibility and the propriety of negociation, it is satisfactory to know that France is at length sensible of the blessings of order; that her disposition for peace is warm and unequivocal: and that her government is capable of maintaining the relations of amity, and inclined to renew those of commerce, with Great Britain.

The people of France, I apprehend, have satisfied themselves that arbitrary power is necessary; I doubt, however, whether their speculations on this subject are as refined as those of the *Morning Chronicle*, which informs us that the First Consul "has it in his power, perhaps, to lead his countrymen to solid liberty. They require a preparation for that state. They must be taught that liberty without order does not deserve the name. Bonaparte, we trust, is now teaching them the wholesome lesson of obedience; that sort of obedience, however, which in nations, as well as individuals, qualifies men to govern themselves—an obedience which does not corrupt and degrade, but which elevates and improves. Undoubtedly the French nation has much need of this lesson."*

Whether the First Consul will perform all that is here set down for him, and "lead his countrymen to solid liberty," I much doubt. It is not

* *Morning Chronicle*, 21st October, 1801.

a difficult task to make a strong government; but to make a free one, suited to the temper and genius of the French nation, to combine liberty with subordination, and to provide means for reform without opening a door to revolution, cannot be the work of one man, however great, or of one age, however enlightened. In the composition of political institutions time must be the principal agent. Bonaparte, however, has one road to glory opened to his view; but, to reach her temple, he must not attempt to mount higher, (as allegory would instruct him,) but be content to descend from the eminence. Sylla, Christina, and Washington have done so before him. Public men, under certain circumstances, may find that "the post of honour is a private station." To Bonaparte it would also be the post of safety. He may confer happiness on France, if, availing himself of the power which military success has placed in his hands, he models his future conduct from examples which may be found in our history, not indeed in the Protectorate of Cromwell, but in the period which immediately succeeded it. I cannot believe that France is for ever destined to experience an elective government. The chances of peace, less expensive to us by thirty millions a year than the chances of war, may place the fabric of the state in that country on firm foundations:—but we must wait with patience,

dum

dum defluat amnis :—the tide of revolution is ebbing away very fast ; may the returning flood “ lead on to fortune !”

For the present, the object of the First Consul seems to be to become the pacificator of Europe. His dispositions accord with the general wishes of the nation. Under such circumstances, half the work of negotiation is accomplished before plenipotentiaries exchange their full powers. Pacific inclinations (we are assured by an authority which the advocates for war will not reject) are the true fundamental basis on which a fair permanent treaty of peace must be constructed. Mr. BURKE's remarks, in illustration of this position, strongly apply to our present circumstances. In noticing the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the two subsequent treaties, he insists that their basis is not, “ and never could have been, a “ mere dealing of truck and barter, but that the “ parties being willing, from common fatigue or “ common suffering, to put an end to a war, the “ first object of which had been either obtained “ or despaired of, the lesser objects were not “ thought worth the price of further contest. The “ parties understanding one another, so much “ was given away, without considering from whose “ budget it came, not as the value of the objects, “ but as the value of peace to the parties might “ require. At the last treaty of Paris, the sub-
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“jugation of America being despaired of on the
 “part of Great Britain, and the independence
 “of America being looked upon as secure upon
 “the part of France, the main cause of the war
 “was removed ; * and then the conquests which
 “France had made upon us (for we had made none
 “of importance upon her) were surrendered with
 “sufficient facility. Peace was restored as peace.
 “In America the parties stood as they were pos-
 “sessed. A limit was to be settled, but settled as
 “a limit to secure that peace, and not at all on a
 “system of equivalents, for which, as we then
 “stood with the United States, there were little or
 “no materials. At the preceding treaty at Paris,
 “I mean that of 1763, there was nothing at all on
 “which to fix a basis of compensation from reci-
 “procal cession of conquests. They were all on
 “one side.—No place being left for barter, sacri-
 “fices were made on our side to peace ; and we
 “surrendered to the French their most valuable
 “situations in the West Indies without any equi-
 “valent.—The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was built
 “upon a similar basis. All the conquests in Europe
 “had been made by France ; she had subdued
 “the Austrian Netherlands, and broken open the
 “gates of Hoiland. We had taken nothing in the
 “West Indies, and Cape Breton was a trifling

* I was not aware of this passage when I made a similar remark in my first Letter.

“ business

“ business indeed. France gave up all for peace.
 “ The allies had given up all that was ceded at
 “ Utrecht. Louis the Fourteenth made all, or
 “ nearly all, the cessions of Ryfwick, and at Nime-
 “ guen. In all those treaties, and in all the pre-
 “ ceding, as well as in the others which intervened,
 “ the question never had been that of barter.”

Mr. BURKE, indeed, adds, that “ the balance
 “ of power had ever been assumed as the known
 “ common law of Europe at all times, and by all
 “ powers ; the question had only been, as it must
 “ happen, on the more or less inclination of that
 “ balance.”* In my last Letter I have endeavoured
 to shew that the balance of Europe has been, and
 may be altered without injury to Great Britain,
 and that whilst some continental powers have been
 aggrandized, and others annihilated, her insular
 situation and peculiar advantages have enabled her
 to advance by more rapid strides than her neigh-
 bours to opulence, strength, and civilization.

In estimating the probability of future security,
 we do not appear to have attached sufficient im-
 portance to the events of the last campaign. The
 force of nations depends as much on their moral
 character, as on their territorial and financial re-
 sources. A people who think themselves inferior
 to their adversaries in military skill and martial
 prowess are already half conquered. Doubt is the

Third Letter on a Regicide Peace, p. 71.

beginning

beginning of despair. Most of the successes of the French are ascribable to energy and confidence. *Possunt quia posse videntur.* The charm, however, which led them on from victory to victory, is at length, I trust for ever, dissolved. They now must know that, even with superior numbers, they are not more formidable to us in the field than on the ocean. That a French army of equal force ever successfully withstood the British bayonet, no fair instance, I believe, can be adduced. From the nature, however, of a continental war, few opportunities have occurred for large bodies of our troops to act unconnected with foreigners. But the expedition to Egypt has proved that, in discipline, valour, endurance of fatigue, patient persevering exertion, the veterans of France may be excelled by the youth of Britain. Our army has added a never-fading wreath to the laurels won at Blenheim, Minden, and Quebec. Posterity will read with astonishment, that less than 14,000 of our troops, many of whom had been nearly a twelvemonth at sea, landed in a country, above three thousand miles distant from their own, a country, too, strongly fortified by nature, and garrisoned by 28,000 French, the flower of those victorious legions, who had spread terror through Italy, and vanquished the best troops of Austria. By three battles, and two sieges, we re-conquered Egypt in less than six months, and sent home

23,000 Frenchmen, disgusted with schemes of Indian conquest, and humbled by defeat. They will record our triumphs in every department of the Republic, and teach their countrymen to remember for many years to come, that the last events of the war were disastrous to France, and glorious to Great Britain. Our exploits at Aboukir, Alexandria, and Cairo, by impressing the French with correct notions of our means of defence, will add security to peace. The Invincibles, who fled before us in Africa, will not intimidate us in Europe.

If a Northern Confederacy should again be formed to invade our maritime rights, which have been formally recognised by the Convention of Petersburgh, the Sound will form no barrier to our fleets, the harbours of the Baltic will furnish no protection to an armed neutrality. In 1780 we were insulted with impunity : in 1800, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, again attempted to insult us ; but the lesson they have received from the battle of Copenhagen will prevent the attempt from being repeated.

In my next Letter I shall endeavour to point out the probable consequences of the peace in its operation on our commercial prosperity. Such mistaken notions have gone forth respecting the losses our trade may experience from the restoration of all our conquests, Ceylon and Trinidad excepted, to France and her allies, that having dis-

cussed the question of peace on general grounds, I feel myself obliged (as far as my limited knowledge will enable me) to examine it in a commercial view, and to lay before you those facts which have convinced me, and I trust may convince you (if conviction be necessary) that the peace will not impoverish our merchants.

LETTER V.

ON THE COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN—TRADE
WITH THE CONQUERED ISLANDS.

SIR,

6th *December* 1801.

EVERY war, in which Great Britain has been engaged since the reign of Queen Anne, except that which has just terminated, has so much affected the relations and connexions of this country with other parts of the civilized world, that, if the extent of our commerce be estimated by the tonnage of the vessels employed, (which upon the whole appears to be a fairer criterion of the magnitude of our trade than the Custom-house valuations of imports and exports, though they ought not to be wholly disregarded,) it will be found to have progressively declined during each period of hostility to a point much below its amount in the preceding period of peace. In the war, which originated from our disputes with Spain in 1739, the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards from the ports of England and Wales fell from 503,568 tons, the tonnage before the war, to 446,666 tons in 1744, and did not reach its former height till 1748, which, as Preliminaries were signed early in April, may be considered as a year of peace: in that of 1756, from 661,184 tons, the average of the years 1749, 1750, 1751, (I have not the accounts of the three subsequent years before me,) the tonnage sunk to 524,710 tons, its lowest depression during the

war; and though it afterwards rose, it did not wholly recover itself till the return of peace: and in the American war a still more remarkable diminution took place. The following extracts from Mr. Chalmers's estimate will exhibit at one view the various fluctuations in our commerce during each of these periods.

Tonnage of Vessels, English and Foreign, cleared outwards from the Ports of England and Wales.

	Years.	English Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tonnage.	
Peace	{ 1736 }	476,941	26,627	503,568	} Average of 3 years.
	{ 1737 }				
	{ 1738 }				
War	{ 1739 }	384,191	37,260	471,451	ditto.
	{ 1740 }				
	{ 1741 }				
	{ 1744 }				
	{ 1747 }				
	{ 1748 }				
Peace	{ 1749 }	608,798	51,386	661,184	ditto.
	{ 1750 }				
	{ 1751 }				
War	{ 1755 }	451,254	73,456	524,710	ditto.
	{ 1756 }				
	{ 1757 }				
	{ 1760 }				
	{ 1761 }				
	{ 1762 }				
Peace	{ 1770 }	703,495	57,476	760,971	
	{ 1771 }				
	{ 1772 }				
	{ 1773 }				
	{ 1774 }				
War	{ 1775 }	783,226	64,860	848,086	
	{ 1776 }				
	{ 1777 }				
	{ 1778 }				
	{ 1779 }				
	{ 1780 }				
	{ 1781 }				
	{ 1782 }				

Of the causes of this depression in our commerce, the principal seem to be, that in war we are usually opposed to those states which in peace are our best customers; that during hostilities the risk of capture so much enhances the expence of freight, which constitutes a part of the price of every article exported, and the charges of seamen's wages and insurance are so much increased, that neutral nations not only become the carriers of our goods, but are enabled to undersell our manufacturers in foreign markets; and that a considerable part of the national capital being required during war for supplying the exigencies of the state, less labour can be set in motion for the purposes of commerce. During the last nine years, however, peculiar circumstances have prevented these causes from producing their usual effect; or rather have counterbalanced them. Since the commencement of the war our commerce has so much increased, that the tonnage of vessels, cleared outwards from British ports, has arisen from 1,639,300 tons, its amount in 1792, the most flourishing year of peace this country ever experienced, to 2,130,322 tons. The following table exhibits this increase, and the progress of our navigation since the year 1788.

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An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels, which entered inwards, and cleared outwards, in the several Ports of Great Britain, from, or to, all parts of the World, in 1789, and the eleven following Years.

Vessels entered Inwards.

Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tons.
1789	1,898,333	190,676	1,589,009
1790	1,428,376	277,599	1,705,975
1791	1,452,498	321,364	1,773,862
1792	1,587,645	304,074	1,891,719
1793	1,342,952	332,375	1,675,327
1794	1,452,786	334,205	1,786,991
1795	1,242,785	390,030	1,632,815
1796	1,474,949	520,069	1,995,018
1797	1,150,222	455,678	1,605,900
1798	1,289,144	420,028	1,709,172
1799	1,375,169	476,596	1,851,765
1800	1,379,807	763,236	2,143,043

Vessels cleared Outwards.

Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tons.
1789	1,507,636	103,697	1,611,333
1790	1,399,233	148,974	1,548,207
1791	1,511,294	184,729	1,696,023
1792	1,563,744	75,556	1,639,300
1793	1,240,202	187,032	1,427,234
1794	1,382,250	218,567	1,600,817
1795	1,145,450	332,567	1,528,017
1796	1,254,626	478,358	1,732,984
1797	1,103,781	396,271	1,500,052
1798	1,319,151	365,719	1,684,870
1799	1,302,551	414,774	1,717,325
1800	1,445,271	685,051	2,130,322

The increase in the imports and exports is still more extraordinary than the increase in the tonnage, exhibited in the preceding table. It appears
S
from

from the following official statements of the Inspector General of the Imports and Exports of Great Britain, laid before Parliament last Session, that since the prosperous year 1792 our imports have received an increase of one-half, and our exports of two-thirds, of their amount at that period; that our imports in 1800, compared with those of 1785, were as two to one, and our exports as five to two. It also appears, that the British manufactures exported in 1800 were valued at more than those exported in the two years 1785 and 1786; that they very nearly equal those exported in the two years 1785 and 1793; and that the British manufactures exported in 1799 and 1800 exceed by ten millions official value (which are equal to about seventeen millions real value) the amount of British manufactures exported in any other two years that can be selected. It is true, that in some articles of export, an increase may be ascribed to the war; but when it is considered that provisions, and naval and military stores, shipped in the King's transports, are not entered on the books of the Custom-house, a very ample allowance may be made for the extraordinary demand created by the war; and yet a considerable surplus will remain, which must be placed to the account of extended markets and improving commerce.

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VALUE OF IMPORTS *

Years.	From East Indies & China.	All other Parts.	Total Imports.
	£.	£.	£.
1785	2,703,940	13,575,478	16,279,419
1786	3,156,687	12,629,385	15,786,072
1787	3,430,868	14,373,146	17,804,014
1788	3,453,897	14,573,272	18,027,170
1789	3,362,545	14,458,557	17,821,102
1790	3,149,870	15,981,015	19,130,886
1791	3,698,713	15,971,069	19,669,782
1792	2,701,547	16,957,810	19,659,358
1793	3,499,023	15,757,693	19,256,717
1794	4,458,475	17,830,418	22,288,894
1795	5,760,810	16,976,079	22,736,889
1796	3,372,689	19,814,630	23,187,319
1797	3,942,384	17,071,572	21,013,956
1798	7,026,930	20,230,959	27,857,889
1799	4,284,805	22,552,626	26,837,432
1800	4,942,275	25,628,330	30,570,605

VALUE OF EXPORTS.

Years.	British Produce and Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	Total Exports.
	£.	£.	£.
1785	11,081,810	5,035,357	16,117,168
1786	11,830,372	4,475,493	16,305,866
1787	12,053,900	4,815,889	16,869,789
1788	12,724,719	4,747,518	17,472,238
1789	13,779,506	5,561,042	19,340,548
1790	14,921,084	5,199,037	20,120,121
1791	16,810,018	5,921,976	22,731,995
1792	18,336,851	6,568,348	24,905,200
1793	13,892,268	6,497,911	20,390,180
1794	16,725,402	10,022,680	26,748,083
1795	16,338,213	10,785,125	27,123,338
1796	19,102,220	11,416,693	30,518,913
1797	16,903,103	12,013,907	28,917,010
1798	19,672,503	13,919,274	33,591,777
1799	24,084,213	11,907,116	35,991,329
1800	24,304,283	18,847,735	43,152,019

It

* The totals, in some instances, in this and the following table, amount to £.1 more than the two first columns added together; this

Imports.

£.
 9,419
 6,072
 4,014
 7,170
 1,102
 0,886
 9,782
 9,358
 6,717
 88,894
 6,889
 7,319
 3,956
 7,889
 7,432
 70,605

Exports.

£.
 17,168
 05,866
 69,789
 72,238
 40,548
 20,121
 31,995
 05,200
 90,180
 48,083
 23,338
 18,913
 17,010
 91,777
 91,329
 52,019

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 ed together;
 this

It is hardly necessary to remark that these values are not the real values of merchandize imported or exported. The rates of value settled in 1697 have been continued at the Custom-house; and according to those rates the value of all merchandize imported or exported is entered in the books of the Inspector General; but since that period the price of almost every article of commerce has so much increased that its official value falls very much short of its real value: in some few instances, however, this is not the case; in an account of the rated value, and of the value agreeably to the prices current, of the foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain to Ireland, (laid before Parliament in 1799,) it appears that the rated value of liquorice, mahogany, coffee, rice, saltpetre, linseed seeds, Bengal, Italian, and thrown, silks, rum, and tar, is more than their real value: coffee is rated at nearly thrice its current price. The Convoy Act, passed in 1798, required the merchant to declare the real value of British merchandize exported, in order that the export duty might be ascertained: but the exports to

this arises from the shillings belonging to the first and second columns, when they amounted to a pound, having been added together for the total. This remark applies to the subsequent tables. These tables of imports and exports were chiefly taken from the Trade and Navigation Account, laid before Parliament in June last; that account, however, varies in a small degree from the Accounts of 1799 and 1800.

Ireland, certain articles used in the fisheries, and cotton manufactures of all descriptions, being exempted from the payment of this duty, the information which it furnished was necessarily imperfect. By assuming, however, that articles exported to Ireland, or used in the fisheries, may be estimated at the same rate of value with articles of a similar value exported to other countries, and by forming an estimate of the true value of cotton manufactures exported, the Inspector General has been enabled to state to Parliament the real value of merchandize exported. From the first half year's operation of the Convoy Duty, it appeared that the *declared value*, on which a duty was paid, exceeded the rate of *value in the Inspector General's books* about 71 per cent. on the whole of the British manufactures exported. The *real* value probably exceeds the *declared* value. In some years, owing to the great quantity of coffee, and other high-rated articles being re-exported, the *official* value of *foreign merchandize* exported exceeds the *real* value*. The Inspector General has laid before Parliament the following statements of the real value of our imports and exports.

IMPORTS.

Years.	From East Indies and China.	All other Parts.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.
1799	8,918,248	40,083,922	49,002,170
1800		45,573,138	

* This it appears, was the case in 1799 and 1800.

EXPORTS.

EXPORTS.

Years.	British Manu- factures. £.	Foreign Merchandize. £.	Total. £.
1798	33,148,682		
1799	38,942,498	11,347,692	50,290,190
1800		16,359,640	
Total actual value of Imports and Ex- ports in 1799 - - - - - }			99,292,360

It appears, from the resolutions on Finance, moved by Mr. Addington, and adopted by the House of Commons last summer, that the total actual value of imports and exports in 1800, supposing the imports from the East Indies and China to be the same as in the preceding year *, may be estimated at £. 110,000,000.

Three of these resolutions exhibit the progress of our commerce during the last twenty years in so satisfactory a point of view, that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of subjoining them.

RESOLUTION XIV.—That the official value of all imports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January 1784, was 13,122,235*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1784, was 11,690,829*l.*: That the official value of all imports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January 1793, was 19,659,358*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1793, was 18,685,390*l.*: That the official value of all im-
ports

* This estimate was very moderate; for the imports from the East Indies and China in 1799 were less than the average of the preceding six years by £.491,913; less than the average of the preceding three years by £.662,529; and less than the imports of the preceding year 1798, by £.3,342,125. It now appears that the imports from the East Indies and China in 1800 exceeded this estimate by £.657,479. See p. 56.

ports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January 1801 (supposing the imports from the East Indies, of which no account has yet been made up, to be the same as in the preceding year) was 29,925,858*l*.* making an increase, as compared with 1783, of 16,803,623*l*. and with 1792, of 10,366,500*l*.; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1801, was 25,259,890*l*. making an increase, as compared with the average to 5th of January 1784, of 13,569,061*l*. and with the average to 5th of January 1793, of 6,374,500*l*.; and that the real value of imports in the year ended the 5th of January 1801, supposing the imports from the East Indies to be the same as in the preceding year, may be estimated at about 54,500,000*l*.

RESOLUTION XV.—That the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th January 1784, was 10,409,713*l*. and on an average of six years, ending 5th January 1784, was 8,616,660*l*.; that the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain, in the year ending 5th January 1793, was 18,336,851*l*.; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th January 1793, was 14,771,049*l*.: That the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain in the year, ending 5th January 1801, was 24,411,067*l*.†; making an increase, as compared with 1783, of 14,001,354*l*. and with 1792, of 6,074,216*l*.; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1801, was 20,085,199*l*. making an increase, as compared with the average to 5th January 1784, of 11,468,539*l*. and with the average to 5th January 1793, of 5,314,150*l*.; and that the real value of British manufactures exported, in the year 1800, may be estimated at about 39,500,000*l*.

RESOLUTION XVI.—That the total amount of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain, in the year ended the 5th January 1784, was 4,332,909*l*.; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th January 1784, was 4,263,930*l*.: That the total value of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th January 1793, was 6,568,000*l*.; and on an average of six years, ending the

* Their actual amount was £.30,570,605. See p. 56.

† See p. 56.

the 5th of January 1793, was 5,468,014*l.*: That the total value of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain,* in the year ending the 5th of January 1801, was 17,166,145*l.*; making an increase, as compared with 1783, of 12,833,236*l.*; and with 1792 of 10,593,145*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1801, was 12,867,958*l.*; making an increase, as compared with the average to January 5th, 1784, of 8,604,028*l.*; and with the average to January the 5th, 1793, of 7,399,944*l.*; and that the real value of foreign merchandize exported in the year ended the 5th of January 1801, may be estimated at about 16,300,000.

The increase of British navigation is no less extraordinary than the increase of British commerce. It will appear from the following accounts, that, notwithstanding the encouragements held out to foreign traders by the war, ship-building has thriven more than ever; and that our commerce has required every year, not only additional shipping, but larger vessels than were built before 1793.

An Account of the Number of Vessels, with the Amount of their Tonnage, which have been annually built and registered in the several Ports of the British Empire, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	Vessels.	Tons.	Average Tonnage.
1789	827	71,090	86
1790	725	68,695	94
1791	766	68,940	90
1792	821	78,120	95
1793	800	75,085	93
1794	714	66,021	92
1795	719	72,181	100
1796	82	94,972	115
1797	756	86,242	114
1798	833	89,319	107
1799	858	98,044	11
1800	965	126,268	13.

An Account of the Number of Vessels belonging to the several Ports of the British Empire, and the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of Men and Boys employed in navigating them, in the Year 1783, and the seventeen following Years.

	Years.	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
On 5th Jan.	1783	8,342	669,212	59,004
	1784	9,111	793,147	65,880
	1785	9,753	859,606	71,372
	1786	10,192	920,926	74,835
On the 30th September.	1787	10,411	1,087,874	81,745
	1788	13,827	1,363,438	107,925
	1789	14,310	1,395,172	108,962
	1790	15,015	1,460,823	112,556
	1791	15,645	1,511,441	117,044
	1792	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
	1793	16,329	1,564,520	118,952
	1794	16,806	1,589,758	119,629
	1795	16,728	1,574,451	116,467
	1796	17,067	1,519,298	120,979
	1797	16,903	1,614,996	124,394
	1798	17,295	1,666,481	129,546
	1799	17,879	1,752,815	135,237
	1800	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

In the above account, the first five years only comprehend the shipping belonging to England and Holland. The accounts of the vessels belonging to Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, Man, and the British Colonies in the West Indies and America, were not returned to the Register General of Shipping previously to the year 1788, when the Act of the 26th of the King, called the Register Act, had taken full effect. From the following comparison of the shipping belonging to different parts of the British Empire in 1788 and 1800 it appears that the number of vessels belonging to Ireland has decreased, and that the greatest increase has been in the shipping belonging to England and the Colonies,

On

On the 30th September, 1788.

	Vessels.	Ton.	Men.
England	9,358	1,055,299	79,859
Scotland	1,864	149,185	13,236
Ireland	1,016	60,777	6,055
Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, }	221	13,801	1,333
Colonies	1,368	84,426	7,442
	<u>13,827</u>	<u>1,363,488</u>	<u>107,925</u>

On the 30th September, 1800.

	Vessels.	Ton.	Men.
England	12,189	1,463,398	104,926
Scotland	2,286	168,485	14,453
Ireland	1,003	54,262	5,057
Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, }	309	17,110	2,749
Colonies	3,009	202,183	16,476
	<u>18,877</u>	<u>1,905,438</u>	<u>137,661</u>

Various causes have co-operated to raise our trade and navigation to this unexampled height of prosperity. The calamitous effects of revolution have long dried up the sources of mercantile opulence in France. The destruction of Lyons, the annihilation of the manufacture of woollens in the Southern, and the temporary suspension (in consequence of the operations of war) of that of cambrics and linens in the Northern, Departments, will, probably, long prevent our neighbours from entering into competition with us in foreign markets. The general insecurity of property on the Continent has thrown a vast capital into Great Britain,

Britain, and thus supported public credit, with which the credit of our counting-houses is intimately connected. The formidable state of our navy, the vigilance of our cruizers,* and the salutary provisions of the Convoy Act, have given confidence and security to our merchants and manufacturers. Almost every port from the Baltic to the Adriatic has been shut against us by the compulsion of open, or the machinations of secret, enemies; but our commerce has forced her way even into countries unwilling to receive her:—
“per obstantes catervas explicuit sua victor arma.”

Those who apprehend that peace must, necessarily, lessen the export of our manufactures, seem to have been led to form this conclusion from observing that our trade has been increased, in some branches, by the extraordinary demand for naval and military stores, and other supplies necessary for our foreign possessions, and by the conquest of many valuable colonies; but they ought also to consider, that, though the war has furnished us

		Ships of the Line	Frigates.
• The British Navy	} in Feb. 1793 consisted of	135	133
The French Navy		80	66
The British Navy	} in Oct. 1801 - - -	202	277
The French Navy		39	35

See Lord Hawkebury's speech on the Peace.

During the war, 90 French, Dutch, Spanish, or Danish, ships of the line, 4 fifties, 190 frigates, and 250 sloops (besides about 940 privateers, and about 5,500 merchantmen) have been lost, taken, or destroyed.

with

with some new markets which we must lose at the peace, it has closed several old ones, which we must recover, and that our business in those which have not been affected by the contest has increased and is increasing. That many valuable branches of trade, which the sovereignty of the sea during the last nine years has enabled us to share with neutral nations, or to appropriate exclusively to ourselves, will, in consequence of the cession of conquered settlements, which we have agreed to make, be either wholly or partially lost to this country is indisputable. I am ready to admit that peace will eventually deprive us of a great part of the trade which we now carry on with the French and Dutch settlements in the West Indies and America, of the whole or greatest part of our trade with the Cape, Cochin, Malacca, and the Dutch spice islands, and of some part of our trade with the northern states of Europe, and with Portugal. But if our probable losses are to be charged against us, we should be allowed credit for our probable gains; if the cessation of hostilities will deprive us of many new customers, it will restore to us many old ones. Our trade with the conquered colonies, which we propose to restore, and our trade with the neutral powers, may experience some diminution; but our trade with our foreign possessions will, probably, be augmented; and our trade with the belligerent powers,

which has been suspended during the war, may be expected to return to its ancient channel. I shall consider each of these four heads separately; and endeavour to shew, from a short review of the tonnage of the vessels which we employed both before, and during, the war, in different parts of the world, that, whatever evils we may dread from the peace, we cannot reasonably apprehend that our manufactures will languish, or our commerce decrease.

I. ON THE TRADE WITH THE CONQUERED COLONIES.

From the following account of the tonnage of vessels entered inwards at the different ports in Great Britain, from the West Indies, since the year 1788, it will appear that our trade with the conquered islands during the last four years, has amounted to a third of the trade which we carry on with our own West India colonies; and that our trade with the foreign islands has been tripled since the war.

Tonnage of Vessels entered inwards in the several ports in Great Britain, from the West Indies, in 1789, and the eleven following Years.

Years.	British West Indies.	Foreign West Indies.	Conquered Islands.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1789	- 142,288	- - 125	- - -
1790	- 140,069	- - 548	- - -
1791	- 144,233	- - 3,124	- - -
1792	- 148,360	- - 2,791	- - -
1793	- 154,310	- - 2,111	- - -
1794	- 172,408	- - 1,111	- - -
1795	- 154,306	- - 4,809	- - -
1796	- 145,195	- - 4,996	- - 34,622
1797	- 112,345	- - 3,366	- - 51,822
1798	- 138,841	- - 3,585	- - 47,412
1799	- 178,782	- - 12,666	- - 57,509
1800	- 162,425	- - 6,075	- - 59,755

The official value of British manufactures exported to our old West India islands, and of the imports from them, was stated by Lord Hawkebury* to be—

	British Manufactures exported.	Imports.
On an Average of the Three last Years of Peace	£. 2,185,000	£. 3,377,000
On an Average of the Three Years of War, 1798, 1799, and 1800	3,561,000	5,101,030

The following official account of imports and exports, distinguishes the value of British manufactures exported during the years 1797, 1798, 1799, and 1800, to the British West Indies, the conquered islands, and the foreign West Indies. It appears from this account that our imports from the conquered islands are above a third, and our exports to those islands not quite a third, of the amount of the corresponding branches of trade with our own West India colonies.

* Speech on the Peace.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from the British and Foreign West Indies and Florida, and of Exports to them, in 1790 and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	4,083,305	1,731,105	185,064	1,916,170
1791	3,849,494	2,359,577	226,805	4,586,472
1792	4,408,532	2,646,370	244,563	2,890,934
1793	4,647,980	2,314,709	253,134	2,567,844
1794	5,566,645	3,257,877	540,312	3,798,189
1795	4,929,519	2,319,101	442,653	2,761,755
1796	4,897,698	3,433,417	597,257	4,030,674

In the following years, the British West Indies are distinguished from the conquered islands, the foreign West Indies, and Florida.

British West Indies, including Trinidad.

	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	3,540,431	2,427,067	228,347	2,655,415
1798	4,594,023	4,166,636	394,958	4,561,595
1799	5,284,306	4,355,352	628,178	4,983,530
1800	5,820,223	2,827,113	339,866	3,166,980

Conquered Islands.

1797	1,632,637	794,244	129,457	923,701
1798	1,796,635	1,294,767	245,446	1,540,214
1799	1,469,280	1,104,724	206,442	1,311,167
1800	2,543,534	704,918	142,314	847,232

Foreign West Indies.

1797	104,955	23,609	3,192	26,801
1798	84,320	43,926	6,120	50,047
1799	602,009	137,943	23,519	161,462
1800	310,196	15,103	7,818	22,921

Florida.

1797	422	—	—	—
1798	—	—	—	—
1799	20,115	—	—	—
1800	10,116	24,792	4,153	28,946

It is possible that we may be deprived of one third of this aggregate of West India trade, by the terms of the definitive treaty, or by the exertions of rival nations ; but I cannot think that our eventual loss will exceed this amount. Jamaica is much improved ; and a considerable addition must be allowed for the acquisition of Trinidad. The situation of that island promises us great commercial advantages. It is well known that, during the last peace, Curaçoa was converted by the Dutch into a vast warehouse, in which assortments of every kind of European commodities might be procured. Thither the Spaniards resorted, both from their islands and the main, to exchange their gold, silver, cocoa, cochineal, bark, staves, and mules, for negroes, linens, cottons, silks, laces, ribbands, India goods, spices, quicksilver, steel, and iron. What Dutch policy effected at Curaçoa, British wisdom will, probably, accomplish at Trinidad. The establishment of free ports in proper situations in the western hemisphere will contribute very materially towards the extension of our West India trade. The articles which the Spaniards are desirous of purchasing with the produce of America consist chiefly of manufactures in which we peculiarly excel. Some years ago, the Spanish settlements were principally supplied with linens and cottons from Germany ; but our artists can now so well imitate the German linens
and

and cottons in texture, colour, sizes, assortment, and manner of packing, that we have been enabled to carry on a considerable trade, in these articles, with Spanish America; and there can be little doubt but that, with proper attention, it may be preserved during the peace. In the manufacture of steel we are unrivalled; in that of iron and other metals, we are rapidly approaching to perfection. India goods, it is probable, might be (I do not believe they are) conveyed to the West Indies, at as small an expence by British, as by American, shipping. The slave trade (I speak of it only in a commercial view) promises to open new sources of mercantile profit. The demand for negroes must, for some years to come, be very great; St. Lucia, Martinico, and Trinidad, may still be supplied, although the not "happier, island in the stormy waste," St. Domingo, should continue to be deemed too pure a soil for slaves to dwell in.

Such is the want of commercial capital, both in France and in Holland, that, although we may ultimately lose 50,000 tons of our present West India trade, by restoring Tobago, Martinico, and St. Lucia to the French, and St. Eustatia, Demerara, Islequibo, and Surinam to the Dutch, it is probable that, for some time after the peace, the trade of these settlements will be directed to Great Britain. In 1763, after we had restored the Savannah to Spain, and Guadaloupe and Martinico

to France, these places continued to trade with this country, and our imports, that year, were *

From Guadaloupe	- - - - -	£.412,303
Martinico	- - - - -	344,162
Havannah	- { Goods	- - 249,387
		- { Bullion
		<hr/>
		£.1,395,302

By an arrêt in August 1784, in the ministry of the Maréchal de Castries, after a spirited controversy in print respecting the colonial commerce, foreigners were permitted, under certain regulations, to trade with the French West India islands. Our trade to them in 1786, in consequence of this arrêt, became very considerable, both in manufactures and in lumber and provisions †.

Of 20,880,000 livres, the value of the merchandize imported into the French islands by foreigners, the British imported merchandize of the value of 4,550,000 livres, in 189 vessels.

And of 14,133,000 livres, the exports from the French islands to foreign countries, our exports amounted to 1,259,000 livres, in 153 vessels.

In the East Indies, the trade carried on with the Dutch spice islands, and settlements at Malacca and Cochin, is too inconsiderable for us to regret its loss. One East Indiaman would bring to

* Burke's "Observations on a late State of the Nation," 1st ed. p. 10. I have corrected his figures from Sir C. Whitworth's Tables.

† Young's Travels in France, 4to edit. vol. i. p. 491.

Europe all the exportable produce of Amboyna, Banda, Ternate, and Malacca. The restoration of the port of Cochin is more than compensated by the acquisition of all the maritime frontier of the Myfore. The loss of the Cape, as a commercial establishment, is of still less importance. It labours under the same inconvenience which has retarded the advancement of our colony at Port Jackson. The North American States, notwithstanding the hardships to which the first settlers were exposed, soon acquired consequence, from possessing a produce that was wanted in Europe. But in New South Wales no such advantage has occurred. Captain Cook, indeed, recommended the New Zealand hemp, as far superior to that imported from the North; but it does not appear that this article of produce has been much attended to. Like our convict-plantation in the southern hemisphere, the Cape possesses no staple commodity (except the very insignificant produce of the Constantia vineyards) which can be exchanged for the manufactures of Europe: and I hesitate not to assert, that the commercial advantages which can be derived from the Cape, would neither repay us, nor even a more frugal nation, the Dutch, for the charge either of its military, or its civil, establishment.

LETTER VI.

II. ON THE TRADE WITH THE NEUTRAL POWERS.

SIR,

16th *December*, 1801.

RUSSIA occupies a chief place among the European neutral powers. Our trade with her, during the last ten years, has very considerably increased. The increase may be partly attributed to the war; but is also in some degree owing to causes which are likely to be permanent. If our imports from the North of Europe have risen in consequence of our late extraordinary consumption of naval stores, they have also risen in consequence of an increased demand among our manufacturers for raw materials; and our export of British manufactures to the North of Europe has risen in consequence of the improved state of this part of the civilized world. Russia is advancing in population and civilization. From Asiatic Tartars, the Russians are (if I may be allowed the expression) becoming Europeans: and their connexions with Britain have, probably, not a little contributed towards their improvement. Our factory at St. Petersburg, I am persuaded, has, in many points of view, proved a good national institute: "*artes intulit agresti Latio.*"

L

Our

Our commerce with Russia has been regularly progressive, since the commencement of his present Majesty's reign. Our exports, which on an average of five years, ending with 1765, amounted to £.66,402, rose to £.196,229 in 1773, the last year noticed in Sir Charles Whitworth's tables of imports and exports; in the year 1792 they were valued at £.800,762; and in 1800 at £.1,025,335, of which £.557,374 were British manufactures.

The trade with Denmark and Sweden has increased during the war; and principally in consequence of the war. That part of it, however, which respects the export of British manufactures has not increased: the export of them to Denmark on the average of 1790, 1791, and 1792, was valued at £.179,333, and the exports to Sweden at £.41,058; and on the average of the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, the export of them to Denmark was valued at £.191,288, and the exports to Sweden at £.26,896*. It will be seen from the following documents that, the export of British manufactures to these two countries, does not equal half the export of British manufactures to Russia.

* See Table of Exports to Denmark and Sweden in page 77. I need hardly remark that the values stated in this page are the *official* values of the Custom House Ledger.

ACCOUNT of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which cleared Outwards from the several Ports of England and Scotland, to Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

RUSSIA.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	47,096	855	7,134	—	55,085
1790	55,911	2,343	4,995	—	63,249
1791	60,668	1,505	5,450	—	67,623
1792	62,877	380	7,226	—	70,483
1793	35,101	1,038	5,498	—	41,637
1794	73,278	1,432	10,592	2,000*	87,302
1795	104,407	3,502	10,041	—	117,950
1796	96,780	9,395	11,874	—	118,049
1797	58,217	1,287	9,128	—	68,632
1798	102,740	1,536	16,272	470	121,018
1799	71,860	29,698	12,194	191	113,943
1800	132,037	24,848	11,871	—	168,756

DENMARK.

1789	45,453	25,617	13,459	1,081	85,610
1790	47,222	34,261	9,177	1,526	92,186
1791	48,392	38,970	10,628	2,530	100,520
1792	42,262	35,874	9,921	1,710	89,767
1793	31,173	30,942	6,527	1,186	69,828
1794	46,478	45,401	7,196	2,781	101,856
1795	39,598	81,507	7,207	7,532	135,844
1796	46,816	91,549	12,847	12,378	163,590
1797	46,627	78,080	8,775	5,672	139,154
1798	53,433	77,773	10,843	12,202	154,251
1799	51,561	117,602	5,169	16,478	190,810
1800	45,850	145,995	9,275	14,218	215,338

* This is stated as the tonnage of one ship; I presume erroneously.

SWEDEN.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	11,826	480	4,880	—	17,186
1790	10,808	351	6,889	—	18,048
1791	5,836	4,753	8,787	—	19,376
1792	7,015	6,703	7,973	682	22,373
1793	6,873	7,429	6,180	—	20,482
1794	15,473	9,803	9,835	447	35,558
1795	10,878	15,157	7,381	238	33,654
1796	16,020	17,216	11,304	180	44,720
1797	9,871	8,243	5,912	—	24,026
1798	12,884	18,347	4,634	—	35,865
1799	7,780	24,678	4,801	1,035	38,294
1800	5,774	27,980	2,314	1,075	37,143

An Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain from Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, and of Exports from Great Britain to each of those Countries, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British from Foreign Merchandize.

RUSSIA.

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports. £.
		British Ma- nufactures. £.	Foreign Mer- chandize. £.	
1790	1,710,374	265,920	188,369	454,289
1791	1,548,677	281,243	292,113	573,356
1792	1,708,671	428,774	371,987	800,762
1793	1,804,025	197,683	123,144	320,827
1794	1,789,448	240,520	255,386	495,907
1795	1,857,978	393,500	468,766	862,267
1796	2,510,083	393,932	372,965	766,897
1797	1,707,504	256,483	217,722	474,206
1798	2,416,829	380,668	311,711	691,780
1799	2,662,255	428,610	341,099	769,710
1800	2,382,098	557,374	467,960	1,025,335

DENMARK.

DENMARK.

Years.	£.	£.	£.	£
1790	149,860	140,418	121,726	262,144
1791	182,040	219,803	134,818	354,621
1792	186,649	177,779	134,941	312,720
1793	205,822	141,590	149,674	291,265
1794	209,885	195,202	203,982	489,184
1795	154,335	175,022	323,441	498,464
1796	243,928	189,672	320,110	509,783
1797	134,602	225,648	445,274	670,922
1798	176,208	193,122	356,428	549,550
1799	194,036	194,041	150,703	344,744
1800	241,562	186,703	353,994	540,698

S W E D E N.

1790	300,518	29,504	34,858	64,363
1791	267,770	36,259	38,483	74,743
1792	338,690	57,413	60,927	118,340
1793	307,395	28,437	47,987	76,424
1794	287,784	43,637	61,636	105,273
1795	294,612	47,304	80,073	127,377
1796	347,336	51,672	69,840	121,512
1797	192,033	74,934	78,961	153,895
1798	266,003	24,807	27,910	52,718
1799	347,882	26,120	24,460	50,580
1800	309,280	29,761	49,079	78,840

The same observation which I made respecting Russia, applies to the northern states of Germany: Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, and (I believe I might add) the hereditary dominions of Austria, though impoverished by the war, are improving markets. Various attempts have been made on the Continent, particularly in Saxony, to rival us in the cotton and woollen manufactures, by the introduction of machinery; but these attempts have not lessened our exports. It is, however, not easy

easy to determine what proportion of British manufactures exported to Germany during the war was destined for the consumption of Holland, Flanders, or France: but it is highly probable, that a considerable part of the commerce lately carried on with the northern states of Germany will be diverted to other channels in consequence of the peace. In 1800, the exports to Germany were £. 12,664,591. It is not to the internal demand of those countries and the improving condition of their people, that we can attribute more than a part of the increased trade which has taken place with them in the course of the war. Whatever advantages Denmark may have derived from the neutrality which she observed till 1801, she will be much deceived if she flatters herself that in any year of peace, 215,338 tons, the amount of the tonnage of shipping from Great Britain last year, will enter her ports. She has acted only as an agent and carrier between the British merchant and other countries. Prussia, too, must consider the late extension of her trade as only temporary. Though she received 1849 vessels (containing 235,481 tons, or a ninth of the foreign trade of this country *) from our ports last year, she, probably, in

* Viz,

Cleared outwards from Great Britain in 1800,

	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.
To Prussia	- - 1976	- - - - 223,859
Dantzic	- - 53	- - - - 11,622
	<hr/>	
Total	- - 2029	- - - - 235,481
To all parts of the world	16,761	- - - - 2,130,322

profound peace, will not furnish employment to a fourth part of this number. In our trade with Hamburgh the tonnage has increased from 6,030 tons, in 1789, to 62,441 tons: the peculiar circumstances of the times may prevent its sinking to the level of the last peace; but our trade with most of the neutral powers except America, will decrease; and its diminution must be allowed against any increase which may be calculated to arise from the commercial intercourse being re-opened between Great Britain and the other belligerent Powers.

ACCOUNT of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which cleared Outwards from the several Ports in England and Scotland to Germany, Poland, Prussia, Bremen, Dantzic, and Hamburgh, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

GERMANY.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	39,099	7,000	7,459	186	53,744
1790	30,571	12,124	9,353	—	52,048
1791	46,973	17,665	9,095	—	73,733
1792	50,506	11,252	8,640	—	70,398
1793	39,095	14,135	5,091	453	58,774
1794	45,629	8,629	6,342	310	60,910
1795	25,830	24,634	2,431	652	53,547
1796	35,043	18,939	5,019	1,306	60,307
1797	26,381	12,989	5,092	635	45,097
1798	47,793	8,204	7,803	259	64,059
1799	28,609	13,988	5,843	108	48,548
1800	32,597	17,735	12,193	707	83,232

POLAND.

POLAND.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	773	320	484	—	1,577
1790	577	320	200	118	1,215
1791	1,577	480	745	—	2,802
1792	2,224	1,615	260	—	4,099
1793	2,034	918	683	—	3,035
1794	2,934	620	373	135	4,062
1795	3,493	265	455	—	4,213
1796	5,059	80	2,643	—	7,782
1797	1,424	270	102	—	1,796
1798	3,646	170	970	—	4,786
1799	1,478	409	2,018	—	3,905
1800	5,522	1,644	3,235	—	10,401

PRUSSIA.

1789	22,721	8,188	4,308	150	35,367
1790	27,924	14,975	7,026	100	50,025
1791	30,462	25,934	5,906	246	62,548
1792	24,509	16,469	3,958	—	44,936
1793	29,470	13,718	4,452	—	47,640
1794	42,872	11,998	3,700	135	58,705
1795	39,575	42,349	3,034	372	85,330
1796	51,335	82,197	4,154	3,118	140,804
1797	23,038	83,068	3,783	3,719	113,608
1798	43,238	98,145	4,546	2,487	148,416
1799	43,702	68,467	4,901	1,685	118,755
1800	41,838	166,242	10,755	5,024	223,859

BREMEN.

1789	2,323	2,557	—	—	4,880
1790	1,912	2,572	—	—	4,484
1791	included in Germany				
1792	1,929	3,055	—	—	4,984
1793	2,782	2,760	—	—	5,542
1794	4,512	7,101	—	—	11,913
1795	3,005	10,330	—	—	13,335
1796	2,797	14,294	—	—	17,091
1797	3,210	7,021	—	—	10,231
1798	13,915	2,807	—	—	16,722
1799	5,742	2,652	—	—	8,394
1800	6,717	13,221	—	—	19,938

DANTZIC.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	1,029	—	669	350	2,048
1790	2,471	4,184	included in Poland		
1791	included in Poland		D ^o		
1792	1,634	3,909	78	—	5,621
1793	1,367	1,720	—	—	3,087
1794	1,224	3,125	147	—	4,496
1795	7,081	8,244	232	—	15,557
1796	4,877	7,044	included in Poland		
1797	1,745	7,539	—	—	9,284
1798	5,236	3,024	281	—	8,541
1799	8,155	5,605	95	—	13,855
1800	2,656	8,637	329	—	11,622

HAMBURGH.

1789	5,434	605	—	—	6,039
1790	included in Germany				
1791	D ^o				
1792	D ^o				
1793	D ^o				
1794	18,233	17,918	—	—	36,151
1795	12,195	41,308	—	—	53,503
1796	8,926	39,095	—	—	48,021
1797	14,527	37,667	539	—	52,733
1798	51,656	22,287	183	—	74,126
1799	31,363	13,364	—	—	44,727
1800	35,699	26,542	200	—	62,441

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Germany and Poland, and of Exports to those Countries, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

GERMANY.

Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports. £.
		British Manufactures. £.	Foreign Merchandize. £.	
1790	603,208	791,601	902,920	1,694,522
1791	715,628	778,213	1,111,532	1,889,745
1792	650,437	811,140	1,327,970	2,139,111
1793	794,095	718,474	1,764,221	2,482,695
1794	796,138	1,634,530	4,308,695	5,943,225
1795	1,020,632	1,760,133	6,311,876	8,072,009
1796	2,082,275	1,591,740	6,582,179	8,173,920
1797	1,576,426	1,964,967	6,419,587	8,384,554
1798	2,091,832	2,042,774	8,646,691	10,689,466
1799	2,820,134	2,032,567	6,640,729	8,673,297
1800	2,352,197	4,364,120	8,300,470	12,664,591

POLAND.

Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports. £.	Total Exports. £.	
1790	114,148	39,217	12,269	51,486
1791	175,043	39,833	22,812	62,645
1792	122,321	32,900	34,174	67,075
1793	275,497	20,533	47,911	68,444
1794	202,222	11,612	64,083	75,696
1795	137,507	15,212	74,217	89,429
1796	340,724	16,124	43,775	59,899
1797	168,662	11,394	19,066	30,460
1798	202,562	22,331	45,908	68,240
1799	270,687	32,247	18,816	51,063
1800	393,041	17,802	30,099	47,902

One neutral power remains to be noticed with which the most important branch of our trade, the export of British manufactures, will suffer no diminution in consequence of the peace: Our commercial

commercial connexions with the United States of America are fixed on such solid foundations, that we have no reason to apprehend that the future political diffentions of Europe will affect them. For many years to come, the Americans, although an extensive sea coast, good harbours, and a spirit of enterprize inherited from their fore-fathers, suggest to them the employment of a part of their capital in commerce, must continue to direct the largest portion of it to agricultural improvements. While we can supply them with better and cheaper goods than other nations can manufacture for them, or than they can manufacture for themselves, they will, from the strongest tie, that of interest, continue to be united to us ; but, as a German writer well observes, “ there are considerations, totally independent of policy and interest, which must and will for ever assure to this country, the almost exclusive commerce of the United States ; these are, in the first place, the consanguinity of the two people ; and in the second, the similarity of religion, language, manners, and taste ; the consumption of the manufactures of Europe will necessarily keep pace with the progress of cultivation in America, until, at some period yet extremely remote, the surplus hands not wanted for agriculture or commerce must seek employment in manufactures.” He adds “ that, as the commerce of the United States must necessarily be possessed by Britain,

“ it will be that country which, in the end, instead
 “ of losing, will have gained every thing by a
 “ revolution, from which we fondly predicted her
 “ ruin. If we were to form our opinion from that
 “ which personal animosities, and the recollection
 “ of civil discord, have generated in the minds of
 “ a few individuals of both nations, we might
 “ fancy that Britain and America would never be
 “ sincerely united. But such feelings are transi-
 “ tory: nations may be considered as combatants
 “ for hire, whose animosity never survives the event
 “ that occasions it*.”

Our trade to North America is of the greatest
 importance, as it principally consists in the ex-
 port of our home productions and manufactures.
 Its increase has been very rapid: and whether it
 be measured by the tonnage of the shipping em-
 ployed, or by the value of the merchandize sent
 out, by years of war, or by years of peace, it will
 justify this conclusion, that our future intercourse
 with the United States, will enlarge those sources
 of employment and of wealth, which that coun-
 try has opened to British manufacturers and mer-
 chants.

* Wimpffen's Voyage to St. Domingo, Letter xxxix.


An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared outwards from England and Scotland, to the United States of America, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.



Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	58,717	26,917	13,961	2,030	101,625
1790	40,768	36,918	10,209	2,523	90,418
1791	43,508	52,603	11,820	3,203	111,134
1792	41,451	56,160	9,512	3,254	110,377
1793	7,054	56,000	1,510	4,747	69,311
1794	9,672	64,093	1,154	2,899	77,818
1795	2,113	90,327	—	3,015	95,455
1796	1,522	99,774	547	5,583	107,426
1797	3,640	73,513	641	5,362	83,156
1798	6,439	68,999	1,478	5,169	82,085
1799	11,401	74,186	2,866	4,497	92,950
1800	9,309	105,476	5,072	7,120	126,977

An Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain, from the United States of America, and of the Exports from Great Britain to the United States; distinguishing British from Foreign Merchandize; in the following Years:



Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports. £.
		British Ma- nufactures. £.	Foreign Mer- chandize. £.	
1790	1,191,072	3,178,594	253,183	3,431,778
1791	1,194,232	3,929,771	205,676	4,225,448
1792	1,018,707	3,974,827	206,591	4,271,418
1793	904,040	3,272,725	141,956	3,414,681
1794	625,733	3,583,889	270,581	3,859,861
1795	1,352,136	4,892,572	361,546	5,254,116
1796	2,080,660	5,835,640	218,651	6,054,291
1797	1,175,512	4,871,316	185,506	5,056,822
1798	1,782,720	5,313,068	267,301	5,580,370
1799	1,818,941	6,096,221	360,337	7,056,558
1800	2,357,923	6,689,467	196,140	6,885,558

The export of British manufactures to the United States in the year 1800 amounted to more than a fourth of the export to all parts of the world.





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



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Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
ROCKY HILL, N.Y. 14560
(716) 872-4303

15 128
16 32 25
17 22
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It appears, from the following comparison, that the export to the United States, during the war, has exceeded the exports of British manufactures, during the same period, to all Foreign Europe.

An Account of the official Value of British Manufactures exported to Foreign Europe, and to the States of America, in 1793, and the Seven following Years.

Years.	Foreign Europe.	States of America.
	£.	£.
1793	3,531,046	3,272,725
1794	4,458,383	3,588,889
1795	4,222,782	4,892,572
1796	4,497,683	5,835,640
1797	3,732,830	4,871,316
1798	3,981,650	5,313,068
1799	4,543,608	6,696,221
1800	7,516,123	6,689,467
	<u>£.36,484,105</u>	<u>41,159,898</u>

Of the British manufactures exported to the United States more than two-fifths consist of woollens. That country now stands first in the list of foreign consumers of this production of British industry.

Of £.6,876,939 the official value of woollens exported in 1799, the export to

The States of America, was	2,803,490
Ireland	916,190
East Indies and China	668,161
Portugal and Madeira	568,788
British and Foreign West Indies	552,726
Germany	427,053
British Continental Colonies in America	324,739
Russia	149,789

The proportion exported to the United States, in preceding years, will appear from the following account:

An

An Account of the Total official Value of Woollen Manufactures exported from Great Britain in 1790, and the Nine following Years, to the United States of America, and to all Parts of the World.*

Years.	United States.	All parts of the World.
	£.	£.
1790	1,481,378	5,190,637
1791	1,621,796	5,505,034
1792	1,361,753	5,510,668
1793	1,032,954	3,806,536
1794	1,391,877	4,390,920
1795	1,982,318	5,172,884
1796	2,294,942	6,011,133
1797	1,901,986	4,936,355
1798	2,399,935	6,499,339†
1799	2,803,490	6,876,939

The value of all the woollens manufactured in Great-Britain was stated to exceed £. 19,000,000, by several intelligent manufacturers, examined before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1800. No register, however, is kept of the quantity manufactured in any part of this island, except the West Riding of York; but the following extracts from the returns annually made to the Pontefract Easter Sessions afford the most unequivocal proof of the prosperous state of this manufacture in the North of England. A great part of

* From an account laid before the House of Commons on the 30th April 1800.

† In the accounts respecting the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland, laid before the House of Lords in February, 1799, (N^o 2) the official value of Woollens exported to all parts of the world, in 1798, is stated at £. 6,836,603. In the "Accounts and Papers relative to the Commerce, Revenue, and Expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland," laid before the House of Commons in April 1800, (N^o 1) the value, agreeably to the prices current, or to the declared value of the merchants exporters, of woollens exported from Great Britain to all parts of the world, in the year 1798, is stated at £. 8,458,567.

of the increased consumption is owing to America, who thus, in some degree, repays the mother-country for having reared her to maturity.

An Account of the Number of Broad and Narrow Cloths milled in the West Riding of the County of York, and of the Number of Yards made in the following Years.

Years.	BROADS.		NARROWS.	
	Pieces.	Yards.	Pieces.	Yards.
1763	48,038	—	72,096	—
1773	120,245	3,635,612	89,874	2,206,235
1783	131,092	4,563,376	108,641	3,292,002
1793	190,331	6,054,946	150,666	4,783,722
1794	190,988	6,067,208	130,403	4,634,258
1795	250,993	7,759,907	155,087	5,172,511
1796	246,770	7,830,536	151,594	5,245,704
1797	229,292	7,235,038	156,709	5,503,648
1798	224,159	7,134,114	148,566	5,180,313
1799	272,755	8,806,688	180,168	6,377,277
1800	285,851	9,263,966	169,262	6,014,420

If we compare the import of the raw material of cottons, another manufacture which forms a considerable part of our exports to America, with the import of the wool used in our finest broad cloths, it will appear, that though the latter is the most flourishing, the former has not been materially affected by the war.

An Account of the Quantities of Cotton and Spanish Wool, imported into Great Britain, on an annual Medium of Four Periods of Five Years each.

Average of Five Years, ending on the	Cotton. lbs.	Spanish Wool. lbs.
5th Jan. 1776	4,414,757	1,578,605
5th Jan. 1787	16,081,983	1,975,327
5th Jan. 1792	28,852,038	3,174,429
5th Jan. 1799	26,433,730	3,800,583

We

We cannot reasonably apprehend that foreign nations, who, with all the advantages of neutrality during the war, have not stript us of our trade, or ruined our manufacturers, should be more successful in peace, when circumstances will be more favourable to us; but it is extremely improbable that France, without fuel, without our improved mills and steam-engines,* without that ingenuity which can only be acquired by long practice, without habits of industry, wanting capital to set her industry in motion, and unable to give that long credit which those countries which deal with us have been accustomed to, should soon dispossess us of those markets which we now supply. If we could undersell the French in America before the year 1793, we may now hope to preserve our superiority. The taxes imposed during the war do not press heavily on our manufactures. The internal improvements, which during the last ten years have taken place in Great Britain, have facilitated the operations of labour, and rendered it more productive. New roads, canals, and machinery, while they reduce the price of manufactures, increase the remuneration of the workman.

In our export trade we now enjoy many peculiar advantages which we did not formerly possess;

* The amount of capital vested in mills and machinery, in the woollen manufacture alone, is estimated, by a very intelligent manufacturer of Leeds, at £.5,083,560. Minutes of evidence relating to wool, p. 31.

there is hardly an article in the manufacture of silks, woollens, cotton, leather, metals, and glass, (plate-glass excepted, in which, however, we have lately much improved,) which cannot be made in this country. Every species of colonial produce (except some kinds of spices * and the precious metals) will be brought directly to our ports. We shall thus be enabled to supply every part of the world with cargoes completely assorted; and, though it should be admitted that in some of the least valuable manufactures other nations may excel us, we may be assured that, whenever we furnish the principal commodities wanted by a foreign consumer, the convenience of making up an assortment will, if our prices are not extravagant, cause a preference to be given to us in more trifling articles.

* Some of the spices, I believe, have been naturalized in our West India islands, and in India: the complete conquest of the Moluccas has afforded us the opportunity, which, it is to be hoped, will not be thrown away, of transplanting the clove and the nutmeg to the congenial soil of Ceylon.

LETTER VII.

III. ON THE TRADE WITH THE BRITISH
COLONIES.

SIR, 22d December, 1801.

I SHALL now proceed to the consideration of the trade carried on with the British colonies.

That branch of it which relates to the West Indies has already been noticed. Our commerce with that part of North America which bears allegiance to His Majesty is of considerable importance. Canada and Nova Scotia, in the year 1792, which I select as a fairer period of comparison than any subsequent year, imported a greater amount of British manufactures than any one country in Europe. Like the United States, they promise, from their increasing population, to furnish us with new customers; nor am I singular in supposing that the vast extent of country, reaching from the Atlantic to the Hyperborean and the Pacific Oceans, which has lately been added to the British dominions by the discoveries of enterprizing traders, may, with proper encouragement, ultimately ensure us the entire command of the fur trade in North America.*

* See Mackenzie's Voyages through North America, just published.

From

From the following statement of imports and exports, which extends to the year 1800, and account of woollens exported, which extends as far as the year 1799 we may reasonably infer that our commerce with these colonies will continue to improve. Whilst the spirit of emigration exists in Europe, (and the state of France and Germany is still such that it cannot be expected to cease in those countries,) it is not only the turbulent and factious, but the peaceable and industrious, who may be led to seek their fortunes across the Atlantic. If French Guiana, according to the First Consul's recommendation, be a good refuge for the former class, British America is a better asylum for persons of the latter description. Though the climate of Canada and Nova Scotia is not so mild as that of the United States, it is more healthy. The difficulty of obtaining unexceptionable titles to land, we are assured, is the only obstacle that prevents this part of North America from experiencing a more rapid improvement than it does.* Every year, however, many persons emigrate from the United States into Canada; and there can be little doubt but that, with proper encouragement, those who leave Great Britain and Ireland to settle in America, might be induced to seek a colony, where they would still live under the protection of that country in which they first drew breath.

* Weld's Travels, Letter xxvii.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from the British Colonies * in North America, and of the Exports to them, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Value of Exports.			Total Exports.
	Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	239,040	623,770	216,908	840,679
1791	253,833	688,658	205,958	894,617
1792	255,798	908,105	211,886	1,119,981
1793	210,345	717,075	187,446	904,529
1794	241,026	735,496	235,754	971,251
1795	314,761	826,440	173,345	999,786
1796	268,777	851,349	169,703	1,021,053
1797	283,431	896,325	151,828	1,048,153
1798	315,792	1,166,730	200,168	1,366,898
1799	333,326	1,309,792	319,039	1,628,831
1800	558,037	1,196,365	240,081	1,436,446

An Account of the official Value of Woollens exported to the British Colonies in North America in 1790, and the Nine following Years.

Years	£.
1790	- 156,192
1791	- 132,997
1792	- 183,681
1793	- 147,631
1794	- 186,787
1795	- 196,876
1796	- 224,649
1797	- 232,329
1798	- 232,869
1799	- 324,739

* Not including Nootka Sound, which forms an article in the Custom-house books of the year 1800. See Letter viii.

It

It appears from the following account of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards from Great Britain to these settlements, that a considerable diminution has taken place during the war. This is principally ascribable to the check which our Newfoundland Fisheries have experienced in consequence of the unsettled state of the markets in the south of Europe. The tonnage of the ships employed in these fisheries, which, on the average of the three years before the war, amounted to 31,112 tons annually, on the average of the last three years was only 15,840 tons. It may, therefore, be presumed that in this branch of commerce some increase will result from a free communication being opened with Spain, and the countries in the Mediterranean.

Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared Outwards from England and Scotland to the British Settlements in North America, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	52,046	90	5,089	—	57,225
1790	44,155	—	4,854	—	49,009
1791	49,319	—	6,449	—	55,768
1792	48,087	—	7,280	—	55,367
1793	34,528	—	6,766	—	41,294
1794	33,303	176	5,421	—	38,900
1795	30,783	—	5,528	—	36,311
1796	29,881	—	5,524	—	35,405
1797	29,642	—	4,005	—	33,647
1798	27,286	—	7,762	—	35,048
1799	29,203	—	9,568	—	38,771
1800	33,262	—	8,759	—	42,021

A con-

A considerable increase may be expected in the trade with the British settlements in Africa, in consequence of the peace. A very large supply of negroes will be wanted in many of the West India islands, and the extension of the slave trade must necessarily create a greater demand for British manufactures in Africa than would otherwise take place. The following account of tonnage and imports does not comprehend our commerce with the Cape of Good Hope. It is very inconsiderable; and, whatever may be the future destiny of that colony, the loss of it, in a commercial point of view, cannot be much regretted, nor the acquisition of it much coveted.

The tonnage of vessels, which have cleared out for the Cape, since we took possession of it, amounts only to 17,987 tons; of which 7,020 tons cleared out in the year 1796.

Our trade with Egypt is comprehended in that with Turkey.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared Outwards from England to Africa in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	Total.
1789	19,493	—	19,493
1790	26,921	—	26,921
1791	32,590	—	32,590
1792	40,479	—	40,479
1793	16,484	45	16,529
1794	29,034	224	29,258

1795

1795	18,234	370	18,604
1796	23,251	1,000	24,251
1797	25,477	1,531	27,008
1798	39,310	755	40,065
1799	41,778	—	41,778
1800	38,966	431	39,397

No vessel cleared out from Scotland to Africa in the above years.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Africa, and of the Exports to that Country, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

EXPORTS.

Years.	Imports.	Exports.		Total Exports.
	£.	British Manufactures. £.	Foreign Merchandize. £.	
1790	71,800	609,820	319,382	929,203
1791	79,784	534,731	321,350	856,082
1792	82,912	882,074	485,845	1,367,919
1793	120,378	256,458	128,128	384,587
1794	48,880	438,577	311,245	749,822
1795	65,097	214,953	213,778	428,731
1796	106,734	298,162	310,803	608,965
1797	54,357	523,367	364,478	887,846
1798	69,761	777,226	514,482	1,291,708
1799	112,789	1,036,261	590,362	1,626,624
1800	96,563	589,496	510,161	1,099,657

A very satisfactory estimate of the importance of our commerce with Asia, both as it relates to our navigation and our manufactures, may be formed from the following documents :

An

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels entered Inwards and cleared Outwards from the several Ports of Great Britain, in the Year 1789, and each of the Eleven following Years, to the East Indies and China.

Years.	Entered Inwards.		Cleared Outwards.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.
1789	27,695	—	22,223	—
1790	27,122	—	26,408	—
1791	25,539	—	24,109	—
1792	21,500	—	27,645	—
1793	25,900	—	39,529	—
1794	34,375	—	30,452	—
1795	46,299	—	34,719	—
1796	31,262	—	59,457	—
1797	34,365	1,032	42,876	294
1798	61,880	—	35,543	—
1799	38,751	1,305	43,049	923
1800	49,635	1,018	49,284	1,990

It appears, from Steel's List of British vessels employed in the Company's Service, that their tonnage exceeds 85,000 tons.

The export of British manufactures to India and China, was greater in the year 1800 than in any preceding year, except 1794; it exceeds the export of 1790 by £. 420,127, *official* value; and when it is considered that, during the last ten years, there has been an advance in the price of various articles of export, there can be little doubt that the *real* value of our exports to that part of the world bears a greater proportion to the *official* value than it did in 1790; and that the *real* value of the exports in 1800 exceeds the *real* value of the exports in 1794.

An Account of the official Value of Exports * to the East Indies and China, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.
1790	2,298,152	88,167	2,386,320
1791	2,176,422	103,384	2,279,807
1792	2,341,360	96,527	2,437,887
1793	2,598,730	122,760	2,721,491
1794	2,832,234	92,595	2,924,829
1795	2,298,533	84,824	2,383,358
1796	2,219,689	157,287	2,376,977
1797	2,185,486	102,945	2,288,432
1798	1,094,004	51,963	1,145,968
1799	2,278,900	157,945	2,436,846
1800	2,718,279	142,141	2,860,421

It will be seen from the following account that our export of woollens alone to Asia now exceeds a million sterling.†

An Account of the Prime Cost, or Value, of Woollens exported to India and China, in the Seasons 1798-9, 1799-1800, and 1800-1.

	Pieces.	Value.	£.
		£.	£.
1798 to 1799	Broad Cloth -	14,175	285,229
	Long Ells -	228,192	553,981
	Camlets -	6,563	39,174
			<u>878,384</u>
1799 to 1800	Broad Cloth -	15,984	320,328
	Long Ells -	230,764	567,343
	Camlets -	12,972	75,671
			<u>963,342</u>
1800 to 1801	Broad Cloth -	14,951	305,069
	Long Ells -	266,590	631,762
	Camlets -	43,755	90,452
			<u>1,027,283</u>

* For the imports from the East Indies and China, see p. 56.

† The true value, agreeably to the prices current in 1791 and 1792, and agreeably to the declarations of the merchants exporters in 1798 and 1799, of woollen manufactures exported from Great Britain, in those years, was

1791.	1792.	1798.	1799.
£.	£.	£.	£.
7,376,745	7,384,295	8,458,567	8,529,229

Copper is another considerable article in our exports to Asia. From the accounts laid before the House of Commons two years ago, respecting the copper trade, it appears that a very large proportion of wrought copper, and of brass, and plated goods, exported, is sent to Asia.

Official Value of Wrought Copper, and of Brass, and Plated Goods, exported to all Parts of the World, distinguishing Asia, in 1790, and the Nine following Years.*

Years	Wrought Copper.		Brass and Plated Goods.	
	Asia £.	All parts of the world. £.	Asia £.	All parts of the world. £.
1790	43,210	324,943	31,469	171,338
1791	51,013	358,844	36,472	209,769
1792	74,730	437,043	64,822	282,469
1793	229,490	465,030	195,030	320,672
1794	235,063	482,188	169,920	279,066
1795	218,890	438,772	174,150	275,888
1796	202,894	462,431	173,344	286,562
1797	146,049	397,495	115,515	219,099
1798	116,543	413,840	76,500	211,093
1799	202,971	515,043†	155,254	346,632 †

Tin, also, forms a considerable part of the exports of the East India Company. The prime cost of the quantity they purchased in 1795 amounted to £.92,204.

* Report of a committee of the House of Commons on the copper trade 1799. App. 33, 34. Accounts of wrought copper, and of brass and plated ware, exported: ordered to be printed 21st March, 1800.

† The value declared by the exporters was

Wrought copper	- - - - -	£. 626,459
Brass and plated goods	- - - - -	613,901

An Account of the Quantity and Price of Tin sold to the East India Company in 1792, and the Five following Years*.

Years.	Quantity. Tons.	Price per Ton.			Total Amount. £.
		£.	s.	d.	
1792	793	76	0	0	60,268
1793	{ 800	75	0	0	90,960
	{ 430				
1794	{ 800	75	0	0	82,660
	{ 330				
1795	{ 800	75	0	0	92,204
	{ 469				
1796	{ 800	75	0	0	77,853
	{ 260				
1797	{ 800	75	0	0	80,320
	{ 427				

In return for British manufactures, India now furnishes us with many raw materials of great consequence to our manufacturers. Indigo, an article of which not a single pound was brought from India twenty years ago, is now an import of such consequence that its sales in one year have amounted nearly to one million sterling. Cotton, too, it is probable, may be obtained from India, in any quantity required by our manufacturers. The average annual export of Malabar cotton, from Surat and Bombay to China, is 60,000 bales, occupying 20,000 tons of shipping, and producing about £. 720,000, the greater part of which is paid into the Company's treasury at Canton, for bills of exchange on the Court of Directors, or lent to

* Report of a Committee of the House of Commons on the Copper Trade, 1799, p. 5.

foreign agents for the purpose of buying teas for the market of Europe*. In the year 1799-1800, upwards of 34,000 bales † (each containing 392 lbs. weight) were imported in 11,500 tons of shipping, into Great Britain. Hemp is another production which, it is supposed, may be imported to advantage. If it should be thought expedient to encourage the importation of that article from Bengal, it will make a demand for a still greater supply of shipping than cotton ‡.

Respecting sugar, another natural production of Bengal, we are informed by Mr. Henschman, in his interesting Observations on the trade between India and Europe, that it “ has, for ages, been cultivated ” there “ in very large quantities. It was “ formerly an article of export trade ; and by the “ activity of individuals, aided by the support and “ assistance of the Company, it has been rendered “ so again ; and will, if it is politically right to “ allow it, be an article of great consideration “ between the East Indies and the port of London, to be again exported for foreign consumption. One very important point, in deciding upon “ this subject, is to recollect the situation of all “ foreign Europeans and Americans in India : “ they are at liberty to bring any articles from the

* Henschman's Observations on the Reports of the Directors of the East India Company, p. 25.

† Equal to 13,328,000 lbs.

‡ Henschman's Observations, p. 16.

“ East Indies that may be beneficial. If, therefore,
 “ sugar should for any reasons be prohibited to be
 “ brought in British ships, they will bring it in
 “ Foreign ships, whenever they find an advantage
 “ in doing so, for the supply of any part of the
 “ world, England excepted *.”

The sales of the East India Company, which, in 1783, only produced £. 3,363,800, now amount to more than £. 10,000,000.

Amount of Goods sold at the East India Company's Sales, in the Three last Years of Peace, and the Three last Years of War.

Years.	Company's Goods. £.	Private Trade, and Privileged Goods. £.	Total. £.
1790	5,104,508	930,930	6,035,438
1791	5,141,532	709,455	5,850,987
1792	5,050,819	703,578	5,754,397

Years.	Company's Goods. £.	Private Trade. £.	Neutral Property. £.	Total. £.
1st Mar. 1798	8,337,066	1,629,959	338,231	10,315,256
to ditto 1799				
1799	7,367,727	2,336,980	455,903	10,160,610
1800				
1801				
1801	7,602,041	2,382,092	339,319	10,323,452

How different is this state of our Indian trade from its amount at the end of the American war, in the year 1783; yet, extensive as our commerce with Asia now is, it is highly probable that it will experience a great increase.

* Henschman's Observations, p. 27.

There

There can be little doubt but that in the hands of Britons, Ceylon (enriched, perhaps, by the introduction of the species of Amboyna, Banda, and Ternate,) will be rendered a very flourishing colony; but I cannot avoid repeating the prayer of the learned author of "the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea," that the commerce of this rich and valuable island, now in the complete possession of the English, may be conducted on more liberal principles, and the natives treated more generously by them than they have been by their predecessors*. The possession of the ports of Mangalore and Onore, and the whole coast of the Myfore, will open a new vent for our manufactures (more particularly our woollens) in that populous empire. Colonel Beatson, in his account of the war with Tippoo, says, that "formerly all traffic between the subjects and dependants of the Company, and those of the late Sultan, was nearly prohibited by the restraints to which his hatred to the British nation, or his ignorance and prejudice, had subjected the communication with his possessions. Those restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring and now united countries of the Carnatic and Myfore will mutually consume a considerable

* Dr. Vincent's Periplus, App. p. 22.

" portion

“ portion of their respective products and manu-
 “ factures; and that even a proportion of British
 “ commodities will soon find a market in Mysore.
 “ Our information with regard to the articles pro-
 “ duced, manufactured, or consumed, in the coun-
 “ tries acquired by the Company, and by the
 “ Rajah of Mysore, is at present too imperfect to
 “ form any accurate calculation of the possible in-
 “ crease of the imports from the coast of Malabar
 “ to Europe; but it appears probable, that the
 “ Company’s investment in the article of pepper,
 “ may soon be augmented to any extent which
 “ may be deemed adviseable*.” Our undisputed
 sovereignty in Bengal and the Carnatic promise
 us similar advantages on the coast of Coromandel;
 the reduction of freight, in consequence of the
 peace, will be highly beneficial to the Company;
 and the spirit of investigation, which will probably
 lead to a full inquiry into the best means of pro-
 moting the interests of the nation respecting India,
 consistently with the chartered rights of the Com-
 pany, will, we may hope, ultimately afford such
 encouragement to private traders in Asia and
 Britain, that the competition of foreign adven-
 turers may be effectually checked, and London ren-
 dered the emporium of Indian commerce.

* View of the origin and conduct of the war with Tippoo, p. 257.

LETTER VIII.

IV. ON THE TRADE WITH THE BELLIGERENT
POWERS.

SIR, 26th December 1801.

COMMERCIAL enterprize, following the footsteps of conquest, has enabled Great Britain by the acquisition of permanent or temporary markets, in distant parts of the world, to indemnify herself for the deprivations which her trade with the Continent of Europe has experienced in consequence of the war. These deprivations, however, will, in a great measure, cease with the termination of the contest; and the renewal of a friendly intercourse with France and her allies will place us, if not on the footing of the most favoured nation, at least in a situation to carry on a direct trade, under certain regulations, with our neighbours. Very considerable advantages must result, both to our merchants and manufacturers, from this change; for, whatever relaxation may have taken place during the last year, before that time the use of British manufactures was prohibited both in France and Holland under the severest penalties; * and all communication interdicted with our merchants. British merchandize, though purchased of neutrals, was subjected to confiscation. Yet, though these

* The effect of this prohibition may be estimated from the lowness of the export of British Manufactures and Foreign Merchandize to France and Flanders in 1798 and 1799. (See p. 112.) Since the establishment of the Consular government the exports to France and Flanders have in one year risen from £.23,139 to £.2,134,246.

checks, together with the increased price of freight, and expence of a circuitous transit through neutral ports, have much reduced the consumption of British commodities in France, they have not altogether prevented it.

The following account exhibits the tonnage of our trade with France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain, both during and previously to the war. It will be seen from this statement that the annual tonnage cleared outwards, on an average of the years of war, to France, Flanders, and Holland, has not amounted to a tenth of the tonnage employed during the preceding period of peace; and though a very large abatement will (as I have already remarked) take place in our peace exports to those neutral powers, who, during the war, have been the carriers of British merchandize, and colonial produce, to the belligerent states opposed to us,* it is probable, for many reasons, that our future trade with France, Holland, and Spain, will much exceed the amount of this abatement. It cannot reasonably be supposed, that France and her allies, at present, receive from us, through the intervention of neutral traders, the same quantity of goods that they would import from Great Britain in a period of profound peace. Some articles, which would readily

* It is, however, remarkable that, notwithstanding the great increase in the export of Foreign merchandize from Great Britain to France, Flanders, Holland, and Italy, in the year 1800, the export of Foreign merchandize to Germany rose from £. 6,640,729, its amount in 1795, to £. 8,300,470 in 1800.

be received by a direct channel, are too bulky to pay a war freight and circuitous navigation. The export of coal from the East coast of England to foreign countries has sunk one half in consequence of the war.* More than half a million bushels of salt were exported to Flanders annually, before 1793; none has been exported during the last six years. † If the wealth and energy of this country should enable parliament to carry into execution the commutation of the salt duty, of which the gross amount is above a million, (a measure which has been recommended by two Committees of the

* An Account of the Quantity of Coals exported from Newcastle and Sunderland to Foreign Countries in the Years 1791, 1792, 1798, and 1799.

Exported.	1791.	1792.	1798.	1799.
	Chaldrons.	Chaldrons.	Chaldrons.	Chaldrons.
From Newcastle	45,702	42,993	44,722	43,366
Sunderland	54,150	53,313	5,111	4,039

The measure here used is the Newcastle chaldron, equal to two London chaldrons.

From other English ports above 16,000 Newcastle chaldrons were annually exported before the war to France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain; but none in 1797, 1798, or 1799.

Report on the Coal Trade, 1800, App. 42. 43.

† An Account of the manufactured Salt exported from Great Britain to Flanders in the years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1798, 1799, and 1800.

	Rock Salt.	White Salt.	
	Bushels.	Bushels.	
1790	582,446	16,880	} Report on British Fisheries, 1798, App. 9.
1791	532,894	6,800	
1792	572,888	25,200	
1798	None.	None.	
1799			
1800			

House of Commons, as more efficacious for promoting the prosperity of the fisheries than any possible system of bounties and encouragement) salt would probably form a very considerable article of export. † From an account of woollens exported to the year 1799 inclusive, it appears that the increased export to Germany (the internal consumption of which country, I apprehend, is much greater than it was ten years ago) had not compensated for the loss of the French, Flemish, Dutch, and Spanish markets. §

† Amount of the Salt Duty. Gross Receipt.

	in 1800.	£.	
In England	- - -	947,120	} for year ending 5th Jan. 1801.
Scotland	- - -	59,399	
Ireland	- - -	86,816	} for year ending 25th March 1801.
		<u>1,093,344</u>	

§ An Account of the official Value of Woollens exported from Great Britain to Germany, Holland, Flanders, France, and Spain, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1797, 1798 and 1799.

	1790.	1791.	1792.
Germany -	£. 223,226	£. 255,303	£. 271,638
Holland -	206,414	313,845	367,583
Flanders -	117,779	124,239	117,151
France -	95,827	96,840	155,134
Spain -	407,464	346,367	472,221
Total -	<u>1,150,710</u>	<u>1,136,594</u>	<u>1,383,727</u>
	1797.	1798.	1799.
Germany -	£. 641,008	£. 463,019	£. 427,053
Holland -	7,712	94	175
Flanders			
France -	631	—	—
Spain -	26	—	—
Total -	<u>649,467</u>	<u>463,113</u>	<u>427,228</u>

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared Outwards from the several Ports of Great Britain, in the Year 1789, and each of the Eleven following Years, to France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain.

FRANCE:

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tons.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.		
1789	137,540	9,860	4,174	—	151,574	Peace.
1790	91,733	9,026	2,095	264	103,118	
1791	110,784	13,018	1,183	80	125,065	
1792	106,481	8,346	1,390	75	116,292	
1793	3,734	8,560	—	—	12,294	War.
1794	83	2,420	—	—	2,503	
1795	627	5,977	—	—	6,604	
1796	—	8,974	—	—	8,974	
1797	—	10,107	—	—	10,107	
1798	—	2,930	—	—	2,930	
1799	—	1,548	—	—	1,548	
1800	534	16,523	—	—	17,057	

FLANDERS:

1789	41,963	2,139	3,586	—	47,688	Peace.
1790	36,236	3,803	196	—	40,235	
1791	33,763	5,706	1,589	—	41,058	
1792	61,175	4,012	1,003	—	66,190	
1793	31,588	9,301	285	—	41,174	War.
1794	29,092	4,703	100	—	37,895	
1795	—	1,669	—	—	1,669	
1796	—	1,876	—	—	1,876	
1797	—	2,692	—	—	2,692	
1798	—	15	—	—	15	
1799	—	214	—	—	214	
1800	—	4,478	—	—	4,478	

HOLLAND:

HOLLAND:

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tons.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.		
1789	134,110	10,828	10,488	—	155,426	Peace.
1790	121,158	11,552	9,349	186	142,245	
1791	127,558	10,739	7,819	544	146,660	
1792	131,611	14,222	8,083	354	154,270	
1793	129,264	17,282	6,471	285	153,302	
1794	106,827	18,802	6,180	—	131,809	War.
1795	817	3,772	—	—	4,589	
1796	22	5,376	—	400	5,798	
1797	—	21,073	—	192	21,265	
1798	174	10,184	—	—	10,358	
1799	879	1,527	—	—	2,406	
1800	—	21,536	—	1,910	22,446	

SPAIN, including the Canaries.

1789	22,076	3,159	1,792	—	27,027	Peace.
1790	20,539	5,766	1,662	—	27,967	
1791	23,811	3,800	3,579	—	36,190	
1792	20,847	3,464	2,020	—	35,331	
1793	16,363	6,433	522	—	23,318	
1794	22,976	7,596	1,558	—	32,130	War.
1795	13,319	9,641	1,962	—	24,922	
1796	5,946	15,897	1,280	206	23,329	
1797	70	4,855	—	—	4,925	
1798	50	6,073	—	—	6,123	
1799	274	10,238	—	168	10,680	
1800	1,584	15,722	—	—	17,306	

Annual Average Tonnage of Vessels cleared Outwards to France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain, before and during the War.

	Average of Peace.	Tons.	Average of War.	Tons.
France	{ four years ending with 1792. }	124,032	{ eight years ending with 1800. }	7,759
Flanders	{ six years ending with 1794. }	45,706	{ six years ending with 1800. }	1,824
Holland	{ six years ending with 1794. }	147,285	{ six years ending with 1800. }	11,143
Spain	{ eight years ending with 1796. }	28,776	{ four years ending with 1800. }	9,758

It

It appears from the following account of imports and exports, that the value of British manufactures exported to France in the year before the war, amounted to 743,280*l.*; and that the value of those exported to Flanders, in each of the years 1790, 1791, and 1792, exceeded 300,000*l.* Whether our future trade to these, now consolidated, states will be equally valuable, must depend on the nature of our future intercourse with them. If the probability of the renewal of a commercial treaty with Great Britain has created murmurs in France, it must certainly be admitted that, in one branch of political economy, our neighbours have not been enlightened by the revolution. Their political economists might inform them that it is advantageous to them to buy their cloth, their linens, and their hardware, from those who sell those commodities at the lowest price. If a commercial treaty will enable us to serve them cheaper than the Dutch or Germans, or than their own manufacturers can do, the French government will consult its own interest in dealing with those whom they term "a nation of shopkeepers." The thinned population, reduced capital, low price of confiscated land, and languid state of agriculture in the Republic ought to suggest to them, that the national prosperity will for some years to come, be best promoted by

by

by encouraging improvements directly connected with cultivation. Mercantile jealousy, and national animosity, if they still influence the councils of France, may point out a different course; and attempt, though they will attempt in vain, to injure Great Britain by forcing French industry, by means of bounties and prohibitions, into a direction which it is not naturally inclined to take.

An Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain from France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain, and of Exports from Great Britain to each of those Countries; in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

FRANCE:

EXPORTS.

Years.	Imports.	EXPORTS.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	605,371	535,284	337,040	872,324
1791	546,957	576,632	554,744	1,131,376
1792	717,634	743,280	484,885	1,228,166
1793	121,027	66,677	162,210	228,887
1794	167	2,680	31,862	34,543
1795	10,362	—	78,652	78,652
1796	14,655	30	7,945	7,975
1797	13,706	32,579	656,715	689,295
1798	20,885	26	4,455	4,481
1799	29,930	570	8,332	8,903
1800	110,415	130,685	1,194,734	1,325,419

FLANDERS:

FLANDERS:

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	145,950	303,537	597,195	900,733
1791	193,420	387,399	539,560	926,959
1792	132,289	381,287	649,806	1,031,093
1793	120,180	215,113	560,976	776,089
1794	76,820	187,577	484,305	671,883
1795	4,287	—	13,508	13,508
1796	7,067	2,045	63,008	65,054
1797	10,514	1,720	122,838	124,558
1798	14,643	—	16,684	16,684
1799	12,355	215	14,021	14,236
1800	34,656	40,415	768,410	808,826

HOLLAND:

Years.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	714,707	727,646	695,698	1,423,345
1791	853,984	692,725	673,149	1,365,874
1792	801,535	785,207	731,242	1,516,449
1793	806,306	578,844	1,037,938	1,616,783
1794	1,013,351	499,179	1,141,736	1,640,916
1795	119,586	1,781	109,333	111,115
1796	309,933	2,792	513,475	516,268
1797	529,428	76,908	1,264,007	1,340,915
1798	594,104	6,297	931,805	938,102
1799	200,432	4,931	12,720	17,652
1800	972,600	20,414	3,188,198	3,203,613

SPAIN.

SPAIN, including the CANARIES.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	738,485	586,498	80,724	667,222
1791	733,048	582,914	90,126	673,041
1792	908,063	720,984	90,394	811,379
1793	490,242	419,360	83,487	502,847
1794	759,950	487,281	165,238	652,520
1795	1,007,936	369,612	100,991	470,604
1796	825,632	441,434	121,395	562,830
1797	517,809	748	6,145	6,893
1798	353,897	397	—	397
1799	429,846	5	—	5
1800	704,189	—	3,382	3,382

It appears from the following account of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards to the other belligerent states, that a diminution has taken place in our trade with all of them, except Portugal. The increased export, however, of British manufactures to that country has not compensated for the loss of the direct intercourse with Spain during the war. The official value of British manufactures exported in the years

	1790,	1791,	1792,	1798,	1799,	1800,
	£.			£.		
To Spain - was -	1,890,396	-	-	-	-	402
To Portugal - — -	1,911,226	-	-	2,902,758	-	-
	<u>3,801,622</u>			<u>2,903,160</u>		

An

An Account of the Tonnage of Vessels cleared Outwards from the Ports of Great Britain to Portugal, Italy, and Sicily *, the Streights and Turkey, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

PORTUGAL including MADEIRA :

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	26,485	777	1,461	—	28,723
1790	28,952	1,935	2,024	70	32,981
1791	34,586	2,543	2,584	—	39,713
1792	33,750	2,650	2,267	179	43,846
1793	22,750	5,519	499	240	29,008
1794	30,110	4,625	1,474	150	36,359
1795	26,042	20,491	1,970	370	48,873
1796	29,028	25,280	2,619	340	57,267
1797	25,262	14,978	2,006	631	42,877
1798	31,846	15,576	2,756	—	50,178
1799	24,371	17,480	2,484	—	44,835
1800	30,029	23,464	754	—	54,247

ITALY and SICILY :

1789	16,642	190	862	—	17,694
1790	19,526	2,263	1,282	—	23,071
1791	29,888	199	1,117	—	31,204
1792	29,467	200	803	—	30,472
1793	17,406	2,200	729	—	20,335
1794	19,507	457	253	—	20,996
1795	13,469	5,958	502	—	19,929
1796	6,416	11,920	—	—	18,336
1797	—	10,082	—	—	10,082
1798	3,863	4,627	—	—	8,490
1799	6,475	3,342	946	—	10,763
1800	12,337	6,075	388	216	19,016

* Under "Italy and Sicily" I have included the following entries, which stand separate in the Custom-house Account of Trade and Navigation, "Italy, Naples, Venice, Leghorn, Genoa, and Sicily."

THE STREIGHTS and GIBRALTAR:

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	7,445	—	450	—	7,895
1790	9,565	1,078	130	—	10,773
1791	7,840	136	464	—	8,440
1792	6,737	—	222	—	6,959
1793	4,197	403	375	—	4,975
1794	5,047	166	177	—	5,390
1795	3,345	—	110	—	3,455
1796	5,300	456	—	—	5,756
1797	3,644	852	223	—	4,719
1798	6,057	228	509	—	6,794
1799	8,328	1,188	370	—	9,886
1800	4,705	2,013	184	—	6,902

TURKEY:

1789	6,077	—	—	—	6,077
1790	4,150	371	—	—	4,521
1791	9,021	—	—	—	9,021
1792	11,186	—	—	—	11,186
1793	2,071	—	—	—	2,071
1794	2,396	—	—	—	2,396
1795	1,683	—	—	—	1,683
1796	1,048	380	—	—	1,420
1797	—	330	—	—	330
1798	1,511	524	—	—	2,035
1799	1,624	2,197	—	—	3,821
1800	2,456	—	—	—	2,456

Our export of British manufactures to Italy has been much reduced in consequence of the war: and, with the exception of the two last years, the annual average export of them to Turkey, during the war, has not amounted to half the average of the three preceding years of peace.

An

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Portugal, Italy, the Streights, and Turkey, and of the Exports to each of those Countries in 1790, and the Ten following Years; distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

PORTUGAL including MADEIRA :

Years.	Value of Exports.			Total Exports.
	Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	746,907	536,887	29,417	566,304
1791	874,225	657,388	31,076	688,464
1792	977,820	714,951	39,671	754,622
1793	482,191	521,167	61,935	583,102
1794	714,388	512,479	78,215	590,694
1795	848,550	643,860	64,876	708,737
1796	677,773	783,046	92,954	876,001
1797	525,319	633,484	77,715	711,199
1798	704,720	782,290	142,453	924,743
1799	1,061,967	1,045,950	138,643	1,184,594
1800	927,258	1,074,518	124,506	1,199,024

ITALY and SICILY :

Years.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	972,847	803,884	87,518	891,403
1791	1,020,298	932,148	115,014	1,047,163
1792	1,069,620	778,195	185,037	963,233
1793	620,679	434,716	108,925	543,642
1794	707,249	420,162	190,398	610,560
1795	596,878	568,278	295,357	863,635
1796	375,054	626,968	146,884	773,852
1797	98,203	100,725	15,383	116,109
1798	145,440	184,075	38,093	222,169
1799	224,607	196,371	191,881	388,253
1800	411,765	449,618	136,940	586,559

THE STREIGHTS and GIBRALTAR.*

Years.	Value of Exports.			Total Exports.
	Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	37,235	188,733	15,341	204,575
1791	16,124	224,673	16,841	241,515
1792	13,154	179,694	17,429	197,124
1793	5,756	118,479	17,225	135,705
1794	11,440	83,164	37,125	120,290
1795	18,033	107,331	32,973	140,305
1796	28,593	97,262	39,273	136,536
1797	16,990	37,760	19,095	56,855
1798	36,217	144,722	57,767	202,489
1799	62,992	289,885	68,899	358,784
1800	35,665	223,620	65,937	294,558

TURKEY:

Years.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	249,187	70,526	42,653	113,179
1791	173,388	99,206	90,085	189,291
1792	292,599	98,961	174,824	273,785
1793	184,681	23,466	21,803	45,270
1794	324,906	55,690	62,009	117,700
1795	84,299	51,800	98,137	149,938
1796	150,182	59,410	96,100	155,510
1797	104,838	22,085	1,447	23,532
1798	42,285	42,860	19,308	62,168
1799	33,091	112,065	114,012	226,078
1800	199,773	111,096	55,708	166,804

Many persons entertain sanguine expectations that the brilliant achievements of the British army in Egypt will, notwithstanding our evacuation

* The exports in the four last years, in this table, were all exports to Gibraltar: the imports from the Straights in these four years were only

In 1797	£. 1,220
1798	3,091
1799	3,957
1800	2,940

of that country, secure to us great commercial advantages in that province of the Turkish empire; but, as the treaty of peace lately concluded between Bonaparte and the Porte places the French republic on the footing of the most favoured nation, it is not by means of exclusive privileges that we can hope to supplant our rivals in the markets of Turkey. We must found our pre-eminence on the lowness of our prices, the variety of our assortments, and the improved quality of our woollen manufactures. The period is peculiarly favourable for speculation in this branch of commerce. Twenty years ago, the French cloth trade to Turkey began to decline; the troubles produced by the revolution in the southern provinces, and the war that followed those troubles, have much injured the manufactures of Languedoc. Marseilles, sixty years ago, annually exported twelve thousand pieces of cloth (of forty yards each) to Aleppo and Constantinople; * but the French woollens are now in low estimation in the Levant. A French ex-consul in Greece admits, that the cloths of Germany, called *Leipsics*, have supplanted the *Londrins* of Languedoc; and that we enjoy a considerable share in the export of stuffs, the lightness and texture of which his countrymen are utterly unable to imitate. † Our

* Hanway's Travels to Persia, vol. i. p. 39.

† Beaujour, Commerce de la Grèce, tome ii. p. 9.

other principal exports to Turkey are gunpowder, hardware, toys, jewellery, and watches. Of our trade in the last of these articles, the writer, whom I have just mentioned, gives a very flattering account. He says that, of English watches, there are sold annually, at Salonichi, thirty dozen; as many in the Morea; three hundred dozen at Constantinople; four hundred dozen in Syria; and two hundred and fifty dozen in Egypt. He says each watch is worth from eighty to one hundred and twenty piafters; * and computes the aggregate of this branch of commerce at 266,400l. sterling. “The trade in clock-work in Europe, has doubled within the last fifty years. It is probable that it will increase with the progress of society; for, wherever civilization exists, time is a precious article, and its value renders the instrument necessary that portions it out.” †

The advantageous situation of Marseilles, which lies almost in the direct route from the West Indies to the Levant, will enable the French, on the complete re-establishment of peace, to recover the export trade of coffee and cotton to Turkey. The export of naval stores, from the north of Europe to the Levant, was formerly in the hands of the Dutch: the Russians, in consequence of the privileges which they have acquired on the Black Sea,

* From 16l. to 20l.

† Commerce de la Grèce, tome ii. p. 18.

now possess this branch of commerce almost exclusively.

I cannot conceive that the possession of Malta (whatever may be its value as a military station) would have afforded us any new means of extending our trade with Turkey. The heavy charge of a garrison at La Valette might, in some degree, have been compensated by a clandestine trade with Italy and Sicily, (if such a trade could have been deemed a national object,) but the acquisition of this island would not have enabled our manufacturers to drive their competitors, the French, Italians, and Germans, from the markets of the Levant. It may, however, be fairly presumed that, in the hands of a formidable third power, Malta will afford greater encouragement to our commerce, than it could possibly do, whilst it languished under the feeble government of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. It may also be hoped that a commercial treaty with the Porte will afford our merchants an opportunity of improving the intercourse which British valour has established with Egypt. Our trade with that country was very inconsiderable before the war.

Tonnage and Number of Vessels entered Inwards from Egypt, and cleared Outwards, from Great Britain to Egypt, in the Years 1790, 1791, and 1792.

Years.	Entered Inwards.		Cleared Outwards.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1790	- - 1	194	—	—
1791	- - 3	576	2	543
1792	- - 2	584	3	287
		R		

It may likewise be expected that our trade in the Mediterranean will receive some increase, in consequence of the establishments of the republic of the Seven Islands. We have long dealt with them for an article, which, however unimportant it may appear, yields a considerable sum in revenue. The duty on currants, which, I believe, are chiefly imported from Zante, last year produced above 90,000*l*.

The consumption of fish in Catholic countries in the south of Europe, afforded considerable encouragement to our fisheries. It will appear from the following accounts that this branch of trade has much declined during the war; and there can be no doubt but that it will revive in consequence of the peace.

An Account of the Number of Vessels (with the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of their Men) which cleared out from the different Ports in Great Britain for the Newfoundland, Greenland, and Southern, Fisheries, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1798, 1799, and 1800.

	Years	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Newfoundland	} 1790 {	298	31,644	2,608
Greenland		116	33,232	—
Southern Fisheries		33	7,262	—
		<u>447</u>	<u>72,138</u>	<u>2,608</u>
Newfoundland	} 1791 {	308	34,166	2,639
Greenland		116	33,906	—
Southern Fisheries		75	16,927	1,478
		<u>499</u>	<u>84,999</u>	<u>4,117</u>
Newfoundland	} 1792 {	263	27,528	2,412
Greenland		93	26,983	3,667
Southern Fisheries		42	9,544	816
		<u>398</u>	<u>64,055</u>	<u>6,895</u>
Newfoundland	} 1798 {	162	15,838	1,268
Greenland		66	18,754	2,633
Southern Fisheries		34	9,143	772
		<u>262</u>	<u>43,735</u>	<u>4,673</u>
Newfoundland	} 1799 {	128	14,322	1,145
Greenland		67	19,360	—
Southern Fisheries		26	7,485	673
		<u>221</u>	<u>41,167</u>	<u>4,501</u>
Newfoundland	} 1800 {	143	17,360	1,380
Greenland		61	17,729	2,459
Southern Fisheries		24	6,382	612
		<u>228</u>	<u>41,471</u>	<u>4,451</u>

The Newfoundland Exports and Imports are included in the Trade of our American Continental Colonies. The following Statement exhibits the Values of our Greenland, and Southern Fishery Trade in 1797 and the Three following Years. In Peace the Imports will probably be doubled.

GREENLAND.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	130,909	95	458	554
1798	120,161	92	691	784
1799	134,909	—	503	503
1800	125,805	—	761	761

SOUTHERN FISHERY.

	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	140,143	6	33	40
1798	95,883	—	150	150
1799	84,007	33	191	224
1800	89,198	—	259	259

An Account of the Quantities of Fish and Oil exported from Newfoundland to the South of Europe, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792; 1798, 1799, and 1800.

	FISH.		OIL.		
	Dry. Quintals.	Wet. Barrels.	Tons.	H.	G.
1790	581,824	3,667	78	1	9
1791	623,083	4,338	44	0	37
1792	490,514	—	27	2	29
	<hr/> 1,695,421	<hr/> 8,005	<hr/> 149	<hr/> 3	<hr/> 66
1798	209,995	—	4	0	0
1799	238,953	990	—	—	—
1800	366,379	—	2	0	4
	<hr/> 815,327	<hr/> 990	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 0	<hr/> 4

The

The British fisheries during the last three years, in consequence of the high price of corn, have received great encouragement at home, but the export of fish to Italy has necessarily declined. In peace, the trade in herrings and pilchards to the south of Europe is very considerable.

The limits to which I propose to confine my enquiries do not permit me to enter into an investigation of the progress of our coasting trade; an investigation which would furnish the most satisfactory evidence of the prosperity of this branch of our commerce. The increase in the number of vessels belonging to the different ports of the British empire, which has already been noticed*, and which is much greater than the increase of our foreign trade required, is chiefly ascribable to the extension of the intercourse between the different British islands. The following accounts of the tonnage of vessels cleared out to Ireland, and the islands of Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, and of our exports to those parts of the empire in 1790 and the ten following years, comprize the principal countries in the Custom-house accounts which have not been noticed in the preceding pages. The disturbances in Ireland have no doubt prevented the increase of Irish commerce from being as rapid as it would otherwise have been; and various circumstances connected with the war have

probably extended the trade of the British islands on the French coast much beyond the limits to which it will be confined in times of peace.

IRELAND:

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	2,573,747	1,328,388	937,380	2,265,769
1791	2,479,279	1,470,795	999,667	2,470,463
1792	2,622,733	1,512,844	860,022	2,372,866
1793	2,284,920	1,055,276	888,048	1,943,324
1794	2,749,900	1,281,316	1,199,159	2,480,476
1795	2,636,705	1,612,270	1,185,193	2,797,463
1796	2,764,879	1,781,789	1,015,280	2,797,070
1797	3,113,585	1,310,996	1,126,085	2,437,082
1798	2,735,686	1,657,954	1,316,408	2,974,363
1799	2,770,731	2,405,999	1,680,987	4,086,986
1800	2,312,824	1,787,966	1,953,533	3,741,499

ISLES OF

ALDERNEY, GUERNSEY, JERSEY, AND MAN:

Years.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	69,194	90,378	30,572	121,559
1791	71,019	98,203	29,112	127,316
1792	86,196	104,201	25,457	129,658
1793	103,204	146,246	38,104	184,350
1794	106,466	132,627	56,464	189,092
1795	142,397	140,546	89,484	230,031
1796	260,290	148,622	73,645	222,267
1797	198,356	137,408	84,335	221,743
1798	206,835	176,209	61,495	237,705
1799	240,290	213,232	102,720	315,953
1800	275,117	195,911	68,398	264,332

One

One measure, which, it was justly observed by Mr. Rose in the beginning of 1799*, was still wanting to secure the foreign commerce we have, and to afford the best chance of extending it considerably, has at length been happily accomplished. By the acts for making wet docks in the Isle of Dogs, and near Wapping, a plan has been sanctioned for establishing a warehouse system; and for enabling ships in the Port of London to take in their cargoes with facility and dispatch. Probably not less than two millions will be expended in these two docks; and new plans are under discussion for rebuilding London bridge, and improving the quays and avenues leading to the Thames. "Thus," as Mr. Burke observes, "our trade has grown too big for the ancient limits of art and nature. Our streets, our lanes, our shores, the river itself, which has so long been our pride, are impeded, and obstructed, and choaked up by our riches †."

I shall close this account of our commerce with exhibiting, at one view, our trade with different parts of the world during the year 1800.

* Brief Examination into the increase of the Revenue, p. 78.

† Third Letter on a Regicide Peace, p. 156.

An Account of the official Value of Imports into, and Exports from, Great Britain in the Year 1800, distinguishing the Countries, and also distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize, including Prize Goods.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Denmark - - - -	241,562	186,703	353,994	540,698
Russia - - - -	2,382,098	557,374	467,960	1,025,335
Sweden - - - -	309,280	297,761	49,079	78,840
Poland - - - -	393,741	17,802	30,099	47,902
Prussia - - - -	1,340,904	297,185	497,266	794,452
Germany - - - -	2,352,197	4,364,120	8,300,470	12,664,591
Holland - - - -	972,600	20,414	3,188,198	3,208,613
Flanders - - - -	34,656	40,415	768,480	808,826
France - - - -	110,415	130,685	1,194,734	1,325,419
Portugal - - - -	916,848	903,435	108,457	1,011,893
Madeira - - - -	10,410	171,082	16,048	187,131
Spain - - - -	655,052	- - -	3,382	3,382
Canaries - - - -	48,536	- - -	- - -	- - -
Streights - - - -	2,940	- - -	- - -	- - -
Gibraltar - - - -	32,725	228,620	65,937	294,558
Italy - - - -	357,737	440,017	123,743	563,760
Venice - - - -	54,028	9,601	8,196	17,798
Turkey - - - -	199,773	111,096	55,708	166,804
Minorca - - - -	12,500	7,776	4,470	12,246
Total Foreign Europe	10,428,913	7,516,123	15,241,131	22,757,254
Ireland - - - -	2,312,824	1,787,966	1,953,533	3,741,499
Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey & Man } Greenland - - - -	275,117 125,805	195,931 -	68,398 761	264,336 761
States of America - - - -	2,357,923	6,689,467	196,040	6,885,508
British Continent of } America - - - -	558,037	1,196,365	240,081	1,436,446
British West Indies } including Trinidad } Conquered Islands - - - -	5,820,223 2,543,534	2,827,113 704,918	339,866 142,314	3,166,980 847,232
Foreign West Indies - - - -	310,196	15,103	7,818	22,921
Honduras Bay - - - -	16,777	1,870	430	2,301
Florida - - - -	10,116	24,792	4,153	28,946
Southern Fishery - - - -	89,198	- - -	259	259
Nootka Sound - - - -	- - -	36,853	644	37,497
Asia - - - -	4,942,275	2,718,279	142,141	2,860,421
Africa - - - -	96,563	589,496	510,161	1,099,657
Total of all Parts	29,887,506	24,304,283	18,847,735	43,152,019
Prize Goods imported	673,098	Prize Goods exported are included		
Total Imports - - - -	30,570,605	in the Amount of Exports to the		
		different Countries to which sent.		

The Shillings and Pence omitted in each separate Article are included in the Totals.

I have

I have thus endeavoured to shew, that, though the greatest part of the colonial trade, acquired by us during the war, must revert to other countries, and our commerce with the neutral powers of the North must be reduced within much narrower bounds than it is at present, we may reasonably expect that the export of our manufactures to the United States will increase, that our settlements in America, the West Indies, and Asia, will be improving markets, and that returning amity and tranquillity will supply us with new customers in those belligerent states in Europe with whom our intercourse has been suspended or embarrassed during the contest. It is, however, material to recollect, that neither the tonnage nor the values of imports and exports furnish a fair comparison of the relative importance of the different branches of our foreign trade. The exportation of a piece of British broad cloth is more beneficial to us than the re-exportation of a quantity of Bengal muslin, or of West India coffee, of equal value. The exportation of a piece of broad cloth to a neighbouring country is more beneficial to us than the exportation of the same commodity to a distant country. The reasons are obvious. The vent of British manufactures gives more employment to British industry,

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ports:

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4,591
8,413
8,826
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8,760
7,798
6,804
2,246
7,254

1,499
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and contributes more towards our internal improvements, than the vent of foreign manufactures or of colonial produce. The circuitous trade carried on with the East and West Indies, for the supply of other nations in Europe, is much too slow in its returns, to set so much labour in motion, and to afford employment and subsistence to so great a part of the nation, as a direct trade with our neighbours; a trade which whilst it enables them to benefit by vicinage, and to procure what they want at the cheapest rate, enables us to purchase the linens of Holland with the woollens of Yorkshire, and the wines of France with the hardware of Birmingham. It is truly observed that, exclusive of British manufactures and produce exported, “ our export trade is, properly speaking, a trade of transit, of merchandize coming either from other parts of the British Empire, or from foreign countries, and passing through our ports; having been brought to them either in consequence of our colonial laws or otherwise, as a safe and convenient place of deposit, in the way to the nations by which it is consumed.—This branch of trade, though of great advantage in a political view, and in its collateral benefits, yet, as a *direct* source of *national* profit, when contrasted with the interior sources” of profit, “ will appear almost insignificant in the comparison, though of no inconsiderable value in itself.—It
“ will

“ will immediately occur to any one who considers
 “ the subject with attention, that this portion
 “ of our export trade must, at all times, whether
 “ of war or peace, return far less national profit
 “ than an equal value of commodities of our own
 “ produce and manufactures *.”

The flourishing state of our commerce, which during a long and arduous struggle, has been extended by British industry, and protected by British valour, affords a memorable example of what may be effected by the sense, the spirit, and the perseverance of the people.

— Quid virtus et quid sapientia possit
 Utile proposuit nobis exemplar.

May the lesson not be thrown away! May Britain, during peace, gratefully recollect that, whilst a great part of Europe, deficient either in wisdom or in courage, has sacrificed its independence with the vain hope of preserving its property, a vigorous resistance has enabled her to maintain her independence, and, by the sacrifice of a part, to render the remainder of her wealth more valuable and more improveable! May she gratefully recollect that the revolutionary system, which she has opposed, has not forced her to surrender her commerce to preserve her constitution, and that the cessation of hostilities does not call on her

* Becke on the Income Tax, p. 51 and 77.

to surrender her constitution to preserve her commerce. They both may, they both will, flourish together; and when, at some future period, the feverish ambition of mankind shall compel her to unsheath the sword, her constitution and her commerce will again supply her both with motives, and with means, to prosecute the contest until it can again be terminated with safety and with honour.

(Note to "Russia," p. 75; "Poland," p. 80; and "Africa," p. 95.)

These entries in the Custom-house Navigation Account do not comprehend "Livonia, Courland, and Barbary;" I have, therefore, subjoined a statement of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards to each of those countries, in 1789, and the eleven following years.

Years.	LIVONIA.			COURLAND.			BARBARY.		
	England. Tons.	Scotland. Tons.	British. Tons.	England. Tons.	Scotland. Tons.	British. Tons.	England. Tons.	Scotland. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.
1789	3,883	—	106	523	—	—	1,384	—	—
1790	4,410	—	—	827	—	—	1,379	—	—
1791	included in Russia.			—	—	—	868	—	—
1792	4,721	—	—	1,809	216	—	14,419	—	—
1793	3,067	30	—	1,337	430	—	80	—	—
1794	7,171	—	—	2,017	—	—	215	—	—
1795	14,957	490	—	225	482	—	839	—	—
1796	9,951	—	—	1,579	—	—	994	780	—
1797	6,734	—	—	694	100	—	283	654	145
1798	10,491	—	—	629	—	—	508	340	—
1799	9,919	52	—	412	—	106	492	50	—
1800	21,311	1,048	—	1,064	80	767	150	270	—

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