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# The Disarmament Bulletin

Min. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures  
OTTAWA

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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## SSEA Addresses Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Halifax

Canada hosted the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Halifax on May 29 and 30. At the Halifax meeting, the members of the Alliance undertook a thorough review of all aspects of the East-West relationship. The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the opening address to the Council. Following is the text of his address.

"On behalf of the Canadian people and the Canadian Government, I extend to you all a warm welcome to Canada and to Halifax.

It is a great honour for Canada to host the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council. This organization

means much to Canadians. We were present at the creation, indeed played no small part in its genesis. And we have been with NATO at every step along the way.


During the long years of its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has known great moments, made historic decisions, weathered stormy periods, and resolved difficult crises. Today, the Alliance finds itself on the threshold of what could be a new era in East-West relations.

The disappointments of *détente* are behind us, the tensions of the first years of this decade have eased, and there is hope for a better tomorrow. But it is hope tinged with scepticism and tempered by experience.

As we embark on our deliberations, let it be clear that the Alliance has gathered to give hope a firmer foundation, to disprove the sceptics, and to pursue the noble cause of reconciliation between East and West without neglecting the firmness that prudence demands.

When Allies meet, it is customary to celebrate the role the Alliance has played in preserving the peace in Europe and North America. This is not an empty boast. Would that the rest of the world could say as much.

Let us never tire of declaring that our freedom, our rights, our system of social justice, our economic development, our democratic way of life, represent the product of our common values. And that we owe their preservation to the Atlantic Alliance.



Mr. Clark addressing NATO meeting in Halifax on May 29. Halifax Herald

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NATO is not only a defensive alliance, of course. It is the primordial instrument of Western political consultation, more so today even than at the time of the Ottawa Declaration that NATO issued 12 years ago.

In this respect, let us pay tribute to the accomplishments of the Secretary-General. Thanks to his tireless efforts to encourage frank and effective consultations among Allies, and to the sensitivity and wisdom he has shown in chairing Alliance discussions, NATO's recent record on consultations has been enviable.

We will be meeting today and tomorrow in a less formal way that reflects the Secretary-General's considerable efforts to improve the quality of political discussions among Foreign Ministers. Our agenda will permit more time than ever before for those issues, current and prospective, that concern Allies the most.

Of all the issues before us, the most important is the effective management of the West's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The most urgent issue is that of arms control and disarmament. International terrorism and conflict in the Third World should also command some attention.

There exists today a renewed desire for cooperation between East and West that cannot fail to promote peace, if properly cultivated. But the peace that we have enjoyed for nearly 40 years continues to depend on our having a sizeable deterrent force in being.

It is a paradox we have had to deal with ever since the Alliance was formed: only by maintaining forces sufficient to counter those of our adversaries have we been able to ensure our defence.

But the most important phase of our work lies ahead of us: ensuring our security at a reduced level of armaments.

In the realm of arms control and disarmament, we are in a period that is both uncertain and expectant.

No one is pleased with the current military situation. Weapons continue to accumulate. They are more and more sophisticated. And the stakes are so high, and the negotiations so complex, that progress must inevitably be very slow.

When we add to this Mr. Gorbachev's repeated indulgence in what I will charitably call Soviet 'kite flying,' you will agree that the way ahead is anything but clear.

But public opinion expects early results, and it is imperative that we try to meet those expectations. We need to get the message across that the Geneva negotiations are vital to international security, and that we have gone into them determined to see them through to a successful conclusion.

In this connection, I should like to thank the United States publicly for the quality of the information it has supplied to Allies on the Geneva negotiations. To those professional critics who are quick to condemn what they see as a lack of consultation within the Alliance, let me say that at no time has the United States failed to keep its Allies posted on the course of the negotiations.

We are convinced there is common ground between East and West. And the West's proposals have been designed to identify that common ground with increasing precision.

We invite the countries of the Soviet bloc to examine our proposals carefully. We are aware of the Soviet proposals, but we are firmly convinced that the USSR can do better and offer more.

It is of fundamental importance that parties to arms control agreements comply fully with the terms of those agreements. Regrettably, the Soviet record of compliance has raised so many questions that the United States itself now no longer feels compelled to abide by the SALT II agreement. That is a profoundly disturbing development, and one we hoped could have been avoided. Let us hope the Soviet record improves and that President Reagan's May 27 announcement is not the final word on the issue.

All of us, East and West alike, bear a responsibility for the welfare of our planet. The Chernobyl accident afforded ample proof of how ecological disaster can transcend international boundaries.

Our sympathies go out to the people affected by this catastrophe. I trust the Soviet Union will accept our invitation to work more closely with the rest of the world in making nuclear power safer.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not say a few words about international terrorism.

In the late 1970s, there were some 500 terrorist incidents a year; by 1985, the figure had risen to over 800. The great majority were cases involving members of the Alliance; a good number were directed against the Alliance itself.

As we remember and regret those instances in our own countries when the bomb has replaced the ballot, we must also recognize the international dimension of terrorism.

Our own responses to terrorism, and the way these responses affect relationships within the Alliance, are as important as terrorism itself. The last thing we want is to see international terrorism succeed, where the Soviet Union has failed, in dividing us.

Let us therefore build upon the foundation of cooperation already laid, both within the Alliance and in other forums, to combat terrorism effectively.

Between East and West, much still needs to be accomplished. But a significant first major step has been taken on the road to reconciliation. We very much look forward to the next meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

There are enough areas in which East and West are talking for substantial progress to be made, if the political will exists.

And most of all if we remain united and determined. Here in Halifax, let us reaffirm our solidarity, and work together



to ensure every new idea and proposal for international peace and security is accorded a full, sympathetic and urgent hearing.

When we chose Halifax to host the meeting of the Atlantic Council, the charm of the city and of this part of the country were certainly not the least of our reasons.

But we wished also to signify how deeply rooted in Europe Canadians remain, and how great an affinity we continue to feel for the Atlantic Community.

This Atlantic port, closer to the shores of Europe than to our own West Coast, symbolizes the enduring link between the Old World and the New. Since the days of Leif Eriksen, John Cabot and Jacques Cartier, Europeans have come to these shores, and to this harbour, in search of safe haven and fortune.

And more recently, Halifax anchored the lifeline which sustained allied forces in Europe in two world wars. From this point, too, Canadians sailed to Murmansk, or died en route, maintaining the 'northern connection' with the Soviet Union.

In brief, when we welcome you in Halifax, we are asserting the community of interest we share with you; we also hope to remind you of the important contribution made to the Alliance by Canada.

Our military presence in Europe, and the commitment we have made to the reinforcement of Europe in time of crisis, are unique for a people so geographically remote from Europe, who also have security interests in the North and in Asia.

But a long time ago, Canadians judged that our common civilization made the security of Europe indistinguishable from that of North America. And ever since, Canadian defence policy has had two priorities — holding the line in Europe, and defending the North American continent.

We all have a duty to fulfil, each in our own way. We all place a high premium on peace. We must all do our part to see it is maintained."

## **NATO Issues Statements on East-West Relations and Conventional Arms Control at Halifax Meeting**

*At the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Halifax, the Council issued two statements, one dealing with NATO's approach to East-West relations and the other with conventional arms control. Following is the text of those statements.*

"At Halifax, we have reviewed all aspects of East-West relations. We conclude that obstacles to agreement, however serious, should not prevent both sides from building on areas of common interest. We remain ready to co-operate where common ground exists. We will continue our efforts to narrow differences elsewhere.

We remain united in our resolve to maintain adequate forces and to seek a more constructive relationship with the countries of the East. However, the conventional imbalance in Europe and the sustained build-up and modernization of all categories of Soviet military power continue to be of concern. In order to preserve peace and to prevent any kind

of war, we will maintain the Alliance's strategy of deterrence.

We are determined to pursue our efforts for progress in arms control and disarmament. We aim at a lower and more balanced level of armaments. We support US efforts to achieve deep reductions in Soviet and US nuclear forces. We seek a treaty totally eliminating chemical weapons. Reductions in conventional forces are also crucial in order to correct the present conventional imbalance between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Beyond this, we aim at conventional stability throughout Europe. We have today made a separate statement on conventional arms control.

In all negotiating fora in which they are engaged, the participating Allies have presented detailed proposals directed at enhancing stability and security. We now await an equally constructive response at the negotiating table from the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Public statements alone are not enough.



*NATO representatives at a reception in Halifax prior to opening of Foreign Ministers meeting. Left to right: Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary-General; Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Secretary; and Vahit Halefoglou, Foreign Minister of Turkey.*

Canapress



Adequate verification measures are the key to progress in all the present negotiations and essential for building trust and openness. Any agreement should enhance confidence of compliance and strengthen the existing treaty regime. We are prepared to accept comprehensive verification measures, on a fully reciprocal basis, including systematic on-site inspections.

But the development of peaceful and realistic East-West relations requires more than arms control. The human dimension remains crucial: this embraces respect for human rights and encouragement of individual contacts. Moreover, a more co-operative East-West relationship, including political dialogue, trade, and cultural exchanges, in which all states participate on equal terms, is needed.

We reaffirm the importance each of us attaches to the CSCE process in all its aspects. At Stockholm we are pressing for agreement on a substantial set of confidence and security building measures by September 1986. We are determined to further the CSCE process at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting in November, which should be opened at a political level.

We underline the importance of the continued observance of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and, particularly in view of the current situation, of maintaining freedom of circulation in the city.

Terrorism is a serious concern to us all. It poses an intolerable threat to our citizens and to the conduct of normal international relations. We are resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge. We urge closer international co-operation in this effort.

The purpose of our Alliance is to enable our peoples to live in peace and freedom, free from any threat to their security. We seek a productive East-West dialogue. This will enhance stability in our relations with the members of the Warsaw Pact. We call upon the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries to join us in this endeavour.

### **Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control**

— Within the Alliance, we cherish the ideal that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps are required in the field of conventional arms control.

— Our objective is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

— To work urgently towards the achievement of this objective, we have decided to set up a high level task force on conventional arms control.

— It will build on the Western proposals at the CDE conference in Stockholm and at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, in both of which participating Allied countries are determined to achieve early agreement.

— It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 18th April expressing, in particular, Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals.

— An interim report will be presented to the Council in October and a final report will be discussed at our next meeting in December.

— Our aim is a radical improvement in East-West relations in which more confidence, greater openness, and increased security will benefit all."

### **SSEA Reiterates Canadian Support for Compliance with SALT II Treaty**

*On May 27, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, issued the following statement on SALT II compliance.*

"As I said in the House in January, Canada strongly supports the arms control regime established by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements and believes nothing should be done to undercut their authority.

We take very seriously the USA charges of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. We have raised these charges with the USSR on several occasions including in correspondence from the Prime Minister to the General Secretary and have pressed the USSR to respond to them satisfactorily.

We welcomed the President's decision even in the absence of a satisfactory Soviet response to dismantle a Poseidon submarine last June and his plan to

scrap two Poseidons when the next Trident submarine goes to sea.

We are, however, very concerned about the implications of the President's stated intention to exceed SALT II limits late this year.

Unfortunately, the President's decision runs the risk of diverting attention from the existing problem of the Soviet arms control compliance record.

It is our fervent hope that in the time remaining before the end of the year the USSR and the USA will reach an understanding on means to ensure continued respect for the limits of the SALT II accord, until such time as a new agreement sharply reducing their nuclear arms is negotiated.

Our views on the importance of the USA abiding by the provisions of the SALT II agreement have been conveyed to the USA Government."



## Canada Assumes Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament

*Canada assumed the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva at the beginning of August, the concluding month of the 1986 session of the CD. On August 5, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, delivered a message to the CD from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Following is the text of the message from Mr. Clark.*

"Canada feels particularly honoured to be entrusted with the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during its important closing, report-writing and inter-sessional period. We shall endeavour to fulfil our responsibilities in a manner which fully reflects the high value Canada attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

In an era when the awesome realities of existing and emerging weapons technologies are a cause for concern to the peoples of all countries and continents, the task of devising effective agreed arms control and disarmament measures cannot simply be left to those who possess the largest arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole

multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, therefore performs an indispensable political and institutional role.

The fact that Canada's presidency occurs during the concluding month of this year's session gives me an opportunity to put forward some reflections on the current international situation in relation to arms control and disarmament, and on the recent work of the Conference on Disarmament in that context.

The attention of the world, understandably, is focussed on the negotiations of the USA and the USSR being conducted, literally, just down the road from the Conference on Disarmament. This attention often takes the form of an impatient clamour for quick results. Such expressions of impatience are politically and humanly understandable. However, we would do well to keep in mind the magnitude and complexity of the agreed objectives which the negotiating parties have set for themselves: no less than 'the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.'

It must also be borne in mind that the issues under negotiation involve vital security interests not only of the negotiating parties themselves but of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed all the peoples of the world. Viewed in this light, while many may have hoped for more rapid progress, there are no grounds for discouragement at this time; there are in fact hopeful signs. Available evidence strongly suggests that both parties are approaching their task with a seriousness and commitment that bodes well for eventual substantive results. It is particularly encouraging when concrete, substantive proposals are put forward at the negotiating table, as has recently been the case, rather than first being announced in public. I am sure that all members of the Conference on Disarmament would agree on the importance of conducting ourselves in ways which are supportive of continuing, serious pursuit of those all-important negotiations, while not abdicating our individual and collective responsibility to advance our own work with a sense of real urgency.

The arms control negotiations and discussions of the Conference on Disarmament may understandably attract fewer headlines than the bilaterals, but this should not be taken as an indication of their unimportance. It has been your task to address some of the most politically sensitive and technically difficult issues which governments confront in this area. Just as important, in its role as a sounding board as well as a negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament helps in registering emerging issues of concern among political leaders and in defining areas for new negotiated measures. Your work can thus also contribute invaluable to establishing the tone and texture of the broader arms control and disarmament process. Your current session has been characterized by a most welcome lessening of polemics; there appears to be an increasing trend towards thoughtful, substantive statements, coupled with the submission of practical working papers. I applaud this new spirit, and this new approach.



Mr. J. Alan Beesley (centre), Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Arsène Després (left), Counsellor with the Canadian Delegation to the CD, and Mr. Miljan Komatina (right), Personal Representative of the Secretary General, during recent session of CD.

L. Bianco



As for the Conference on Disarmament's priorities, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is a central task of the arms control and disarmament process. Your efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons therefore is rightly a priority item on your work agenda. Official confirmation by the United Nations Secretary-General of repeated chemical weapons use in the Gulf war, which Canada resolutely condemns, as well as reports of efforts by other countries to acquire a chemical weapons capability, must add to our collective sense of urgency to achieve progress on this item. Canada does not favour diverting efforts from the negotiation of a comprehensive ban in order to address the proliferation problem separately. Nevertheless, out of concern for the problem, Canada recently increased to 14 the number of chemicals subject to export controls and, in consultation with several other countries, we are implementing a warning list procedure for a longer list of chemicals.

In the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, there were several welcome developments during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The USA delegation made an important clarification of its thinking on how a treaty might apply to differing social systems. The USSR delegation made new and positive substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of verification of a treaty, which my Government hopes will soon be supplemented by further proposals dealing with other aspects or verification. The Canadian Government hopes also that the important recent UK initiative will facilitate a convergence of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections. Under energetic and notably competent chairmanship, the *ad hoc* committee has made further progress towards resolving some of the more difficult technical issues. The Canadian delegation submitted two working papers as a contribution to the collective effort. The holding by the Netherlands of a workshop relating to verification of non-production, as well as the broad attendance at that workshop, was gratifying and encouraging. It is important that the momentum thus generated be

maintained, including through inter-sessional work to the extent practicable.

The issue of a ban on nuclear tests has properly continued to occupy a prominent place in the CD agenda. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. We were therefore disappointed at the failure to agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body on this item, which would have permitted practical work in preparing the ground for the negotiation of such a ban. This session, nevertheless, was not without positive developments. We have noted carefully, and welcome, the recent Soviet statement indicating a forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters relating to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. We are also pleased that the USSR and the USA are holding expert-level discussions on nuclear test issues. Australia's call for a decision to establish an international seismic network is wholly consistent with Canada's longstanding concern to develop means for reliably verifying a test ban. The Conference on Disarmament is aware that we are upgrading a seismic array in our own northern territory and have commissioned other related research, and that we will be conducting a technical workshop in Ottawa this autumn, at which we hope CD members will be widely represented. In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high priority for Canada, and this CD agenda item warrants special effort and attention. As was the case last year, Canada submitted a substantive working paper designed to facilitate consideration of existing relevant international law and the possible need for it to be supplemented by additional negotiated measures. We have also commissioned extensive research into the potential for using existing technology for purposes of space-based

verification. We intend in the future to make the results of this research more widely available.

It was a matter of disappointment that a mandate for a subsidiary body on the outer space item was agreed on only halfway through the 1986 session. As a result, for a second consecutive year, only half of the session's time could be devoted to substantive deliberations. Once the mandate was agreed on, the ensuing discussion was on the whole characterized by an impressive sobriety and thoughtfulness. In the Canadian view, the existing mandate is demonstrating its usefulness.

The Conference on Disarmament is also engaged in negotiation aimed at banning radiological weapons, which fortunately are not yet known to exist. My Government recognizes that following the tragic accident at Chernobyl, there are heightened concerns about the potential consequences of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. My Government hopes that there can be early agreement on how this issue can most effectively be addressed, so as to avoid prolonged further delay in concluding a radiological weapons ban.

Unfortunately, concrete achievements at the Conference on Disarmament in recent years have been scarce. This may be an indicator not so much of failure as of limits. Delegations at the Conference can achieve no more than what their respective instructions, reflective of perceived national interest and political will, allow. Nevertheless, Canada would join with others in urging a searching re-examination of the methods and procedures whereby the Conference on Disarmament conducts its operations. It would be regrettable, possibly tragic, if opportunities for progress were missed due to institutional inefficiencies or failings.

In conclusion, I am confident Ambassador Beesley can count on the support and cooperation of all delegations in bringing this year's Conference on Disarmament session efficaciously to its conclusion."



## **Canada's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Address the Stockholm Conference**

*On June 10, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. James H. Taylor, addressed the opening plenary of the eleventh session of the Stockholm Conference and outlined how Canada thought the Conference could be brought to a successful conclusion. Excerpts from his statement follow.*

"As this negotiation moves into the home stretch, we must focus more precisely the energy of our broader political purpose and direct it with care and determination towards hammering out a full solid agreement.

And broader political purpose there most certainly is. We seek a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures which will inject vitality into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the arms control process. After investing two and a half years in this enterprise, it would surely constitute a failure — and a disappointment — if we produced only a marginal embellishment of the measures in the Final Act.

We are beginning a process. It will clearly not be possible in this phase of the Conference to solve all the problems of confidence-building in all its aspects. The subject is as vast as its concrete manifestations are essential to the underpinning of peace.

But it is crucial that this Conference produce a result which is substantial enough to justify the effort to date, and to make it worthwhile to continue. This means that effort must now be concentrated — and quickly — on negotiating a set of measures covering the activity of land and combined forces which — no one can seriously doubt — poses the highest risk of war in Europe....

The Soviet Union has recently stated that it is no less interested in effective verification than are the Western States

and it has recognized the potential usefulness of on-site inspection as a means of verification. We await here a confirmation of this interest through positive and specific suggestions for cooperative and reciprocal verification measures accessible to all the participating States.\*

Verification measures have both political and military value as a means of ensuring compliance. Since military potentials on each side in Europe are very high, any major lack of compliance would require a considerable military effort which could not go undetected. While minor non-compliance might not jeopardize the other side's military situation, any would-be violator would hesitate, weighing carefully the political consequences of any such action.

A cooperative and reciprocal inspection regime would help to clarify a situation before it could lead to a serious misunderstanding, or miscalculation, or worse, and, recognizing that the real world in which this system will operate is full of ambiguities and uncertainties, here as elsewhere flexibility will be required.

But the essential principle remains: an agreement lacking effective verification is not better than no agreement at all. An agreement that is permissive towards violations, or could give rise to allegations of non-compliance because it lacked effective verification provisions, could be a greater danger than no agreement at all. It could lead to tensions arising from dubious compliance when national security is seen to be at risk. Efforts to control or reduce armaments in Europe must sooner or later involve the full range of political interests of all the participating States. Verification is essentially a cooperative and reciprocal process. Thus, all States assuming

\*A Soviet proposal allowing for a limited number of on-site inspections in each country per year was announced in the Conference on August 19.

obligations under any agreement adopted here should be assured that they can effectively verify compliance with it.

This Conference could take a major step forward in the verification process. Here is a forum where a common political commitment combined with technological expertise and multilateral diplomacy could produce a verification arrangement that will ensure that the agreed measures really do build confidence and security.

Verification is not an end in itself, but it will be of vital importance as a component of the final result here, because it enhances the confidence of the parties and creates a sense of predictability, and that comes close to the heart of our purpose....

### **Canadian Statement of June 30, Made on Behalf of NATO Caucus**

*In order to promote the possibility of achieving an agreement prior to the Stockholm Conference's adjournment on September 19, the NATO participating States decided to offer several concessions in the Allied negotiating position. These were outlined on behalf of the NATO caucus by the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. W.T. Delworth, in a statement on June 30. Excerpts from his statement follow.*

"This negotiation is still spinning its wheels on the sands of political indecision, and time is passing quickly. We are halfway through this session, which we have all called critical, in the search for mutually acceptable solutions based on the common ground identified so far.

We can no longer afford to repeat old arguments, valid though some of them may be. We need to reassess our respective positions, taking into account the interests and perceptions expressed by others here.

Initiatives now seem called for, to unlock the road ahead towards an agree-



ment which, in accordance with the mandate, will begin a process meaningful for building confidence and security as well as for the CSCE.

In speaking on behalf of the sponsors of SC.1\*, the 16 Delegations which together made the first initiative at this Conference, I can say that we have therefore decided that we would be prepared to make moves in the following areas of the negotiation. Notification of ground force activities has often been described as the core of the agreement we have to adopt; the definition of the threshold for ground force activities is a key element of this measure. Three approaches to this problem have been presented: one puts the emphasis on structure; another on manpower; a third one on 'mobility and firepower,' which in practical terms means equipment. An attempt to combine these three approaches was recently made by the NNA States. We think that this is the right way to proceed and we would like to declare our readiness to draft on the basis of the proposal tabled by the Austrian Delegation on June 13. We hope others will take a similarly positive view....

The level of the threshold is an essential issue. Our approach is to emphasize structures, and the number of troops is only one element in this approach. It has been contended that our proposal would result in an excessive number of notifications per year. We do not think that the figures which were mentioned in support of this objection are accurate. But we are ready to consider raising the numerical element of the threshold beyond the figure of 6 000 troops. We seek increased confidence through militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which cover the whole of Europe....

Moreover, we are prepared to make another move. Understanding of mobilization practices through notification would contribute significantly to greater

stability and confidence-building. However, we have heard concern expressed on our proposal relating to notification of mobilization activities. Some countries whose defence capabilities almost exclusively rely on the recall of reservists have argued that such a measure would affect their security interests.

We are willing to consider whether we could meet this preoccupation but we would expect similar consideration of our concern in other areas such as constraints where provisions have been advocated which, in turn, would unacceptably affect our security interests....

On observation we continue to believe that agreement to observe all notifiable military activities from their beginning to their end would be a substantial improvement over the provisions contained in the Final Act. But this ambitious aim has raised many logistic and financial objections. It is our view that observation should assist participating States in meeting the overall objectives of the confidence-building process: it must enable the observers to assess the scope and nature of military activity, which of course does not imply that the first man to leave and the last to return to normal peacetime locations should be observed.

Here again we are prepared to look sympathetically at the above-mentioned objections and consider a limitation on the duration of observation both as far as its starting and its ending are concerned. We expect this move to enable everybody both to agree to a low threshold for notification and to facilitate agreement on detailed and specific modalities for the observation regime.

On verification, our inspection proposal meets the mandate criteria and ensures each State equal opportunity to verify compliance with the agreed CSBMs. Objections have been raised, however, emphasizing the burden represented by our proposal. While we would have preferred to leave open the option for each participating State to conduct two inspections a year, we believe it is essential that each participating State should have the option to conduct at least one inspection a year. Central to

our approach to verification is the position that inspections must be an essential and integral part of the result of this Conference. However, we are entitled to carry out every year from two to one as evidence of our willingness to ensure against the abuse of the right to inspect military activities of other participating States....

The time has now come for new efforts to further the drafting process. The points I have just made are intended to serve that purpose. This is not of course the first example of our determination to reach an agreement. May I recall that on the issue of the non-use of force we have also made significant steps, first in agreeing to include this issue on the agenda of the Conference, then in tabling the most comprehensive contribution to date, and more recently in drafting actively on this subject. We have done this even though work in the field of concrete measures was stagnating.

The initiative we are taking represents careful study and sometimes difficult decisions on our part. In making these offers, that is, in showing yet again that we are prepared to be flexible, we must of course make it clear that we do so in the expectation that our other negotiating partners will show matching movements not only on the issues I have mentioned but also on others, such as information which I have not raised today. Nor would we expect our negotiating partners to introduce obstacles to real progress.

The only way to reach a substantive agreement is to follow a give-and-take process. We hope that the initiative taken by us today will create a dynamism leading to such an agreement in the eight weeks left to us before the Conference adjourns on September 19. We shall be prepared to do our part."

*The outcome of the Stockholm Conference will be known by the time this issue is released. The results of the Conference and their significance for the future of conventional arms control in Europe will be examined in our next issue.*

\*NATO proposal



## **Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification**

*On April 14, the Canadian Government transmitted to the United Nations a comprehensive study on arms control and disarmament verification prepared in response to the UN resolution 40/152(o) dealing with verification in all its aspects. This resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, signalled a major breakthrough by requesting that Member States submit their views on verification and on the role of the UN in the field of verification.*

*Following is the text of the letter that accompanied the Canadian report to the United Nations Secretary-General. Copies of the report may be obtained by writing to the Editor.*

“Excellency:

I have the honour to refer to United Nations resolution 40/152(o) entitled ‘Verification in All Its Aspects,’ which was adopted without vote on 16 December 1985 by the United Nations General Assembly during its fortieth session. The resolution called upon Member States of the United Nations, *inter alia*:

...to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than April 15, 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification....

In accordance with that invitation, I am pleased to convey to you the attached comprehensive study on arms control and disarmament verification conducted by the Government of Canada.

This document provides a detailed analysis of verification, an issue which the Government of Canada believes has become the single most important element in international arms control and disarmament negotiations.

The importance of verification centres on the fact that an arms control agreement is essentially a compromise in which each party bases part or all of its national security on the undertakings of other contracting parties rather than on its own military capabilities. All such agreements touch directly on the most sensitive aspects of national security. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties will adhere to their obligations is essential; the more so when such agreements are negotiated and implemented in a context of political suspicion and mistrust. Verification, in simple terms, is the means by which such confidence is gained.

A starting point for any discussion of verification issues should be acceptance of the proposition that verification serves functions that are essential to the long-term success of the entire arms control and disarmament process. This fact has indeed already been clearly acknowledged by the international community, most notably in the Final Document of UNSSOD I, paragraphs 31, 91 and 92.

There is thus an international consensus that adequate and appropriate verification provisions form an essential element in all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

The functions to be performed by verification are threefold: deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, and treaty assessment. Verification is thus more than a matter of providing for a ‘police’ function. It should help meet the need to institutionalize in the context of relations among states the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations as those that govern the conduct of relations among individuals in all civilized societies. Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent on the part of others, but they allow for such a possibility and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations could be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and

resolved, and non-compliance objectively established.

In this connection, it should be emphasized that the verification process does not in itself address the issue of what can or should be done in the event of misconduct. No judicial function is involved. The political management of the consequences of demonstrated non-compliance is perhaps the ultimate, and most difficult and sensitive, problem in the whole arms control and disarmament process. The role of verification in this context is limited to providing, in the most comprehensive and objective way, data relevant to such behaviour. It thus can be valuable in limiting the scope for unjustified allegations and in providing a basis for reasoned and factually-based decisions by the international community in instances where non-compliance is demonstrated.

It has been contended that the emphasis on verification has been used as a pretext for impeding or avoiding progress in the negotiation of agreements. Similarly, it has been said that verification means are also used as a pretext for the gathering of intelligence unrelated to the verification task.

Each of these criticisms reflects, in certain measure, an area of valid concern: about the utility of verification research not linked to specific agreements; about the political motivation which may underlie varying approaches to verification issues; and about the broad implications for the entire arms control and disarmament process of perhaps excessive concern with the perfectability of verification measures.

Nevertheless, Canadian experience and research with respect to verification questions indicate that intensive study of the verification issue can not only allay many of these concerns but also facilitate the arms control and disarmament process. There are many initiatives that can be undertaken to prepare and develop a range of instruments — legal, institutional and technological — that could contribute to the potential for the verification of specific agreements. The work of the Conference on Disarmament’s



Group of Scientific Experts is a good example of this point. Its cooperative research into seismological techniques, despite the absence of a specific Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has advanced considerably the global capability for monitoring an eventual CTBT.

General research into verification techniques also offers the promise that effective verification systems can be made less intrusive and, therefore, more acceptable to parties concerned about the potential intelligence-gathering capabilities of verification systems.


It has also been said that generic research into, and discussion of, verification is not productive. Such a view ignores the fact that the general principles of verification developed at UNSSOD I have applicability, in some degree, to all specific arms limitation issues. It also ignores the possibilities for developing general procedures and techniques which could then be applied in specific arms limitation contexts. For example, various procedures and techniques developed by the IAEA have potential application elsewhere, including a convention on chemical weapons. Attempts to research and relate principles to the procedures and techniques involved in verification can be highly productive both in generating new ideas and solutions to specific problems and in overcoming obstacles in specific negotiations.

A review of the Final Document of UNSSOD I reveals several principles relating to verification. These include 1) adequacy, 2) acceptability, 3) appropriateness, 4) universality, 5) verification methods and procedures in combination, 6) non-discrimination, 7) minimum interference, and 8) non-jeopardizing of economic and social development. It is the task of governments and their negotiators to formulate verification provisions in conformity with these principles.

In the future, although it is expected that much attention will continue to focus on the bilateral arms control process, it is likely that the multilateral dimension will become increasingly

significant. This reflects a number of realities: the need to deal with existing or potential weapons systems for which a large number of countries have a capability (e.g., chemical and biological weapons); the increasingly recognized interest in precluding or controlling weapons deployment in certain specified environments (e.g., the Antarctic, the seabed and outer space); and the growing recognition of the desirability in principle of universal commitments to agreed arms control measures. ('Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among states': UNSSOD I Final Document, paragraph 40.)

In this context, the experience of the USA and USSR in implementing bilateral agreements is of limited value and relevance. Each party to those agreements is to a large extent self-reliant for verification purposes; each party relies on its own personnel and technological resources, which remain under its own direct jurisdiction and control in the collection and interpretation of data. Nevertheless, in addition to the technologies that have been developed, the consul-



A view of the UN headquarters in New York at sunset. The buildings are the 39-storey Secretariat (right), the General Assembly (centre), the Council Chambers and Conference Rooms (at the river's edge) and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (foreground). UN/Y. Nagata

tative procedures and collateral measures which the two parties have elaborated (e.g., in relation to the ABM and SALT agreements) could be of considerable instructive value in a multilateral context.

For the resolution of some of the more difficult problems in the verification of multilateral agreements, however, the experience with bilateral agreements offers only partial guidance. At issue are such matters as: equitable sharing of rights, responsibilities and costs; the delegation of executive and operational responsibilities in ways which make the principles of acceptability, universality and non-discrimination operationally meaningful; and the effective coordination of procedures and techniques so as to ensure that the entire verification process is adequate, appropriate and minimally intrusive. Meeting these challenges will require careful and imaginative institution-building and the creative elaboration of new international law.

At the conceptual level, a number of possible approaches can be envisaged. One possible approach, for example, might be for the parties to an agreement to delegate responsibility for data collection and interpretation to a selected group of countries possessing the relevant technological and other resources. In effect, much of the verification service would be obtained from those having the capability to perform it. Such an approach would need to involve a careful elaboration of agreed terms of access to information and agreed decision-making procedures for the purpose of taking action in the light of the interpreted data.

Other approaches posit the notion of an International Verification Organization (IVO), an organization created and maintained specifically for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. An IVO could have 'general' responsibilities, i.e., be responsible for conducting verification activities in relation to several different agreements. The 1978 proposal for an International Satellite



Monitoring Agency (ISMA), which would rely on a specific type of technology (surveillance satellites), would seem to fall into this category. Or an IVO could be established for the purpose of conducting the entire verification process in relation to only one particular agreement, for example, a chemical weapons convention. It is conceivable that, over time, such agreement-specific IVOs could serve as stepping-stones toward the creation of a general IVO with broader responsibilities. This might, for example, permit more economical use of verification-dedicated resources.

It should be noted that none of the concepts outlined above involves monitoring activities by states in relation to agreements to which they are not themselves parties, nor by any other agent, except as expressly authorized by agreement of the parties. The presumption throughout has been that the principle of acceptability rules out such monitoring activity and that all aspects of the verification process must be expressly accepted by all parties to an agreement.

Fortunately, the international community already has some (all too limited) experience with verifying multilateral arms control agreements which can serve as a base and guide for further pioneering. Of greatest interest as a model of an agreement-specific IVO is the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) system of safeguards which verify the non-proliferation commitments of its member states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA has, with impressive success, confronted and coped with all the kinds of generic problems that have been cited here. It has done this, moreover, in direct relationship with a technology sector of unique sensitivity from both commercial and military perspectives. The IAEA has undoubtedly had a key role in maintaining a high level of international confidence in the NPT as one of the more successful international security measures of our time. Its organization, procedures and techniques merit careful study.

Finally, the existing and potential role of the United Nations must be seriously

considered and addressed. As pointed out in paragraph 114 of the UNSSOD I Final Document:

'The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures — unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral — and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.'

There is a need to translate principle into practical application. You, Mr. Secretary-General, have demonstrated that initiatives can help bridge the gap between prohibition and verification and, in turn, build a stronger involvement of the United Nations.

Our study has identified a number of other ways in which the United Nations might acquire an enhanced role in the verification process. First, it could give further consideration in the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission to the essential role that verification plays in the arms limitation process, and therefore, in international security.

Second, the United Nations could examine the possibility that individual nations or groups of nations possessing verification expertise could offer such capabilities to the international community for use in the verification of multilateral agreements.

Third, the United Nations could undertake research and examination of the organizational structures, procedures and techniques which might be devised and further developed for use by IVO-type organizations, utilizing the rich body of documentation generated over the years in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere.

Fourth, the United Nations could provide greater assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators in the regional arms control and disarmament process with a view to combining international mechanisms with regional measures for verification (e.g., the control system of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which utilizes safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the control measures provided by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)).

Fifth, on a responsive basis, the United Nations might involve itself in the formulation and execution of verification provisions within agreements. Where a need exists, the United Nations should be prepared to help bring together verification expertise and encourage states to develop procedures through which this expertise can be applied in actual agreements.

And finally, given the appropriate flexibility, the United Nations could secure a stronger role in future regional arms limitation agreements. Should one or more arms limitation agreements be developed in any one region for which a space-based remote sensing system could be an appropriate verification technology, it would be both reasonable and cost-effective for this space-based verification capability to be generated by a group of capable nations and provided for use under the auspices of the United Nations or a regionally-based IVO in the context of the agreement(s).

Excellency, with or without legal provisions for verification purposes, nations will strive to collect information on the military activities of other nations which are perceived as relevant to their own national security. Such efforts have always been, and will continue to be, a predictable aspect of national behaviour. Adequately verified arms control and disarmament agreements, however, could provide the means whereby certain of these basic information needs can be met under conditions where interference is minimized, sovereignty is respected and distrust is largely dispelled. Similarly, it is clear that



compliance with any future significant arms limitation treaty will need to be verifiable to a high degree of confidence before nations will accede to the agreement. As the debate concerning allegations of non-compliance has illustrated, when this high degree of confidence in compliance does not exist, both the climate and process of arms limitation are damaged. Verification, which addresses both confidence and compliance, is at the very core of this requirement.

The conclusion to be drawn is that, while the negotiation and implementation of agreed verification measures will always be agreement-specific, there is a vast scope for constructive activities by governments and international bodies in refining and expanding the technological, organizational and institutional options available for verification purposes to governments and their negotiators.

Canada, through a modest verification research programme, is working to improve the verification process. It has committed resources to this end, based on the conviction that a variety of useful work on verification problems can be accomplished outside, and in advance, of negotiations towards specific agreements. To this end, we encourage other Member States to explore with us this vital element in the arms control and disarmament process.

Given the severe financial crisis facing the United Nations, Canada will circulate copies of our comprehensive reply to all member states and interested organizations. In these circumstances Canada would request that only this letter be circulated as a document of the United Nations General Assembly.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Stephen H. Lewis  
Ambassador and Permanent  
Representative  
Permanent Mission of Canada  
to the United Nations"

## **Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**

*The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.*

Canada has been sympathetic in principle to the concept of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) where they are feasible and would promote stability. While we have not considered such zones to be fully satisfactory alternatives to the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the countries of the areas concerned, we believe that, in the absence of universal or near-universal adherence to the NPT and provided certain principles are observed, the creation of such zones can make a significant contribution to the objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada's position on each NWFZ proposal is determined on a case-by-case basis, but we believe that, to be effective, such zones must apply to a defined geographic area, be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned including the principal military powers of the area, not give military advantage to any state or group of states, contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that all countries abide by the commitments involved and not permit countries of the area to have an independent nuclear explosive capability for whatever purpose.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Canada has supported resolutions calling for the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and South Asia.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon free status for Canada because, while in fact Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, nor are such weapons stationed on Canadian territory, we continue to participate fully in NATO, a defence alliance which deploys a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon free zone would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.

Regarding the proposal for a NWFZ in Central Europe, there are a number of reasons why Canada and most of NATO do not support this idea. The proposal strikes at the very essence of NATO's ability to deter aggression in Central Europe by reserving the right to use nuclear weapons, if need be, against the preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Thus a reduction and eventual removal of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe would only be feasible once conventional parity had been reached. Even then there would be difficulties since nuclear munitions could be more quickly reintroduced in Eastern Europe because of the Warsaw Pact's significantly shorter lines of logistics. Thus, any agreement would be of small military significance, would be difficult to negotiate and to verify and could create an unfounded impression of enhanced security.

The establishment of a Balkan NWFZ would remove US missiles from the region while leaving untouched nuclear weapons stationed on Soviet territory (which is not included in the proposal) within easy striking distance of the area. It should be noted that a political declaration of the Warsaw Pact established a link between the proposal for a denuclearized zone in the Balkans and a similar zone in Northern Europe. Implementation of the proposal would expose NATO's southern flank to the threat of Soviet attack and would not contribute in any substantive way to nuclear arms control or the reduction of tensions in Europe as a whole.

From a Canadian perspective, a Nordic NWFZ cannot be a viable concept unless the Baltic Sea and parts of the Soviet Union were to be included in the geographically defined region. The likelihood of this happening is remote. Furthermore, although there are no nuclear weapons in Norway or Denmark, a formalized Nordic NWFZ commitment, which would include those two NATO countries, would further reduce NATO's options to repel any Warsaw Pact aggression in the region.



## House of Commons Holds Debate on Nuclear Arms Free Zone Concept on October 10, 1985

On October 10, 1985, the House of Commons debated a private member's bill urging that Canada be declared a nuclear arms free zone. Following is the text of the intervention by Mr. Gerry Weiner, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Weiner is now Minister of State for Immigration.

"Last March 18 the House had a full debate on Bill C-218, an Act to declare Canada a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Today we are asked to debate the question of declaring Canada a nuclear arms free zone which would prohibit the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada and the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms. From my point of view, there is no difference in substance between a nuclear weapons free zone and a nuclear arms free zone. This being the case, although the Government position on this matter has not changed between March 18 and today, this is a good opportunity to repeat certain aspects of our policy on nuclear weapons free or nuclear arms free zones.

On June 30, 1984, Canada removed the last remaining nuclear-tipped Genie air-to-air missiles which were to be used in wartime in an air defence role by Canadian CF-101 Voodoo interceptors. The air defence role has now been taken over by CF-18 aircraft which can do the same job using conventional weapons systems only. There are no nuclear weapons stationed on Canadian soil which is not the case, however, for at least eight of 16 members of NATO. Overflight of American aircraft with nuclear weapons, or port visits by nuclear-powered war ships, some of which may bear nuclear weapons, were they to occur, would do so only with the express permission of the Canadian

Government. The same consultations and permission would be required for the deployment of any other nuclear weapons within Canadian territory.

Thus, while in some respects Canada may be regarded as a *de facto* nuclear weapons free zone following the withdrawal of the last nuclear capable aircraft from service with the Canadian Armed Forces, we continue to participate fully in the defence alliance, NATO, which employs a nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, possible comparisons with the practices of other countries which are not members of NATO are not particularly valid.

Canada is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and has now been for more than 36 years. We joined the Alliance because we believed in the concept of collective security — a united effort to deter aggression or to counter it should conflict occur. There were many advantages to such an Alliance. However, the most telling advantages were then, and continue to be, the united strength which accrued to the Alliance enabling it to resist undue external political and military pressure to reduce the cost of defence by dispersing the burden of armaments among the member states.

Similarly, NATO has enabled the West to speak with a unified voice on critical issues of international security and to pursue the progressive development of east-west relations in a coherent fashion. It is an invaluable forum for nations such as Canada to express their views and to exert a constructive and moderating influence on the policy directions taken by the western powers in their relations *vis-à-vis* the East Bloc.

However, while Canada enjoys the collective security and influence given by membership in NATO, Canada also recognizes the need to share the burden of this collective security. It should be

noted here that no NATO country has declared itself unilaterally a nuclear weapons free zone. As a point of clarification, Iceland has not declared itself a nuclear weapons free zone as has been erroneously reported in some news media. The Icelandic Parliament, in its resolution of last May, simply reiterated its old policy that no nuclear weapons be situated in Iceland without the prior consent of Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic Parliament has also envisaged that its Foreign Affairs Committee explore possible participation and further discussions of a nuclear weapons free zone in northern Europe encompassing an area from Greenland to the Ural Mountains.

The proposal to make Canada a nuclear arms free zone might have the effect of prohibiting the testing of the cruise missile in Canada. The decision by the previous Government to allow the United States to test unarmed air launched cruise missiles in Canada was seen as consistent with that Government's support for NATO's two-track policy which led to the deployment of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles in several NATO European countries. This Government decided to allow the United States to continue with its testing program because it believes that the cruise missile is an essential element in the global balance of deterrence and is part of the western response to the modernization by the Soviet Union of its offensive and defensive nuclear systems during the 1970s. This Soviet modernization continues into the 1980s.

It must also be remembered that NATO has had to rely on nuclear weapons to overcome the potential threat present in the great preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. It would not be in NATO's interest to give up the option of the



possible use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent should the Warsaw Pact forces ever contemplate an attack on the West. At the same time, however, it should be noted that NATO upholds the United Nations Charter which lays down that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means and that there be no use of force — any force — against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

The proposal would also prohibit the construction of any components of nuclear weapons in Canada. Regarding Canadian co-operation in the production of US cruise missiles, Litton Systems Canada Limited was awarded the sub-contract by the US Department of Defence through its parent company in the United States, Litton Industries, to produce a portion of the inertial guidance system for the cruise missile. Litton's participation in a small part of the cruise missile vehicle program should not be taken as a change in Canadian policies instituted at the end of the 1960s to divest our armed forces of a nuclear weapon capability. It is, however, consistent with joint defence efforts with our NATO allies who rely in part on the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of the growing military threat from hostile forces.

The proposal before us today also calls for the Government to encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world also to become nuclear weapons free zones. While someone else will speak on the question of regional nuclear weapons free zones, I would like to comment on the question of Canadian cities and provinces declaring themselves nuclear weapon free zones. We recognize that there is an important symbolic value in the declaration of a nuclear weapons free zone as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the threat of nuclear war. However, any responsible Government must look at the real implications of what a nuclear weapons free zone means from the point of view of security."

## Major Canadian Statement at MBFR Negotiations

*Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, involving 12 members of NATO and the seven Warsaw Pact members, began in Vienna in 1973 as a result of a NATO initiative to reduce the military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal, significantly lower levels. NATO participants include all members of the Alliance except Spain, Portugal, France and Iceland; all Warsaw Pact member countries are represented. The agreed goal is the reduction of each side's military manpower in the "zone of reductions" to parity at a level of 700 000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900 000 air and ground force personnel combined. The zone of reductions consists of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern side. In addition to these reductions, the West seeks certain "associated measures" that could facilitate verification, build confidence and enhance stability.*

*Following is an excerpt from a major statement made at the MBFR negotiations on May 15, by the Head of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Michael Shenstone.*

"Mr. Chairman,

It will surprise no one around this table to hear that the thirty-eighth Round which ended on March 20 was a great disappointment to the West, and one which we did not expect. After the major initiative tabled by the West on December 5, 1985, the sides found themselves for the first time in the long history of these negotiations agreeing to a common framework. In this initiative, the West made a historic move demonstrating its political will to create conditions favourable for reaching an agreement. While many substantive issues remained, we had genuine hope that the East might muster similar political will to match the West's concession and that subsequent work could expand the areas of common ground so as to bring an agreement finally within reach.

These expectations were raised even higher by public statements of Eastern leaders that seemed to augur a new willingness to negotiate effective verification.

As the Round unfolded, however, the West found its Eastern partners reluctant to work on a common agenda for progress. Instead, the East advanced what was described as a further development of its earlier Basic Provisions. Despite the dazzling merits claimed for this package, the East demonstrated an embarrassed reluctance to answer several repeated questions from the West for clarification. When partial answers were eventually extracted from our Eastern colleagues, it became clear why they were embarrassed: to back up the high rhetoric of its advance publicity, the East grudgingly unveiled verification measures that failed to demonstrate even the slightest substantive improvement over its previous inadequate measures. On one specific measure, the application of exit-entry points, the East revealed a position which politeness compels me merely to describe as a backward step.

This development, far from building upon the opportunities created by the West's acceptance of a common framework, only imposed yet another obstacle to progress in Vienna.


The West reviewed this unfortunate turn of events in its closing plenary on the 20th of March. It urged its Eastern colleagues to re-examine their former positions on key subjects such as verification and return to the thirty-ninth Round with constructive proposals that would match the Western move of December 1985. The West expected, of course, that if any progress were to be achieved in the period ahead, Eastern proposals would need to relate to the context of the hard-won convergence onto the common framework for a first-phase, time-limited agreement on initial US and Soviet reductions and a no-increase commitment — an agreement along the lines of the Basic Provisions

# The **Disarmament** Bulletin

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### The Arms Control and Disarmament Process at the United Nations



An aerial view of New York City and the East River. At lower left overlooking the East River is the United Nations complex.

UN/Y. Nagata

Within the United Nations system, arms control and disarmament (ACD) matters are discussed, in greater or lesser degree, by the following:

- (a) The plenary of the General Assembly
- (b) The First (Political and Security) Committee
- (c) The United Nations Disarmament Commission
- (d) Various *ad hoc* committees and bodies
- (e) Various study groups

Each of these is administratively supported by the United Nations Secretariat, specifically the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

These various UN bodies are *deliberative* in nature. They have no negotiating power and their work concentrates on formulating collective views, expressions of intent, guidelines and declarations. (The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on the other hand, is a *negotiating* body and while it has a close link with the United Nations system, its characteristics, methodology and results are not the same.)

#### Plenary

Generally, the plenary of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) limits itself to consideration of, and voting upon, the reports of the First Committee. There is normally very little discussion of the ACD items in the plenary. Exceptionally, there are items such as the International Year of Peace that are not referred to the First Committee which receive full debate in the General Assembly.

This is the second in a series of periodic supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



### First Committee

The agenda of the First Committee (the main UNGA forum for arms control, disarmament and international security matters) contains more items than are considered by any of the other six main committees of the General Assembly. At the forty-first General Assembly, there are expected to be nearly 80 resolutions on ACD and international security topics. In recent years, the number of First Committee resolutions has increased dramatically (from 44 in 1978 to 73 in 1985), leading many delegations to call for a re-structuring of the agenda. This matter has yet to be considered by the UNGA.

The following are some of the main issues of special interest to Canada that will be considered by the First Committee:

(1) *Comprehensive Test Ban.* At UNGA 40, there were three resolutions dealing with various aspects of nuclear test bans, one introduced by New Zealand and two by Mexico. Canada and over 20 other countries abstained on the resolutions introduced by Mexico at UNGA 40 because they were judged to present several practical problems relating to the most appropriate and effective method of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Canada voted for the resolution on this subject introduced by New Zealand at UNGA 40. It reaffirms the conviction of the General Assembly that all nuclear tests in all environments should be abolished by all countries for all time. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is urged to resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as issues of verification and compliance, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty. This resolution has been introduced in alternate years by New Zealand and Australia.

(2) *Outer Space.* At UNGA 40, a resolution entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" was adopted by a vote of 151 in favour, none against, with two abstentions. Drafted by non-aligned delegations, the final product was a result of agreements reached between all groups at the UN.



Delegates voting in the First Committee, the main UN General Assembly forum for arms control, disarmament and international security questions.

UN photo 165000/Y. Nagata

It called upon the CD to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and also requested the CD to establish an *ad hoc* committee in 1986 with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. An *ad hoc* committee was established by the CD and the report of its accomplishments will be considered at UNGA 41.

(3) *Chemical Weapons.* Canada and Poland alternate in taking the lead on a resolution which calls on the CD to intensify its negotiation of an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. At UNGA 40, Canada took the lead on this item, which is traditionally uncontentious and is adopted by consensus. Poland will lead at UNGA 41.

(4) *Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes.* This traditional Canadian resolution, which receives a very high vote, will be introduced once again this year.

(5) *Verification.* At UNGA 40, Canada succeeded in having adopted, by consensus, a resolution (40/152o) entitled "Verification in all its Aspects". In reference to the verification resolution, former Canadian diplomat John Holmes, writing in the *Ottawa Citizen* on February 8, 1986, noted: "It was obvious to me, furthermore, that (the Canadian) success was attributed to the respect in which Canada is held as a constructive and independent-minded force in the Assembly." This is the first resolution passed on that subject in the 40 General Assemblies of the UN. It built upon the consensus language of the UNSSOD I Final Document and called "upon member states to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures." Further, it invited all member states to submit to the Secretary-General "their views and suggestions on Verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The General Assembly will, at its forty-first session, consider the replies and decide on further action.



### United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is another deliberative body, but it devotes attention to only a limited number of ACD items. It meets each year for virtually the entire month of May and is open to attendance by representatives of each of the 159 UN member states. Whereas the First Committee conducts its business by means of voting, the UNDC operates by consensus.

In 1986, the UNDC discussed six issues: the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of military budgets, the nuclear capability of South Africa, the role of the UN in disarmament, curbing the naval arms race, and confidence-building measures. In comparison with previous years, the 1986 session was exceptionally successful. The main achievements included agreement on a document on confidence-building measures, thus clearing this item off the agenda. There was also substantial progress on a document on the reduction of military budgets (ROMB), with only one paragraph in an otherwise agreed formulation of guiding principles

The First Committee Programme of Work and Timetable follows the same format from year to year, and for UNGA 41 is expected to be as follows:

	Dates	Number of Meetings
General debate on all disarmament agenda items	mid to end of October	20
Statements on specific disarmament agenda items and continuation of general debate, as necessary	end of October to early November	20
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	end of first week in November	
Consideration of and action upon draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	to mid-November	20
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolution(s), on Question of Antarctica	end of November	8
Deadline for submission of draft resolution(s) on Antarctica	end of November	
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolutions, on the three international security agenda items	early December	10
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on international security agenda items	early December	
Voting in General Assembly	early December	



Closing session of the 1985 Disarmament Commission. At the podium are (left to right) Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan); Fehmi Alem, Secretary; and Don Arturo Laclaustra (Spain), Rapporteur.

UN photo 165323/Y. Nagata

for ROMB agreements remaining to be negotiated. Some useful work was also realized on the role of the UN in disarmament. However, little progress was reported on agenda items dealing with nuclear and conventional disarmament, or on the item dealing with South Africa's nuclear capability. The session also witnessed a considerable difference of views on the naval arms race item. In general, the 1986 session was a positive one and it is hoped that this spirit will carry over into the 1987 session.

### Ad Hoc Committees and Bodies

Committees which function under a mandate from the General Assembly and in which Canada plays an active, or monitoring, role include:

(1) *Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean*. This committee meets from four to six weeks per year to deal with preparatory work relating to the convening of an international conference which would be concerned with the



The Secretary of State for External Affairs meeting with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. In his statement to the 40th General Assembly, Mr. Clark renewed the commitment that successive Canadian governments have made to the United Nations since its creation in 1945.

UN photo 164239/Y. Nagata

implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Canada is one of the 11 Western members of this 48-nation committee.

(2) *Ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.* This committee meets from four to six weeks a year and is charged with maintaining close contact with the nuclear weapon states in order that the committee be made aware of their opinions regarding the holding of a World Disarmament Conference.

(3) *World Disarmament Campaign Pledging Conference.* The World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) was launched in 1982 by unanimous decision of the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). It has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate, and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the Third WDC Pledging Conference on October 31, 1985, Canada announced its third contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the WDC — which makes Canada one of the leading contributors to the Campaign. Our contributions have

supported the publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and other UN information material as well as research activities undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The 1985 contribution also included \$10 000 for the International Year of Peace Voluntary Trust Fund.

(4) *Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development.* This committee met for two weeks in 1985 and for four weeks in 1986. The main items to be discussed at the conference itself will be:

- (a) Review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.
- (b) Examination of the implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear weapon states, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.

(c) Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.

This conference was originally to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986. However, the French Government, as host, expressed the wish that it be postponed until 1987 so that better preparation could be guaranteed and the chances of success improved.

(For further information on the conference, see the article on this subject in this issue of the *Disarmament Bulletin*.)

**Study Groups**

From time to time the General Assembly calls for studies to be carried out on ACD items. Some studies recently completed or in progress are:

- Naval Arms Race
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- Reduction of Military Budgets
- Deterrence
- Conventional Disarmament
- Military Research and Development
- Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Matters
- Relationship Between Disarmament and Development

During the period 1979-1984, Canada participated in four UN study groups.

**Summary**


Canada's role in the arms control process at the United Nations is a significant one. Canada is recognized as having an important role to play in the discussion of these questions and is making a practical contribution to the activities of the UN in this field. In addition, through its chairmanship of the Barton Group (composed of UN representatives of the NATO countries, Australia, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand), named after the former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Mr. William Barton, Canada is able to facilitate active discussion and exchanges of opinion on arms control and disarmament issues within the UN context.



proposal made on February 14, 1985, by the East.

In his plenary statement presenting that Basic Provisions initiative over a year ago, the Distinguished Representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Mikhailov, placed great importance on the merits of setting aside the comprehensive approach and concentrating on a first-phase agreement. He claimed that the contents of that proposal would permit us speedily to achieve a first-phase agreement. He added that such an action, by demonstrating the readiness of both sides to move forward towards lowering the level of military confrontation, would undoubtedly help to create the necessary confidence and establish a favourable climate and ground for further joint efforts to improve the military-political situation.

While the West saw the need for substantial improvements in several features of those Basic Provisions, most notably in their minimalist verification provisions, it recalled the merits of its own 1979 first-phase proposal. After an in-depth review of these negotiations, the West concluded that a time-limited, first-phase approach did offer a possible way forward. In December 1985, the West thus tabled an initiative which not only accepted the framework embodied in the East's Basic Provisions but, in order to break the deadlock in these negotiations, took the exceptional step of setting aside its legitimate insistence on prior agreement on data. That, Mr. Chairman, according to earlier Eastern claims, was the ' Gordian knot ' in need of cutting, following which progress could at last be made in Vienna. Ambassador Mikhailov's closing invocation on February 14, 1985, urged the West to ' treat the new proposal of the Socialist countries in a most attentive and serious way and to give it a timely and constructive reply which would make it possible to reach the first tangible result in the negotiations in Vienna. ' This requirement was not only met but exceeded by the West's milestone initiative. In effect, the sides finally agreed on a common itinerary to reach a first tangible result.



*Mr. Michael Shenstone, Head of the Canadian delegation to the MBFR talks.*

The West still supports the common framework approach so earnestly advocated by the East over the past 15 months. We still consider it the most realistic and practical means of achieving an early first agreement for reductions and limitations on conventional armed forces in Central Europe. The next logical step is to complete the journey we mutually agreed to embark on. If and when we succeed in doing so and the resultant agreement is implemented to the satisfaction of all parties, then the more ambitious phase involving substantial reductions in military manpower to reach parity at lower levels in Central Europe would at last become an attainable goal. However, for the time being, we are at the stage where issues that still divide us must be aired, argued and hopefully reconciled in the search for the final breakthrough to a first-phase agreement.

One of the most important of these issues is the need for a system of verification that will instil sufficient confidence in all parties to this agreement that implementation and compliance occurs, and is seen to occur, in strict conformity with the obligations undertaken. The West has developed and fully explained

its concept of verification. The East has still to demonstrate how its meagre verification measures can satisfy the high standards of effectiveness and reliability required of a viable verification regime. The West was disappointed with the East's failure in the last Round to fulfil the expectations created by the proclamations of its leaders and with its apparent backtracking on certain key points. Nevertheless, we take the optimistic view that such positions may have been developed in haste and may yet be modified to make a positive contribution to our joint efforts here.

During a speech in East Berlin on April 18, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev outlined some ideas which alluded to untying a supposed knot in our Vienna negotiations, but which seemed to cut across the work of several arms control fora. How these ideas will affect our talks in Vienna, if at all, is not clear at present. But without making any further comment on the implications of the April 18 statement as a whole, we note that the view that European security is a concept going beyond Central Europe is consistent with a long-held NATO position — often expressed at this table — that certain of the Associated Measures proposed by the West should apply beyond Central Europe. We hope, therefore, that the East's resistance to these Associated Measures will now come to an end.

The West is always prepared to consider constructive suggestions to advance these negotiations. However, the West is not aware that our work on the first-phase agreement has exhausted its promising prospects. We hope, therefore, that time will not be wasted in extraneous discussions here which might delay or detract from the progress that these talks deserve, and that our common framework now facilitates....

To our view, the best means of demonstrating the sincerity of the East's commitment to substantial reductions and limitations on conventional armed forces in Central Europe and to reliable verification at every stage is by dealing positively and constructively with the serious Western proposal tabled here in December...."



## Disarmament and Development Conference Postponed to 1987

*On June 20, the UN General Assembly adopted, without discussion, the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee for the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development to postpone the conference until 1987. This conference was originally to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986. However, the French Government, as host, expressed the wish that the conference be postponed until 1987 so that better preparation could be guaranteed and the chances of success improved.*

*Canada participated in three meetings of the Preparatory Committee, in July-August 1985 and April and June 1986. These meetings were designed to prepare for the conference and for the substantive discussion that was to take place in Paris on this subject. Although the conference has been delayed, the third preparatory meeting adopted, by consensus, a document containing elements which are to serve as the framework for a Final Document of the conference.*

*Following are excerpts from the Canadian address to the Preparatory Committee meeting of April 10, made by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, which set out Canadian views, many of which are reflected in the consensus document adopted at the third Preparatory Committee meeting. (For further information on Canada's approach to disarmament and development, see the article on this subject in our "Winter 1985 — Spring 1986" issue.)*

"We now have to turn our attention to the task of drawing up the broad outlines of the kind of document we think should emerge from the conference.

In proceeding with this next step in our work, we have to bear a number of points in mind. First, the document must represent a consensus. Second, it must stand the test of time since we shall be looking to it to provide guidelines for years to come. This will be an ongoing document that cannot simply reflect the biases of the moment. Third, it must help to maintain the momentum of both the disarmament and development processes where this exists or to encourage such momentum where it is lagging. We must adopt the high road rather than a parochial approach to our subject.

With these points in mind, we believe that the conference should work towards the adoption of a consensus Declaration on the relationship between disarmament and development that reflects longer-term objectives. Such a Declaration need not be long. Indeed, if we are to succeed in achieving consensus on this complex subject, we may have to aim at a Declaration which, while substantively of great significance, is modest in length.

That Declaration should perhaps contain an Introduction consisting of a statement setting out the situation regarding both disarmament and development which has inspired the proposal for this conference at this particular point in time, namely, the disproportion in the amounts currently devoted to armaments and development.

The Introduction might then be followed by the Declaration proper which would set out a conceptual framework. This would contain the common elements in the views expressed by delegations on the relationship between disarmament and development, the conclusions reached about the uncertain impact of military expenditures on the world economy and the various broad alternative approaches on which we can agree.

We see the starting point of the Declaration being the points of consensus which have been reflected in the various statements in our debate.

The common thread in most of those statements, which should find its way into the final document, is the recognition that disarmament and development are two separate and fundamental processes which the international community is dedicated to foster, notwithstanding the much more complex relationship between them than we have recognized in the past.

Our discussion, I believe, has highlighted the importance of security for both these processes.... I believe that there has been general recognition of the fact that security in this context must be viewed in a broad sense to encompass not only military but non-military threats.

If we have interpreted the debate correctly, my delegation believes there has been a heightened concern on the part of delegations about the implications of too tight a conceptual link between disarmament and development. Put in its starkest terms, as it was by several delegations, progress in the transfer of any resources to development should not be held hostage to progress in arms control. That basic thought must, I believe, find its way into the Declaration emerging from the Paris conference.

My delegation believes further that there has been a shift in the thinking about the concept of direct transfers of resources from disarmament to development. Whether or not there is a full consensus on this point remains to be seen in our further discussions; but it is our clear impression that there is a recognition that, however desirable delegations may view them, there is nothing automatic about such transfers. They are subject to the decision of the countries undertaking disarmament measures. While those decisions are based on national interests, they are not taken in isolation but in the context of the total international situation....



The document will...have to be balanced in its analysis of the role of both the developed and the developing countries in the creation of the problems we have examined and in their solution, however large or small that role may be.

On the important action-oriented elements of the Declaration, we do not yet see a consensus on the various proposals that have been put forward. That subject may have to be left to mature until the next Preparatory Committee meeting or the conference itself.

My delegation would hope that serious consideration will be given to the view it has put forward, namely, that not only the direct transfer approach but alternative approaches be examined. We would hope that the Declaration would

reflect the view that measures such as the reduction of national expenditures and deficits, by strengthening donor countries, might be a better way of guaranteeing that more funds will, in the long term, be allocated to development assistance than a simple direct transfer from military expenditures to help developing countries....

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the essence of Canada's approach and appeal is this: the final statement of the Paris conference has the potential for making a significant, long-term contribution to global understanding of how true human security can be enhanced by more rapid progress in both disarmament and development. To make this contribution, the Final Statement must, of course, be a consensus document. In a

consensus around a subject that is by definition complex and controversial, not everyone will be satisfied. But everyone can be helped by a new bridge of understanding. Today's differences can be bridged by a Declaration at Paris that establishes, for the first time, the principles for the global community to follow in implementing the disarmament-development interrelationship.

All of us need more time over the next months to pursue our study of the valuable information already produced. We ought not to leave this Preparatory Meeting with any thought that we have begun the in-depth drafting process; but rather we should disperse, determined to build on the process already started to outline the bridging consensus that we seek."

## Canadians Now Part of Sinai Peace Force

At the request of Egypt and Israel, Canada assumed operational responsibilities with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) on March 31. The Canadian contingent with 136 personnel and nine Twin Huey helicopters is located with the force headquarters at El Gorah, in the northern Sinai, and provides helicopter support to the MFO, including observation and verification, command and control, logistic support, search and rescue, medical evacuation and air traffic control.

The MFO was established in 1981 to monitor security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Canadian participation in the MFO will contribute to the reinforcement of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. The treaty between the two countries, based as it is on the principle established in Security Council resolution 242 of exchanging land for peace, stands as an example of what can be achieved in the region when the political will exists. Canada remains committed to assist in the search for peace and stability in the Middle East.



During his official visit to the Middle East in April, Mr. Clark visited Canadians at MFO headquarters in El Gorah. At far right is Canada's Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Marc Perron.

Denis Drever



## **Letter to Ms. Margaret Laurence on Question of Possible Tritium Exports from Canada**

*On June 19, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, released the following text of a letter to Ms. Margaret Laurence.*

"Dear Ms. Laurence,

I have read your open letter concerning possible tritium exports from Canada and believe that a number of the misleading allegations therein should be refuted. In my view allegations of that nature do not contribute to the informed and comprehensive discussions desirable on matters of government policy and merely serve to confuse and mislead those exposed to them.

First, you make sweeping statements about past and current nuclear cooperation by Canada without making any effort to point out that Canadian Government policy and activities in this field have evolved significantly, not least of all in response to India's misuse of Canadian nuclear technology in 1974. Thus Canadian nuclear cooperation now only takes place within the framework of a comprehensive non-proliferation policy which requires, as a condition for nuclear cooperation with Canada, that all non-nuclear-weapon states must make a binding international commitment to non-proliferation, either by adhering to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or by taking an equivalent step, and must accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, current and future. In addition all of Canada's nuclear partners, whether non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon states, must conclude with Canada a nuclear cooperation agreement specific to clearly identified Canadian material, nuclear material, equipment, and technology and incorporating a number of non-proliferation and safeguards provisions. The Canadian Government has learned from its experiences in the field of nuclear cooperation and now has one of the

most stringent policies of all nuclear suppliers. Pursuant to that policy cooperation with India, Pakistan and Taiwan was terminated ten years ago and cooperation with Argentina has been limited to supporting the safe and efficient operation of the Embalse reactor. Canadian cooperation with Romania and South Korea takes place in full accord with the policy outlined above. As this information is widely known, I believe your letter to be deliberately misleading in this regard.

Secondly, Canadian Government officials have responded to numerous enquiries over the past few years, including enquiries from Energy Probe, concerning possible tritium exports from Canada. There has never been any effort by the Government, or by Ontario Hydro in our experience, to deny or avoid any reference to this potential activity. To the contrary, officials have consistently advised that any such exports would take place only within the general framework of Canada's non-proliferation policy as regards nuclear exports. In that context it should be noted that tritium is not identified as a nuclear material in the Statute of the IAEA, and is not subject to IAEA safeguards. The Canadian Government believes that, given the physical nature of tritium and its limited proliferation significance, the application of safeguards to tritium is not appropriate. It should be clear, however, that export licences and permits for tritium will not be issued unless the Government is satisfied that tritium will not be used for nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive purposes. Moreover, officials indicated that detailed guidelines covering the evaluation of export applications were being developed for Ministerial consideration. Those guidelines were announced publicly by the Atomic Energy Control Board on March 14, 1986, well in advance of any request by Ontario Hydro to export tritium. The allegations, implicit and explicit, in this context in your letter are thus also unfounded.

Finally, and most importantly, you state in your letter that 'the prime beneficiary of our (tritium) exports is expected to be the US military' and moreover that 'there's nothing to stop the USSR, other nuclear weapons states, and even terrorists from ultimately getting their hands on it.' There is no basis for this statement. As I have already indicated no export licences or permits for tritium will be issued unless the Canadian Government is satisfied that the material will not be used for nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive purposes. The March 1986 guidelines issued by the AECB clearly support this. Moreover it is my understanding that, contrary to your assertion, the USA military are not called upon by law to fill commercial orders for tritium; in fact, tritium is made available to the USA military by the Department of Energy, which also fills commercial requirements. We have been assured by USA officials that their Oak Ridge facility, which manufactures tritium, has ample supplies for all requirements. Once again I find your letter erroneous and misleading.

Your persistent connection of Canadian tritium to weapons is not only incorrect, but misleading. Commercial, medical and research applications of tritium contribute to the safety, health and well-being of both individuals and general populations. Tritium facilitates such safety-related products as instrument dials, exit signs and emergency markers for commercial aircraft and air ambulance guidance. The benefits to modern medicine of radioisotopes in general are well known and the support of fusion research will assist the development of a new energy source which will be of benefit to all mankind.

Ontario Hydro is the subject of a number of statements in your letter with regard to which it is, I believe, best placed to respond. I can assure you, however, that my officials have found Ontario Hydro representatives to be well-informed, open, and cooperative in responding to their enquiries as regards Ontario Hydro's tritium-related activities.

In conclusion, I believe the Canadian Government has responded in a timely



and effective manner to an evolving industrial and technological situation, and to potential commercial opportunities for Canadian companies, by applying to possible tritium exports, in an appropriate way, its nuclear non-proliferation policy as regards nuclear exports. That policy, developed and consistently applied by successive Canadian Governments since 1965, is designed to ensure that Canada's nuclear exports, including tritium, will not be used for nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive purposes.

Yours sincerely,

Joe Clark"

### **Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War**

*Following is the text of the Canadian statement on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war, delivered at the Conference on Disarmament on March 25 by Mr. Arsène Després, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva.*

"Participants in this forum will be aware that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has reported to the Security Council, on the basis of the findings of an international investigative team which he sent to the area, that the renewed use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war has been confirmed. The President of the Security Council on March 21 issued a statement on behalf of the Council which includes a strong condemnation of this continued use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Security Council statement also includes a renewed demand that the provisions of that Protocol be strictly observed. This is the third such confirmation of chemical weapons use in that war. In this instance, the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces has been confirmed. This ought to be cause for dismay on the part of the entire international community.

Mr. President, it is well known that the investigation of allegations of chemical weapons use is a matter in which Canada has taken a particular interest and to which we have devoted considerable effort. During the fortieth UN General Assembly Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, presented to the Secretary-General a handbook on the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons or biological weapons. Precisely for the purpose of assisting in investigations of the kind that has recently been completed, on March 11 that handbook was submitted in this forum as something that would be of use in the future in the context of a verification regime that would be part of a chemical weapons convention as it is being negotiated. Canada lauds the Secretary-General for again taking the initiative to investigate the most recent allegations of chemical weapons use.

Canada, a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons use, strongly opposes the use of chemical weapons. We call on all signatories to the 1925 Protocol, including both combatants in the Gulf war, to adhere to their legal obligations. We resolutely condemn any action that has been or might be taken in breach of that agreement. In taking this position, the Government of Canada is in no way seeking to take sides between the combatants in that tragic war, which ought to be brought to a negotiated conclusion as soon as possible in accordance with Security Council resolution 582. Our concern is to maintain and strengthen the authority and integrity of international agreements.

We are also concerned at any actions which would have the effect of undermining the efforts in this forum to conclude a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons ban and have it universally applied. The evidence of recent chemical weapons use should reinforce our sense of urgency to complete this priority task. We hope the international community will be unanimous in condemning any future use of this kind of weapon, which we have by agreement defined as a weapon of mass destruction which ought not to be used."

### **Canadian Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations with Japan and China**

*On March 17, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.*

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced that a Canadian delegation of senior officials departed today for China and Japan to hold bilateral arms control and disarmament consultations. These consultations will encompass a wide range of arms control and disarmament topics with particular focus on issues at the United Nations and the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva where all three countries are represented at the negotiating table. Canada places great importance on such consultations with these major Pacific states. These consultations are intended to become regular annual events.

The consultations in Tokyo will take place on March 19 and 20. During his visit to Canada last January, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone agreed with Prime Minister Mulroney that their officials hold regular arms control and disarmament consultations, and that the first of these would take place before the Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting in May. Canada views these consultations with Japan, an Economic Summit partner and a non-nuclear power, to be an important element of its bilateral relationship with Japan.

The consultations in Beijing will take place on March 24 and 25. They are part of an agreement to strengthen the consultative process between Canada and China. The arms control and disarmament consultations are particularly important given China's position as one of five nuclear weapon powers and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council."

## **SSEA Announces Canadian Programme for the International Year of Peace**

*On March 6, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué on Canada's International Year of Peace Programme.*

"The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today announced the details of Canada's International Year of Peace (IYP) programme.

The Canadian Government's programme of activities includes the following:

— A contribution of \$10 000 to the International Year of Peace Voluntary Trust Fund of the United Nations.

This contribution was announced on October 31, 1985, as part of Canada's overall contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign. Canada's contribution, one of the largest contributions made to the Voluntary Trust Fund, will support activities undertaken by the United Nations IYP Secretariat during the International Year of Peace.

— A cross-Canada tour from April 14 to May 2 by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche.

Mr. Roche will discuss the International Year of Peace and the question of the relationship between disarmament and development with members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and with interested Canadians

— The preparation, in book form, of a selection of essays written by distinguished Canadians and dealing with the broad themes of the International Year of Peace from individual perspectives.

This book, prepared in order to encourage reflection on the basic requirements of peace in the contemporary world, as proposed by the United Nations, will be published in the fall of 1986 and presented to the United

Nations as a distinctive Canadian contribution to the International Year of Peace. It will also receive wide distribution in Canada.

— An essay competition for Canadians dealing with the theme 'What is peace and what can I do to achieve it' and a poster competition on the International Year of Peace.



*Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, addressing public forum in Saskatoon on April 27.*

Saskatoon Star-Phoenix

Winners of the competition will be awarded a trip to the United Nations in New York. This competition is being organized by the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC) under the terms of a contribution from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs. Inquiries should be directed to UNAC at Suite 808 - 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A5 (tel: (613) 232-5751).

— The issuing of a commemorative stamp by Canada Post Corporation in the fall of 1986 to mark the International Year of Peace. Further details will be announced by Canada Post in the near future.

— Funding priority, through the Disarmament Fund, to projects directly linked to the objectives of the IYP that meet the criteria of the Fund.

The Disarmament Fund, which totalled over \$500 000 in the 1985-86 fiscal year, will encourage a balanced discussion of arms control and disarmament issues in Canada.

Mr. Clark said the Government of Canada supports the broad objectives of the International Year of Peace, which include stimulating action by the United Nations and Member States in promoting peace and security on the basis of the United Nations Charter; strengthening the United Nations system as the principal international system devoted to the promotion of peace; and focusing attention on the basic requirements of peace in the contemporary world. Canada was a co-sponsor of the International Year of Peace resolution that received the unanimous consent of the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1985. The IYP resolution recognizes the multi-dimensionality of peace in that it encompasses not only the prevention of war but also the enhancement of the quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the satisfaction of human needs, international development, the protection of the environment and other questions. Mr. Clark said that Canada has always stressed the role of the United Nations and the UN Charter in enhancing international peace and security and will continue to work towards those ends, not just in 1986 but every year.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said the broad scope of the Government's IYP programme reflects its abiding concern for the enhancement of international peace and security. He said that this continues to be one of the highest priorities of the Canadian Government.

Mr. Clark noted that various government departments are taking into account the themes of the IYP in their activities during 1986."



# *Proclamation of the International Year of Peace*

*WHEREAS* the General Assembly has decided unanimously to proclaim solemnly the International Year of Peace on 24 October 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations,

*WHEREAS* the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations provides a unique opportunity to reaffirm the support for and commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*WHEREAS* peace constitutes a universal ideal and the promotion of peace is the primary purpose of the United Nations,

*WHEREAS* the promotion of international peace and security requires continuing and positive action by States and peoples aimed at the prevention of war, removal of various threats to peace – including the nuclear threat – respect for the principle of non-use of force, the resolution of conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes, confidence-building measures, disarmament, maintenance of outer space for peaceful uses, development, the promotion and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, decolonization in accordance with the principle of self-determination, elimination of racial discrimination and *apartheid*, the enhancement of the quality of life, satisfaction of human needs and protection of the environment,

*WHEREAS* peoples must live together in peace and practise tolerance, and it has been recognized that education, information, science and culture can contribute to that end,

*WHEREAS* the International Year of Peace provides a timely impetus for initiating renewed thought and action for the promotion of peace,

*WHEREAS* the International Year of Peace offers an opportunity to Governments, intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and others to express in practical terms the common aspiration of all peoples for peace,

*WHEREAS* the International Year of Peace is not only a celebration or commemoration, but an opportunity to reflect and act creatively and systematically in fulfilling the purposes of the United Nations,

*NOW, THEREFORE,*

*THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY*

*SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS* 1986 to be the International Year of Peace and calls upon all peoples to join with the United Nations in resolute efforts to safeguard peace and the future of humanity.

Adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1985  
(Resolution 40/3)



Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  
Secretary-General

Jaime de Piniés  
President of the fortieth session  
of the General Assembly



## Signals of Hope: Canada and the International Year of Peace

Following are excerpts from an address on the theme of the International Year of Peace made by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, in Edmonton on March 10.

"What is meant by the United Nations proclamation declaring 1986 as the International Year of Peace (IYP)? And what does it mean to Canada?"

IYP is essentially a challenge to the governments and peoples of the world to focus more clearly on the multi-dimensional nature of peace — conflict resolution, economic and social development, human rights, elimination of racial discrimination, as well as the traditional issues of arms control and disarmament.

Peace can no longer be defined as the absence of war, though the avoidance of nuclear war must be the chief priority.

Peace requires more than a reduction of arms, though disarmament measures are essential.

Peace demands the attaining of true human security so that people everywhere can live free of the threat of war, free of violations of their human rights, free to develop their own lives to attain economic and social progress.

Peace, then, is a multi-splendoured goal.

No one expects that this goal can be achieved by December 31, 1986. That is not the idea behind the International Year of Peace. Rather, IYP highlights the broad international agenda that must be advanced as the world continues to evolve into a global community with increasingly closer relationships among all peoples.

This growing recognition that the planet is a place of common ground, with common vulnerability and common opportunity, is the real message of IYP. It establishes peace as a system of values.

This is clearly an advance in global thinking. And this advance constitutes a signal of hope to a humanity that has for too long been fractured and frustrated in the attaining of enduring human security.

All this is a subject critical to Canada's interests in the modern world as was indicated by Canada's co-sponsorship of the IYP resolution at the United Nations.

It seems as if the world has two political axes — East-West and North-South.

The East-West axis has been characterized by 40 years of tension, of escalating armaments and declining understanding. East-West relations have come to be defined in terms of the nuclear arsenals of overwhelming destructive potential possessed by the two superpowers.

The North-South axis is characterized by decades of deprivation, famine, homelessness and disease. North-South relations have come to be defined in terms of the stark disparities in resources and opportunities which exist between a privileged minority of the world's population, who enjoy great prosperity, and the vast majority afflicted with utter destitution.

The management of these two sets of relationships is the starting point on the route to peace. East-West relations focus on the negotiated limitation and reduction of arms and the building of confidence and trust; North-South relations focus on the sound economic development of the most impoverished nations in the world.

The UN's 1985 *Report on the World Social Situation* reveals how far we have to go to achieve these goals:

— in 1984, global military expenditure was \$800 billion — approximately \$130 for every man, woman and child in the world. This is equivalent to more than the average income of many developing countries;

— in 1980, military spending by developed countries represented more than ten times the amount spent by developing countries on health programmes;

— the cost of a single nuclear submarine equals the annual education budget of 23 developing countries with a total of 160 million school children.

The field of arms control is itself highly complex, technical and, above all, political. It is easy to advocate ridding the world of nuclear weapons; numerous proposals have been put forward since the Baruch Plan of 1946, but it has been very difficult to find a way of negotiating them down to acceptable levels on the basis of equality and equal security.

A significant step was taken in this direction at the November 1985 Summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. In their joint declaration, the leaders agreed that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.' As well, they identified several areas in which the USA and USSR had a common interest in progress. These included:

— accelerated work at the nuclear and space talks which began in March 1985;

— the further enhancing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);

— accelerated global efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons;

— agreement to work for positive results at the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Establishing and sustaining political dialogue at the highest level in order to build on the common ground between East and West is a step of fundamental importance.




This approach has been a consistent element of Canadian foreign policy. At the conclusion of his visits to many world capitals in 1983, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau suggested ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

These principles, reflected in the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit statement, broaden the perspective of East-West relations and stimulate greater international effort in the search for a durable peace.

In his first speech immediately after assuming office in September 1984, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney reiterated the commitment of the Canadian Govern-



*Logo of the International Year of Peace.*

ment to work effectively within the world's multilateral forums to reduce tensions, alleviate conflict and create the conditions for a lasting peace. He said:

'There can be no let up in our efforts to reduce the threat of war. No matter how frustrating or difficult, negotiations must be pursued.... The exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue on whose outcome the lives of our children and humanity depend.'

And he added:

'No matter how much we may accomplish here in Canada, I will have failed in my most cherished ambition if under my leadership Canada has not helped reduce the threat of war and enhance the promise of peace.'

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark carried the Government's commitment into the global community when he stated in an address to the thirty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations:

'Canada, for its part, is determined to continue to play a leading role in the search for peace and disarmament. We believe the nuclear build-up threatens the life of every Canadian, and the existence of human society. Countries like our own must use influence to reverse that build-up and reduce the danger of destruction. That will be a

constant, consistent, dominant priority of Canadian foreign policy.'

Canada has a long, constructive history of active engagement with the most important global issues. This tradition was outlined by Mr. Clark in the foreword to the Government's Green Paper on foreign policy:

'We assisted at San Francisco in the creation of the UN. We were at Bretton Woods when the post-war monetary system was designed. We were at Havana and Geneva as well, where the international trading system was conceived. We have worked diligently ever since to improve international order — Lester Pearson and peacekeeping, Howard Green and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Paul Martin and membership in the UN for newly independent states, Pierre Trudeau and cooperation between North and South and between East and West.'

Although 1986 is designated by the UN as the International Year of Peace, every year is a year to work for peace and Canada will go on pushing and probing for viable ways to stop the spread of nuclear weapons with the motivation and spirit described in the 1984 Throne Speech:

'Patience and perseverance we will need, for in this endeavor even the smallest progress is worthy of the greatest effort.'

Thus, Canada, along with its Allies, works to influence and assist the bilateral negotiations in positive, constructive ways in order to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons. This is done through a great deal of unpublicized effort. Though there is only room for the two superpowers at the Geneva negotiating table, Canada constantly stresses that the conduct of these negotiations will have an impact on every nation on earth. The ongoing negotiations — with their series of offers and counter-offers — indicate the scope and complexity of the extensive systems of nuclear arms possessed by both sides. Though agreement still seems a long way off, most experienced



observers are now reflecting cautious optimism....

The General Assembly's proclamation of the International Year of Peace goes well beyond the more traditional issues of disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It recognizes that efforts to improve the conditions of life for people around the world and the natural environment can alleviate tensions and thereby make for a more peaceful world.

It is obvious that flagrant inequality between rich and poor is a potential source of instability; that incarceration, torture and murder of persons by their own or alien governments breeds bitterness and violence; that continuing desertification of vast tracts of Africa may force entire communities to move into the territory of others, with serious potential for conflict.

Canada has for many years made substantial efforts to alleviate such problems and we will remain active and persistent in seeking long-term solutions for them.

Canada's development assistance programmes recognize our humanitarian duty to help the world's poor, illiterate and afflicted; they also recognize the benefits for our own economic well-being of a more widely-shared prosperity. We are, therefore, committed to advancing issues of concern to the less-developed countries in a number of ways:

- a better definition of growth and adjustment in developing countries, through discussions under way in the World Bank and the IMF;
- strengthening the international trading system through the promotion of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations;
- participating in the special UN discussions on African development problems;
- strengthening the international economic negotiating machinery of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and

— improving the definition of international agricultural policies and seeking to make the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme work better.

Canada also helps to protect human rights through our participation in the Commission on Human Rights (currently in session in Geneva), the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly's Third Committee. Work is proceeding to allow Canada to ratify the International Convention Against Torture. We have been especially heartened by recent political developments in Guatemala, Haiti and the Philippines, which point to new policies and better respect for the human rights of the peoples of those countries.

Canada has long striven to persuade the South African authorities of the injustice and short-sightedness of the system of apartheid. Last July, the Government announced a series of measures designed to stiffen the pressure on South Africa and to signal our profound dissatisfaction with its failure to put an end to institutionalized racial discrimination. Prime Minister Mulroney played a key role at the most recent meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in developing a Commonwealth plan of action. We are using every avenue to urge the South African Government to summon up the courage to dispense with this unjust and backward system. The Anglican Primate of Canada, Reverend Edward Scott, is a member of the Group of Eminent Persons now seeking a more open dialogue with South Africa in an effort to avert a major tragedy.

For more than a decade, Canada has been in the vanguard of international efforts to improve the management of the world's natural environment, but mankind is still witnessing the disastrous results of careless neglect. Acid rain is damaging our forests and the aquatic life in our lakes, the Sahara advances perceptibly into the hitherto fertile lands of the Sahel; cities are defiled by smog and undrinkable water. Efforts to combat environmental damage must be based

on the realistic premise that, though this is a long-term problem, action must start now.

Progress has been registered recently through international collaboration to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean and the signing last July of an international protocol on sulfur dioxide emissions. In 1986, we will continue to combat acid rain and Great Lakes pollution; in the Economic Commission for Europe, discussions are continuing to reduce nitrous oxide emissions from industrial sources, power plants and motor vehicles; in the UN Environmental Programme, negotiations are under way on an international protocol on the protection of the earth's ozone layer. The World Commission on Environment and Development will visit Canada May 22-31 to examine environmental problems and better ways and means of resolving them. Groups and private citizens will have an opportunity to present views to the Commission....

For many Canadians, the IYP proclamation confirmed what we had already known. It has served to remind us that peace without development is not peace, that peace without racial equality and harmony is not peace, that peace without a reasonable quality of life is not peace.

It is, therefore, the fullness of Canada's programmes — from development assistance and active support for human rights to the protection of the environment and the promotion of a better standard of living for people across the country and, indeed, around the world — that constitutes a meaningful contribution to peace.

The spirit, determination and commitment generated by IYP must be carried forward into the years ahead if we are to create a truly peaceful planet.

Canada and Canadians can use IYP as a catalyst in our ongoing work for peace. If we can infuse others with our hope and belief in true human security, we will have accomplished a great deal."



## Embossed Stamp to Mark 1986 as the International Year of Peace

The Canada Post Corporation announced on April 10 that an embossed stylized drawing of a dove soaring above Earth will be featured on a stamp to be issued September 16 to mark the United Nations proclamation of 1986 as the International Year of Peace. The Honourable Judge René J. Marin, Chairman of the Board of Canada Post

Corporation, noted that the proclamation "offers not only an occasion for celebration or commemoration, but an opportunity to reflect and act creatively and systematically in fulfilling the purposes of the United Nations."

The stamp design, by Montreal graphic artist Carole Jeghers, shows a white

dovelike bird soaring in outer space, its wings extended towards Earth as if about to embrace the planet.

Ashton-Potter Limited, of Toronto, will print 14 million 34-cent stamps in five-colour lithography plus embossing.

## Ambassador for Disarmament Undertakes Cross-Canada Tour

*On April 8, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.*

"The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today announced the details of a cross-Canada tour to be undertaken from April 14 to May 2 by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, as part of Canada's International Year of Peace (IYP) programme previously announced by Mr. Clark on March 6.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Mr. Roche will visit every province in Canada to discuss the question of the relationship between disarmament and development and the International Year of Peace with members of the non-governmental Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and with interested Canadians. These consultations are part of Canada's preparations for an international conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2. Mr. Clark said this major tour will provide the opportunity for a productive exchange of views on these issues between the Government of Canada and interested Canadians.

During the tour, the Ambassador for Disarmament will also speak on the themes of the International Year of Peace at a series of public meetings...."

## Royal Canadian Mint Launches \$100 IYP Gold Coin

Mr. Robert J. Huot, Vice-President of Marketing at the Royal Canadian Mint, launched on August 7 the eleventh issue of the Canadian \$100 Gold Commemorative Coin Programme at the American Numismatic Association Annual Conference. The coin commemorates the International Year of Peace and will be available from August 15 to November 30.

The International Year of Peace highlights the broad international agenda that must be advanced as the world continues to evolve into a global community with increasingly close relationships among all people. The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that he was "particularly pleased that the Royal Canadian Mint has chosen to commemorate the International Year of Peace with the issue of a new \$100 Gold Coin."

Designed by internationally acclaimed Toronto artist Dora de Pédery-Hunt, the

coin depicts a branch of maple leaves intertwined with a branch of olive leaves, symbols of Canada and peace. The words "Peace"—"Paix" form a circle and are superimposed on the design.

The obverse bears Arnold Machin's effigy of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

The 22 karat gold coin contains one half troy ounce of pure gold. It has a diameter of 27 mm, a thickness of 2.15 mm and weighs 16.965 g.

The mintage has been limited to 100 000 coins worldwide and its selling price has been established at \$325 (CAN) or \$245 (US).

Mail orders should be addressed to the Royal Canadian Mint, P.O. Box 476, Station A, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 9H3 and will be accepted until November 30, 1986, or until mintage is depleted, whichever comes first. The coin may also be purchased from coin dealers.





## Canada Contributes \$100 000 to World Disarmament Campaign



Canadian officials recently presented three cheques totalling \$100 000 to the United Nations that constitute Canada's 1985 contribution to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign. This contribution was announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on October 31, 1985, and is Canada's third contribution of \$100 000 each to the Campaign. In upper photo, Mr. Jan Martenson (*left*), UN Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, is presented with a \$50 000 cheque on May 15 by Mr. H. David Peel, Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau, Department of External Affairs. This contribution will assist publication of the UN *Disarmament Yearbook*. In middle photo, Mr. H. Thierry (*left*), Deputy Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, is presented with a \$40 000 cheque on April 9 by Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. This contribution will assist UNIDIR's research in the field of verification. At bottom, Mr. V.A. Ustinov (*left*), UN Under-Secretary-General, Political and Security Council Affairs, is presented with a \$10 000 cheque by Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Stephen Lewis, on February 21. This contribution, earmarked for the Voluntary Trust Fund for the International Year of Peace (IYP), will assist activities undertaken by the UN during the IYP.



Logo of the World Disarmament Campaign



## **List of Arms Control and Disarmament-Related International Agreements to which Canada is a Signatory or Party**

### **BACKGROUNDER**

1. 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement (United Kingdom-United States)  
Signed and in force 29 April 1817  
  
Negotiated after the end of the War of 1812, this agreement resulted in the reduction, limitation and equalization of naval forces on the Great Lakes. It is the earliest disarmament agreement of the modern era. It had considerable influence on the improvement of relations between Canada and the United States and the eventual creation of a disarmed border.
2. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare  
Signed: 17 June 1925  
Ratified: 6 May 1930  
In force for Canada: 6 May 1930
3. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water  
Signed: 8 August 1963  
Ratified: 28 January 1964  
In force for Canada: 28 January 1964
4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies  
Signed: 27 January 1967  
Ratified: 10 October 1967  
In force for Canada: 10 October 1967
5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
Signed: 23 July 1968  
Ratified: 8 January 1969  
In force for Canada: 5 March 1970
6. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof  
Signed: 11 February 1971  
Ratified: 17 May 1972  
In force for Canada: 18 May 1972
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction  
Signed: 10 April 1972  
Ratified: 18 September 1972  
In force for Canada: 26 March 1975
8. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques  
Signed: 18 May 1977  
Ratified: 11 June 1981  
In force for Canada: 11 June 1981
9. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  
Signed: 22 September 1980  
Ratified: 21 March 1986  
  
This Convention will not come into force until ratified by 21 countries.

### **Related documents**

Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, included in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
Signed: 1 August 1975



## **Leaving its Alliances is No Choice for Canada**

*Following is the text of an article written by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and published in the Montreal Gazette on April 3.*

"Gwynne Dyer (Columns, March 15) argues Canada should leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence Command to make 'nuclear war ... less likely to happen.' He believes we could become a Canadian Finland.

Both his assumptions are wrong.

Leaving the Western alliance would make nuclear war more likely. The Soviets might be emboldened by a break in the West. NATO would feel weakened, and some of its members might be driven to hawkish demonstrations of strength.

The atmosphere that led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit could be shattered, and the road closed again to negotiated arms control.

Second, Canada could never be Finland. The Finns are an estimable people, shaped by their own nature and history. But their nature and history are different from ours.

We are proud of our role as an international peacekeeper, a moderate and reasonable country. But moderation is a means, not an end. Our purpose is to enlarge freedom. We prefer to do that by advocating peaceful settlement of disputes, by fighting poverty and famine, and by promoting respect for human rights.

But we have also always been prepared to defend our values, by force of arms if necessary. The determination and gallantry of Canadians in two world wars and in Korea are as much a part of our history as diplomacy and development. There is nothing neutral in Canada's nature or tradition.

Geography is not the paramount reason we belong in NATO or NORAD.

Freedom is. Those alliances, with all their imperfections, defend a system of free societies and — by maintaining strength in the face of Soviet strength — help keep the peace.

It demeans Canadians, and misreads our history, to suggest that we stay in NATO because leaving it would displease the United States. We are in NATO because we belong there, just as we belong in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and in the fields of Asia and Africa teaching agricultural reform.

Indeed, Canada played a key role in the invention of NATO, which both asserts our commitment to freedom and provides the means for ensuring a collective Western approach to fulfilling that commitment. Through NATO, we and others can — and do — influence American policy.

Parenthetically, commentators who regard NATO as a Canadian burden rather than a Canadian invention nurture the notion that Canada is a country without identity or accomplishment.

There is no doubt that an uncontrolled arms race would threaten humanity. All countries have an obligation to reduce that risk, and a country such as Canada can have more influence than many others. We can best exercise that influence by being true to ourselves.

Part of our strength is our reputation for working consistently and constructively where we have expertise or standing — on verification, banning chemical weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, and other issues. Part of our credibility is that we do not pretend to be neutral. Part of our authority is that we do not grandstand.

When events move slowly, and fear and frustration increase, the temptation grows to make dramatic gestures. Regularly, as foreign minister, I am invited to embrace some dramatic extreme in Canada's name, so 'our voice will be heard.'

International events rarely respond to 'voices.' Change is almost always undramatic, a product of steadiness, not surprise. Indeed, dramatic departures are often counterproductive. Dyer suggests that Canada's quitting NATO would inspire Poland to leave the Warsaw Pact. Almost certainly, the opposite would happen. The disarray we would cause in NATO would undoubtedly inspire the Soviet Union to insist on even greater solidarity within the Warsaw Pact.

What is more curious about Dyer's proposal is its timing. Two years ago the world was worried by both an increase in arms and a decrease in contacts. Now, at least there is contact, between Soviet and American leaders, negotiators and populations. The movement has been substantial on both sides. There is the real possibility of progress in reducing overall numbers of arms. The two leaders have agreed to meet regularly, and are appearing on one another's televisions. While progress will, inevitably, be slow, there is more hope now than for several years.

These negotiations are happening, in part, because the Soviet Union was left with no doubt about Western solidarity. Attempts failed to divide NATO over Afghanistan, over missile deployment in Europe, or over the US strategic defence initiative (SDI, or Star Wars). Jeopardizing the unit that led to Geneva could jeopardize Geneva itself.

Indeed, the resumption of negotiations between the superpowers makes NATO and NORAD even more important. While only two countries are at the table, all the world's people are affected by the results.

NATO provides Canada, and other allies, with direct access to the details of the negotiations, and influence on the negotiations. In the past we have proposed specific initiatives the Americans could consider raising at the table and have seen our proposals accepted. Surely we would wish to be able to do so again."