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# A <br> L E T T E R TOTHE 

## People of England,

ON THE

## Prefent Situation and Conduct

## 0 F

Nationali Affairs.

LETTER I.
Hoc illud of pracipue in cognitione rerum faiubre ac frugifcrum, omnis te exempli dacumenia in illiftri pofita monumento intueri: inde tibi tucque reipublica quod imitêre, capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites.
Tit. Liv.

The Second Edition.

> LONDON:

Printed for J. Scott, at the Black-Swan in

$$
\frac{\text { Pater-nofer-Row. }}{\text { MDCC IV. }}
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ERRATA in Letter I. PAGE 32, Line 16, for chafored, read Page 33, I.ine 7, for /bown, read /hone.
Page 34, Line laft, for Page 34, Line laft, for oppofe, read expofi::

# A <br> L E T T E R <br> TOTHE 

## People of England.

L ETTERI.

WHOEVER has been accuftomed to read with Attention, the Hiftorians, Orators, and fatyric Poets of Greece and Rome, that wrote towards the Decline of thofe States, and obferved the Manners, Purfuits, Objects, and ruling Paflions of thefe People, together with the Symptoms of impending Ruin, prefaged and delineated by thofe Men of fuperior Genius, muft, on Comparion with what prevails at prefent in England, be deeply touched with the Analogy. The Philippics of Demoftbenes are fo replete with ftriking Pictures and vivid Reprefentations, drawn from Obfervation, on what paffed at $A$ thens during his time; and A 2 fo

## [4]

fo applicable to the People and prefent State of this Country, that the great Difference of the Names of thofe Perfons who lived, and Flaces which exifted Two Thoufand Years ago in Greece, have not fufficient Power to withhold my Imagination from being impofed on by the Similitude of Manners; or reftrain me from beilieving, that I am reading the Hiftory of Englijpinen, and the prefent Age.

When I fee this Patriot Orator generoully upbraiding his degenerate Countrymen with univerfal Venality and Lofs of public Virtue; defcribing them drown'd in Floods of felf-love; Pleafure, and public Shows, fupinely neyligent of their Country's Welfare; contemning the Merit of all other Nations, themfelves arrogant and felf-fufficient in Excefs; preferring private Opinion to eftablifhed Wif-: dom ; idolizing Mortals in Power and irreverent to their Gods: What Eye fo dim that carinot diftinguifh the Analogy fo manifeft between the Athenians of his Time and the Eng lijls of ours? what Mind fo ftupid as not to forefee the fame Events?

IT feems evident from all I can gather, that the Strength, Happinefs, Military, and

Civil

## [5]

Civil Glory of all Nations, have ever fubfifted and encreafed in Proportion to the Underftanding and Virtue of thofe, who reigned, and thoie who obey'd; and though Numbers of Inhabitants and Degrees of Riches may be thought by many to oppofe this Obfervation, yet a juft Examination will prove the Truth of what is here faid.

Was it not by means of the happy Union of thofe fuperior Qualifications in the firft Cyrus, that he extended his Empire from the little Realm of Perfia over Nations, almort too diftant to be vifited, and whofe Languages were unintelligible to each other, as Xenoplion has defcribed them? Yet fuch is the Fate and Revolution of Empires; Darius with all thefe Nations in Subjection, with infinite Armies and untold Sums of Treafure, deferted by Virtue only, fell the eafy Prey of Alexander and a few Macedonians,

To this energic Influence of Virtue in the common People, and Underftanding united with it in their Leaders, it is owing that the Grecians in their rifing Glory performed almoft miraculous Exploits.

## [6]

To confirm this Truth, the well fought Field of Marathon, where Miltiades and ten thoufand Greeks defeated fix hundred thoufand Perfians, affords an irrefiftable Evidence: as did the naval Victory of Themifocles, who faved his Country from Perdition, fuch amazing Atchievements can fmall Numbers actuated by their Country's Love, armed with the Sword of Virtue, and conducted by fuperior Wifdom, perform againt Millions funk in Effeminacy, Luxury, and Riches.
$S P A R T A$ remained invincible whilft her Sons were virtuous, and Leonidas unconquerable but by Death.

Even Thebes, the long Object of farcartic Attic Wit, lifted her Head from below the Duft, and walked forth the prevailing Power of Greece, by the Virtue of one great Man; like a new Star fhe fhone forth in Luftre amongft the other Cities: with Epaminondas its refplendent Courfe began, with him it blazed, and with him expired.

The whole Roman Glory was entirely owing to the Virtue of its Inhabitants, whilft the greateft Honour attended Integrity in Poverty, and private Parfimony was Praife; whilft their

Generals

## [7]

Gencrals tilled their own little Farms, and the Labour of their Hands gave their Children the Bread of Virtue ; whillt Merit brought Dictators from the Plough to rule a Nation, the Romans were infuperable : yet, when their Emperors poffeffed half the Globe and half the Riches on its Surface, this very People became the eafy Capture of Gotbs and Vandals.

In this Manner will Nations perifh, who renounce the Dictates of Virtue.

In all Situations, where Nations are equal in the Qualities of the Heart, the Chief who excels in Underftanding prevails in his Undertakings. The Moment Marlborough left the Command of the Army, Villars conquered the Allies, and the long vanquihed triumphed over their former Victors. Turenne, who during three Months had traverfed the Defigns and difappointed the Attempts of the Auffrians, being now no more, left an eafy Conqueft over the Troops he had commanded, 2ad hisCountry to be invaded by $\mathrm{N}^{\prime}$ mtecuculi.

PETER the Ruffian Emperor, by Dint of Genius created a civilized People from Beings little better than Brutes. The very Man, who with more than a Hundred Thoufand
of his Troops fled before the Approach of Eight Thoufand Swedes, and the fevere Virtue of Charles, in his Beginning Reign, became at latt Hris Conqueror, and made his Nation refpectable.

The prefent Sovereign of Prufia, the patriot King, who has refcued his Subjects. from the Rapine of the Law, who inftitutes and fuftains Manuffouries, encourages Arts and Sciences; promotes Induftry, opens new Trades, extends his Commerce, enlarges his Dominions, aggrandizes his Name, and holds. the Balance of Europe; is a living Inftance of what exalted Underftanding on aThrone can effect for a Nation.

In this Manner our illuftrious Queen Elizabetb rigned over the Hearts of a free People, directed by upright Minifters to her Subjects good. In this Mamer it might have continued, if the cold, conceited Difputatious, man-loving Scot, had not filled the Throne of England, and blafted with his Northern Breath the blooming Plants of Glory which the had raifed.

As arc the Princes and Minifters, fuch have ever been the People who live beneath their Influcnce, in England and all Nations.

## [9]

## [ 10 ]

Death, can be exifting in the fame People; that the Courfe of Nature is fufpended in our Favour, or that England is exempted frum the Conditions which Providence firf fixt on all created Things.

Is fuch Imagination a lefs Abfurdity than to conceive that phyfical Principles, which produce Putrefaction and Diffolution in vegetable and animal Nature, may exift in full Energy, and yet thefe Subitances remain unaltered, incorrupt, and entire, from that Influence.

Has not Venality in human Kind, the fame Effect on the Soul that the putrefactive Principle has on Matter? Does it not deftroy the Union of its Parts, and diffipate that ftrong attractive Power which holds the Mind firm, and refifting all vicious Attacks? Deprived of Virtue, it no longer poffeffes Strength or Vigor; it becomes feeble and effete. Yet, as in preferving animal and vegetable Subftances from Decay, Art may fupply the Abfence of Nature in fome Degree; fo in Societies and moral Nature, Wifdom may reftrain the precipitate Fall of $\mathrm{Na}-$ tions, and preferve them from total Ruin, tho'

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tho' it may never reftore them to their original Perfection.

I have frequently thought that the Roman Word Virtus, which fignifies Courage, has a Propriety in expreffing the Idea beyond all the few Languages I have any Knowledge of; it feems to embrace the whole in Man which confpires to perfect that Attribute; Courage has been deemed by that People an' Emanation of every Virtue, the Refult of all others combined; and therefore by way of Eminence diftinguifhed by that Appellation Virtus, the Virtue. They had remarked, that in Proportion as the Bofom is replete with Probity and Truth, the Love of its Country and its Gods; fo is the Heart which inhabits it, with Courage.

That Breaft which is freeft from Pollution, is the leaft intimidated at Danger; the pureft Soul is foremoft in offering up Life a Sacrifice to its Country, whereas the contaminated fkulks to fave itfelf in Cowardice.

Thes was the unvarying Characteriftics of Perfians, Gresks, and Romans, in their Days B 2

## $[12]$

of greateft Glory, till at Length their Souls; debafed by Corruption and Pleafure, becaine pufillanimous in Action, even in thofe Men whofe Minds were not influenced by the certain Fear of future Punifhments.

This Kind of Cowardice receives a new Caufe, and this Obfervation a farther Confirmation in Chriftian Kingdoms ; that Being which is depreciated by mean Actions, Corruption, and Injuftice, is eternally haunted by the Dread of oppofing himfelf to Danger, his Fears increafe with his Vices, that very Individual which defpifes his Religion and defies his God, breathes Infolence and Outrage apart from Danger, trembles at the Approach of an Enemy, when Death and confcious Guilt recoil upon his Mind, like the timid Deer, who, valuing himfelf upon the Strength of his Antlers, flies at the firft Sound of Hounds which purfue him ; or the Lark, which fhrinks to the Bofom of the Earth at the Sight of the Hawk, which hovers over his Head.

The Englifoman whofe Valour is infuperable whilft Integrity fuftains, Religion animates,

## [ I 3 ]

Souls, caine Men e cer-
mates, and Patriotifm urges him to Battle, muft yield an unrefifting Victory when thofe invigorating Qualities defert him ; however true this muft be acknowledged to be, it muft be confeffed alfo that the common People in no Nation have ever been the Caufe of their own Corruption; it has always taken its Source from the polluted Fountain of the Great, and thence ran muddy thro' the Multitude below.

Was it not the Patricians at Rome that by Bribes began to fap the Virtue, pollute the Hearts, and corrupt the Integrity of the Roman common People, by purchafing their Votes in the public Elections of their Officers ; the Inferior fought not the Great. England was a Nation of Probity, till thofe who ought to have been the voluntary Choice of uninfluenced Confent, debafed their own Souls and thofe of their Electors, by becoming their Reprefentatives thro' Venality and Purchafe. The Man who fells himfelf is more a Slave than he that is fold by another, and deeper impregnated with bafer Qualities of Bondage.

Hence, from Hiftory and Nature, from Obfervation and Reafon, it plainly appears

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that Nations have ever fucceeded according to the Virtue and Underftanding of thofe who directed them, and have declined and rifen as thefe prevailed.

That this Kingdom is replete with all thofe fatal Symptoms, which foretold the Ruin of other free States, who fhall deny? In England the King can do no Wrong, for which Reafon the M——r becomes juftly chargeable with the Errors and Mifconduct of the State. As are the Talents and Defigns of this Man, will be the Capacities and Purfuits of thofe who are employed beneath him. If we divide the Scale of mental Nature into ten degrees, and fuppofe that of a M ——r to be at five, will not all thofe he appoints either in the Army or the Fleet, in Embaffies and Counfel, be below that Degree of Underftanding, his own Judgment muft in his own Opinion be the moft perfect of human Intellect in all Plans, Refolutions, and Conduct; he is prevented, by his Mhallow thort-fighted Degree of Underftanding; from penetrating into the Conceptions and Schemes of fuperior Minds, and muft neceffarily chufe thofe which refemble him in Size of Capacity. For this Reafon, as Men exceed him and

## [ 15 ]

and one another in Excellence, the lefs probable will it be that they will be employed under him. As thefe Men advance to Perfection in this Scale of intellectual Nature, they will grow more incomprehenfible to his confined Underftanding, and be deemed as Vifionaries and Projectors; in Proportion as they are adapted by all the exalted Attributes of the Mind to ferve their King and Country, their Counfel will be rejected and themfelves excluded; judge then what Cataftrophe muft attend Kingdoms fo directed.

Ir is with the human Intellect as with the human Body, each extends according to its natural Size, each has its Limit, beyond which it cannot pafs ; and a Dwarf will reach with his Hand as high as Goliab, before the Duke of ********* will conceive the Extent, Force, and Truth of the Earl of $G$ - $e^{\prime}$ S Capacity.

From this Manner of Reafoning, whenever a M—r is weak [we fhall talk of the Effects of Wickednefs in a fucceeding Letter] all thofe who are under his Direction, and of his Choice, mult participate of that

## [ 16 ]

that national Calamity; the Strcam of Poifon which rifes deftructive in the Head, will ftill run on the fame, through the Conduct of all that Body which lies beneath him.

I have thus long intruded on your Patience, my Fellow-Countrymen, to fhow you that what may be here advanced is true in the View of Nature, as deduced from Principle; and verified by Obfervation and Experience in the Hiftory of Mankind, to convince you that Love of my Country; and not Malevolence to M-rs, Truth and not Scandal, Good-will towards Mankind, and no latent Averfion againf Individuals, have been my fole Motives to this Attempt.

In all Accounts I fhall confine myfelf feverely to Truth, and attempt to draw no Inferences which do not appear evidently deduceable from preceding facts: In executing this, however derogatory to the Capacity of thofe in Power, $\mathbf{I}$ fear not the Cafumny of Minions in Favour, Hawkers of minifterial Falfioods, Advocates for Deffroyers of their Country, or even M-ins themfelves.

## [ 17 ]

If what thall be here written appears to be juft, what honeft Englifkman thall difapprove of my Conduct? Whatever Diftance either Chance, Birth, or Riches, may have placed between me and a Prime $M — r$, there muft be yet more between him and his Country. In Subject can be fo fuperior to me in Rant, as this Nation is above him in Dignity. If I prefume to examine the Underftanding of him who prefides at the Helm, let it be remembered it is becaufe I am convinced his Weaknefs mifguides his Fellow-Subjects. If I am blamed for daring to arraign his Conduct, it is becaufe I am fatisfied his Prefumption may ruin his Country. Acquitme then or condemn me, as he is innocent or guilty.

However, I confide that the patriot Defign which juftified Demofthenes the Atbenian, and immortalized his Name, fhall at leaft find me, an Englifbman, prefent Favour and Applaufe; and Zeal for the Conftitution of my Country vindicate me in the Hearts of all Men who yet preferve the Love of Probity and their native Land.

As we refemble the Greeks and Romans in the Symptoms of declining Liberty and Virtue,

fupcrior

## [ 18 ]

fuperior Wifdom in the Conduct of our M -rs can alone reinftate and preferve us. Let us then examine on what our Expectations are founded, and what is to be expected from thofe who prefide in public Affairs.

IT is not my prefent Defign to fummon $u_{0}$ before your Eyes the Ghofts of Mal-Adminiftration, or tur them back on the Conduct of the two Brothers, during the laft Wars; I mean not now to awaken your Attention to that Flood of Pollution and Corruption, which has been let out, to Deluge Integrity and Juftice; I wilh not to bring paft Crimes to your Remembrance, fquandering your Properties, and invading your Liberties, to aggravate the prefent Mifconduct, or tread backwards thofe Paths which lead to unraveling M_I Iniquity, I will not hint the Inattention which prevailed during the French naval Armaments and Ufurpations in America. Objects within the Ken of every Eye, Tranfactions of Yefterday, what has lately paft by Land and Sea, fhall be lain before you. Behold thofe with Attention, judge impartially from the Conduct in thefe Affairs, what is the Force of that Ca pacity which directs them, then remember that England is your native Land, and reflect
one Moment on the Danger which hangs threatning over it.

To avoid every minute Particular, let us begin with examining the Conduct of our Navies.

No Man, I believe, will prefume to deny that.a true Intelligence, of what employs our Enemies, is neceffary to all Minifters who would fuccefsfully oppofe their Machinations; and though it may be difficult to obtain a fure Knowledge of that Expedition which a Fleet is deftined to go upon, it muft be an eafy Tafk to be afcertained of the Number of Ships they are equipping. The Bofom of one Man only may be confcious of the Intention of a naval Armament, when Thoufands muft know the Number which are arming. The Minifter may be incorruptable, and the Secret impoffible to be penetrated: Amongtt the Multitudes employed in preparing this Force; many may be found, and infinite Ways contrived, to know the Number of our Enemies Ships. Without this previous Knowledge, on what Bafis can it be prefumed we oppofe the Fleets of our Enemies? Yet this neceffary Information, fo eafily procured, muft C 2 be

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be confeffed to have been totally neglected, difregarded, or unobtained; or, which is yet more flagrant, the higheft Imputation of Folly muft be attributed to the Ad-n.

To prove this Affertion, let us begin with faying, that it was decided that the French Fleet at Brefl fhould be oppofed by the Englifh, and its Deftruction refolved upon; let us now caft our Eyes on the Manner in which this Defign was plann'd; and the Way in which it was intended to be accomplifhed.

To execute this, Admiral Bofcawen was fent to command a Squadron of Men of War, and in confequence of that Refolve fet Sail from off Plymouth the twenty-feventh of April, with a Fleet confifting of eleven Ships of the Line and one Frigate. It has fince appeared, that his Orders were to cruize on the Banks of Nerofoundland, to wait the Arrival of the French Fleet, and intercept their Voyage to America.
.- The fending this Squadron under Admiral Bofcawen, is a clear Proof that our M—rs imagined the Number it contained was fufficient to deftroy the French Fleet; or it muft

## [21]

be granted, that if they were purpofely fent out unequal to the Attempt, that that Behaviour would be but little better than dooming them a Sacrifice. On the fixth of May the Frencb Fleet, confifting of twenty-five Ships of the Line, ten of which were employed as Tranfports, their lower-deck guns being taken out; the reft fully armed, failed from Breft for North-America.
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{N}}$ confequence of the Intelligence that this Fleet was failed, and the Number of it, Admiral Holbourne was difpatched with fix Ships of the Line and one Frigate, and failed from off Plymouth the fixteenth of May, being nineteen Days after Mr Bofiawen, and ten after the failing of the French Fleet, to join the Englif, Admiral.

This Reinforcement is an undeniable Proof that the $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{y}$ was abfolutely unacquainted with the Number of Ships equipping at Breft, for this Expedition, before their failing; otherwife can it be prefumed they would not have fent a greater Number of Ships with Mr Bofcarocn at firft, fince many more were ready for the Sea; or would they have fent the Reinforcement by Mr Holbourne at all, if they had

## [ 22 ]

known that Mr Macnamara would have returned with nine Ship: of the Line; the Number of the French Fleet then, and the Part of it which was to return, were abfolutely unknown to our M-y before it failed ; for the laft they may be excufed, but the Ignorance of the former is ut:erly unpardonable.

After thefe three Fleets were failed, let us now fuppofe that to happen, which our M-y had prefumed and withed at Admiral Bofcazen's failing might be the Event of their Orders; that is, that he might meet Macnamara with his Squadron of twenty-five Ships of the Line, fixteen of which were prepared for fighting, and the reft with their lower-deck Guns out, procceding as the M-y believed at the Time of Hollourne's failing, for NortbAmerica.

What would have been the Event of this Rencounter, fince Mr Bofcarven had received Orders to attack the French? I afk this Queftion of Men who can look with unprejudiced Eyes on the Merits of other Nations. With all the true Bravery, Prudence, and Knowledge of that Commander in naval Affairs, and thofe brave Captains joined with

## [ 23 ]

him in the Expedition, is there a well-founded Reafon to believe that twenty-five French Men of War, circumftanced even as thefe were, would have been defeated by eleven $E n g$ li/h? If they had not, would not the thameful Ignorance of the M-y in the Number of the Enemy's Fleet, a Knowledge which every Man might have obtained who would have been at the Expence of paying for it, and furely the Parfimony of public Money is not the prefent reigning Tafte, have proved the Perdition of his Majefty's Fleets and Subjects, to the everlafting Difgrace of the Englifb Nation.

Nay fo exquifitely fubtle was the Defign of this Scheme, even the fecond Fleet, commanded by Admiral Holbourne, would in all human Probability have fallen into the Hands of the French Squadron alfo ; for by the Refult it has appeared, that he did not join Mr Bofcarven till eleven Days after the taking the Alcide and Lys.

By this Accident it might, with the greateft Probabil'ty, have happened, that Admiral Bofcaren being defeated the tenth of fune, the Day the Englif and French Fleet met in Darknefs

## [24]

Darknefs and Fogs on the Banks of Newofoundland, that Mr Holbourne might have fuffered the fame Fate eleven Days after, the very Time of his arriving at thefe Parts. I mean, if the furrounding Obfcurity had not faved the Englifh Fleet, as it has the French.

Such was the probable Prefumption when Mr Fiolbourne quitted the Englifb Coaft, and fuch would have been the fatal Event, if Macnamara had continued the Voyage and Mr: Bofcarven had met and engaged him. Judge. then how pernicious this Ignorance of the Number of the Enemy's Fleet would Iave proved to this once illuftrious Nation, had Things fallen out as our M—rs originally defigned ir.

> Ir is extremely difficult to affign any Reafon for Mr Holbourne's being difpatched at all to join Admiral Bofcawen, the very Diftance in the Times of failing of there Fleets rendered. it improbable that he could join the firf Admiral before the Engagement between him and Macnamara muft have been totally decided, as is manifeft by the Event of his joining Mr Bofcarven.

## [ 25 ]

IT appears then felf-evident that the fending this Admiral could have anfwered no other Purpofe than deftroying two Fleets in-1 ftead of one, and facrificing more of théir Countrymen to the God of War, on the Altar of Ignorance.

The Efcape then with which thefe two Fleets have been favoured, and the Succefs' which the firft obtained in taking two French Men of War, inconfiderable as it is, cannot with the leaft Appearance of Juftice be attributed to the ill-plann'd Defigns of thofe who fent them on the Expedition. Can thofe Men be intitled to Praife for an Error in Judgment, in the Frenis Admiral's Return, of which they knew nothing? and who, if he had proceeded on the whole Voyage to America, would in all Probability have ruined the two Fleets of England, fent as they were, one after the other; on this Expedition? With what Propriety then can this unforefeen Event be imputed to the Fore-thought of thofe who prefide in $\mathrm{m}-1$ and naval Affairs ; fhall the Advantage of Accidents, unimagined, be laid to the Account of their Penetration and Wifdom? as well may you attribute the Winds which blew the Fleet to the Conft of Aimerica to their Sa-

D
gacity,

## [ 26 ]

gacity, as the little Succefs which they have obtained in the Voyage. The juft Reward of: thefe Men then, is the Difhonour of planning an Expedition that, through the Ignorance of what Numbers the Enemies Squadron was formed, would in all human Probability have been the Perdition of two Engli/b Fleets, and Thoufands of brave Men and ufeful Subjects of Great Britain.


#### Abstract

But as there may be Englifomen who, prompted by national Prejudice, believe that Admiral Bofcazven with his eleven Ships was a Match for Macnamara and five and twenty French Men of War; let us, fuppofing this to be true, examine the Prudence with which, under this Idea, the Expedition was conducted.


First it is a felf-evident Truth, that there can be no Evidence or Intelligence of a Fleet's failing to any Part of the Globe, equally certain with that of its leaving the Port in which it is equipt; the firft, however well founded it may be in the Opinion and Judgment of an Enemy, can in its Nature be no more than cafual and the Height of Probability ; the fecond muft be Demonftration and Neceflity.

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 Ministers may alter the Nature of theirSupposing then the Strength of the French Fleet had been perfectly known, and Mr Bofcawen had commanded a Force fufficient to have defeated it, which he might with Eafe have had under his Command, there being at that Time twenty Ships of the Line at Spitbead more than his Squadron, moft of them fully mann'd. Is there a Boatfwain of the Fleet who would have fent the Admiral to the Banks of Nerefoundland, where Darknels palpable like D ${ }^{2}$
the

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the Eryptian, is known, by every common Sailor in the Navy, to reign three fucceffive Months in the Year, in one of which the French Fleet muft have paft thefe Parts of the Seas; where Fogs that conceal more effectually, than the darkeft Night all Objects which pafs within the Length of a Ship, muft have faved the greateft Part of that Fleet which they were fent to deftroy? A Place to which they never might arrive, or never be feen if they did. The Confequence of their being fent has evidently proved the Truth of this Obfervation.

What fhall then be faid in Favour of that Man, who ordered the Engli/bNavy from thofe' Parts where the Enemy's Fleet muft inevitatably pafs, to one where they might not have been ordered to fail? To defert a Part in which they muft be vifible to all the Squadron, for one in which they would probab: 3 , be enveloped in a Cloud, like Æneas fecured from the Eyes of all Beholders? What is this but. fending Ships the long Voyage to America, with the greateft Rifque of miffing in thofe Seas that which they muft have met in the. Britifl Channel? Is not this the firf Inftance of an Underftanding that has prefided over Fleets and Armies, that preferred a may.

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be to a Demonftration, and quitted a real Advantage in Certainty, for one of lefs Value in Probability only? Is it not owing to this Caufe that fo little Utility has been reaped from this Expedition, and the French Fleet efcaped almoft unfeen? Was there ever a Perfon till this Time who would have deferted the Door of the Houfe of that Man he wanted to meet, and who muft come out of it, to feek him in the Streets where he never might pafs, and prefer even Darknefs to the noon-tide Hour, for that Bufinefs? Is there a Country Gentleman who could judge fo diametrically wrong? would he have fent his Game-Keeper to fhoot Woodcocks by Night?

Yet fuch is the Goodnefs of Heaven, as Mr Bofcawen was prepared, inferior to the Fleet which left Breft ; the Abfurdities of thefe Directors have preferved our Navy from a Defeat, and our Nation from a greater public Difgrace. For if Mr Bofcawen had been ordered off Breft, the Place which in right Reafon he ought to have been ordered, the Ignorance of our M-rs in the Number of that Fleet which firft left Breft, would have proved the Deftruction of him and the Englifb Squadron. So gracious was the Will of Heaven,

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Heaven, and fo abfurd the Judgment of thofe who prefide over naval Affairs in this Kingdom. This Conduct of our M—rrs is not however without its Advocates; the Reafons for juftifying their Proceedings in this Manner are yet more extraordinary than the Behaviour irfelf: It is moft gravely urged in Defence of this Conduct, that the French Squadron was not attacked in Europe, becaufe their Allies, particularly the Spaniard, fhould not take Umbrage at our Behaviour; or fuch an Action bring on Hoftilities in Europe. What kind of Capacities muft thefe Men poffers, who can imagine that an Englifbman of common Senfe can be cajoled with fuch frivolous Pretenfions to a Juftification of wrong Meafures? Who can be deluded to believe, that a Fleet, freighted in France with Arms, Ammunition, Soldiers, and Provifions for America, can create any Difference of Opinion in a Nation, whether it be defeated on the Coaft of France or the Banks of Nerefoundland? Thefe Advocates mult have well ftudied Grotius and Puffendorff, who make this Diftinction ; and undertand human Nature to great Perfection, who conceive, that the Spani/b Miniftry can be influenced againft England, or to its Advantage, in favour of, or contrary to its own

Intereft

## [3I]

Intereft to join or oppofe the Power of France, by fo fubtle a Diftinction, as our no engaging that French Fleet in Europe, which you determine to deftroy in America. ${ }^{*}$ A Defeat in this Part of the World of one half of the French Navy, would have humbled the Gallic Arrogance, prevented Spain and the Allies from joining the King of France; and cooled their Ardor for War, in Proportion. as it diminifhed the Powers with which it muft be fuftained.

The depriving our Enemies of their military Force, is the moft effectual Method of intimidating their Allies from joining them : few chufe the finking Side of a Queftion, and add a Probability of their own Ruin to that of thofe who are already deftroying. Though the drowning Perfon feizes every thing to fave himfelf; yet few catch hold of him that is finking, with the View of going along with him. But in the Manner we have proceeded, what have we done but behaved
like

* That this was given out as a Reafon to cover their Miftakes, and not thro' any juft Apprehenfion of Spani/b. Refentment, is now evident from the taking the French Merchant-Ships, and Mr Hawke's cruifing for their Men of War in the European Seas,


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like Poachers, with all that little defpicable Cunning of fending our Ships at a Diftance, to effect what it was prevented from doing by the Nature of the Place: A Specimen of that mean Timidity and Weaknefs of Capacity, proceeding, from the Exercife of corrupting, and being corrupted, which has been long too manifeft in all our m-1 Meafures. A Difpofition which effectually difgraces a $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{r}$, and infallibly ruins a Nation. What have we done more than fhewn, that our Navy, though the moft powerful, and our Seamen the braveft; by the wrong Judgment and finifter Di rection of our Rulers in $m-1$ Affairs, can be rendered abfolutely ineffectual?

We have cautioned and not chaftened the French; we have fent a brave Admiral, brave Officers, brave Sailors, and feventeen Line of Battle Ships on a ufelefs Parade to Nova Scotia, at an immenfe Expence, to take two French Men of War and to lofe one of our own. We have been the Witneffes to the landing their Troops in America, and not prevented their Expedition, Such is the Conclufion of all the boafted Secrecy, Difpatch, and ravihhing free-born Subjects from the Arms of their

Wives and Children; and fuch the Refult of the Wifdom of our m—l Conductors.

This then having been the Succefs and Conduct of our naval Armaments; let us now turn our Eyes on thofe of our LandForces, and candidly enquire, if the Wifdom of our M——rs has fhown forth more eminently in the Management and Defign of our Army on the Continent of America.

It was at length refolved, that General Braddock, with two Regiments, and all neceffary Provifion for a Siege, chould be fent to America, to defeat the Schemes of the French Nation, which had been artfully ufurping the Dominions of our Sovereign. And here it is impoffible to avoid remarking, that the Alarm which was fpread againft the French Infolence, and the Meafures taken in confequence of it, were not fo much undertaken from the Reprefentations of the various Provinces of America, as from the private Intereft which a certain Quaker had in the $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{y}$, to whom Lands on the River Obio had been granted by the Governor of Virginia, which have fince been ratified in England.

## [ 34 ]

This Man, being at the Head of a Sect which has conftantly fupported the M-r in all his ftrenuous Endeavours for Power, and Defigns upon his Country, was attended to with greater Deference, and had more Weight than the Remonftrances of Two Millions of faithful' American Subjects, who were fill totally neglected: So much can the Intereft of one Man, who heads a factious Sect in favour of a M—r, prevail beyond the public Good of the Subjects of this Kingdom, and the Honour of its Sovereign.

Fort Lequefne, feated on the Obio, in thofe Lands which were granted to this Quaker, was the Object which General Braddock, and the Briti/b Forces were deftined to demolifh; the French were to be diflodged from thefe Parts, at all Adventures.

And in this Place it muft frike the Senfe of every Man who reflects one Moment, that this very Perfon, whofe paffive Principles of of Chriftian Patience prevent hiin from bearing Arms in Defence of this Land, which was granted him, had yet the unrelenting Confcience to obtain many Hundreds of his Fellow Subjects to oppofe their Lives, and fall a Sacrifice

## [ 35 ]

Sacrifice in repoffefling his Property. Such are the Proceedings of this Sect of Anti-conftitu tional and pernicious Beings.

The Expedition, however, being fet on foot, the fame Identical Quaker, who had Influence fufficient to get it refolved on at firt, had yet the farther Intereft of its being deftined to defend Virginia: The Reafon of this will foon appear more evident; and here, notwithftanding we fhould allow Fort Lequefne to be a Place which ought to be attacked, we mult infift that Penfylvania was the Place where the Troops ought to have been difembarked.

First, This Country being fuller of Inhabitants, and all kinds of Handicraft Workmen, coúd have eafily fupplied whatever an Army might have ftood in need of at that Time. Virginia being a Land cultivated by Negroes, muft, for that Reafon, be more deftitute of European Settlers, than Colonies where Blacks are not in ufe.

Secondiy, The additional Numbers which might have been thought necefflaty to have been raifed for this Expedition to the Obio, E 2 . would

## [ $3^{6}$ ]

would have been more eafily levied in Penfylvania than Virginia.

Thirdly, The requifite Attendants of a Military Expedition, fuch as Horfes, Carts, Cattle, Provifion, and all kinds of Tools, are in greater Plenty in Penfylvania than Virginia. This is evident from the Neceflity the Army in Virginia was under, of having thofe Utenfils and Supplies from Penfylvania before it marched.

Fourthly, The March of the Troops to Fort Lequefne from Pbiladelpbia, had been for a much longer Part of the Road through a fettled and cultivated Country, where all Kinds of Refrefhments which are ufeful for an Army in hot Countries, and fatiguing Marches, might have been fupplied with greater Eafe.

The important Advantages which attended Penfylvania above Virginia, though reprefented to our M—rs in the moft frong and demonftrative Manner, were all neglected and over-ruled by the private Intereft and Opinion of one Quaker.

> Tantum ille potuit fuadere malorum,

## [ 37 ]

Is it not obvious to all Apprehenfions that a Tobacco Merchant, efpecially if he be the Head of his Profeffion in London, muft have more Intereft in Virginia than in Penfylvania, his Correfpondence teing with the former, which produces the Commodity he traffics in, and not with the Pbiladelpbians, who do not raife that Merchandize?

Is it not certain alfo from the Neceflity of Trade, that he muft have many outfanding and dubious Debts in that Colony, and from the Nature of Man, and more particularly from the Nature of a Quaker, that he muft wifh to have thefe hazardous Debts rendered more probable to be paid; and with this Intent, that he would embrace an Opportunity of putting his Debtors in a Way of difcharging them whatever his Country might fuffer? As his Correfpondence is the largeft of any Merchant's in this City with the Colony of Virginia, and his Intereft the ftrongeft with the $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{r}$, he clearly forefaw that an Army fent to Virginia could not be fuftained without large Sums of Money, and that the Remittance of it muft fall to his Share : which very Circumftance being attended with at leaft two and a half per Cent. was an Object too replete with Advan-

## [ $3^{8}$ ]

tages to be neglected by a Money-loving Mercantile Man, detached from all other Confiderations of Advantage.

These Circumftances then duly attended to, would they not perfuade many a Man, who is not firmly convinced of the fincere difinterefted Spirit and patriot Love which animates a Quakers Heart, that Virginia was preferred to Peniflivania for the lucrative Confiderations above mentioned.

But as this Sect has ever behaved with fuch particular Zeal to defend their own Country, and fingular Attachment to its Welfare, divefted of all Defire of private Advantage, what can the moft malevolent Imagination faggen againt the Behaviour of this individual Quaker?

Let me then fuppofe a Thing not abfolutely impoffible, That this Defign of his procuring the 「roops to be fent to Virginia, took its Source from an Error of Judgment; that the Good of his Country was his Object, tho' he was miftaken in his Aim, and though his private Intereft was the fole Refult of his Defign, yet he propofed it for the Public. How thall

## [ 39 ]

Thall we; even in this View of Things, apologize for the M-rs who were drawn into fo palpable a Miftake ?

Though it might be allowed, that Merchants may be vindicated in not underftanding to what Part of the American Continent a Military Force ought to be fent, which was deftined to attack Fort Lequefne, yet a M—r, whofe peculiar Province it is to fuperintend the public Welfare, the Lives, Properties, Advantages, and Commercc of his Fellow-Subjects in Peace and War, cannot avoid Condemnation for fuch miftaken and fatal Judgment.

There may indeed be Men who may imagine that this Quaker was truly, acquainted with the Difference and Difadvantage which attended Virginia more than Penfylvania, and that Self-Intereft; more than the public Welfare, weighed in obtaining the Troops being fent to the Colony of Virginia. If this Notion fhould meet a general Reception among Mankind, how hall we then account for a $M$ —r's being duped to the Intereft of a private Quaker, or reconcile national Difgrace and Ilender Intellects, with the Duty of Direct-

## [ 40 ]

ing in Peace and War, the Affairs of a whole Nation?

From what has been faid, does it not evidently appear, that allowing Fort Lequefne to be an Object which demanded our Aitention, and that a Military Force was neceffary to be fent from thefe Kingdoms to reduce it, that Virginia was the Spot whicia ought not to be preferred to Penfylvania?

This then, abfurd as it may appear, is even lefs than what we fhall foon lay before your Eyes, fhall we venture to affert, that the whole Armament which was defigned and fent to the Demolition of this little Fortification, the Money which it has and will coft the Nation, and Lives which it has lavifhed in the Service of a non-refifting Quaker, were altogether ufelefs and unneceflary; nay, that even Succefs in the Expedition to this Fort, could have been attended with no poffible Advantage, whether the Attempts of the Americans fucceed or mifcarry at Niagara and Crown Point.

To prove what we have here fuggefted, let us caft our Eyes over Mr Huske's Map of

Nortls

## [4I]

Nortb America, by much the moft accurate of all thofe which have been given to the Public.

Let us obferve from what Part of the Dominions poffeffed by the French, the Supplies, Provifion, and Men neceffary for the fupporting Fort Lequefne, muft be drawn.

Ir is a Truth univerfally acknowledged, that Canada is the only Part which can afford thefe Requifites to the Parts where the French Forts are built from 2uebec to Fort Lequefine; this happens becaufe the Method is by an eafy Tranfit, and Things are commodioully tranfported, the whole Diftance being almoft Wa-ter-Carriage, from the Mouth of St Lawrence River, to the Forts on the Ohio.

The Miffifipi is too diftant for a March by Land, and the Navigation of the meanderinc, Obio too long to be attempted by Water. aced it is a known Fact, that the Northern Settlements of the French, fupply all thefe Parts with Recruits, Ammunition, and Provifion.

To attack Fort Lequefne at all then feems abfolutely abfird, becaufe all Supplies for that F

Place

## [ $4^{2}$ ]

Place being neceffitated to pafs by the Fortification at Niagara, fituated between the two Lakes Eric and Ontario, whoever becones Mafter of that Fort, neceffarily cuts off all Conmmunication and Power of Support from Fort Lequefne, and this latter Place muft of confequence furrender itfelf in a very little Time, into the Hands of thofe who poffers Niagara: This Affertion is as true, as that the Power which can cut off the River Thames at Maidenbiad, and turn it into a new Channel, prevents ,for from being fupplied with that Water.

This Fortification of Niagara then, fituated between the Lakes, being abfolutely the Pafs by which all Supplies mult go to Lequefne, the taking that alone chould have been the Object of our Forces.

The Defign on Lequefine, fuppofing all to have been honeft that produced it, could have taken its rife from nothing but want of Knowledge in common Geography : No Eye that follows the Courfe in the Map, which is akways tuken by the Canadian French from Quebec to Fort Lequefne, but muft be neceffarily convinced that the taking Niagara would have anfwered all the Purpofes of pofferfing that and Liquefine.

Thus

## [43]

Thus the difgraceful Defeat of our Army, the Difreputation of our General, the Deftruction of our Subjects, the Expence of the Expedition, and Difhonour of the Nation, might have been prevented.

But alas! fuch has been the undeviating Cuftom of the Englifh, fince the Adminiftration of the late Earl of Or_d, to bear Infults from all Nations inattentively, till the Refervoir of Injuries being full, the Banks are broken down, and the Torrent of Refentment rufling forth with too much Impetuofity, deftroys by its Violence and Quantity, the very Benefit which it would otherwife have afforded by being deliberately and juftly difpenfed abroad.

Too flow in our Refolves in the Beginning, and too impetuous in the Execution of them at laft, the Zeal for doing, too frequently defeats the Reafons and Powers which conduct and fupport our Enterprizes.

There are not wanting indeed Men well acquainted with thofe Parts of America, who, with great appearance of Truth, and foree of Argument, alledge, that a few armed Veffels on the Lake Ontario, would have fecured us' a fafe and eafy Conqueft of Niagara and Fort $\mathrm{F}_{2}$ Lequefie.

## [ 44 ]

Lequefine. It is indubitably true, that no Ship of Force or Burden can enter that Lake from the Head of the River St Lawerence: Confequently the Engli/b Ships being firft fet a . Swimming on the Lake. Ontario, they muft have prevented all Supplies from going by Water to Niagara; as well as: deftroyed all Ships pretended to be built on the Borders of the Lake by the French; as the Englifh by that Conduct would become abfolite Mafters of that Water.

Hence, by the Cruizing of thefe Ships it being rendered impracticable to fupply Nia gara and Fort Lequefine, a few Months confuming the prefent Provifion would have given us Poffeffion of both; Famine being an Enemy, which no human Power can refift.

Thus then, by obferving this Conduct, a finall Expence, a prudent Patience, a fteady Perfeverance, and a little Time, would have accomplifhed what has already failed in one Part.

Let us however fuppofe that it was abfolutely neceffary that an Army fhould be fent to the befieging Fort Lequefine from England, thall we be permitted the Liberty of afking thofe

## [ 45 ]

thofe who chofe the General for this Expedition, and directed the Undertaking, Whether a hot impetuous Arrogance of Temper is that which is adapted by Nature, or fhould be pitched upon in a Man who is fent to command an Army in a new Land, where HardThip, more than in European Countries, mult be undergone by the Soldier, where Affability and Compaffion, Gaiety, Popularity, and Encouragement in a General, are the neceffary Ingredients to fweeten and palliate the Bitternefs of that Draught which War adminifters to the Tafte of all Nations, and to win the People to his Confidence and Obedience.

Would a Man of common Underftanding havefent a felf-willed, felf-fufficient, rah Commander, to oppofe an Enemy in a Country replete with Opportunities and Situations for Ambufcade and Snare? The Genius of which People is to combat their Enemies in that way of Fighting ; a Man whofe very Prefumption, Idea of Security, and Contempt of his Enemy, effectually deceived him into the Ruin of his brave Officers and his Army, with an Addition of Difgrace to his own peculiar Deftruction ; fuch a Difpofition in a General, is a greater Advantage to a difcreet Enemy than a thoufand fighting Men added to their Party.

## [ $4^{6}$ ]

And here permit me to obferve, that it r.ms owing to this want of Judgment irs We who have long appointed our Commandang Officers, that the Panic at Prefon Pans, the Fatality, as it is politely called, at Falkirk, the Flight at Fort L'Orient, and the Difgrace at Fort Lequefne, have thus fucceeded each other, in a great meafure, as well as to the univerfal Corruption of thofe Men from which the Soldiery are generally collected.

Had the Soldiers poffeffed a full Confidence in cither of the Generals, who commanded on thefe Days, they would probably have behaved with the fame Spirit they did at Culloden, when the Duke of Cumborland, in whom every Soldier confided, led them to an eafy Conquent, and routed the Rebels at that Place.

It is this Confidence of an Army in their General which unites every Hand into one Action, animates every Heart to the fame Obedience, and executcs, by a happy Belief in their General's Excellence, what is vainly expected from the exact Difcipline of Exercife in a Martinet; thefe are the Means, and not the Regularity of moving the Legs of a whole Rank, which incite and carry a Soldier on to Victory.

From

## [47]

From what has been already faid; is it not felf-evident, that General Braddock fhould, inftead of dividing his Powers, have marched in Union with Mr Sbirley to Niagara, if they were determined to take that Fort by a land Force?

But by thus having divided their Forces, and his being defeated four Days before Mr Sbirley began his march for Niagara, Mr Braddock has given his Enemies that received him fo fatally near Fort Leque/ine, the unexpected $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{F}}$, Jrtunity and Advantage of being at Nia gara before the Americans under the Command of Mir Sbirley, and affifting their Coun-try-men with all the Ammunition, Cannon, and Baggage, which were taken at this difgraceful Defeat: This Circumftance, if it fhould not totally prevent, will abfolutely retard the taking Niagara, produce more Bloodmed; and expend more Money.

When we reflect on the Behaviour of our Troops on this difaftrous Spot, fo fatal to Englif Honour, how can we réfrain from obferving that the Irregulars of the Provinces held their Bofoms firm againft that Battle, and that Danger from which the Regulars and Difciplined Troops turned away ; and that native Courage supplied
fupplied to the unccrrupted American, what Art and Difcipline could not impart to the Soldiers of Great Britain.

This, in my Opinion, offers an invincible Proof, that a Militia in this Kingdom, raifed amongft the Farmers and Peafants, where Virtue yet remains in a much greater Degree, than amongft that corrupt Rabble of perjured Corporation Borough-men, from whom the Soldiers are chiefly collected, where every moral and religious Influence being effaced by Bri-bery and Venality, all Senfe of Honour and Duty is deftroyed, would be a more effeciual Defence of the Kingdom from all foreign Attacks, than ten times the Number of fanding Troops; compofed of fuch miferable Mifcreants.

But alas! fuch is the Difference in Judgment and Conduct of that M-y which directs the Affairs of France and this Kingdom, the Subjects of a Free Nation are not permitted to know the Ufe of Arms, and defend themfelves, their Liberties, King, and Country; whilf thofe which we treat as Slaves in that Nation, are encouraged to the Ufe of Military Difcipline, and enirufted with Arms to defend, alas, what we call neitiar Liberty nor Property. Show

## [49]

Show me a greater Paradox in all Nature, and explain to me the Motives to this Behaviour in the different M -rs on juftifiable Reafons, why a free People fhould be denied the Power of defending their Freedom, and thofe under a Monarchic Government fhould be openly encouraged to Fight for Shavery? Is Bravery more natural to Slaves than Freemen ? or is Defpotifm a more animating Motive to the Perfon who lives under it, than the Charms of Liberty?

Thus, my Countrymen, I have, with the utmoft Impartiality, laid before your Eyes the true Proceedings of thofe who have lately conducted our Fleets and Armies. From this View Goes it not too plainly appear, that the Direction of each has been totally miftaken? Providence indeed, in pity to this favourite $\mathbb{I} l$ e, has almoft deviated from the common Courfe of Nature, and once more faved its Fleets from Difgrace in fpite of all the Ignorance that fit. perintended them. A Miracle only could have faved the Army commanded by a felf-willed General, who arrogantly defpifing the Powers of his Enemy, fell the Victim of his own Folly and their fuperior Knowledge.

## [ 50 ]

How contemptible muft we appear in the Eyes of all Europe from this Imbecility of M- 1 Judgment in the Choice of Generals, what Expectations of Succefs may not our Foes flatter themfelves with, front this vifible Inequality of Underftanding in thofe who direct, to the Greatnefs of thofe Powers which are to be conducted by them during a War, when they have feen a State the Itrongeft in'maritime Force fo totally divefted of all Advantage, by the finifter Application of its Navy ; an immenfe Fleet preventing not their Enemies from being fupplied with every thing neceflary to fupport themfelves during a War? What muft we conceive will be the ultimate Event, when M-rs, by the p aral Bent of their Underftanding, can defeat ur Armaments with fcarce an Eneriy to oppofe them? Will they, whofe Capacities, in Tranquillity and at Eafe, might have planied the Deftruction of their Enemies Fleet, and yet have failed, be equal to the Conduct of a general War, and Succefs?

Will not thofe, who have been the duyctile Dupes of their ownIncapacity, and a Quaker's felf-interefted Defigns, in appointing ufelefs Expeditions and unequal Generals, be eternally bewildered in the Turbulence of a general

War, and the Attention which is neceffary to a Multiplicity of Affairs ?

Wili thofe then be lefs open to the Schemes of their Enemies, than to their own Follies, and the Defigns of their deceitful Countrymen? Will thofe Eyes which could not difcern the true Object that hould be purfued, when one only was in Agitation, be capable of fupervifeing to the infinite Calls of a general War?

What more beneficial Suggeftion in Favour of Franie could Monfieur Macbault have infinuated into the Imagination of our M-r, than this, of concealing the Fleet of England $i_{n}$ Fogs impenetrable to human Vifion, rendering them invifible and ufelefs? Who but this Bayes in Politics can elevate and fur. prize in fo amazing a manner? He has conceal ed his Ships in Darknefs as effectually as his Namefake did his Army at Knightsbridge. Is not this, as a certain Speaker in P_t began his Speech; " new in Politics, new in War, and new in Council."

IT is more than probable that Macnamara, not meeting our Fleet in the European Seas, had Orders to return, and confide in their Invi-

G 2
fibility

## [ $5^{2}$ ]

fibility on the Banks of Nerefoundland for their fafe Arrival in America. In this how little was he deceived?

Hence it too evidently appears, that we are in that finking State which, through all Ages, has attended the Want of Underitanding and Virtue. If then the Refurrection of a Nation from Sloth and Corruption, to Honour and Efteers, depend on the Capacity of thofe M——rs who direct it, how dreary and barren is the Profpect which is eternally offered to our Eyes?

Is it not the fettled Ruleof Providence, that the beft Underftandings hall always prevnil at laft, though in the Beginning fometimes the contrary appears true; yet here, alas, we want that flattering Commencement. It is like the Calculation of Chances; though the Perfon that deals at Pharo may be worfted once or more, he muft infallibly get the better at the Year's End, and ruin thofe who engage with him at the Conclufion. If then the Direction of $M-1$ Affairs run on in this Channel, what thall defend us from National Deftruction, which comes failing down before the Wind and Current full armed upon us ?

## [53]

- Yet even tho' Incapacity may plead a Pardort, it does not annihilate the Difgrace which attends the Nation in confequence of it: Tho' the Punihment due to premeditated Villany cannot be imputed to the Charge of thofe Di -
rectors, cannot be imputed to the Charge of thofe $\mathrm{Di-}$
rectors,
In this Infance, their Hearts being not culpable, will excufe them for this fingle Eflay of their Incapacity, in the Opinion of all honeft Men: But if the Ambition of prefiding in public Affairs, a Paffion too often and too fatally mixed with Weaknefs of Underftanding, fhould fill goad them on to direct and ruin, what will then be their Due from your Hands?


## [ 54 ]

rectors, yet the Sufferers are not alleviated by that Conlideration in the Diftrefs which they bring to a Nation. Weaknefs and Incapacity are even more fatal and defructive than a wicked Heart joined to fuperior Intellects in a M—_r: This laft, thro' pure Underftanding, will exert every Faculty; conceiving his own and his Country's Intereft infeparably united, his Judgment will correct his Miftakes, and re-inftate what may have been originally wrong: But want of Intellect is irremediable; no human Power can correct that Error; its natural Lumpifhnefs, like Gravitation in Matter,' making it tend for ever to the Center of Darknefs; like Impotence in Nature, producing nothing, or but ill-fhaped Monfters: It is the moft incurable of all Difeafes of the Mind.

What I wifh then, is not to roufe' you to the Deftruction of thefe Men, but to your own Prefervation; to awaken your Attention, that nods over the Ruin which furrounds you, that, like the paralytic Stroke, feems to beniumb your Faculties. Rife then to the Salvation of your expiring Country ; urge to your Reprefentatives the Refolution of obtaining a fuperior Underftanding, as effentially neceffary to the Prefervation of this Kingdom, which ought to be dear to every Englifloman.

## [ 55 ]

Do not imagine I mean to intimidate you

Let not the Clamor of Difpatch, and Impetuofity of Warlike Preparation, deceive you into an Opinion of thefe Men. The headftrong Horfe, whofe Violence carries him without the Courle, as effectually lofes the Race as that which is diftanced: The Traveller who rides Poft out of the Way, is at the Evening only more tired and farther diftant from his Home than he
who trots on foberly; and Fleets and Armies, deflined by frong mifguided Impulfe to wrong Places,' ufelefs and inapplicable Defigns, only fonener exhaut the Powers of a Nation.

Let me implore you then to remonftrate to Majeny itfelf, if your Reprefentatives refufe your Petition, that able Heads may direct his Councils; and that Arms be intrufted to your Hands, in whom Safety can be only placed; who love your King and Country, and are ready to offer up your Lives a Sacrifice to their Prefervation and Welfare.

Let us not fand thus, almoft naked, and expofed to the Attacks and Infults of Two hundred thoufand Soldiers, defended by lefs than twenty thoufand : A Battle loft in this Ine decides the Fate of England Remedy thofe Evils; place yourfelves, your King, and Country in Security ; chaitife your Enemies by Sea. Believe me in what I have uttered, left, like the Trojans who neglected the Prophecies of Caffordra, felf-fufficient, inattentive, and fecure, you bewail too late the predicted Evil, when no human Powers can remove the Weight of that Ruin which now hangs threatning over you.

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