



## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 51/2      Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation  
to the United Nations General Assembly,  
made in the First (Political) Committee  
on January 26, 1951.

Before expressing the views of my delegation on the two resolutions<sup>x</sup> which are now before us, I would like to outline recent developments in this Committee, as I understand them, which have led us step by step to the situation with which we are now concerned.

I would like to begin with a few words about the work of the cease-fire group of which I had the honour to be a member and the results -- or rather the lack of results -- of that work. In dealing with this matter, I speak, of course, as one member of that group and not in any sense for the other two members with whom it was my great honour and privilege -- and these are not mere words -- to be associated in that joint effort. If we did not succeed, it was not due, I assure you, to any lack of industry, wisdom and skill on the part of my two colleagues.

Our first attempt failed because the proposals for a cease-fire which we made were not even examined by the Peking Government. We ourselves felt that these proposals which were acceptable to the United Nations Unified Command provided a reasonable basis for discussion.

It would, of course, have been easier for us to explain our purposes to the Peking Government if the representative of that Government, who was in New York at the time, had been willing to meet and co-operate with the group. He, however, had been told by his Government to adopt a completely unco-operative and negative attitude toward us on the grounds that our group was illegally constituted. The absurdity, of course, of this argument is patent and need not be gone into.

A more serious reason for the refusal of the Peking Government to co-operate in the first stages of the cease-fire work seems to have been the alleged fear that they would be lured into a cease-fire arrangement which would be followed, not only by a discussion of Far Eastern questions in which they would participate, but by a new United Nations offensive in Korea. In this respect, our cease-fire proposals seemed to them as a trap. We accepted the possibility of genuine fear and misunderstanding on this score and attempted to remove it by further assurances to Peking on, I think, December 19.

x See Appendix I, page 14.

All our efforts, however, to remove misunderstandings were summarily rejected in the telegram from Peking of December 21 to the President of the General Assembly.

Notwithstanding this uncompromising and negative attitude of the Peking Government, the Political Committee asked the cease-fire group on January 4 not to abandon its task, but to try again to meet any legitimate doubts and anxieties on the part of Peking by drawing up a statement of principles and a programme which might guide any discussion and underlie any settlement of Far Eastern issues once a cease-fire had been brought about in Korea. Our group, as the representatives know, submitted such a statement on last January 11. It was fully discussed by this Committee, after which fifty Member States formally approved it and requested its transmission to the Peking Government for their observations.

There were many members of this Committee at that time who felt that, in making this further effort to bring about a negotiation of Far Eastern difficulties with those who were intervening in great force in Korea to assist the aggressor, we were weakening and indeed humiliating the United Nations, and that we should proceed at once to a condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor.

There was a second group which felt that almost everything should be subordinated to the necessity of stopping the fighting and getting those most concerned, including the People's Government in Peking, around the council table with a view to a peaceful and honourable settlement of Korean and other Far Eastern questions. This viewpoint was, I think, based in part at least on a feeling that United Nations action in Korea on and after the crossing of the 38th parallel gave some reason for the Chinese in Peking -- cut off as they are from normal contacts with so much of the outside world -- to fear for the security of their position in Manchuria and of their regime generally.

There was a third group which agreed that, whatever might be the rights or wrongs of the matter, we should further prove our good will and our unswerving desire and, indeed, determination to bring about a peaceful solution by making one further effort at peaceful settlement before proceeding to any condemnatory resolution; that without such further effort it would be difficult to preserve the unity of the free world in the United Nations in regard to action in Korea. Some of the members of the Committee, while taking this view, were frankly pessimistic about the result.

Finally, there was the Soviet bloc to whom the question was a simple one. The United Nations had merely to deny and disavow the action it had taken, yield to every single demand of those it had termed aggressors, and then there would be "peace". As for Far Eastern problems generally, the Soviet bloc position was, just give the forces of international Communism directed and controlled by Moscow their own way, and soon there would be no problems. Of course, they do not put it this way -- they talk about peoples' democracies and American

aggression, but this kind of verbal smokescreen has long since been unable to conceal their own imperialist designs.

The statement of principles which was approved last week was an earnest and sincere attempt to reconcile the first three points of view which I have just mentioned. With the fourth, of course, no reconciliation was possible on honourable terms. Furthermore, our statement was of a nature which gave us reason to believe it could be accepted in Peking, if the Government there had control of its own affairs and sincerely desired peace.

It is important, I think, that even at this late date we should know exactly what that statement contains and what it implies. It may also be of some interest if, as one of those responsible for drafting it, I attempt to give some interpretation of it in view of the confusing and conflicting views that have been expressed as to what it means.

Our statement of principles met, I think, every legitimate point that had been made by the Peking Government. There are those who have complained that in adopting it we have gone too far, that we had compromised our principles for the vain hope of an honourable agreement, that we had surrendered to intimidation and blackmail and that we were in danger of repeating the betrayal of Munich. The tragedy of Munich, however, as I see it, was not in going there; in fact, it might have been better if more Governments had been able to accept the responsibility of being there. The tragedy was in what was done there, and our statement of principles did not, I think, recommend doing anything that meant the betrayal of a people or a principle, nor was it a weak surrender to armed pressure or a naive misunderstanding of a political situation or of the dangers ahead if it were handled the wrong way.

I would not myself participate in or approve of any action which could be fairly described in terms such as those used the other day by the representative of the Philippines. Nor would my country, which I may add was not represented at Munich but was concerned with fighting imperialism and aggression far from its own shores in 1914, 1939 and now in Korea in 1951. Canada has fought in the past to the limit of its military strength and resources and we seek now a firm and honourable foundation for peace to the limit of our political and diplomatic strength, without any illusions about the difficulties ahead and without weakening our defences -- indeed while strengthening them -- in the process. There is nothing of what is called "appeasement" in such a course.

Because of the interpretation given to it in Peking, because of some misunderstanding of it by members of this Committee and because of its misrepresentation by the Soviet bloc, I would like to analyze briefly the statement of principles, as one of those who was initially responsible for it.

Paragraph 1 is of course self-explanatory, giving in a few words the purpose of a cease-fire.

Paragraph 2 is important because it states that steps for the restoration of peace could begin even before a formal cease-fire arrangement had been concluded,

providing there had been a lull in hostilities while the negotiation of a cease-fire arrangement was going on.

Paragraph 3 provides for the withdrawal from Korea of all non-Korean armed forces so that, without pressure from outside armies, the Korean people under international supervision could decide their own future. But the next paragraph, paragraph 4, made it quite clear that while this decision was being taken there should be international arrangements for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there. Those arrangements were to be the subject of negotiation. United Nations supervision of some kind, however, would be essential if the decisions were to be free and not the kind that we have seen imposed on certain Eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Finally, there was paragraph 5, which has been by far the most controversial section of the statement. The first words of that paragraph read: "As soon as Agreement has been reached on a cease-fire...". That does not mean, as I understand it -- and this I think is very important in the light of the Chinese reply to our statement -- that all the details of a cease-fire arrangement had to be worked out before the political negotiations referred to in the paragraph could begin. There had to be prior agreement on the basic principle that the actual shooting must stop before the political discussions began.

Then in paragraph 5 we provided for a negotiating body which, while it mentioned four States, did not -- though some members of this Committee have interpreted it in that sense -- exclude any other State from membership. For instance, the inclusion of France in a body of this kind would be normal and natural and would certainly be supported by my delegation. That body, which would include the People's Republic of China, would attempt to secure a political settlement of Far Eastern problems, including those of Taiwan and Chinese representation in the United Nations, in conformity with existing obligations, which one assumes would include the Cairo Declaration for those countries which had accepted that Declaration. We also provided in paragraph 5 that any political settlement should be in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, whose priority over all other international obligations is naturally not affected by this paragraph.

That was our statement as I understand its terms and its implications. Will anyone say that we did not in that statement, which was accepted by fifty of our members, go as far as honourable Governments and men could go, and further than many people sincerely thought we should go to meet every legitimate point advanced by the Peking Government?

Any progress as a result of that statement depended, of course, on its acceptance by Peking. Have we received such an acceptance? Or have we any reason to believe that the note from Peking of January 17 provides a basis for further discussion with some hope of reaching a mutually satisfactory and honourable agreement?

In our opinion, the January note from Peking - their reply - represents an advance both in form and substance over the previous statements given by Peking at or to the United Nations. Furthermore, certain obscure passages in that reply have now been given an interpretation by the Peking authorities which in my opinion, and notwithstanding its summary rejection by certain members of this Committee as unworthy of consideration, may represent a substantial additional advance.

Part 1 of the communication from Peking of January 17 lays down Peking's principles for a cease-fire and a settlement along the lines originally stated by that Government and by the Soviet bloc. I have already expressed my views on these principles. I think that they are quite unacceptable and form no basis for a just settlement.

Part 2 of the Chinese note makes certain observations on our statement of principles. These are of very considerable importance, if obscure in a few places. In the first place -- and they are not very obscure on this point -- they misrepresent completely the purpose of a cease-fire by saying it is designed merely to give United Nations troops a breathing space, ignoring entirely that sentence which reads:

"Such an arrangement ..." -- that is, a cease-fire -- "should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive."

They also ignore point 5 of the proposed cease-fire arrangements included in our report of January 2, which reads:

"All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and material."

More important, however -- indeed of critical importance -- are the comments of the Peking note of January 17 on the relations between a cease-fire and political negotiations. If the Peking telegram meant that there must be final agreement on all of the cease-fire arrangements, and that there must be political discussions before the shooting stops, that of course would be completely unacceptable as I see it. If, however, the note meant that there must first be negotiations to decide the time and basic conditions of the cease-fire, that, on the other hand, would be, to me at least, quite acceptable. Indeed, we tried last December in the Cease-Fire Group to have just such negotiations, and we were not very successful. This is a point on which the further interpretation given by the Chinese authorities in Peking seems to me to be of some importance, for, in spite of what the representative of the Philippines said yesterday, they appear to me now to be saying that they are prepared to enter into and conclude cease-fire arrangements before the discussion of any other subject is begun.

Part 3 of the Chinese note then makes certain counter-proposals. The first of these, which they call point A, provides for withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and a settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Koreans themselves. That would be satisfactory, I think, if it meant that this would be done according to the principles of paragraphs 2 and 3 of our statement, and providing that the Peking Government clearly and specifically indicates that the foreign troops to be withdrawn would include Chinese forces and nationals. The interpretation of their note given to us through the Indian Ambassador in Peking, though still, not too precise on these points, gives grounds for believing that Peking accepts them.

Point B reads as follows:

"The subject matter of the negotiations must include the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and Far Eastern related problems."

That has already been included in our statement, though in somewhat different form. I do not think there should be any great difficulty here, because our statement was quite clear on this point, and contemplated honest and sincere negotiations with a view to reaching a settlement.

Point C sets up a committee of seven for the negotiation and settlement of political questions, excluding presumably any other State from that body. In this respect the Peking reply goes further with a more rigid provision than that contained in paragraph 5 of our statement. Moreover, it states that the "rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the seven-nation conference".

If this means that one of the important subjects for post cease-fire discussions must be decided in advance, namely, membership of the People's Government of China in the United Nations, then of course this Peking counter-proposal would not be worthy of consideration. But the message from Peking read by the representative of India on Monday last seems, at least to me, to indicate that the Peking authorities do not require such a condition, but ask the members of the proposed conference when it meets to affirm their right to membership in the United Nations.

There are many Members of the United Nations who have already recognized the Peking Government as the de jure government of China; there are others who were coming to the view that, having regard to the facts of the situation and the desirability of having as a spokesman for the Chinese people at the United Nations a representative of the Government which, whatever we may think about it, is in effective control of continental China, such recognition should be given to the Peking Government. There is little doubt that there was a trend in that direction, which by now might have resulted in a decision as to membership in the United Nations, when the outbreak of war in Korea and the relationship, from the beginning, of the Government in Peking to that war, made any such action, for the time being, quite impossible.

Before this question of Chinese representation in the United Nations can be discussed again and settled, and it is now before the United Nations General Assembly, there has to be an end to the fighting in Korea and an abandonment of assistance to those who have been adjudged aggressors by the United Nations.

Point D of the Chinese counter-proposals states that the meeting visualized in point C should take place in Peking. This would not, I should think, be a matter of great importance, if other points could be settled.

The examination of these replies from the Central People's Government by my delegation led us to the view that the Political Committee would now be wise to consider a specific programme for a negotiated settlement which would, on the one hand, lead to the fulfilment of United Nations objectives in Korea, and, on the other, to a peaceful settlement of outstanding Far Eastern issues. Such a programme, which would I think be a conclusive test of the real intentions of the Chinese Government in Peking, could be along the following lines, and I put these forward merely as suggestions, the views which my delegation holds.

I think a conference could be convened at Lake Success or New Delhi, within a week or ten days of the decision to hold it, ten days at the latest. That conference might consist of the seven States which have been mentioned previously: The United States, the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India and Egypt.

The first order of business and the first purpose of any such conference should, in our opinion, be to refer to a cease-fire committee consisting of representatives of the United States, the People's Republic of China and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, together with any other representatives which the committee might unanimously agree to associate with it in its work, responsibility for arranging an immediate cease-fire on the basis of the plan submitted in the report of the Cease-Fire Group of January 11, and that part of the work of the conference, if it were ever held, would have to be completed, in our view before any other items on its agenda were even considered.

Then, once arrangements for a cease-fire by this special committee had been completed, the seven-power conference could consider a peaceful solution of Korean problems in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraph 2 and 3 of the statements of principles of January 11. This would cover arrangements for the withdrawal from Korea of all non-Korean armed forces, including, specifically, all Chinese nationals and forces.

Then the conference could proceed to a discussion of Far Eastern problems in accordance with paragraph 5 of the statement of principles of January 11, and as the first item of such discussions, consider the request of the Central People's Government for a definite affirmation, as they call it, of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Of course, I assume it would be understood that such a conference could

not itself decide the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations which can only be decided by the United Nations itself. The most any such meeting could do would be to express a view on this subject. And I do not see any reason why the members, at such a meeting, should not do this if they so desired. Such a conference might, in effect, be considered almost as taking the place or performing the function which has now been assigned to the Assembly's Committee on Chinese Representation which was set up at the beginning of the session and which is still under instruction to report to the General Assembly.

In the discussions at the Conference of Far Eastern problems, I would suggest that any government especially concerned with a particular problem should be invited to participate during that part of the discussion.

Then I would suggest, as part of this idea, that the recommendation in question -- if it ever became a recommendation -- should be transmitted by the Political Committee to the Central People's Government at once, with an indication that a reply would be required within a very brief period indeed -- perhaps forty-eight hours after its receipt in Peking -- in order that the Committee might know whether it would be possible to proceed with arrangements for convening the conference on the date proposed.

My delegation would have been glad if consideration could have been given to some such procedure as that suggested above. We felt that it would not have involved us in prolonged discussions, and that if it had been unacceptable to Peking -- and we would know that within a few hours -- we could then have proceeded to condemnatory action, with a far greater chance for a united front than seems to be the case at present.

It was with a view to ascertaining whether the above procedure would be worth considering that my Prime Minister, on receipt of the Chinese reply of January 17, suggested to the Prime Minister of India, with whom he had been in consultation on these matters during and following the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, that certain questions might be addressed to the Peking Government, with a view to clearing up, if possible, some of the ambiguous points in their reply. If Canada had had its own representative in Peking, we would, of course, have been in a position to ask these questions ourselves. As this was not the case, we relied on the assistance and co-operation of the Indian and United Kingdom Governments, and we are grateful to them for that co-operation.

Meanwhile, we already have two resolutions before us. One, sponsored by the twelve Asian States, proposes a procedure by which the intentions of the Chinese could be finally clarified and steps taken toward a settlement. Though I and my delegation approve of the objective of this resolution, I regret that we cannot regard the procedure suggested in it as the best method of reaching that objective. The terms of reference of the conference proposed in the Asian draft resolution are very wide and, as we understand them, do not specifically embody the conception of an orderly sequence of events, beginning



with a cease-fire and proceeding logically, through a Korean settlement, to a more general discussion of other Far Eastern questions.

I think that it is even possible, under this draft resolution, that the conference envisaged might find itself involved in a discussion of general questions before any progress whatever had been made towards arranging a cease-fire. This, as we see it, would sacrifice a basic principle, to stop the fighting first before negotiation of other questions can begin, a basic principle which has been firmly adhered to, throughout our discussions of this problem, by my own delegation and many others. For these reasons, my delegation is not able to support this resolution as it has been presented to us.

The second draft resolution, proposed by the United States of America, finds that the People's Government of China has engaged in aggression in Korea. If this resolution is pressed to a vote without further consideration of other measures, delegations will have to take a decision in regard to it, and that decision is not as easy or as simple for my delegation as it seems to be for some other delegations around this table. We feel that it has to be taken not only with a full acceptance of our sense of responsibility under the Charter -- and we all have that sense of responsibility -- but also with a clear understanding of its implications and where they may lead us; and finally, in recognition that none of us has any right to feel that his duty is automatically discharged merely by joining in some form of moral condemnation.

It has been said by some speakers in this Committee that if the United Nations does not do its duty in condemning the aggressor in this case, it will go the way of the League of Nations when it defaulted over Ethiopia, and it will deserve to do so. In my opinion, however, the fatal blow to the League of Nations was not struck when it refused to call fascist Italy an aggressor -- I was there at the time and I remember that it did so in eloquent and ringing terms -- but the fatal blow was struck when its members gave the world the hope and belief that this declaration would be followed by effective action -- and my own Government was one of those concerned -- and then betrayed that hope and debased that belief by running out on their obligations to take such action.

It may be right and necessary to pass a moral judgment on the aggressor, even if there exists a situation such as the possibility of another and far more dangerous aggressor which may affect the enforcement of that judgment; it may be right and necessary to do that providing we recognize the circumstances and state the position accordingly. That course is honest and straightforward. But we have, I think, on the other hand, no right to pass a judgment and at the same time give the impression that we can and will immediately and effectively enforce it no matter what the consequences may be, if we are not prepared to do that.

Holding these views, I would like to give the opinion of my delegation in regard to the United States resolution. My Government believes, with other governments, that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to

maintain peace, not to wage war. The United Nations has had successes in preventing war by conciliation, mediation and reconciliation. And on every such occasion infinite patience was required. There were many times when it seemed as if every endeavour to stop the fighting had been exhausted, and members were tempted to give up the struggle for a peaceful settlement and allow the parties to resort to force.

Even in this, by far the most difficult situation which has ever faced the United Nations, with powerful forces behind the initial aggressor, and even more powerful -- possibly controlling -- forces behind these, my Government still believes in continuing efforts to find a peaceful and honourable solution of the conflict in Korea and of all our differences with the People's Republic of China. The response of the Peking Government to the attempts that we have made so far has certainly been enough to try the patience of us all. Nevertheless, we are ready to hold the door open for further negotiations if the People's Republic of China gives us any reason to believe that these negotiations can be successful, and they cannot do this by issuing ultimata which the United Nations cannot and will not accept.

The United States draft resolution -- and this is one part of it which appeals to us most -- makes provision for a cessation of hostilities and the achievement of our objectives by peaceful means. In its last paragraph it not only proclaims these peaceful intentions, but also provides for measures to implement them when there is a suitable opportunity to do so. We could have wished, on our part, that this paragraph had been even broader in scope. If the People's Republic of China has not closed the door on its part, there is no valid reason why, whatever happens to this draft resolution, discussions cannot continue. If the People's Republic of China considers that its response to our proposal has been misunderstood, we can still consider any observations it wishes to make. Furthermore, it is our view that the statement of principles for a cease-fire and a settlement, which was passed by this Committee, still stands.

In the meantime, however, we feel that we must support the United States draft resolution before us because it states one vital truth that is self-evident. The armed forces of the People's Government of China continue their invasion of Korea. By opposing or abstaining on this draft resolution, no matter how unwise we might think its introduction at this particular moment, we would be denying that fact of armed aggression of Korea by Chinese aggressors, and we will not do this. We cannot achieve the only kind of peaceful settlement which is acceptable, by denying that an aggression was committed in Korea in June 1950 and that the forces of the Chinese Government in Peking are now participating in that aggression which we have already condemned. The Central People's Government must understand that a settlement is not possible if they refuse to end such participation. It is to make this point clear to the North Koreans, to the Chinese who have aided them, and to all those who may contemplate aggression in the future, that a finding against the Central People's Government is made in this draft resolution.

This draft resolution is in no sense a declaration of war -- limited or unlimited -- against China. It is in no sense, as I understand it, a declaration of desire or intention to destroy the Chinese Communist revolution or overthrow the regime in Peking. If it were, my Government would not support it. When one considers the provocation offered by the People's Republic of China and the military action it has taken -- and we are concerned only with that action and not with any policy which may have inspired it -- one cannot even call this draft resolution a hostile declaration against the Chinese people or claim that it shuts the door finally against negotiations. It is, in the first place, a firm call to the Peking Government to desist from participation in aggression and, in the second place, a promise of peaceful settlement if it does.

I am aware of the fear expressed by certain members of this Committee that the consequences of paragraph 3 would, as Sir Benegal Rau said the other day, create an atmosphere in which further negotiation would be impossible. We would be distressed, on our part, if this should be the case, and we are most anxious, as I have already said, that negotiations continue if there is any possibility of their being successful. We ask ourselves, however, what could the Peking Government expect? They know the views of the United Nations on the aggression already committed in Korea, but in spite of this fact, they have joined in that aggression, claiming that we, the United Nations, are the aggressors. We have asked them to withdraw, and they have refused to stop killing members of the United Nations forces. So I find it rather difficult to believe that they would be shocked or surprised by our conclusion that they are participating in aggression. What else could we decide once we had to make the decision? We cannot, after all, encourage their Korean aggression by giving them cause to believe that we are the aggressors or that we no longer distinguish between right and wrong. It may still be that the Chinese consider that they are engaged not in aggression, but in self-defence; that they are so imprisoned by their own dogma and their isolation, so influenced by bad advice and misled by wrong information, that they do not understand the intentions of the United Nations in general and of the United States in particular. We have recognized, and we should, I think, still recognize, this possibility and be prepared to give even further assurances of our intentions if we are given an opportunity to do so. But it can hardly be said that we have not already tried with great patience to understand the motives of the People's Republic of China and to explain ours to them. They have been given every chance to explain why they should not be considered as having participated in aggression, and they should know by now that we have taken every possible mitigating factor into consideration.

The question now arises: If we pass this draft resolution -- and this has a bearing on remarks I made a few moments ago about passing draft resolutions without careful consideration of their consequences or without giving the impression that we are going to do more about them than in fact we are -- what do we do then to continue our efforts to restrain the aggression which is taking place in Korea? This question cannot be easily or quickly answered. The Committee, which is proposed in

the second last paragraph of the draft resolution to seek an answer, will have serious responsibilities indeed. The judgment it will give on the question particularly before it of "additional measures" in respect of the aggression in Korea will depend on the answers to other questions. It will have to take into account the realities of the world situation. It will have to accept the fact that while the resources of the free world, which is the only part of the world willing to support collective action, are growing stronger, they are at the moment limited. It will have to realize also, as I see it, that the free world as a whole is now under a menace far greater than anything offered by the Chinese regime in Peking, a menace which even that regime itself will, we hope, one day come to recognize and to resist, and that our main objective must be to hold ourselves prepared to meet that threat. We have certainly not accepted anything like the prospect of inevitable war with the Soviet Union, and we are still ready to accept genuine conciliation with members of the Soviet Union bloc. We cannot, however, close our eyes to the complicity of the Soviet Union in the aggression action of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, their subjugation of neighbouring countries, their world-wide sabotage of peace, and the continuous instigation of a new war by their propaganda machines, disguised these days as propaganda for peace. It is for these reasons, for purely defensive reasons, that I feel we must remain on guard and not allow ourselves to be deliberately distracted into weakening skirmishes or open war with a country with which we have no basic grounds to quarrel.

For this reason I think that the Committee on Collective Measures, if it is set up, should keep before it our major objective of reaching a peaceful settlement with the Chinese on issues which we believe can be settled. While considering how best the United Nations effort can be strengthened in Korea, the Committee should keep always in mind, I think, the larger objectives of a peaceful settlement in the Far East. We, therefore, hope that the Committee proposed in paragraph 8 of the United States draft resolution, far from recommending impetuous moves with unforeseeable consequences, will act with wisdom and restraint, will help to assure and strengthen the authority of the United Nations in carrying out this draft resolution and its other decisions concerning Korea, and also help to prevent ill-advised and rash action.

Finally, this resolution, as I understand it, does not deal with a new and separate aggression requiring new and separate action, but does deal with an old aggression in which the Chinese Communists have been participating. Therefore, it is our view -- and we would welcome confirmation of it -- that this resolution does not give the Unified Command or its commanders in Korea any authority to take action which it and they do not already possess. No new powers are given to anybody, as we understand it, by this resolution, paragraph 5 of which reads:

"The General Assembly affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression."

The decision of my delegation to vote in favour of this resolution as a whole has only been arrived at after

particularly grave thought and deliberation. In concluding, I should like to put the Canadian position frankly before the members of the Committee. There are one or two features of this resolution which do not carry the considered judgment of the Canadian delegation. Moreover, we think the putting of such a resolution at this stage and in this form, when the possibilities of negotiation with the People's Government of China are not, in our opinion, completely exhausted, to be premature and unwise. Why then is the Canadian delegation voting for the draft resolution as a whole? In the first place, we are doing so because the main purport of this resolution, as we understand it, and certainly as the public in our own country will understand it, is to condemn the Chinese People's Government for the assistance they have given the aggressors in Korea. We think that there is no shadow of doubt about this participation in aggression and we believe that the action of the Chinese People's Government in this matter has been morally wrong and is to be condemned. The United Nations cannot ignore such a defiance of the principles upon which it is founded.

In the consideration of this resolution, the Canadian Government has honestly differed with the Government of the United States on some points. We have made our position clear and we shall continue to press for those policies which, in our opinion, would be most conducive to a peaceful settlement in the Far East. While maintaining our own view on these matters, my delegation will support the United States resolution as not being inconsistent in principle with those policies. We reserve our position, however, in regard to any amendments which may be submitted and, if the resolution should be voted on paragraph by paragraph, we also reserve our position in regard to paragraph 2.

In conclusion, our support for this resolution is the easier for the Canadian delegation because it is proposed by the United States of America, that country whose valiant forces are still bearing the brunt of the hard and cruel struggle against aggression in Korea and which is at the same time making unparalleled efforts in the defence of freedom everywhere.

APPENDIX I

Draft United States Resolution on Korea introduced  
before the First Committee on January 20, 1951

General Assembly

Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue action in Korea to meet the aggression;

Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and Requests the president of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

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Draft Twelve Power (Arab-Asian) Resolution introduced  
before the First-Committee on January 24, 1951: "Peaceful  
settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems"\*

Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran  
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Yemen:

\* This resolution was subsequently amended.

The General Assembly,

Viewing with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

Considering that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,

Noting the reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the resolution of the First Committee dated 13 January 1951,

Desiring to continue its efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations,

Recommends that representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt and India and of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China meet as soon as possible for the purpose of securing all necessary elucidations and amplifications of the above-mentioned reply and of making any incidental or consequential arrangements towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other Far Eastern problems.

The first meeting of the above representatives will be held on a date and at a place to be fixed by the President of the General Assembly; the date and place of each subsequent meeting will be fixed by the representatives themselves. They will hold their meetings in private and will frame their own rules of procedure. They will advise the General Assembly of the result of their consultations as early as possible.

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