



CANADA

CANADIAN WEEKLY BULLETIN

INFORMATION DIVISION · DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS · OTTAWA, CANADA

Vol. 21 No. 28

July 13, 1966

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THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR CONTROL

The following are excerpts from a recent address by Prime Minister L.B. Pearson to the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Scarborough, Ontario:

...There is no need for me to dwell on the frightening and fantastic development of military power since the end of the Second World War. By the early 'sixties, this development, fortunately, had resulted in a relatively stable, if uneasy, balance of nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union, a balance based on the ability of each to destroy the other regardless of how or where the first attack was launched - the balance of shared capacity for mutual annihilation. The certain knowledge that rash and ill-considered action by either one which threatened the vital interests of the other might lead to a nuclear exchange fatal to both has, up to the present, deterred both sides from pushing any such actions to a showdown. The frightening realities of this power balance were revealed in the Cuban crisis of 1962.

One result of the reaction to that particular confrontation was the subsequent agreement between Washington, Moscow and London on a partial nuclear test-ban. It was agreed to install a direct-communication link between Washington and Moscow. A short time later, the great powers were able to agree on a United Nations resolution prohibiting the orbiting in outer space of weapons of mass destruction.

These measures were important in themselves, since they were the first tangible steps towards arms control after continuous debate and negotiation since 1946. But, beyond their intrinsic value, I suggest that they are also of importance because they mark a tacit understanding by the two nuclear super-powers to avoid direct confrontations which would

threaten the outbreak of nuclear war. In this way, both East and West have acknowledged the danger of disrupting the existing power balance. They have attempted to reduce conflicts of interest even if they have by no means succeeded in eliminating all potentially dangerous situations.

RE-APPRAISAL OF ARMS RACE

The existence now of a *détente* between East and West - even an uneasy one - provides us with an opportunity to re-examine afresh the need to control the arms race, to question whether we should continue to devote such a tragically large proportion of human and material resources to the improvement of weapons whose use would threaten humanity's very survival.

A thorough re-appraisal is particularly appropriate today, when both the major powers face the question of whether or not to take a significant step in the arms race - that is, whether to produce and to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. The deployment of such a system would be an enormously costly undertaking, which, in the end, would probably lead, as the ballistic-missile race did, to ever-mounting defence budgets without any permanent increase in national security or international stability.

There are those who will argue that it is not just a question of the two major powers agreeing not to deploy ABM systems in relation to each other. They point to the need for protective measures against the looming threat of Communist China, with its potential nuclear capability. But I suggest that the day when North America or Europe should be genuinely concerned about a nuclear attack by China is still many years in the future. Moreover, it is my view that fear

of possible future developments should not deter us from a course of action which offers promise of substantial benefits in the immediate future. If the result of such a re-assessment were a tacit understanding by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to refrain from the development of ABM systems – and so prevent a new dimension of escalation of the arms race – the dividends in terms of reduced tension and enhanced international stability would place us all in a much better position to examine the vital political issues which still divide us and which so largely determine our prospects for reducing armaments.

PERILS OF PROLIFERATION

We accept the inevitability of change in international relations and institutions. The world does not stand still, so any balance of power which now exists is not permanently assured. The elements of the nuclear equation do not remain constant. New factors emerge and old ones change. The major powers are continually refining and improving their nuclear weapons. Within the present decade, two additional nations have emerged as nuclear powers. Other potential candidates are now weighing the advantages of joining the nuclear club. Moreover, the number of states capable of developing their own nuclear weapons is constantly increasing. We face – not as an academic problem but in a very real and urgent form – the dangers of proliferation. These dangers are upon us. The further spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear war and so the insecurity of all nations. It could add a new and threatening factor to historical, ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one country to acquire nuclear weapons would almost certainly generate strong pressure on others to take similar action. International relations would thereby be made more complicated and more dangerous. Agreements on arms-control measures would become more difficult to achieve and any prospect of progress in this field would recede. Moreover, there would be greater risk of nuclear war breaking out as a result of human error flowing from defective control arrangements or through the action of irresponsible elements into whose hands the weapons might fall.

Further nuclear proliferation is most likely to occur in countries faced with a conventional or nuclear threat but lacking the protection and security afforded by membership in a nuclear alliance. In such circumstances, certain non-aligned countries might be persuaded to create a nuclear arsenal in the vain hope of improving their national security, or in anticipation of a similar development by a hostile neighbour, or in order to enhance their national prestige and their international influence.

URGENCY OF PREVENTION

The prevention of such nuclear proliferation is important and urgent. In his annual report for 1965, the UN Secretary-General describes it as “the most urgent question of the present time which should remain at the very top of the disarmament agenda”. President Johnson has made clear the central place in his administration’s policy of the effort to control, to reduce and ultimately to eliminate modern

engines of nuclear destruction, to act now to prevent nuclear spread, to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear stocks.

In his message to the ENDC of last February 1, Chairman Kosygin said: “If we do not put an end to the proliferation in the world of nuclear weapons, the threat of the unleashing of nuclear war will be increased many times.” Unfortunately, not all the potential nuclear powers have taken such an unequivocal stand.

The issues involved in this matter are so complex that no single measure is likely to provide a solution. Where considerations of national security and international prestige are closely intertwined, answers must be sought in several directions if we are to succeed in preventing nuclear proliferation. Measures proposed will need to take into account the factors motivating countries to seek nuclear weapons and to make provision for appropriate disincentives. Obviously, too, we must concentrate on those countries capable of achieving nuclear status – not in the more remote future but over the next decade.

CONTROLLED SHARING

The discussions at present going on...at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons make little progress, despite the urgency of the matter. But the time used for argument on general principles will have been wasted unless it results in an instrument linking both the nuclear and non-nuclear countries. These discussions have revealed the existence of two different types of problem. The first is the question of multilateral nuclear-sharing. This has its origin in the desire of the non-nuclear members of NATO for a voice in the planning and management of the nuclear forces on which they feel their own security so largely depends. The discussion here has made plain the importance of a clear and precise definition of proliferation.

On this issue, we in Canada stand on the principles embodied in the Irish resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly in 1961. We are convinced that proliferation would not occur under the terms of a treaty which required that the present nuclear powers must retain full control of their nuclear weapons. Perhaps such a treaty should prohibit, specifically, the transfer of such control to states, groups of states or other entities, requiring that the present nuclear states must at all times maintain the power of veto over deployment and firing of such nuclear weapons.

PROBLEM OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The nuclear-sharing issue is, of course, closely connected with a second and broader question, that of European security, which, in its turn, is concerned with the settlement of important political questions on that continent.

While much of the present lack of progress in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation derives from difficulties about nuclear-sharing and European security, it seems to me that, in the long run, these questions may prove less intractable than the other problem of the national development of nuclear

CANADA-U.S.S.R. AIR AGREEMENT

The signing of the first air-travel agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union by First Deputy Chairman Polyansky of the U.S.S.R. and Prime Minister Pearson concluded the recent visit to Canada by the Soviet delegation. Mr. Pearson made the following statement:

I am very pleased that the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and I are able to mark the conclusion of his highly successful visit to this country by signing together – along with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs – the first air-transport agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R.

This agreement, establishing air service between Montreal and Moscow, is a practical expression both of our common interests and of the co-operation between our two countries in serving these interests. So it is particularly fitting that this “signing” ceremony should be linked with Mr. Polyansky’s visit, for we regard both the agreement and his visit as milestones in the development of closer relations between Canada and the Soviet Union.

I am sure that Mr. Polyansky and those who have travelled with him through seven of our ten provinces, have been impressed by the friendliness shown by Canadians to them – by farmers and industrialists, private citizens and representatives of governments whom they have met.

The extensive coverage given our visitors by press, television and radio has reflected how genuine and widespread Canadian interest is towards the Soviet Union and its peoples.

NUCLEAR PLANT FOR NOVA SCOTIA

Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, announced in the House of Commons recently that Canadian General Electric Company Limited would build a heavy-water production plant on the Cape Breton side of the Strait of Canso, Nova Scotia. An overriding factor in favour of this site was the deuterium content of the water that will be used in the manufacturing process.

It is understood that the Nova Scotia Power Commission will build a power-plant fuelled with oil (with provision for back-up with coal) that will supply steam and electric power for the heavy-water plant. It is hoped that the heavy-water plant and the power plant will form part of a larger industrial complex.

CGE will build a heavy-water plant with a capacity of not less than 400 tons a year, and will guarantee a production of 5,000 tons within a maximum delivery period of 12½ years. The company will be responsible for financing, designing, building, and operating the plant, and production will begin in autumn 1969. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited will underwrite the sale of 5,000 tons of heavy water produced in the plant at an average price of approxi-

We also have with us today – and I welcome him to Canada – General Loginov, Soviet Minister of Civil Aviation. Together with our Minister of Transport, the Honourable J.W. Pickersgill, General Loginov will sign a memorandum of understanding on the technical aspects of the agreement, and will exchange letters providing for future discussions over its extension. The heads of Aeroflot and of Air Canada later will sign the necessary commercial agreement between the two airlines.

Both our countries are confident that this direct air service between Montreal and Moscow, being inaugurated on the basis of these agreements, will be of great practical benefit to the travelling public of Canada and the Soviet Union. We hope that, based on these agreements, further air service will be developed in due course.

BENEFIT FOR EXPO

We in Canada are particularly happy that the Moscow-Montreal service will be inaugurated on the eve of our centenary, for it will facilitate travel to Expo '67 where the Soviet Union, as we all know, will be a major participant.

In conclusion, Mr. Polyansky, may I reiterate how much we have valued your presence among us. Both your visit and this agreement demonstrate the mutually beneficial relations which have developed and are expanding between our two countries and peoples. I hope that our new air service will not only encourage reciprocal travel by Canadians and Russians, but, indeed, that it will also facilitate your own early return to our country.

mately \$18.15 a pound. The price for the initial production will be \$20.50 a pound, and will decrease over the contract period to \$16.00 a pound.

BLUENOSE FLIES FIRST FLAG

Bluenose II, a copy of the famous Grand Banks racing yacht of the 'twenties, which recently returned to Halifax, Nova Scotia, from a goodwill tour of the Caribbean, was the first Canadian ship to hoist the centennial flag.

During a flag-presentation ceremony at Halifax, held by officials of the Centennial Commission, the ship’s owners, Oland and Son Limited of Halifax, received a scroll of honour for “outstanding contribution to the Canadian identity”.

The second *Bluenose* was launched in 1963 from the Nova Scotia yard of Smith and Rhuland. The same firm built the original vessel which brought renown to Canada throughout the 1920s and 1930s when, commanded by Captain Angus Walters, she defeated all comers in the international schooner races off the East Coast.

NEW HOSPITAL FOR ALBERTA

A hospital valued at \$26 million, designed and built by the Alberta Department of Public Works, was opened recently in Calgary.

The Foothills Hospital, covering 17 acres of the 85-acre plot, consists of 13 floors containing over 2,000 rooms and is designed in an inverted "T" shape to give the shortest horizontal distances to a central elevator core.

FACILITIES

The nursing school and student nurse residence building of ten floors will provide the 329 residents with modern comfortable living accommodation and education facilities including a gymnasium, library and recreation amenities.

The hospital will consist of 766 patient beds, 116 bassinets, 15 day-care beds, ten operating theatres, two psychiatric wards, a glaucoma laboratory, department of pathology and the normal medical, surgical and administrative functions necessary to a modern efficient hospital. Medical features of particular importance are the glaucoma laboratory, serving Southern Alberta, and a radiology department that offer normal X-ray facilities, closed-circuit television, 16mm and video-tape recordings.

NEW FEATURES

Particular emphasis has been placed on speed of communication and inter-nursing stations. The transmission of documents to all departments will be by means of pneumatic tubes that carry pre-dialled capsules to a central distribution point where they are automatically sorted and dispatched.

Pillow microphones will receive radio and television transmissions as well as providing two-way communication with the nursing station controlling the ward. Nurse-to-patient calls will cut in on other transmissions to patients and, in cases of specialized attention, patient-to-nurse calls can be set to receive priority over other calls at the nursing station.

UNIVERSITY ENROLMENT

According to an advance release of figures by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, full-time enrolment in Canadian universities and colleges at December 1, 1965, was 205,888, larger by 15.5 per cent than the preceding year's comparable figure of 178,238, and over double the enrolment of six years ago.

Full-time graduate enrolment increased at a greater rate (24.6 per cent) from 1964-65 to 1965-66 than did undergraduate enrolment (14.7 per cent).

For some years previously, the increase in enrolment of women (22.6 per cent) was higher than that for men (12.5 per cent). Women accounted for 31.6 per cent of total full-time enrolment in 1965-66. In 1960-61 women represented 24.1 per cent of this total, while in 1955-56 the percentage was 20.9.

PROVINCIAL FIGURES

Full-time enrolment increases from 1964-65 to 1965-66 ranged from 10.4 per cent for New Brunswick to 24.7 per cent for British Columbia. The large British Columbia increase was mainly because of the opening of two new institutions in the province — the Simon Fraser University and Vancouver City College.

By including enrolment at all affiliated institutions, eight institutions had over 10,000 full-time university-grade students. The Université de Montréal was largest with 29,323, followed by the University of Toronto, 17,810, Université Laval, 17,006, the University of British Columbia 15,966, the University of Alberta, 14,444 including 3,268 at Calgary, McGill University 11,696, the University of Manitoba 10,786, and the University of Saskatchewan 10,583.

An additional 73,942 part-time university-grade students were reported in attendance at December 1, 1965 (of this total 28,881 were women and 7,724 were graduate students). Another 6,561 students were enrolled in university-grade correspondence courses.

EXTERNAL AID APPOINTMENT

Prime Minister Pearson announced recently the appointment, effective October 1, of Maurice Strong, a Montreal business executive as Director-General of Canada's External Aid Office, succeeding H.O. Moran who has been appointed Canadian Ambassador to Japan and Korea. The External Aid Office, which reports to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, is responsible for the administration and operation of Canada's assistance programmes for developing countries.

Mr. Strong is President of Power Corporation of Canada Ltd., a large company dealing with transportation and communications, energy resources, real estate and hotel development, construction, paper manufacture and finance. He also holds office in other Canadian and international enterprises, positions he will relinquish prior to taking up his public appointment.

JOB VACANCY SURVEY

Mr. Jean Marchand, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, announced recently that a survey of job vacancies was being undertaken in seven Ontario cities, the first step in his Department's programme to obtain better information on industry's manpower requirements. All employers in Windsor, Sudbury, Midland, Cornwall, Hamilton, Collingwood, Owen Sound and surrounding areas would, he said, be asked to complete and return a job-vacancy questionnaire. Some 20,000 employers would be involved.

Mr. Marchand said that the survey, which would ask employers to list all jobs that were vacant on

June 30, would take about a month to complete. It will provide information on job vacancies by occupation, by industry, and by geographical boundary and will be valuable in developing vocational and other training programmes.

Mr. Marchand noted that the survey, as well as being a means of obtaining information on current manpower requirements in selected Ontario localities, is a feasibility study to test the questions and procedures that should be followed in future surveys. It is not known yet whether employers can provide the required information or whether manpower specialists can interpret the job descriptions given by employers.

In seeking the co-operation of employers to make the survey successful, Mr. Marchand said, the seven centres were chosen as providing a good cross-section of the province, both geographically and industrially; among the industries represented are automobile, steel, textiles, shipbuilding, mining, paper, grain elevators, tourist and agriculture.

CANADA NEARS FIRST CENTURY

On July 1, to mark the ninety-ninth anniversary of Canada's Confederation, Prime Minister L.B. Pearson issued the following message:

Today our country enters its hundredth year of confederation, as 20 million Canadians from Newfoundland to Vancouver Island observe our ninety-ninth national birthday.

As 1967 approaches, there is everywhere a growing excitement over our centennial celebrations – a growing sense of pride in Canada's past, and greater confidence in its future.

In the past few years, we in Canada have been living through a significant historical process, one connecting what has been with what is to come. Our national birthday, each year, should remind us of this creative march from the past into the present and the future.

From our past, we remember particularly the courageous and far-sighted work of the Fathers of Confederation, "...who builded better than they knew". We remember that, for 99 years, through challenges and sacrifices far greater than any we face today, our country's course towards its destiny has run straight and true, along the paths of freedom and justice and charity among men – that our great strength as a people and as a federal state has lain not in declarations and documents but in creative, determined action.

The present, too, has its lessons. It teaches, above all, that our diversity is the very source of our distinct Canadian development and Canadian character. I hope it teaches, too, that tolerance and understanding among ourselves, and patience when understanding is not clearly established – are among our greatest needs. Given these, I am confident that no influences or pressure from without or within can change the basic Canadian design as envisioned 99 years ago in which our confederation was cast.

CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

But it is our Canadian future towards which our attention must be directed throughout our hundredth year of nationhood – the future Canada that we will bequeath to our children and our grandchildren: a strong, prosperous, independent nation in the family of nations. We cannot fulfill this destiny nor discharge this commitment to our future without unceasing work and unceasing devotion; not expecting or accepting easy solutions to problems, but carrying the burden, as our forefathers did, until we reach our goal.

In a very real sense, we are the executors of the testament handed down by those who conceived our confederation. It is on our shoulders to bring our country into its second century more sure, more confident, more determined to preserve and strengthen our free institutions. I hope we will never lose sight of this challenge that history has posed for us, nor weary in the task of meeting it.

Our strength, progress, our prosperity, these must be shared by all Canadians. In moving forward, differences and difficulties must be recognized – certainly – but they must not be exaggerated; individual, special and regional interests will persist in a country such as ours, but this must not be at the expense of the common good; the demands of change must be met – but not at the cost of human misery or at the risk of destroying our real values and our cherished institutions; our country's stature in the world must continue to be a source of pride to us as mankind seeks for peace and understanding.

Above all, let us all remember this July 1 that we are Canadians. We have not been as vigilant as we should have been in promoting the national spirit, the national pride that our country should command in its children – the love for and dedication to a Canada second to none in the world as it nears its second century.

THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR CONTROL

(Continued from P. 2)

weapons by states with the technical skill, resources, and industrial bases which could enable them to produce such weapons, and who feel that this is necessary for security reasons.

For the non-aligned countries, security assurances to prevent this development raise complex issues affecting their non-aligned status, their relations with the great powers and with their immediate neighbours. In India, for example, which is confronted by a hostile China, these issues are particularly acute and have recently given rise to public discussion. Within the last few weeks, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh stated in the Indian Parliament that, if the nuclear powers wished a non-proliferation treaty, they must be prepared to make some sacrifices. Among other things, he went on to recount the merits of a multilateral international guarantee to reassure the non-nuclear countries against nuclear blackmail.

Security assurances of this kind raise important issues for the nuclear powers. They already have commitments to their allies and the acceptance of

new commitments might tend to strain their military resources and complicate their political relations with other nuclear powers as well as with rivals of countries to whom a guarantee was extended. While the great powers might be prepared to accept responsibilities commensurate with their status, there are, of course, limits to the responsibilities they can be expected to undertake.

U.S. AND SOVIET PROPOSALS

Attention has been given recently to this question of providing the non-aligned countries with adequate assurances about security, which, at the same time, might help to dissuade them from developing their own nuclear weapons. President Johnson made a constructive contribution when he declared in 1964 that "nations not following the nuclear path will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail". At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. delegates suggested that such assurances might take the form of an Assembly resolution.

More recently, Chairman Kosygin has proposed a type of indirect assurance under which the nuclear powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. While this proposal may have certain attractions, we must recognize a difficulty in establishing as a fact whether nuclear weapons are present in certain areas. Furthermore, the additional security offered by this suggestion will be measured against its possible disruptive effect on the collective-security aspects of alliances.

Non-aligned countries, however, faced by a credible nuclear threat, may wish to enter into some form of collective-security agreement with all the nuclear powers, or, if this proves impracticable, into arrangements with individual nations on an ad hoc basis.

A United Nations resolution signifying the intention of members to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states subject to nuclear attack, or threats of attack, might also provide a form of useful collective assurance in no way incompatible with other and more direct arrangements.

QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDS

Mention should be made of another difficult question, that of safeguards. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in elaborating the conception and in developing the practical application of the means of preventing nuclear materials which are supplied for peaceful use from being diverted to the manufacture of weapons. As a major uranium exporter, committed to supplying nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes, Canada is much encouraged to see the acceptance of international safeguards steadily gaining ground, either under the efficient system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency or through equivalent arrange-

ments of an organization such as EURATOM. In the common effort to contain the nuclear threat, we regard safeguards as one of the important instruments which the international community has at its disposal.

Canada has participated actively in the working out of the IAEA safeguards system. Only this week we demonstrated again our support for and confidence in that system, in respect to our agreement with Japan for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We signed an agreement in Vienna under which the International Atomic Energy Agency assumes the responsibility for administering the safeguards incorporated in the Canada-Japan Agreement.

If a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective, to inspire confidence, and to endure, it will require some means of verifying that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are being carried out. This should include a provision to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities and materials for them are not being used clandestinely for military purposes.

But, if safeguards are to be acceptable and effective, they must be acceptable and applicable to all states. These recognized systems of safeguards which are already applied by many countries to transactions involving transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should be applied to cover all such international transfers. In this way, an important step forward would be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by additional countries. We in Canada support the inclusion in any treaty of a provision designed to achieve this objective....

CHINA MUST BE INCLUDED

I have already mentioned the emergence of China as a nuclear power and as a new factor in the nuclear equation. The Chinese leaders appear bent on achieving an effective military nuclear capability however long it takes and however much it costs. To those seeking a peaceful world order, this prospect can only be viewed with deep concern. So long as China remains outside existing international councils, isolating itself from the influence of other governments and world opinion, it is the more likely to remain a recalcitrant and disturbing factor in the world balance of power.

Yet it seems clear that progress towards the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective measures of arms control require that all the principal world powers - including continental China - must be party to international discussions of these questions. Therefore, we should do everything possible to bring China into discussions about disarmament and other great international issues. This may make it more conscious of its responsibility as a member of the international community. In this endeavour, those who already have direct contact with Peking have a special and important role to play....

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