


doc
CA1
EA360
C44
ENG
1982

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS – FINAL RECORDS (PV)
1982 SESSION**



PV

COMPILED BY:

**ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1983

Dept. of Foreign Affairs
Min. des Affaires étrangères

AVR
APR 29 2004

Return to Departmental Library
Retourner à la bibliothèque du Ministère

PREFACE

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT - 1982 SESSION

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

43258713

This book is the result of an initial survey of the 1982 final records of the Committee on Disarmament (CD). It has been compiled to facilitate research on the issue of chemical weapons (CW) and is a compendium of the more significant material made available to the CD.

INDEX

STATEMENTS MADE IN PLENARY SESSION

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>
1	CD/PV.150	21-22	Netherlands/Fein	2.2.82
2	CD/PV.151	12-13	FRG/Wegener	4.2.82
3	CD/PV.152	15-16	USA/Rostow	9.2.82
	CD/PV.152	20	Bulgaria/Tellalov	9.2.82
	CD/PV.153	51	China/Tian Jin	9.2.82
4	CD/PV.153	9-10	UK/Summerhayes	11.2.82
	CD/PV.153	14-15	Australia/Sadleir	11.2.82
5	CD/PV.154	8	Pakistan/Ahmad	12.2.82
	CD/PV.154	15	Cuba/Sola Vila	12.2.82
6	CD/PV.155	14-15	Poland/Sujka	16.2.82
7	CD/PV.156	8	Canada/McPhail	18.2.82
	CD/PV.156	15	Egypt/El Reedy	18.2.82
	CD/PV.156	32	Ethiopia/Terreffe	18.2.82
8	CD/PV.157	18	UK/Summerhayes	23.2.82
9	CD/PV.159	18-19	Austria/Nettel	2.3.82
10	CD/PV.160	19	Morroco/Skalli	4.3.82
	CD/PV.160	35-36	Norway/Berg	4.3.82
11	CD/PV.162	15	USSR/Issraelyan	11.3.82
	CD/PV.162	20-24	USA/Fields (et al)	11.3.82
12	CD/PV.165	7-12	GDR/Herder	23.3.82
	CD/PV.165	13-15	UK/Summerhayes	23.3.82
	CD/PV.165	16-20	Poland/Sujka	23.3.82
	CD/PV.165	35-38	Switzerland/Pictet	23.3.82

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>
13	CD/PV.166	7-11	FRG/Ruth	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	15-16	Hungary/Hollal	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	18-22	USA/Fields	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	24-26	Mongolia/Erdembileg	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	30-33	Bulgaria/Grinberg	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	34-42	USSR/Issraelyan	25.3.82
	CD/PV.166	43	GDR/Herder	25.3.82
14	CD/PV.167	14-18	Argentina/Carasales	30.3.82
	CD/PV.167	19-21	China/Tian Jin	30.3.82
	CD/PV.167	23	Venezuela/Navarro	30.3.82
	CD/PV.167	28-31	Czechoslovakia/ Vejvoda	30.3.82
	CD/PV.167	36-38	Sweden/Lidgard	
15	CD/PV.168	16	Cuba/Sola Vila	1.4.82
	CD/PV.168	19-24	Australia/Sadleir	1.4.82
16	CD/PV.170	10	USA/Busby	8.4.82
	CD/PV.170	20-21	Nigeria/Ijewere	8.4.82
17	CD/PV.171	8-10	FRG/Wegener	15.4.82
	CD/PV.171	15-16	Poland/Sujka	15.4.82
	CD/PV.171	19	Pakistan/Ahmad	15.4.82
18	CD/PV.172	11-12	Poland/Sujka	20.4.82
19	CD/PV.173	13	Canada/McPhail	21.4.82
	CD/PV.173	21	Czechoslovakia/ Vejvoda	21.4.82
20	CD/PV.175	15	Canada/McPhail	3.8.82
	CD/PV.175	20	USSR/Issraelyan	3.8.82

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>
	CD/PV.175	23	India/ Venkateswaran	3.8.82
	CD/PV.175	32	FRG/Wegener	3.8.82
	CD/PV.175	39	Sweden/Thorsson	3.8.82
21	CD/PV.176	10-11	Czechoslovakia/ Vejvoda	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	13	Japan/Okawa	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	16	Romania/Datcou	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	19-20	China/Tian Jin	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	23	France/de la Gorce	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	26	Australia/Sadleir	5.8.82
	CD/PV.176	37	GDR/Herder	5.8.82
22	CD/PV.177	13-14	USA/Fields	10.8.82
	CD/PV.177	15-16	Romania/Datcou	10.8.82
	CD/PV.177	17-18	Poland/Sujka	10.8.82
	CD/PV.177	21-23	Belgium/Onkelinx	10.8.82
	CD/PV.177	25	Indonesia/Sutresna	10.8.82
23	CD/PV.178	7-11	USA/Fields	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	14-15	Bulgaria/Tellalov	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	15-19	Netherlands/ Van Dongen	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	20-22	Czechoslovakia/ Vejvoda	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	22-30	USSR/Issraelyan	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	32	Burma/ U Maung Maung Gpl	12.8.82
	CD/PV.178	34-37	UK/Middleton	12.8.82

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>
24	CD/PV.179	12-13	Italy/Alessi	17.8.82
	CD/PV.179	25-26	Hungary/Komives	17.8.82
	CD/PV.179	26-28	China/Tian Jin	17.8.82
	CD/PV.179	31-32	Norway/Vaernø	17.8.82
25	CD/PV.180	9-10	Mongolia/ Erdembilig	19.8.82
	CD/PV.180	21	Venezuela/ Rodrigues Navarro	19.8.82
	CD/PV.180	32	Cuba/Sola Vila	19.8.82
	CD/PV.180	40-42	Indonesia/Sutresna	19.8.82
26	CD/PV.182	22-23	FRG/Wegener	26.8.82
	CD/PV.182	27	Ireland/Hayes	26.8.82
27	CD/PV.183	39	Algeria/Taffar	31.8.82
	CD/PV.183	48	Zaire/Ekanga Kabeya	31.8.82
	CD/PV.184	16-19	USSR/Issraelyan	2.9.82
28	CD/PV.185	14-16	FRG/Wegener	7.9.82
29	CD/PV.186	6-7	India/Saeen	14.9.82
	CD/PV.186	20	Egypt/El Reedy	14.9.82
30	CD/PV.187	7	Belgium/Onkelinx	16.9.82
	CD/PV.187	10	Burma/ U Maung Maung Gyl	16.9.82
	CD/PV.187	14	Bulgaria/Tellalov	16.9.82
	CD/PV.187	18	USA/Fields	16.9.82
	CD/PV.187	23-25	Poland/Sujka	16.9.82
	CD/PV.187	28	Brazil/ de Souza i Silva	16.9.82

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Nation/Speaker</u>	<u>Date</u>
31	CD/PV.188	8	France/de la Gorce	17.9.82
	CD/PV.188	11	USSR/Issraelyan	17.9.82

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

not only is it necessary to arrange adequate verification measures in a CTB treaty but we are convinced that adequate verification is also possible. As far as there are technical problems, we are confident that they can be overcome, inter alia, by drawing on the experience gained and to be gained in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, in which the Netherlands participates. I may recall that significant progress has been made by this Group in the design of a global verification system. Effective continuation of these efforts, including a full scale test of the seismic system, is called for. The time is also ripe for working out the administrative elements for such a seismic system within a CTB treaty.

A corollary to a CTB treaty would be a so-called "cut-off" agreement which would ban the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. This, too, would be an effective step in curbing the nuclear arms race. We are not unaware of the verification problems involved, but a cut-off presents one of the few effective nuclear arms control measures for which in principle an international verification system has already been worked out, to wit: nuclear safeguards. It seems logical, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should deal with this matter as well.

It stands to reason that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be re-established. The Netherlands delegation is one of those who hold that under the inspiring chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons came close to exhausting its mandate last year. We hope very much, therefore, that a new mandate can be agreed upon now, enabling the Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, as a matter of high priority, a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction.

Next to matters relating to the scope of a chemical weapons convention, the Ad Hoc Working Group will have to deal extensively with its verification provisions. We believe that verification should serve as one component in a system that, together with a meaningful scope and a reasonable amount of protective measures, will give a State more national security than the maintenance of the chemical weapon option would do. Without adequate verification, States will not be confident that the provisions of a convention will be observed. As we stated before, it is our considered view that within the framework of a chemical weapons convention, national and international verification are complementary. After all, we are dealing with a proven weapon system, ready and available in large amounts.

At the end of last year's summer session, at the 143rd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, on 4 August 1981, I had the honour to introduce document CD/203 concerning consultative and co-operative verification measures and a complaints procedure in the framework of a chemical weapons convention. This document gives a complete outline of a reasonable, but effective, verification system and was designed in such a way as to take care especially of practical needs. Allow me briefly to recapitulate the main characteristics of our proposals:

Consultation, co-operation, verification and complaints are not treated individually but form elements of one integrated, consistent system;

National and international verification are therefore interlinked;

The establishment of national implementation agencies will be called for;

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

The national implementation agency will, inter alia, work closely together with a consultative committee to be established;

The consultative committee should permanently oversee the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

The consultative committee must carry out the supervision of the destruction and diversion through on-site inspections on a permanent basis;

Through random on-site inspections the consultative committee will check periodically that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals does not exceed agreed quantities;

With a view to enhancing confidence, the consultative committee should undertake inspections on a random basis at facilities on the territory of States parties that will on a regular basis be assigned by lot;

The consultative committee shall be competent to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in, or violations of, the compliance with the convention;

In the context of such an enquiry the consultative committee would be competent to undertake on-site inspections after consultation with the State party concerned. If the latter State party, however, does not agree to such an on-site inspection, it must provide appropriate explanations;

Each State party to the convention may use national technical means of verification;

Complaints can be lodged with the Security Council. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

In view of both the outcome of last year's activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and of the massive support for General Assembly resolution 36/95, introduced by Pakistan, my delegation is certainly in favour of the re-establishment of the negative security assurances Working Group. In fact we were pleased and encouraged by the positive attention which we received when last year we proposed a model "common formula" for a Security Council resolution covering the common ground contained in the national statements of the nuclear-weapon States. It seems, however, that last year the Ad Hoc Working Group took things as far as we can carry them and that the ball is now also very much in the camp of the nuclear-weapon States. We call therefore for a joint effort by the nuclear-weapon States involved to bring their respective negative security assurances nearer to each other and possibly to harmonize them. As long as such a joint effort is not undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States involved, we can hardly conceive of room for much further work for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances. The Working Group would therefore be more or less on a stand-by basis.

During the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Netherlands delegation actively worked for the adoption of a draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The General Assembly decided to entrust this important

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My Government, in full agreement with the Final Act of Helsinki, has repeatedly urged the Polish leaders to lift martial law in order to re-establish the Polish people's civil rights, to release those who are arrested and to resume a genuine dialogue with the Catholic Church and legitimate representatives of the independent trade union in Poland. We also request that Poland be enabled to solve its problems autonomously and without external interference.

If these overriding requirements are met, mutual confidence will revive and the prospects for progress in terms of concrete results in disarmament and arms control will be substantially enhanced.

Grave as the events in Poland are, they are not the only threats to the international security climate. The military balance in Europe still gives rise to undiminished concern.

The Federal Republic of Germany therefore welcomes the fact that the negotiations here in Geneva between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces have been resumed after the Christmas recess. We are convinced that a positive outcome of these negotiations will contribute to greater international stability and progress in other arms control endeavours. We fully support the far-reaching American proposal -- thoroughly prepared within the Western Alliance -- aiming at a zero level outcome for all land-based intermediate nuclear missiles on both sides.

A treaty which honours this unique offer would eliminate the weapons category of greatest concern. We feel that such an outcome would be the most promising and tangible way of strengthening international peace and security. We welcome the commitment on both sides to spare no effort to reach agreement. In the same spirit, my Government attaches a high value to continued negotiations in this Committee.

Turning to the second part of my intervention, I should like to highlight once more the importance which my delegation attaches to the question of chemical weapons. In my country, a comprehensive chemical weapons prohibition is a matter of concern not only to the Government but to all political parties represented in the German Bundestag. On 3 December 1981, the Federal Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution urging the immediate conclusion of a chemical weapons convention to operate under effective international control.

Looking at the achievements of the Committee during its 1981 session -- and that means at the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons -- we can pride ourselves on having produced, under the efficient leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, a considerable degree of specificity in what comes very near to being treaty language. However, progress is so far less apparent in the field of verification. But verification is the centrepiece on which the ultimate success of our negotiations depends and on which, therefore, we should focus particular attention during this year's debate.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Experience of agreements lacking a proper verification mechanism, such as the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, stresses the need for a comprehensive solution to this question.

My delegation has on many occasions set out its views on the essentials of an effective international verification system. Let me just recapitulate:

Verification must follow a regular, pre-established procedure so as to be non-discriminatory and take place in a businesslike and co-operative atmosphere;

It must provide for impartial investigations into events which require clarification; and

It must protect legitimate economic interests.

In order to advance work in this direction, my delegation will, during this session, introduce a working paper which will set out in greater detail the mechanisms and procedures which are, in our view, necessary for an effective verification of a chemical weapons convention. This working paper will, inter alia, specifically deal with the problems of binary weapons. In particular, we intend to propose a way whereby -- contrary to certain allegations that the non-production of binary weapons is not verifiable -- verification can also be extended to and include binary weapons.

The vital contribution of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament need not be underscored. From the documents it appears evident that the Committee on Disarmament must come to terms with the CPD issue, and that at least a negotiable text, with or without a limited number of alternative options on specific problems, must be ready for the larger New York audience by the time this Committee winds up its spring session. The matter is urgent, and the credibility of this Committee is at stake.

The CPD Working Group which met through most of January has done good work and, while no firm results are in sight on most issues, it has deepened the insight and understanding of all delegations concerned. My delegation is grateful to the participants and to the Working Group's Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. The work accomplished in January allows us to identify the areas where consensus is well within reach, and, conversely, those areas where major controversies loom which we must jointly settle in the next few weeks.

From the viewpoint of one of the sponsors of document CD/205, the only complete draft programme before the Committee at this time, my delegation is under the impression that the following three issues of principle have arisen and need creative negotiating in a spirit of compromise:

1. Nature of the CPD

It is obvious that the CPD will need a mode of adoption and promulgation commensurate with its overriding significance for the success of the second special session on disarmament. It must, at the same time, correspond to

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In connection with another issue which has been under active consideration by the Committee during its past three sessions, that of the so-called negative security assurances, I would like to reaffirm the unilateral assurance given by the United States at the time of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. As we said at that time:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The United States stands by this statement as a reliable and firm assurance. We have nonetheless participated, and are willing to continue to participate in the Working Group which deals with this issue, and would join a consensus to re-establish the group. The United States believes that development of a common assurance, as has been suggested, would be extremely difficult, although of course we are not opposed to this concept.

The Committee's task of developing a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as mandated by the first special session on disarmament, is extremely important. We strongly support this effort and will continue to work constructively toward enunciation of a meaningful programme to be presented to the General Assembly at its second special session. The United States believes that to achieve the necessary consensus, such a programme must be realistic and must reflect the security needs of all States. It should provide guidelines for the actions of States, with an over-all goal of promoting world stability and peace.

Both the increased complexity of modern weapons and the turbulent condition of world politics have highlighted the special importance of compliance with treaties as a factor among the responsibilities of this Committee. Trust is an essential ingredient of the condition of peace. Montesquieu spoke of peace as a state of tranquillity in which no man need fear his neighbour. Alas, that criterion is not satisfied today in many parts of the world. None of the neighbours of the Soviet Union can say that it feels comfortable about the inviolability of its borders. And more generally, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union radiates anxiety far beyond the States in its immediate neighbourhood, to States which fear the fate of Afghanistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the German Democratic Republic, or Bulgaria. Troubling questions have arisen about Soviet compliance with international agreements concerning chemical and biological warfare. Those questions affect every State in the world community. And they cast a shadow over the possibility of verifying Soviet compliance with treaties on the control of other arms, and particularly of nuclear arms.

In 1967, the International Red Cross published disturbing evidence about the use of Soviet chemical weapons in the Yemen. Now, initial circumstantial evidence that lethal chemical weapons have been used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

been confirmed by new evidence from south-east Asia -- evidence of the use of prohibited lethal mycotoxins, which are particularly cruel and inhumane weapons of war. The production and use of such weapons raises most serious questions about compliance with existing international constraints on such activities, including the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972 and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which the Soviet Union is a party. This development demonstrates the necessity of further consideration of the adequacy of applicable verification and compliance provisions.

It is vital that all countries concerned co-operate to the fullest extent with the work of the United Nations Group of Experts investigating this matter. It will not suffice simply to call attention to the problems. We deserve answers. The 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk has never been adequately explained. The Soviet Union and its friends and allies have vehemently denied that the Soviet Union is engaged in any way in the use of toxins or other chemical weapons. But it remains altogether unwilling to discuss these matters in detail or to offer the kind of co-operation that might alleviate the legitimate concerns of the world community. Soviet behaviour in the face of such inquiries has simply deepened the suspicions and anxiety of all persons of goodwill. This is a fact of particular importance to the work of this Committee.

It is therefore essential that the verification of compliance with arms control treaties be made a central feature of our work programme here. Until the nations agree on the principle of far-reaching international co-operation in monitoring and enforcing compliance with such agreements, arms control and disarmament cannot begin to achieve their full potential as programmes of peace. The Soviet Union has recently stated that while it continued to rely primarily on national means of verification of compliance with arms control treaties, it was willing to accept co-operative means of verification where circumstances make such procedures necessary and desirable. The United States welcomes this assurance. And it recalls the fact that in 1947 the Soviet Union made a far more comprehensive statement of its readiness to accept inspection and other co-operative means of verification in the interest of arms control during the consideration of the United States' proposal for the international control of nuclear energy, known as the Baruch Plan. The volatility and fragility of the international atmosphere make it essential that the Soviet Union go beyond President Brezhnev's statement of 23 November 1981, to Foreign Minister Gromyko's earlier and more ample offer.

Thus far, I have alluded only in passing to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is because in many respects its shape and the nature of its contribution to our common endeavours cannot yet be clearly foreseen. In no small part, what happens in New York in June will depend upon what happens here between now and then. The Committee's work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a major input. In that effort, the United States wishes to play an active and energetic role. But, obviously, all does not rest on what we do here. Much will depend on whether the behaviour of States conforms to their professed goals and intentions. The work of the second special session will be particularly sensitive to this factor. Let us hope that, to the extent that we can influence events, this Committee will contribute to a special session which should be marked by a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations in the effort to maintain peace and security for all mankind.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Our delegation will continue to make its contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on problems of the seismic monitoring of the observance of the future treaty.

The question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is closely linked with that of the development of new types of nuclear weapons. An example of this gloomy prospect is the decision of the present United States administration to start production of nuclear neutron weapons. In endeavouring to resolve this issue, we ought not to be put off by artificial excuses, such as the argument that neutron weapons are not basically a new type of weapon and that there is therefore no need to consider them separately.

It is important that we should embark at once on negotiations for the elaboration of a convention prohibiting this type of weapon, for many specialists categorically affirm that it lowers the "nuclear threshold."

Another question which is closely bound up with the nuclear weapons issue is that of strengthening the security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Our delegation's interest in this matter is well-known. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries we have been taking an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group concerned. Our aim continues to be the conclusion of an international convention, taking into account, also, other proposals in this direction. In this connection, we believe that it is time to begin negotiations on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation is convinced that the Committee should concentrate its attention on and contribute to the elaboration of a treaty for the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We fully support the proposal made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Israelyan, concerning the setting up of an ad hoc working group to negotiate with the aim of reaching agreement and the text of such a treaty.

The progress of negotiations on chemical weapons is an example of how the Committee's efforts lag behind the development and deployment of new and yet more dangerous types of such weapons. Together with other socialist countries and the vast majority of members of this Committee, we are in favour of the intensification of negotiations within the framework of a mandate which would open the way to the drafting of the actual provisions of the future convention.

We supported the General Assembly's appeal for a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations and we consider that the Committee, for its part, ought to pay particular attention to binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and also to the matter of non-stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation attaches great importance to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We would urge the setting up of a group of qualified governmental experts, bearing in mind the development of the question at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is our belief that the setting up of such a group would permit an in-depth study to be made of the question within the framework of a permanent and purpose-oriented organizational structure.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

effective implementation. For each stage, an indicative time-frame should be provided. And the verification machinery and procedures necessary for reviewing its implementation should be established. Since the programme is to be worked out through serious negotiations, States should undertake obligations and responsibilities arising therefrom and implement the programme in earnest.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has always been an important issue at the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. The continued use of such weapons of mass destruction in massacring people has aroused grave concern on the part of the world public opinion. Over the past year, there have again been many reports on the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and other places. It is disturbing to note that the superpowers which possess large arsenals of chemical weapons are stepping up the production, development and deployment of these weapons. All this commands greater urgency in the task of formulating an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. We agree with the proposal of many countries that the mandate of the Working Group be extended.

We maintain that the scope of the prohibition in the future convention should cover the use of chemical weapons. To emphasize anew the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would supplement and strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In order to ensure implementation of the future convention, we maintain that stringent and effective measures for international verification be provided for, including on-site inspections on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

Let me turn now to the question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the face of the grave nuclear threat, the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States demand that, pending nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States unconditionally undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and that on this basis, negotiations be started as soon as possible to conclude an international convention in this regard. The Chinese delegation supports this demand. We are ready to give positive consideration to proposals made or to be made on this item, provided they are truly conducive to the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In our view, the nuclear-weapon States should consider the reasonable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for the guaranteeing of their security. Basing themselves on their own narrow interests, the major nuclear-weapon powers are putting various conditions to non-nuclear-weapon States, and demanding that non-nuclear-weapon States ensure the security of the major nuclear Powers first. Such a practice of putting the cart before the horse is bound to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from making progress on this item.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session call upon the Committee to consider at its current session the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. In recent years, the two superpowers have been energetically developing military technology used in outer space. They have in their hands some outer space weapons which are near the operational stage. The fact that the arms race between them has already extended into outer space is another salient feature in the new round of their arms race.

CONFIDENTIAL

For each stage, an indicative programme of work is set out in the following table. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year.

The programme of work is intended to be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year.

The programme of work is intended to be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year.

The programme of work is intended to be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year.

The programme of work is intended to be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year. It is intended that the programme should be completed by the end of the year.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

points upon which we hold a different view from that expressed by the delegation of India. In particular, we are surprised to find that he considers that document CD/205 does not provide an idea of the route along which we must travel towards general and complete disarmament. In our view, document CD/205 does provide such a route, particularly for the first part of the journey. Thereafter, we have sketched out some possible paths to follow; but we do not consider that it is feasible, when the map is largely uncharted, to go further without adequate review. As I have indicated, however, we believe that the possibility of reaching agreement on the comprehensive programme does exist and that we should now concentrate our efforts in the Working Group on this aim.

Although, as I have made clear, my delegation attaches particular importance at this time to the CPD negotiations, we also believe that members of the Committee should not lose sight of the more direct contribution they can make to progress on arms control through the Committee's work on radiological weapons and, still more, on chemical weapons.

My delegation demonstrated its belief in the value of the early completion of negotiations on a final text of a convention to ban radiological weapons by its support for resolution 36/97 B at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We are again ready at this present session to play a constructive part in discussions aimed at achieving a generally acceptable text; success in these discussions could provide a useful, if modest, step further forward in arms control. The importance of the measure lies not so much in the likely imminence of the introduction of such weapons -- for radiological weapons would certainly be very difficult to employ -- but in the incalculable and uncontrollable nature of their effects, which could persist long after a war in which the weapons were used, thus affecting future generations. That is sufficient reason for banning this potential class of weapons. I believe that we are most likely to achieve our objective by concentrating on the specific and well-definable issues which were still to be resolved at the end of last year rather than by attempting to cast our net too wide.

I should like now to turn to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which covered a great deal of ground last year under the able and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. The United Kingdom destroyed its entire stock of chemical weapons more than 10 years ago and my Government remains committed, as it has been since negotiations first began in the CCD, to seeking a comprehensive, effective and adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons. My delegation therefore very much welcomed the intensive consideration of the range of issues covered last year. The report of the Working Group showed that there is still a great deal to be done, but it also pointed to a number of areas where a convergence of views is beginning to develop. We hope that the momentum created last year will be maintained during this session; we would, in particular, think it highly regrettable if the work of this Group were in any way to be held up by procedural considerations. We look forward to further substantive progress to report to the second special session devoted to disarmament and, in this connection,

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

we intend shortly to put forward some detailed suggestions on the question of verification. The United Kingdom's views on this subject are already well-known. While the various elements of a convention are clearly bound up with each other, the purpose of the working paper, which, while focusing on verification, will be to build on the progress made on this issue since the United Kingdom tabled its views in 1976. Verification is still the central problem we face in drawing up a convention. Satisfactory resolution of this problem is the only way in which the parties to a convention can have confidence in it.

The United Kingdom considers that verification provisions would be necessary for each stage of implementation -- that is, for the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and production facilities --- and thereafter to monitor the compliance of States, including the monitoring of permitted peaceful uses of chemical warfare agents and dual-purpose agents. It is essential also that the convention should have an effective complaints procedure.

We believe that the verification of implementation of the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities must be under international control. Thereafter, verification of compliance could be by a mixture of bilateral and multilateral contacts between States parties, with an international body -- the Consultative Committee, on which we have already made detailed proposals -- having ultimate responsibility.

Among the other items of business before the Committee to which we attach much importance is a subject commended to our attention by General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99, namely, the question of further measures of arms control in outer space. My delegation hopes that this subject is to be included in the agenda of the Committee for this session and that time will be allocated in our work schedule for discussion of the technical issues which will have to be addressed in this new area of work.

The question of our work schedule to which I have just referred brings me back to the point I mentioned in connection with the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are faced with a formidable amount of work in a relatively short period, since, for practical purposes, I believe we should finish our session by the middle of April. I believe that we must be guided by the actual possibilities for making progress on particular items and not necessarily by the theoretical allocation of priorities to certain subjects according to their over-all importance in the disarmament field. I also suggest that we might consider reverting to a practice used to good avail during our 1980 session, namely, that of holding less than the usual number of plenary meetings, at least during the latter part of the session, to allow time for extra informal meetings, sessions of the Working Groups and so on. This might be particularly useful when we begin to prepare our reports. If we are to complete the work of this session in good order, it will be necessary to make proper dispositions even at this early stage for our special report to the General Assembly.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

If the political climate is bad and if the assurances, the prospect of security are not as firm as they might be, it is not for us here in this Committee to collapse into despair. We, above all, are charged by our Governments, by our peoples and by the United Nations system to work towards disarmament. That is a key responsibility. It is precisely when the political climate is most difficult, when the assurances each of our States seeks are most lacking, that we of the Committee on Disarmament should be making the most urgent efforts to press our responsibilities and bring forward agreement when none seems possible. I venture to suggest that one substantial achievement, only one achievement, on our part at this session would do much to restore that spirit of optimism in the international community which in recent years has so sadly been lacking.

I turn now to the items on our agenda. For Australia, the first item, the nuclear test ban, has always held special importance. Of the several dozen disarmament resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, few can be said to have much importance for negotiating disarmament. One, however, resolution 36/85, is sufficiently balanced and sufficiently constructive to show the way ahead in tackling the question of a nuclear test ban. I am happy both that Australia played a leading role in drafting this resolution and that it attracted 140 positive votes and no negative votes in plenary. The resolution stresses the indispensable role of this Committee in negotiating a test ban. It also asks the Committee to determine the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system.

In the context of resolution 36/85, the Committee's attention should be drawn again to document CD/95, which my delegation introduced in 1980 and which provides an illustrative list of subjects which might, in this context, be examined by the Committee. Many delegations have, in the past, urged us to be more ambitious and to hold out for immediate, full-scale negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Many delegations have, in the past, considered that only in the forum of a working group could substantive discussion on a CTB take place. It is the view of my delegation that rigidity will not help us in present circumstances, either as to the context or to the way we go about our work. We consider that detailed and practical consideration of the elements of a nuclear test ban can and should take place, at an early date, in one of a range of possible formal or informal sub-groups of this Committee. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has long been a model of patient industry, on just one aspect bearing on an eventual nuclear test ban. There is no reason why other aspects cannot now be addressed with similar efficacy.

The subject of chemical weapons is the other agenda item of particular importance to my delegation. Here again there is a strong and valuable United Nations resolution to guide us. Here, I draw attention to resolution 36/96 A. Here again is a chance for the Committee to be imaginative in the method of its work and to avoid needlessly standing square-on and stationary before a roadblock. There is no doubt that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has run its course and needs revising. So long as a new mandate permits progress its precise terms should not greatly matter: the "elaboration of a chemical weapons convention" seems to us to be our task and there is no earthly use in wasting time on semantics before getting down to it.

There is absolutely no question that the need to ban chemical weapons is urgent. Because such weapons are militarily effective -- providing as they do a flexible and stunning option, particularly for surprise attack -- they are widely

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

deployed in Europe. The asymmetry of deployments is, unfortunately, such that we read reports of plans to add to the stockpiles and systems of chemical weapons there. How much better if the reports were instead of plans for symmetry involving a unilateral reduction of chemical weapon readiness. Since, moreover, chemical weapons are specially effective against the unprotected, there is a constant temptation to use them against less equipped adversaries. This, very likely, lies behind reports from South East Asia and Afghanistan of the use of chemical agents in conflicts there. The reports are a cause for serious distress. The ban for which we call should resolve the ambiguities and close the loopholes which mar related prohibitions, namely, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Such a ban should, above all, be fully verifiable. Progress here in the next months towards a ban on chemical weapons is one of the achievements which could, in one stroke, both justify the existence of this Committee and constitute a tonic for the world.

Another area where progress is possible is the effort to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This item, the third on the Committee's agenda, was the first to be entrusted to an Ad Hoc Working Group. Although movement has been slow, a real opportunity exists now for acceleration. At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the delegation of Pakistan introduced a resolution, adopted as resolution 36/95, with 145 favourable votes and no negative votes, which indicates how this important issue may be managed. My delegation will co-operate with others in efforts to ensure a successful outcome on this matter. It would be appropriate if the nuclear-weapon States, whose positions, as set out at the first special session on disarmament, gave impetus to our efforts in this area, were able to advance it for recognition by the second special session.

Turning to the comprehensive programme on disarmament, I should like simply to state our belief that the time has come to start serious drafting. The Working Group spent three rewarding weeks in January thoroughly studying all major issues at stake in the projected programme. However, time is short, the general debate has nearly run its course and intensive drafting is now required. We therefore welcome the establishment of open-ended drafting groups, under the able guidance of Ambassadors de la Gorce of France and de Souza e Silva of Brazil, on those sections of the programme dealing with objectives and priorities. The establishment of the drafting groups reflects, we believe, recognition that, in this case, a working group is too cumbersome an instrument for speedily advancing the Committee's work. We suggest, accordingly, that perhaps only one formal meeting a week of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be sufficient and that the other working period allotted to the CPD should be set aside for drafting or informal consultations.

As to radiological weapons, I say only that the Australian delegation sought last year to play a helpful role in bridging the differences that have so far prevented the Committee from bringing this limited disarmament measure to a conclusion. It is a role which, on behalf of my delegation, I pledge ourselves to maintain this year.

Australia, in part because of geographical circumstance, has long been involved in the adventure of exploring outer space. It is a source of concern to us that that new frontier of man should not be abused. It was for this reason that Australia, at the recent General Assembly, co-sponsored resolution 36/97 C. We consider that, in this first half of its 1982 session, the Committee could best advance its work on the issue of outer space by engaging in a broad exchange of views on the question in all its aspects. This would enable the Committee to take, at a later stage, a more informed approach in dealing substantively with the topic.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

climate, this session can give an impetus to setting in motion the disarmament process. Nor should we underestimate the important part which the Committee on Disarmament can play in ensuring that the opportunity of the second special session is not missed. My delegation therefore agrees with those speakers who have suggested that our work during the next 12 weeks must be aimed principally at ensuring that the Committee makes an optimum contribution to the success of the special session.

The conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty would undoubtedly contribute immensely to the success of the second special session. But hopes of this happening have dimmed. It should be possible at the very least for the Committee to establish a working group on the CTB at the current session and to make some progress towards the treaty which can be reported to the special session. There is, of course, a direct link between nuclear disarmament and a test ban treaty. But it was our impression that the test ban was an immediate rather than long-range objective of all Governments of nuclear and non-nuclear States. We would do well to ponder, at this stage, the risks which any further delay in concluding a test ban treaty would entail. It would also be relevant to recall once again the link between measures to halt the vertical as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another issue on which this Committee has been asked to conclude an agreement for submission to the second special session is negative security assurances. My delegation was most gratified at the overwhelming support for Pakistan's resolution on this subject at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the recommendation made in that General Assembly resolution, my delegation is prepared to undertake further intensive efforts to search for a common approach or a common formula "including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981". May I recall that these include principally the one proposed by the Netherlands and the three formulations informally suggested by my delegation. The discussions last year, however, have made it amply clear that an agreement would become possible only if the nuclear-weapon States reconsider their divergent positions and respond in a more forthright and credible way to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly has appealed, "especially to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". I can do no better than to reiterate this appeal. As Ambassador Fein put it, "the ball is in the court of the nuclear-weapon States". We look forward to a serious and considered response from them, not merely a reiteration of positions which are conceived only in the context of their narrow self-interest and nuclear doctrines.

My delegation would welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope that it will be given a new mandate which will enable it to commence the concrete task of negotiating the text of a chemical weapons convention. This goal has become all the more urgent in the light of persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world and other reports regarding decisions taken to augment and modernize chemical weapons stockpiles. Further delay or ambiguity regarding the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could well erode the existing international consensus on the subject and add the spectre of general chemical warfare to the nuclear shadow which already hangs over mankind.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Perhaps it is necessary to point out once again that the establishment of working groups as subsidiary bodies of the Committee has been recognized as one of the most effective means of carrying on work within this forum.

In this connection, my delegation supports the immediate establishment of the working groups which will continue advancing on the road already opened up in previous years to agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the granting of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the Committee has already decided, at the very start of its 1982 session, that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will continue to work under the guidance of Ambassador García Robles. This provides an immediate guarantee that this negotiating body will succeed in presenting a draft programme for adoption at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation is also of the opinion that the Committee on Disarmament is under an obligation to seek ways of complying with the requests by the United Nations General Assembly that it should begin negotiations with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons and with a view to drawing up a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Although at future meetings we shall speak in detail on the items before the Committee, I should like to make a few brief comments on the procedure to be followed for their consideration.

The need to prepare a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons is becoming increasingly pressing in view of the escalation of the chemical arms race, as is made clear by the recent decisions of the United States Government to authorize the continuation of the manufacture of such weapons.

Last year, the relevant Working Group made considerable progress, which should be continued this year so that such a convention may be adopted with the necessary urgency.

The adoption of urgent measures to prevent the development of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, calls for the establishment of a working group with an appropriate mandate that will enable it to enter into the substance of the preparation of the convention in question.

My delegation hopes that, this year, a decision to this effect can be taken at an early date.

With regard to the preparation of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, there can be no justification whatsoever for any further delay.

In the relevant resolution of the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to continue negotiations so that the text of the agreement may be submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, my delegation has actively participated in this Committee in all debates and in the preparation of the appropriate documents on this agenda item, starting with document CD/4 at the beginning of existence of the Committee on Disarmament in its present form. We shall continue to do so with a deep conviction that the establishment of the working group would constitute the next and necessary step forward in fulfilling the Committee's mandate on this agenda item.

I would like to support the draft mandate for the working group just proposed by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

It is equally so with the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Committee should not delay any longer the establishment of the ad hoc working group on this item, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions that have been adopted in the last several years and, most recently, resolutions 36/84 and 36/92 F. We should, indeed, bear in mind the fact that, as stated in General Assembly resolution 36/84, "... since 1972 ... all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary ...". It is deplorable that, as emphasized in the reports from its last year's session and in the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution the Committee on Disarmament was prevented from responding to the general wish for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item only as a result of the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States. The working group should be established without any further delay and should consider all the aspects of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests and aim at the early elaboration of the text of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Speaking on the complex problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, I must touch on the question of nuclear neutron weapons. In its resolution 36/92 K, the General Assembly requested this Committee "to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons". My delegation believes that the best organizational framework for elaborating such a convention would be an ad hoc working group which could be established by this Committee. We have at our disposal a comparatively good background for such an exercise: the draft convention submitted by the group of socialist countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a broad exchange of views on the subject matter which could be continued and deepened in the working group.

With regard to the agenda items on which we concentrated our efforts last year in the work of the working groups, I would like to present the views of my delegation on chemical weapons and the comprehensive programme on disarmament.

With regard to chemical weapons, we note with great concern the news of dangerous developments in the chemical arms race. The United States Government is making preparations for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, specifically binary weapons. As the members of the Committee are aware, we have so far not been able to start concrete negotiations on the draft text of a chemical weapons convention. This was so mainly because of the position of at least one delegation which favoured a rather limited mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

on chemical weapons. Now, we have learned with satisfaction that the United States would be ready "to support efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons". My delegation welcomes such a statement, which we take as an expression of the consent of that delegation to a broader mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In view of the above, my delegation believes that a proposal on the broadening of the mandate will achieve consensus. With an enlarged mandate, which will oblige us to start the elaboration of a draft convention, the working group should obviously base its work on the solid foundations that have been built at the Committee's last two sessions under the very able chairmanship of the Ambassadors of Japan and Sweden. How to proceed further? As we all realize, the present stage of negotiations makes it possible to determine the level of convergence and divergence of views on numerous issues around the table. From this point on, this year's group should start elaborating specific provisions of the convention on issues where convergence or unanimity of views has been reached and try to narrow the gap on issues where the views still differ. The group could possibly work in turns, that is, concentrating at a time on elaborating specific provisions and, at another time, on narrowing the gap between the diverging views.

My delegation, which was a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, wishes to refer to its operative paragraph 5, which "calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". We are convinced that this stipulation should be clearly reflected in our work on the future convention on chemical weapons.

The distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, who spoke on 2 February, expressed in considerable detail the views shared by the socialist countries, including Poland, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a whole, as well as on its particular chapters. I do not have much to add, except to underline and emphasize once again that, in the light of the coming second special session which will approve the programme, my delegation belongs to those very many others who consider that the draft CPD should be elaborated by this Committee at its current spring session. What we need is a realistic and genuine approach to the main objective: to negotiate for general and complete disarmament. In this connection, I totally share the view expressed here one week ago by the distinguished representative of India.

In fact, I have one remark to add to the discussion of the principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I have in mind the "linkage" argument. If each of us in this room is to apply the "linkage" approach, then, indeed, we shall not be able to work out a genuine comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation therefore suggests that the disarmament negotiations, known from past experience as a time-consuming and painstaking process, should not be linked with other events in international life. We are of the opinion that that should become one of the principles of the future CPD.

This is the position on the main topics that my delegation has brought with it in coming to participate in the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. We are ready to co-operate with every delegation, as we think it essential that tangible progress should be made this year. For socialist Poland's foreign policy, there is objective more important and urgent than to secure lasting peace and multilateral co-operation for all nations of the world. This can be done only by stopping the mad arms race with a view to arriving at a general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

Last spring, I noted that, in our opinion, it would be wise for the Committee to make an objective assessment of the direction in which we were moving and why precisely because we were leading towards the next special session devoted to disarmament. While it is true that the Committee on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body and therefore possesses unique authority, its authority, we repeat once more, ultimately depends upon the results it produces. This year we face a shortened session, yet this year, even more is expected of the Committee: and, let us face it, more hope is invested in it than in the past. These, then, are the international and internal atmospherics affecting the tasks with which the Committee is charged in the period up to the second special session. I now would like to turn briefly to these tasks:

Those who participated in the efforts of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons have reason to be satisfied. A number of the most complex areas in the elaboration of an eventual chemical weapons treaty were identified and set down. Complex problems remain, some substantive and some technical, particularly in the field of verifying the terms of an eventual treaty; and some, of course, of a more political nature.

It is a matter of great regret to us that the traditional resolution on chemical weapons jointly co-sponsored by Canada, Poland, the Byelorussian SSR and Japan was not adopted by consensus at the last General Assembly. The lack of consensus on this resolution could mean that the way is open for a prolonged debate on procedural matters, should some in this Committee so choose. Such a debate in our view would, we fear, sacrifice substance to form. We are confident, however, that such a debate can be avoided and indeed we hope and expect that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be adopted in this Committee by consensus.

Many expect that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a "centrepiece" of the second special session on disarmament. There are few areas where the consensus-building procedure of finding the lowest common denominator of agreement and raising it to the highest is more important than during our efforts to develop a comprehensive programme that can be accepted by all. This process will require patience and flexibility, for only through compromise is consensus possible. Great problems remain and consensus is by no means certain. We are encouraged however, that it does appear there is a gathering consensus on the holding of review conferences. This is only a beginning, but a good beginning.

We continue to believe that a treaty on radiological weapons has the advantage of closing off a weapons option and the prospects for its development. We do not exaggerate the importance of such a treaty, but we do think it would be a positive step. This said, if at all possible -- and we think it is possible -- the conclusion of the text of such a treaty by the time of the second special session would represent the first concrete evidence of the Committee on Disarmament's ability to produce an agreement. It is for this symbolic reason that we consider the conclusion of a text more important than it would otherwise be. There are still a number of proposals which could be incorporated into the text of a treaty on radiological weapons, particularly one put forward by Sweden on the safeguarding from attack of civilian nuclear facilities. It is surely not beyond the skill of this negotiating forum to find a technique for addressing seriously this question in parallel with the work already undertaken on the treaty.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Turning now to the item on chemical weapons, on which a good measure of progress has been made in reaching agreement on specific elements and detailed formulations for incorporation in a treaty on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, we believe that the early conclusions of such a treaty has become an imperative and urgent matter in view of all the developments presaging a stepping up of the production of chemical weapons, a situation which would create additional difficulties if a speedy conclusion of the treaty is not forthcoming. Today we are at a critical turning point. Consequently, this Committee should gear all its efforts towards the finalization of a treaty on chemical weapons, taking advantage of the progress made last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the leadership of Ambassador Lidgard.

Only a few months lie ahead of us before the beginning of the second special session of the General Assembly. We are therefore working under the pressure of time to finalize consideration of certain issues before this deadline. Foremost among them is the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which hopefully will be finally agreed and formulated before the end of this session in April. The Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject has made considerable progress in exploring the various elements to be included in the programme. What remains is to reach agreement on some of the key issues, in particular those relating to "measures", the nature of the programme, and the time-frame for its implementation.

In addition to the CPD, which we hope will be finalized by the end of our current session, should we not also endeavour to finalize agreement on some other matters under consideration in order to submit the results to the second special session?

In this regard, one of the most important aspects is to reach agreement on a clear and categorical commitment whereby the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the first special session, the nuclear-weapon States issued their unilateral declarations. However, it is now generally recognized that these declarations are not sufficient and do not offer sufficient assurances. If we can, in this Committee, on the basis of the discussions which took place in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, the plenary Committee itself and the General Assembly, reach an agreement whereby the nuclear-weapon States commit themselves, clearly and unequivocally, to renouncing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, then we will be able to claim a first significant achievement. Moreover, such a development will answer the legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option within a treaty framework and have subjected their nuclear installations to international inspection and verification procedures.

In addition, we believe that we have to pursue efforts to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production and use of radiological weapons. Although such a convention is not an urgent priority on the disarmament agenda, its conclusion, in our view, would be a contribution to our efforts to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation considers it essential

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

and the question of the peaceful uses of outer space, for herein lies an unlimited chance for mankind to direct its universal knowledge to benefit all countries of the world in the solution of their economic and social problems, particularly in the field of communications and the exploitation of natural resources. In the Committee on Disarmament, our immediate task is to negotiate measures of preventing the nuclear arms race from being extended into outer space, for the use of satellites for early warning system against nuclear attack and other uses of outer space suggest the likelihood of space war in the future. This concern, however, should not detract the Committee from pursuing its priority items.

In the light of the growing interest displayed by States and concerned people all over the world in the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament, the work in the ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its preparation of a draft comprehensive programme will most naturally command special attention in the Committee's work. In this connection, it is indeed good fortune that the working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament has the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, to steer its work with his characteristic comprehensive and skilful approach.

The views of my delegation on the number of issues pertaining to the CPD are reflected in the position of the Group of 21 as contained in its working papers CD/223, CD/229 and CD/230. Based on the provisions of the Final Document, these working papers, which have been the object of extensive examination by various delegations, provide a realistic and effective approach for ensuring a meaningful disarmament draft programme for the second special session.

On the question of nuclear weapons, the objective of some delegations to equate nuclear weapons with conventional weapons would be difficult for my delegation to accept. Also, attempts to question the priority accorded to the question of nuclear disarmament in disarmament measures would equally be difficult to accept.

With respect to the items on our agenda, I would like to reiterate that my delegation would like to see the ad hoc working groups established last year continue their work without delay. On the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which are items of the highest priority, we wish to reiterate our view and emphasize the urgent need to set up ad hoc working groups. It is unfortunate to note that, in view of the statement made on the nuclear question by the distinguished representative of the United States at the plenary meeting on 9 February, it may prove difficult to attain this particular objective at the present time. However, with respect to chemical weapons, we should be able to make more progress under the revised mandate of the working group. In this connection, we regard published reports of the decision by the United States to build a facility to produce chemical weapons, as well as the allocation of increased funds for chemical weapons production, as regrettable, as it will inevitably intensify the chemical arms race. We are fearful that, in view of this disturbing trend, the complexity of chemical weapons negotiations will only increase over time. Therefore, the urgent need to achieve rapid progress on a chemical weapons convention is self-evident.

In conclusion, I would like to take cognizance of the report of the Secretary-General on the study of the relationship between disarmament and development, which we received with great interest. Under the chairmanship of Madame Thorsson of Sweden, to whom my delegation wish to express appreciation for the valuable contribution made, the study will not only provide a useful basis for the examination of the socio-economic consequences of the arms race, but will also hold the key to potential resources for the development objectives of the developing countries.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, who will introduce the working paper contained in document CD/244.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, as you have just said, I have asked for the floor this morning to introduce document CD/244, which we have entitled "Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention". We have put this document forward as a contribution under item 4 of our Committee's agenda. We tabled this new working paper to be available at the time when the Committee had just taken the decision to give a revised mandate to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to the resumption of the Group's work later this week under the leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland and we hope that our paper, which we have also asked should be circulated as a working document under the symbol CD/CW/WP.26, will be considered in detail in that forum as soon as possible. We understand that all language versions will be available this evening.

I will not take up much of the Committee's time now in describing the substance of the working paper, but I think it is useful to do so very briefly. As I made clear in my opening statement on 11 February, my Government has had a long-standing commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive, effective and adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We believe that verification is the central problem to be faced in drawing up a CW convention and that the Working Group will need to ensure that adequate attention is devoted to this key issue if we are to make progress. This is the reason why my delegation has concentrated on verification and compliance in the paper I have introduced; we are nevertheless very much aware that other important issues such as the definition of the scope of the convention will also need to be resolved and we hope that it will prove possible to work in tandem on these issues.

Perhaps I should now make a few explanatory remarks about document CD/244 which other delegations might find helpful in further considering our proposals.

The paper is set out in two sections: the first describes in the form of a memorandum the United Kingdom's view on the way in which a chemical weapons convention should be verified; the second sets out, in the form of draft elements, the type of provisions which a convention would need to include in order to fulfil the requirements set out in the first section of the paper. We will of course be happy to elaborate further upon the reasoning behind our proposals; the first section of document CD/244 gives a preliminary explanation of the provisions which are set out as what we have called draft elements.

In looking at the substance of document CD/244, delegations may find it helpful to know that we approach the verification of a chemical weapons convention from two directions: first, the verification of the destruction of stockpiles and, secondly, the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, which we have called "monitoring of compliance". We have divided verification into these two separate categories because the different activities to be verified will need different monitoring techniques. Moreover, for the vast majority of countries which, of course, do not possess any stock of chemical weapons, only the second category of verification measures, that is, those relating to the monitoring of non-production, would come into force.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria, His Excellency Ambassador Nettel.

Mr. NETTEL (Austria): Mr. Chairman, may I express my delegation's sincere satisfaction in seeing you assume the responsibility of guiding this Committee through its important work during the month of March. It gives me particular pleasure to welcome you, an eminent representative of our good neighbour, Italy, as Chairman of the Committee at this crucial stage in its work.

As regards the Chairman for the month of February, the representative of Iran, my delegation acknowledges with appreciation his efforts to overcome the procedural obstacles which are usually the prominent feature at the beginning of each year's session.

Taking the floor for the first time in the course of the 1982 session, I wish to put on record our gratitude that the Austrian delegation has again been allowed to participate in the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies.

By observing most attentively the work of the Committee and its working groups, my delegation demonstrated already last year its great interest in the work of this body. The representatives of Austria will not fail to intensify this learning process, the outcome of which will hopefully permit us to contribute actively to the future work to be undertaken in this forum.

My delegation is well aware that, according to the agreed schedule, the time for statements of a more general nature has already passed. With your kind indulgence, I shall nevertheless make some remarks of a more comprehensive character; this is of course due to the fact that non-member States obtained permission to make statements only a week ago.

So, permit me to look briefly into the past, upon which this new session of the Committee on Disarmament will have to build. The Austrian authorities have closely examined the 1981 report of the Committee and took note with satisfaction of some progress which was achieved regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons. Austria joined those States which welcomed this development during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which, however, urged the Committee with no lesser degree of concern to continue sincere and meaningful negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production or stockpiling of all chemical weapons. My country, being located in one of the most sensitive areas of this globe, is conscious of the incredible danger it would encounter if such terrible weapons were to be used in its region. As a matter of fact, Austria itself has always been free of chemical weapons, by conviction and past experience, as well, later on, as a consequence of a legal commitment laid down in the State Treaty of 1955. We sincerely hope that the "Elements suggested by the Chairman", which are contained in last year's report, can soon be transformed into formal treaty provisions. Negotiations conducted in good faith and oriented towards an early conclusion should be one of the main tasks of the Committee during its 1982 session. In view of this over-all objective, we consider

(Mr. Nettel, Austria)

the extension of the working groups' mandate, as decided recently by the Committee, to be an important step forward. Any concrete achievement towards the elaboration of a convention will be highly appreciated by the second special session, which will judge the Committee not by its words, but by its deeds.

As regards the consideration of nuclear disarmament by the Committee on Disarmament we learned with some apprehension that there had been no progress at all. Looking in particular for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, my Government regrets that the trilateral talks have not been resumed and that it has not been possible to establish within the Committee a working group, which, to a certain extent, might have been instrumental for the reopening of these trilateral negotiations. As a consequence, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, Austria joined those States which stressed the necessity to give high priority to the CTB issue and which requested the Committee to initiate substantive negotiations, which should be conducted in a working group established to that effect. It is therefore with much regret that we have learned these days that the Committee so far has again been unable to establish such a group. If the creation of a formal group is considered too far-reaching a step by certain delegations, all possibilities for intermediate measures should be explored so as to take appropriately into account the high priority mark assigned to this item by the international community as a whole.

May I also briefly mention our continuing interest in the issue of non-proliferation. This concern is clearly demonstrated by the fact that this year's International Seminar for young diplomats at Klesheim Castle in Austria will deal exclusively with the question of non-proliferation. We do hope that one or another junior representative to the Committee will be able to attend this Seminar.

May I refer again to the last General Assembly because that body is, for a non-member of the Committee, the focus of its disarmament policies and the main forum for the presentation of new ideas concerning international security in particular. In his statement delivered on 1 October 1981, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, W.P. Pahr, expressed concern regarding the continuing arms race and the failure with respect to balanced disarmament. He suggested that objective procedures for assessing and verifying the true level of armament in the world could contribute to a process of the progressive and balanced lowering of these levels. Our proposal to study mechanisms, to which could be entrusted the task of verifying and evaluating the state of armament on an objective basis, was the subject of consultations. In the light of the reactions received, the initial project was re-examined by my authorities and the revised version circulated in New York as a working paper (A/C.1/36/14), which might serve as a basis for further consideration, possibly within the framework of the second special session. I and my colleagues would be ready to discuss this matter informally with the members of the Committee and would welcome further reactions on this issue, which is related to the area of confidence-building measures, as well as to that of verification and, through these links, also connected to the concept of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Confidence-building constitutes an important feature of another subject-matter under consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, the so-called security guarantees, which my delegation prefers to label "commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States". May I refer in this connection to another proposal by the Austrian Government, which I had the honour to present to the Committee in July of last year. At that time, I referred in particular to certain doubts which arose with

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

In the past three years, the Committee has merely continued to hold general discussions in the shadow of the negotiations conducted in 1979 and 1980 by the three nuclear Powers which are the depositaries of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It should be noted that the trilateral negotiations have not led to any results that might facilitate the task of the Committee, which has, so far, not been able to engage in genuine negotiations. The regrettable fate of the first item on our agenda is also that of the second item, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation, which believes that it is of the highest importance to continue to respect the Committee's status as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, considers that it is high time to move from the stage of exchanges of view to that of negotiations on the above-mentioned items.

My delegation continues to give preference to the establishment of subsidiary bodies and, in particular, working groups to conduct the negotiations on these two items. We hope that this problem will be solved this year so that the Committee can break the deadlock in which it finds itself.

The Moroccan delegation welcomes the fact that the Committee has agreed to re-establish the Working Groups on the items on our agenda relating to chemical weapons, radiological weapons and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's congratulations to the distinguished representatives of Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan on their appointment as the Chairmen of these Working Groups. It is a matter of particular satisfaction that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been revised and brought more into line with the goal we have set ourselves, namely, the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

In this connection, we note with appreciation the intensive efforts made and substantial results achieved by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons at the preceding session. My delegation is of the opinion that so much progress has been made in the work of this Group that we should, without delay, engage in the task of negotiating the text of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons. The conclusion of such a convention would undoubtedly be a crucial disarmament measure and it is one to which the international community attaches the greatest importance and highest priority.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it would be highly desirable, particularly in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to intensify efforts to reach an agreement on an approach or a common formula to be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature. In this connection, my delegation has already had an opportunity to state that it is in favour of an international convention. We hope that the Working Group will take account of the fact that there is widespread support for the idea of such a convention.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Norway has taken a special interest in the verification issue concerning the comprehensive test ban question, which we consider extremely important. Adequate verification is an essential element in any agreement of this kind. We have participated actively in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts set up to consider international measures to detect and identify seismic events. This is due to the expertise and instrumentation provided by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR). Considerable progress has been made in this Group. In fact, the Scientific Group has done some pioneering work. Its proposed system of verification can be a model for verification mechanisms in other areas, in our opinion.

I would like to reconfirm the readiness of my Government to make NORSAR available as a station in a global seismic verification system to monitor compliance with a comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

Another important contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack. Norway accepts the argument of those States that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States. Those States which are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their option to acquire nuclear weapons have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States directly involved bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem.

While, admittedly, there is a regrettable lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, we feel that such lack of progress cannot be accepted as justifying the rejection of non-proliferation measures. It is a matter of great concern to us that several threshold States in regions of tension and conflict have not yet abandoned the option to develop nuclear weapons.

For its part, Norway supports the principle that sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology should not be transferred or exported unless all nuclear activities of the recipient non-nuclear-weapon States are subject to IAEA safeguards or other similarly binding international commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices. Consequently, Norway has decided to restrict its own nuclear exports to countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Permit me also very briefly to reiterate our views on chemical weapons. In view of recent reports on the use of chemical weapons, we consider it an urgent need to build obstacles against further developments in this field. We therefore urge intensified efforts to reach agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons made significant progress last year. Every effort should now be made with a view to arriving at a draft text on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. For this reason, we have noted with satisfaction that the Committee has succeeded in arriving at a consensus decision on a new mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

A new convention must, in our view, contain provisions for adequate verification, to which we hope to make a modest contribution. The Norwegian participant in the expert meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has initiated a research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents used under winter conditions. The objective of the programme is, inter alia, to develop international verification procedures for the purpose of finding evidence of the use of chemical agents. The results of this research project will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

In concluding I should like to mention that we have recently strengthened our representation in Geneva in order to enable the Norwegian Government to follow more closely the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, for the first time, we will take an active part in all the working groups of the Committee on Disarmament.

Through our participation, we shall endeavour also to draw on the expertise available at Norwegian research institutions in recognition of the key role played by the working groups in the negotiations here in Geneva.

Finally, I note that, at its present session, the Committee will once more discuss the membership question in preparation for the second special session and the review to be undertaken there. Norway, for its part, would favour yet another limited expansion of the present membership of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that such a limited expansion would increase the representative nature of the Committee without hampering its efficiency or its negotiating character.

Should the second special session recommend another limited expansion, Norway will actively seek full membership of the Committee. This would be in keeping with our long-standing interest in arms control and disarmament -- an interest also influenced, as I said by way of introduction, by our strategic geographical location.

I would like to thank you for having accorded me this opportunity to address you this morning. In the name of my Government, I want to offer my sincerest wishes for the successful continuation of the Committee's important deliberations. I can assure you that Norway will continue to take part as an active observer in the work of this Committee and, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, may I add as my personal hope, that, in the not too distant future, a representative of Norway will have the privilege of addressing this Committee in the capacity of a full member.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs for his important and interesting statement and am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list; would any other delegation like to take the floor? If not I would like to announce that, at my request, the Secretary has distributed today an informal document containing the timetable of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this is only an indication and may subsequently be adjusted, if necessary, according to the requirements of our work. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation, which is acting as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for March 1982, has taken the floor in order formally to introduce the document of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/258) entitled "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons". The sponsors of this document -- the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic -- have set themselves a modest but important objective: to draw the attention of the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament to the fact that the well-known decision of the United States administration concerning the large-scale development of the production of binary chemical weapons with their subsequent stationing on the territories of other States, primarily European, entails, apart from other negative consequences, substantial additional difficulties in the matter of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The socialist countries consider that the Committee on Disarmament -- a body in which the international community at present places great hopes with regard to the elaboration of a draft of such a convention -- cannot behave as though nothing had happened and ignore the consequences of the above-mentioned decision. That would be to close our eyes to reality. I do not wish to anticipate or prejudge the Committee's attitude, but the socialist countries for their part are firmly convinced of the need for the future convention to prohibit all chemical weapons -- both traditional and new -- and to leave no possibility for the retention of any such weapons, particularly weapons with a binary charge.

The working paper submitted by the socialist countries does not by any means list all but only some of the difficulties with which the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons will be faced in the light of the prospect of the production of binary weapons. The questions prepared by the Bulgarian delegation in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons spell out some additional aspects of the problem. Other delegations, too, no doubt, will have questions and comments in this connection. It is important to look into all this. And if we want the negotiations to be successful, we should do this within the Working Group in a businesslike manner, calmly, neither dramatizing the situation nor simplifying it. It is the duty of all of us to proceed in this way.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I would like to propose formally that the draft decision be amended to include a reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency along the following lines: following the words "United Nations Environment Programme", my proposed amendment would insert the words "Director-General of IAEA" and then, further down, in the matter "of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well as consultations convened by its Chairman on toxicity determinations", I would substitute the words "on technical matters" for the words "on toxicity determinations" and then make appropriate adjustments to the end of that sentence by striking out the word "to" before the word "organizations" and ending the sentence with a full stop after the word "organizations". My rationale for this proposed amendment is as follows: the Committee will recall that, during the informal consultations with chemical weapons experts held by Ambassador Lidgard last summer (document CD/CW/WP.22/Rev.1), a presentation was made to the Group by the United States delegation concerning a system for remote continual verification, known by the acronym RECOVER. A number of delegations expressed interest in learning more about this concept. It is being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conjunction with its nuclear safeguards programme and a demonstration project is currently underway. My delegation and others have been very interested in the possibilities of remote continual verification and its possible application to CW verification problems. On behalf of interested delegations, I intend to request that time be allocated during the expert session next week for further informal discussions on this possibility. It would therefore seem appropriate to request that IAEA be invited to send a technical expert to participate in the appropriate session of the informal consultations for the purpose of providing technical information with respect to the work of IAEA in the field of remote continual verification and its possible application to a CW prohibition. In this regard, I think the same criteria would apply that have just been alluded to by the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina: this participation is only for the purpose of aiding the Working Group and the Committee in a derivative sense, concerning particular technical matters. It should be related solely to technical information without recognition of anything more than this contribution by technical experts from that body who have unique qualifications and expertise in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Before I give the floor to the representative of India, who has asked for it, I would like to request Ambassador Fields kindly to repeat his proposed amendments to the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was apparently working from an earlier draft and therefore would merely add to this the phrase concerning the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The other amendment which I proposed would not be necessary as Working Paper No. 57 seems to have cured any problems that may have arisen in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States, who has proposed that, in the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57, the words "and the Director-General of IAEA" should be added immediately after the words "the regional office for Europe of the United Nations Environment Programme". The representative of India has asked for the floor in this connection.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): We have heard with interest the proposal made by the distinguished representative of the United States. But, as I recall, last year we went into this subject in some detail and the new proposal regarding the inclusion of experts from IAEA will have to be considered, by my delegation at least, most carefully. If I may therefore appeal to the representative of the United States through you, I would suggest that the existing draft decision may perhaps proceed and that we could, if necessary, prepare a subsequent draft decision inviting experts from IAEA after we have had more time to consider this particular question.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has also listened with great interest to the proposal made by the Ambassador of the United States, but, as the Ambassador of India stated a moment ago, we consider that the Committee now has before it a draft decision which was discussed and proposed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and which involves a request for technical information from two entities with regard to two specific points, namely, the establishment of toxicities of chemicals and the international register of potentially toxic chemicals. As I understood the Ambassador of the United States, his suggestion has a different purpose, namely, to invite the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to send a representative to provide technical information on a point that may be described as the mode of operation of the RECOVER system at present underway on an experimental basis within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in co-operation with seven countries possessing installations with which the RECOVER system can be used. In other words, the subject is a different one and, in my opinion, it would therefore be preferable to separate the two questions by taking different decisions: we would approve the draft decision now under consideration if there is a consensus on it and we would then draft another decision, perhaps within the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is the body that will ultimately have to make recommendations to the Committee on this matter. In this connection, I would like to state that my delegation will consider the matter in the same spirit in which it has approached this draft decision. On that basis, I urge the Ambassador of the United States to consider this possibility.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I am fully prepared to consult with the delegations concerned on this matter and to see whether we cannot make some accommodation. As the matter was presented to my delegation only this morning, we have not had the time to consider it in detail here. However, we are certainly prepared to enter into discussions with the other interested delegations or to participate in a discussion on this matter within the Working Group. We would prefer that the decision await those consultations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States and would like to ask the Committee whether, in its opinion, it would be possible to solve this problem through rapid consultations between the delegations directly concerned. In this connection, I note that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is to hold informal consultations tomorrow morning and that its next formal meeting is on Monday morning. It would thus be possible for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to reconsider the matter and, on the basis of the outcome of the consultations, to make possible new proposals at the beginning of next week with a view to solving this problem. Are there any objections to this way of proceeding?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): At my request, the secretariat distributed today an informal document containing the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this time-table is only indicative and it may, if necessary, be adjusted later according to the requirements of our work.

The representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, has asked for the floor and I give it to him.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, since you talked about the future consultations with the Working Group, I was persuaded that this meant that you are going in the direction of the motion made by the delegation of India, supported by Argentina, that we adopt this decision as it has been drafted by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that the additional invitation should be the subject of other consultations. However, my neighbours have a different interpretation of your decision. I would therefore like to clarify the situation because the work of the experts begins on Monday and appropriate letters should be sent to the organizations which are mentioned in Working Paper No. 57, so as not to delay our work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sujka. The decision we have just taken was in line with the suggestion I made to the Committee, i.e. that, if there were no objections, the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 would be submitted to consultations which I myself would like to be rapid and which could be completed in a very short time so that there would be no unreasonable delay in our work and our hearing of the representatives of WHO and the United Nations Environment Programme. It was on that basis that I considered that agreement had been reached in the Committee and, therefore, that the decision should cover all the problems at hand and it was on that basis that I announced it.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the matter of concern to me is the same as that stressed by the Ambassador of Poland. It was my understanding that what was going to be postponed was only the question of the suggestion made by the United States that the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be invited to send a representative for the purpose already mentioned and that this was what was going to be the subject of consultations. It was my understanding that there was no objection to the adoption of this draft decision, on which agreement exists and which refers to a different matter, since the date of the meeting of chemical weapons experts is very close at hand and time might be lost if we delay the sending of notes to these two entities, namely the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Health Organization, a question on which a consensus has been reached. Moreover, my delegation has stated that it prefers to see these two questions dealt with in two separate decisions.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, frankly speaking, the Soviet delegation, too, understood your decision as implying approval of the draft decision in Working Paper No. 57. In fact, a general agreement was reached in the Working Group yesterday and, as I understand it, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has submitted a recommendation. So far as I know, no one in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons objected to that recommendation. It seems to me, therefore, that the course to take is the one we have always followed, namely: questions are considered by the Working Group; the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Working Group recommends a decision to the Committee; and the Committee adopts that decision. I would be in favour of our adopting a decision on this question, leaving the new proposal that was made today to be considered separately. In any event, these are two different issues, and an invitation to experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency is quite unconnected with the work of the Group of Experts on toxicities of chemicals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I am sorry if the way in which I presented the decision has given rise to different interpretations. I must put myself in the Committee's hands on this matter; and I think I can say that the amendment proposed by the distinguished representative of the United States does not have the Committee's full agreement. Some delegations would like it to be dealt with in a separate decision. I would like to ask whether there is a consensus that the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 can be accepted in the form in which it was transmitted to us by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I have listened to the concerns expressed here and I cannot myself distinguish the difficulty that people are having. The two organizations mentioned in this decision are both located here in Geneva, whereas IAEA is in Vienna and so the question of timing about an invitation and the arrival of appropriate technical experts would seem to me to be more keen in the direction of my amendment to this draft decision. We have sought to amend the paper through the Chairman of the Working Group, but that did not appear appropriate. I therefore think that we are perfectly sound in suggesting that this go back to the Working Group, where we shall have an opportunity to debate the respective merits of these proposals and then present the Committee with something on which we can agree.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Fields. I note from his statement that there is no consensus on the immediate adoption of the text of the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57. I therefore suggest that the matter might be taken up again as soon as possible at one of the forthcoming meetings, after consultations and a possible new decision by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

I come back to the question of the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week and, in this connection, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, has asked for the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I have asked for the floor merely, with your permission, to make a brief announcement to prevent any mistaken interpretations. On Monday, 15 March, at 3 p.m., it will still not be possible for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to meet. There will, rather, as during this past week, be a meeting of the contact group in the usual room, Meeting Room No. I.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his clarification; the time-table will be amended accordingly. I therefore take it that the draft time-table for the coming week is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would like to inform representatives about possible dates for the Committee's informal meetings on item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of the arms race in outer space". My concern is to ensure that delegations which would like to take part in the exchange of views on this new item on our agenda have enough time to prepare their contributions. I therefore suggest Friday, 26 March, at 3 p.m. and Tuesday, 30 March, at 3 p.m. These dates seem convenient, in view of all the work the Committee has to do. I suggest that you should consider the possibility of agreeing to these dates so that we can take a decision in this connection when we adopt the time-table for next week or earlier, if possible.

You will also recall that, in this week's time-table, we tentatively planned to hold an informal meeting tomorrow afternoon, Friday, at 3 p.m. Today, we have heard statements in the plenary meeting, particularly the statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who have introduced new elements whose importance for the Committee's work on items 1 and 2 of the agenda cannot be underestimated. I intend to continue, with all due urgency, the informal consultations that I have been holding since the beginning of this week, taking account of these new elements. Accordingly and bearing in mind the legitimate desire of delegations to have some time for reflection, I tend to think that the informal meeting which we had planned in principle for tomorrow afternoon could be more usefully held during next week when the Chairman's consultations have been completed, thus giving delegations time to reflect and to consult.

If there is no objection, we might therefore cancel, for the time being, tomorrow's informal meeting and postpone it until next week, if possible.

I would like to make an announcement: the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will meet here tomorrow at noon. If there is no other matter for discussion, the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 16 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 165th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee today begins consideration of item 4 of its agenda, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the United Kingdom, Poland, Nigeria, Romania, Kenya and Switzerland.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today this Committee takes up item 4 of its agenda -- the prohibition of chemical weapons. There is no need to elaborate on the necessity and importance of a ban on chemical weapons. This was done time and again here in Geneva during the 1960s and 1970s. There is at least one historical analogy: as at the beginning of the 1970s, we seem to be again at a crossroads. Owing to the attitude of some Western powers, the only result 20 years ago was the Biological Weapons Convention, while no comprehensive ban on biological and chemical weapons was achieved. Today, having to choose between the binary route and the chemical disarmament route, one important Western power has embarked upon the first one. It is planned to spend billions of dollars on starting the production of a new generation of chemical weapons. After years of hope, we seem to be now on the brink of a new arms race which will seriously affect disarmament negotiations. Now, it is only too obvious that the aim of a slanderous campaign on the alleged use of chemical weapons carried out during recent years was to prepare the climate for a new turn in the arms spiral.

The production of a new generation of chemical weapons is part and parcel of the so-called rearmament process initiated some years ago by the United States. Actually, after medium-range missiles such as the Pershing 2 and land-based cruise missiles, and nuclear neutron weapons, binary weapons are the third step in this programme. These up to now three components of the rearmament programme of NATO seem to have at least one thing in common: whereas these weapons are to be produced beyond the Atlantic Ocean, it is planned to deploy them in western Europe. Not to mention that the implementation of ideas to equip long-range cruise missiles with binary munitions would add a new dimension to chemical warfare.

Already today, military planners leave no doubt that the storing of binary weapons on the territory of its producer country would be of little utility. There are plans to deploy these dangerous weapons as near as possible to the future "theatre of chemical warfare", i.e. central Europe. Projects for the stationing of these weapons in the western neighbourhood of the German Democratic Republic are of immediate concern to my country.

It is not difficult to foresee the devastating results the use of these chemical weapons would have in densely populated central Europe. Therefore it is only too understandable that not only the broad masses of the people but also some Western Governments reject United States plans to deploy new chemical weapons on their territories.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Let nobody be deceived by arguments alleging that binary weapons are "normal" chemical weapons to be treated on a "business as usual" way. The opposite is true. The production and deployment of binary weapons is fraught with negative implications for disarmament negotiations.

In working paper CD/258, the delegations of seven socialist countries, among them that of the German Democratic Republic, substantiated the assessment that binary weapons will create a new situation with regard to our work. Especially two aspects of binary weapons seem to be relevant in this regard:

Firstly, some special properties appear to make binary weapons very attractive to military planners and to enhance the general interest in chemical weapons, which facts tend to fuel the arms build-up. And nobody really knows what is still in "Pandora's box".

As far as the "advantages" of binaries are concerned which make them so attractive to the military and industrial complex in some countries, we see the easier handling of these weapons, the increasing number of poisons which can potentially be used for chemical warfare, the lower costs of producing, storing and transporting binary weapons, and others.

Secondly, the production of binary weapons is likely to undermine the search for a chemical weapons agreement since it complicates or even foils the elaboration of adequate verification techniques. Thus, with regard to verification, a completely new situation has emerged with the development and production of binary chemical weapons. Already some years ago, responsible scientists had emphasized this aspect. In 1975 the SIPRI publication Chemical disarmament - new weapons for old stated that "binary weapons are, in effect, miniaturized nerve-gas production plants. The problems which they represent for verification are therefore analogous to those of moth-balled nerve-gas factories, with the important exception that their locations are unlikely to be detectable by any form of extra-territorial surveillance. Most of the verification procedures which have so far been proposed will thus have great difficulty in establishing whether binaries do or do not exist within a particular country. The appearance of binaries has therefore had the consequence of removing much of the value from existing verification studies; it has necessitated an expansion of these studies into areas that have not been extensively explored". Unfortunately, at the time when binary weapons were still in the developmental stage, the chance for precluding their full-scale production was missed because of only too well-known reasons. Today, as in other cases, too, we have to note that the military use of the latest achievements of science and technology has outpaced our negotiations in which we are trying to find solutions for ageing weapons. These solutions are likely to be rendered meaningless by the production and deployment of binary weapons.

This process must be stopped. While continuing our negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons convention as a matter of high priority, we should explore other possibilities as well which could contribute to an early halt to the chemical arms race.

Of special importance in this regard is the appeal contained in resolution 36/96 B of the United Nations General Assembly. This resolution called upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

prohibition of chemical weapons. States should specifically refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where such weapons do not exist at present.

The implementation of this appeal would, without doubt, promote our efforts here in the Committee on Disarmament to deal with all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

During recent years, considerable progress has been achieved in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. As a result of the able guidance of this group by its previous chairmen, Ambassador Sujka of Poland is now in a position to build upon the "Elements" elaborated in the past. We welcome and support his efforts to achieve a new quality in the work of the Group. We believe it is time to proceed, in accordance with the mandate, to actual drafting. The above-mentioned Elements as well as proposals concerning the scope of prohibition tabled in recent weeks by different delegations provide a sound basis for this. This endeavour should not be hampered by differences of opinion with regard to some questions. Moreover, all efforts should be made to arrive at reasonable compromise formulas.

This applies to verification provisions as well. Sometimes we hear arguments that the socialist countries are not interested in real verification measures and are only prepared to accept measures of "self-control". To the contrary, as regards verification of compliance with a future chemical weapons convention, we contemplate a variety of different methods and procedures, the core of which consists of the following three main elements:

Firstly, a national verification system. It is our belief that it is in the first instance up to the States parties themselves to enforce the obligations undertaken internationally on their own national territories and also to give some assurance to other parties that these obligations are being complied with. No international organization can relieve a State party of this obligation. In the German Democratic Republic, the chemical industry is centrally planned and managed. This provides excellent conditions for our Government to ensure compliance with a chemical weapons convention by all chemical enterprises.

The establishment of a national control system is, of course, the prerogative of the countries concerned. But this should not prevent us from introducing some recommendations about such a system in a chemical weapons convention. It was satisfactory to my delegation that our ideas in this connection found their reflection in the Elements drafted under the guidance of Ambassador Lidgard last year. At the same time, we cannot but deplore the fact that in working paper CD/244 tabled by the United Kingdom delegation, virtually no role has been envisaged for a national verification system.

Secondly, national technical means of verification could play a useful role in monitoring compliance with a chemical weapons ban. These means should be used in accordance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

A great body of interesting data and assessments has been assembled in many working papers tabled over the years in this Committee and its predecessors. These papers show the great verification potential inherent in national technical means. Here I would only like to draw your attention to working papers CCD/371 and CCD/502 tabled by the United Kingdom, CCD/533 by the Netherlands, CCD/538 and CCD/539 by the USSR and CCD/344 and CCD/577 by Finland. So, in United Kingdom document CCD/502 it

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

was stated that once a reliable indication of an infringement of a convention had been obtained by national technical means, then a case for on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened.

Thirdly, we envisage an international complaints procedure involving a consultative committee, certain international procedures of consultation and co-operation within the United Nations, and the Security Council. To establish the actual state of affairs in case of suspicion concerning compliance with the convention, relevant information might be requested and some form of verification by challenge could be used. In general, parties could exchange different kinds of data necessary for assessing compliance with the convention by other parties.

In view of the character of the modern chemical industry, regular and permanent international on-site inspections can only very marginally add to the effectiveness of a verification system. But they would be connected with serious political, economic, technical and financial problems which would more than outweigh their limited value. This concern was very eloquently stated in the Committee on Disarmament three years ago by the former Australian representative, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll, whom I would like to quote:

"Problems of verification arise in acute forms because so much of chemical capacity and of chemicals themselves can be used for different purposes. There are going to be limitations on the value of inspection. To inspect all chemical productive capacity would involve a whole army of people -- an enormous number of people. The problems of preserving industrial secrets, commercial secrets as well as security secrets, are very considerable. One has to ask oneself how detailed an inspection is going to be justifiable either in results or in cost, because it is not just production that will have to be looked at, it is also the ultimate use. Chemicals can be stored perhaps for years and then be available for use in chemical weapons." (CD/PV.44, p. 20)

On the other hand, it is difficult to agree with the conclusion of Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll that it would take years to work out all these things. This approach as well as the approach that the verification means should determine the scope of prohibition would endlessly postpone the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

In the same way we have to recognize the problems stressed in 1978 by the former representative of Japan, Ambassador Ogiso, who stated that "since the threshold to be applied to chemical agents to be banned and verification procedures for dual-purpose agents involve technical, specialized and complicated problems, each country is concerned over the strong possibility that such verification procedures may obtrude upon its chemical industries for peaceful uses, and therefore needs to conduct detailed examinations in relation to national laws and regulations". (CCD/PV.801, pp. 25-26)

Having these problems in mind, one may ask if the private corporations of some States asking for intrusive international inspection are ready to accept these controls. The Canadian document CD/167 provides a useful analysis of the pros and cons of several verification methods. This document, in our judgement, very much shows the advantages of a verification system based on a combination of the three main elements listed above.

I think the whole complex of verification methods available and possible, ranging from national control to some international verification by challenge,

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

provides a high degree of assurance that a violation of a chemical weapons convention could be detected. It is highly doubtful that a militarily important violation could be concealed. So, we should be very reasonable and not lose ourselves in a labyrinth of technical details, forgetting about our ultimate aim in this regard -- a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons containing adequate procedures for verification of compliance with it.

Before concluding my statement allow me, Mr. Chairman, some general remarks concerning verification. Certain representatives, particularly from Western countries, this year again have come out with ideas to put more emphasis on consideration of the so-called verification question. In this connection we have again witnessed in this hall attempts to misinterpret the stand of socialist countries towards verification of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. It has been alleged that socialist countries underrated verification, and were even not ready to join far-reaching verification measures. As a matter of fact, we are no less than other countries interested in verification. The basic principles of our approach to these questions were clearly outlined here on 31 March 1981 by the representative of the USSR, Ambassador V. Issraelyan. This approach is fully based on the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which in paragraph 31 and other parts contains clear provisions on verification. We also agree with the view of the Indian delegation reflected in working paper CD/209 "that it would be wrong to make a fetish of verification. It would be equally wrong to devise or establish a machinery of controls in the absence of genuine measures of arms limitation or disarmament. To do that would be like putting the cart before the horse. There can be no merit, either, in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of an international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitation".

Yet it is just this clear relationship between disarmament and verification measures which was neglected in recent statements about "far-reaching verification measures". Actually we were told a lot about "balanced agreements", "transparency" and confidence-building measures, but virtually nothing was said about real disarmament measures. We subscribe to the view stated in the above-mentioned Indian working paper that "it is universally recognized that strong political will is a prerequisite to reaching agreement on any significant or meaningful measure in the field of disarmament. Once such political will has been built up, it will not be difficult, and certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise controls appropriate to any requirement in the field of disarmament, no matter how complex it may be".

Let me briefly raise two further political questions closely connected with verification.

Firstly, we proceed from the conviction that it should be the objective of verification measures to provide assurance that the corresponding agreement is observed by all parties, thus enhancing confidence in the agreement and attracting other States to adhere to it.

On the other hand, a certain minimum of confidence is necessary as a basis for devising an effective verification system. Thus, it was not by chance that in the 1970s when détente prevailed, satisfactory solutions to some verification problems were found. Then all parties agreed that these procedures worked well.

In recent years we have heard accusations concerning the compliance of socialist States with certain agreements on arms limitation. It is difficult

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

to see how the picture should have changed in some years' time. Moreover, one may ask if these accusations just conceal the intention to call into doubt the usefulness of curbing the arms race by mutual agreement.

In general we proceed from the conviction that normal relations between States based on détente and recognition of mutual interest are very conducive to the elaboration of reliable verification procedures, whereas a policy aggravating international tension and enhancing suspicion is not likely to promote the agreement on far-reaching verification measures. Can verification under these circumstances really be a substitute for trust? Furthermore, in discussing verification questions, should we not also take into account the international law of treaties? Why should a given country enter into a disarmament agreement if it intends to violate it? Why should a party violate a certain agreement, thus risking its international credibility, if it could easily withdraw from it, using the relevant treaty provisions?

Secondly, it is obvious that verification capabilities are in a continuous race with changing military technology which by such features as miniaturization, mobility, deployment methods and so on undercut the possibilities for making special disarmament measures verifiable. One may cite such examples as land- and sea-based cruise missiles, certain plans for MX deployment, binary weapons and other systems. For example, land-based cruise missiles resist verification as the launchers are small and mobile. In this regard one may agree with John Newhouse, a former Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who wrote that "there is no need for such weapons. They may very well give the arms competition another dimension. Once deployed, there will be no reliable way for the other side to count them. The Administration says it will deploy several hundred cruise missiles. If the Soviets said the same thing, one would assume eventual deployment of thousands". It should be quite clear that such weapon developments as cruise missiles threaten to undermine the very basis for disarmament talks -- a fact which was so eloquently described here by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, some weeks ago. The example of the cruise missiles shows that the protagonists of the qualitative arms race and of "far-reaching" verification measures are identical. It is difficult to understand how one can, on the one hand, reduce international confidence by creating new and unverifiable weapon systems and, on the other hand, demand "effective" verification measures rendered impossible by the foregoing. Furthermore, here again there is an attempt as usual to apply a double standard in verification questions: whereas socialist countries could not be trusted, the insinuation is that one's own trustworthiness is always out of the question.

Let me summarize our views on verification: the German Democratic Republic, like other socialist countries, stands for strict verification of compliance with concrete measures in the disarmament field. Verification measures should enhance confidence in those agreements, thereby promoting the disarmament process. In this sense my delegation is ready to play an active and constructive part in the elaboration of verification measures connected with concrete steps of arms limitation and disarmament. But the Committee on Disarmament should not be involved in an abstract verification discussion diverting its attention from substantive disarmament problems.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, my remarks this morning will be chiefly directed to item 4 of our agenda, namely, Chemical weapons. But I wish, however, first to refer briefly to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, that is, a Nuclear test ban and the Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

When I spoke in the Committee on 11 March, I welcomed the announcement by the United States delegation that it would be prepared to join in a consensus to set up a subsidiary body to study issues connected with a nuclear test ban. Since that time a number of delegations have sought clarification on a number of aspects of my own delegation's position. The questions which have been put to us merit a considered response, and I hope that the delegations concerned will understand when I say that I do not feel that it would be appropriate to attempt to answer them in detail today while the mandate for the subsidiary body is still under negotiation. As I said on 11 March, my delegation hopes that we can proceed rapidly to reach agreement on a mandate for a working group -- or whatever other form of subsidiary body may be acceptable to the Committee -- in order that it can begin functioning without delay. Having entrusted you, Mr. Chairman, and a number of our colleagues with the formulation of a mandate, I also believe that it would be inappropriate for me today to make a detailed statement concerning the position of my delegation on these matters.

However, these considerations need not prevent me from responding to the distinguished representative of India by saying that we do indeed recognize that the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States are affected by matters relating to nuclear weapons and that we do indeed sympathize with and even share many of these concerns. The Committee on Disarmament provides an important forum in which the views of the non-nuclear-weapon States can be made known. But as CD/180, the document prepared by the Group of 21 to which the distinguished representative of India referred, itself acknowledges, "the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility". It is for that reason that I said in my statement of 11 February that my Government attaches the highest importance to progress in negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on limiting intermediate nuclear forces and that we also looked forward to the opening of the strategic arms reduction talks. We hope that progress in these talks will lead to progress in other areas of arms control endeavour in which the work of this Committee should figure substantially.

Turning now to the subject of chemical weapons, upon which the Committee has just concluded a week of intensive consultations, I intend to look at some issues which have come up during the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group, and in the meetings of chemical weapons experts. This pragmatic approach seems to be the appropriate one at the stage when we have started work on the elaboration of a convention.

I should like first to look at the work under way in the Ad Hoc Working Group under Ambassador Sujka's chairmanship and to consider how we envisage the work of the Group developing in the next few weeks before our spring session comes to a close. My delegation accepts and indeed welcomes the working method which has been adopted in the Group by Ambassador Sujka, namely, that delegations should attempt to put their views on particular points into concrete terms in the shape of draft elements. I believe that this is a good method for the stage which we have now reached, since we have had ample opportunity in the last two years of the Working Group's life to hear the argumentation behind each delegation's point

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

of view; the next step is quite clearly to see how particular points might appear in a convention. I would note, however, that this work method did to some extent take delegations by surprise. I believe this was to be expected, since it is one thing to make a general statement, and another to turn it into precise treaty-type language. I do not, therefore, think that we should be discouraged by the relatively slow start of the work in the Group, and I believe that its last few meetings have begun to pick up speed as delegations have had more time to prepare the concrete contributions requested by the Chairman. This is a good sign, and my delegation looks forward to seeing further proposals for draft elements before the end of the spring session. If we can achieve this much, we shall have reason to be pleased with our work and we shall then be in a position, when the summer session begins, to analyse the various drafts put forward in order to identify the common ground which exists between them, and where further substantive discussion will be required before agreement can be reached.

In this connection I do not believe it would help the pace of the Group's work if it were to attempt to produce a substantive report before the end of April. Instead, we would support a brief report by the Chairman on the lines of that given by Ambassador Lidgard at the same point in the Committee's session last year. There will, of course, need to be a passage on chemical weapons in the Committee's special report to the United Nations General Assembly's special session on disarmament. The report of the Committee to the special session will in any case need to look back over the last four years. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, I think delegations will agree that there is cause for a positive assessment of the pace of work in those last four years, particularly since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group in 1980.

I should now like to turn briefly to the United Kingdom working paper on verification aspects of a chemical weapons treaty, circulated as CD/244 and as Working Paper 26 of the Working Group. I am very grateful to delegations for the many comments which they have made on this working paper, both in the Working Group and privately. I look forward to its further discussion in the remaining sessions of the Working Group devoted to verification. One point has emerged from the discussion of the United Kingdom paper which I think it might be helpful to respond to here. Many delegations clearly feel that the fact that a particular proposal or particular course of action has not been included in the draft elements contained in CD/244 means that my Government opposes that particular course of action or proposal. This is not the case. The purpose of CD/244 was to change somewhat the emphasis contained in the draft elements attached to last year's report of the Working Group, because my delegation does not believe that those elements give sufficient emphasis to international means of verification. My delegation is not opposed to the inclusion of additional language in the elements, for example, on national means of verification or on the collection and exchange of data and information under the convention, subject, of course, to the language being satisfactory. We would in fact welcome concrete proposals from other delegations to deal with these points. But we attach great importance to the balance between national and international measures of verification which we have described in CD/244.

I should also this morning like to make a few comments on the meetings of chemical weapons experts which were held last week. As always, the presence of technical expertise proved stimulating within the delegations, and helped us to focus

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

on the areas where further work is required before we can achieve a ban on chemical weapons. But I want to record a view which is perhaps shared by other delegations, that, at least initially, the meetings of the experts appeared to have lost some of the impetus with which they began their work last year. This was perhaps because the Working Group did not tell the experts clearly enough what was wanted from them. However, towards the end of the week the meetings picked up momentum again, and the Chairman's report which has just emerged shows a satisfying degree of progress towards finding solutions to some of the technical problems associated with toxicity determinations. In order to ensure that the meetings of experts continue to maintain this momentum, my delegation believes that the Working Group should consider very carefully the list of suggestions put forward last week for further work on the technical aspects of a chemical weapons convention and recorded in the Chairman's report. We believe that we have now reached the stage where it would be useful to widen the scope of the experts' meetings in order to examine issues other than those related to toxicity criteria. For example, it would be useful to have a discussion of the technical aspects of the most basic provision of a convention, namely, the destruction of stockpiles, and the verification of their destruction. As far as toxicity criteria are concerned, my delegation feels that the Ad Hoc Working Group will need to consider more carefully the specific purposes for which such criteria will be used in a chemical weapons convention before requesting the experts to look again at this question. I should like to record here my delegation's gratitude to Professor Rump of the Polish delegation for his endeavours as Chairman of the meetings of experts.

Finally, my delegation would like to comment on the concern expressed recently by a number of delegations that because toxic chemicals can be produced by the binary process, a new dimension has been added to our discussions. I think we should give this matter careful consideration before reaching any conclusion of this sort. It is clear that binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited. But we question whether by their nature binary weapons make problems of verification more difficult. The components of binary weapons must be chemically very highly reactive for them to be suitable for use in such weapons systems. If the materials to be used are chemically highly reactive, then storage problems for at least one of the precursors will be just as serious as for other chemical warfare agents, and such precursors will not be stored in large amounts for civilian use. A system of verification which included on-site inspections of a random sample of major chemical installations, such as the United Kingdom has proposed in CD/244, would thus be adequate to verify the non-production of binary weapons as well as of other types of chemical weapons. Thus the problems of verification of essential binary precursors will be similar to those of the verification of other lethal agents, and in fact less difficult than the problems of dual-purpose chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide. We must not allow imaginary problems associated with binary agents to cause an unnecessary diversion in our work on a chemical weapons convention.

We shall hope to contribute further thinking on this particularly important issue during the meetings of the Working Group.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by offering you, on behalf of the delegation of Poland, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. Together with my congratulations and best wishes, I pledge to you, Mr. Chairman, the full co-operation and support of my delegation in the discharge of your duties.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express to Ambassador Mahallati of Iran the high appreciation of my delegation for the dedicated and competent way in which he chaired this Committee in February.

In a spirit of friendship and co-operation I welcome in this room our new colleagues, Ambassador van Dongen of the Netherlands and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

The Committee on Disarmament is considering during this week's plenary meetings item 4 of its agenda, that is, Chemical weapons. I would like to devote my intervention today mainly to this subject. But I also intend to touch upon item 1 of the agenda, in the light of the recent exchange of views on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament.

Resolutions 36/96 A and 36/96 B adopted during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations have been rightly interpreted in this Committee by many speakers as a growing demand on the part of the whole international community, conscious of the dangerous consequences of a new stage in the development of chemical weapons, to advance effectively the pace of negotiations on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

This Committee considered it wise and possible to commence the elaboration of a future convention this year. This task has been entrusted to the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established at the beginning of this session with a revised mandate, authorizing the Group "... to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives".

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has at its disposal the results of years-long bilateral and multilateral negotiations and discussions, countless working papers and draft provisions, elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and now by the Committee itself. They have been brought to this negotiating table and they reflect the differing positions of the participating States. These include, inter alia, the results of the work on defining issues and structuring the basis for a future convention undertaken by the Working Group in 1980 under the effective leadership of Ambassador Okawa which are, in fact, formulated in document CD/220, that is, in the report of the Working Group on its work in 1981 under the skilled leadership of Ambassador Lidgard.

Document CD/220 contains the basic elements for a future convention, together with comments reflecting the differing views of individual delegations or groups of delegations on the shape and substance of the said elements. What is important is the fact that the specific dimensions of both the convergences and divergences of views on the form and contents of the chemical weapons convention's future provisions have thus been clearly outlined.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Starting its work this year under its new mandate, the Working Group has decided to continue and develop further the results achieved so far. The Group is aiming this year at translating the positions expressed in the comments contained in document CD/220 into the language of alternative elements or various versions of elements. The divergences expressed in such a way should lead to a narrowing of the gap in the positions of particular delegations or groups of delegations. I am of the opinion that the Working Group has not yet arrived at such a stage of negotiations, but I note with satisfaction that, so far, it has been actively engaged in a discussion of the organization of its work as well as in the detailed consideration of the scope of a future convention and the elaboration of alternative versions of the elements. Last week, considerable assistance to the Group was provided by consultations with experts in toxicology who managed to agree on their recommendations on standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations and for acute inhalation toxicity determinations.

My delegation wishes to express its conviction that the present organizational framework, as succinctly described above, meets the requirements of the present stage of negotiations in the Working Group under its new mandate. Furthermore, the progress and results of our activities in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons may depend on how soon and to what degree particular delegations will be able to clear up their positions, in particular, in questions where there are significant divergences.

It is the considered view of my delegation that the results of the work on a convention have significantly decreased in the absence of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations. This comes to mind not only because of the importance of the last report from these negotiations published in document CD/112, but also, and perhaps particularly, because of the role these negotiations could play at present in finding possible solutions to very many controversial problems the Working Group has to deal with.

Of decisive importance for the future convention, and particularly for the acceleration of work on its elaboration, is a clear-cut line between what is only desirable and what is possible, real and necessary in this treaty. What we need is not the will of a perfectionist but a persevering effort towards the cessation, as soon as possible, of the dangerous chemical armaments race which, if not stopped, may lead to a further postponement, for many years, of any possibility of reaching a universally acceptable agreement. This view of my delegation makes me think of the following analogy: as the production and equipment of armed forces with neutron weapons mean a new dangerous spiral in the nuclear arms race, so the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons in the same way will inevitably lead to a new spiral in the chemical arms race. Let us be frank: here we speak about new generations of weapons of mass destruction, which increase

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

the danger of the outbreak of a war with the use of different types of weapons of mass destruction. To make it absolutely clear, I am of the opinion that we would be considerably closer to concluding the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons if no binary weapons existed. It seems to me that if this is the case we should conduct the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons more energetically, while it is not too late.

The questions which arise in this context and which should be given a clear and honest answer are, among others, these: what new problems and what kind of new problems do binary weapons create for our negotiations? Which elements of the future convention will be mostly affected by their emergence? These questions are justified particularly in the light of United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/96 B which in its paragraph 5, inter alia, "... calls upon all States to refrain from ... production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". Moreover, and unfortunately, these questions are justified in the light of the decision on the production of binary weapons already taken by the United States Government. The emergence of these weapons in arsenals of other countries, after the aforementioned decision, may be only a question of time. This is why no effort should be spared by this Committee in negotiating, without any unnecessary delay, a convention which would ban, inter alia, the proliferation of binary weapons.

In our considered view, the emergence of binary systems will affect many crucial elements of the future convention, namely: its scope, prohibition of transfer, declarations of stocks, destruction and, above all, prohibition of their production and stockpiling.

It is important to point out that the deployment of binary weapons will complicate the already complicated and controversial problems of the verification of compliance with the provisions of the future convention. In fact, one cannot apply to binary weapons such verification methods as are based upon the extreme toxicity of the chemical agents used in traditional types of chemical weapons. All this, in a new way, raises the question of the verification of stocks and their destruction, and the question of control over the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons.

Coming up to the question of their proliferation, we have no doubt that the production of binary weapons by one country makes possible their deployment on the territory of another country, precisely because of a considerable easiness in their transport, stockpiling and retaining. Secondly, in the case of binary weapons, there exist comparatively easy ways of transforming industrial production capabilities from peaceful purposes to warlike ones. These questions are discussed in document CD/258 of which Poland is co-author, and furthermore, in the questionnaire presented by the delegation of Bulgaria in document CD/CW/WP.29. My

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

delegation is of the opinion that replies to the questions touched upon in the said documents would facilitate bridging the gap which, in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, has been created by the emergence of the binary systems. In fact, it is inconceivable to elaborate a convention which would not take into account all the consequences brought by binary weapons.

In the Working Group, we have examined in depth the questions concerning the scope of prohibition, aiming at further narrowing the differences. The Group, I have to stress, unfortunately has not managed to determine clearly the scope of prohibition. But I would like to come now to the question of verification. From the first round of discussions it can be said that a more reasonable approach seems to be emerging during this session. However, in our view, further discussion should concentrate more on the aspect of the adequacy of the verification system in relation to the sphere of prohibition. I think that there exists a somewhat artificial problem or certain misunderstanding in the discussions on verification. It is pointless to discuss whether national means of verification are better or more efficient than international mechanisms, and which ones are to be applied, because in fact both are needed. And the negotiations should go in both directions. Moreover, the negotiations should concentrate on methods and means of verification so that they can be adjusted to the contents and form of the prohibition. In other words, with three categories of chemical agents as spelled out in document CD/220, adequate forms of verification through national and international means should be applied to each of them in a differentiated but internally balanced and mutually interrelated system. This could be taken into account in our further discussions on verification.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, I would like now to touch upon another question which has been quite intensively discussed at the recent meetings of the Committee. I mean the declaration made by the United States delegation at the meeting of 11 March with respect to the establishment of "a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement".

As you know, somewhat earlier, to be precise on 9 February of this year, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, stated the United States position on the question of a nuclear weapons tests prohibition. He stated: "... we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance". This statement shows that the United States refuses to study the question of the tests prohibition as an independent item, but rather links it with the "wide range of nuclear problems". At the same time, the United States flatly refuses to take any step towards multilateral negotiations on

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

the limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. In particular, the United States impedes the establishment of a working group on this question which the non-aligned and socialist States insist upon. The United States delegation in its statement of 11 March reaffirmed its negative position both in respect of a nuclear weapons test ban and with respect to the nuclear disarmament problem as a whole.

Thus, on the one hand, the United States expresses its readiness to discuss the matters of verification connected with a nuclear weapons test ban, and on the other, it excludes the possibility of concluding an agreement on this subject in the near future. In this connection, delegations have a number of questions. Our delegation would also like to ask some questions. The main question is: is there any reason to discuss matters of control if the possibility of concluding an agreement is being denied? If the United States delegation proposed starting the elaboration of an agreement on a nuclear test ban with questions of control, then maybe one could understand it (although not necessarily agree).

There is another question: matters of control of a nuclear test ban have been discussed for a quarter of a century in various bodies and in different forms; in what manner should the discussion of control questions differ from previous discussions of previous questions? Is it a fact that previously the discussions of control questions were carried out in connection with the need to conclude an appropriate agreement, and now the American side proposes to indulge in pure abstraction?

Finally, we would like to ask the United States delegation the following questions. Does it envisage discussing only the problems of control over a nuclear weapons test ban or also problems concerning peaceful nuclear explosions? What does it envisage doing with the question of the scope of prohibition? Is the American delegation going to initiate the discussion of this later? Or does it not see any necessity in it at all, since it denies the possibility of the conclusion of an agreement on this matter? Thus, we return to the point we started from: why discuss questions of control if there is no prospect of concluding an agreement?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Ijewere.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed both to the Chair and to my country.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 159th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of our host country, Switzerland, His Excellency Ambassador Pictet.

Mr PICPET (Switzerland) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. I should like to assure you that it is a great pleasure for me to take the floor in the Committee on Disarmament while it is meeting under your chairmanship.

In the year that has elapsed since it was first authorized to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Switzerland has noted with a great deal of interest and attention the modest but nevertheless genuine progress made in the consideration of this difficult question. The issues involved are beginning to emerge more clearly and their formulation, in the form of elements, by the prior Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, has greatly helped to clarify ideas. My Government therefore welcomes the re-establishment of the Working Group and more particularly the fact that it has been given a new mandate allowing it to proceed now, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, to the actual elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Switzerland will continue to be represented at the meetings of the Working Group, and my Government sincerely hopes that it will prove possible during the current session, in spite of its brevity, to achieve further positive results.

I wish first of all to recall that, as I stated in your Committee on 14 July 1981, the Swiss private chemical industry, which is, as you know, highly developed, does not and will not under any circumstances manufacture chemical weapons. The Confederation, for its part, produces no chemical weapons for military purposes in its own establishments. Furthermore, Switzerland has not acquired chemical weapons from other countries it has no stock of chemical weapons and no such weapons are stored on its territory. The equipment possessed by the army is designed solely to protect combatants against the effects of toxic chemicals, should these be used in a conflict.

In making this statement, which is also a commitment as regards the future, Switzerland is demonstrating that, with respect to the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, it has no military chemical capacity whatever to defend. My Government nevertheless attaches very great importance to a convention in this sphere because of the inhuman character of chemical weapons and of the serious threat which they represent also for civilian populations. My country's interest in the conclusion of such a convention is twofold: on the one hand, from the standpoint of its security, which implies in particular that the convention should include adequate verification procedures, a sine qua non condition for the renunciation of costly national measures of protection and defence; and on the other, from the standpoint of the development of its chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which ought not to be hampered.

I should like today to make some observations concerning certain of the elements submitted to the Working Group by its Chairman last year, since they are still serving as a basis for the Committee's discussions.

The question whether it would be appropriate to repeat in the convention the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons which appears in the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) has been the subject of a great many comments relating to Element I ("General provision"). On the one hand, it can be argued that such a prohibition would have the advantage of being more comprehensive than that contained in the Protocol, since the latter does not cover all chemical weapons and prohibits only their first use. Furthermore, it would be a means of making up for the absence in the Protocol of any control machinery, a highly regrettable shortcoming when allegations are made concerning the use of chemical weapons, as has been the case on several occasions recently. On the other hand, the fear has been expressed that to reaffirm the prohibition of use in the convention would in the final analysis lead to a weakening of the Protocol, which must, of course, be avoided. Upon reflection, we believe that this is to a great extent a false problem. In fact the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol will, we believe, together form a set of complementary obligations, such that it seems extremely unlikely that a State would become a party to the convention without being bound by the Protocol. If that view is accepted, the convention should not only not "be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from ... the Protocol" (according to the wording proposed in Element VII entitled "Relationship with other treaties") but should rather express the idea of an organic link between the two instruments. That the parties to the convention should also be parties to the Protocol is important from three points of view: first, during the transitional period, which will be especially critical, in the course of which States will proceed to the dismantling of their stocks of chemical weapons, secondly, with regard to the amounts of super-toxic chemicals the possession of which would be authorized for non-hostile military purposes (as provided in Element VI); and, lastly, in the event of withdrawal from the convention. With these considerations in mind, my delegation wishes urgently to reiterate the hope that all States will forthwith become parties to the Geneva Protocol. Universal adherence to the Protocol, combined with the making of unilateral declarations of the non-possession of chemical weapons and the intention never to possess any, like the declaration which Switzerland has made on two occasions, would constitute confidence-building measures that could not but help to create a climate favourable to the negotiation of the convention.

With regard to the general definition of chemical weapons, which is the subject of Element II, my authorities are of the opinion that it would be preferable if the convention covered only chemical weapons in the strict and classical sense of the term, i.e. super-toxic and toxic substances which are produced expressly for military purposes and have lethal effects on man or cause lasting physiological harm. We are aware that such a definition has the effect of leaving outside the scope of the convention dual-purpose chemicals and substances intended for civilian use even if they can be employed for hostile purposes, such as certain herbicides and insecticides. True, chemicals in this category constitute a definite danger from the military standpoint, but it is a danger that is incomparably less serious than that represented by chemical weapons proper.

Furthermore, various difficulties, such as the need to use huge quantities when they are employed for military purposes make their utilization in hostilities unlikely. However, the main reason why Switzerland advocates the exclusion of these substances from the scope of the convention is that verification measures in respect of them would pose immense problems. In fact, an effective control would call for the placing under surveillance of virtually all civilian chemical manufacturing concerns because it would be possible, in certain conditions, for a very wide range of chemical products to be used for military purposes. Even though certain verification techniques used in the matter of non-proliferation could be applied, it would hardly be possible to place a country's entire chemical industry under control, in the way the non-proliferation Treaty has placed all nuclear installations under control.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

Moreover, as regards the use of herbicides and insecticides for hostile purposes, we may recall articles 54 and 55 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and article 18 of the second Protocol, relating to the protection of property essential to the survival of the civilian population and the protection of the natural environment.

Other terms used in Element II ought also, we think, to be clarified. For example, the meaning of "other lethal, and other harmful chemicals" would be clearer if the text read "other lethal chemicals or chemicals causing lasting physiological harm to man which are capable of being used for military purposes". With regard to precursors, we believe that this term should be used only to designate the component elements of so-called binary weapons and not the chemical substances used as starting materials or intermediate products, with no distinction being made between the civilian and military sectors. Lastly, the "means of production of chemical weapons", the prohibition of which is envisaged in Elements I, IV and V, can, we believe, only refer to the facilities that carry out the operations which render capable of military use chemical substances to which the convention would be applicable (loading or filling facilities).

Element VI, to which I referred earlier, provides that each party to the convention should undertake not to possess super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes in an aggregate quantity which exceeds 1,000 kilogrammes. We have serious reservations about this provision. It amounts in effect to perpetuating, and in fact legalizing, through the very convention that is designed to banish chemical weapons from the arsenals of States, the de facto inequality at present existing between the States which possess such weapons and those which do not. A State which possesses no chemical weapons at the time of its adherence to the convention will in fact be unable to acquire any quantity whatever of super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes without violating the undertaking under Element I "never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile [or] retain ... chemical weapons".

Consequently, stocks intended for "non-hostile military" purposes would be held only by the powers, happily few in number, which now possess, or will possess, at the time of their adherence to the convention, chemical weapons in the form of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Thus the impression of equality created by the fact that, under Element VI, each State party would be able to possess the same quantities of these chemicals for such purposes is, we believe, a false one, concealing what is in reality the discriminatory nature of this provision.

In any event, the quantity permitted appears to my delegation to be altogether excessive since these are substances intended for purposes of research in the matter of defence and protection. Consequently, the possession of such quantities of these chemicals by certain Governments would continue, in spite of control measures intended to ensure that the authorized ceiling is not exceeded to constitute a threat to the security of other States.

Allow me, before concluding, to say a few words about the measures for verification of compliance with the convention. Switzerland continues to be firmly of the view that in order to provide adequate guarantees of security, the verification system will have to be based on a combination of national and international measures and to include the possibility of on-site inspections. We have read with great interest the working paper presented on 18 February by the United Kingdom delegation (document CD/244), which seems to us to be one of the most detailed texts presented on this subject. With regard to on-site inspections, it is essential that an explanation should be given for any refusal to authorize such an inspection, and that provision should be made for a complaints or

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

recourse procedure in such a case. In this connection Switzerland, faithful to the general principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, is of the view that every party should have the right, in the event of disagreement regarding the interpretation of a provision of the convention, to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice, the recognition of whose competence should be compulsory. However, it seems to us somewhat premature to consider in detail at this stage the methods for verification of compliance with the convention. The modalities of control will in fact depend in part on the scope of the convention and, in particular on the definition of chemical weapons given in it. As I indicated earlier, Switzerland would see many advantages in confining the convention to a limited range of chemicals, produced specifically for military purposes. The broader the scope of the convention, the more extensive the verification measures will have to be and, consequently, the more complex and difficult to apply.

Unlike other measures of disarmament or arms control, a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons would at present concern only a small number of States, those possessing such weapons. These States therefore bear a special responsibility similar to that of the nuclear-weapon States. It is as necessary to try to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons as it is to prevent that of nuclear weapons. But chemical weapons, which are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce, are within the reach of a very large number of States, if they wish to possess them. Hence the very real threat which such weapons represent. In these circumstances, therefore, it is perfectly understandable that many States should wish to be associated with the negotiation of a convention on this subject. They are all entitled to stress their legitimate security interests as well as the interests of their civilian chemical industry and their technology, which should be protected. It is, in any event, these considerations which led the Swiss Government to seek permission to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to this very important item on its agenda, and in particular to present to you again today its views on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no further speakers on my list. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor?

If not, I should like to recall that, as we decided last week, we shall, immediately after this plenary meeting, hold a short informal meeting so that Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, can make a statement on the subject of documentation and other questions in suspense.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 25 March, at 10 a.m, as indicated on our time-table for this week.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 166th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda: "Chemical weapons". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I should like to welcome today to the meeting of the Committee two distinguished visitors, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the representative of Hungary.

His Excellency Ambassador Ruth has already made statements before our Committee several times in the past. As you know, he is the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. He has been very active in matters of disarmament, not only in this Committee but also in New York, where he has attended the regular sessions of the General Assembly.

His Excellency Mr. Imre Hollai, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, is also an experienced diplomat who has already twice served in his present post. From 1974 to 1980 he was the permanent representative of his country to the United Nations in New York. As a specialist in multilateral diplomacy, he has participated in a number of international conferences, some of them on disarmament.

I know that members of the Committee will listen with great interest to the statements our two visitors are going to make to us and that their presence here is greatly appreciated.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, the United States, Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Kenya, Argentina and China. A further member of the Committee has expressed a wish to speak today and I hope that I shall be able to give him the floor. However, since we already have nine speakers on the list for this morning, he has kindly agreed to speak only if we have sufficient time when the above list of speakers is exhausted.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, His Excellency Ambassador Ruth.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, it is a very great honour for me to address the Committee on Disarmament again. The last time I had this privilege was on 6 August 1981. On that occasion I explained my Government's position on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/205) jointly submitted by Australia, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time I was able to obtain a personal impression of the great sense of responsibility, the dedication to serious negotiation and the expertise which characterize the Committee's work. In my address I warned against either euphoria or resignation and stated that I was particularly encouraged by the negotiations within the working groups for chemical and radiological weapons. I note with satisfaction that the work on a convention banning chemical and radiological weapons has been intensified.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament has entered a decisive phase. We shall continue to participate constructively in the work of the Committee aimed at presenting a product to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly that is capable of gaining the support of all sides.

As we all know, the prospects for tangible success of the Committee's efforts depend to a large extent on whether there is an improvement in the international climate, especially between East and West. Unfortunately there has been a deplorable reverse trend: since 13 December 1981 a dark shadow has been lying over the relations between East and West as the consequence of an event that runs counter to the objectives and results of the CSCE process in Europe. Several delegations, including my own, have stressed this in the general debate at the beginning of this session.

Realistic and concrete arms control continues to be an urgent task of international security policy. It is therefore gratifying that the Committee has been able to agree on an effective programme of work, that a new extended mandate has been formulated for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that progress has been made towards the establishment of a new working group on the subject of nuclear testing with a focus on problems of verification of the observance of a comprehensive test ban.

My Government, which has attached great importance to the Committee's work in the field of a chemical weapons ban from the very outset, is ready to make its contribution so that success can be achieved. With this in mind my delegation is submitting a new working paper on the question of verifying compliance with a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and stipulating the destruction of existing stocks and production plants. We do so knowing that a large measure of agreement has already been achieved on the convention's scope and on definitions. Unfortunately this positive development has until now not been accompanied by corresponding progress in resolving the crucial issue of verification.

The position of my Government is clear:

The Federal Republic of Germany is a contracting party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which it adheres without reservations. Furthermore, in 1954 it became the only country until now to commit itself -- vis-à-vis its allies -- not to produce nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. When signing the Bacteriological Weapons Convention in 1972 my Government declared that "in the sphere of chemical weapons, it will neither develop nor acquire nor stockpile under its own control any of the warfare agents which it has already undertaken not to manufacture". My country also agreed, in connection with its commitment, to international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The experience gained from this practical verification was presented at an international workshop held in March 1979 and was then recorded in document CD/37.

In view of these circumstances my country felt justified to make energetic efforts to promote the conclusion of a comprehensive and -- at the same time -- verifiable chemical weapons convention. Our parliament, the German Bundestag, unanimously supports these efforts. In a decision unanimously adopted on 3 December 1981 it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to make even greater efforts than hitherto for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, which it deems indispensable and of which effective international verification must be an integral part.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

I know that we are all agreed on the following points:

Chemical weapons are regarded by the international public as being especially obnoxious and are a particularly great threat to the civilian population.

The danger that these weapons might be employed in a military confrontation despite the Geneva Protocol banning their use cannot be precluded as long as they exist.

This danger must be averted, and indeed it can be averted. This requires an agreement which stipulates the destruction of all existing chemical weapons subject to adequate verification and ensures that no State may in future develop, produce or stockpile chemical weapons.

The observance of such an agreement must be reliably safeguarded. This is the only way of ensuring that the horrors of chemical warfare are completely banned and forever from the world.

Our experience with regard to the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons reinforces our conviction that, although these problems are even more multifaceted and complex than those connected with other arms control agreements, practicable solutions that are universally acceptable can none the less be found. Let me outline some of the elements of a necessary verification arrangement.

(a) A chemical weapons convention cannot be monitored by national technical means alone. By looking at a chemical factory from the outside one cannot see what is going on inside.

(b) On-site inspections by teams of international experts must therefore be a firm component of a verification régime.

(c) A reliable verification régime has two main functions: it must enable situations requiring clarification to be examined impartially, and it must ensure the observance and implementation of the convention by means of regular and non-discriminatory international measures according to a fixed procedure.

(d) The legitimate interest in keeping chemical production and research methods secret must be fully protected.

There are, in my view, favourable prospects for progress towards a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Only recently the President of the United States stated unequivocally that his country regards the conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention as a high priority of its arms control policy and that it would welcome such an achievement by 1984 since it would then no longer need to resume the production of chemical weapons discontinued by the United States in 1969 and introduce modernized chemical weapons. The Committee's working group on chemical weapons has for the first time been given a comprehensive mandate for the drafting of a convention. The discussions in this group have been speeded up and intensified. The future work of the Committee can build on the substantive progress already achieved. International opinion has been made sensitive to the subject of chemical weapons not least by reports that such weapons may have been used in crisis areas in South Asia. Thus the conditions exist for a successful outcome which would free mankind from a nightmare.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The working paper submitted today by my delegation is intended to be a constructive contribution offering practicable solutions to the one problem still causing the greatest difficulty: that of adequate verification.

The authors of the paper have been guided by the following objectives: we propose a verification régime which, in our view, is both effective and acceptable. It recognizes that expenditure and the manpower requirements must be kept within reasonable limits.

The paper envisages regular checks for monitoring both the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and the undertaking not to manufacture chemical weapons. In addition, the paper calls for inspection on challenge, that is the possibility of special checks in the event of founded suspicions. Neither of these two procedures is sufficient on its own; a dependable verification régime must include both of them.

The paper does not overlook the fact that a verification régime could be more elaborate. We do not exclude the possibility of defining additional confidence-building measures in the field of chemical weapons, which could have a particular psychological and political impact. The paper does not contain any specific suggestions in this field as it is designed to outline the elements of a verification régime that we consider indispensable for any ban on chemical weapons.

Let me add a few words on the regular checks described in the paper. We feel that we have not proposed any unreasonable measures. To verify that the commitment not to manufacture chemical weapons is being honoured, we consider it sufficient to ensure random on-site inspections of chemical plants producing organo-phosphorous substances. The paper recommends that lots be cast to select the plants for inspection. In our view, the very possibility of the lot falling upon a potential violator serves to ensure a large measure of confidence that the convention is being complied with.

Specific rules are suggested for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. They provide for obligatory inspections before and after the period during which destruction is to be effected; during the period itself jointly agreed forms of monitoring with technical aids, such as flowmeters, and random on-site inspections are to be carried out.

As you will notice, we do not suggest the inclusion of regular checks to monitor the production of dual-purpose agents. In this respect the scope of the convention goes beyond that of this proposed verification régime. This seems to us to be a justified limitation. In our view, comprehensive verification would be very difficult to carry out from a technical point of view in this particular field. Furthermore and above all, the agents concerned are of less military importance. The regular checks suggested by the paper therefore concentrate on supertoxic agents. In this context the actual design of a production facility will give an indication of whether the convention is being violated.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

In this connection the paper also suggests a method for verifying the non-production of binary weapons. This involves the taking of samples, which are analysed at the inspection site itself. The analysis involves a summary procedure which proves the non-production of the key precursors of binary weapons but does not disclose the complete actual composition of the sample. When I speak of binaries I mean a composition containing a key precursor as one of the two or more components. Only this key precursor is a phosphorus-organic compound which is essential for a binary weapon. It is this key precursor which must be subject to verification. It is thus not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification. In this context I should like to add that the term "binary", as used in the paper, includes weapons made up of two or more active substances..

Let me stress that the proposed procedure is intended to rule out the possibility of any abuse. My country's chemical industry, which faces lively competition on both national and international markets, strongly supports the proposals made here and is willing to share the experience it has gained with any interested party.

I invite all delegations to the Committee to take a close look at our paper and to incorporate it in their own considerations. In the interest of increased international co-operation and trust, long-standing reservations should now be re-considered. Clearly defined on-site inspections should be recognized as a suitable means of verification in the field of chemical weapons. This would also create favourable conditions for other disarmament and arms control efforts. Reliable verification is not to the advantage or disadvantage of any individual party: rather, it serves the interests of everyone concerned and enhances world-wide confidence in arms control agreements and the realistic expectation of achieving co-operative measures designed to ensure compliance with negotiated results.

Ever since the Geneva Protocol was drawn up in 1925, this city has been the scene of many successful international endeavours for disarmament and arms control. At present it hosts not only the Committee on Disarmament but also another negotiating forum of crucial importance for security and stability in Europe and worldwide. I refer, of course, to the American-Soviet negotiations on the reduction and limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which, after the agreed two-month recess, will be resumed on 20 May with a new round. My Government is naturally following these talks with the greatest interest and is participating actively in the consultations of the North Atlantic Alliance on this subject. In our view, the bilateral American-Soviet INF negotiations and the Committee's multilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons convention have something in common: they both aim at a zero-level outcome, in other words, the INF negotiations at the elimination of all land-based long-range nuclear missiles, and the efforts of this Committee at the elimination of all chemical weapons, thus making a contribution to achieve outcomes at the lowest possible level. My country hopes that such substantive results will be achieved in both cases. We will support every effort to move towards constructive and concrete results to facilitate the negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

remove the threat of a nuclear war would be the earliest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons, or at least to outlaw the first use of such weapons as the gravest crime against humanity. Partial measures, however, could also contribute to the strengthening of the security of States.

In this context, I wish to emphasize that my Government attaches great importance to strengthening the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Our point of departure is that States -- like my own country -- which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons under a valid international legal instrument, and whose territories are free of nuclear weapons of other States, have an inherent right to unconditional guarantees that they will never, under any circumstances, be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We continue to be advocates of a solution within the framework of an international convention. However, we support the proposal to have, as a first step, declarations by the nuclear-weapon powers to that effect, identical in substance and confirmed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Hungarian people was deeply shocked and alarmed when in August last year the United States Government announced the commencement of the large-scale production of neutron warheads. Even the thought of a possible use of that weapon is profoundly deplorable, and generates a strong feeling of indignation all over the world, but particularly in Europe where it is intended to be deployed. My Government is resolutely urging the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations without delay on a convention to prohibit in a comprehensive manner that abominable weapon.

The amount of time I have devoted to questions concerning the complex of nuclear disarmament, just like the great emphasis that the Hungarian delegation has always laid on all such issues, is clearly indicative of the urgency and priority which the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to those problems. This fact, however, does not detract from our will and readiness to pursue meaningful negotiations on all the other items on the Committee's agenda.

The Hungarian delegation has, indeed for a long time, been one of the proponents of urgent measures, the conclusion of international agreements aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons; the prohibition of radiological weapons; and the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The people of my country, like peoples in the whole of Europe, are deeply worried by recent measures taken in the United States on the production and deployment of binary weapons. All States, in particular the European States, should raise and firmly reject the sinister plans aimed at flooding this continent with new waves of nuclear, neutron and chemical weapons. This Committee should accelerate its efforts aimed at preventing a new and very

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

dangerous spiral of the chemical arms race. Urgent steps should be taken to prevent the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons, as well as the deployment of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

The Hungarian delegation has been deeply involved in efforts to elaborate a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, and it will continue to be engaged in further negotiations to that end.

Only a week ago our delegation submitted a proposal in this Committee concerning various steps aimed at preventing a qualitatively new round of the technological arms race, and to achieve a comprehensive prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. We suggested also to give serious consideration to appropriate formulations, by which all States, especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any further efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. My Government is hopeful that our initiative is carefully considered and will be given positive response.

Before concluding this review of my Government's position on some of the major problems of arms limitation and disarmament, I wish to mention that we fully support the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the earliest possible conclusion of an international treaty aimed at preventing outer space from becoming a new arena of the arms race. We hope that all the members of the Committee realize the great danger that would face mankind if another sphere of vital interest to all States got involved in the arms race.

In conclusion I wish to reaffirm the great importance which the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With that in mind, our delegations here in the Committee and its subsidiary bodies, and in the Preparatory Committee in New York, are co-operating in the preparations in order to ensure the realization of all the sound anticipations. We expect the special session to become a forum of action-oriented decisions. We shall do everything to help preserve and further develop the results achieved at the first special session. We want to contribute to the maintenance of the principles embodied in the Final Document, and to be instrumental in the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): We are indeed privileged today to have two distinguished guests participating in our plenary session. Their presence confirms the importance which their respective Governments attach to our Committee. My delegation takes great pleasure in joining you, Mr. Chairman, in extending to their Excellencies Ambassador Friedrich Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Imre Hollai of Hungary to our meeting, and in expressing to them our appreciation for their presence in the Committee. I also wish to note with some regret the departure of our distinguished colleague and friend, His Excellency Ambassador Mircea Malitza, the able representative of Romania to this body. My feelings, I must confess, are mixed because, while I shall, as indeed shall we all, miss his congenial and skilful work in our Committee, I must say that our sense of loss here in Geneva is a selfish one because he takes up his post in Washington, and there he will become the diplomatic representative of Romania to the United States. I wish him well in his new responsibility and know that he will make a significant contribution to Romanian/United States relations.

The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. It is a goal to which my Government attaches great importance.

In his statement to the Committee on 9 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, outlined the position of the United States with respect to a chemical weapons prohibition. Today, during one of the two plenary sessions devoted specifically to the subject of chemical weapons, I would like to set forth the United States approach in greater detail.

The United States views the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as a means for increasing our own security and the security of our friends and allies, as well as the security of neutral/non-aligned States. We are seeking to eliminate a real threat by removing real weapons from existing arsenals of potential adversaries. The United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect. They are particularly effective against military forces and civilians in small countries who do not have the means to protect themselves. We are convinced that even as we sit in this room these weapons are being used in current conflicts in remote areas of the world -- in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. We must stop the use of chemical weapons and achieve the goal we seek -- a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons for all time.

Ensuring that a chemical weapons ban increases security and that, so far as is possible, it does not harm legitimate chemical activities is a heavy responsibility. It is a highly complex and difficult task to strike the proper balance. Toxic chemicals are ubiquitous in modern societies. Today all societies depend heavily on toxic chemicals used as drugs, pesticides and chemical intermediates, to name but a few examples. It is my Government's view that the simple approach used in the past for biological weapons and environmental warfare cannot serve as a model for dealing with the much more complex problems surrounding a ban on chemical weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have already been working on a chemical weapons ban for over a decade. In view of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, it should not be surprising that reaching agreement has proved difficult. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that considerable useful work has been accomplished.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

Unfortunately, progress has been very uneven. Far greater progress has been made in defining the scope of a prohibition than in working out arrangements to ensure universal confidence that all parties are complying with their obligations. It is clear that lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance constitutes the key obstacle to successful completion of the Committee's work.

In this context, I would like to discuss briefly certain events outside the Committee which form an important part of the background for the Committee's discussions of a chemical weapons ban, and which have a great influence on the attitude of my Government. A proper understanding of these events is essential if members are to understand the United States position on this subject.

First, as is well known, the United States has concluded that it cannot any longer postpone steps to modernize its deterrent chemical weapons stockpile. More than a decade ago we shut down all of our chemical weapons production facilities. We have not produced any chemical weapons since that time and have in fact destroyed large quantities of such weapons. We had hoped for reciprocal behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union, and believed that progress toward a chemical weapons ban would obviate the need for future production by eliminating the threat our chemical warfare capabilities were designed to meet. Unfortunately, however, the threat not only remains, but is greater than ever. We must take prompt steps to deal with it -- to do otherwise would be irresponsible. We would greatly prefer an adequately verifiable treaty, we will continue to work actively for it, but until such an agreement is achieved, it is clear from Soviet actions that we must maintain military capabilities in the chemical weapons field. This approach is consistent with that taken by my Government in other areas where negotiations are under way. Sadly, my Government has concluded that no other approach is likely to produce positive results. I shall not belabour this point. For the information of other distinguished delegates, my delegation is submitting today a working paper entitled, The United States programme to deter chemical warfare, which explains in greater detail the several steps we are taking and the reasons behind them. The objective of the United States chemical programme as has been clearly stated, is to maintain the safest, smallest level of chemical munitions which will provide an effective deterrent to a chemical attack by an aggressor. It is not, as some would have you believe, to gain a superiority in these weapons, or even to match the sizeable Soviet capability. I would note in particular that over 70 per cent of our planned expenditures are related to protection against chemical attack.

Allegations have been made in this Committee that the United States is not negotiating in good faith, and that we are deliberately creating obstacles to an agreement by modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities. That is sheer nonsense. United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government. I would also like to make clear that if we are successful in achieving such a ban, we would be willing, indeed eager, to terminate our binary weapons programme promptly.

In addition, some delegations would have others believe that production of binary chemical weapons will make adequate verification of a chemical weapons ban considerably more difficult or perhaps even impossible. This, too, is nonsense. The fact is that all manufacturing processes for chemical warfare agents, whether for conventional, binary, or other multi-component weapons, present the same basic verification problems. Our planned binary systems will produce standard nerve agents which have been discussed extensively in this Committee. They will use the

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

same key precursors used to produce nerve agents by conventional methods. A binary production facility will still contain special devices for handling toxic chemicals. These will not be as extensive as in a conventional nerve agent plant, but this difference will have no real impact on verification. National technical means are not adequate even for dealing with conventional chemical warfare agent plants. As with facilities which produce conventional chemical weapons, an on-site visit to the production facility itself could determine without great difficulty what was being produced and for what purpose. Also, as with conventional chemical weapons, there are precursors involved which are "single-purpose"; that is, they have no commercial application. Such key precursors will have to be dealt with in a future convention, regardless of the type of chemical warfare agent production process in which they may be used.

There is a second series of events which has much more serious implications for the work of the Committee -- events which have created grave concerns that existing arms control constraints on chemical and biological weapons are being violated.

The United States now has good reason to question soviet compliance with the biological and toxin weapons Convention -- an arms control treaty negotiated in this Committee's predecessor body. We have compelling evidence of a highly unusual outbreak of anthrax, linked to a heavily-secured military installation, in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979. We have repeatedly, on a bilateral basis, asked the Soviet Union to provide information which would allay our concerns. The response of the Soviet Government -- that this outbreak was due to natural causes -- is frankly not consistent with the information available to us.

In addition to the Sverdlovsk outbreak, the United States and other countries have evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Soviet and Soviet-assisted forces in contravention of international law. Lethal toxins, whose possession for hostile purposes is prohibited by the biological and toxin weapons Convention, have been found in samples from areas of reported chemical weapons attacks in Laos and Kampuchea.

My Government has just completed an exhaustive review of all the information currently available on the reports that chemical weapons are being used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. We have concluded that lethal and other chemical weapons are being used in all three countries and that a member of this Committee, the Soviet Union, is directly involved. We will make available to all delegations a copy of the document which outlines our conclusions and the information on which they are based.

This accumulation of evidence, from many different sources, raises a number of serious issues regarding existing and future arms control agreements, particularly in the area of chemical weapons. The need for improved international verification procedures and mechanisms for dealing with compliance issues has been clearly demonstrated. The repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to co-operate

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

in resolving these outstanding issues, which are of great concern to the United States and others, casts a pall over our collective efforts to attain a chemical weapons ban.

These developments have reinforced my Government's determination to ensure that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention are truly effective.

The importance which my Government attaches to verification is well known. This is not an abstract negotiating position. It is a fundamental security consideration. We believe that a capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack is essential for the purpose of helping to deter such an attack. If we are to accept an obligation under a convention to relinquish such a capability, the provisions of the convention must provide an adequate level of confidence that potential adversaries are also relinquishing their chemical weapons capabilities. Let me be frank. We will not accept a convention that cannot be adequately verified and thus cannot be relied upon to eliminate the threat which chemical weapons pose to the security of the United States and others. I cannot conceive that my Government would enter into a convention if serious doubts on this remained.

There is general agreement that a verification system for a chemical weapons convention should be based on a combination of national and international means which would complement and supplement each other. However, fundamental differences exist. Some delegations want to rely almost totally on national technical means and national measures of implementation. Many others, including my own, believe that only international measures, including systematic international on-site verification, can provide the basis for adequate verification. We are convinced that for the foreseeable future, national technical means will be inadequate. Furthermore, national implementation arrangements will not help assure others that national Governments are in compliance. There can be no substitute for co-operative international verification measures, including appropriate provisions for systematic on-site monitoring, agreed in advance in the convention.

Discussions of general approaches to verification have amply demonstrated that these fundamental differences exist in the Committee. One would think that in such a situation, an intensive effort would be made to isolate, and focus on, the problem areas. That is the approach favoured by my delegation and many others. But a number of delegations apparently want to avoid tackling these difficult questions. We do not see how such an approach can lead anywhere. Ignoring problems will not make them less real or less important and certainly does not facilitate their resolution. Meaningful progress toward a chemical weapons convention will depend upon progress in resolving basic verification issues. In my delegation's view, it is not productive to try to draft the text of provisions in other areas when there is not even the basis for a common approach on the verification provisions.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

The time has come to move beyond a general discussion of broad approaches to verification. The Committee should now focus on specific verification tasks, one by one, and devote as much time as may be necessary to achieving agreement. The list of tasks outlined in the Canadian working paper, document CD/167, would provide a good starting point for drawing up a list of issues to be addressed. There clearly will not be any simple formula which can be applied in all cases. Because of the variety of verification tasks, a chemical weapons verification system will need to include a variety of measures tailored to suit particular situations.

Finding solutions to the many remaining problems will require active co-operation among all members of the Committee, applying their collective imagination and expertise. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification. In the near future we will submit a concrete proposal to the Committee for a detailed evaluation of this technique as a possible component of a chemical weapons verification system.

The active involvement of technical experts will be needed for understanding both the technical dimensions of the tasks and the technical possibilities for accomplishing them. In this regard, my delegation believes that the principal work of experts in the area of toxicity determination has been completed. The most important need now is for expert advice in the area of verification. We would agree that as a first step, experts be asked to outline this summer possible procedures for monitoring destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and to address several other specific verification-related topics contained in the draft report of the consultations held on 15-19 March.

There is one final point that I want to ensure that everyone understands. My delegation pledges its full co-operation in the Committee's efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban. We are ready and willing to sit down with others to try to find specific solutions to the many specific problems which have to be resolved if a chemical weapons convention is to be achieved. In this regard, some have suggested that one of the most effective ways to achieve rapid progress would be for the United States to resume bilateral negotiations with the USSR. Let me clearly state the United States position on this matter. The possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations remains open, pending a demonstration by the Soviet Union of genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to comply with their obligations under existing agreements. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The ball is squarely in the Soviet court.

We have been seeking an effective ban on chemical weapons for many years. We have no illusions that solutions will be found quickly. But the longer we wait to grapple with the real problems in the area of verification and compliance, the longer it will take. We should not lose any more time.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

initiatives aimed at the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. In this context I should like to stress the importance of the new Soviet proposal concerning a key issue in the matter of the prevention of the growing threat of a nuclear missile war.

The Soviet Union's new peaceful initiatives, put forward a few days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, at the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, have been received with full support in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, the quantitative and qualitative freezing of such weapons already deployed there and the halting of the replacement of old missiles by newer ones, as well as a number of other concrete proposals advanced by the Soviet Union, are permeated with a sincere concern to avert the threat of war and a desire to reduce the level of military confrontation and to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in the Soviet-United States negotiations on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union has thereby demonstrated once again its goodwill and its readiness to strive for the positive solution of vitally important problems in the interests of strengthening peace and stability, not only in Europe but in the world as a whole.

Allow me now to make some observations on behalf of the Mongolian delegation with respect to item 4 of the agenda, which the Committee has begun considering this week.

The many years' efforts of the Committee on Disarmament aimed at the elaboration and approval of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction are meeting with serious new difficulties. We are convinced that the prohibition of chemical weapons is today one of the most urgent tasks, brooking no further delay, in the sphere of real disarmament. The majority of the world's States are of the same view, namely, that mankind must be spared the horrors of chemical warfare and saved from that most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction.

However, a diametrically opposite position has been taken on this important issue by the Washington Administration, which has adopted a multi-billion-dollar programme for the "chemical rearmament of the United States", the essence of which consists, basically, in commissioning a new generation of chemical weapons and ultimately stationing them on the territories of other States. The decision of the United States to step up the production of charges containing a new and even more lethal nerve-gas mixture, the so-called binary charges, is creating a situation fraught with the most dangerous consequences.

The addition of binary weapons to the military arsenal of the United States of America and its NATO allies represents first and foremost a threat of the use of this most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction in densely-populated parts of Europe. Thus attempts are being made not only to transform Europe into an arena for some kind of "limited nuclear war" but also to regard that continent as the most suitable theatre for a future war with the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

At the same time, the authors of that very programme of "chemical rearmament of the United States of America" are continuing in every way possible to inspire reports of "instances of the use of Soviet chemical and toxin weapons" and to involve the United Nations in a so-called "investigation of the matter". In the statement just made here in the Committee by the representative of the United States there was again an attempt to make allegations not in accordance with the facts. Members of the Committee on Disarmament are well aware that such ploys have failed to produce any result whatsoever.

It is not surprising that such slanders and distortions of the facts are being resorted to by those who for many decades ignored the 1925 Geneva Protocol and, in the early 1970s, made use of chemical weapons, or rather waged real chemical warfare against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. Such inventions are resorted to by those who are waging an undeclared war against Afghanistan. They gladly supply chemical weapons to terrorist bands sent into the country from abroad, who then use them against the peaceful Afghan population.

All these actions are being undertaken by certain circles to justify their practical steps towards the implementation of the plan for "chemical rearmament" and, in particular, the large-scale production of a new generation of chemical weapons — binary weapons.

These actions are being undertaken also in order to justify the Reagan administration's plans, which were confirmed by the United States Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in his interview on "The Voice of America", to consider reviewing international treaties and agreements prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The modernization and the unprecedented increase in the production of war gases is inevitably leading to a new and dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and is creating a situation in which everything positive that has been achieved towards the reaching of agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons and further efforts in that direction could be reduced to naught. In other words, the whole matter of the emergence of binary weapons will severely complicate the negotiations on the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

At the last plenary meeting, Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, very rightly said that the emergence of the problem of binary weapons inevitably creates certain difficulties in solving a wide range of questions relating to the future convention — questions relating, in particular, to the scope of the prohibition, transfer, the declaration of stocks and their destruction, and issues directly connected with the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the delegations of the socialist countries, including Mongolia, have submitted working paper CD/258 drawing attention to certain important aspects most directly related to the negotiations at present taking place in the Committee. I do not wish to dwell in detail on that document, as its contents are already known to all members of the Committee, and it should form the subject of careful consideration.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are convinced that a review of the decision, i.e. the renunciation of the wide-scale production and deployment of a new generation of chemical weapons, would contribute towards the early achievement of generally acceptable agreements in the important disarmament sphere of the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

The Mongolian People's Republic, together with other peace-loving States, is resolutely opposed to the production and deployment of binary weapons.

In that connection I wish to point out once more that at the last session of the General Assembly Mongolia was a joint sponsor of resolution 36/96 B, which was supported by the votes of 157 delegations, only the United States delegation voting against. Proceeding from its consistent policy aimed at preventing war and strengthening universal peace and security, the Mongolian People's Republic considers it urgently necessary to intensify multilateral efforts to curb the chemical arms race even further and to undertake practical steps towards the attainment of agreement in that area of genuine disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament can do a great deal in that respect, first and foremost by successfully completing the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Mongolian delegation notes with satisfaction the active continuation of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the capable and enterprising chairmanship of Ambassador B. Sujka of Poland. We hope that on the basis of the broader mandate adopted at this session of the Committee, the Working Group will achieve even more substantial progress towards the earliest possible elaboration of an appropriate international instrument.

While it has the floor, the Mongolian delegation would like to deal in detail with one of the issues relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As members of the Committee know, the agreed position of the group of socialist countries set forth in document CD/245 has evoked considerable interest on the part of a number of delegations, and especially among the representatives of the Group of 21. The sponsors of that document have been requested to provide additional explanations on some of the points contained in it, and a number of questions were raised in that connection.

The Czechoslovak delegation has made several statements here on behalf of the group of socialist countries, giving a detailed explanation and exposition of our agreed position. The Mongolian delegation will not, therefore, repeat what has already been said, but would like to answer some questions asked by the distinguished representative of India at an earlier plenary meeting of the Committee.

Those questions relate to the initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic concerning the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. That proposal was formulated in document A/36/27 (p. 100) and also in document CD/245 (p. 8).

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Ambassador Grinberg.

Mr. GRIMBERG (Bulgaria): My delegation has already had an opportunity to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee, as well as to welcome the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands in this Committee. Let me now express our satisfaction in connection with today's participation in our deliberations of two distinguished guests, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. Imre Hollai as well as Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Ruth, the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lastly, I would like to state how much we regret that the head of the Romanian delegation, and our very good friend, Ambassador Mircea Malitza, is leaving this Committee in order to take up another important post. We have always appreciated his important contribution to our work and enjoyed his close co-operation and his contribution to the development of our common endeavours in this Committee.

Today I would like to present certain considerations of the Bulgarian delegation on item 4 of our agenda, "Chemical weapons". Instead of describing the importance of our negotiations in this field, let me give a brief quotation from a manual on chemical weapons: "After only a brief exposure to nerve gas, victims bleed profusely from the nose and mouth, go into severe convulsions and die within minutes or after days of agony." To this the manual adds that the lethal doses are measured in milligrams. While discussing this issue, therefore, we should not forget that the military arsenals of today may contain several hundred thousand tons of chemical warfare agents.

I think we need such a reminder in order to grasp the true dimensions of our task.

Paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament proclaimed that "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament", and that the conclusion of a convention to this end "is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". Very soon this Committee will have to report on the results of its efforts to halt and reverse the arms race in this important area.

Looking back over the years of deliberations, we would like to underline first of all the fundamental role that was played by the bilateral USSR-United States talks in the period 1976-1980. It is to be regretted that these talks have been unilaterally discontinued, because they could still have served a very useful purpose.

Turning now to the multilateral negotiations, I would like to note with satisfaction that during the sessions of the Committee in 1980 and 1981 very useful work on the elaboration of the elements of a future convention was done under the leadership of Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard. This year's session has been marked by the resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an extended mandate, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Our delegation welcomes the business-like atmosphere that prevails in the Working Group. A number of statements and documents presented by different delegations will no doubt contribute to the formulation of the elements of the future convention. Finally, let me also mention that for the last three years we have been assisted in our work by technical experts from more than 20 countries, including Bulgaria, and I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express to them our acknowledgement.

We are all aware that in spite of the progress achieved so far, a lot of problems still remain to be resolved, including those of definitions, the scope of the prohibition, declarations concerning and the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, verification of the implementation of the convention etc. It is essential, at this stage, that all delegations take a balanced approach towards the whole complex of questions, without artificially upgrading some at the expense of other, equally important questions.

It is heartening to note that there is an increasing awareness of the necessity of such an approach. Even in the statements made on the complex and delicate subjects of control and verification, it has often been possible to discern signs of a growing realization that the "concept of distrust" would lead us nowhere. For our part, we fully share the position of the Soviet delegation, as presented by Ambassador Issraelyan in his important statement of 31 March 1981: "No matter how much we expand and complicate the verification system, no matter how comprehensive we strive to render it, we shall never reach the point at which we can be sure that no uncertainties have been left concerning some important aspect or other of the activities of States, related to the observance of all the provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons."

Having said this, however, I would like to stress most emphatically that our position regarding the possibility of devising an effective system of verification over the implementation of the future convention is a positive and optimistic one. In this respect my delegation has been encouraged by the initial exchange of views in the Working Group, which revealed that even though some important questions have yet to be resolved, there are a considerable number of converging points on questions of both principle and detail.

We could hardly make an attempt at assessing the present state of the negotiations on banning chemical weapons without taking into account the recent decision of the United States Administration to proceed to the production and deployment of what are known as binary and multi-component chemical weapons.

To condition the American people to accept these unpopular measures and in order to justify themselves before world public opinion, in the course of the last several years, the United States has been waging an unprecedented, large-scale defamation campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, affirming the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia. Today the United States representative, Ambassador Fields, thought fit to repeat these slanderous accusations in his statement. We can only regret that those who are responsible for this campaign have not yet abandoned their tactics which can only result in poisoning the atmosphere and making our work even more difficult than it actually is.

The fact is sufficiently worrisome in itself, that at a time of greatly increased tensions and an escalating arms race in many fields, a new, particularly deadly weapon is being added to the long list of horrible means of mass destruction, threatening the survival of mankind. But on top of this, as has been rightly pointed out by many delegations, we have to bear in mind that should these new weapons, based on the latest technological achievements and on qualitatively new principles, actually be produced and deployed, the current negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be greatly complicated. This is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the international community as reflected in General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, which in its operative paragraph 5 "Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons". It is indeed regrettable that the United States cast the only negative vote on this important resolution.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

We cannot fail to voice our anxiety and to deplore the fact that the new multi-billion-dollar programme for the production of binary weapons will open up a new channel in the arms race. But as Europeans we have additional reasons for concern because hardly anyone could doubt that these weapons are to be deployed in densely populated areas of the world, and above all in Europe. That is why my delegation strongly supports the idea of the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territory of countries where such weapons are not stationed at present. We have also proposed that each State party to the convention should recall to its national territory, not later than six months after its adherence, all chemical weapons stationed under its jurisdiction on the territory of other States.

Following an objective preliminary analysis of the implications resulting from the emergence of binary weapons, the delegations of a group of socialist countries presented to the Committee document CD/258, in which they have put forward their views on a number of issues related to those weapons. Apart from this, the Bulgarian delegation submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a questionnaire on the same subject. At this point I would like to refer in general terms to two major problems that the emergence of binary chemical weapons poses for all of us. The first one relates to the scope of the prohibition in the future convention, the second to its control and verification provisions.

1. In the considered opinion of our experts, binary weapons will further complicate the already difficult distinction between commercial chemicals and those which can be used for chemical weapons. This applies especially to organo-phosphorus compounds in the production of pesticides.

2. In the area of control and verification, binary weapons will multiply the difficulties in the evaluation of the declared stocks of chemical weapons, the control over non-production of chemical weapons, the non-possession of chemical weapons, etc.

In stating the above we are fully aware that these views are not shared by some delegations. Only two days ago the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, questioned whether by their nature alone binary weapons made problems of verification more difficult. Today we heard similar views from the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields. To prove his point Ambassador Summerhayes maintained that the components of binary weapons were chemically highly reactive and, because of storage problems, essential binary precursors would not be stored in large amounts for civilian use. Hence, the problem of verification of such precursors would be similar to, if not less difficult than those of the verification of other lethal agents.

The arguments adduced by the United Kingdom delegation failed to remove our concern regarding the negative implications of binary weapons for our efforts.

As is well known, the civilian chemical industry uses for permitted purposes many substances which are highly reactive. Their storing in large amounts does cause some technical difficulties but these problems are not insurmountable. Thus, on the one hand, it would not be impossible to store highly reactive substances as precursors of binary weapons, and, on the other, the presence of such substances in a given country could not in itself constitute a basis for suspicions of non-compliance unless they are known to be components of binary weapons.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

But, could there be a guarantee that the States parties to the future convention will be fully informed of developments in the field of the production of binary or multi-component chemical weapons? How are they going to overcome the dangers resulting from a possible lack of knowledge or from an overdose of suspicion? These are real and not imaginary problems.

I hope the question I have raised will not be interpreted as an expression of pessimism. Our purpose is only to contribute to the better understanding of the problems posed by the introduction of the new generation of chemical weapons and, through this, to their solution. We sincerely believe that, should there be a political will, this Committee will be in a position to accomplish successfully its difficult tasks.

I would like to turn now briefly to item 1 of our agenda. We have already addressed the nuclear test-ban issue on previous occasions and our position is clear. We are in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. With this in view we gave our full support to the proposal for a mandate for such a working group made by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic (document CD/259).

As is known, there were some new developments in this area recently. A statement was made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, to the effect that the United States would be in a position to join a consensus to establish "a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement".

In view of some previous statements which made clear that the United States no longer considered the negotiation of a CTBT an immediate task to be accorded the highest priority, many delegations met Ambassador Fields' announcement with mixed feelings and many questions. These reservations were fully justified because a discussion of an issue of such complexity as verification in a vacuum, and without any reference to a clearly defined objective, could hardly serve any useful purpose.

Now, as is known, in spite of these legitimate doubts, a drafting group was set up under your chairmanship to try to formulate a mandate for a working group which would make it possible for this Committee to start a process of genuine multilateral efforts which should culminate in the conclusion of a CTBT. My delegation is participating in the drafting group, proceeding from the belief that should there be goodwill on all sides its task would be successfully accomplished. In our view to achieve this the mandate of the future working group should be based on the following premises: (1) it should allow for a consideration of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests in all its aspects, and (2) the aim of this discussion should be the subsequent early conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation has asked for the floor today in order, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, to state our position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, before I pass on to this subject, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union on the key problems of the prevention of the ever-increasing danger of a world nuclear-missile war which were put forward by President L. Brezhnev on 16 March of this year.

Especially significant are those proposals which are designed to facilitate the achievement of an agreement on a large-scale reduction of the nuclear weapons of the two sides in Europe, based upon the principle of equality and equal security. The decision of the Soviet leadership unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe serves these goals. Moreover, the Soviet Union intends already this year, if there is no new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce, on its own initiative, a certain proportion of its medium-range missiles.

In response to the request made to us by a number of representatives in the Committee, the Soviet delegation is distributing a part of the statement of L. Brezhnev at the seventeenth congress of trade unions of the USSR as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

For a number of reasons we attach particular importance to our statement today. It concerns the prohibition of chemical weapons i.e. the problem of one of the most dangerous and barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction, the solution of which is awaited impatiently by all mankind and which is rightly listed among the priority issues confronting our Committee.

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to chemical weapons is clear and unequivocal: the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of the proposal for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and it has done and is continuing to do everything in its power in any forum and within any organizational framework where such efforts are made, for the speediest possible elimination of this type of weapon from the arsenals of States.

At the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and subsequently, the Soviet Union drew the attention of the world community to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons were inadmissibly slow. That was not a mere statement of fact but rather an expression of concern for the speeding up of the negotiations. The effective conduct of negotiations and their successful conclusion are needed particularly now in the light of recent events, when an entirely new situation is emerging or has already emerged in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. If no decisive steps are taken today to eliminate chemical weapons, tomorrow it may be too late.

In this connection the most serious factor, leading directly towards a dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and thus undermining the very basis of the negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon, is the United States decision regarding the further expansion and the modernization of its chemical arsenal. The five-year programme amounting to \$10 billion includes the mass production of binary chemical munitions and the development of new methods for the use of chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that present United States stocks of chemical weapons

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

include about three million shells, tens of thousands of aircraft bombs, hundreds of thousands of mines and high explosive bombs, it is planned to increase the quantity of chemical charges up to five million units and to replace the types growing obsolete by new ones, and mainly by binary munitions.

The United States decision on chemical rearmament is part of an over-all scheme which includes the initiation of the production of neutron weapons, the plans for the stationing of new American nuclear missiles in western Europe and the general NATO decisions on the expansion of military preparations. According to the latest United States military doctrines, the European region is the most probable arena for the use of chemical weapons. The United States deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, speaking in Congress, stated that it was necessary to equip the United States armed forces with the newest types of chemical weapons in order "to have the possibility of conducting large-scale chemical warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Treaty countries".

We sometimes hear it said, including today in the Committee on Disarmament, that the production and deployment by the United States of new varieties of chemical weapons, and especially binary weapons, are essential in order to guarantee the security of the United States and also its allies, and because the United States is "lagging behind" the USSR in the sphere of chemical weapons, because of the "Soviet threat", and so on. Gentlemen, how often can the same pretexts be used, particularly when they have over and over again been flatly refuted, even by some leading American figures?

The world has already witnessed American discomfiture over the alleged United States lag in the sphere of nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft in the 1950s and over the "United States missile lag" in the early 1960s. Later it turned out for example that the Soviet "missile threat" had been overestimated by some 15-20 times, but by then the United States had already embarked on the mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus laying the foundation for a renewal of the arms race. The United States is now trying to convince us of its "backwardness" in the sphere of chemical weapons. The United States is obviously using these fables to try to persuade American taxpayers to finance its gigantic military programmes.

It is claimed that what is involved is a normal modernization of chemical weapons. In reality, the development of the production of binary weapons introduces a new generation of chemicals into the range of warfare agents.

The other side of the coin consists in the fact that the production of binary chemical weapons will considerably complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions at the current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The work of the Committee at the present session has already confirmed this. Many delegations, both in the Ad Hoc Working Group and at plenary meetings, have pointed out the additional difficulties arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons.

In this connection we would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to working paper CD/258, "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons", submitted by a group of socialist countries. The sponsors of the paper, without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation of Bulgaria put forward a number of specific questions which have arisen in connection with the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

decision on the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. It seems to us that the answers to these questions are of interest to all members of the Committee. The Yugoslav delegation submitted an interesting document on binary weapons in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We agree with the statement of the United Kingdom Ambassador that it is necessary to give careful consideration to the matter of binary chemical weapons before reaching any conclusion. One can also agree with his words that "binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited".

At the same time we can in no way share his opinion that the problems of control as regards binary weapons and as regards chemical weapons with ordinary unitary munitions differ very little from each other, since allegedly the components of binary weapons, designed by their nature to be highly reactive, are related to toxic chemicals also by their aggressiveness with respect to the material of the munition's case. There is no need to be an expert in order to understand that there is a serious inaccuracy here. From unclassified literature it may be learned that there is no correlation between a chemical's toxicity and its activity with respect to the material of the casing. Thus the high reactive capability of these chemicals is of no assistance in the matter of control.

As regards the additional difficulties which arise in connection with the emergence of binary chemical weapons, they include, for example, the ensuring of compliance by States parties with the commitment not to transfer chemical weapons, since the separation of chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals for weapons purposes will become an almost insoluble problem. Difficulties will arise also in connection with the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production of such weapons, because it will be necessary to specify the chemicals for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons.

To illustrate this problem let us take the following example. As components for the synthesis of warfare agents in the binary charges being elaborated and developed in the United States, isopropanol and polysulfide are being used, i.e. common chemical products. Consequently, in order to produce binary munitions the Pentagon has no special need to establish new branches of industry. The other components of the binary synthesis -- the chemicals "DF" and "QL" -- are somewhat more complicated in their composition, but they, too, without any particular difficulty can be absorbed into the technological processes for the production of organophosphorus pesticides production. In addition, the cases of binary munitions are virtually the same in structure and shape as those of other special munitions (smoke, signal, propaganda, etc.) and they could be produced by factories producing ordinary munitions.

It is quite probable that even at factories producing the separate components of binary systems as well as cases for binary munitions, it will be impossible to determine the real purpose of the products. Thus even if the representatives of an international verification body are admitted to such a plant, they are unlikely to be able to detect anything relating to binary weapons. The conditions will therefore exist for the secret stockpiling and storage of chemicals for purposes of binary weapons -- for the production of chemical weapons within the framework of commercial production. We shall, of course, study document CD/265, introduced today by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, but all that we have said shows that there is no justification for the conclusion contained in the statement of Ambassador Ruth that "it is not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The idea of binary weapons allows the possibility of selecting the pairs of components among a wide range of chemicals, which would lead to the emergence of ever new varieties and modifications of chemical agents with the most diversified spectrum of effects. This fact means that the establishment of a list of potential chemical agents to be prohibited would become meaningless. How, then, is it possible to dismiss as "nonsense", as the representative of the United States did today, the concern of a large number of States, including a number of Western countries, at the appearance of binary weapons?

We are saying all this now, not in order to give a political assessment of the actions connected with the production of binary weapons. That has already been done, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in resolution 36/96 B, which contains an appeal to States to refrain from the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. As you know, of the 157 States Members of the United Nations, only one voted against this resolution -- the United States of America. Here in the Committee on Disarmament we are concerned, first and foremost, about the fate of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and about the effectiveness of any agreements that might be reached at those negotiations.

The same resolution contains an appeal to States to refrain from stationing chemical weapons in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. This appeal, which in particular was also adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is designed to increase the effectiveness of a future agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is important, in our view, that while efforts are being directed towards the elaboration of a convention and also during the first years of its implementation, when stocks of chemical weapons are to be destroyed, no actions should be allowed which could lead to a proliferation of chemical weapons on the globe, and in particular to their stationing on the territories of other States. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Soviet delegation has already submitted a draft for a provision of the convention on the non-stationing of chemical weapons, either directly or indirectly, on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of the commitment on their destruction or conversion to non-hostile purposes. It would be a good idea also if we were to consider together how to solve the question of the non-stationing of chemical weapons also during the period before the convention enters into force.

I should like now to touch upon questions of verification. We have repeatedly stated, and we reaffirm it again, that we, no less than others, are concerned that the commitments under the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be strictly observed. We do not therefore altogether understand the United States representative's excessive emphasis of the importance of verification questions. Whom was he actually trying to convince? -- himself?

The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to express in the Committee on Disarmament the substance of our views regarding the verification of compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons. In order not to repeat myself I will refer to our statement of 31 March 1981. Briefly, our view is that control should be based on national methods of verification, supplemented by international procedures; it should not be accompanied by "total verifications", which are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of States and are detrimental to peaceful industry. Control should in all respects and at all times be commensurate with the real requirements of the convention and ensure the fulfilment of each of the undertakings provided for in it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The representative of the United States attempted in his statement to present the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a distorted light. He asserted that they rule out international forms of verification. This, like many other things in the statement of the United States delegation, is not in accordance with the facts. I repeat: we are in favour of a combination of different types of control measures. At the same time it is clear from the statement of the representative of the United States that the latter recognizes nothing other than systematic intrusive international verification. That, to be precise, is the true situation.

How then can we solve this difficult problem, taking into account all these requirements, which are undoubtedly fair in themselves, and on a basis acceptable to all States parties to the future convention? Past experience suggests that the time has come to change somewhat the methods used for the examination and elaboration of provisions on verification.

It seems to us that we could stop discussing in general terms whether preference should be given to national or to international means of verification, whether international on-site inspection should be carried out on a voluntary basis or not, whether such verification should be conducted when necessary, upon demand, by request, according to lots, on a systematic, regular, periodical basis, etc., etc., and pass on to a consideration of verification problems in a more specific way.

We have in mind the following. Clearly under the convention, the States parties will assume a very specific range of obligations. To a large extent these have already been defined. Thus, there is the possibility of considering concretely, for each of these obligations, what forms and types of control would be necessary and to what degree.

For example, States will be obliged to destroy within established periods of time their stocks of chemical weapons. There could be endless discussions, with no common view emerging, as to whether, in connection with this obligation, there should or should not be international inspections at the site of the destruction, whether samples should be taken at the same time, and if so of what kind, how often and by whom, etc. In order to start making some headway, we could proceed differently. We could think carefully about the series of measures necessary in order reliably and effectively to guarantee the destruction of stocks, beginning with those that are the most natural and easy for States to carry out, and passing on if necessary to the more complicated and difficult ones. In other words, whenever a common opinion emerges to the effect that national verification measures may be insufficient, appropriate international procedures could be discussed according to the same principle -- that is, proceeding from the relatively simpler to the more complicated measures.

In proposing that we should proceed in this way we are taking into account the extreme difficulty of devising a verification system which, while ensuring the requisite control over compliance with the convention, at the same time meets the need to respect the legitimate security interests of the States parties.

All more complicated and difficult verification measures should be used only in cases where the control measure more acceptable to the State cannot give the desired result i.e. provide the assurance that the convention is being implemented.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This approach takes into account also the important fact that the control measures will be supplemented by various kinds of declarations, the exchange of information and other measures giving States the assurance of compliance with the convention.

Allow me to refer to the words of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, concerning questions of control in connection with a nuclear weapons test ban. In particular he said: "The quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all." Ambassador Okawa further said that the adequacy of any verification system is probably in the last resort a question of political assessment.

Distinguished delegates, we must endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem. It is completely out of place to put forward preliminary conditions, as was done today, in an almost threatening manner, like an ultimatum: either the Committee accepts unconditionally the principles of verification for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that please the United States, or that country will not become a party to the future convention. That is not the language of negotiation. It will lead nowhere. It merely compromises those who resort to it.

I should like to make one general observation. With every new development in the consideration of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Working Group shows a quite natural and lawful tendency to go deeper into the technical points and details. This reflects the progress in its work. At the same time, we would like to warn against too great a passion for discussing various, sometimes strictly scientific and even abstract problems which will merely deflect us from the immediate and priority task of the earliest possible elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons.

The Soviet delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the way in which the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been organized and is proceeding this year. Precisely in accordance with the new mandate, intensive work is being done on individual provisions of the future convention, and comments and working papers are being put forward which contain at times some interesting approaches. We are especially pleased to note all this since the Chairman of the Group is our friend Ambassador B. Sujka.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties mentioned in our statement today, we are optimistic as regards the possibility of achieving progress in the field of chemical disarmament. At the same time we naturally understand that a great deal of work still remains to be done in order to make this progress real. We call upon other delegations to co-operate constructively in this important matter.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In recent years the United States and some of its allies have often tried to envenom the political atmosphere in many international bodies, including the Committee on Disarmament, with baseless slander directed at socialist States. One of the favourite forms of this slander has been references to some kind of involvement of the Soviet Union in alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union has nowhere and never violated any international agreements including those in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Nevertheless the slander continues, as was shown by the statement of the United States delegation at today's meeting. This is done in order to justify before public opinion, including that of their own country, the new spirals in the chemical arms race. The false and fabricated character of this statement is shown among other things by the fact that the initiators of the slander, while shedding crocodile tears over alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol slyly, and of course intentionally, pass over in silence the terrible consequences of their own actions in south-east Asia. The representative of the United States did not say that the crimes of the American soldiery in this region of the world are still having their effects even today. It is true that the United States representative recognized that "the United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect", but he did not dare to admit that the United States itself has made extensive use of chemical weapons, that no State in the world in the whole history of mankind has used chemical weapons on such a scale as the United States. And again, he did not say that the consequences of the crimes of American militarists in south-east Asia are continuing today.

Recently a delegation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR visited Viet Nam, where it examined the conclusions of the studies of the consequences of chemical warfare in that country. Here are some of them. The mass utilization by the United States armed forces of chemical weapons against Viet Nam during the period 1961-1971 caused profound changes in the ecology of the country, greatly undermined the economy and inflicted irreparable damage on the health of the population of Viet Nam. More than 100,000 tons of various chemical agents were used against the people of Viet Nam, including 96,000 tons of phytotoxins and more than 7,000 tons of war gases. Toxic chemical agents were spread over 44 per cent of the tropical forests and jungles and 40 per cent of the cultivated areas of South Viet Nam. In their attacks on large tracts of forests and cultivated lands, the United States armed forces used chemical agents in huge quantities -- from 10 to 100 kg per hectare. In recent times, to the many thousands of victims of chemical weapons during the period of the war there have been added the victims of those weapons' so-called long-term consequences. These are people suffering from nervous disorders, skin diseases and more serious illness such as, for example, cancer of the liver. The women of Viet Nam give birth to deformed babies; they are subject to abnormal pregnancies and miscarriages.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Most anomalies observed now in Viet Nam, especially during child-birth, are the result of disorders of the genetic structures caused by dioxine. It should be noted that the nature of the changes in the genetic structures observed in Viet Nam in those of the population who suffered the effects of the "orange mixture" are similar to the changes in the chromosome structures observed in the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who suffered the horror of atomic bombing. Thus at the present time it can be affirmed that as a result of the use by the United States of various types of weapons of mass destruction, there are on our planet two sets of people with disorders of the genetic structures: they are among the inhabitants of Japan and Viet Nam.

It is becoming more and more clear that Americans themselves are among the victims of the chemical warfare carried out by the United States in Viet Nam. The ecological delayed-action bomb which they laid in Viet Nam has transformed itself into a boomerang destroying the very Americans who participated in the war in Viet Nam. Those who carried out chemical attacks are now suffering in the same way as their former adversaries and victims. Thousands of veterans victims of chemical weapons are registered now in the United States.

Those who are now doing their utmost to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have allegedly used chemical weapons wish to pass over the above-mentioned crimes in silence.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, including those at the highest level, in different international bodies have resolutely repudiated this lie. We would like to point out that many eminent scientists and experts, including some in the United States, have found a complete incompatibility of the above-mentioned fabrications with the scientific, medical and technical data. Substantially the same conclusion was reached also by the group of experts who, as is clear both from the document they submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and from press reports, were unable during their official visit to Asia to find any evidence of the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons. Even the most zealous instigators of the anti-Soviet campaign are compelled to recognize the absence of any facts on this score.

Allow me, for example, to quote the note verbale of 14 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General: "American experts have studied and evaluated the symptoms described in these reports in order to determine what poisonous substance or substances could have had such effects. They came to the conclusion that none of the known classical chemical warfare agents, either alone or in combination with other substances, could have caused the symptoms that were described or have led, as was reported, to such rapid death." The matter could have been closed there. The soap-bubble burst, but the State Department decided to continue the campaign it had begun.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Nothing is changed and nothing can be changed in this regard by a new opus of the State Department. It is high time for the United States to stop inventing fables about Soviet-made chemical weapons. The insinuations of the Western press and officials about a "Soviet chemical threat" will not become true by being repeated many times. Neither the Western press, nor those who give it biased disinformation have or can have any objective data about the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons because no such facts exist in nature.

Two words about the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union's position regarding the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States has been repeatedly stated by President Brezhnev. We are prepared to resume the talks that have been broken off, but we are not begging for them. We can make headway either with or without negotiations with the United States. But we cannot permit a distortion of the facts.

Typical of such distortion in the statement of the United States representative was the attempt to create the impression that some kind of deadlock had occurred in the Soviet-American negotiations over the question of control. There was no such deadlock in those talks, as is evident in particular from the Soviet-American report to the Committee on Disarmament of 7 July 1980. That report (CD/112) states in particular: "The United States and the Soviet Union wish to inform the member States of the Committee on Disarmament of their earnest intention to continue their persistent efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the extremely complex unresolved issues relating to a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to completing successfully the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations and presenting a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest possible time."

How is it possible to talk about a deadlock when in fact the date was given for the next round of talks -- January 1981. The United States unilaterally broke off those negotiations in the same way as it broke off many other negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitation questions. They decided to do this, not because of any difficulties which had arisen on one question or another in the course of the negotiations, but in accordance with the general anti-Soviet policy adopted in the matter of armaments by the Government of the United States. That is true on this matter also.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as is shown among other things by their actions in the Committee, are actively participating in the efforts aimed at the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons, and they believe that this type of weapon of mass destruction should once and for all be eliminated from military arsenals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. The last three speakers on the list of speakers for today, namely, the representatives of Kenya, Argentina and China, have very kindly, in view of the lateness of the hour, agreed to defer their statements to the next plenary meeting of the Committee, on Tuesday, 30 March. I should like to thank them on behalf of the Committee for the understanding they have shown and to assure them that their names will appear at the head of the list of speakers for the meeting on 30 March. Are there any other comments? Ambassador Herder has asked for the floor.

Mr. HERDIER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic highly appreciates your efforts to promote an early agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda.

In recent days, my delegation, the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland as well as other delegations addressed pertinent questions to the United States delegation in order to clarify some problems connected with the United States proposal on this subject made on 11 March. We are very much interested in having clear answers to all those questions because this would provide my Government with the necessary information to determine our further approach to the elaboration of the above-mentioned draft mandate.

After having had a look at the list of today's speakers and having noticed that the United States representative was on the list, I had expected, frankly speaking, an answer from him to the many questions which were addressed to his delegation in connection with our efforts to agree on a mandate for a CTBT working group. I hoped that after several attempts made by my delegation and other delegations to get some explanations from the United States delegation, that delegation would at least respect the wishes expressed by members of the Committee and show a constructive approach to the items inscribed in our agenda. What happened was just the opposite.

It was with deep regret that my delegation today listened to a fairly undisguised statement on the necessity of a new spiral in the chemical arms race. Obviously, the country concerned needs not only nuclear-weapon tests for a "credible deterrence" but also a "chemical weapons deterrence". Thus, we may ask ourselves if the Committee on Disarmament, shortly before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, should be transformed into a Committee for advertising and justifying different kinds of doctrines on deterrence and on the need to develop and deploy corresponding sophisticated weapons. As far as binary weapons, verification of compliance with a chemical weapons convention, and the "alleged use of chemical weapons" are concerned, my delegation explained its position on 23 March. There is no need to repeat our arguments.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, we repeat our request to the above-mentioned delegation to respond to our questions, since a failure to do so could complicate, even delay an understanding on a draft mandate for a CTB working group.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I did not wish to raise a point of order out of respect for Ambassador Herder whose rank is higher than mine, but since three distinguished representatives, those of Kenya, Argentina and China, have withdrawn their names from the list of speakers, I think we ought to abide by your decision and close the meeting now.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I have already had an opportunity to express the satisfaction of my delegation, Mr. Chairman, at seeing you presiding over the work of this Committee, as also of expressing our appreciation of the very efficient work done by your predecessor as Chairman of the Committee, the Ambassador of Iran. Allow me, then, on this occasion, Sir, simply to express my delegation's pleasure upon the arrival in this Committee of two new representatives, the Ambassadors of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, and also my personal regret at the departure of Ambassador Malitza of Romania my friendship with whom dates back 20 years and with whom it was a pleasure to work in this Committee. I should like to ask the Romanian delegation kindly to convey to Ambassador Malitza the best wishes of my delegation and of myself personally for his success in the new duties with which his Government has entrusted him.

Today I should like to speak about the agenda item that was the subject of our discussion last week, when I was originally to have spoken, namely, item 4 of the Committee's agenda, on "Chemical weapons".

First of all, I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the agreement which allowed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group to be broadened -- a change long sought and which we are well aware was not an easy one. It is to be hoped that the new mandate will give a fresh impetus to the efforts that were so ably guided in previous years by Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard, and that are now being conducted with the same enthusiasm by Ambassador Sujka.

It is unnecessary to stress the importance of a convention on chemical weapons in the general context of disarmament. Agreement on such a convention in the near future would meet the deep desire of the international community which has so far remained unfulfilled, despite the bilateral negotiations which took place between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and the many years of multilateral discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee.

It is true that, owing to the very nature of chemical substances, their prohibition gives rise to a number of technical problems. There is little divergency with regard to super-toxic lethal chemicals since their high level of toxicity means that they cannot be used in peaceful activities or for research purposes, except in minute quantities.

The picture is not so clear, however, with regard to the lethal and harmful chemical substances which, because of their dual nature, the constant development of the chemicals industry and ceaseless research, are indispensable in medicine, agriculture and other peaceful fields.

Precursors and the appearance of "binary weapons" have added new and difficult problems to the formulation of a precise and correct definition of the chemical weapons which are to be prohibited by the convention.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In this connection my delegation, as it declared earlier, in its statement of 21 July 1981, considers that the definition of "chemical weapons" should include an express reference to "binary weapons".

The "general purpose" criterion will permit a broad distinction to be made between prohibited and permitted chemical substances, but it must be complemented by other criteria such as those of "toxicity", "chemical structure" and "quantity".

The complementarity of different criteria is particularly important in the matter of verification of compliance with the convention. The subjective nature of the so-called "general purpose" criterion and the difficulty of applying it, whether actively or passively, makes it necessary to have recourse to other means of establishing whether or not the production, stockpiling or transfer of a given substance in a given quantity constitutes a violation of the convention.

We believe that international records of the production, consumption, import and export of specific chemicals could be extremely useful in this connection.

The Argentine delegation, together with other delegations, has constantly advocated a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, the scope of which should include their "use".

Arguments have been put forward against this proposal which, with all due respect for the positions of the delegations concerned, my delegation has found very unconvincing.

It has been argued that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 comprehensively prohibits the use of chemical substances in warfare, that to restate this prohibition would raise doubts as to the recognized value of the Protocol and that the inclusion of verification machinery would give rise to ambiguities.

We do not believe this to be so, for the following reasons:

In the first place, the proponents of the express prohibition of the "use" of chemical weapons have in no way sought to discredit the 1925 Protocol. On the contrary, its validity could be clearly reaffirmed in the text of the convention, both in the preamble and in its operative part.

The existence of international treaties which mutually reaffirm and complement each other is a normal occurrence in the constant evolution of international instruments. Examples of this are the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which were adopted in 1977. These Protocols first, in their preambles, reaffirm the validity of the Conventions of 1949 and then set forth a series of provisions complementing and developing those of the Conventions.

Secondly, the Protocol of 1925 was drafted at a certain stage in the history of international law, which has since undergone changes and progress. In the past, "war", the only term used in the Protocol, was clearly distinguished from other types of "armed conflict". The specific character of its conditions and protagonists gave rise to legal consequences which did not apply to other types of conflict.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

War was prohibited, first of all partially under the 1919 League of Nations Covenant and then wholly under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, but other armed conflicts whose characteristics did not qualify them to be described as casus belli, remained outside that prohibition. The Charter of the United Nations did away with that distinction, ruling out any resort to force.

From then on, the traditional term "war" was replaced by other expressions such as "armed conflict" or "hostilities", which broadened the concept as regards both the situations covered and the protagonists involved.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are a good example of the foregoing. Article 2 (1), common to the four Conventions, refers to "international armed conflicts", which includes both war and other armed conflicts between States, whatever their intensity. The Additional Protocols of 1977 continue that development by adding new elements to the concept.

The evolution of concepts can also be seen in the convention on chemical weapons we are discussing.

Element II of the draft contained in the report of the Working Group submitted in 1981 speaks of "hostile purposes", while element III refers to the prohibition of the transfer of chemical weapons to "anyone", a broad term which covers not only States but also any organization, group or person.

The limited nature of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is thus obvious, and the inclusion of the word "use" among the prohibitions of the new convention is therefore, in our view, essential.

Thirdly, the definition of the substances and devices prohibited under the Geneva Protocol is vague and gives rise to serious doubts as to whether it covers all the chemical weapons which the development of the chemical industry has made possible, including binary weapons.

And fourthly, in the course of the last 50 years many allegations have been made of the use of chemical weapons and we may assume from our experience of international realities that the same will happen in the future.

This situation of uncertainty, in which charges are made but there is no way of either establishing their truth or disproving them, is the result of the fact that the 1925 Protocol prohibited the "use" of chemical weapons but did not establish a procedure for the verification of compliance with that prohibition, and it can only be corrected if "use" is included within the general framework of the prohibition of a genuinely comprehensive convention embodying a satisfactory system of verification.

It is precisely to that other important aspect of the convention, verification, that I would like to refer now.

The problem of verification involves not only technical questions but also political decisions.

Argentina favours a flexible system of verification combining national and international mechanisms.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

We believe that international verification, including on-site inspections carried out on a non-discriminatory basis, is the only effective system for developing countries which do not have access to sophisticated technologies enabling them to ensure that other States parties are complying with the convention.

Some States are opposed to international verification, invoking arguments of sovereignty and claiming that it would constitute interference in their countries' industrial activities.

However, if international verification is carried out through a body representative of the States parties to the convention, established on the basis of a fair geographical distribution, which uses universally accepted methods and verifies compliance with the convention by all States parties equally, the interests of each country would be duly safeguarded.

In this sphere, discrimination is the element which affects the rights of States. And discrimination should not exist in a convention drafted within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, the first truly multilateral negotiating body; if the Committee's rule of consensus is applied to the conclusion of an agreement, that should guarantee its universal acceptance.

As it has already stated on previous occasions, my delegation considers it essential that a consultative committee made up of not too large a number of States parties and having at its disposal a group of experts appointed by those States, should be recognized as the body responsible for the control and verification of compliance with and implementation of the convention on chemical weapons.

This consultative committee should receive allegations of possible violations and be responsible for confirming or disproving them.

On the other hand, we are not in favour of including the United Nations Security Council in any stage of the procedure.

The present voting system in that body makes it unsuitable for playing a positive and impartial role in the sphere of verification.

In addition to considerations of a political nature, as I said earlier, there are the technical issues. Many documents have been submitted to the Working Group and to this Committee, describing possible methods of verification for each of the elements of the convention.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

I shall not go into the details of these suggestions but shall confine myself to pointing out that however much technological and scientific progress allows us to approach the ideal of complete and exhaustive verification, there will always be a margin for doubt, and the possibility of deception or concealment.

Will it ever be possible to be sure that a State has really destroyed all its stocks of chemical weapons? Or that it has not omitted to mention, in its declaration, certain of its storage places? What kind of verification could be established to prevent scientists and engineers from divulging key information that would allow others to manufacture chemical weapons?

Ambassador Okawa, speaking at the plenary meeting on 23 February last with reference to item 1 of our agenda, said the following:

"The effective functioning of a reliable verification system is of fundamental importance to any disarmament or arms control measure. However, the quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all. A reasonable balance has to be struck between the value of having a positive if not complete disarmament agreement, on the one hand, and the risk that certain violations may be theoretically possible in spite of the verification mechanism that has been agreed upon, on the other. Perhaps the adequacy of any verification system is ultimately a matter of political judgement and mutual trust."

We believe that the words of the Ambassador of Japan are just as pertinent in connection with the convention on chemical weapons.

Every treaty must be based on a certain amount of trust between the parties.

If a choice is to be made between having a convention with an adequate -- and I stress the word "adequate" -- system of national and international verification, even though this system may not be perfect for each and every one of its provisions, and having no convention at all, we prefer the former.

My delegation will continue to contribute to the search for a system acceptable to all, so that it may be possible with the goodwill and co-operation of all the members of the Committee, to draft a convention on chemical weapons, the adoption of which is becoming increasingly necessary and urgent.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, since the establishment of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, under the energetic guidance of Ambassador Okawa of Japan and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, detailed and in-depth discussions have been held in the Group on questions relating to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Through the discussions on "the elements of a chemical weapons convention" in particular, many substantive issues have been clarified. We are pleased to see that this year the Committee has made a correct decision to enlarge the mandate of the Working Group, so that its work has proceeded to the important stage of elaborating the convention. It is our hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland and with the efforts of all the delegations, the Working Group will fulfil the important task entrusted to it by the Committee.

Notwithstanding the fact that certain progress has been made in our work, the road leading to an agreement is not smooth and there is no ground for optimism about its prospects. Some events which have occurred over the past couple of years in particular have caused our deep concern. I am referring first of all to the charges about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. An increasing number of reports and evidence have already aroused the close attention of world public opinion. It is only natural that people should demand that fair investigations be carried out to bring the truth to light. The United Nations has adopted resolutions to this effect and established investigation groups. However, the States concerned, while flatly denying their use of chemical weapons, have obstructed the investigation work. Under these circumstances, one may ask: how can the "confidence" they glibly talk about be established? If the existing international treaties cannot be proved to have been complied with, how can the effectiveness of the future convention be guaranteed? Such a state of affairs will inevitably cast a shadow over the ongoing negotiations. In addition, one Superpower has asserted that in order to offset the superiority of the other Superpower in chemical weapons, it has decided to produce binary chemical weapons. This decision is bound in its turn to lead to a further expansion of the chemical weapons arsenal of the other Superpower. We all know that to both Superpowers the technology of producing binary chemical weapons is nothing secret, and they both have the capability to produce such weapons in large quantities. The adoption of such technology would turn the production of chemical warfare agents into that of ordinary chemicals. As a result, the preparations for chemical warfare will become more covert and easier. This will further increase the danger of chemical warfare. The people of all countries are faced with the situation in which the arms race between the two States with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals has entered a new field and their development and use of chemical weapons is reaching a new stage. If this Working Group fails to make rapid progress in its negotiations and fails to conclude at an early date a convention on a general prohibition and the total destruction of chemical weapons, then the arms race between the Superpowers in the field of chemical weapons will further escalate and chemical weapons will probably be used more frequently and on a larger scale in wars and armed conflicts. This is something the people of the world are resolutely opposed to. The Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility to prevent the emergence of such a situation and to reach an agreement on the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons is in the process of formulating the specific provisions of the future convention. We have consistently maintained that the scope of prohibition of the future convention should cover the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The reason underlying this has been repeatedly explained by our delegation at plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and at meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. A provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was proposed in document CD/CW/CRP.24 of 3 March 1982, co-sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan and China. Here, I shall not repeat the reasons why the future convention will be complementary instead of contradictory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, since they have been stated before. I simply want to confine myself to the following point, namely, that the Geneva Protocol lacks complaints procedures and verification clauses, which has resulted in failure to take the necessary actions to deal with and prevent acts of violation in the ensuing years. If the scope of prohibition of the future convention does not cover a prohibition of use, the measures of verification, no matter how detailed they may be, cannot apply to the use of chemical weapons, thus leaving a serious loophole. We hope that delegations present here, aware of the urgent need to prevent the use of chemical weapons, will take this proposal into serious consideration.

The Working Group has concretely discussed the question of verification. It is the consistent view of the Chinese delegation that a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons must provide for strict and effective international control and measures of verification. Without these, there can be no really meaningful disarmament agreement. The Chinese delegation has made it clear in its working paper CD/102, submitted in 1980, that there should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose, charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their production. Such an organ should also be empowered to initiate prompt and necessary investigations in the event of a complaint concerning the use of chemical weapons or other violations, and to take appropriate measures to deal with such a violation when the complaint has been verified. In this regard, document CD/244 submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom recently offers a comparatively comprehensive proposal in the form of provisions for the future convention. We appreciate this contribution on the part of the United Kingdom delegation.

With regard to the composition, task and working procedures of the international verification mechanism, there are some concrete proposals and suggestions in working paper CD/220. What I would like to point out is that in respect of the verification task of the future international monitoring and control mechanism, the said paper and other working papers do not have a clear provision for effective on-site inspection of the use of chemical weapons. We deem such on-site verification not only necessary but also more pressing than ever before in view of the international incidents which have taken place in recent years. As a matter of fact, there has been an almost continuous flow of complaints about the use of chemical weapons ever since signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For this reason, we are of the opinion that not only should the scope of prohibition in the future convention cover the use of chemical weapons, but the verification measures should also apply to the use of such weapons. In this way, the Geneva Protocol would be strengthened and the future convention would become more comprehensive and effective.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The consultations of experts held not long ago adopted standardized methods for determining lethal toxicity through subcutaneous injection and inhalation, and suggested that an inventory be drawn up listing the key precursors of chemical warfare agents and other harmful chemicals, whose toxicity criteria are difficult to formulate. These concrete results of a technical nature can undoubtedly be helpful to the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. We welcome these positive results. The Chinese expert has also presented a working paper, contained in document CD/CW/CTC/3. It is our hope that the Committee will conduct more consultations on the technical problems during future sessions, taking advantage of the presence in Geneva of experts from various countries, in order to promote the progress of our negotiations. Of course we are fully aware that the negotiation on the prohibition of chemical weapons is mainly a political matter rather than a technical issue. In this respect, the two Superpowers which possess chemical weapons should undoubtedly have major responsibilities. If they could halt their chemical weapons arms race and demonstrate the sincerity that is required, the process of negotiations for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons would be greatly accelerated.

Mr. NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, before I begin to explain Venezuela's position with regard to the different items on our agenda, I would like to congratulate you upon your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. Our country enjoys particularly good relations with the country you represent.

I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to the Ambassador of Iran for the very efficient way in which he presided over the meetings of this Committee during the month of February.

Last year, I was warmly welcomed on my arrival here to represent my country in this the only multilateral negotiating forum, and it is now my pleasure to welcome in turn the representatives of the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, whose contributions will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Committee in its work.

I also wish to bid farewell to my good friend Ambassador Malitza of Romania and to express my delegation's appreciation and very best wishes for his outstanding success in the new and important functions he has been called upon to discharge.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will take place very soon, and the most important document to be adopted at that session, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, while it may not now be in an embryonic state, is nevertheless still far from completion. Understandably, we are finding it very difficult to formulate the measures making up the programme.

The measures included in the programme should be very specific and subject to completion within a time-frame which, although flexible, ought not to be so flexible as to defeat its own purpose. We would stress that the comprehensive programme of disarmament ought to be adopted by consensus at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament since otherwise we shall lose sight of the primary objective of the programme, which is to unite the will of all the peoples of the world in a process directed towards general and complete disarmament.

This meeting of wills cannot be a mere compromise between ideas about disarmament. This is no longer possible. We do not all agree on how to bring about disarmament, but there will be no disarmament if we do not reach an agreement on how to achieve it. We

(Mr. Navarro, Venezuela)

Venezuela is prepared to consider the various alternatives for the mandate of the proposed working group only if it is understood that the work of that group will form part of the process of the negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty, meaning that there must be the intention to negotiate such a treaty, which is a matter of unquestionable priority and has been demanded countless times by the international community; otherwise, the Committee's time can be spent more usefully on something else. In short, if there is no intention of negotiating, there is no intention of coming to an agreement and so we know already what the results of such discussions will be.

The tasks of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons are of great interest to our country; there is a need for a convention which will complement and reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the purpose of eradicating those atrocious weapons - chemical weapons. We believe that policies of deterrence based on chemical weapons are incompatible with the objectives of such a convention. We hope that, through this convention, doubts with regard to the scope of application of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 may be resolved and that a procedure will be established for verifying charges of the use of chemical weapons as well as an adequate system for verification of compliance with the obligations flowing from the convention, whether these imply actions or refraining from actions. The importance of this convention as a true disarmament measure will reside precisely in the system of verification.

I shall resist the temptation to go into very detailed aspects of verification, but would like to stress the principle of verification since it is not only the details but the basic concept itself that is endangering the success of this future convention, as also, of course, that of the nuclear test-ban negotiations. In the first place, verification is in no way synonymous with confidence, nor can the one term be substituted for the other. Confidence is not achieved through verification and cannot be written into documents. It is a matter of the general attitude of one State towards another or towards the international community.

Whereas verification is a mechanical act, confidence is a human act. States must more actively endeavour to win the confidence of others, and a system of verification of a mixed character with the emphasis on openness towards the world forms part of this process of becoming worthy of confidence.

The so-called negative security assurances demanded by the non-nuclear-weapon States represent a just claim on the part of those countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and even more so of those which have renounced nuclear weapons through legally binding instruments. Venezuela, since it belongs to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, is covered by those assurances from all the nuclear-weapon powers, and we offer our solution and our experience to all those who, like ourselves, wish to ensure, through a legally binding instrument, that they will not be subjected to a nuclear attack. We do not share the views of those who do not possess nuclear weapons but would be prepared to use them. It is clear to us that the only real assurance is the non-existence of nuclear weapons; however, if what we are now talking about is provisional measures, then we are satisfied at having obtained them. I said that we offered our solution to others, but we are not imposing it and what is more we uphold as a profoundly legitimate claim not only that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be assured that these weapons will not be used against them but also that nuclear weapons should never under any circumstances be used. Until such time as all nuclear weapons have disappeared, we shall continue to try to ensure that these assurances are as universal as possible, for atomic weapons neither recognize frontiers nor read documents.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Item 1 of our agenda has been widely discussed recently in connection with the proposal of the United States delegation, supported by the delegation of the United Kingdom, to establish a subsidiary body "to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement". As to our delegation, we have a definite idea of what this agreement should be about. Therefore the expression "any comprehensive test-ban agreement" seems, after years of negotiations on the subject matter, rather outdated. It is our understanding that this expression has been used intentionally and is precious to the United States delegation. Its use leads us to believe that its proponents are willing to discuss verification and compliance in total isolation from the concrete provisions of a future agreement.

Besides, my delegation has also serious doubts on the utility of creating one more body to deal solely with problems of verification and compliance. The right approach to this problem was chosen in 1976, when the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was created. The results achieved so far in this expert group, with the active participation of two experts from Czechoslovakia, create a solid basis for a reliable verification system, consisting of both national and international verification procedures.

Moreover, the proposal of the United States delegation is very unclear. It escapes our understanding why a delegation suggests that a subsidiary body be created to discuss the verification and compliance aspects of an agreement the conclusion of which in the near future is excluded by this very delegation. But there is no need for me to seek all necessary clarifications since the relevant questions were raised by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Poland in their statements of 18 and 23 March respectively. Regrettably, the United States delegation has so far not offered any answers.

A number of delegations around this table elaborated eloquently on the dangerous consequences of the further perfectioning of nuclear weapons, should their testing continue unabated. Neutron weapons, the prohibition of which my delegation fully supports, should be a sufficient warning in this regard. And my delegation considers, that a working group with the mandate suggested by the United States delegation could not cope effectively with the problem of a nuclear test-ban. We therefore associate ourselves with the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria in his statement of 23 March in which he said: "A more serious look at the proposals and the further clarifications that we have heard so far in this Committee do not justify the orchestrated optimism that heralded those proposals".

At the same time, we fully support the creation of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda which should negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. In this respect we fully support the proposal of the German Democratic Republic concerning the mandate of the relevant working group contained in document CD/259.

We were told by some delegations that the United States move concerning the creation of a working group on the verification of a nuclear test-ban was a step forward, however small a one. We still wonder whether a move which will not bring about anything concrete with respect to the desired treaty can be called a step forward.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I am now going to refer to another issue of high priority, that of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

For the last three years this issue has been dealt with predominantly in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group. The Czechoslovak delegation acknowledges with satisfaction that the Working Group has been re-established this year with a revised mandate enabling it to start elaborating the text of the convention.

Our delegation highly appreciates the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland as the Chairman of the Group, and fully supports his intention "to translate the positions expressed in comments contained in document CD/220 into the language of alternative elements or various versions of elements".

We all know that in spite of the many years' efforts in the Committee, there continue to be significant divergences of views on a number of aspects of the principal elements of the future convention. The task of the Group will, therefore, certainly not be easy. Still, our delegation is convinced that substantial progress can be achieved, provided that the problems are approached in a business-like manner, and with good political will to co-operate and to find concrete and realistic solutions.

This is fully true also with regard to the problem of verification.

Rather too often, clamorous demands have been made for an over-all intrusive verification, according to which verification should permanently, through on-site inspection, in fact cover an unlimited range of industrial, defence and other types of activity. It seems self-evident that such one-sided and exaggerated demands, often virtually in the form of an ultimatum, cannot serve as a basis for serious international negotiations.

We are glad to note that some of the proposals submitted in the last period of our work show a greater sense of reality. With perhaps a few exceptions, the idea of an interlinked system of national and international verification measures seems to be generally accepted. It is also becoming increasingly understood not only that an atmosphere of co-operation is a prerequisite for verification, but also that all procedures relating to consultation, co-operation, national and international verification and complaints compose an integrated system assuring compliance with the convention. While national control of implementation, exchange of information, consultations and co-operation would be the main permanent procedure, the intrusive methods of verification should be reserved for selected situations. A lack of information on a substantive activity covered by the convention or a contradictory information which could not be sufficiently explained might perhaps be one such reason for suggesting the use of an intrusive international verification procedure.

We fully support the view of delegations suggesting the elaboration of concrete specific verification procedures for each relevant provision of the treaty. Such an approach will make it possible to discuss things in concrete terms and to evaluate the necessity of specific information, material, laboratory evidence, etc., with regard to all provisions of the convention.

As far as the States parties to the convention are concerned, it seems evident that they should create a national verification system. We are aware of some opinions expressed in the Committee that a national verification system may be a rather ineffective self-control of the Government concerned.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Such an approach might indicate a certain lack of information or at least a serious underestimation of the complexity of the problem.

The chemical weapons convention will have important implications not only for military activities but also for industry and research. Under present practice, no governmental organ exists covering such a broad spectrum of diverse activities.

We are not going to suggest the establishment of any obligatory national institutions controlling the implementation of the convention. This is fully for each Government to decide.

In principle, however, in any country with a developed chemical industry and a significant research basis (irrespective of the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons), there should be an organ responsible to the Government (but independent of institutions fulfilling the duties imposed by the convention), which would survey the implementation of the treaty by all institutions under the State's jurisdiction. It should have permanent access to all data relevant to the convention, and should collect, check, assess and publish them in a proper way. It should also have permanent access to all relevant activities, including the possibility of laboratory testing, etc.

In our understanding, this should be an organ to assist, in the first place, its own Government, since it is certainly the Government which is responsible for the implementation of the treaty. One can, however, assume that for routine contacts with a corresponding international organ such as the proposed consultative committee, there would be a delegation of the Government's responsibility to such an organ.

Also, for any intrusive international verification, the information gained from such a national organ would probably be the most important point of departure for any verification procedure. A close co-operation with such a national organ would also be indispensable in cases where technical assistance was needed, etc.

I have explained our views on some functions of the national verification system in more detail mainly to demonstrate that in our understanding the principle of a balanced system of national and international verification measures has quite a concrete content which opens a way for the further elaboration of specific questions.

Giving our main emphasis to positive, constructive efforts in the committee, we cannot avoid expressing our deep concern with regard to some serious events threatening to abolish the results of all efforts made so far towards elaborating the chemical weapons convention, or at least to make our work still more complicated and difficult.

I have in mind above all the decision of the United States Government to start production of a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons. I am certainly not going to repeat the arguments indicating how much the proliferation of binary weapons would hinder the elaboration of a convention. Our view was fully expressed in document CD/258. Our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Fields of the United States, in his last statement rejected any idea about binary weapons creating obstacles for negotiations very categorically. We would, however, be much more satisfied if in addition to strong language some more concrete evidence supporting his view could be displayed.

In any case the American decision to start a new spiral in the arms race, with an aggressive military deterrence doctrine in the background, has a most negative implication for the international political atmosphere. Instead of concentrating all efforts on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the main attention of a great Power is focused on boosting its chemical armaments.

Trying to find arguments to justify its chemical weapons programme, the United States Government has also initiated and systematically elaborated an unprecedented propagandistic campaign of allegations, suggesting that the Soviet Union and its allies have been using chemical and even biological warfare agents in several areas of conflict.

In his last statement, the distinguished delegate of the United States once more repeated, for example, a three-years-old story concerning a so-called "highly unusual outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk". It is not a new issue; it was presented on many different occasions.

In the meantime, however, a very interesting piece of information was published in the American press: at the time of the "Sverdlovsk case", and American scientist on an official United States-Soviet exchange was working in Sverdlovsk and living with his family in the town. In his published statement he denied the American accusation fully.

Moreover, it can be documented without any difficulty that since the Second World War anthrax has been extensively studied for the purpose of biological warfare in only two large military research institutes: one of them happened to be Fort Detrick in the United States, the other one the Porton establishment in the United Kingdom.

In addition to this, it is equally easy to prove that all philosophy of modern biological warfare was born in the United States of America. As far as socialist countries are concerned, the biological weapons issue was always tackled exclusively from the point of view of defence and biological warfare was outlawed.

The American accusations are thus not only lacking in any substantive ground; they are also totally inconsistent with all historical facts regarding biological weapons.

The same kind of unbelievable inconsistency between confusing and contradictory evidence on the one side, and far-reaching political conclusions on the other side is also very typical for all stories we have so far heard with regard to the alleged use of toxins and (undefined) chemical weapons. It is not only our claim; statements about the unbelievable inconsistency between confusing and contradictory evidence were recently made in several articles in the American press.

The American propagandistic so-called "yellow rain" evidently has a lot of unique characteristics:

It was demonstratively coloured;

It was used in the form of a coarse-particle aerosol, which is the least effective form in which a biological agent can be applied;

People died after touching a sample contaminated with a toxin which can kill only if eaten in doses many times higher than those reportedly detected in the laboratory of Dr. Mirocha of the University of Minnesota;

Chemical weapons have allegedly been used in some regions since 1976: after six years of such chemical warfare, during which thousands of people were

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

reportedly killed by toxins, nobody, including the United Nations Commission of experts, was able to find one single case of typical intoxication,

And, what is equally striking, there is an absolute absence of medical findings of chemical exposure even among those claiming to have just suffered from "yellow rain" attacks in the areas along the Thai-Kampuchea border. It is not necessary to remind the Committee that the reports of chemical warfare in Kampuchea appear to emanate almost entirely from the Pol Pot military organization.

Compared with the terrible consequences of the first primitive use of chemical weapons in the period of the First World War, or with the lasting devastating effects on the ecology and the health of the population in Viet Nam, where chemical weapons were used by the United States army more than a decade ago, the yellow rain with its untracable effects really seems to be a most spectacular case in the history of chemical warfare.

In spite of these brainwashing attempts to make the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons as fuzzy as possible, we still sincerely believe that the great majority of delegations in this room are vitally interested in the total and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, and they will not diminish their efforts aimed at reaching that goal as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to offer a few comments on the informal consultations on issues relating to toxicity determination held by the Chairman of the Working Group in the week from 15 to 19 March 1982. The fact that 32 experts from 25 countries participated in the consultations only indicates the importance delegations attach to the solution of technical problems relevant to the convention. We acknowledge with satisfaction that two standard protocols for estimating toxicity were elaborated, so that screening procedures needed for the practical application of the toxicity criteria for the purpose of the convention have become available.

At the same time, two important restrictions on the application of toxicity criteria were indicated by experts: the precursors of binary chemical weapons and incapacitating agents cannot be classified for the purpose of the convention according to their toxicity levels. Hence, in addition to the general purpose criterion, other approaches should be elaborated, and the elaboration of illustrative lists of precursors and of incapacitating agents was suggested as a task for the future consultations.

Our delegation wishes to express its support for this recommendation, since the solution of both the above-mentioned questions would be very important for the elaboration of several basic elements of the convention (such as definition, scope, verification, etc.).

It is hardly necessary to recall that Czechoslovakia has always been active in all relevant meetings with the participation of experts. We value very much the qualified opinion of our experts, and we have been using their assistance as frequently as possible. There is also no need to emphasize how many serious and complex technical problems underly the chemical weapons issue.

However, I would like to express our view that all crucial questions regarding a chemical weapons convention are basically of a political nature, and that political decisions of principle are the fundamental prerequisite for the success of the negotiations on a convention. Technical procedures and suggestions, important as they undoubtedly are, play basically an auxiliary role, and there certainly can be no reason for any delay in the work on the treaty because of technical questions.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, like most previous speakers today, I am going to focus my intervention on issues under item 4 of our agenda, namely, concerning chemical weapons.

It should be obvious to all that a chemical weapons convention is now more urgently needed than ever. It is therefore a source of great satisfaction to my delegation, as well as to me personally, that the Committee on Disarmament has this year provided its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an improved mandate which enables it to embark upon genuine and serious negotiations in order to achieve agreement on such a convention. We are grateful to Ambassador Sujka for having taken upon himself the strenuous but also stimulating task of leading those negotiations this year. I am confident that with his serious resolve and diplomatic qualities the negotiations will take an important step towards the conclusion of a convention.

It has taken the Committee three years -- and I want to remind you that our predecessors dealt with this issue from 1968 -- to reach the stage where we now are in the negotiation process. In the first year we were told that the matter was not ripe for being dealt with in a Working Group. It was only the following year that a Working Group was established but regrettably only with a vague mandate. I think today nobody would contest the value of multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. The experience we have obtained in the Working Group proves the viability of the existing machinery for such negotiations. This bodes well for our hope that the future convention will gain universal acceptance. The example of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons should also be used to dissipate the remaining reluctance about multilateral negotiations on other disarmament matters.

As regards the developments in the Working Group during the present session, Sweden welcomes the increased participation by the major powers in the work. They have more clearly than previously stated their views and presented concrete proposals. This has certainly contributed to the solution of many of the still outstanding issues. This year, as last year, many other countries also have made very interesting and valuable contributions as regards both the scope and the verification of a chemical weapons convention.

It is obvious that important differences of opinion regarding the scope of a future convention still remain. Among them could be mentioned the questions whether a convention should include a prohibition of use and whether it should include prohibitions regarding animals and plants. Another question in which my delegation has taken a particular interest is the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals as weapons in combat. My delegation has submitted a working paper to the Working Group on this last issue, document CD/CW/CMP.29 dated 15 March 1982. Responding to the request of the Chairman of the Working Group, we have suggested wordings to be added to the elements included in last year's report of the Working Group. We have also responded to various questions and comments with regard to our proposal.

While no delegation has questioned our statement that in order most effectively to eliminate a chemical warfare capability it is necessary also to prohibit organization, planning and training for the purpose of such warfare, some have asserted that it would

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

be difficult to verify such provisions. One could, however, recall that other prohibitions, too, have been suggested that may be very difficult to verify, e.g. the non-existence of stockpiles of chemical weapons. No one, of course, seriously questions this prohibition. The verification measures that the Swedish delegation has suggested to accompany its proposal would to a large extent be based on an exchange of information regarding different activities.

My delegation has also pointed out that, for practical reasons, the provisions on planning, organization and training would most probably take effect only after the complete destruction of all main stockpiles. We hope that other delegations will study our suggestion and make comments, so that an appropriate solution can be found.

The other week the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons held consultations with delegations assisted by their technical experts primarily on questions concerning toxicity determinations and on their standardization. The Swedish delegation would like to express satisfaction on the results obtained in those consultations. Thus, it was most valuable that the participants were able to recommend two protocols on standardized toxicity tests to the Working Group. We express our appreciation to the Polish expert, Professor Rump, for his highly qualified work, which made this result possible.

Another development during the consultations will no doubt prove important for our future negotiations, namely, the discussions of the application of the toxicity criterion and thereby also of toxicity tests in order to relate the so-called precursors of chemical weapons to the provisions of a chemical weapons convention. This is a complicated question, although far from unsolvable. My delegation has suggested a conceptual basis for the application of the toxicity criterion in this connection. A working paper on this question will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the near future. The discussion which took place on this issue during the consultations showed how difficult it is to have a purely technical discussion when political restrictions are imposed. My delegation considers, for example, that the question of the reliability of toxicity tests on chemical reaction mixtures, including those from binary weapons, is irrelevant.

It is not the toxicity of the reaction mixture as such that matters, but of the toxic chemical warfare agent formed, among other chemical reaction products.

By saying this my delegation does not want to give the impression that binary weapons do not pose a problem for our negotiations. It is, on the contrary, with great concern that my delegation learned of the preparations by the United States to start production of binary chemical weapons. This has sometimes been explained, inter alia, by the lack of willingness of the Soviet Union to provide information that would dissipate fears of an overwhelming strength as regards chemical weapons on its part. The United States decision to build up its chemical weapons arsenal is, however, more likely to lead to further escalation of the arms race than to the alleged purpose of promoting a chemical weapons convention.

This brings me to the question of verification. We have studied the working paper presented by the United Kingdom delegation on verification, document CD/244, with great interest. It is clear in its aim. We have also noted the explanation by Ambassador Summerhayes the other day that the suggestions in the working paper do not

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

imply that proposals which are not dealt with in it would not be acceptable to the United Kingdom. The Swedish delegation shares the view that the verification provisions of a chemical weapons convention should include on-site verification. We think, however, that a more balanced presentation of all the aspects relevant to an interrelated complaints and verification procedure would have been obtained if the problem had been approached within the framework of the existing elements in CD/220 rather than by presenting a new structure.

For the moment, I would only like to state that the Swedish delegation attaches great importance to an adequately functioning structure, which allows information-gathering, fact-finding and information-dissemination to serve the parties to the convention. It is our firm belief that a consultative committee -- which is necessary for many purposes -- cannot determine the respective security needs of the parties and what those needs may require as to clarifications from or on-site inspection on the territory of other parties. In this connection we note with interest the discussion on remote continual verification, the so-called RECOVER project, which highlights an interesting approach towards less intrusive verification measures. The Swedish delegation feels that this possibility should be further investigated.

My delegation noted with satisfaction the statement the other week by the Chairman of the Working Group in which he expressed confidence about the development of the negotiations on verification issues. Ambassador Herder on that same occasion gave a comprehensive and interesting review of the verification problems. A continuing constructive treatment of these questions would be most welcome, including an agreement on the necessity of adequate on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany also introduced in the form of working paper CD/265 dated 24 March 1982, a considered view, inter alia, on the verification of non-production of chemical warfare agents, which my delegation will study with great interest.

In this context I should like to state that I listened with great interest to what Ambassador Rodriguez Navarero said this morning about confidence-building measures. My delegation entirely shares his evaluation of the importance of such measures. We intend to submit in due course a working paper on the subject to the Committee.

The discussions about allegations of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world very forcefully indicate the need to establish permanently available, flexible and objective complaints and verification mechanisms in arms limitation and disarmament agreements. They could, in the form of an international machinery, give the parties the possibility of having their cases investigated in an impartial manner. Such mechanisms would provide for investigations to be carried out without hindrance and for full access to sites and materials, which would shed light on the facts in each case. It is conceivable that the existence of such mechanisms would have been useful and of assistance to the countries involved in the present dispute.

Another lesson to be drawn from the current experience is that an effective control of disarmament agreements, including the one on chemical weapons, requires greater openness. To suggest relying on mutual trust is merely a pious hope when there is a grave dispute about compliance. When allegations of breaches of international agreements are made, co-operation between the parties will in most cases be difficult to obtain through bilateral contacts. This is but one of the factors which underline the necessity of multilateral negotiations and international solutions to problems which affect us all.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

With regard to transfers, it should be noted that the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons is growing: the purpose of certain transactions will be very difficult to determine since it is practically impossible to draw a distinction between chemical substances for commercial use and those for use as weapons.

Consequently, it will also be extremely difficult to demonstrate that violations have occurred.

It is worth noting that the declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities will become more difficult because chemical substances produced for commercial purposes may also be used to manufacture binary weapons. It should also be pointed out that this affects the developing countries which do not have chemical weapons and which will have to provide data on their economies that may deliberately be used to hinder their development.

Lastly, I would like to make some brief comments on verification measures. The development of binary chemical weapons has undoubtedly created a new situation and the methods of control which we have discussed for so many years do not appear to be able to guarantee with any certainty that a particular country has or does not have binary weapons.

The existence of chemical substances which can serve a dual purpose and be used both in civilian and in military industry detracts from the effectiveness of the so-called in situ inspections supported so strongly by some delegations. It can also be said that this situation lends itself to concealment of the funds which States allocate to chemical weapons and thus also affects the declarations we referred to earlier.

In view of the foregoing, it is essential to recognize the importance of a national system of verification and control under which States would, because their prestige was at stake, take all the necessary steps to guarantee strict compliance with an international agreement on the subject.

A national system of verification as a basis for the control of any agreement assumes considerable significance in terms of international verification measures, since the direct participation of States in the control of agreements to which they are parties would prevent doubts and suspicions concerning the implementation of such agreements and guarantee that the collection of the data needed for effective control would not be hampered.

In conclusion, we must recognize once again the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which were in progress on this subject outside the Committee, but which have now been unilaterally and unjustifiably interrupted. The resumption of those negotiations would undoubtedly help to solve many of the problems that arise in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, with the work which this Committee is called upon to do in that field.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, His Excellency Ambassador Skalli.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

As to the form of the international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Moroccan delegation has already stated on several occasions that it is in favour of concluding an international convention on the matter.

We are also pleased to note that, in principle, there is no opposition to such an approach.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Skalli for his statement and for his very kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that, on behalf of my delegation, I congratulate you, the representative of a State with which Australia not only has strong regional ties, but a special treaty relationship, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

May I also express my appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Alessi, on the efficient and sensitive manner in which he presided over us. That the Committee has been able, in difficult international times, to make recognizable progress on several important fronts is in no small way due to his personal efforts.

I turn now to two items on our agenda, namely, the issues of chemical weapons and of radiological weapons.

We, as the Committee on Disarmament, can take some satisfaction from the sense of priorities and timing that led us to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons; a Working Group which has, moreover, the mandate of elaborating an agreement to prohibit such weapons.

In one context or another, the attention of the international public is being drawn, increasingly, to these peculiarly sinister and grotesque tools of war. International concern at their very existence grows steadily. The topic is an emotional one, as it has been ever since the first horrific use of chemical weapons almost 70 years ago. Emotion is not a good basis for reasoned debate or substantive negotiation, but it lends impetus and urgency to the search for a convention designed to eliminate these weapons.

There are already important areas of consensus on the means of achieving and shaping such a convention. There is consensus, for example, on the need for such a convention. There is consensus on the aptness of this Committee as a body in which to negotiate a convention banning chemical weapons. There is consensus on the fact that chemical weapons are of considerable military value. That point is nowhere disputed in the publicity currently being given to these weapons. Indeed, it is partly their very efficiency, notably against civilians and the inadequately protected, which makes resort to them tempting and the need for a ban on them urgent.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

If chemicals of one sort or another are being used in the conflicts now taking place in too many parts of this earth, then there can be no doubt that those chemicals are taking a very severe toll. If, already, there is deployment on a large scale on one or both sides of the European military theatre, then that is because the use of chemical weapons in certain military contingencies offers a decisive advantage, even when those who constitute the target have some protection. If there is to be an increase in CW capabilities, for example through the development of binary weapons, this is because that increase in capabilities may serve to deter. I do not intend, here, to give an assessment of the various public reports that have appeared on these matters. But I will come back to them in describing the task before the Committee.

Two major issues remain to be resolved in our efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Those are the issues of scope and verification. The issue of scope, including the important question whether or not there should be a ban on use, is a contentious one. Once again there is, however, consensus on some fundamental points. One of these is the sanctity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, even though it does not do so in a comprehensive way. The Protocol is far from perfect, for it suffers from ambiguity, as well as a lack of comprehensiveness. Nevertheless, the Protocol of 1925 does have great merit: it is already in place, it is already part of the machinery of constraint and a great many States are parties to it. The Protocol will need to be referred to in the new convention towards which we are working, since whatever the scope of the new instrument, it will build on the achievement of 1925. What our convention should do is link itself, perhaps in its preamble, to the Protocol. In doing so, it should reinforce the Protocol. This reinforcement would then be mutual. The determination of the international community to make chemical weapons impossible would be unequivocal.

Some delegations have in the past expressed concern that a new convention could have the effect of weakening the 1925 Protocol. I do not think they need worry. When a treaty builds on an earlier one, the legal force of that earlier treaty cannot be weakened. Nor is there ambiguity of commitment. A party to one, but not to the other remains bound by the commitment it has made. If bound to both, the commitment is equally clear. In practice, it seems highly probable that all States parties to the 1925 Protocol will also move to adhere to the new convention.

Another fundamental point under the heading of scope on which there is consensus concerns the definition of the criterion of purpose. There is general agreement that some highly toxic chemicals will be permitted for production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and so on. Such chemicals will, for example, include pharmaceuticals. The essential criterion distinguishing permissible chemicals from those to be prohibited is the ends to which these chemicals are to be put. The definition of the general-purpose criterion is, and must be, the corner-stone of the treaty at which we aim: all other definitions refer back to it. In the definition of categories -- supertoxic lethal chemicals, lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals -- the criterion of purpose will determine what is and what is not to be banned.

The criterion of purpose as applied to chemical warfare agents refers to the purpose for which they are made. They are produced for use in armed conflict in order to confer military advantage. Thus, the criterion of purpose refers, in fact,

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

to the specific activity of gaining a military advantage, namely, the use of chemicals in war. In other words, the general-purpose criterion already refers to the use of chemicals in armed conflicts. It seems logical therefore to ban the use, as well as the production, stockpiling and so on, of toxic chemicals.

A ban on use is also logical from another point of view. The clauses of a CW convention aimed at determining whether or not the convention is being honoured are likely to be applied only when there are reports, suggestions or news that chemical weapons are being used. You may think that a pessimistic statement, what in the jargon of our times might be termed a "worst-case scenario", but it is for all that a realistic statement. Consequently, it seems to my delegation logical that provision must be made in a convention for a ban on use to be investigated and verified on its own merits. We should not make the problems of verification more difficult by introducing artificial constraints that permit verification only of less central and more oblique violations, such as unlawful production or stockpiling.

Even in the best case, use is pertinent: if our efforts are successful, that will be evident only by the fact that chemical weapons are not used. Whether or not there is unlawful production, stockpiling or transfer, there will be little real concern among States or on the part of world public opinion so long as there are no suggestions of use.

Recent reports of use in various conflicts bear directly on our task, both with regard to the scope of a future convention and with regard to its verification provisions. The United Nations is looking into these reports, but under considerable handicaps, not the least of them being the absence of agreed mechanisms. This is, in part, why the United Nations investigation has been extremely slow. The procedures for collecting and assessing material relevant to the United Nations team's enquiry are undetermined. The lesson to be drawn is that the convention we seek must provide for eventualities of this sort: it must ban use and it must establish machinery for complaints and for verification. Many sound ideas have been advanced on these aspects. Those ideas include proposals to link the new convention to existing instruments. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, detailed proposals have been put forward for establishing a consultative committee. One suggestion, which has not been made in this Committee before, but should not be ignored altogether, is for agreed, designated neutral States to make available a small corps which would specialize in verification techniques and could quickly investigate cases referred to it by the consultative committee. I mention these ideas to show not only that our work is urgent but that we should not have closed minds on the range of options open to us in tackling it.

Since the Committee on Disarmament first began work on this agenda item, it has benefited from the help of experts. Delegations have been able to draw on technical advice and feed it into the Working Group. This has helped in regular sessions of the Working Group and in separate exercises structured around specific problems such as

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

the determination of toxicity. It is time, in the view of the Australian delegation, to develop this important aspect of our work. It is time that technical advice should be available when a political need for it has been determined. Conversely, technical advice can help to shape that political need and, indeed, ensure that the need is a real one or well-based or intelligently framed. My delegation considers that on aspects such as verification, it would greatly assist the Working Group to know what technologies are available and how they might be applied to our task. We have consistently supported, for example, the work done in this area by Finland and believe that this work will prove valuable. It is for this reason that we consider that the technology described as remote continual verification -- or Recover -- should be further examined. It is why we believe that the CV specialists should be convened here again in August to explore technical aspects of a future convention, as recommended in Working Paper No. 30.

We have heard a great deal about binary weapons at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation regrets any new development of chemical weapons, for whatever reason. We would be happy to see the shelving of any new development, including that of binary weapons. But some fundamental points need to be faced squarely. First, binary weapons are no more or no less than the sum of their parts: the known sum of known parts. For the purposes of our convention, as has been urgently argued by Yugoslavia in document CD/266, the parts can be called precursors, or more precisely "key precursors" and subjected to the same procedures as the chemicals which go to make up a chemical weapon of a non-binary type. The binary process -- involving chemical reaction during use -- would therefore be treated under the convention in the same way as the process of producing chemical weapons by a chemical reaction at a chemical plant. Secondly, are the most vocal opponents of this development in favour of a ban on binaries? If so what arrangements do they have in mind in practical terms for verifying such a ban? In my delegation's view, verifying a ban on binaries is no different from verifying a ban on other chemical weapons and it should, of course, involve on-site inspection. Finally, the clock cannot be stopped, let alone turned back. Assuming there was a ban on binaries, and an effective, verifiable one at that, we would still have to cope with the potential for binaries. We would still, in attempting to draw up a chemical weapons convention, have to acknowledge the possibility that a weapon could be constructed by mixing two chemical agents in flight. In other words, the issue of binaries is with us come what may: the problem is a technical one and it should have nothing to do with politics.

My last remarks on this item relate to the activity of the Working Group, under its dedicated Chairman, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. My delegation was pleased to see the mandate of the Working Group expanded. We were pleased that its new terms of reference permit specific wording to be tabled in the form of alternative elements of a draft CV convention. It is pleased too at the response of delegations to this development. It considers that a positive report on its

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

current work can be made by the Working Group, through the device of an agreed Chairman's statement, to the second special session on disarmament. It considers that, at the resumed summer session, the Working Group will be able to go a stage further and seek to rationalize the various new alternative elements. Together with the elements and comments that constituted last year's report of the Working Group, under the distinguished chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. Such rationalization should mean that, by the end of the year, much of the work of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons will have been done. Many technical details will remain to be worked out. It may be that the questions of scope and of linkage with other instruments will not have been fully resolved by then. Nonetheless, we shall have taken a decisive step forward, a step which does much to meet earnest international hopes for real progress towards proscribing chemical weapons.

I now turn to the subject of radiological weapons, on which the Australian delegation has not spoken substantively in plenary for some time. That is because, in our view, more was to be gained by concentrating our efforts in the Working Group on resolving outstanding questions. For two reasons, we judge that the time has now come to speak out on some aspects of the Working Group's tasks. We note first that, building on the strong foundations laid last year by the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary, Mr. Komives, and under the driving leadership of this year's Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, there is a real chance of progress in the work on what is defined as the traditional subject-matter of negotiations on radiological weapons. Secondly, the Working Group has begun serious study of how to ban attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

On the text covering the traditional material, Australia last year sought to help define what constitutes a radiological weapon. This year, we have put forward in the Working Group four different definitions. In so doing, we hoped not so much to conceive a definition that would meet the stringent technical requirements that are needed, but to prompt creative thinking on the problem. In that respect, we believe we have succeeded. We earnestly hope that, once a technically sound definition has been achieved, political objections yet unvoiced will not impede its ultimate inclusion in a treaty. Many grey cells and much sweat have gone into the effort to devise a definition that can in no way be interpreted as legalizing the use of nuclear weapons. Discouragement and much disappointment would undoubtedly follow if doubts yet unexpressed on this way of proceeding were to negate it.

As to the other articles of the projected RM convention, we have been greatly encouraged by the workmanlike attitude of those taking part in the Working Group and firmly endorse the Chairman's view that we should try, before the second special session, to come as close as possible to an agreed treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Frankly, my delegation has always seen a convention on radiological weapons as a marginal disarmament measure. Nonetheless, we have also regarded it as worth persisting in as a further step on the path to disarmament. Agreement, even near agreement, on the draft of a convention is, moreover, something which can only encourage us in our work and help ensure a successful special session. We need, in any event, quickly to despatch this particular monster so that we can attack with greater confidence the larger monsters that crowd our agenda.

As to the projected ban on attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, Australia still has under review how this might best be achieved. One thing, however, is clear: there is little to be gained from linking it in such a way to negotiations on the traditional material that neither is advanced. The banning of attacks on civilian nuclear installations will be, as even the first of our meetings has shown, a task of great complexity. It requires and deserves the full attention of a Working Group free from other preoccupations. It has, for example, been argued that so fierce are the consequences of the hostile dispersal of radioactive material from nuclear facilities that attacks on the whole range of installations involved in any way with such material should be prohibited. While this may sound like a good idea, it raises immense problems not only of verification, identification and marking of the facilities to be protected, but also of adequately delimiting perimeters and sanctuaries. Many countries are, moreover, so peppered with facilities which use or handle radioactive material for a wide variety of purposes, that an effort to ban attacks on all of them immediately runs up against insurmountable practical problems.

Thus, the Committee will need to look carefully at the problem of definition, especially at the lower, less dangerous, end of the spectrum, which includes such installations as spent fuel storage facilities, nuclear research establishments, factories working with irradiated material and radioactive material being transported between facilities. Australia, as a country with facilities at this lower end of the spectrum, is concerned to see a full exchange of views on all the options open to the Working Group in developing a definition of the kinds of facilities and installations to be protected by the projected ban. Accordingly, we would welcome any technical information and expertise that delegations can bring to the discussions. I do not want to finish this statement without stressing that my delegation brings an open mind to the matters encompassed by a ban on attacks against civilian nuclear installations and looks forward both to learning from and to co-operating with all delegations on this journey into relatively uncharted waters.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Busby.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, although Ambassador Fields has already expressed to you the congratulations of the United States delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship, I would like to take this opportunity to express my personal pleasure at seeing you in the Chair and to wish you every success in your difficult and demanding job.

My purpose in asking for the floor today is to introduce document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 co-sponsored by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States and entitled "Technical evaluation of 'Recover' techniques for CW verification".

The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. The Committee's discussions of general approaches to verification of a future CW prohibition have demonstrated that fundamental differences exist on verification issues. If meaningful progress is to be made on a chemical weapons convention, it is clear that progress must be made in resolving these issues.

Because of the variety of verification tasks to be dealt with in a CW prohibition, there can be no simple formula which can be applied in all cases. A variety of techniques, tailored to particular situations, will be required. Finding solutions to them will require active co-operation, imagination and expertise from all members of this Committee. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification ("recover").

The recover system is a unique global sensor-monitoring and data collection network being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency for use primarily with regard to nuclear safeguards. However, it appears to the co-sponsors that the technology involved may have wider applicability. In particular, it is our view that the recover techniques may have potential application as one component of a broadly based CW verification system.

Document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 describes the remote continual verification concept and suggests a framework within which a technical evaluation of recover could be conducted under the auspices of the Committee. The results of such a technical evaluation would be used to determine the applicability of recover as one component of a CW verification system.

It is clear that the lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance is the principal obstacle to successful completion of this Committee's work on a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons. Document CD/271-CD/CW/WP.32 suggests a technical evaluation which could assist us by taking another step towards overcoming this obstacle. It could also serve as a confidence-building activity in which States would co-operate to develop and evaluate improved monitoring arrangements. For these reasons, we seek favourable consideration of this proposal and intend to propose the inclusion of this item in our work programme for the summer session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador van Dongen.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

possibilities for compromise with a view to a clean programme have been explored in this Committee. Far from it. The will to negotiate is not forthcoming, if not totally non-existent, on the part of certain delegations. To those delegations, the many imponderables that affect disarmament negotiations, namely, the complexity of some measures for negotiation, verification and compliance and the international situation, especially the political relationship between the Superpowers, are necessary conditions for progress. Perhaps such an assessment offers a lop-sided justification for maintaining the status quo, but, for my delegation, a self-contained document like the comprehensive programme of disarmament, if implemented within the possible twenty-year time-frame originally proposed by my delegation, would considerably change the present trend of the arms race. Such an eventuality would also lend credibility to the determination of the Member States of the United Nations to live by the obligations they assume in declaring decades for the achievement of disarmament.

Time is short, but a genuine change of heart is still possible and my delegation will continue to offer its modest contribution.

Permit me now to comment briefly on item 4 of the Committee's annual agenda: Chemical Weapons.

My delegation would like to join other delegations which have expressed their pleasure at seeing Ambassador Sujka of Poland chairing the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are sure that, under his able chairmanship, the Group will make the necessary progress, as it did under the energetic chairmanships of Ambassadors Okawa of Japan and Lidgard of Sweden.

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction and their terrible impact is next only to that of nuclear weapons. My delegation would therefore like to see this system of weapons banned for all time. Negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons have been going on far too long and my country, a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention, finds the present lack of progress on a CW convention unacceptable, since the close link between a BW convention and CW convention has been clearly spelt out in article 9 of the BW Convention. Those States which assumed obligations and were trusting enough to sign the BW Convention are still anxiously awaiting the military significant States to negotiate in good faith and to proceed to negotiations on the text of a CW convention.

After three years of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, the perennial question of verification has yet again been brought up to explain why progress should necessarily be slow in negotiating a CW convention. As far back as May 1978, Adrian Fisher, the United States representative to the CCD, stated that:

"The issues involved in complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons are extremely complex. The political and technical issues involved are directly linked and thus must be dealt with at the same time. The development of an adequately verifiable disarmament measure which is designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

States and which also affects one of the major industries in many countries is a task which requires great care".

At this session, Ambassador Fields of the United States has again stressed the importance of verification and has even expressed a lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. My delegation stresses the importance of effective verification measures in any disarmament negotiations. However, we would merely like to state here that "100 per cent verification" is impossible and hence there must be an element of confidence among States. Consequently, a combination of international and national means of verification would be the most ideal for a CW convention. We note with regret that some western and socialist States continue to disagree on the proportions in which such means should be mixed. However, the working papers presented at this session and the Canadian paper contained in document CD/167 continue to form a good basis for negotiations.

My delegation would like to stress that we do not favour the conversion of chemical weapon facilities for "peaceful purposes", even if economically profitable, for this would only increase verification problems. My delegation does place importance on the destruction of chemical weapons and their means of production and we are therefore willing to study measures whereby means of production can be converted for destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We believe that 10 years is a suitable time-frame for the destruction of CW agents and weapons systems after the treaty enters into force.

My delegation cannot support the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and we are therefore disturbed to hear allegations of use in this Committee. Needless to say, the racist régime in South Africa has used chemical weapons. My delegation agrees with the view expressed by Ambassador Lidgard at our plenary meeting on 30 March 1982, namely, that the United States decision to build up its chemical weapons arsenal is more likely to lead to further escalation of the chemical weapons arms race than to the alleged purpose of promoting a chemical weapons convention.

The already irrational race in the nuclear field should have demonstrated to both parties that there can be no winners in a CW race. Confidence-building measures are urgently required and my delegation urges both parties to adopt such measures, since they can lead to the reduction of suspicions and thereby facilitate the conclusion of a CW convention.

It has been stated that disarmament is seldom fashionable. This is true. But certainly my delegation and the non-governmental organizations currently meeting in Geneva believe that it is a worthwhile cause. As we approach Easter, I merely wish to associate myself with the following view expressed by the British Council of Churches in 1972:

"We believe it our duty to pursue disarmament not just as a means to enhance security, or to effect economies, but as a clear Christian obligation, by which we mean that to use the human and material resources of God's creation to prepare for destruction is contrary to God's will for the human family".

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

security situation and the continued violation of the United Nations Charter in many parts of the world. I also voiced concern about the deteriorating balance of forces in Europe. Like others, my delegation pointed out that the chances for substantial progress towards arms control and disarmament were impaired by such developments and called upon those causing these grave disturbances to return to a policy of restraint and moderation in the pursuit of external interests.

We all know that it is difficult for disarmament to flourish in such a political environment. And yet, this unsatisfactory situation makes it even more imperative that we explore every chance, every niche of potential progress. It is a matter of limited gratification to my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament has had a relatively good season even under these disconcerting circumstances.

In fact, we must note that negotiations in several fields have progressed markedly in these last few weeks. In several areas, stagnation has been overcome. Our consideration of the chemical weapons issue has reached the stage of a full-fledged negotiation and the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on vital issues allowing progress towards a comprehensive test ban, a cherished objective of many delegations in this room, is imminent. In large measure, this progress is due to the determination and sense of realism of one major delegation and I for one would like to pay a tribute to it. You will forgive me if I also list the field of radiological weapons as one where some progress has been possible.

Finally, the Committee has, for the first time in many years, undertaken to deal in earnest with the problems of a possible arms race in space and some new important vistas have opened up in this field.

All these steps have taken place in a sober, constructive atmosphere which has led us, finally, to approach some of the real problems involved in the issues at hand. While verification can never be a substitute for disarmament, just as little as confidence-building measures alone can play this role, my delegation continues to believe that verification and compliance are the centre-pieces on which the ultimate success of disarmament negotiations depend. We therefore consider it logical and indeed a token of the progress achieved that on many subjects simultaneously, we have now come to look into verification problems in concrete terms and that this session of the Committee, like few others before, has been marked by a wealth of new working papers on this important and complex subject.

After these more general remarks, let me turn to some of our concrete problem areas. I intend to touch, in that order, upon chemical weapons, problems of outer space, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and radiological weapons.

Let me first turn to the problem of chemical weapons. My delegation has attempted to provide a specific input relating to the technical aspects of verification procedures and supplementing the detailed efforts undertaken in the same direction by other delegations, particularly the delegation of the United Kingdom. We are gratified by the interest which the Working Paper

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

contained in document CD/265 has aroused among all regional groups. The method of casting lots as a means of random selection of chemical installations for regular on-site inspections has met with particular interest and has been recognized by many delegations as a possible way of providing a comprehensive verification régime and still maintaining a low personnel input and cost effectiveness. The mere prospect that any chemical installation, even one inspected only a short while ago, could be designated by lot for inspection would act as a powerful disincentive to any breach of the future convention.

Many delegations have asked how the system of casting lots would work in practice and I am pleased to use this intervention to reply to a certain number of these questions, thereby clarifying our approach. While our long-standing experience with the inspection system of the Western European Union has prompted us to make our general experience available to others, the system of random selection by casting lots has not been part of this particular verification régime. It has rather been developed independently with the assistance of computer-based studies.

The subjects of the regular random-selection inspections would be all the stocks and production units declared as such by States parties. Declarations would cover existing stocks and production facilities of supertoxic chemical weapon agents, the general industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds, as well as the limited quantities of supertoxic warfare agents permitted by the future convention. All declared substances and facilities would, without exception, be subject to the lot-casting procedure.

The number of lots to be drawn would depend on the general percentage to be set in advance by the consultative Committee of Experts. This percentage could vary from year to year, for instance because of a sudden increase in the total number of objects to be inspected resulting from an increase in the number of States Parties.

While all States would, from a legal point of view, be radically equal before the lot-casting authority, there might be variations in fact. States Parties which have no industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds and may therefore not have any object to declare would of course be exempted from inspections. A country which chose to conceal stocks or production facilities would, for the moment, be exempted from on-site inspection. However, if doubts arose as to the existence of such undeclared stocks or units, the on-challenge procedure would apply.

It has been asked how several related production units in one country should be treated, for instance if they were spread over a distance, but were nevertheless administratively connected. Here we would recommend a criterion of local propinquity. All production units situated within a certain local perimeter, sufficiently clustered to permit one single inspection, would be counted as one unit, while production units dispersed over several localities would have to be counted separately, even if they were administered by the same managerial authority. It is, however, obvious that the duration and intensity of the inspection and the number of inspectors needed would depend on the dimensions and sophistication of the plant.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

In the questions put to us, preoccupation with the safeguarding of industrial secrets and property rights has played a substantial role. I would therefore like to emphasize that, whenever samples were to be drawn, they would, according to our conception, be taken by employees of the production units inspected. All chemical analyses would be conducted on the spot, a procedure made possible by the limited range of chemical substances indicative of compliance with or breach of the convention. No samples would be taken out of the country. The precise composition of the substances examined could therefore not be detected by the inspectors.

In reply to some other questions put to my delegation, I should like to stress that our procedure would not envisage national quotas for the total number of inspections to take place in each country. Identical treatment of all is guaranteed by the objectivity of criteria and the unpredictability of the lot-casting method.

My delegation has followed the debate on problems of outer space with great interest. In our view, the Committee has made a good beginning in approaching this topic in response to the relevant resolutions adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, one of which was co-sponsored by my delegation. The debate has quite clearly shown that there is a considerable difference of views concerning the method to be used in future work. Many delegations have subscribed to a pragmatic, gradual approach by which concrete negotiating steps would, in a first phase, be taken to deal effectively with the most threatening and destabilizing weapons systems, i.e. anti-satellite weapons, especially since such systems have already been tested and made operational by at least one country; anti-satellite technology is available and deployment may already have taken place. There is another approach which aims at a purportedly broader, non-specific ban on all arms in outer space, but places very little emphasis on real effectiveness. It is also difficult to see in what order of priority the various complex issues involved would be treated under this approach. While my delegation is in favour of every possible step designed to exclude non-peaceful uses of outer space, it would appear logical and appropriate to us to adopt a step-by-step approach and to build upon the existing body of international regulations in this field. The establishment of a working group to take this work in hand in the coming summer session of the Committee would be welcomed by my delegation, if the mandate reflects this approach. I would like to remind the Committee in this respect that General Assembly resolution 36/97 C specifically requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. The mandate of a future working group would have to reflect this and, in our view, the Committee, acting accordingly, will have to avoid clogging the agenda of a working group with broad and hazy projects which would not allow the Committee to deal with concrete problems in a limited time and not aim at a really effective peaceful space régime.

My delegation has already given its view on outer space problems in a more comprehensive manner during one of the informal meetings devoted to the subject; the text of our statement has been made available to delegations in an informal manner. Now that I have the opportunity to speak on the subject in a formal meeting, allow me to reaffirm one clarification. The draft treaty of 10 August 1981 contained in document A/36/192 and referred to in General Assembly resolution 36/99 does not appear to my delegation to be a suitable basis for

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;

- (iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
- (v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, who will address the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all, as this is my first official statement this month, to begin by offering you my most sincere and heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. I am deeply convinced that, under your able and experienced leadership, this Committee will fully and perfectly discharge its reporting tasks in preparing the special report to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and in full consultation with the Group, I wish to present to the Committee on

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Disarmament my oral report concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session and to inform the Committee of the adoption of the special report of the Group to the Committee prepared in view of the special session devoted to disarmament.

At its 6th meeting, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons took note of the Chairman's report on issues relating to toxicity determinations and contained in document CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1. The Chairman was asked to inform the Committee on Disarmament of the results of these consultations and especially of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous and inhalation toxicity criteria contained in the report and to ask the Committee to take note of the report, as well as of the recommended procedures annexed thereto.

On the basis of this report, the Group agreed that its Chairman should hold consultations with delegations on technical questions in the week of 2 to 6 August of this year, unless the Committee decides otherwise at the beginning of the second half of its 1982 session. The Working Group agreed to suggest to the Committee on Disarmament that it devote the week following the technical consultations to the consideration of the item "chemical weapons" in its plenary meetings. In order to allow for adequate preparations, the Working Group's Chairman should continue his consultations on the technical questions to be discussed during the consultations envisaged for the week from 2 to 6 August 1982.

Taking into account the report contained in document CD/CW/WP.30, the information obtained from delegations and the outcome of his informal contacts with delegations on this subject, the Chairman will announce, at the very beginning of the second half of the 1982 session, which technical questions he recommends for these consultations.

I take pleasure in informing you that last night, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons adopted the text of the special report to the Committee on Disarmament it has prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament. This report is now being processed by the Secretariat and should be available in all languages in time for the Committee's next regular meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have taken note of his request and, at the same time, I wish to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of the activities of his Working Group, which adopted its report yesterday afternoon.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmed.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

among the developing countries regarding their nascent nuclear programmes. This confidence has been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities last June. Therefore, the scope of the prohibition should include not only larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities, but also smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries.

Pakistan has submitted a concrete proposal regarding the scope of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities on the basis of the criteria and considerations I have mentioned. We hope that the important political issues involved in this matter will be discussed in the near future.

The negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons currently being pursued under the sagacious guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland have assumed greater urgency in view of recent developments. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world have not been conclusively disproven. The acrimony surrounding the issue, however, attests to the overriding need to affirm in the CW convention that the use of chemical weapons is totally prohibited and to provide for adequate and credible means by which such allegations can be objectively investigated in the future. My delegation has made no technical determination as to whether the development of binary chemical weapons will further complicate the negotiation of a CW convention, particularly its verification procedures. Nevertheless, the current escalation of the arms race in chemical weapons, the implied reliance on these weapons in the "balance of terror" and persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons are ominous portents, especially if one bears in mind that the capability to produce these weapons of mass destruction is, unlike nuclear weapons, not limited to a handful of States. These disturbing dimensions of the problem must be addressed squarely at the forthcoming special session and in our subsequent negotiations.

As was to be expected, the most intensive work has been done at this session on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Despite the political and conceptual difficulties encountered, considerable progress has been made in this task under the experienced and dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Unfortunately, significant portions of the text remain in square brackets. My delegation believes that further progress in negotiating the comprehensive programme of disarmament depends on appropriate political decisions being taken especially by the major Powers. Before resuming work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is essential to reach some understanding on the fundamental conceptual issues involved. There seems to be de facto agreement that the programme should be elaborated in three stages. This agreement seems logical and natural and it should be formalized. Some members continue to entertain reservations about the concept of "time-frames" for the implementation of the programme and its stages. It is possible to link the notion of indicative time-frames with the procedure for the review of the implementation of the programme. The Group of 21 has made specific proposals in this regard. My delegation is flexible on the kind of linkage that may eventually be established. But the review mechanism in itself cannot serve as a substitute for a political indication that certain disarmament negotiations would be undertaken in good faith by the States concerned within a certain period of time. My delegation continues to regard the end of the century as a symbolically attractive and politically feasible target date for the completion of the comprehensive programme.

Mr. SUJKA (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce a special report of this Group to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The text of the report is contained in document CD/281 which, I hope, is available to all the distinguished representatives in this Committee.

I would like to be as brief as possible, as I have always been during our meetings. First of all, I wish to state that in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/92 F, this Committee has been requested to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament "a special report on the state of negotiations on various questions under consideration by the Committee". In a similar way, a specific requirement by the General Assembly has been stated in paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/96 A, as far as chemical weapons are concerned. I hope that the report, as contained in document CD/281, does reflect the present state of negotiations in the Committee's Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The report itself being self-explanatory, I would like to share briefly with the Committee some important points of the discussion in the Working Group which led to the elaboration and adoption of this report. Thus, in its introductory part, the Group wished to refer directly to paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which, let me recall, stresses the importance and urgency of negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. On the other hand, the Group wished to refer, rather generally, to all other proposals and documents on the prohibition of chemical weapons which in the past had been presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee itself, assuming that merely listing them all would be a space-taking and not very productive task, especially in view of the second second special session.

The same approach has been displayed by the Group in elaborating the other parts of the report. Without going into details of its discussions in 1980 and in 1981, under its previous mandate, the Group emphasized the most significant points discussed in those two years as they, indeed, mark very important stages of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As far as the present state of the work is concerned, the Group has underlined the importance of a new mandate which allows the elaboration of a convention and succinctly described the topics of discussions for the first half of its 1982 session and the main differences of views and problems which emerged in the discussion in the past two months or so.

There is one thing I would like to make as clear as possible: the Group wished to avoid repeating in this report, all over again, all the various views of particular delegations or groups of delegations on countless smaller and/or bigger problems that emerged during the more than three-year-long discussions. These are sufficiently reflected in the Working Group's report of 1980 contained in document CD/131/Rev.I, and its report of 1981 in document CD/220. Both those reports are specifically mentioned in the present report of the Group.

In my concluding statement to the Group, I described in considerable detail a possible course of action for the Group during the second half of the 1982 session. In this connection, I appealed to the members of the Group asking them to do

specific preparatory work for the summer session if we are to approach as closely as possible to the stage of drafting the provisions of the convention. I do not want to repeat myself because that statement, in view of the interest shown by members of the Group, has been circulated by the secretariat as a working paper of the Group on Chemical Weapons. But with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal again for a display of serious efforts by all delegations during the summer session so that we can translate as many dissenting views as possible into the alternative elements and then elaborate compromise elements. A compilation of draft elements and proposed new texts has also been made available to all delegations to facilitate the kind of exercise I am appealing for.

I would like to apologize to my predecessors, Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, for not mentioning their names as chairmen of the Group in 1980 and in 1981 respectively, in the introductory part of the report. I personally was of the opinion that that kind of introduction should not contain all the details I have noticed in the reports of other working groups. But certainly I am for the uniformity of the reports of all the working groups in this respect, and I hope that the Committee will agree to cover these problems in paragraphs 61 and 62 of its own report. The same procedure could also be applied as to the participation of non-member States in the work of the Working Group.

Finally, let me refer to some recent discussions in the Committee's drafting group. My reply is brief: the Working Group, indeed, has not been directly reflecting in its activities the Committee's plenary discussions. It has conducted its work on the basis of a new, I repeat, new mandate which was adopted with the consent of all delegations. On the basis of that mandate and the programme of work, also adopted by consensus, the group has acted and its activities have been reflected in this report. Let me also say that, exactly, this is the principal aim of the Committee's report -- to reflect the course and trends of discussions that have been taking place in plenaries. The Group's report, in my view, had to be limited to the discussions in the Working Group itself. References to the discussions in plenary have, of course, been reflected in the Group's work, when such discussions contained specific proposals relevant to the subjects of negotiations in the Group.

As the distinguished members of the Committee are well aware, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has entered, with a new mandate, another, sensitive phase of its work. We have held another series of thorough examinations of difficult and complex problems. I wish to emphasize, as Chairman of this Group, that despite the great sensitivity and complexity of our negotiations, the work has been conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding, respect and co-operation. For this understanding, mutual respect and co-operation I should like at this moment once more cordially to thank all the members of the Group.

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman, that this statement be distributed as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament in the same way as document CD/286, which contains the statement of the distinguished Chairman of the CPD Working Group, Ambassador García Robles.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for introducing his report. I am sure the request for his statement to be circulated as an official document will be duly taken care of. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His excellency Ambassador Wegener, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/284.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I think this is a time for frankness. How much effect will the comprehensive programme have on the work of the Committee? The comprehensive programme remains essentially an agenda, no matter how described, of negotiations on arms control and disarmament. But the Committee has its own agenda, which will still guide our work when the second special session is over, and for this reason, it is all the more important to concentrate on the practical and realizable when the Committee resumes. Statements of broad vision do have their place, and indeed it is a common hope that the second special session will provide the world community with that vision; but the Committee must rightly deal with the mundane, the practical, the negotiable. Negotiation is never easy, and requires both attention to detail and compromise -- not really the stuff special sessions are made of.

In short, we cannot look to the special session to solve problems this Committee deals with because it will not; and the practical issues the Committee confronts will still be present after the second special session is history.

One of these major practical problems is verification. It has been a theme, if not the major theme, of this session. In aspects of the Committee's work where hope is highest, for example with respect to chemical weapons, the emphasis on verification is greatest. The accomplishments of the Committee on Disarmament through the activities of the Seismic Experts Working Group are essentially in the area of verification. The CTB Working Group will address the subject of verification. On the other hand, one of the built-in problems in achieving a mutually satisfactory and universal negative security assurance is that, by its very nature, such an assurance is unverifiable: it deals, not with arms, but with intentions. Perhaps the lesson of verification has only recently been learned. Many have asserted that verification adds to confidence, and does not detract from it. Treaties have been concluded in the past without adequate verification provisions, and the consequences have underlined their resulting weakness. Inherently unverifiable treaties have been concluded, such as the Briand Kellogg Pact, which outlawed war. It is this historical experience which troubles many in discussing proposals that cannot be verified. In their view, and indeed in ours, the law is only the law if it is agreed -- and enforced, in the case of international agreement on arms control and disarmament, through verification.

Earlier I noted three positive signs in the Committee's work. There is a fourth. The Committee has moved beyond discussing verification as an abstract principle, and is now considering the means of verification. Views differ, perhaps not as much as before, and solutions are in sight, if not yet within grasp.

The resolution of verification problems is rarely a glamorous business. But it is always essential. The second special session, obviously, cannot do this work. We can and should.

There are some who, while agreeing in principle to verification, are concerned that insistence on absolute verification, or something close to it, is a means to avoid progress on other substantive arms control and disarmament matters. It is easy to sympathize with this concern. That is why we believe our aim should be to seek adequate and mutually-acceptable verification measures. We are confident that with patience and perseverance, this can be done -- even in such technically demanding fields as chemical weapons verification. In the meantime, no agreement of consequence is likely to be achieved without suitable verification provisions. Let us therefore proceed accordingly. We, for our part, in due course, will be putting forward further suggestions on verification, particularly in the area of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

position of the United States towards the problem of a nuclear-weapon test-ban expressed in the statement by Mr. Rostow to the Committee on 9 February when he informed the Committee that, in the view of the United States delegation, negotiation on a nuclear test ban "may not be propitious at the time". The socialist countries also consider inconsistent the United States approach to a nuclear test ban whereby it links progress on this subject to reductions in nuclear armaments while opposing the commencement of negotiations in this respect.

The delegations of socialist countries continue to believe that the resumption and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations would be of special significance and would create the possibility for a future nuclear test ban to enter into force provisionally before the two remaining nuclear-weapon Powers joined it.

The delegations of socialist countries continued to work actively in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. They welcomed the initiation of a new phase in its deliberations marked by the adoption of a new mandate allowing it to work on the text of the future convention, which they favoured already during the earlier stages of negotiations on this question. During the first part of the Committee's 1982 session, a very useful exchange of views was carried out which clearly showed the areas of mutual understanding on a number of substantive aspects of the future convention.

The group of socialist countries continues to maintain that the future convention will be effective only if it takes into account all recent developments in the field of chemical weapons. In this respect they fully shared the view expressed by the overwhelming majority of delegations to the effect that the future convention should also exclude any possibility of the production of binary weapons. The delegations of the socialist countries expressed their views on this question in document CD/258, in which they drew the attention of delegations to United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/96 B which calls upon all States "to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present".

The socialist countries draw the attention of delegations to the draft of a provision for the chemical weapons convention proposed by the Soviet delegation on the non-stationing directly or indirectly of chemical weapons on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of commitments on their destruction or transfer for non-hostile purposes.

The question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction remains a problem of primary importance and should, in the view of the socialist countries, be given due attention in the work of the Committee. They consider that the time is ripe to set up an ad hoc working group of experts, which could seriously address this matter. The group of socialist countries also considers that the Committee could be helpful in giving consideration to appropriate formulations by which all States, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States, would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any future efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/89.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I should like to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. It is good to see you in the Chair. Many delegations have worked with you in New York and here in Geneva on disarmament matters and I want to take the occasion also to thank Ambassador Okawa for his great efforts as Chairman in April when he attempted to prepare the Committee in order that it would maximize its contribution to the second special session. Much is expected of the Committee during this period. Much responsibility, therefore, lies with you. It is always a pleasure to see a fellow representative of the Commonwealth in the Chair. We aim to contribute to your success. At the same time, I should like to welcome Mr. Bensmail to the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament. He brings with him experience which will stand the Committee in good stead.

Just before it adjourned last spring, I referred in a plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament to its unique responsibility -- to negotiate. At its regular sessions the General Assembly does not negotiate, nor indeed was this the function of its second special session on disarmament.

Despite a number of shortcomings, the second special session has reaffirmed the critical role of the Committee on Disarmament in the multilateral process of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed, the second special session reaffirmed, in a number of ways, the confidence of the international community in this Organization. Should we not therefore look quickly to the future? Should we not build especially upon areas where substantial progress has already been made?

In planning our work for this short summer session we need to husband our resources carefully. In our view, the Committee should focus its main attention on three substantive areas -- chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban and outer space.

Issues such as negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament should, in our view, be given less concentrated treatment. In the cases of negative security assurances and radiological weapons, discussions during our spring session suggest that while these matters need to be kept under review in the Committee, further consultations outside the Committee amongst individual delegations might yield the most profitable results.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

forth in the memorandum. Moreover, in compliance with the wishes expressed by many States we agreed that one of the first stages of the programme would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials used for the production of various types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to consider this problem in the whole context of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is a very urgent problem. Before the recess the Committee set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this item, and we hope that this Group will proceed without delay to work on the problem that was indicated in plain terms by practically all representatives when they agreed on the mandate for this Group -- the problem of drafting a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In view of recent press reports concerning the adoption by the United States Administration of some new decision on the question of nuclear tests, it is important to us -- and obviously to all those present in this room -- that the United States delegation should clarify that country's intentions and indicate whether it is ready to draft such a treaty or not. Clearly, this will greatly influence the attitude of the States members of the Committee to the activities of the above-mentioned Working Group.

In accordance with our decision taken earlier, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work before the start of the plenary meetings of the Committee itself. This proves that the Committee is perfectly aware of the primary significance of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of the speediest possible solution of this major problem. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone. Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session a text entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

Our draft, which has been distributed as an official document of the Committee, contains quite a number of new elements, inter alia on the question of verification of compliance with future conventions, and we express our deep satisfaction at the fact that both at the second special session and during the work of our Working Group on Chemical Weapons many delegations gave a positive appraisal of the provisions of the Soviet draft. The representative of Canada has referred to our proposals at this morning's meeting.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that there now exist all the objective conditions necessary for a decisive advance towards the solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We therefore consider that the Committee should prepare by the end of its current session a composite draft text of a future convention containing both agreed provisions -- we hope there will be many of them -- and those on which we have not been able to reach agreement during this stage of our work on the draft of a convention.

The problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not less important, and it, too, has already been referred to today. Unfortunately events are developing in such a way that outer space is becoming more and more an arena for the arms race. It is for this reason that we ought without delay to start drafting

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Indian delegation, I would like to welcome you, the representative of friendly and non-aligned Kenya, as Chairman of the Committee for the month of August. We meet today for the first time since the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The total failure of that session to achieve any tangible result whatsoever adds a sense of urgency and importance to our work here as the only multilateral negotiating body. We hope, Mr. Chairman, that under your wise and experienced leadership we shall be able to dispel some of the gloom and pessimism that has descended over the international scene as a result of the failure of the second special session.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of our delegation to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who, as Chairman of this Committee since April, not only presided over the crucial phase of the preparation of our report to the General Assembly at its second special session, but also successfully steered us to a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. In addition, I have great pleasure in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Datcou of Romania, a country with which India has cordial and fruitful relations. His experience and knowledge will be valuable to the Committee in its work.

The failure of the second special session last month to produce even the most modest results has been a great setback to the cause of disarmament. What is especially regrettable is the fact that the report of the session failed miserably to do justice to the depth of concern and anxiety which oppresses the people of the world at the growing danger of nuclear war. If one had to identify the single most important cause for the failure of the session to adopt even a single measure towards preventing the possible outbreak of a nuclear war, it is the patent fact that for the most powerful nations the illusion of political and military pre-eminence which is associated with the accumulation of armaments proved more important than the special responsibility they bear towards the international community to ensure world peace and security.

India, as you know, dissociated itself from the chapter on conclusions contained in the report of the session. We did so because we share the view expressed by a large number of non-governmental organizations and popular movements that survival is not a matter of consensus. At a time when popular disquiet and anxiety over the dangers of a catastrophic nuclear war have reached overwhelming proportions, the session could not offer even one modest measure to restore hope. The credibility of the multilateral process is now in danger of being entirely vitiated, unless we in the Committee on Disarmament can bring a new sense of purpose and urgency to our negotiating task, particularly on the priority items of our agenda. We may rightly be disappointed at the failure of the second special session but we should not allow that to discourage us in our efforts.

The summer session of the Committee this year will barely cover six to seven weeks. It is necessary, therefore, to be carefully selective in our approach and to focus attention on the most important priority areas. We are glad to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which has been meeting since 20 July under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has at last come to grips with the crucial process of reconciling divergent positions through an exploration of various promising compromise options. This phase of the Group's work is perhaps the most crucial and at the same time the most difficult. It requires intensive

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The chemical weapons group has got off to an early and promising start. It will easily become the one work unit which will accumulate the maximum number of meetings by the end of our session. This is perfectly in keeping with my delegation's intentions. A comprehensive chemical weapons ban is highest on our priority list, and my delegation notes with encouragement the new vistas that have opened up for the Committee's work in this domain on the basis of declarations made during the second special session, mainly by the Soviet delegation. These vistas have to be explored with care, and have to be measured against the requirements which many countries have established in the course of previous sessions, specifically in the verification field. While my delegation generally welcomes the thrust of the new Soviet proposals, we feel that there may still be considerable deficiencies, mainly as regards the scope of regular obligatory on-site inspections, and there is a need also to incorporate in the future chemical weapons convention a full-fledged contractual obligation on the part of all States to submit to on-site inspections if a breach of the convention is alleged and a formal demand for such inspection is put forward. In order to obtain a clearer view of the meaning of the Soviet proposals, my delegation has submitted, in the form of a working paper, a number of detailed questions. We are looking forward to replies from the Soviet side, and express gratitude in advance. The chemical weapons Working Group has commenced its work with considerable momentum and speed, and this momentum should be maintained.

In the view of my delegation it is imperative that the Working Group on nuclear testing should get off to a rapid start under dynamic leadership, and that the potential of the mandate of the Group which the Committee agreed upon in late April be fully utilized with the aid of a well-structured work plan and a maximum of technical and political expertise. My delegation is particularly interested in seeing the work of this Group going ahead on the basis of realism, taking into account the preparedness and ability of all participating countries to move forward at this time. This would also imply that the Working Group does not disdain the principle of graduality and brings in its harvest, limited as it may appear to some, at a time when the fruits are ripe -- hoping for new seasons to yield additional and perhaps more delicious fruits.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is back on our list of agenda items. My delegation has attempted to make the fullest possible contribution to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, both prior to and during the special session. We are therefore particularly saddened that progress in New York was not more substantial. Yet the thorough discussion of all parts of the comprehensive programme during the special session brought intermediate results that should not be underestimated, and has certainly brought a better understanding of what the programme must and can achieve. There is perhaps little point in devoting a major part of this session to further formal negotiations on the comprehensive programme, but all delegations must now carefully analyse the results of the negotiations of June and July and, on that basis, perhaps in the framework of informal exchanges, give thought to how and when a new series of negotiations should be initiated, taking into account our 1983 deadline for that venture. During the final stages of the special session my delegation had occasion to suggest that we may also wish to rethink the methodology and structure of the comprehensive programme.

As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I am fully aware of the difficulties that lie in the way of a successful resumption and conclusion of negotiations in that Group. At this juncture, it appears important that all delegations should gain a very clear view of the options that offer themselves to negotiators. I have written to all heads of delegations in that sense, and would hope shortly to embark on some informal consultations on the basis of reactions to that letter, before new formal meetings of the Working Group, if any, are called.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The chemical weapons field appears to my delegation to be one area of negotiation where there is still hope for agreement, however complicated the substance. This opportunity must be used to the full by the Committee and its Working Group. Needless to say, it will take the active co-operation of the Superpowers not only in the Committee but also through a resumption of their bilateral negotiations. We for our part are prepared to make every effort to contribute to a solution of outstanding problems. We would not be opposed, inter alia, to continuing work beyond the scheduled working period of the Committee, if this appears desirable to achieve decisive progress.

This leads me on to a few words on the procedures and activities of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been reaffirmed as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Sweden does not believe that we should allow a discussion on this matter to develop into a great procedural debate, which would deprive the Committee of much of its precious negotiating time. On the other hand it would be futile to deny that certain improvements and changes could be brought about through informal consultations. At this point let me make the following brief comments.

We have some doubts about making this body a permanent around-the-year negotiating forum. Even the present work-load of the Committee strains the capacity of a developed and technically advanced country like my own. A further extension of working schedules and programmes would be likely to overextend smaller delegations and would only favour those large States or groups of States whose sincere disarmament interest there is sometimes reason to doubt.

But there is, as I said, room for improving the efficiency of our work. Thus, the use of plenary meetings for making repeated general statements could be questioned. Much stricter priorities should be set for the time allocated to working groups. Whereas it would seem highly advisable to provide additional meetings for the negotiations on chemical weapons and the CTBT and perhaps also for outer space, we should somewhat limit time allotted to some other working groups, not because the issues that they are dealing with are in themselves of secondary importance but because they are unlikely to yield results unless a change of wills and minds occurs. This could in due course be ascertained through informal consultations.

Let me also recall Sweden's firm view, which we share with many other members of the Group of 21, that the consensus rule of the Committee should not any longer be allowed to be misused in procedural matters, such as in blocking the setting up of working groups requested by a large majority of Committee members.

Much has been said and much will have to be said about the imperative need for a change of wills and minds, first and foremost in the leading military Powers. We have waited for that change a long time. Quite a number of us have recently gained new hope, not because of any signs of such a change, but because of the appearance of a new and, hopefully, significant political force, the sharply awakening public awareness of the tremendous risks that this and coming generations run, if we allow the leaders of the world to continue their present course. For a growing number of people, for a swiftly growing number of people, the issue has changed from being one of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival. It is a matter of rapidly increasing awareness of what a nuclear weapon actually is. For the first time since 1962, when Herman Kahn published his well-known book, people are thinking about the unthinkable. One of the reasons: they have suddenly understood that they will have to do so, because military and political leaders, by talking about "controlled nuclear counter-attacks", "protracted conflict periods", have made the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

nuclear-weapon test ban. We cannot but add our voice to that of the delegations of India, Mexico, Sweden, the Soviet Union and others, which have questioned the United States approach. We also believe that an explanation on the part of the United States delegation as to its approach to the Working Group on a CTB would be very useful.

Thanks to the constructive work of the group of experts in the field of seismology who, after seven years of complicated negotiations, have in fact resolved all the basic problems of the verification system for a future agreement, we can hope that this Working Group will be able this year to concentrate its efforts on the preparation of an agreement in all its aspects. Czechoslovakia is ready to offer the experience of its experts in seismology and intends to take an active part both in the meetings of experts as well as in the Working Group.

We welcome the increased activity of the Committee in dealing with the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The relevant Working Group, headed by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has since 20 July done a lot of useful work. We are convinced that given good political will there are sufficient opportunities for the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, including the establishment of an effective system of verification. The Soviet proposal concerning the basic provisions of a convention submitted to the second special session constitutes a new basis for undertaking decisive steps towards reaching the desired aim. We consider encouraging the fact that both during the second special session and in the Committee on Disarmament a number of delegations reacted positively to the proposal of the Soviet Union. We hope that a constructive approach will prevail also in the drafting process. In the present circumstances we consider it desirable that the Committee should undertake, preferably during this year's session, the elaboration of a composite draft text of a future convention. Although we shall probably not achieve generally acceptable texts on all the aspects during this summer session, it seems to us that a composite draft text could become a useful framework for an assessment of the progress achieved as well as serving as an instrument for further negotiations.

A positive course in the complicated negotiations would, in our view, undoubtedly be facilitated also by the implementation of the Soviet proposal not to deploy chemical weapons in territories where there are no such weapons at present. At the same time we cannot help wondering whether good political will in this regard exists on the part of all States members of the Committee. The United States attitude to the solution of problems of such weapons of mass destruction, its intention to start the production of binary weapons, the interruption of its bilateral negotiations with the USSR and the launching of noisy slanderous campaigns are a matter of serious concern.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The enormous progress achieved by the creative and technical genius of mankind provides already now real possibilities for finding solutions to such pressing and universal problems as the struggle against hunger, diseases, want and many others. However, all this requires that scientific and technological progress should begin to serve exclusively as an instrument of peaceful aspirations of mankind.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, along with other socialist countries, has for a long time been proclaiming the urgency of taking some precautions which would prevent the further misuse of the results of science and technology as well as the waste of human and material resources for the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced that the drafting of the text of an appropriate international agreement and consideration of the possibilities of concluding separate specific agreements would be considerably facilitated by the setting up of an authoritative group of experts which would simultaneously observe and evaluate developments in this area.

The decision of the United States administration to build neutron weapons in numbers amounting to tens of thousands, in our view strongly adds to the urgency of considering seriously the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons submitted to the Committee in 1978 by the delegations of the socialist countries.

Nowadays we can also witness yet another tendency, inspired by the Western military-industrial complex, that of the penetration of weapons to areas which were not used earlier for military purposes. We condemn resolutely any steps aimed at spreading the arms race into outer space. Outer space should remain forever free of any weapons so that it cannot become a new sphere of the feverish arms race and a source of further deterioration in the relations among States. Therefore, we support the establishment of a working group which would deal in full responsibility with the problem of prohibiting all types of weapons in outer space. We believe that a generally acceptable mandate for this group could be agreed upon without unnecessary delay so that we can start business-like negotiations on a number of existing proposals already made at previous sessions and at this session.

In this complicated international situation we regard it as especially urgent to take a firm line of opposition to the policy of warmongering. It is encouraging that in spite of a complicated international atmosphere more and more efforts are taking place to halt the feverish arms race. It is promising that especially in recent years the number of initiative proposals from various countries designed to resolve the specific tasks of disarmament has sharply increased.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the Committee on Disarmament is ready to contribute in good faith to the constructive discussion of any proposal or a set of proposed measures on disarmament which would be based on the principle of equality and equal security.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

In particular, this summer session will be of very limited duration -- 5 or 6 weeks at the most -- and we must endeavour to make the most of that short period. My delegation therefore endorses the idea that, during this summer session, we place emphasis on the truly priority items, i.e. item 1 (CTB) and item 4 (chemical weapons); we would like to see more time allocated to these items than to the other items both in the plenary sessions and in the working groups.

On the question of chemical weapons, the Working Group has been at work under the conscientious chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka since 20 July, prior to the opening of the summer session. My delegation hopes that, on the basis of the revised mandate achieved at our spring session, further substantial progress will be made toward the elaboration of the draft text of a convention by the end of this session.

In this connection a number of noteworthy proposals were tabled at the second special session by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union and others. My delegation hopes these proposals will contribute to advancing our discussions in this Committee. We have duly noted that the concept of on-site inspections has in principle been accepted by the Soviet Union, in particular with respect to verification of the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks.

Japan has been consistently calling for the realization of nuclear disarmament as a matter of the utmost urgency. Japan has, in particular, urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, including underground testing, with a view to restraining the further sophistication of nuclear weapons as the first concrete step toward nuclear disarmament. It goes without saying that the elaboration of adequate and effective verification measures is indispensable for the realization of a comprehensive test ban. This is why Japan has been actively contributing over the years towards the establishment of a system of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events.

In this connection, we wish to express our regret that the reopening of the trilateral CTB negotiations -- which Japan has been calling for -- seems to remain beyond our reach in the foreseeable future. Japan wishes to appeal once again for the early resumption of those trilateral negotiations, through joint efforts by the parties concerned to achieve a breakthrough in their quest for a solution to the problem of verification.

Under these circumstances, one can say that the role of this Committee on Disarmament in achieving a CTBT has become all the more important. In that context, the agreement at the end of our spring session to set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was most opportune. My Government places great hopes in the work to be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Working Group in the sense that it could open the way to truly multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban which Japan has been calling for for so many years.

I wish to urge that we initiate substantive deliberations in the new Working Group as soon as possible during this summer session, so that we may finally start making progress under the agenda item "Nuclear test ban".

The huge demonstrations in favour of peace and disarmament which have taken place in many countries, including Romania, and have shown a strength and vigour never seen since the Second World War; prove clearly that world public opinion expects the negotiating bodies in this field, and in particular this Committee, to produce concrete results to save mankind from a nuclear disaster.

As many delegations have stressed, the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is very short. Furthermore, it is taking place between the second special session and the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. In the view of the Romanian delegation, these circumstances require us to make an additional effort of will and organization so that the time allotted to us is used in the most effective way possible. It is on this subject that I would like to make certain preliminary remarks.

First, I would like to emphasize that, like other delegations, we consider that it is a matter of the utmost urgency and moreover necessary as a demonstration of the viability of this multilateral body that real negotiations on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be initiated within the framework of this Committee. I would like to stress that in my delegation's view there can be no valid argument against the commencement of such negotiations. The complexity of measures connected with nuclear disarmament is simply one more reason for beginning the search for solutions as soon as possible, for there is no better way -- no other way, in fact -- of finding solutions than a patient and persistent search with a will to find solutions acceptable to all -- to large and small countries alike. This calls for the establishment of a more appropriate framework for the search for solutions than that of plenary meetings. That is why the Romanian delegation supports the creation of a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with the relevant rules of the rules of procedure for the effective discharge of the Committee's tasks in connection with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We believe that such a decision would make it possible to deal with all the specific proposals which have been submitted to the Committee concerning the halting of nuclear weapon production, the prohibition of the use of such weapons and other measures designed to reduce the risks of a nuclear war started either deliberately or by accident, error or miscalculation. Furthermore, it would provide an appropriate framework for the discussion of general questions arising from the adoption of specific measures in the nuclear field, and for keeping Member States of the Committee informed about the nuclear negotiations taking place in other forums.

As the Romanian delegation has frequently emphasized the establishment of subsidiary bodies is not an aim in itself for the Committee. But in view of the present state of nuclear arsenals and the conditions of grave tension affecting international relations, we believe that a decision to establish a subsidiary body on the subject of nuclear disarmament could have a considerable impact, by showing the political will of all of us to co-operate and to negotiate, lucidly and realistically, in a constructive spirit, and with respect for the interests of all countries.

It goes without saying that the launching of negotiations in the Working Group on a nuclear test ban, a vital element in the strategy for halting the improvement and development of nuclear weapons, will be an important test for the Committee on Disarmament. The appeal made this very morning by the distinguished representative of Japan made a very great impression on us. For the moment, I shall confine myself to stating once again my delegation's support for the urgent conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests.

The prohibition of chemical weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- is undoubtedly a priority area this year. Without now going into the substance of the discussions on this matter, I should like to stress my delegation's support for intense and constructive activity in the Working Group which is presided over with such devotion and dynamism by our colleague, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

for peace on the part of the broad masses. We believe that, with a view to safeguarding peace and preventing nuclear war, it is necessary to identify the source of the threat to international peace and the security of countries before effective measures can be instituted to check the arms race and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. At present, the two major nuclear powers are engaged in a fierce arms race to seek for nuclear superiority, and are intensifying their deployment and preparations for a nuclear war. Under such circumstances, the threat of nuclear war can be lessened only if these two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals cease forthwith their arms race and reduce substantially their nuclear weapons. Proceeding from this fundamental principle, the Chinese delegation put forward concrete proposals at the second special session, the main content of one of which is to call on the Soviet Union and the United States to cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacturing of any kind of nuclear weapons and reduce by 50 per cent all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Thereafter, all nuclear-weapon States should cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and reduce their respective nuclear arsenals according to agreed proportions and procedures.

Judging from the present state of nuclear armaments in the world, the key to disarmament today lies in the cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and their reduction by the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals, which measures we could call, for the sake of brevity, "three cessations and one reduction". Since they both possess the capacity for overkill, a mere cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons cannot bring about any reduction in the huge nuclear arsenals in their possession and, consequently, would be of no help in diminishing the threat of nuclear war. Only when the "three cessations" are carried out in conjunction with the "one reduction", will the nuclear threat be diminished.

As a nuclear-weapon State, China is also prepared to assume disarmament obligations. After the two Superpowers have carried out the "three cessations and one reduction" and narrowed the gap between themselves and the other nuclear-weapon States, China will be ready to join all other nuclear-weapon States in assuming the obligation of the cessation of the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and to join in a reduction leading ultimately to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We are in favour of the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament as proposed by many countries in the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, we hope that the United States and the USSR will conduct their nuclear talks in a serious and responsible manner, so that their negotiations will result in agreements truly conducive to the curbing of the nuclear arms race and to the reduction of nuclear weapons.

II. The prohibition of chemical weapons has all along been a question of deep concern to the people of all countries. During the spring session, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons made some progress in its work. Its Chairman submitted document CD/CW/WP.33, which contains a summary of the deliberations of the group in recent years. This will facilitate further negotiations. Certain concrete technical results achieved by the expert group on toxicity determination will undoubtedly be of help also to the work of the Committee.

Starting on 20 July, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has held in-depth discussions and earnest consultations on the existing divergences and on ways to resolve them. A number of delegations, including the Chinese delegation, have put forward specific proposals in a positive and constructive spirit.

China has consistently been opposed to the use of chemical weapons for massacring people. We are in favour of effective international investigation into reported cases of the use of chemical weapons. We advocate the speedy elaboration of a convention through negotiation, providing for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, so as to eliminate once and for all the threat they pose to mankind. The Chinese delegation will contribute its efforts to this task.

III. The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The threat to world peace and security posed by the development of weapons used in outer space is causing increasing concern among the world community. The two superpowers are sparing no expense in the development of military technology for use in outer space, and the arms race between them is steadily extending to outer space. As is known, at present only the two superpowers have the means to test, deploy and use weapons in outer space, and it stands to reason that they should undertake the responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. People should be vigilant against the practice in some quarters of paying lip service to "the peaceful use of outer space" while actually stepping up the development of various types of weapons used in outer space.

China firmly advocates that outer space be used for peaceful purposes and for the good of all mankind and strongly opposes the arms race in outer space, which endangers peace and security. Consequently, it stands for the prohibition of all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons. We are in favour of the establishment of a working group on this subject. With regard to the mandate of this working group, it should, in our view, be the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of outer space weapons.

IV. The question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. Faced with the increasing nuclear threat, the non-nuclear-weapon States at the second special session once again voiced their strong demand that nuclear-weapon States should immediately and unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, pending the realization of nuclear disarmament. This demand of theirs is fully justified. The Chinese delegation to the session reiterated that China unconditionally undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope that the major nuclear powers will no longer cling to their respective narrow self-interests so that conditions will be created to enable the Working Group to continue with its meaningful work.

V. The question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We appreciate the efforts by many non-aligned countries for the formulation of a CPD, which went on until the last moment of the second special session. We wish also to express our admiration for the talent and devotion of the Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the chairmen of the drafting groups at the special session. The Chinese delegation, having participated in the whole process of the negotiations on a comprehensive programme, fully understands the sentiments of disappointment and dissatisfaction felt by the non-aligned countries about the failure to reach agreement on a CPD at the second special session. We share the view expressed by some delegations that, if the countries with the greatest responsibilities for disarmament still lack the political will, it would be useless for the

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

But the urgency of the problem should not make us adopt an over-hasty solution -- on the contrary. It would serve no purpose to embark prematurely on the drafting of a text which on many points would be a mere juxtaposition of statements of different positions; these positions must first be given thorough examination and efforts must be made to see how far they may be compatible with one another.

Among recent proposals made on the subject of chemical weapons, my delegation noted with the utmost interest those put forward at the second special session on disarmament by Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and reproduced in a document submitted last month to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. A number of questions have been put to the Soviet delegation on the subject of that proposal and there will no doubt be others; the French delegation will undoubtedly wish to ask for clarifications on a number of points. Those questions and the Soviet Union's replies to them are of interest to the Committee as a whole, and the exchange will make a contribution of the highest importance to the consideration of the substantive problems that remain to be solved. Only when those substantive problems have been examined will it be possible to judge how far the drafting of a composite text would be useful to the progress of our work this year.

Among those problems, none is more essential than that of verification. In fact, only effective verification of each party's fulfilment of its undertakings can guarantee that the convention on chemical weapons will increase the security of all.

We consider that the system of verification to be established by the convention should be based essentially on international verification. We regard acceptance of such a system as the criterion of the political will to conclude the convention and to carry out its commitments in good faith.

With regard to the working groups on radiological weapons and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it seems to us, as to other delegations, that they can be left in abeyance during the summer session. We should, however, be very happy if informal consultations conducted by their chairmen yielded some progress.

The last item on our agenda -- the new item, on the subject of outer space -- has already given rise to statements of substance. Many delegations, including our own, are in favour of the establishment of a working group. We are also in favour of the starting of consultations on the terms of the mandate of such a group. We should also like discussions on the substance of the question to continue so as to shed more light on the various aspects of this very complex issue.

Lastly, the Committee must, in accordance with the conclusions adopted at the second special session, report to the General Assembly at its next session on a possible enlargement of its membership. Consultations on this subject ought therefore to be initiated among us very soon. The French delegation will approach them with a very open mind; it takes a sympathetic view of the candidatures submitted by countries which have a sincere interest in disarmament negotiations and some of which have already made a substantial contribution to our work.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Thirdly, on radiological weapons we have reached a stalemate. My delegation considers that the so-called "traditional" track could still usefully be pursued to its conclusion, and that the other track should be developed as well, perhaps on law-of-war lines. We do not have particular ambitions or expectations in this area though we believe a convention or conventions on both aspects are achievable. We have tended to favour a radiological weapons convention more as useful practice for the Committee on Disarmament -- to demonstrate that it can produce something if it really tries.

Of the remaining agenda items, a ban on chemical weapons clearly is the best immediate hope for the Committee. If, in the foreseeable future, a convention could be elaborated here at Geneva this would practically in itself justify the existence of this Committee. It is not an impossible, merely a complex, task. We are already proceeding on sound lines, negotiating effectively, bringing in technical expertise as necessary and, above all, we are unanimous on the final goal. We should not fail to give the required time and resources to the task.

Our number one agenda item, a nuclear test ban, is entering a new phase. We should exercise some self-restraint on this issue. Having achieved the establishment of a Working Group we should not shoot for the moon. The mandate we have is restricted, but not unduly so. There is a very great deal that can be achieved within the prescription on which we have agreed. It would be to our credit if our first report to the General Assembly was along the lines that we had drawn on the existing work, done in many different forums, and set a sound basis for future work. If we were able to concentrate in these first stages on verification, we should be in all the better a position to argue for a broader mandate in coming sessions. I note in particular the related seismic work on verification done in the Group of Scientific Experts and urge all delegations to give this work particular support, preferably by active participation.

The other new item on our agenda, outer space, is similarly ready for serious consideration with fresh minds. Whether we should move straight into debate on the need for a working group is a moot point. My delegation would prefer that we first lay the basis for that step by identifying the potential areas for useful activity since we do not have a great body of existing work in this field to draw on. It is an important and a vast subject; it is a subject of considerable future potential for disarmament and it will need careful handling on our part.

I have not gone into all the possible questions that our agenda encompasses. I have avoided the issue of nuclear disarmament, partly because of a personal preference to leave something which has escaped all compromise in this forum to be given more of a chance in new bilateral forums. We could perhaps review the issues in more detail early in our 1983 session. Similarly I should like to see us begin looking at conventional disarmament some time, but since there are several priority tasks which command the attention of this brief session that topic, too, might be left to another year.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

To promote the start of actual negotiations in this Committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty my delegation submitted, during the spring session, a draft mandate for a working group on this topic. Unfortunately, owing to the attitude of some countries, it was not possible to agree on an all-embracing mandate directed at actual negotiations. In a spirit of compromise my delegation in April joined the consensus on a mandate which fell rather short of our expectations, and not only ours. In my statement of 21 April I already outlined my delegation's interpretation of this mandate. It is our hope that the new Ad Hoc Working Group, by examining all specific issues as well as relevant comprehensive proposals with regard to a nuclear test ban, will give fresh impetus to the initiation of real negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, thus enabling the Committee on Disarmament to discharge its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, as was stated in the mandate mentioned. My delegation intends, in the future course of this session, to put forward specific suggestions concerning the activities of the new Working Group on item 1 of our agenda.

The resumption and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations which have been suspended would very much improve the conditions for the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within our Committee. We therefore join all those delegations which called upon the United States and the United Kingdom to declare their readiness to take such a step. It is our hope that the negative reply given recently by the President of one major nuclear-weapon power will not be that country's last word with regard to this issue.

At the beginning of this year's session a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was agreed upon. Some headway was made in our negotiations during the spring session.

At the second special session on disarmament, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, like many others, welcomed the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention. This initiative takes into account the views of other countries, especially with regard to verification, and clearly shows the firm intention of the USSR to facilitate a breakthrough in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and to bring them to a successful conclusion. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to the efforts undertaken in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, directed towards achieving tangible progress in elaborating a draft treaty. We express our hope that substantial results in the drafting of the elements of a convention will be reached in the foreseeable future.

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could be promoted by some urgent measures designed to bring about a cessation of the qualitative improvement of chemical weapons as well as their geographical spread. It was for that reason that the German Democratic Republic at the second special session on disarmament, proposed that States should refrain from any action which could impede the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In particular States were urged

To refrain from the production, stockpiling and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and

Not to deploy chemical weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

My delegation looks forward to reactions to these proposals in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

To promote the start of actual negotiations in this Committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty my delegation submitted, during the spring session, a draft mandate for a working group on this topic. Unfortunately, owing to the attitude of some countries, it was not possible to agree on an all-embracing mandate directed at actual negotiations. In a spirit of compromise my delegation in April joined the consensus on a mandate which fell rather short of our expectations, and not only ours. In my statement of 21 April I already outlined my delegation's interpretation of this mandate. It is our hope that the new Ad Hoc Working Group, by examining all specific issues as well as relevant comprehensive proposals with regard to a nuclear test ban, will give fresh impetus to the initiation of real negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, thus enabling the Committee on Disarmament to discharge its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, as was stated in the mandate mentioned. My delegation intends, in the future course of this session, to put forward specific suggestions concerning the activities of the new Working Group on item 1 of our agenda.

The resumption and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations which have been suspended would very much improve the conditions for the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within our Committee. We therefore join all those delegations which called upon the United States and the United Kingdom to declare their readiness to take such a step. It is our hope that the negative reply given recently by the President of one major nuclear-weapon power will not be that country's last word with regard to this issue.

At the beginning of this year's session a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was agreed upon. Some headway was made in our negotiations during the spring session.

At the second special session on disarmament, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, like many others, welcomed the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention. This initiative takes into account the views of other countries, especially with regard to verification, and clearly shows the firm intention of the USSR to facilitate a breakthrough in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and to bring them to a successful conclusion. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to the efforts undertaken in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, directed towards achieving tangible progress in elaborating a draft treaty. We express our hope that substantial results in the drafting of the elements of a convention will be reached in the foreseeable future.

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could be promoted by some urgent measures designed to bring about a cessation of the qualitative improvement of chemical weapons as well as their geographical spread. It was for that reason that the German Democratic Republic at the second special session on disarmament, proposed that States should refrain from any action which could impede the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In particular States were urged

To refrain from the production, stockpiling and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and

Not to deploy chemical weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

A great deal of effort has been invested in, and progress made toward the conclusion of a treaty banning radiological weapons. In fact, this measure is nearer completion than any other before this body. At our last session, the able Chairman of the radiological weapons Working Group devised a method of work which seemed to my delegation to offer hope for the conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty. My delegation has been among those which have questioned the necessity of entering into negotiations on the protection of nuclear facilities -- and we have been critical of delegations which have blocked our progress on the conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty pending the resolution of the nuclear facilities issue.

The time has come to assess this situation with more realism. We believe that the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons is in our interest, and in the broader interest of mankind. At the same time, we fully understand the concern of those who have advocated negotiations on the further protection of nuclear facilities. We, therefore, have come to this session prepared to participate vigorously and constructively in discussions on this issue. We remain unconvinced of the linkage between radiological weapons and the nuclear facilities issue. But we are prepared to engage ourselves seriously on the merits of the issues, and will not stand in the way of any reasonable procedure which facilitates substantial progress.

At this session, some have advocated the establishment of a working group to deal with the issue of outer space. Many among these advocates confess limited knowledge of this complex and highly technical subject and see the working group as a means to educate us. My delegation supports an examination of the outer space issues by this Committee. Substantive discussions can serve to focus the issues and provide an informed basis for any future consideration. Only minimal discussion of the outer space issue has taken place in the Committee and we have not even heard preliminary views from some delegations.

My delegation remains unconvinced that the establishment of a working group would be the wisest course for us at this time. We would, however, strongly support a number of formal or informal plenary sessions being devoted to the subject of outer space. Only after a full airing of all delegations' views and a great deal of substantive preparation can we begin to focus our efforts.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been meeting since 20 July. My delegation has participated actively and energetically in the chemical weapons deliberations, and we will continue to do so. We place an extremely high priority on the achievement of a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons, as evidence continues to mount regarding the use of prohibited toxin weapons in South-East Asia and chemical warfare against freedom fighters in Afghanistan, it is imperative that major emphasis be placed on making progress in this field, especially in defining and agreeing upon the necessary measures of verification and compliance.

My Government listened with interest to the statement by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at the second special session regarding verification of a chemical weapons convention, and we have carefully scrutinized the draft proposals which he laid before that body. We hope the Soviet Union will explain what lies behind some of the very general language which it has presented. Unfortunately,

(Mr. Fields, United States)

that has not as yet been done, we have been disappointed by the reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to engage in serious discussions, or to respond to substantive inquiries with respect to their proposals. I will speak at our Thursday meeting in more detail regarding chemical weapons and intend at that time to elaborate further on our views as to how rapid progress can be made toward the achievement of a convention.

I have not spoken about all the issues before the Committee, not because of any wilful neglect, or lack of interest, but rather for the sake of brevity, I shall, in future statements set forth my delegation's views on other issues and amplify my remarks today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Romania, His Excellency Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): My statement today will be devoted to the subject of chemical weapons which, according to the programme of work we have adopted, is the topic for our discussions this week.

The work which has been done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons since 20 July 1982 and the meetings held, with the participation of experts, on certain selected topics prompt some comments from my delegation on the present stage and the future prospects of our negotiations on this topic.

I should like first of all to stress the fact that our discussions have revealed a general desire to achieve results on the subject of this terrifying weapon of mass destruction which exists in the military arsenals of certain States.

In addition to the compilation of concrete suggestions in this connection contained in document CD/CW/WP.33 we now have the constructive proposal submitted by the Soviet Union (in document CD/294) for the Basic Provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Furthermore, other concrete proposals are constantly being put forward by various delegations, in the form of working papers or suggestions made in the course of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

We believe that at this stage of our negotiations, we should concentrate our efforts on reaching at least broad agreement on the basic provisions of the future convention.

Since, as the recent special session of the General Assembly indicated, a certain political will towards this end exists, since there is no lack of concrete proposals and since substantial preparatory work has already been done over recent years, we believe that the necessary conditions exist for bringing to the United Nations General Assembly real results in the matter of the elaboration of a convention outlawing chemical weapons.

We ought therefore to give particular attention to the main areas of disagreement.

With your permission, I would like to dwell today on the question of the purpose of the future convention, one of the difficulties we are facing in our negotiations.

As you know, my delegation has always favoured the conclusion of a convention having a broad sphere of application and offering the best guarantees for the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States. It is this basic position which has guided us in studying the proposals for the inclusion of the non-use of chemical weapons and the concept of chemical warfare capability among the prohibitions which are to form the subject of the convention.

I do not wish to put forward any new arguments for or against these ideas, and in any case, I believe that the time for doing so is past. The delegations concerned have already done so. I would simply like to submit a few comments on them on behalf of my delegation.

The idea of prohibiting chemical warfare capability is obviously prompted by the desire to achieve a broad and effective prohibition -- a concern shared by my delegation, as indeed, I believe, by all of us. This idea nevertheless raises certain difficulties, both from the conceptual point of view and as regards its practical verification. We believe that thinking of it in terms of future application, after the convention has been in force for a certain time, might perhaps offer a solution.

As for the use of chemical weapons and their express prohibition in first Element of the future convention, we believe that the opposing views are too well known to need repeating here.

As we see it, however, two points have been emphasized by all delegations. The first is that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the convention we are now negotiating are two legal instruments linked by the very fact that they both deal with chemical weapons. The second is that any use of chemical weapons will clearly constitute a violation of the convention we are negotiating, which will prohibit the parties from developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring chemical weapons and at the same time require them to destroy stocks and dismantle facilities.

My delegation believes that these two points offer a basis for reaching a compromise between the contrary views expressed, so permitting us to move forward in our work.

One possible way of proceeding which we would like to put before the Committee for its consideration is the following:

(a) To complete the first Element of the convention without including a reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons;

(b) To include in the preamble to the convention a paragraph referring to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirming the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and to include in Element VII another reference to the Geneva Protocol stating that the convention should not be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States on the basis of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

(c) To introduce a new article into the convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons constitutes a violation of the convention and that therefore the provisions concerning verification of the future convention will apply also to such situations.

As I said, this is a possible way of proceeding; if delegations could accept it, I think that it would provide a solution to a very important problem that is as yet unresolved.

My last comments concern technical matters, which are playing a larger and larger part in our work. The consultations with the participation of experts which took place last week on technical questions relating to the determination of the toxicity of certain chemical agents and verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons were useful in providing clarifications and precisions which will facilitate our work.

With regard to the application of the toxicity criterion to other harmful chemicals it seems to us that the consultations have shown fairly clearly that there are at present no adequate methods for determining incapacitating and other harmful effects. This being so, we believe that for the purposes of the future convention the best solution might be to draw up a purely illustrative list of some chemical agents falling within this category.

We have still not succeeded in formulating a satisfactory definition of the "precursors" of chemical agents. In view of the difficulties of applying the toxicity criterion in this case, we believe that here again, the drawing up of a list of the "principal precursors" is a solution to be considered.

Obviously, the technical problems relating to monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons are extremely complex. As the consultations with the participation of experts made clear, we are only at the beginning of this process. As negotiations in the Working Group proceed, with the help of the experts, further efforts with a view to elaborating the technical methods needed in this area are proving to be necessary.

Those are the observations my delegation wished to make at this stage of our negotiations on chemical weapons, and the suggestions we wanted to put before the Committee. I would like to assure you again, Mr. Chairman, as also your colleague, Ambassador Sujka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that as in the past the Romanian delegation will spare no effort to contribute to the progress of our work.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Polish delegation I welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. I am fully convinced that under your able and skilful guidance this Committee will use all the opportunities offered to make a step forward in the fulfilment of its responsible tasks which the whole international community is closely following. I should like to assure you on behalf of my delegation you can count on our full co-operation and assistance in your responsible task.

For your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Yoshio Okawa of Japan, I have always had very sincere respect -- and I am happy to repeat it at this moment again -- for his valuable contribution to the work done by the Committee at its spring session.

It is also my great pleasure to welcome among us the representative of a brotherly socialist country and my immediate neighbour at this table, Ambassador Datcu of Romania.

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, this week is to be devoted to the subject of chemical weapons, my intervention today will be concentrated mainly on this particular agenda item.

My delegation has followed with great interest all the interventions in plenary meetings of this Committee devoted to chemical weapons. With the same undiminished attention we shall follow interventions which are going to be pronounced on the said agenda item. It is encouraging to note that all delegations which took the floor before me declared their readiness to recognize the priority character and primary significance of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I would like to express my conviction that these very favourable declarations will be followed by concrete contributions to the elaboration of compromise formulations in the quite many controversial issues which the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has on its negotiating table. The Committee on Disarmament being at present the only forum for negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, it has an exceptional role to play if both members and non-members alike have the will to reach an agreement on a complete elimination of this weapon of mass destruction as early as expected by the international community and as early as necessary in order to remove this weapon from military arsenals and from scientific laboratories.

The question of the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons is clearly stated in the Group's mandate the pertinent portion of which I should like to quote once more: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date ...". Numerous resolutions of consecutive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly are equally clear in their letter and spirit in this respect. A strong note on the earliest possible elaboration of a convention resounded during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. If we take into account the above on the one hand and the growing danger of a chemical arms race, also a qualitative one, on the other, we must realize that we find ourselves at a crossroads from which one way leads to an accelerated chemical arms race. We do not want to follow it. But there is another way, the way of peaceful, quite negotiations on the cessation of the arms race in chemical weapons and the

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

destruction of their stockpiles and means of their production. This is the way we want to follow. I am persuaded that the Soviet proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" shows such a way. It is, therefore, only natural that the Soviet "Basic provisions" have been universally recognized as a considerable impulse to the acceleration of serious negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our considered view, the Soviet document covers all existing proposals and, at the same time, goes further to make very many new ones; it also dispels doubts that have been heard, inter alia, in this Committee. In other words, we have at present great possibilities for gaining momentum in the negotiations and, responding to the appeals for the elaboration of a convention, we ought to use this opportunity to have its draft elaborated.

It is exactly to this end that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its regular meetings on 20 July and continues its work with quite an intensive pace.

As this year's Chairman of the said Working Group, I wish to emphasize, first of all, the excellent atmosphere which is maintained by all delegations participating in the work on a convention at the present stage. I am glad to inform this Committee that in the more than 10 meetings which the Chemical Weapons Group has held between 20 July and today, we have been able to discuss in considerable detail, on both a formal and an informal basis, practically all questions and issues on the future convention. Very many more consultations were held by six informal contact groups which are continuing their efforts to elaborate specific compromise provisions. In addition to the above, consultations of the delegations with the participation of experts, on certain technical issues related to a chemical weapons convention were held over the last full working week. To complete the description of the Group's activities, let me inform the Committee that the six informal groups I have just mentioned are doing their homework in the following spheres of the future convention:

The question of the inclusion or not of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons;

Definitions of numerous technical terms to be used in the convention;

General provisions on verification;

Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production;

Declarations of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of their production; plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes and time-frames as well as forms for making such declarations;

Other remaining issues, inter alia, the convention's preamble, its relationship with other treaties, international co-operation in the implementation of the convention and its entry into force, as well as many other legal aspects.

The open-minded informal discussions on the complex problem of verification machinery for a future convention have revealed that the Working Group would favour the elaboration of one article containing general provisions on verification

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, His Excellency Ambassador Onkelinx.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I do not think it would be very useful in this Committee and at this stage of our work, to make a statement which would seek to establish responsibilities and to draw general lessons from the situation which prevailed at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Nevertheless, I think that the possibilities offered by multilateral negotiations on disarmament matters are now clearer, as compared with the multilateral deliberative approach which, it must be recognized, has produced virtually no concrete results apart from the hardly won and, in a sense, fragile achievement of 1978. Since the resumption of our session we have heard many statements, some of them polemical and at times aggressive in tone. We do not think that the latter constitute useful contributions to our work. It is more imperative than ever that each of us, far from engaging in polemics, should ask himself what is the best way of advancing our discussions, particularly on the priority items on our agenda.

For it is of the utmost urgency that the Committee on Disarmament should demonstrate its capacity to negotiate and to produce concrete results.

Negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- the item recommended for our discussions in plenary this week -- constitute, for the immediate future, the most appropriate way of making such a demonstration, for the following reasons:

The problem is a vital one, affecting the security of all;

The Committee is unanimous in its will to draft such a convention, and we have just heard Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Working Group, give us his views and tell us of the good atmosphere which is at present prevailing in his Group;

The various parameters for such negotiations have now been clearly defined; and

New proposals have been made, particularly by the USSR, which deserve careful study.

My country attaches great importance to the speedy conclusion of these negotiations, and we hope that the Committee will be able to make the necessary procedural arrangements for devoting all the time necessary to this work, if need be going beyond the closing date of this session.

Several important conceptual problems remain to be settled. One of them, to which I would like to limit my statement today, concerns whether or not the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of the convention. It was to this same subject that Ambassador Dăescu devoted a large part of his statement, and I listened to him with interest. We know the arguments relating to the two theses, and I shall not repeat them.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The Working Group has certainly made progress in its attempt to find alternative formulas to these two approaches. In conducting this exercise we have been able to see the close link that exists between the scope of the convention we are elaborating, the prohibitions set forth in the Geneva Protocol, and verification of compliance with the prohibition of use.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol was the basis of a lengthy undertaking aimed at the complete prohibition of all chemical and bacteriological weapons. In the provisions of the Protocol itself, the prohibition of use was intended to cover all chemical and bacteriological weapons. A problem would be created if a new regime relating to use were introduced solely for chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons being left aside. In this connection it is noteworthy that the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons carefully avoided saying anything about the prohibition of use, merely recalling, in its preamble, the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. Furthermore, a certain symmetry has been observed so far in the elaboration of measures aimed at the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thus, after a period of joint negotiation on the two questions, the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons prescribed, in its article IX, the continuation of the negotiations only on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. There is no reference in the article to the prohibition of their use. We have to bear this symmetry in mind if we wish to organize the regime of prohibition emerging from the Geneva Protocol in the broadest manner possible.

Verification of compliance with the prohibition of use also raises a number of questions. We think that the development of such a mechanism, both for bacteriological and for chemical weapons, would meet a requirement felt by the international community, since its absence has been the cause of many disputes and of much friction between States over the past decades. The modalities of such verification must be specific to the matter prohibited. Thus the provisions in this respect must be different from those relating to verification of the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling, as well as those relating to destruction. It is also becoming apparent that, in view of the interrelationship between the subjects and the symmetry between the regimes for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, this type of verification should be aimed at ensuring compliance with the prohibition of the use of both categories of weapons at the same time.

The link between scope and verification in the context of a single instrument is also something to be thought about. For it would be difficult to include in a convention on chemical weapons a system of verification which would apply to prohibitions not explicitly mentioned in the convention.

These are the main considerations which underlie the initiative taken by Belgium at the special session when it submitted a memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We are now submitting this text to the Committee in document CD/301/CD/CW/WP.39, in the hope that this initiative will help us in our joint effort to find a solution to the problem of the use of chemical weapons.

I shall refrain from describing the contents of the document. I should simply like to emphasize its basic objectives.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The first objective is to make good the gaps in the 1925 Protocol by proposing a verification mechanism which would apply to all situations of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in combat. We would at the same time also settle the debate on the scope of the Protocol by providing that the prohibition relating to use covers all chemical and bacteriological weapons, not only in time of war but more generally in combat.

The second objective is to resolve the problem posed by the question of use with respect to the convention on chemical weapons.

And lastly, the third objective is to provide for a flexible mechanism which could be agreed on quickly and enter into force even before the convention on chemical weapons. The composition of the proposed advisory committee (at the present stage all the States parties to the 1925 Protocol and to the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons) and the conditions for entry into force (a very small number of ratifications, we believe) as we envisage them, are such as to permit the system very quickly to begin functioning.

The mechanism we have in mind could take the form of an instrument sui generis, whose links with existing instruments -- the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons -- as well as with the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons, could be clearly and easily described.

I have expressed the hope that this initiative will in particular, help us in our joint efforts in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope in this way to stimulate the search for an option which may be able to satisfy the supporters of the two opposing theses and which may also prove useful at the level of international law.

My delegation will, of course, be ready to provide, particularly in the Working Group, any clarifications which may be desired with regard to this document.

I have deliberately chosen to confine this statement to one particular item on the Committee's agenda out of a desire to help advance our work. The Committee's effectiveness would gain much if all delegations were to refrain, in future, from reaffirming political positions known to everyone, from making accusations, and from resorting to charges of ill faith.

Our work must not at any time be transformed into a mere forum for impressing the outside world. The international community would probably be more convinced of the role of the Committee on Disarmament if the Committee were to give it more often some evidence of the real efforts which we are all willing to make to try to reach concrete agreements.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, I would like at the outset to extend the congratulations of my delegation to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of August. We are confident that your wise counsel and vast diplomatic experience will contribute to the furtherance of the Committee's

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

This is where the importance of this session of the Committee on Disarmament lies. We are entering a stage where new efforts should be made with more vigour, while at the same time far-sightedness coupled with objectivity should be our guide. Our summer session will be a relatively short one. It is imperative, therefore, that the Committee should work with a deep sense of urgency and priority.

Progress should not be unduly hindered or jeopardized by the misuse of the notion of consensus on procedural questions. The Indonesian delegation is of the view that the Committee should immediately start its real work on the highest priority item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", by setting up a working group. We strongly believe that nuclear disarmament is not the concern solely of those who own nuclear weapons and arsenals, but is indeed the major concern of mankind as a whole. This has been amply demonstrated by the increasingly manifest world opinion shared by growing numbers of people in many parts of the world. It is certainly incorrect to believe that the fate of mankind should be subjected to the political expedencies of certain powers. The working group, when it is established, will have a useful document contained in CD/116 dated 9 July 1980 proposed by the Group of 21, on the basis of which it could start its work. In this connection, the Indian proposal on the prevention of nuclear war, in the opinion of my delegation, is indeed of the utmost importance inasmuch as its thrust has a direct bearing on our common survival. This subject could well be taken up as a priority item in the proposed working group. We feel that it is already time to abandon the practice of dealing with item 2 of our agenda through informal meetings. Experience has shown us that this procedure is inadequate and leads us nowhere.

Another important item that the Committee should focus on during the summer session is that of chemical weapons. The work done by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the two weeks before the start of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland deserves our appreciation. Through informal working arrangements and by dealing with each of the elements of the package under discussion in different small groups, assisted by the positive atmosphere prevailing in the discussions, the Working Group has made some progress that could lead the Group to proceed further towards the objective of drawing up a draft convention on chemical weapons. It is certainly our common duty and responsibility to ensure that during this summer session the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be able to make further headway so that it may live up to our expectations. And one way of doing this is by encouraging small groups and informal consultations which have proved to be useful during the pre-session consultations as I indicated earlier.

One of the important results of our spring session is the establishment of the Working Group on a nuclear test ban. Needless to say my delegation, for one, is anxious to see the Working Group commence its substantive work as soon as possible. We all have to make serious efforts to overcome the difficulties that seem to stand in the way. The findings which have been made so far by the seismic experts Group should, in the view of my delegation, contribute to the solution of the problems in the matter of verification. But the most important thing is how to translate these technical findings into a political consensus. In this connection it might be useful to recall the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that "all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement" (CD/86).

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Burma, the United Kingdom and India.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, at the plenary session on Tuesday I emphasized the importance my Government attaches to the subject of chemical weapons. On 8 February of this year President Reagan stated that "the ultimate goal of US policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons". Today I wish to comment on the current status of our efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a chemical weapons ban and also to give the views of my delegation as to what is required if progress is to be made. I will also outline the general points which we believe should form the basis of a chemical weapons convention.

Our meeting today is one of the two plenary meetings dealing with a chemical weapons ban. Since the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has already been in session for more than three weeks, it provides a good opportunity to take stock of the Committee's efforts to elaborate a chemical weapons convention. And, since a significant amount of time remains this summer for further work, we have the opportunity to check our progress and make mid-course corrections, if necessary.

Although my delegation is disappointed at the over-all pace and organization of our work, the chemical weapons Working Group is entering upon a more intensive and productive phase. The decision to resume discussions on chemical weapons two weeks before the Committee itself reconvened was clearly a wise one. It enabled the members of the Working Group to devote more time and energy to the subject than is possible once the regular session begins. A certain momentum was achieved under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka during those two weeks, which my delegation hopes will continue through the entire session.

For the first time, the Working Group has acted to deal with some of the key problems which must be resolved if a convention is to become a reality. The creation of so-called "homework groups" to discuss specific problems and to identify possible approaches to overcoming them is a step in the right direction. Also, for the first time the consultations with technical experts have tackled some of the major technical issues related to verification. I had the pleasure of attending one of their sessions on verification and destruction and found the interest high and the proceedings business-like.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

A number of delegations have made important and interesting proposals regarding a chemical weapons ban in the Committee this year. Last spring, the delegations of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany presented detailed working papers on the subject of verification (CD/244 and CD/265). The Soviet document containing "basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention (CD/294) is potentially useful in our discussions.

These are the positive elements. However, much remains to be done, and my delegation is not entirely satisfied with the Committee's work on chemical weapons so far this summer.

My delegation came prepared to do serious business. This has been difficult because a number of delegations, including several particularly influential ones, apparently wish to avoid dealing with the key obstacles to the elaboration of a convention. Although most delegations are pressing to come to grips with the fundamental verification and compliance issues, a few still try to divert attention to less important questions. Unless this difficulty can be overcome and the Committee can proceed to deal with the key verification and compliance issues in a concrete, task-by-task manner, as I proposed here last March, we will not get very far.

Serious business has also been frustrated because the position of the Soviet delegation on verification and compliance issues remains unclear. We have heard that their delegation has new flexibility regarding on-site inspection provisions, an area crucial to real progress in this Working Group. We have been looking forward to receiving a clear explanation of how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in meeting the verification concerns expressed by my delegation and many others. We were disappointed that such elaboration of the Soviet position was not presented when working paper CD/294 was tabled. But we are hopeful that such explanations will be forthcoming soon, so that the Committee can take them into consideration in its work this summer. For our part, we are ready to deal seriously with any and all constructive proposals regarding verification, whether from the Soviet delegation or any other.

Finally, our work has been hampered because of the complexity of the Committee's agenda. For many delegates, the subject of chemical weapons is only one of many issues with which they must deal. We can understand and sympathize with these delegations but we must utilize the time available for work on chemical weapons in the most efficient manner. We are prepared to explore new procedures which will allow the work on a chemical weapons ban to proceed as rapidly as possible.

As a specific suggestion, my delegation believes that more effective use should be made of technical experts. For example, the most recent series of technical consultations has demonstrated that attempting to compress the consultations into one week is ineffectual. Since most experts are in Geneva for at least two weeks, consideration should be given to scheduling adequate time for in-depth discussion of issues directly relevant to the efforts of the Working Group. We should expect concrete results from these discussions.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

This morning, as I have done on other occasions, I want to emphasize the serious attitude of the United States toward achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I have in the past stressed the importance which is attached to such a ban at the highest levels of our Government.

We are active in all aspects of the Working Group's efforts. We have augmented our delegation. We have brought a number of specialists to Geneva for the consultations with technical experts. And we have made and will continue to make creative proposals for dealing with the important verification questions. But in this day and age of inflated rhetoric some scepticism apparently remains about our true intentions. Our goal should be clear to all. It is the goal established by President Reagan --- to achieve a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons.

Let me outline now some general points which we believe should serve as a basis for an effective agreement.

The scope of any future agreement should prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemicals, munitions and equipment for chemical weapons purposes. Certain other activities and capabilities which contribute to an offensive chemical weapons capability should be prohibited. In addition, the agreement should ban any assistance or encouragement to others to obtain or produce chemicals or munitions for chemical weapons purposes.

In our view, the agreement should cover super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, and precursors of such chemicals. We do not believe it necessary to include herbicides or riot control agents.

A general purpose criterion should be incorporated in the agreement, along with specific toxicity criteria to supplement such a criterion.

One of the key disputes in the Working Group is whether or not to include a ban on the use of chemical weapons. The United States supports in principle the banning of any use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. At the same time we believe that care must be taken to avoid undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Therefore, we believe consideration should be given to including in a convention a reaffirmation of the Protocol and of supplementary undertakings. Furthermore, we believe that the verification and compliance provisions should allow for a fact-finding inquiry into alleged uses of chemical weapons.

Let me turn now to issues relating to the declaration and elimination of stockpiles and facilities. The declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production and filling facilities should provide base-lines for monitoring purposes. Thus, any agreement should mandate prompt, detailed declaration of any chemicals, munitions and specially designed equipment in chemical weapons stockpiles. The agreement should also mandate prompt and

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

detailed declaration of any facilities designed or used for the production of any chemical which is primarily used for chemical weapons purposes or for filling chemical munitions. Such facilities should be declared even if they are or were dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for other purposes, such as civilian production. Declarations of stockpiles should include the chemical name and quantity of agent, munitions, equipment possessed, and the exact stockpile location. Declaration of production and filling facilities should include the nature of each facility, its capacity and exact location.

In this area the agreement should also provide for confirming declarations of stocks and facilities, for immediate and verifiable closure of facilities, and a ban on construction of any new facilities. Declared stockpiles and facilities should be destroyed over a ten-year period according to an agreed schedule and agreed procedures.

The agreement should also provide for agreed controls under which the declared chemicals with legitimate peaceful applications could be used for such purposes.

As the Committee is already well aware, my Government places particular emphasis on effective verification provisions. To be acceptable to the United States, the verification provisions of a chemical weapons convention must provide confidence that other parties are complying with all provisions of the convention. For the foreseeable future such confidence cannot be obtained by national technical means alone. In some situations, mandatory, extensive and carefully-specified on-site inspection will be needed. A chemical weapons convention will therefore require a verification system based on a combination of national and international measures. Included in international measures must be provisions for systematic international on-site inspection.

In particular we believe that there should be agreement in advance in the convention that the following activities, as a minimum, shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification:

Destruction of declared stockpiles, on a continuous basis until destruction is completed;

Disposition of declared production and filling facilities, under agreed procedures, until the facilities have been destroyed;

Permitted small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, under agreed procedures, for as long as a facility is maintained for that purpose.

Furthermore, the agreement should provide for the creation of a consultative committee of parties with verification responsibilities.

(Mr. Fields, United States of America)

Agreed procedures should be included for a fact-finding investigation under the auspices of the treaty parties in the event that suspicious activities were reported. A more practical arrangement than a meeting of the full consultative committee should be provided for initiating and carrying out such an inquiry.

We believe that the complaints procedure should incorporate the obligation to co-operate in resolving compliance issues expeditiously. This should include an appropriate right of on-site inspection at subject sites. A means for redress if the issue is not satisfactorily resolved should also be provided.

The agreement should include constraints specifically designed to reduce monitoring difficulties, and should contain effective confidence-building measures. Further, there should be provisions for exchange of information on the production and use of specific commercial chemicals, including precursors, which might be diverted to chemical weapons purposes.

Finally, and this is a particularly important point, there should be effective provisions for dealing with the possibility of undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

At our spring session, I noted with sorrow that the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons were taking place under the long and dark shadow of the use of chemical weapons in current conflicts. I wish I could today report that this heinous practice had ceased. Unfortunately this is not the case. The use of prohibited toxin weapons and lethal chemical agents in south-east Asia and chemical warfare in Afghanistan continue. As President Reagan said when he addressed the second special session:

"The Soviet Union and their allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan. We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors".

There is an important lesson for the Committee to be drawn from this dreadful experience. Any new agreement must have effective provisions for ensuring compliance. The existing chemical weapons and biological weapons conventions do not have adequate verification and compliance provisions. They are being violated. We must not succumb to any temptation to conclude a convention which does not ban these weapons completely, effectively, and verifiably. We simply must never make that mistake again.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The question of outlawing chemical weapons and of their destruction remains one of the focal points in the field of disarmament. It is generally recognized that we have reached an important crossroads. Now it is up to us to take a well-defined course towards the elaboration of the convention by resolving the outstanding issues on the basis of a realistic and effective approach and harmonizing our views on the necessary political and technical decisions.

The other way would take us into a labyrinth whose meanders are named "all-embracing scope", "100 per cent verification", "round-the-clock on-site inspections", etc. Like every labyrinth this one should have an exit, too, but when we finally reach the end of the tunnel we shall most probably be confronted by a different set of problems caused by technological advance and weapons development. I have in mind, of course, the binary types of chemical weapons, whatever the efforts to minimize their negative impact on the negotiations.

We listened with interest and satisfaction to the statement at our last meeting of the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. It is our hope that under his able and energetic leadership it will be possible to realize the goal of elaborating optional -- and why not in some cases, agreed, -- texts of the elements of the future convention. This would be in accordance with the priority given to this item on our agenda, and even more so with the demands and the wishes of the international community. In this line of thought, I wish to render the full support of our delegation to the idea of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union Ambassador Issraelyan, who, while presenting the new major Soviet initiative, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", suggested at the opening meeting of the Working Group that a tentative deadline for the final elaboration of the draft convention should be agreed upon.

Today I would like to offer some observations on the relationship between national and international measures of control and verification. With a view to the solution of numerous issues in this complex domain, including the cost-effectiveness of these procedures, it seems necessary to discuss and outline in more precise terms at least the following aspects of this relationship:

The utilization to the maximum extent of the possibilities of national control, supplementing national mechanisms with international measures when and where an agreed necessity exists.

The correlation of national and international measures should be determined in every specific case depending on the nature of the relevant provisions of the convention with a view to constructing the most efficient and at the same time least cumbersome system of control and verification.

An evaluation of the role of confidence-building measures in the context of the over-all approach to the problems of control and verification. Of particular importance in this respect would be the fact that the different kinds of declarations envisaged in the convention will provide valuable and indispensable information, guaranteed by the authority of the respective State party to the convention.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

We offer these considerations guided by the thought that the cornerstone of any system of control and verification must be rationality, rationality coupled with realism and objectivity. The national and international measures of verification should be organically combined, rather than doubling each other. What we suggest is not to lose the over-all picture when concentrating on the elaboration of particular areas of the future convention.

Here I would like to remind you of the experience of the early stages of the discussion of technical aspects of the verification of a test ban treaty. Initially, our predecessors in the disarmament negotiations, more than 20 years ago, were considering the establishment of dozens of internationally operated seismic stations all over the globe, involving huge costs and creating numerous technical and human problems. A much simpler and rational solution was generally accepted eventually, as all of us are aware, that is, the utilization of national seismic stations. This is only one example of applying rationality to the genuine requirements for verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

I would like to stress once again that the elaboration and the implementation of a convention to ban and destroy a most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction would be a major achievement in the efforts to curb the arms race. The socialist countries have on more than one occasion contributed in a substantive way to the course of negotiations. The latest Soviet proposal is another milestone along this road. Let us hope that the final goal is not too far away.

The important and responsible tasks set before the Committee highlight the necessity of taking practical measures for increasing its effectiveness. This could be best achieved by the setting up of additional subsidiary bodies on priority items and by the possible extension of the duration of the work of some of the existing ones. When organizational matters come up for discussion we intend to present our views and ideas in a detailed way.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador van Dongen.

Mr. VAN DONGEN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction to see the chairmanship of the Committee on the opening of our summer session in such capable and experienced hands as yours. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has amply demonstrated that the climate for disarmament can hardly be called favourable; all the more do we stand in need of wise and tactful leadership, and we are confident that you, Mr. Chairman, will provide it. Warm thanks are due to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan. His was far from being an easy task; it demands not merely the diplomatic gifts we have come to expect from the delegation of Japan, but equally inventiveness and stamina. In so far as we concluded our previous session in an orderly manner and produced the report expected by the General Assembly, it was in no small measure due to Ambassador Okawa's dedication to our duties.

Many previous speakers have given us their views on the whys and wherefores of the failure of the second special session to produce something better than the token result embodied in its concluding document. On this subject, I shall be brief. Most of the second special session is best speedily forgotten. The lack of results is deplored, but at least no irreparable harm was done to the multilateral disarmament process. In this context, the Netherlands attaches great value to the

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

fact that the consensus-principle was upheld, since this principle is a pre-condition for the process to be serious and credible. As a result, we are dissatisfied but not discouraged, nor are we unduly surprised by the final outcome of the second special session. In fact, the general lack of expectations may itself have contributed to it by playing the role of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Looking back to the second special session is useful only in so far as it is directly relevant to the future; trying to apportion blame for its shortcomings is largely, as Hamlet would have it, "stale, flat and unprofitable", and I do not intend to indulge in this kind of gamesmanship.

If, therefore, I prefer looking ahead to looking backward, I also stress that in the Committee on Disarmament we should concentrate on negotiations on subjects that may yield some practical results rather than continue talking about disarmament in general terms. The latter is best left to deliberative bodies like the General Assembly and it would be my guess that few of us could stomach many more ringing appeals and more rhetoric, however beautifully done. We should also bear in mind that on some subjects, results in this multilateral forum can only be achieved once the pre-condition of at least a measure of progress in the bilateral discussions between the two major nuclear-weapon powers have been fulfilled. This does not imply that we should have to remain entirely silent, let alone be obliged to acquiesce passively in whatever the two nuclear giants may work out between themselves, but rather acceptance of the fact that theirs is of necessity the leading role. The same realism makes it possible for the Netherlands delegation to accept a temporary halt in the negotiations concerning a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Plans as ambitious as the CPD can only come to fruition in a favourable climate; efforts to force decisions through can only lead to ambiguity or other inner weaknesses for which we would eventually pay the price.

Let me now turn to the subjects that do lend themselves to useful discussion; the comprehensive test ban, outer space and chemical weapons. The Netherlands Government is convinced that during this summer session the Committee on Disarmament should try to carry out with priority the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda, a nuclear test ban. On the basis of the progress report to be submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group before the conclusion of the 1982 session, the Committee will have to take a decision on subsequent courses of action, as the last paragraph of the agreed mandate stipulates. There is thus little time left for the execution of even the present limited mandate. I intend to submit a working paper outlining a possible programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group at the next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 17 August, and I trust that agreement on the chairmanship of this Ad Hoc Working Group can be reached without further delay.

Another item the Committee should come to grips with during this summer session is that of arms control in outer space. The Netherlands was one of the sponsors of resolution 36/97/C requesting the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. The General Assembly also requested the Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the above objectives. After the preliminary exchange of views during the spring session, the Committee should now establish the required infrastructure to deal with this agenda item in a businesslike manner. I listened with great interest to what my distinguished colleagues from Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the United States and the

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

USSR recently had to say on this matter. The General Assembly resolution I referred to a moment ago provides suitable elements for the mandate of an ad hoc working group under item 7 of the agenda.

The third main object of our efforts should be item number 4 of our agenda: chemical weapons. The importance the Netherlands Government has attached over the years to this subject is amply borne out by the time, energy and resources we have made available to the multilateral efforts aimed at achieving an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban. We believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group is on the right track to make the best possible use of the elements produced last year under its new mandate which warrants full negotiations. Now that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR seem likely to remain suspended for the near future, the role of the Committee on Disarmament is all the more crucial. The "Basic provisions" submitted by the Soviet delegation I shall come back to in a moment. We pledge our full support to the Ad Hoc Working Group and hope that at the conclusion of the summer session success can be achieved in producing a composite paper which could serve as a basis for drafting the chemical weapons convention next year.

Verification issues related to compliance with a chemical weapons convention have rightly become a focal point in the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Today I will introduce two contributions on verification issues, one also on behalf of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Before going into the details, I believe it is proper for me to refer briefly to the general philosophy of The Netherlands with respect to verification. Adequate verification is, in our view, not identical with a set of measures that would be perfect in isolation. Rather would we consider verification measures to be adequate if, measured against a well-defined scope of the treaty and a credible system of protection measures, the advantages of compliance with the convention would outweigh the tremendous disadvantages and risks of maintaining a chemical warfare capability for retaliation purposes.

On behalf of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and my own, I would now like to introduce document CD/308, dated 10 August 1982. This document contains a list of questions that our respective authorities believe to be of relevance for a continuation of the efforts in the Ad Hoc Working Group, having studied document CD/294 -- CD/CW/WP.35 dated 21 July 1982 submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union. It is the hope of our two delegations that this document, which supersedes and elaborates upon the set of questions put forward by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group a few weeks ago, will facilitate the further clarification which the delegation of the Soviet Union undertook to present in due course. I would like to make it clear that our respective authorities have considered with interest the Soviet draft "Basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention. It is the hope of our two Governments that unambiguous answers to the questions contained in CD/308, in conjunction with subsequent in-depth discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group, will provide fresh ground for speedy agreement on an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

In 1977 the Netherlands delegation tabled document CCD/533, a working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants. In the last paragraph of that paper it was announced that further work would be carried out, inter alia, to investigate the applicability of the procedure in case of binary nerve agents systems.

Working document CD/307, which I am pleased to introduce today, contains the results of the announced further scientific work in my country.

Allow me to say a few words to refresh your memories as to what working paper CCD/533, now reissued as document CD/306, is about.

The scientific method described in CCD/533-CD/306 concentrated on a militarily highly significant class among the supertoxic single purpose agents, i.e. the nerve agents. It was defined with a view to contributing to the elaboration of international measures of verification of a chemical weapons ban, with emphasis on the non-production of these agents, including binary weapon systems -- measures that would be, in order to be acceptable to all States, of as non-intrusive a character as reasonably possible.

The method was developed under the direction of Dr. A.J.J. Ooms, well known to most delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, who is director of the Prins Maurits Laboratory of the Netherlands Defence Research Organization. This highly sensitive method is based on an analysis of waste water downstream of chemical production plants, with a view to detecting a phosphorus-methyl bond the presence of which is common to most of the known supertoxic nerve agents. It is very stable towards chemical reactions and can be used as -- and I think the comparison is comprehensible -- a "fingerprint". As the possible presence of the compounds at issue may also be due to the natural or industrial background, a reference sample upstream of the chemical production plant should be analysed in addition to a downstream sample. Only if the analysis is positive with respect to what I call the "fingerprint", pointing to the presence of decomposition products or starting materials in waste water, recourse may ultimately be had to more intrusive measures, such as a visit to the suspected plant to reveal the identity of the product manufactured.

Having explained this much about document CCD/533 (now reissued as document CD/306), I can venture to elaborate on our new working document CD/307. First of all, it contains positive results of research with respect to the applicability of the "fingerprint" method to binary nerve agents. After stating that it is safe to assume that one of the two precursors of the binary agent does

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

already contain the fingerprint bond before reaction with the other, the paper goes on to say that the validity of the analytical method for two distinguishable types of precursors has been tested with success. Thus the entire range of the most toxic binary G-agents as well as binary VX has been covered.

Research was also carried out to get acquainted with the occurrence of compounds containing the fingerprint in water from natural or industrial origin, since the findings in this respect could theoretically affect the applicability of the verification method. To our satisfaction it was found that the phosphorus-methyl procedure was sensitive even in heavily polluted water. The environmental background levels do not affect the maximum distance of a few hundred metres downstream where samples could be taken. Thus the originally foreseen degree of non-intrusiveness can be maintained.

The advantage of the system is obvious. It gives a simple yes or no answer to the question whether compounds related to chemical warfare nerve gases containing the "fingerprint" are present or not. The method is equally relevant for binary weapon precursors. The chemical analyses of the waste water can be performed by many laboratories in the world. The method is highly sensitive and can best be illustrated as follows. In many languages a particularly difficult fact-finding mission is metaphorically described as "looking for a needle in a haystack". The staff of the research institute was so tempted by this metaphor that they decided to compare the relative values of weight for needle and haystack with the values found for the fingerprint in a corresponding volume of waste water. It was found that the needle value was indeed matched.

Our research in this field will continue, but already at this stage we can safely recommend the method described as at least one valuable building block in a set of interacting components of a verification system to be agreed upon. We would very much hope that other delegations will carry out comparable research. In this context my delegation would like to express its respect to the delegation of an observer-State, Finland, for the impressive and laborious work that has been carried out in Finland over the years, of which the latest so-called "blue book" is yet another reflection. It is our sincere hope that thus the technical basis for verification will already have been established when the time is ripe for a final breakthrough in the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of a chemical weapons ban.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, my intention today is to deal briefly with agenda item 4 concerning the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. In my statement during this year's spring session I dealt extensively with the problem of verification of the provisions of a future chemical weapons convention. Now I would like to address mainly some problems arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons and some other aspects with regard to the scope of prohibition.

The General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, unequivocally reaffirmed the prohibition of chemical weapons as an item of exceptionally high priority and called for an early conclusion of a convention on that subject. It is up to our Committee, the only multilateral body negotiating on disarmament, to cope with this task and to exert all efforts to elaborate a chemical weapons convention in the nearest future. We firmly believe that after years of negotiations, with many proposals and numerous conceptual material gathered, a solid basis exists for a fruitful continuation of our work.

This, let us say, optimistic approach is based on the presumption that a broad convergence of views exists as to basic aspects of the future convention. This optimism is also considerably backed by the document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" submitted by the Soviet Union at the second special session. I have already had the opportunity to stress the importance my delegation attaches to this document and to voice our full support for it. Now I would simply like to add that we regard the "Basic provisions" as an example of a constructive approach whereby the proposals and views of negotiating partners are considered and taken into account. That is exactly what the negotiating process is about. It is therefore fully justified and fair if we expect other major powers to display similar good will and a compromise approach.

One of the problems which is seriously hindering the elaboration of a draft convention is the decision to produce and commission binary weapons and ultimately to station them on the territories of other countries. This decision is contrary to United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/96B, which, inter alia, "calls upon all States to refrain from ... production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". And let it be recalled that no more than one delegation at the General Assembly last fall found it necessary to vote against this resolution.

My delegation completely fails to understand how the programme of modernization and chemical rearmament undertaken in the United States of America goes together with the sincere interest to negotiate and to achieve the prohibition of chemical weapons professed in this room by the United States delegation. Moreover, we do not think that the term "modernization" reflects fully what is going on. Many delegations have already stressed, and we deem it necessary to

(Mr. Vajvoda, Czechoslovakia)

emphasize once more, that the full-scale production of binary weapons would amount to the commencement of a qualitatively new round in the chemical arms race since these weapons represent a new generation of chemical weapons. My country has one more reason to oppose the production and proliferation of binary weapons since the prospect of having thousands of units of binary ammunition stationed in our immediate western neighbourhood is a matter of grave concern to us. The stationing of these weapons in Europe is not just a remote possibility. We have heard of numerous statements of high United States officials and strategists in this respect.

The introduction of binary weapons into the arsenals of States would also significantly complicate the solution of the basic difficulty in the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention, namely, that of separating commercial chemicals from those which can be used for chemical weapons. Consequently, the extremely difficult task of defining chemicals for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons would arise. Thus, the implementation of many aspects of the future convention would be seriously complicated, e.g. the obligation not to transfer chemical weapons and other obligations related thereto. The process of the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons would also be seriously hampered. The emergence of binary weapons would also significantly facilitate possible covert stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons purposes and for developing chemical weapons under the guise of commercial production. There is no need to elaborate extensively on the grave consequences this would have for the relevant verification procedures, both national and especially international. We do not think it feasible to apply to binary weapons such verification methods as are based upon the extreme toxicity of the chemical agents used in traditional types of chemical weapons. We have heard some arguments to the contrary. However, we consider those arguments rather oversimplified.

At the same time we reject most emphatically all attempts to suggest that the future convention should ignore or somehow circumvent the problem of binary weapons. The agreed provisions on the scope of prohibition contained in the joint Soviet-United States report to the Committee on Disarmament of 1980, which we still consider valuable, clearly encompass binary weapons as well. Should the programme of binary weapons production be undertaken, these positive results would be seriously undermined.

There are also other, both immediate and long-term effects the production of binary weapons would have on the elaboration of and compliance with a chemical weapons convention. I am not going to deal with all of them, since the group of socialist countries referred to these effects in detail in document CD/258 of 9 March 1982. The deliberations in the Committee both last year and during this year's spring session clearly demonstrated that virtually all delegations paid special attention to the question of binary weapons and considered that these weapons should be prohibited in the future convention. Apart from the statements by the socialist countries we noted the views of the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden as well as the statements of other western delegations and the Group of 21 members.

It is well known that as yet we have not reached full agreement on what should be encompassed by the prohibition in the future convention. We should spare no efforts in trying to reach agreement on this subject since it undoubtedly has a direct bearing on all other provisions of the future convention. It is important to harmonize our views and to overcome persisting differences of opinion in this regard as early as possible, be it with respect to the problem of the definition

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of the term "chemical weapons", the question of the sphere of activity to be encompassed by the prohibition or the much discussed problem whether the prohibition of use of chemical weapons should be included in the future convention. The problem of the use of chemical weapons has been widely discussed in the Committee in recent years and numerous arguments have been raised both supporting and opposing its inclusion. I do not believe that going through all these arguments once again would serve any purpose. However, at this stage when we are, hopefully, about to embark on the formulation of a composite draft text of a chemical weapons convention, my delegation would like to record here briefly its position on the subject.

As far as the use of chemical weapons is concerned, Czechoslovakia considers it clearly and unequivocally prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We maintain that the Protocol is an important international instrument which has since its adoption played a positive role. In connection with the proposals to strengthen the Protocol by including the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the future chemical weapons convention; we do not share the view that by doing so we can strengthen the Protocol whatsoever. Quite the contrary, for the doubled prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would inevitably lead to the weakening of the Protocol and to the creation of an unnecessary precedent. All our efforts should be aimed at the achievement of and ensuring compliance with a convention which would leave no chemical weapons in the arsenals of States. If this is achieved, and we deem it feasible, no question of use can arise.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in accordance with its programme of work the Committee on Disarmament is today discussing an issue which requires particular consideration and attention on the part of all delegations represented here. The exceptional importance of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons is self-evident.

The times are past when the danger represented by chemical weapons was, as it were, overshadowed by the horror and dread that nuclear weapons inspired in mankind. For who today is not aware that modern chemical weapons also have a frightening capacity to sow Black Death on earth? Chemical weapons are, moreover, particularly barbaric because they endanger above all the unprotected civilian population. There is a real and growing threat of the widespread use of chemical weapons. Thus the question is whether we are going now, immediately, to put a stop to the chemical arms race orgy, or whether we are going to miss the opportunity, perhaps irrevocably.

The Soviet Union is decisively in favour of the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons. As President L.I. Brezhnev said in his message to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "Everything must be done to ensure that chemical weapons have no place on earth. The Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of this goal. We are prepared to reach an agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks of such weapons". The Soviet Union confirmed that this was its approach to the matter by putting forward the "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet delegation has distributed the text of these "Basic provisions" as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament and also of its Working Group on Chemical Weapons (document CD/294/CD/WP.55). Today we wish formally to introduce this document.

The Soviet document was prepared taking into account the results of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons between 1976 and 1980 and of the negotiations that took place in the Committee on Disarmament during that same period and subsequently. While it naturally reflects the Soviet position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it incorporates many valuable and sound proposals of other States and with respect to a number of the most important aspects it takes into account the positions of our negotiating partners.

If the essence of the Soviet document were to be summarized in a few words, it could be said that what it amounts to is a translation into the language of the provisions of a convention of the desire of the USSR to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons and so far as possible to remove the obstacles to the adoption of a convention by putting forward for consideration on the really crucial, and I repeat crucial, but controversial aspects of the convention, flexible solutions which take account of the various points of view and, we believe, make it possible to reconcile them.

Allow me to go into the Soviet document in somewhat greater detail. First of all I should like to emphasize that this is not a comprehensive text of a future convention, but rather its basic provisions. In other words, the Soviet draft offers possible formulations or what appear to us to be mutually acceptable approaches to the formulation of the principal provisions of the future convention. It is not designed to provide answers to many questions concerning details of the future convention. It aims primarily at helping to resolve key issues -- the scope of the prohibition, confidence-building measures, verification of compliance and other questions. Unfortunately, as you all know, there has not up to now been any general agreement on these. It seems to us that the draft text we have submitted provides a basis for the achievement of consensus precisely on the key aspects of the convention.

I would remind you that the Soviet draft proposes that the future convention should consist of four main sections -- on the scope of the prohibition, declarations and confidence-building measures, ensuring compliance with the convention and the concluding provisions of the convention. Allow me now to touch upon some matters relating to the various sections of the Soviet draft.

I shall not enumerate them, for they are probably well known, the more so since, as I have already said, in many cases they reflect a common standpoint -- they reflect the positions of the Soviet-American joint proposal. It was no surprise to us, therefore, that the statement by the United States delegation indicated certain positions which are in fact also reflected in the Soviet draft basic provisions. What is there to say about the scope of the prohibition? What do we want to emphasize in this section of the future convention?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Scope of the prohibition. Here we believe it is particularly important that the future convention should include a prohibition of weapons with binary or multi-component charges, as referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of chemical weapons under section I of the Soviet draft. We attach particular importance to this matter as we consider that the appearance of binary chemical weapons will represent a qualitatively new stage in the chemical arms race, a stage which could vitally affect the entire prospect for the prohibition of this type of weapon. We have talked about this a number of times already, and our views are shared by many other delegations. These views were confirmed, moreover, by the consultations with technical experts, which made it clear that by contrast with the production of supertoxic weapons in factory conditions, in which the traditional types of such weapons are manufactured on the basis, as a rule, of the same chemicals of known composition, in the development of binary systems of chemical weapons their production may involve new chemicals of various classes and in a wide variety of combinations. The uncertainty from the standpoint of the detection of compliance or non-compliance with the convention becomes many times greater as a result of the possibility of the appearance in the future of various kinds of binary weapons in addition to supertoxic lethal systems. Furthermore, binary systems of chemical weapons make it difficult to monitor their production and stockpiling by groups of States belonging to military blocs. Some members of a bloc may in the future be parties to the convention while others may not, and the provisions of the convention would thus not apply to the latter.

It is obvious that the development of the production of any type of binary weapon will bring new generations of chemicals into the range of chemical substances capable of being used as the components of such weapons, and States parties to the convention will be confronted with the extremely difficult problem of how to set a limit distinguishing chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals which could -- and I repeat could -- be used in binary systems of chemical weapons. It cannot be excluded that this problem might arise in connection with other substances in addition to organophosphorus compounds.

It must also be pointed out that the components used in binary systems constitute a special kind of precursors. They differ from the precursors used in industrial conditions chiefly in that they are not simply the raw materials for obtaining lethal chemicals but practically already prepared chemical weapons when they are in combination with special devices or constructions.

Thus, it must be recognized that binary varieties of chemical weapons based on the latest advances in science and technology represent an incomparably more serious danger and create incomparably greater difficulties in the determination of the scope of the prohibition as well as in the monitoring of compliance with that prohibition, than do so-called unitary chemical weapons.

It is obvious that there is no way around these problems and the only thing to do is to tackle the solution of them in a serious manner. What kind of a convention would it be if it were to deal only with obsolescent types of chemical weapons that are being removed from arsenals and ignored the more modern types of such weapons which are

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

being developed by at least one State? We have heard repeated assurances from the United States delegation and a number of other States that binary weapons will be subject to absolute prohibition under the convention. These are fine words. But they are still not enough. It is essential that the problems arising in connection with binary weapons should be resolved both in the process of the consultations with technical experts and in the Committee as a whole.

The participants in the consultations, and no doubt all members of the Committee also, have obviously noted that we, the Soviet delegation, are interested, for example, at the practical level, in the problem of the prevention of the concealed manufacture, either in the guise of commercial manufacture or via a "division of labour" among States, of components of binary systems, special-purpose additives for such systems, including catalysts, and also devices and constructions specifically intended for binary systems. We have raised the question how to identify for the purposes of the convention those areas of chemistry and chemical technology where the emergence of new, as yet unknown systems of binary weapons is possible; and how to devise methods for the detection of stockpiles of binary weapons that might already exist if, that is, in defiance of the General Assembly's decision States had embarked on the production of binary weapons? We have not received answers to these questions from any delegation, including that of the United States.

With regard to the section on the scope of the prohibition, I should like to draw attention to the fact that there are no provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the Soviet draft, for a simple reason: the use of chemical weapons is unconditionally and absolutely prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stocks will deprive States, so to speak, of the material basis for violating the 1925 Protocol inasmuch as they will not even have any chemical weapons. We therefore believe that if there is a real rather than a feigned desire to strengthen the regime for the non-use of chemical weapons established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, then the fundamental thing to do is to direct all efforts towards the speediest possible conclusion of the convention we are working on. Let us suppose that, with a convention in existence, suspicions arise concerning the use of chemical weapons. This will automatically give rise to a suspicion of the violation of one or of several of the obligations entered into by States under the convention, namely, the obligations not to develop, produce, transfer or retain chemical weapons and to destroy all stocks thereof. In short, it seems to us that this question, which has been posed and blown up in a rather artificial and unjustifiable manner, becomes all the more complicated when it is proposed in the context of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to solve questions relating to other international agreements. This merely further complicates a task that is already complicated enough.

The second main section of the Soviet draft, entitled "Declarations and confidence-building measures", reflects the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to ensuring implementation of the convention on the basis of international co-operation. I do not intend now to dwell on all the declarations and confidence-building measures we have proposed; I should simply like to stress that they are all closely linked with the verification measures and should be viewed as forming a

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

whole. I should like merely to draw attention to the undertaking by States parties that is provided for in our draft to submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, and not later than 30 days after the completion of such operations to submit statements to that effect also.

I wish also to draw attention to the provision providing an undertaking by States parties to the future convention to submit annual declarations concerning basic categories of chemicals produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used. This important provision is, of course -- and I should like to stress this -- stated in the Soviet draft in general terms, and needs to be elaborated, but we believe that at the present stage we should agree on such undertakings in a broad way and go into the details of the actual provisions later.

The Soviet draft also provides for the drawing up through collective efforts of lists of chemicals and precursors which represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to use for chemical weapons purposes. It also proposes that notifications should be submitted concerning transfers by one State party to another of chemicals which could be used as components for binary weapons, and so forth.

As is clear from the foregoing few examples, all the measures we propose are aimed at giving the parties to the convention the assurance that it is being complied with.

Allow me now to dwell on questions of verification. I should like once again to reiterate our conception of the matter of the monitoring of implementation of an international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of strict and effective but not intrusive verification. We are in favour of a verification which gives States the assurance of compliance with the convention but which will not at the same time engender mutual suspicion or in any way lead to a worsening of the relations between States.

As we have already stated more than once, we consider that effective implementation of the convention can be ensured by national monitoring, by national technical means of verification, supplemented by certain international procedures including on-site inspections on a voluntary basis or what some call challenge verification. However, in view of the decisive importance of the destruction of stocks, and wishing to provide for ourselves and for all other future parties to the convention, an additional assurance that no party is committing a violation of this most important undertaking, in the end, in some measure and simply to accommodate the positions of many of our partners in the negotiations, we considered it necessary to provide for the possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota, of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities.

We have also provided for a special verification procedure for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals at a specialized facility. This is on the understanding that such a facility will continue to exist even when total chemical

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

disarmament has been accomplished and no chemical weapons as such remain on earth. In those circumstances, it would of course be extremely dangerous if someone should attempt to abuse the trust of other States and use that facility for the secret production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The Soviet "Basic provisions" provide for a very wide range of possible actions by States parties to the convention for the purpose of establishing confidence between them on the matter of the implementation of the convention and the monitoring of compliance with the obligations flowing from it, such as: a declaration by States as to whether or not they possess chemical weapons; the declaration of stocks of such weapons and capacities for their production; and of plans for their destruction or diversion to permitted purposes and plans for the destruction and dismantling of facilities, stating the location of the facilities; information concerning progress in carrying out the declared plans with notifications prior to the start of each stage of their implementation and also following the completion of the operations concerned. According to the Soviet provisions, such measures would be carried out by national verification bodies, by national technical means, if they possess such means or, in the case of other States which have an agreement to that effect, on the basis of information received through the use of those means, and lastly by the international verification body with the conduct of on-site inspections on the basis of a documented request as well as of systematic international inspections carried out, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota as I mentioned earlier. Our approach ensures confidence in the implementation of the convention while at the same time it is not burdensome.

In connection with the matter of the verification of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility, some delegations have put forward proposals, firstly, for permanent on-site inspections (with international inspectors staying at the facility day and night throughout all the years during which stocks are being destroyed), and I believe this was referred to today in a statement, and secondly, for the installation at the facility of so-called "black boxes" which would collect and process information and transmit it by radio telecommunications.

Let us suppose for a moment that such a verification system had been established. There would be inspectors permanently stationed at the facility concerned, who could not leave it even for a second; there would be "black boxes" in every corner, and the people working in the facility would be stumbling over them; but let us suppose that this had been done. It would then be necessary seriously to ponder the question of what would be the results of the most meticulous and thorough verification of the progress of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility if a State had not made a full declaration of its stocks. Or supposing a State after declaring the stocks that are to be destroyed at a specialized facility, then proceeds to conceal part of the stocks and does not submit them for destruction at the facility, or pretends that it has destroyed them?

Would it not be simpler to assume that, if it has such dishonest intentions, a State will merely fail to declare that part of its stocks which it does not intend to destroy, and no amount of day and night permanent inspection will be of any avail whatsoever.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

No other method of international verification except inspection on grounds of suspicion in such a case will help to establish the truth. We should also reflect on how to take account, for our purposes, in the drawing up of measures for verifying the destruction of stocks, of the fact that any specialized facility of such a kind must have its own strict and clear technological regulations, specific parameters for the entry of chemicals and output of the products of their destruction, its own extensive range of devices for process management and control, and so forth.

In short, while appealing for a greater objectivity in the work on the provisions of the future convention relating to verification, we are gratified to note that some delegations are beginning to seek more realistic approaches. To mention just one example, the document on verification submitted by the delegation of Canada (CD/167) contains a whole series of interesting points, one of which says in effect that in the drawing up of various control measures the starting point should be minimum levels of intrusiveness in the internal affairs of States. It is to be hoped that in the positions of all delegations a spirit of realism and constructiveness will in the last resort prevail.

Mr. Chairman, in connection with the submission of the Soviet draft basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a number of delegations have requested us to answer some questions. We consider this an expression of interest in the Soviet document and express our gratification and thanks to those delegations for that interest. We have repeatedly explained our position on key questions of the convention, including, we hope, at today's meeting.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in its document of 26 July, referred to our working paper CCD/539 of 3 August 1977, which stated that the main purpose of monitoring the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons should be to establish: (a) the fact of the destruction of an agent of a certain type; (b) the quantity of the agent destroyed; and (c) the quality of this agent. The delegation asked us: are the systematic international on-site inspections designed to achieve these goals?

We answer this question in the affirmative. It should be explained that in our 1977 document the principle of national verification is taken as the basis, but we see no reason for opposing national verification to international verification. We are in favour of a harmonious combination of the two types of verification.

We have also been asked, and not only by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, to explain what is meant by an "agreed quota". In the "Basic provisions of a convention", the carrying out of international on-site inspections at specialized facilities (of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes) on the basis of an agreed quota is proposed as one -- I repeat, one -- of the possible forms of such inspections. This does not mean that we are not prepared to consider other possible forms too. Obviously when agreement has been reached on procedures which are acceptable to all, we shall then have to work out in detail together the contents of such procedures. On a number of other specific issues the Soviet delegation intends to give a reply in the Working Group during the consideration of the relevant provisions of the future convention. I will say, however, at once, that in our opinion many questions call for joint answers, especially when they concern such matters as systematic international on-site inspections, on which in the past many different proposals have already been put forward by quite a large number of States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We prefer the method of bilateral and multilateral consultations with interested delegations in a joint search for answers to the questions which arise in the course of negotiations. For the information of members of the Committee I will say that the Soviet delegation has already conducted a series of such extremely useful bilateral consultations, in the course of which we ourselves asked questions and we answered the questions of our partners, and we intend to continue this practice. We think that this is far more effective than something more like a quiz game -- you know: question, answer, question, answer. Anyone really interested in finding joint answers will find a constructive partner in the Soviet delegation. I repeat, we are ready to search for answers to any questions which arise in the course of the negotiations, including those concerning the Soviet draft.

I should like to refer to another matter. Every now and then an attempt is made to steer negotiations into the labyrinth of secondary questions at a time when agreement has not been reached on the major questions. Take, for example, these problems of verification. While there is quite a high degree of agreement on the question of scope and, as we believe, the outlines of possible formulations on the scope of the prohibition are emerging, this is not yet the case with regard to verification issues. Nevertheless we sometimes get bogged down in a discussion of highly specialized aspects of verification. We propose that agreement should be reached on basic approaches, where this is possible, of course, and then on the basis of such agreed approaches -- general approaches -- we can work out the details.

The Soviet draft "Basic provisions", whose significance has been acknowledged by almost all delegations in the Committee, are a demonstration of the Soviet Union's interest in the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and evidence of its goodwill. At the same time, we should also like particularly to stress the fact that we are hoping -- we are very much hoping -- for a demonstration of goodwill from the other side also.

This refers in particular to the United States delegation, which the other day, and also today, expressed in the Committee its "disappointment" because, allegedly, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries do not wish to take part in serious discussions. The slightest acquaintance with the work of the Committee, of its working groups and contact groups, would suffice to arrive at quite the opposite conclusion. It would seem that some members of the Committee are judging others by themselves. We, for example, are not in the habit of agreeing, on the one hand, to the setting up within the Committee of a working group on a priority aspect of disarmament -- a nuclear-weapon-test ban, in this instance -- and then of stating bluntly that the time is not yet ripe for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Judge for yourselves: who takes a serious approach to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and who does not?

We should like to ask the United States delegation a simple and direct question, which certainly does not call for the assistance of experts: how does it see its own path towards the achievement of mutually acceptable solutions, and its readiness to take account of the position of other participants in the negotiations, including the Soviet Union? Negotiations can be successful if all those taking part in them strive for mutually acceptable solutions -- we repeat, mutually acceptable solutions.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the end of his statement, the representative of the United States, referring to the need to ban poisonous substances, could not resist the temptation to employ a peculiar type of poisonous substance -- falsehood and calumny -- right in the middle of our meeting; even the reference to the President does not in any way alter the fact that a poisonous cloud was released in this room. We regret this, as once again the assertions by the United States of its attachment to chemical disarmament were placed in doubt by the United States delegation itself. The reasons for this importunate repetition of lies are well known. One of them -- and probably the main one -- is to justify the United States' policy of chemical rearmament. It is enough to mention a single fact: the United States document (CD/264) speaks openly of the advantages of binary weapons, which the United States is today proceeding to produce on a large scale.

I should like to say, finally, that the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent and priority task. All delegations have tirelessly repeated this. We want to go further, and to propose concrete steps towards the fulfilment of this priority task.

In the first place, we consider it essential that the activity of the Working Group, under the able guidance of our friend, Ambassador Comrade Sujka, should not be suspended for almost six months (i.e. from practically the beginning of September, when the Committee's session is to end, until the end of February, when the Group will in effect be able to resume its work. We are opposed to this long interval. We are ready to agree to any generally acceptable arrangement. The Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons could continue its work now; it could resume work after a short interruption, or, lastly, it could resume its work at the beginning of next year, as happened this year in the case of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

In the second place, we consider that it would be useful to establish a date, even if only an approximate one, for the completion of work on the convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection it should be borne in mind, inter alia, that the chemicals industry is developing today not daily but literally hourly. A few years ago, the problem of the prohibition of binary chemical weapons did not exist; no one was talking about it. It has now arisen in connection with the well-known decision of the United States Government, and this has greatly complicated the negotiations. This, too, has been mentioned today by all speakers with the sole exception, I believe, of the first speaker. Who, I ask, can guarantee that while we are squandering precious time, and discussing sometimes doubtful problems, new and still more dangerous types of chemical weapons will not appear, and all the work we have done so far will have been in vain, will come to naught.

We are pressed for time, gentlemen, on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

meetings over a longer period than at present. It is certainly not for lack of time that the Committee has been unable to make much headway in its work. Future consideration could be given to the question of the duration of annual sessions on the basis of the volume of work of a substantive nature.

For reasons already well known, the summer session of the Committee will be of a shorter duration than is usual and it is not expected that we can do much in so short a time. However, it is encouraging to see that the Committee has managed to adopt its programme of work within a shorter time than usual, and this, to our mind, is a good augury.

There is universal consensus that general and complete disarmament should be the ultimate goal if we are to eradicate for all time the twin threats that most seriously menace mankind, namely, the scourge of war and the threat to human survival posed by nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no greater task for this multilateral negotiating body than to have as the foremost item on its agenda a programme for the ultimate attainment of general and complete disarmament. For this reason, the comprehensive programme of disarmament must continue to be the means through which the goal of general and complete disarmament must be reached. Our past inability to draw up a comprehensive programme is, without doubt, due to the fact that we have not been able to reconcile our views as to the principles on which the programme should be based. We therefore feel that a meeting of minds with regard to the principles of stages, time-frame, measures and commitment must be reached before we can carry out the next round in the drafting exercise.

With the rapid rate of advance in the development of space technology, the arms race now threatens to enter the realm of space. It is, therefore, urgently necessary to prevent outer space being used for warlike purposes before it is too late, as the consequences of such use are likely to have a destabilizing effect on earth itself. This delegation, therefore, supports the consideration of this item within a working group as first suggested by the delegation of Sweden during the last session.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons which met in advance of this summer session made a good start under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. There are indeed ample grounds for optimism that progress can be made even in the short time we have during this summer session. It is important to note that in dealing with chemical weapons we are dealing with a real disarmament measure on weapons of mass destruction the use of which could have devastating consequences on the civilian population also. Negotiations in the past have made considerable progress on the scope and definition as well as the nature of the convention. We hope that there will be a narrowing of differences between the two sides on the issue of verification and compliance in the light of fresh developments at the second special session, and this is a hopeful sign.

Limitations of strategic armaments have suffered a severe set-back with the setting aside of the SALT II Agreement. New concepts and doctrines are being advanced which appear to make it permissible to use nuclear weapons by underrating the possible outcome of their use. Despite the seriousness of the situation, this Committee is still unable to deal effectively with measures on nuclear disarmament, and efforts for the creation of a working group have not been possible as the rule of consensus is being used in a spirit that was not intended. No doubt, bilateral discussions are necessary between the great Powers which possess an overwhelming preponderance of these weapons. But at the same time the multilateral aspects of dealing effectively with them should not be ignored. The nuclear menace is a matter of universal concern and as such needs to be dealt with from the point of view of its multilateral aspects

The CHAIRMAN: The 178th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will continue to listen to those speakers inscribed for today's plenary meeting. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Middleton.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should first like to join those who have welcomed you to the Chair of the Committee for the month of August; my delegation shares the pleasure of other delegations at seeing the Chair occupied by a delegate who has such a distinguished record in the field of disarmament, particularly when he represents a State which is a fellow member of the Commonwealth. I should also like to extend our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, who guided the Committee so skilfully through the period leading up to the General Assembly's special session on disarmament.

I propose today to devote my statement entirely to the current item of our agenda, the prohibition of chemical weapons, a topic to which the British Government has attached great importance over a number of years. My delegation believes that of the subjects before us at present, that of chemical weapons perhaps offers the best prospects for progress in the near future. We therefore welcomed the early resumption of the Chemical Weapons Working Group and we are pleased that work is now aimed at identifying what options there are for bridging the gaps between the divergent views of delegations on many specific issues. We hope that we shall make substantial progress in this direction so that by the end of the session we shall have a clearer understanding of the possibilities for solving several of the key issues of a convention.

Before discussing certain issues in some detail, I would like to turn briefly to the consultations with technical experts which the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Group has just held. Some delegations have expressed the view that the discussion of technical issues was complicating our work, and might delay progress towards agreement, since many issues required political rather than technical decision. But in order to take political decisions we need to be aware of the range of technical possibilities for resolving particular problems. It is an unwillingness to make substantive contributions to the discussion of such technical issues rather than the technical discussions themselves which will delay our progress. My delegation accordingly attaches great importance to the continuation of the Chairman's consultations. The consultations with technical experts should, however, be given a precise mandate by the Working Group. The mandate drawn up for the experts' meeting this session produced, in our opinion, a more fruitful discussion than in the past, and we hope that this precedent will be followed for the next meeting.

In examining the report of the experts' meeting, I would like to reiterate the view which my delegation expressed at the spring session that the work on toxicity criteria has now been taken as far as is useful for the present, although at a later stage in our work it will be necessary to return to the protocols prepared during the spring session to see whether they meet the needs of the convention. We would suggest that work should now focus on the other topics mentioned in the report, that is, on the technical methods for verification, and we hope that experts will come to the next meeting ready to contribute to the discussion.

I should now like to offer views on some substantive aspects of a convention on chemical weapons, and in particular on the question of the declarations which will need to be included in such a convention. As work on the convention has evolved over

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

the last few years, it has become clear that the filing of detailed declarations by States parties will have a key role to play in ensuring confidence in the treaty regime. Without detailed declarations, adequate verification of the convention will be almost impossible, since it is clear that checks cannot be made, for example that all chemical weapons have been destroyed, unless we first know what chemical weapons a State holds.

In our view, declarations will fall into three categories. The first category will comprise those declarations which should be made soon after the convention enters into force. Such declarations should cover the following key areas:

(a) Whether or not a State possesses chemical weapons and facilities for their production;

(b) The stocks of chemical weapons and facilities for the production and filling of such weapons held by States;

(c) Plans for the destruction or, where appropriate, diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

(d) Plans for the destruction, dismantling or, where appropriate, conversion of declared facilities for the production and filling of chemical weapons.

These declarations should be detailed and accurate, and should include information on, inter alia:

The number and location of stockpiles;

The number and location of production facilities for both chemical agents and munitions, as well as munition-filling facilities;

The quantity of individual agents held and their concentration categorized by named agents;

The type and quantity of munitions, including any stocks of empty munitions specifically designed for chemical charges;

The capacity of production facilities and the agents or munitions which they produce.

The above declarations should, in our view, cover both single-purpose chemical agents, and dual-purpose chemical agents above a certain level of toxicity, together with key precursors, including those for use in binary munitions. If stockpiles of dual-purpose agents are held for commercial rather than military purposes, the commercial purpose should be stated. In addition, it will be necessary to declare in detail the plans for the destruction or diversion of stocks and production facilities.

The second type of declaration, which will need to be made at periodic intervals until all stocks and production facilities have been destroyed, will contain progress reports on the destruction process, and should give details of the timing of destruction programmes, the place where the destruction will take place, the quantities of munitions and individual named agents to be destroyed, and so on.

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

The third type of declaration will be required throughout the life of the convention, since a number of activities will continue to require monitoring. These declarations should cover any production of supertoxic agents for permitted purposes such as medical and protective measures. Details should be given of the quantities of specific agents produced, the location, capacity and capability of the production facility, and the purpose for which the agents are intended. Declarations will also need to be made about the production for civilian purposes of dual-purpose agents above a certain level of toxicity, giving details of the number, location, capacity, capability and turnover of production facilities for such dual-purpose agents. If possible, details of transfers of these agents should also be given, together with declarations on the number and nature of commercial research programmes into toxic agents for peaceful purposes. States must, of course, protect the interests of the commercial industries, but it would build confidence if parties had some idea of the research taking place in other countries.

I should now like to offer some preliminary comments on document CD/294, tabled at the beginning of the session by the Soviet delegation. My delegation welcomes this serious contribution to our work, and appreciates the detailed exposition of the ideas contained in it which was given to us this morning by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. We should, however, like to place on record some of the points which occurred to us in studying this document.

Firstly, on the section entitled "Scope of the Prohibition". Whilst recognizing that toxicity parameters have yet to be set for the various categories of agents, I should record here our view that irritant agents intended primarily for civil law enforcement should be excluded from a convention. There would then be no need for declarations of annual production as proposed in section II, paragraph 7, or for the negotiation of a ban on their transfer to non-States parties. To attempt to cover these materials in this Treaty would, we believe, complicate the discussion excessively and reduce the prospect of agreement.

On another point of detail, paragraph 2 of the section entitled "Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for production of chemical weapons" does not make clear that all chemical weapons production facilities, except those authorized for permitted production, should be made inoperative for production purposes soon after the treaty comes into effect for any State. For practical reasons there will, however, be a time-lag between the cessation of production and the destruction or dismantling of the production facilities. My delegation would therefore ask the Soviet delegation what arrangements it envisages for the mothballing of all chemical weapons production facilities, apart from those intended for the destruction of stockpiles, until their final dismantling or destruction takes place.

My delegation would also welcome clarification from the Soviet delegation of the verification provisions included in CD/294, since some of the ideas contained in this document have not previously been put forward by the Soviet Union. Delegations will no doubt recall the detailed paper on verification and the monitoring of compliance tabled by the United Kingdom delegation in the Committee on Disarmament on 18 February. This document, read in conjunction with similar papers tabled by the

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

delegations of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, outlines many of the detailed procedures we consider necessary in order adequately to ensure the compliance of States with a chemical weapons treaty.

Although this subject is not addressed in our own paper, the United Kingdom can certainly accept the setting up of national committees to oversee internal compliance as proposed in document CD/294 but a decision to set up such a committee would in our view lie with each State party. We would also reiterate our view that greater emphasis should be put on international verification measures controlled by the consultative committee. The text of a convention should emphasize in this connection the need for effective measures for systematic inspection of the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities. The Soviet draft mentions quotas for such inspections. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union touched on this point this morning, but my delegation would still welcome further clarification. It seems to us that depending on circumstances, representatives of the consultative committee may need to maintain a permanent presence at destruction sites and a "quota" may not be sufficient. Furthermore, we believe that a convention should provide for challenge inspection of general industrial chemical facilities which have a capacity for chemical weapons production, even if they are not declared as chemical weapons plants, and also for measures to check the declared volumes of accumulated stockpiles. It would also, in our view, be necessary to agree on the machinery by which States parties could assess, within the framework of the consultative committee, whether the explanations of an accused party which declines on-site inspection were sufficiently convincing.

As outlined in our own paper on verification, we consider that the consultative committee should be a permanent body established at the entry into force of the chemical weapons convention. Such an arrangement would help to ensure early investigation by the Committee of alleged contraventions of the treaty. We note that the Soviet Union has refrained from elaborating on many of the functions and powers of the consultative committee. It is, for instance, not altogether clear from document CD/294 whether, in cases of suspected violations, requests for information and for on-site inspection can be made to the consultative committee itself, so that its representatives might carry out inspections on behalf of one or more States parties, or whether the role of the Committee would be limited simply to passing on bilateral requests for such visits. In our view, only after the consultative committee has itself been directly involved in making at least one request for on-site inspection, and these requests have been refused, should the matter be taken to the Security Council of the United Nations.

I apologize if my remarks have seemed to some delegations excessively technical, but my delegation believes that we have reached the stage where detailed discussion of such points is appropriate and necessary if the progress we are all seeking is to be achieved. My delegation would welcome comments on our own ideas and look forward to a response from the Soviet delegation to the comments we have made on its paper. We shall also study with care the detailed statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union this morning. We look forward to a further exchange of views in the Working Group.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Italian delegation would like first to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee and to wish you every success in your work. The competent way in which you are guiding our work is yet another reflection of your great qualities as a diplomat and the worthy representative of a country with which Italy maintains fruitful relations.

My delegation would like to thank the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, for the exemplary manner in which he accomplished his task during a particularly difficult period in the work of our Committee.

I should also like to take this opportunity to offer a warm welcome to the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu, and to express my delegation's regret at the departure of an eminent member of this Committee, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India. Allow me also, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with the words of welcome you addressed to Ambassador Vaernø of Norway.

As this session of the Committee is a short one, I feel that it would be more useful if I were to confine my remarks to a brief statement of my delegation's views on certain questions more directly related to our current work, namely, a nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, established as a result of very difficult negotiations, has finally begun its work under the dynamic and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard. The first meetings of this Group have taken place in a positive atmosphere, which makes us optimistic about the possibility of making a start, at this session, on the implementation of its mandate. We feel that the attitude of the United States delegation is particularly encouraging, and will allow the Group greater latitude in its work. Although the absence of two delegations is obviously regrettable, it should not, for the time being, prevent important and useful work from being done in the Working Group, which at present constitutes the only international forum dealing with the subject of a nuclear test ban.

Furthermore we are convinced that, in considering the problems connected with the verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban, the new Ad Hoc Working Group will not fail to take advantage of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Some degree of co-ordination between these two bodies would certainly be useful, and the question of a possible broadening of the mandate of the Group of Experts, which has been suggested by several delegations, should be given consideration.

It is in the matter of chemical weapons that the Committee most nearly fulfils its institutional role as a multilateral negotiating body. Our great appreciation goes to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka. We endorse the objective of completing, by the end of this session, the elaboration of a document which can next year serve as the basis for the drafting of the text of a convention. The discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group clearly shows that the success of our efforts depends essentially on agreement on an adequate system of verification. In this connection, we would like to express our appreciation to the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands which have made very useful

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

new contributions in this area during this session. For the same reason, we share the interest aroused by the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The comments to which they have given rise and the replies awaited thereon could be of considerable assistance in our efforts.

On a specific point, that of the use of chemical weapons, I should like briefly to recall our position, which has already been explained in the Working Group: it is that a solution to the question of the use of chemical weapons should be sought within the framework of an adequate procedure for dealing with complaints. To this end, the future convention should include a clause expressly endowing the consultative committee with competence to investigate any complaint concerning the use of chemical weapons, and this, independently of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the validity of which should be explicitly reaffirmed. Such a clause should be based on recognition of the fact that any use of chemical weapons would necessarily imply the violation of one or more of the obligations included in the field of application of the Convention.

It is, however, essential that a rapid investigation into the use of chemical weapons should be possible. For this reason, provision should be made for the fairly automatic initiation of an investigation after the receipt of a documented complaint. The consultative committee's competence in this sphere should apply not only to cases of the use of chemical weapons by a State party to the convention, but also to cases of their use with the assistance of a State party. Last year, my delegation proposed a formula which is included among the comments on Element XIII, covering these two possibilities: we have noted that several delegations have expressed similar views this year; we therefore hope that our proposal can form the basis of a compromise to resolve this delicate issue.

I am pleased to note that the Committee seems determined henceforward to give the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space all the attention it deserves; some reservations expressed last spring appear to have been overcome. Proposals have been made for the establishment of a working group on this item of our agenda. We are in principle in favour of doing this. The real problem, however, is not whether or not to set up a subsidiary body, but how to proceed in this matter. It would be essential for the group to have an appropriate mandate, both because of the technical complexity of the subject and because we have no experience of negotiations on weapons control and disarmament in this area.

Without a mandate which provides a specific goal for our discussions, they are likely to prove aimless. My delegation has constantly drawn the Committee's attention to the urgent need to consider, as a matter of priority, questions concerning an effective and verifiable prohibition of anti-satellite systems. That in itself would be a sufficiently ambitious task. Although opinions in the Committee differ on this subject, we have noted with satisfaction some change in the way of thinking of certain delegations.

On the points to which I have referred, as well as on others which will be considered by the Committee, we should bear in mind the lessons of the second special session on disarmament. While it produced very little in the way of

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Committee at the last meeting, and congratulates Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1. We can assure him of our full support and co-operation.

In April my delegation acted in a spirit of co-operation and compromise when it joined the consensus on a mandate for that Working Group. We considered and continue to consider the compromise formula as a basis on which concrete work towards the negotiation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can and must be started. We fully endorse the interpretation of the provision of that mandate given by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic in his statement on 21 April, and the Hungarian delegation will participate in the activities of the Working Group in conformity with that interpretation. My delegation fully shares the views expressed in connection with the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban by my colleague from the German Democratic Republic who preceded me.

In the context of agenda item 1, the Hungarian delegation feels it necessary to express its regret and resentment concerning the attitudes of China and France with respect to their non-participation in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We certainly hope that their negative posture will not last long.

The alarming news reports concerning the United States position on nuclear-weapon testing, and the United States Administration's open refusal to resume the trilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban, have come as a slap in the face to all those who are eager to start negotiations on that top priority issue. The prospect that the United States may even increase the size of the weapons tested, as indicated recently by one of the high officials in Washington, is a valid reason for concern and anxiety not only to members of this Committee but also to the whole of mankind.

The Hungarian delegation, therefore, is eagerly awaiting a detailed and unambiguous statement from the delegation of the United States, clarifying the intentions of its Government on that very important subject.

There is yet another item which I want to deal with today. During the spring session of the Committee the Hungarian delegation welcomed the adoption of a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, allowing it to accelerate the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. We deem it essential, as we emphasized also at the special session, that renewed efforts should be made towards the early elaboration and conclusion of such a convention. We must keep in mind that certain decisions concerning the manufacture and deployment in Western Europe of a new type of chemical weapons, binary weapons, are likely to initiate a new surge in the arms race. It is, therefore, especially justified and urgent to demand the active contribution of all member States to the work that has been under way since 20 July in the Working Group under the able and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The best example of such an active contribution is the "Basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention submitted by the Soviet Union at the special session, and tabled also here as document CD/294. That document, having received overwhelming support from delegations, is capable of giving a major impulse to accelerated and serious negotiations on a draft convention, given similar will also from other sides.

The Hungarian delegation is of the view that the Working Group has made substantial progress in its deliberations -- and here one must not forget to mention the useful activity of the experts on chemical weapons -- at least enough for the elaboration of a composite draft text of a convention. Containing already agreed provisions as well as alternative texts for provisions where agreement may not be reached within the short time now at our disposal, the composite text would make it possible not only for us but also for the General Assembly at its forthcoming session to assess the progress achieved, and would then serve as a useful basis for our negotiations next year.

I cannot conclude this statement without giving strong expression to the deep concern and rightful indignation of my Government and of public opinion in Hungary over the brutal Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the Palestinian people and the peoples of the whole region. We have strongly condemned that genocidal attack and the imperialistic motives behind it, and continue to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and other occupied territories.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.'

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to dwell upon the question of banning chemical weapons. This question has all along had its important place in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and has attracted particularly the attention of the people. This is because, on the one hand, the people of the world are abhorrent of such inhuman weapons, and on the other hand, the threat of chemical war is growing unabated. One Superpower, faced with charges of its use of chemical weapons, is refusing any international investigation, while the other Superpower, in disregard of opposition at home and abroad, is engaged in the renewal of its chemical arsenal with binary chemical weapons. The side which has gained an edge in chemical warfare capacity tries to preserve it, while the losing side attempts to recover its lost superiority. Thus, the two sides are vying with each other in expanding their respective chemical armaments. These facts and also what has transpired in some of the local conflicts since the Second World War serve to remind us that we must not relax our vigilance against the grave consequences of the possible use of chemical weapons. The Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility to eliminate this horrible threat and to reach agreement as soon as possible on the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons.

We have scored some progress after several years' efforts. The devotion and ability of the successive chairmen of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the goodwill and co-operative spirit displayed by many representatives as well as the efforts made by the experts -- all these have made it possible for us to enter into a new stage of elaborating provisions of a future convention. In this regard, document CD/CW/WP.33 submitted at the end of the spring session is of help in our further negotiations.

Now I would like to offer some observations on the following questions:

1. On the scope of the prohibition:

We have maintained all along that the use of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of the prohibition in a future convention, and we have repeatedly reiterated our position both at plenary meetings and at meetings of the Working Group. Together with four other delegations, we put forward at the spring session an alternative text on this issue. In the discussions since 20 July, the importance of this question has gained more attention. Here I would like to express our thanks to the Romanian representative for his useful work as co-ordinator of the consultation group on the question of "scope of prohibition". He has provided us with a list of possible solutions on this question which will facilitate our further discussions.

2. On declaration:

Declaration is one of the key elements in a future convention. A declaration should include detailed and accurate items and contents in its provisions; otherwise, the effectiveness of the convention could not be ensured. In this connection, I would like to point out that in annex II of document CD/CW/WP.33, it is laid down that the contents of declarations should include the capacity and location of chemical weapons production facilities. We consider this very necessary. We are also of the view that the production facilities for chemical weapons referred to here should comprise both factories set up solely for producing chemical weapons as well as specialized facilities affiliated to other chemical industry enterprises (such as a chemical weapons workshop set up within a civilian chemical industry enterprise).

The delegation of the Soviet Union put forward recently the "basic provisions" of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall study them further. The Soviet paper contains provisions relating to declarations and confidence-building measures. According to those provisions, a country might postpone its declaration to the international community of the location of chemical weapons production facilities till seven years after it becomes a party to the convention. We feel that it is rather difficult to understand such a prolonged postponement. It is our view that the adherence of a State to a convention means that it is willing to undertake the obligations laid down in the convention; consequently, the location of production facilities to be dismantled should not be kept secret for such a long time. Otherwise, it would run counter to the purpose of the confidence-building measures.

3. On verification:

Verification is another key element in a future convention. Strict and effective verification would serve as an important guarantee that the convention may not become a mere scrap of paper. In this regard, suffice it to refer to the historical lessons of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is precisely because the Protocol lacks the necessary verification provisions that over the past 50 odd years since the signing of the Protocol it has not been possible to conduct any fair international investigations into complaints about the use of chemical weapons, including complaints and reports on chemical warfare in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in recent years. This state of affairs cannot but jeopardize the authoritativeness of the Protocol.

Therefore, we hold that emphasis should be put on international verification and, in particular, necessary on-site inspection. In fact, many States have advanced constructive proposals. Document CD/CW/WP.33 also embodies a number of very good provisions. However, there are also evident shortcomings, i.e. no on-site investigation is provided for in regard to complaints or reports on the use of chemical weapons. We deem it indispensable to include such a provision, if we are to attempt to elaborate a credible convention for the international community.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

We have noted that the Soviet Union, in submitting the "basic provisions", has accepted the principle of on-site inspection. In the "basic provisions", reference has been made to the possibility of carrying out on-site inspection in two kinds of situation. Some representatives have made comments in this regard. As I mentioned earlier, we will study the Soviet proposal further. However, I would like to offer a preliminary observation. We feel that to ensure the effectiveness of the convention, more necessary on-site inspections are required, such as on-site inspection on the dismantling of production facilities and on allegations of the use of chemical weapons, etc.

Since the start of the summer session, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has adopted some flexible approaches, setting up a number of informal consultation groups to engage in intensive consultations on some major issues of a future convention. We welcome this useful attempt. We also hope that consultation will be conducted on the basis of the results already achieved, which are reflected in document CD/CW/WP.33.

During the Second World War, the Chinese people also suffered from the harm of chemical weapons. In order to eliminate forever the danger of chemical war, the Chinese delegation sincerely hopes that a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons can be concluded as soon as possible. To this end, we pledge to make efforts together with other delegations.

Mr. STEELE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today to react to the announcement by the delegations of France and China that they will not participate in the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Australia has for many years stressed the priority in disarmament negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, and has consistently played an active role in international forums on this question. We have always held that such a ban should be genuinely comprehensive and should prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. A comprehensive test ban must, by definition, be capable of attracting universal adherence. It goes without saying that the prospects for this would be vastly better if all those States involved in nuclear testing participated in work on the treaty from the outset. While it is true that the Working Group established by this Committee is not, for the time being, empowered to begin negotiations on a CTB, it does have the opportunity to make an invaluable contribution to that end. Indeed, the fact that the Working Group does not have a negotiating mandate is all the more reason why no delegation should abstain from participation.

Australia can feel only regret and disappointment that two of the nuclear-weapon States have seen fit not to join in this endeavour. The Australian public has long been concerned at continued nuclear testing, particularly in our region. It will not be an easy task for the Australian Government to explain why two States, both having excellent relations with Australia, have declined to join in discussions aimed ultimately at a halt to such testing. Australia hopes that France and China will reconsider their positions and at an early date take up their rightful place in the nuclear test ban Working Group.

Australia similarly hopes that the negotiations between the other three nuclear-weapon States may be resumed at the earliest possible date.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Under the able chairmanship of Dr. Ericsson of Sweden, the Group has proposed the establishment of a global seismological network to assist in the verification of a potential CTBT. The Ad Hoc Group is pursuing its work by elaborating in detail how such a global system should be operated. A problem of particular importance in this regard is how to achieve rapid, reliable exchange of the large volumes of seismic data which would be accumulated. In the years that have gone by since the Ad Hoc Group first proposed the global system (in 1978 in document CCD/558), there have been rapid technological advances with respect to computer and data communication technology. This has opened up new possibilities to improve the effectiveness of the global data exchange, and Norway considers it important that the work of the Ad Hoc Group take advantage of this new situation.

As a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Group, a low-cost computer system has been developed for the purpose of rapid international exchange of seismic data. The system would be suitable as a prototype which could be further developed for future installation at any station in the global seismic network.

In this connection I have the honour to introduce the Norwegian working paper contained in document CD/310 on a prototype system for the international exchange of seismological data under a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a prototype has been developed by scientists at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) as a result of a research project which was initiated in 1980 under the sponsorship of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon a demonstration of how such a system functions will be staged by representatives of NORSAR.

It is our hope that this national contribution will prove to be of value to the further studies of the seismic expert Group and the negotiations in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which in its first phase will focus on verification.

As we have pointed out before, the Norwegian Government is prepared to make NORSAR available as a monitoring station within a global seismic verification system. With this in mind, Norway will continue to take an active part in the seismic expert Group. We shall also participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban as an observer.

According to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its regular sessions, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Norway welcomed the decision taken at the beginning of this year's session on a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Based on document CD/CW/WP.33 and under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka, the negotiations are now entering a new phase, aimed at reaching compromises on the main outstanding questions. In this regard, Norway has with interest studied the proposals concerning verification contained in the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention which were introduced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the second special session.

The Norwegian Government is of the opinion that a ban on chemical weapons is one of the most important issues on the international agenda for disarmament.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Today, I have the pleasure to introduce document CD/311, which is a Norwegian working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention. The working paper is based on a research programme on sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions. This research programme, which is also sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was initiated in 1981 as a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The working paper contains a summary of the research report. The full report is annexed to the English version of the working paper.

This working paper describes the results of field experiments of sampling and analysis of supertoxic nerve and mustard agents under winter conditions. Field experiments have been undertaken in order to avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory set-up. The samples were left outside in the prevailing weather conditions of changing temperature, wind and relative humidity, which are hard to simulate in a laboratory exercise.

Within the framework of the research programme we have studied the various factors determining the loss of chemical agents, in order to evaluate the probability of making a negative or positive conclusion. We have also investigated the penetration and diffusion of the chemical agents in snow, problems of the utmost importance for sampling procedures. In addition, we have looked into the problem of transporting samples from the field to an internationally recognized laboratory. The field experiments showed that identification of chemical agents can be made by analysis of snow samples taken as long as two weeks, and in some cases even more than four weeks, after possible use. Verification of nerve agents such as Vx and Soman can be achieved over a longer period than is the case for Sarin and Tabun.

In the last part of the working paper we have made some concluding remarks concerning the consultative committee to be established within the framework of the convention.

The committee should be authorized to conduct on-site inspections in order to fulfil its responsibilities. In our view, the committee should establish a pool of well-qualified international experts from whom a multilateral team of experts could be selected in each case.

As soon as possible after its establishment, the committee should adopt verification procedures flexible enough to take account of any new scientific achievement. In elaborating the procedures for on-site inspection it is necessary to take into account the time element.

In the second phase of the Norwegian research programme which will take part during the winter of 1983, we intend to study problems related to storage of samples until they can be analysed by an internationally recognized laboratory. We shall also investigate the behaviour of other agents such as irritants and precursors. Efforts will also be devoted to the possibility of using the decomposition products of chemical agents under winter conditions as additional evidence of identification, since this may significantly extend the possibility for drawing firm conclusions for a long period after possible use.

... the ... of ... the ... of ...

This applies in the first place to the recent ... of the United States ...

The ... of ... in the ... of ...

We ... like to believe that ... of ...

It is ... that the ... of ...

We ... as a ... of ...

The ... of ... of ...

It is ... to ... of ...

During the ... of ... the ... of ...

(Mr. Erdembilig, Mongolia)

ad hoc working group on agenda item 1 aroused the hope of the Mongolian delegation that it would be possible to begin concrete negotiations on this question. However, in view of the new circumstances, doubts arise as to the sincerity and reality of the intentions of certain nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee and their willingness to embark on genuine negotiations.

This applies in the first place to the recent decision of the United States Administration not to resume the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, which they had broken off, as well as to another of its decisions — the decision not to ratify the bilateral Soviet-American agreements signed in 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is perfectly obvious that the United States does not wish to show willingness to negotiate with a view to drawing up an international legal instrument on a total nuclear weapon test ban. This is the only explanation for the attitude of the present United States Administration on this question.

The recent formal declarations by France and China of their refusal to participate in negotiations in the new Ad Hoc Working Group have caused general concern. The positions adopted on this issue by certain other States are also well known to us. Thus, on this question a situation is emerging which is quite familiar to us from the past.

We should like to believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will be able to do some useful work during the short time that remains at this session. We consider that in future this Group should deal seriously more with questions of substance. In this connection, the practical and business-like participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception is necessary.

It is well known to all that the Soviet Union and other socialist States, as well as many non-aligned and neutral countries are in favour of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by all States, in all environments and for all time.

We take as a starting point that it is not only important to strengthen the 1963 Moscow Treaty, by making it more universal, but also urgently necessary to elaborate and implement a comprehensive solution in this field.

The Mongolian delegation shares the opinion of the majority of the members of the Committee, including a number of western delegations, that the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on questions, verification and compliance should not focus purely on the technical side of the issue, but should be aimed at achieving a political and legal solution in order to facilitate the drawing up of an international agreement on a complete and general nuclear test ban. This is precisely what we see as the major goal of the Ad Hoc Working Group

Allow me now to make some comments on behalf of the Mongolian delegation on agenda item 4.

During the second part of its current session, the Committee on Disarmament is paying particular attention to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, one of the most pressing tasks in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. First of all, I should like to refer to the vigorous activity of the Working Group under the able and energetic guidance of the Ambassador of Poland, Comrade B. Sujka. A considerable number of formal and informal meetings and many consultations have been held, and in addition eight working contact groups have been

(Mr. Erdembilig, Mongolia)

set up in which intensive work is being done. In a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, two weeks ago, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group held consultations with experts on a number of technical questions, in which 35 specialists from 23 countries took part. All this bears witness to the priority importance which delegations attach to the speediest possible solution in the Committee of the question of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

My delegation does not intend at this stage to sum up the present state of the work in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. I should like merely to refer to something which we consider very important. As has frequently been observed here, as a result of the careful and thorough consideration of chemical weapons problems, there now exist all the conditions for real progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We believe that various things have contributed to this situation, foremost among them being the submission by the Soviet Union of a new document entitled, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", which contains quite a number of new elements relating to the solution of the most complicated issues. The Mongolian delegation would like to express the hope that the other partners in the negotiations will also take responsible steps towards the accomplishment of this difficult but vitally necessary task in the sphere of genuine disarmament.

In view of the pressing and urgent need to achieve agreement in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons, and of the signs of progress which are becoming apparent in the negotiations, the Mongolian delegation supports the proposal that agreement should be reached on an indicative date for the conclusion of the drafting of the convention. We also consider that at this stage the Ad Hoc Working Group could conclude its work on the preparation and submission to the Committee of a composite text of a draft of the future convention by the end of this session. We believe that for this purpose the Working Group should be given the necessary additional time to enable it to conclude its work with the best possible results.

In conclusion allow me to make some comments concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

According to its programme of work, in the fifth week of this part of its session, the Committee on Disarmament will proceed to discuss agenda item 7.

During both the spring and the summer parts of the Committee's session, almost all delegations have spoken in favour of the creation of an ad hoc working group. There was a general understanding in the Committee on the setting up of this subsidiary body. In order to facilitate the speediest possible adoption of a formal decision on this question, during the first part of the session the Mongolian delegation formally submitted a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group for consideration by the Committee and proposed that consultations should be held with a view to reaching agreement on the text.

As you know, so far no specific comments have been made on the draft mandate we put forward, nor have any amendments or additions to it been suggested.

(Mr. Rodriguez Navarro, Venezuela)

We hope that the results of this new stage will exceed expectations, to the benefit of all.

Agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons", is another of the topics to which we should give special attention during this short summer session.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which has been meeting since 20 July, offers fairly encouraging prospects since a minimum degree of consensus has been reached on some points on which there were diverging views.

Working document CD/220, submitted by the Chairman of the Group, has given rise to comments and specific proposals from countries which are active in the discussions on the revision of the Elements (document CD/CW/WP.33).

This stage is a positive one in the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, in that connection, it must be borne in mind that the future convention should not merely be a tenuous supplement to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, but an instrument which extends the scope of its content and eradicates once and for all the inhuman use of such weapons. At the same time, it should be an agreement which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and/or transfer of chemical products for military purposes. In addition, it must provide effective machinery for the elimination of existing stocks and installations for non-peaceful purposes.

With regard to the controversial aspect of verification of the implementation of the provisions of the future convention and subsequent compliance with its provisions, my country considers it appropriate to provide adequate means for national measures of verification using modern methods selected by the sovereign State. Provision should be made for scientific international verification where necessary, provided that this does not prejudice the security of any State and that it forms an element of international aid and co-operation in ensuring strict compliance with the convention by the nations which adhere to it, in the cause of peace.

At this crucial and difficult stage of the work of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons, we must not allow any dilution of the results already achieved and, more important, political will must not be allowed to be conspicuous by its absence in these decisive discussions.

Another area of concern to my country is the militarization of outer space and the placing of satellites in synchronous geostationary orbit, to the point of saturation, for purposes that are not exactly peaceful. This directly affects the security of all countries and particularly that of the equatorial countries.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

distort the principles, priorities and objectives which had been clearly laid down for the disarmament negotiations, thus proving, despite their later disclaimers, that they did not share the views enshrined in that important document.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has speeded up its work and seems likely under the skilful guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, to give us concrete results.

We must remember, however, that there are still important issues on which it has not been possible to reconcile opposing views, in particular the scope of the prohibition and questions of verification.

It may be recalled, in order to have a clearer picture of realities and the present situation, that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons began its work with an inadequate mandate. When at last those States which had opposed the broadening of its mandate agreed to its reformulation, there came the decision to start manufacturing new chemical weapons systems, which placed a new obstacle in the way of negotiations on this important topic and jeopardized all that had been achieved in earlier years.

It must be recognized that the advent of binary weapons, as many experts in the various groups of States have said, particularly complicates the two aspects of determination of toxicity and verification, which must be dealt with in any agreement.

As far as verification is concerned it is obvious that, in the first place, it cannot be talked about in general and abstract terms. It must necessarily be linked to the scope of any prohibition. In the case of chemical weapons, the prohibition must be broad enough to take into account the enormous range of lethal and supertoxic chemical substances, as well as other harmful substances and their precursors, the range of which has been considerably expanded with the advent of binary weapons.

Similarly, we must not allow ourselves to be distracted by the sterile debate which opposes national means and international forms of verification. Every verification measure applies to a concrete agreement, and both national means of verification and the international system of verification that is to be established should be taken into account. The two things should be interrelated, and this idea must be accepted if we are really interested in making progress in our work.

The situation with regard to a nuclear test ban is in some respects similar.

From 1979 onwards, the Committee on Disarmament was unable to establish a working group to deal with the first item on its agenda because two States (the United States and the United Kingdom) were opposed to its doing so.

When it finally succeeded in establishing a working group, and all the indications were that we were about to begin consideration of this item, it was suddenly claimed that negotiations could not be initiated for the time being, thus removing all credibility and effectiveness from the Group's work.

Moreover, it should also be recalled that the Group of 21 accepted the present mandate only conditionally, and that its views as to the best way of dealing with the item are set forth in document CD/181. While we are disappointed in the present mandate, we should also be dissatisfied with any other action short of negotiations.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

theories, that are as dangerous as they are unfounded, into a prime element in the nuclear policy of none other than one of the two superpowers. We venture to hope that this is not the case, and that we shall soon hear in this room a statement by that country's delegation that will allay our fears.

For my delegation is firmly convinced that, as is stated in the last report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons which I have already quoted, a nuclear war would represent -- in the words of the report -- "the highest level of human madness", and that all the calculations and forecasts made in that respect should have as their sole inspiration that -- as the Secretary-General said -- "there should never be a nuclear war".

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the Indonesian delegation has on previous occasions stated its position regarding chemical weapons. However, in view of the importance Indonesia attaches to the item, and after listening to the statements made on this item in the plenary in the last few days, my delegation wishes to express its views on certain important aspects of the problem of chemical weapons.

First of all, my delegation shares the views expressed by many delegations that the Committee should give priority to this item and that further serious efforts should be made in order that the Committee can make substantial progress in elaborating a convention on chemical weapons. It is needless to emphasize the magnitude of the devastation and harmful effects caused by the use of chemical weapons, as history has clearly indicated. It is all the more so if we take into account, and add, the impact of technological advance to that magnitude. The alleged use of chemical weapons in armed conflicts in certain parts of the world have further generated serious concern in my country. The magnitude of the devastation and damage these weapons inflicted on human beings and other elements of the living world has strengthened my delegation's conviction that the Committee will make an invaluable contribution to mankind if it could make substantial progress in the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. In this connection I should like to express our appreciation to the delegation of the Soviet Union for having presented a proposal on the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention which will be useful to our joint efforts.

As regards the general elements of the convention, we take the view that documents CD/220 and CD/CW/WP.33 constitute sound bases for our further efforts. In the plenary we have expressed our views with regard to the method of work for dealing with those elements and my delegation has made serious attempts to make the necessary contributions in various "homework groups". I wish to take this opportunity to express our views on certain elements of the convention. Frankly, I was surprised when I listened to the statements made by a few delegations in this plenary, not only questioning, at this stage of our work, the validity or the legitimacy of the arguments in favour of the inclusion of a provision in the scope prohibiting the use of chemical weapons but also saying that the effort to include such provision will complicate reaching agreement. To support their views, they have contended that since the convention will prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons and the means of production of such weapons, then the proposal to include a prohibition of use is baseless and unnecessary. They have contended further that such inclusion will undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Other delegations, including my own, have put forward valid arguments in favour of the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the convention. For this reason, I do not want to go through those arguments again. I believe, however, that it is of great importance for this Committee to note that there is no logic in the argument that since the development and production of chemical weapons are to be prohibited by the convention, it will not be necessary to prohibit their use. Statements made in this Committee at previous sessions as well as at this session have clearly indicated the inadequacy of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, caused among other things by its limited scope of application, the lack of a verification régime and the apparent built-in mechanism which renders the use of conventional weapons a possibility. Those weaknesses were in fact and in part due to the rapid development in technology which now has confronted us with new imperatives, and had nothing to do with the goodwill of the parties concluding the Protocol. And it is precisely because of those shortcomings that we are attempting to elaborate a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons. As to the contention that a prohibition to develop, produce and stockpile will subsume a prohibition to use, my delegation would like humbly to submit the following. First, the Convention we are elaborating will certainly not be applied in a vacuum. It will be applied in a situation where some countries will already have stockpiles and arsenals of chemical weapons. Under this circumstance, before a State party could destroy such chemical weapons, for practical reasons, there will be a time lapse during which that State, for reasons of national security, could probably use the chemical weapons at its disposal legally, simply because there is no provision in the convention which bans or prohibits their use; hence the 1925 Geneva Protocol mechanism will operate. This is a legal lacuna which we want to avoid and overcome. Secondly, since it is generally agreed that the scope would include a prohibition to acquire chemical weapons, and since actually it could also be said that prohibition to develop, produce and stockpile chemical weapons will subsume the prohibition to acquire, my delegation can not understand why certain delegations treat the question of non-use differently from the question of non-acquisition by opposing the inclusion of non-use. On the relations between the proposal to include prohibition of use in the scope and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, we would like to take this opportunity to assure those delegations that we have no intention whatsoever to undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which Indonesia itself is a party.

My delegation has indicated in its statement in plenary of its appreciation of the developments in the informal consultations concerning various elements of the convention, including the scope. While we are taking a firm position in favour of the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the scope, we are prepared to study alternative approaches which could generate a consensus. In this connection, we are also prepared to include in the "package solution" a provision in the convention which will ensure that a convention which includes a provision on the prohibition of use will not undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Our position on the question of non-use is motivated simply by fear and anxiety created by the destructive effects of chemical weapons on living structures as well as by the fact that modern technology has been developing in such a way that it has lowered the threshold for the production and use of chemical weapons.

Another important element of the convention is definition. We take note of the positive developments reported informally to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the progress of informal consultations on this matter. It is my delegation's view that we should work out a comprehensive definition of chemical weapons which

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

will best serve the basic purpose of the convention, namely, a total ban of chemical weapons in all their forms and methods of use. It is necessary, therefore, that the definition should include environmental warfare agents, including herbicides. Indonesia is a developing country whose economy depends primarily on agriculture. The use of such chemical agents would no doubt adversely affect our livelihood as well as the ecological balance.

Useful informal consultations have also been carried out on another element of the convention, namely, the element concerning destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion. General understanding seems to be developing on various aspects of the element. It is not my intention, of course, to prejudge the report on these informal consultations yet to be made. I would simply like to reiterate the need to separate the obligation to destroy chemical weapons from the possibility of diversion for peaceful uses. It is also important to stress that international co-operation would be required for finding simple destruction methods to be used not only for destroying chemical warfare agents but also for destroying industrial wastes which have increasingly inflicted harmful effects on the environment, especially in developing countries.

It is generally agreed that any convention prohibiting chemical weapons will not achieve the desired effect if it does not contain adequate provisions on verification. We consider that the verification regime constitutes one of the most essential elements of the convention. It is our duty to elaborate a regime which will include a viable and effective verification system and mechanism. They should reflect a balance between national and international verification. The verification regime should also include a verification mechanism for every important stage of implementation of the obligations under the convention, including the verification of declarations of possession or non-possession of chemical weapons as well as the verification of non-use.

Finally, as time does not permit me to express my delegation's views on all the other elements of the convention, my delegation reserves its right to state its views on those elements if and when it deems it appropriate.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I take the floor today for personal -- yet relevant -- reasons. Our plenary meeting today is a nostalgic one for us all, for it is the last one which we shall share with our distinguished colleague and esteemed friend, Ambassador Venkateswaran, who now departs from our midst for new diplomatic vistas.

He represents a country noted for, among other things, gurus and has, in many respects, been a guru to us. Although he modestly shuns that title, Ambassador Venkateswaran has diligently sought to lead us toward worthy goals. He has injected into all of our deliberations, as well as in our personal and social contacts, that infinite wisdom usually associated with Indian gurus. Centuries of intellectual and cultural development form the well-spring of his sagacity. We have all been enriched by his contributions, and will be diminished by his departure. To his wisdom, he added the sparkle of his wit. A storyteller in the great tradition of his cultural heritage, he has enlivened our debates, as well as our social contacts. If I may compare him to a wellknown philosopher from my country, Ambassador Venkateswaran is India's diplomatic answer to Will Rogers -- a man with a rare gift of relating truth and wisdom through humour. Indeed, the loss of his humour will leave us a more sombre and unleavened body.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The transmission of this complete set of parameters via the GTS/WMO system on the basis of an official recognition of the Group of Experts by WMO;

Examination, by practical tests, of the possibility of the transmission of Level 2 data over WMO lines as well as other data channels; the elaboration of standard formats for this purpose;

The development and experimental verification of analytical procedures in data centres, using modern evaluation methods, and leading to a comparison of results of Level 1 and Level 2 data respectively.

I would like to stress that a more experimental orientation of the work of the experts would provide results which would be particularly valuable for those countries which are not seismologically equipped themselves and which could use the exchange system as a basis for their own verification efforts in the field of nuclear testing. In any event, my delegation feels that both the work of the Group of Experts during this year and our debate in plenary on 24 August have demonstrated the necessity of building into the mandate the assumption that all participating countries are politically and technically prepared to apply the most recent insights of science and technology, and make the fullest conceivable use of them.

Turning now to the field of chemical weapons, I would like to voice the satisfaction of my delegation over the mode of work which the Ad Hoc Working Group in that field has adopted. The present negotiating method of launching a number of small, spirited groups without a precise mandate has turned out to be quite successful. This is an experiment in multilateral negotiation from which we may wish to draw our lessons for other endeavours as well. We should commend Chairman Sujka for having introduced this flexible negotiation scenario; for the first time, our chemical weapons negotiators have gone beyond the mere juxtaposition of the positions of individual country perspectives. They have now started to evaluate the difference between their views and to agree, increasingly, on common positions.

Earlier during this session my delegation commented upon a particularly important feature of the current negotiating session: the new language on international verification offered in New York by the Soviet delegation and reintroduced here. We have tried to move the negotiation along constructively by asking the Soviet delegation some questions on aspects which we thought would need further clarification. These questions were put forward in document CD/CW/CRP.63. In order to make our list of questions even clearer, and to

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

facilitate responses by the Soviet delegation, we joined forces a few days later with the Dutch delegation to reformulate our small questionnaire and to structure it more logically. I am grateful to Ambassador Issraelyan for having supplied some initial answers to our first series of questions in his statement on 12 August. At that juncture it was quite obviously impossible to have replies ready on all our questions. We all recognize how complex this subject matter is. Yet, reiterating the high interest of my delegation in the Soviet Union's views, I would like to state that my delegation continues to hope for a full formal response to our queries at the appropriate time. The Soviet Union has been particularly articulate in stressing the urgency of an early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Since it appears that the clarifications in the international verification realm which my delegation seeks would be important for rapid progress in our negotiation, we can confidently assume that early replies to our questionnaire would help to advance the course of our negotiations. I would also like to remind the distinguished Soviet delegate that my delegation was immediately ready to supply answers to similar questions in the verification field which were directed to us after the circulation of our working paper CD/265. I myself addressed these questions in a detailed statement in plenary on 15 April, and my delegation took an opportunity to elaborate our replies and elucidate additional aspects in direct contact with our Soviet colleagues. Some degree of reciprocity would certainly be welcome.

In conclusion, may I make a brief statement in my capacity as the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In response to the letter circulated at the beginning of our session on 3 August, I have received full replies from 13 delegations, and one reply from the spokesman of a regional group, purporting to speak for its eight members. That makes replies from about half the members of the Committee. I am particularly grateful to those who have responded. In the next few days I would be pleased to be available to those who prefer oral communications and to those who would like to elaborate on their written replies. I would ask those delegations to contact me at the earliest possible point. A formal meeting of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will be held in the afternoon of 2 September. I intend during that session to report on the views expressed to me and to make suggestions for the further course of work.

(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

should be universally accepted and call on the States in a position to acquire nuclear weapons to refrain from doing so in the interests of all. Agreement now by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to end testing would show that they, too, are willing to accept restraints and would give great encouragement to those of us who want to see a non-proliferation Treaty firmly established and accepted by all. In the words of the Palme Commission, a comprehensive test ban "would enhance the acceptability and credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty".

In view of the great importance which the Irish Government attaches to agreement on a comprehensive test ban, it is for us a matter of great regret that the prospects for reaching agreement have not improved in recent months. The trilateral talks to which we attach great importance have not resumed and recent reports are somewhat pessimistic regarding the prospects for an early resumption. However, we are confident that the last word has not been heard on this and we, for our part, continue to hope for an early resumption. It is our view that concrete discussion between the nuclear-weapon States principally involved is essential if the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament are to be crowned with success.

Those outside the Committee on Disarmament have watched your efforts within the Committee in recent years to come to grips with this most important question, including your efforts to agree on the establishment of a working group. We are, of course, aware that you did decide in April of this year to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and that you agreed on the mandate which would be given to that Group. I must confess immediately that the mandate which was agreed on would not have been the one which we would have suggested. I would add that in our view the discussion should involve all the nuclear-weapon States.

I would recall that on 29 February 1972 the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, speaking to the CCD, the predecessor of this Committee, regarding a comprehensive test ban, stated: "I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement." The problem of verification has, of course, been closely linked over the years with discussion of a comprehensive test ban. However, it seems to my delegation that what the Secretary-General said in 1972 is certainly true today. The quest for an infallible verification method may prove to be a very long one, but the margin of error in verification is being constantly reduced by scientific developments in detection and identification. We must be prepared to seek a balanced solution. That, of course, is what the Secretary-General meant in 1972 when he expressed the view that only a political decision was now necessary in order to achieve final agreement.

From what I have said it will be clear why my delegation has had some initial reservations regarding the mandate of the new Ad Hoc Working Group. However, this does not mean that our attitude to it is a negative one. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group allows the Committee to start work on this most important subject. We are also encouraged by our experience of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons which originally had what we might describe as a somewhat limited mandate. In spite of that limited mandate it has been able, as we know, to do extremely useful work. We would hope that in the light of that experience the Ad Hoc Working Group which has now been established to deal with the subject of a comprehensive test ban will be able to carry out similarly useful work.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

We recognize, of course, that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in such negotiations. But this responsibility ceases to be exclusive as soon as the issues under discussion are such as to affect the security of all States.

The initiation of restricted negotiations, however important, cannot be used as an argument to justify the holding up of the multilateral process of negotiation. My delegation remains convinced of the need to set up an ad hoc working group to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify the basic questions to be dealt with in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We also support the Indian proposal for the establishment, under this item, of a working group to negotiate, as the first stage in the negotiating process on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is more urgent than ever today to adopt effective measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Another item on our agenda second only in importance to that of nuclear weapons is the question of chemical weapons. The negotiations on this subject are extremely promising, to judge by the progress made -- slow, it is true, but substantial -- and the intensity of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka. The Group has in fact embarked on the delicate and crucial stage of trying to reach a compromise on the questions which remain at issue.

The main tasks remaining before the Working Group are to find a balance acceptable to all parties between national means of verification and the international verification system and to reconcile the positions of delegations on the question of a clause prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. On the latter point it appears that the Working Group is near a compromise which, without prejudice to the Protocol of 1925, meets the requirements of delegations demanding the inclusion of such a provision. The solution of these two important questions will mean that an appreciable advance has been made towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the item for discussion at our meeting today. No one is unaware of the importance of this subject in view of the threat of the extension of the arms race to outer space which is increasing day by day. The use of space technology for military purposes greatly increases the risk of outer space becoming the arena of rivalries and constituting a threat to peace, security and the peaceful use of space. Paragraph 80 of the Final Document of 1978 states that further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In the consideration of this question, the importance and complexity of which no one can deny, a global approach should be adopted covering all types of armaments and all activities connected with the development, production, stockpiling and deployment and use in outer space of all types of weapons, while allowing the right of every State to engage in the exploration and the peaceful use of outer space. All negotiations on this question ought, moreover, to include a consideration of measures to promote international co-operation in the matter of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

(Mrs. Ekanga Kabeya, Zaire)

My delegation hopes that in spite of that failure the Working Group, which will resume its activities only in 1983, under the distinguished guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, will make good use of the respite which has been granted it to conduct varied and constructive consultations with a view to devising a comprehensive programme of disarmament acceptable to all. The same applies to the working groups on security assurances and radiological weapons, whose work has been suspended until the end of this year.

My delegation is very much interested in the consideration of measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind and ought to be used by States solely for peaceful purposes. My delegation is ready to agree to any constructive proposal in this connection and fully supports the idea of the consideration of this subject during the present session in a working group set up for the purpose.

My delegation considers chemical weapons the most barbarous and murderous weapons of mass destruction and has always been in favour of their total elimination.

We reaffirm our support for General Assembly resolution 35/144B which urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, negotiations towards the adoption of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

We believe that a general and verifiable prohibition of the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons of all types would constitute an important step towards general and complete disarmament.

My delegation would like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, for the noteworthy progress the Group is continuing to make under his efficient guidance.

We are glad to see that the proposal made at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament that meetings of ad hoc working groups should be concentrated in time for the sake of greater efficiency has been applied in the matter of chemical weapons.

Lastly, the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of universal concern. Like very many other members of the Committee, we believe that in order to create conditions conducive to the disarmament process, all States without exception should comply strictly with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, refrain from any actions which might be prejudicial to the efforts being made in the disarmament sphere, adopt a constructive attitude towards the negotiations and manifest the political will to reach agreements.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Zaire for her statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

context of other measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and also take into account other comments made during this session, in particular by the delegations of India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.,

The Soviet delegation acknowledges the technical complexity of space problems, to which the representative of the United States referred in his statement at our plenary meeting of 10 August. In our view, however, this fact does not argue in favour of putting off the discussion of the question for ever but rather in favour of supporting the Mongolian delegation's proposal for the setting up of a working group on this subject before the end of the Committee's present session.

It must be said that statements made at the Committee's plenary meeting on 31 August, as also today's statement by the representative of France, show that material for negotiations exists.

We appeal to the United States delegation to reconsider its approach and we firmly urge the establishment of an ad hoc working group which would permit the Committee to begin serious negotiations on this exceptionally important problem with the participation of experts.

In conclusion, we should like to stress that one of the most important tasks of the Committee is to do everything in its power to help prevent the possibility of space becoming a source of military danger for States, which will inevitably happen if weapons of any kind are installed in outer space. We, for our part, are ready to engage in honest, equal and business-like negotiations with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In connection with the questions put by many delegations, and in particular those contained in document CD/503, concerning certain elements in the Soviet basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the delegation of the USSR would like to offer certain comments on a number of these questions which appear to us to present a broad interest.

As regards other questions that have been put, we intend to answer them in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

First of all, I should like to make a comment of a general nature. As you know, the Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the international community a draft text on basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- which means what it says, basic provisions and not a precise text of the entire convention. This, of course, was done deliberately. For it seems to us that in order to draft such an important and complex international convention we must first of all agree on its basic provisions, the "skeleton" of the convention, as it were, to which we can then add with less expenditure of effort the "muscles" of appendices, lists, quotas, protocols, etc.

Let us now look at the questions.

We were asked why we had included a special provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

Well, of course, it was not by chance that we included in the draft basic provisions a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States and on the removal of such weapons from those territories and their

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

subsequent destruction. There were very good reasons for this. The inclusion of this provision is based on reality, namely, the practice of certain States, which have stationed stocks of chemical weapons outside the boundaries of their national territory. For example, according to numerous press reports, there has been a good deal of political tension recently about the location of stores of American chemical weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This fact is clear evidence of the merit of including in the draft convention a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

An obligation in this sense ought, in our view, to enter into force simultaneously with ratification of the convention and continue for the entire period of its validity. Naturally, the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the territories of other States will demand a certain amount of time, depending on the quantity of the stocks so stationed. We would propose reaching agreement on such periods of time. How is the fulfilment of this obligation to be verified? Such verification can be carried out through national technical means, and also upon request.

There is another and not unimportant aspect: our proposal aims at preventing the deployment of binary weapons in parts, for example, by the members of military blocs as part of a "division of labour", so to speak, between them. For example, stocks of one component of a binary weapon could be stationed on the territory of one State and stocks of the second component on that of another. Such a possibility must, of course, be reckoned with, and that is what we are trying to do.

Another of the questions put to us concerns substances produced for permitted purposes which, it is proposed, should be included in a list of chemicals presenting a particular danger from the point of view of their possible diversion to use for purposes of chemical weapons. Preparing and agreeing on such a list will, frankly, be very difficult, in particular because this question directly affects both the chemical industry and the use of chemicals for military purposes not connected with chemical weapons. An illustrative list of certain substances -- as has been suggested -- will not solve this problem. I should like to take this opportunity to appeal to delegations to take an active part, at the appropriate stage, in efforts to find a concrete answer to this undoubtedly important question, with the help of their technical experts.

Considerable interest was expressed in the section of the draft basic provisions devoted to verification.

On the question of verification of the destruction of stocks, in particular, we assume that in addition to national verification, declarations, etc., a number of international procedures will be applied also. One of these might be when an additional exchange of information is necessary between interested States concerning the factual state of affairs. Another procedure might be the conduct of on-site inspections upon request if an exchange of information has not provided a satisfactory solution. Another, and independent -- and I would repeat, independent -- measure envisaged is that of systematic international verification of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota.

Questions were put to us about certain particular aspects of this form of inspection. But it would surely be better for the participants in the negotiations to reach an agreement in principle that during the period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons or their diversion to permitted purposes there should be provision for the possibility of the conduct of systematic international on-site inspections

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities. If such a provision for inclusion in the convention were agreed on in principle, which unfortunately is not the case at present, that would constitute a great step forward and we could then consider methods of implementing that agreement -- and I repeat, agreement. Such an agreement does not yet exist.

The same applies to verification that the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals at specialized facilities does not exceed the upper limit of one tonne. We propose that such a facility should operate under national verification with very strict registration of amounts of initial products consumed and chemicals produced, that its location should be declared and that provision should be made for the carrying out of international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) to verify the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at such a facility. But it may be asked, have we reached agreement in principle on this question too? I think not although there would not seem to be any obvious insuperable obstacles to our doing that.

We are also in agreement with those delegations which, judging by their questions, are concerned about how verification can be conducted with respect to the possible production of the precursors of supertoxic substances and, in truth, of binary weapons, at commercial enterprises. As for arguments that binary weapons and their production can be dealt with in the same way as other types of chemical weapons, we do not find them very convincing. Such arguments do not eliminate the problem of verifying that precursors for binary weapons are not being produced, in particular at commercial enterprises.

I should also like to stress one other point. Whatever types of activity we may consider and whatever obligations under the Convention may be involved, in practice, according to the Soviet draft basic provisions international verification in the form of on-site inspection upon request would in general be applicable. We were asked about the procedure for carrying out this form of verification. In this connection I should like to point out that such a procedure has been worked out in detail in the course of negotiations on other international agreements and treaties and the experience gained in the course of those negotiations, in particular the Soviet-Anglo-American negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, could obviously be applied also to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I should like to take the opportunity to make a few brief comments on the course of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Committee. There is no doubt that the Ad Hoc Working Group under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Sujka has done a great deal of useful work: mutual understanding has widened on many important aspects of the convention; differences of views have in many instances been reduced or minimized, and possible agreed formulations are even beginning to emerge. At the same time, however, in the Soviet delegation's view, there have appeared certain undesirable tendencies diverting us from the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These tendencies are evident in the fact that, instead of consolidating the basic provisions of the future convention, on which consensus is in sight, some delegations have been trying to divert the discussion to secondary and at times purely technical matters. And the number of these matters is constantly growing.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Some seem to regard the Committee as a place providing courses for the improvement of skills, and force the Committee to investigate technological methods which they have not tried out themselves, not to speak of the fact that other delegations have serious doubts about these methods.

Of course no one denies the possibility of using technical progress and the achievements of science for ensuring the effective fulfilment of international agreements, but we must not put the cart before the horse and substitute academic discussions of various kinds for political readiness. If we follow this course, with our frankly rather slow tempo of negotiations, we shall never catch up with technical progress. The existing technical procedures will be replaced by new ones; those new ones will be replaced by even newer ones, and so on. We are opposed to the conversion of the Committee into a scientific and technical society. We believe that agreement on key aspects of a chemical weapons convention such as the scope of the prohibition, declarations, confidence-building measures, verification and other aspects of the future convention should be consolidated and not made artificially dependent on the solution of particular issues.

Not long ago, during one of her visits abroad, the Prime Minister of India recalled an old Indian tradition, namely, to find something about which agreement can be reached, even if it is only something very small; that is a starting point, and you must then try to enlarge the area of agreement. That is an old and wise Indian tradition.

Those are the comments the Soviet delegation wished to make about the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of Mongolia, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, warmly to welcome you to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of September. We know you well as one of the outstanding diplomats of Mexico and a great specialist with a wealth of experience and knowledge in the sphere of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. This gives us every confidence that the Committee will successfully complete the work of its 1982 session. Allow me sincerely to wish you every success in your responsible task and to assure you that the Mongolian delegation will co-operate closely with you in dealing with the matters that are on the Committee's agenda for this session.

The Mongolian delegation would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his contribution to the work of the Committee during the month of August.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation joins others in welcoming you to the Chair. We all know how much the Committee can benefit in these final stages of its 1982 session from your wisdom, your immense experience, your sense of vision. Ambassador Maina, our previous Chairman, has already departed, but I should like to express to his competent colleagues from the Kenyan delegation the gratitude of my delegation for the fair and circumspect manner in which he has presided over our work.

An expert from my delegation will contribute at this afternoon's informal meeting to the subject of mass destruction weapons which is also officially inscribed on the agenda of our meeting. The comprehensive statement he will make seems to obviate the need for me to address the same issues here. Instead, I should like to speak on three subjects of particular interest to my delegation: firstly, chemical weapons, where I intend to introduce a new working paper; secondly, outer space, where the exceptionally long list of speakers last week prevented me from going on record, and lastly, radiological weapons, where I would briefly like to comment on the process of negotiation as the outgoing Chairman of the Working Group.

My delegation feels gratified that during this summer session efforts have concentrated to a considerable extent on the search for an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and providing for the destruction of existing stocks and production and filling facilities. As a country which, as far back as 1954, renounced, in an international Treaty, the production of chemical weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany has ever since given its strongest support to all efforts aiming at the speedy conclusion of a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which for my Government represents a very important and, above all, perfectly attainable goal.

Chemical weapons are distinct from most weapons in that their use in war is proscribed by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and by customary international law as well. Therefore, chemical weapons should have no role in the military considerations of any State and, if all States were unanimous in this aim, should not exist at all. The time has come for all States to relinquish weapons which have been outlawed for more than half a century and to conclude an international convention to this effect.

A ban on chemical weapons will enhance the security of the contracting parties, but it can fulfil this task only if all parties to the treaty share the conviction that contractual provisions will be fully complied with. The problem of verification is thus of crucial importance. This is a complicated but in no way insoluble issue. National means, as all of us are aware, are not enough. The solution has to be found essentially on the basis of international co-operative, non-discriminating and at the same time effective methods. International on-site inspections to be initiated by a permanent multilateral body of competent experts are an essential part of such a co-operative international verification system. The importance of a chemical weapons ban for my Government is such that I have felt constrained, now that the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to a close, to stress a certain number of general points, even though some of them are widely accepted and often also stated by others in this Committee.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Moving on now to specifics, my authorities have studied with great care the "basic provisions" for a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons which the Soviet Union has recently submitted. They have come to the conclusion that these Soviet proposals, although in a number of areas they fail to provide satisfactory solutions, constitute progress in so far as they acknowledge, in principle, the necessity of systematic on-site inspections.

As delegations will remember, during the spring session the Federal Republic of Germany presented a working paper (CD/265) which outlined our concept of a realistic and efficient verification system.

I have the honour today to introduce a new working paper which elaborates on the ideas contained in document CD/265, taking into account contributions by other delegations and giving further precisions. The main purpose of this new paper, which is numbered CD/326, is to suggest possible formulations for those sections of the chemical weapons convention which are directly linked to the problem of verification. This is to say that the paper suggests language for the chapters dealing with "verification" and the "Consultative Committee" and thereby gives a clear picture of the obligations States will have to undertake in the field of verification.

We propose an effective, practical and reliable verification system which, at the same time, requires only limited personnel and financial resources for its implementation. Our main considerations in this respect are as follows:

A chemical weapons verification system would aspire to provide the highest possible degree of assurance that the treaty obligations are being met by all participants, while not requiring an outsized supervision apparatus.

We propose a solution which establishes a high detection risk for any possible violator by introducing two different types of checks:

(a) One which provides for investigations in case of allegations that treaty obligations are not being observed, are being neglected or are being circumvented. Such "checks on special grounds" must be binding upon the State against which an allegation of breach is levelled. Confidence in the observance of treaty obligations could indeed not develop if it were left entirely to the discretion of the suspected State to admit or refuse a special check, on the grounds that the checks were of a mere voluntary nature. An exception might be made in the event of the request being totally devoid of foundation in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the parties.

(b) Secondly, we propose regular checks upon compliance with key treaty obligations namely: destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, dismantling and destruction of chemical weapons production and filling facilities, observance of the permitted maximum amount for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals as defined by the treaty and compliance with the obligation not to produce chemical weapons. In order to keep the verification system practicable, it is our conviction that regular checks with regard to non-production are indispensable only for that part of the chemical industry which could potentially produce supertoxic chemical agents, and specifically for the producers of organophosphorus compounds. Coverage of this segment

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

of the chemical industry by regular checks would at the same time provide a practical and effective solution to the problem of verifying the non-production of key precursors for binary weapons. On the basis of present technological standards, no major industrial country can be ruled out as a producer of such materials.

There is no need to carry out on-site inspections at all relevant factories as a continuous operation. An adequate degree of confidence will develop if the international Consultative Committee annually decides on a quota of such factories to be inspected, and selects the individual installations by casting lots.

I appeal to all delegations to work towards a solution of the unresolved issues of a convention on the total ban of chemical weapons. As the use of chemical weapons is already proscribed, it should be possible to ban these weapons in a complete and comprehensive manner, and to reach this aim soon. It appears that the main argument for retaining chemical weapons is the fear that others might possess and use them. It is now possible to break this vicious circle.

Before leaving the field of chemical weapons, may I offer a brief comment on Ambassador Issraelyan's statement of 2 September on the subject.

My delegation is grateful for having obtained some further clarification on the questions put to the Soviet delegation, jointly with the Netherlands, in document CD/308, and we are looking forward to replies on the remainder of our queries. As a preparatory step towards the requested formal answers, my delegation would welcome, and be readily available at all times for, the kind of bilateral or trilateral informal exchanges suggested by the Soviet Ambassador.

Ambassador Issraelyan in his statement made references to old stockpiles of United States chemical weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. These stocks are not within the domain of the Federal Government. At the moment of entry into force of a chemical weapons convention, they would have to be declared and destroyed by the United States of America. The implementation of these obligations would be subject to the treaty clauses on verification, which would mean, in our view, to systematic on-site inspections under the auspices of the consultative committee of experts. Although verification would thus take place on German territory, my Government would readily admit these measures in the interest of enhancing international confidence. Needless to say, the very same declaration and verification procedures would have to apply to the substantial stockpiles of Soviet chemical weapons on the territory of East European States and the German Democratic Republic.

My delegation listened attentively last week to the formal exchange of views on the dangers of an arms race in outer space, a topic to which it actively contributed both during the spring session and at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 186th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee will today take up item 8 of its agenda, which includes consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements about any other matter connected with the work of the Committee.

Allow me, first, to offer a warm welcome in the Committee to the new representative of Yugoslavia, His Excellency Ambassador Kazimir Vidas, who is with us today for the first time. Ambassador Vidas is an experienced diplomat who has held important posts in the course of his career. He has taken part in many international conferences as well as in sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and of other international bodies. Ambassador Vidas has in the past been involved in disarmament efforts and has participated very actively in the meetings of the non-aligned movement. In 1978 he was appointed his country's Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He will, I am sure, make an outstanding contribution to the work of our Committee.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of India, the United Kingdom, Cuba, Indonesia, Romania, Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the first of these, the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

Mr. SARAN (India): It is a matter of great pleasure to my delegation to see you, the distinguished representative of friendly Mexico, in the Chair for this crucial month of September when we shall be engaged in finalizing our report to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. Familiar as we are with your experience in, and deep dedication to, disarmament, we have no doubt that within the next few days we shall achieve a successful conclusion to our work for the 1982 session. As always, the delegation of India pledges its full support and co-operation to you in your difficult endeavours.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome on behalf of my delegation, Ambassador Cannock of Peru. We wish him a successful tenure in Geneva and are confident that our two delegations will continue to co-operate as closely as we have done in the past. May I also join you, Mr. Chairman, in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, the representative of a friendly non-aligned country. We wish him all success in his assignment in Geneva.

We have also learnt that Ambassador Summerhayes will be leaving us shortly. I take this opportunity to bid him farewell. Ambassador Summerhayes embodies in himself the best traditions of British diplomacy, and we regret that we shall be losing such an experienced member of this Committee. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to wish him all success in his new assignment.

This summer session of the Committee has been a relatively brief one. In the wake of the dismal failure of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it has also been a session at which much less intensive work has been done than before. Among the items under negotiation, in-depth work has been possible only on chemical weapons. And for this the credit should go to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. It was under his guidance that several informal contact groups on various elements of the future convention have been mapped out, in very

(Mr. Saran, India)

clear and precise detail, including the territory which must be covered in negotiations and the outstanding issues which must be resolved. In many cases the contact groups have gone beyond the stage of identifying existing divergences and have set forth certain promising options which may lead to compromise solutions. It is this kind of work which in our view will bring the objective of a chemical weapons convention closer to realization.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was unable to draw up any conclusions for our future work, primarily because it was unable to reach agreement on an appropriate work programme. While every delegation in the Group agreed that issues relating to verification of compliance cannot be considered in isolation, it did not prove possible to reach consensus on a working hypothesis concerning the nature and the scope of the multilateral treaty that we envisage will eventually emerge through a process of multilateral negotiations. As far as my delegation is concerned, we have consistently taken the position that a treaty on a nuclear test ban should aim at the general and complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. Along with other members of the Group of 21, we have repeatedly stated that such a treaty should be able to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system which is universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and which provides for equal access by all States.

While we regret that we were unable to reach a consensus on a work programme, we should not lose sight of the very interesting and fruitful exchange of views that took place on several key issues related to a nuclear test ban in the Working Group. Certain important queries were addressed to the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the negotiations, concerning their approach to verification. In response to queries from my delegation, one of the parties which had participated in the trilateral negotiations until they were suspended in the Autumn of 1980, i.e. the Soviet Union, confirmed unambiguously that the trilateral negotiators had reached complete agreement on all the elements relating to the verification aspects of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban. That delegation informed the Working Group that the questions awaiting solution related to certain additional measures which would be applicable only to the three parties engaged in those restricted negotiations. This is an extremely significant statement and should be taken due note of by the Committee.

The Soviet Union also confirmed that it considered the means of verification at present available, using both national technical means as well as international co-operative measures for the detection and identification of seismic events, to be more than sufficient to verify compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

It is unfortunate that the two other parties which had been engaged in the trilateral negotiations have not been as forthcoming as the Soviet Union in providing the Working Group with details relating to those negotiations which could be of considerable use to the Working Group.

The United States and the United Kingdom were also asked to specify what they regarded as adequate with respect to verification of a nuclear test ban. These two nuclear-weapon States have in the past taken the position that the means of verification at present available are not capable of giving sufficient assurance that the provisions of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing are being complied with. They have held that the main obstacles in achieving the

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Another positive factor which should not be overlooked when evaluating the work of this session is the outstandingly diligent approach which has characterized the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Under the capable chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, this Group was able to devise a practical method which had a direct effect in furthering the progress of its work. The way in which the contact groups dealt with the various elements of a draft treaty on the full and effective prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons was both positive and fruitful. We hope that, at the next session of the Committee, the Group will be able to build on its achievements during this session and that it will be successful in reaching agreement on a specific text and provisions for the various articles of the draft treaty.

I would now like to turn to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a matter which, after extensive debates during the spring session, we agreed to include on our agenda. At that time I explained Egypt's position in this respect and emphasized the fact that, since the beginning of the second half of this century, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and, in particular, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Egypt had continually advocated the need for an agreement to prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes and to restrict its use to peaceful purposes in furtherance of the interests and progress of mankind. Although agreement was reached in 1967 on the "Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", 15 years after the adoption of that Treaty we still lack an international agreement prohibiting the arms race in outer space and restricting its use to peaceful purposes.

The rapid progress in modern technology and the space sciences calls for an early approach to this item through an ad hoc working group endowed with a general, comprehensive and non-specific mandate within the framework of which it would be able to address all aspects of the problem, including the question of anti-satellite systems.

We are naturally aware of the complexities and ramifications of this question. During the first part of this session last spring, therefore, we proposed that the secretariat should prepare a full collection of all the background documents and proposals relating to this question so that we could identify the various stages through which it has passed. This would undoubtedly save much time and effort which would otherwise be spent in the informal consultations which have been proposed to deal with this question.

At the conclusion of the work of our session we note that, in spite of all the efforts made, there are some issues which have not been addressed. I am referring in particular to the question of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The discussions and consultations that will be taking place during the coming session of the General Assembly may be able to remove some of the obstacles impeding agreement on these two questions.

Possibly no single item on the agenda of the international community has been the subject of greater endeavours than that of disarmament. Hence, the feeling of frustration is felt most keenly by those whose work relates to disarmament questions,

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We hope that in 1983 the Committee will not waste the opportunity that has been offered to it of starting such genuine negotiations and that, on the basis of a programme of work that is as precise as possible, it will thoroughly examine the various questions falling within the mandate that has been given to the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Our agenda covers a large number of subjects, and it is difficult to organize an in-depth discussion of each of them. We should like to suggest, however, that once a main topic has been selected for discussion at the Committee's plenary meetings during a particular week, delegations should try to keep to that topic in their statements and not refer to various others. This would make for greater unity in our debates and our efforts.

It seems to us, moreover, that in 1983, if we want finally to achieve some success in our negotiations, we ought to set aside more time for those questions in respect of which the conditions for genuine negotiations appear to us to have been met. In saying this I am thinking in particular of the prohibition of chemical weapons and that of radiological weapons. This pragmatic approach should be understood as being without prejudice to the fundamental priorities as seen by each of us in the disarmament process. It would be rather a matter of functional priorities dictated by the course of the discussions and encouraged by the chances of success in certain sectors of our work. It seems to us preferable to accept such a functional selectivity rather than maintain a programme of theoretical priorities which, in the end, would merely perpetuate the present state of stagnation of our work.

So far as the prohibition of chemical weapons is concerned, we shall have at our disposal in 1983 an excellent basis for the continuation of the negotiations. I am referring to the reports of the various contact groups which the Chairman of the Working Group had the excellent idea of setting up.

While it is true that agreement on one basic element in the draft convention will always depend on agreement on the other components, our delegations ought nevertheless at the present stage to be very open-minded as regards the procedures to be employed at our next session. It seems to us that the time has come to embark on the stage of drafting a convention. The contact group approach has had the advantage of permitting parallel discussion of all the various elements of the convention. In our work in 1983 we should make use of the lessons learned from this method.

When the Committee meets again for its next session, in 1983, it will have had a long period of reflection, of some eight months, on the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons. The consultations held by the Chairman of the Working Group and his use of a written questionnaire have, we believe, helped to clarify to some extent the various points of view. Our feeling is that we have come closer to the moment when genuine negotiations, covering both the so-called traditional subject matter and the problem of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, should become possible.

Various formulas have been put forward, in particular by Japan, for establishing a link between these two subjects of negotiation. Belgium, too, has in the past offered suggestions for the establishment of such a link. Those proposals were based on article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. They are still valid and could be developed in the light of the new suggestions put forward during the present session.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament is the kind of freeze that the international community is finding it difficult to accept, and we wish to express the hope that this Committee will be able to deal with this issue within a working group when we meet again next year. It would serve our purpose to recollect that negotiations on nuclear disarmament beginning with the concept of a freeze were once conducted in the ENDC by those Powers that are now reluctant to take such a step. Here again, living up to previous commitments and principles is an imperative that we cannot ignore if this Committee is to start work on nuclear disarmament when we meet again next year.

With regard to the test-ban issue, we wish for the present to confine our remarks to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under its given mandate and shall not be commenting on the issue as a whole.

The absence of a work programme has not made possible a systematic and structured discussion, and the exchanges of views which have taken place so far have been more or less of a general nature. However, two different fundamental approaches have once again emerged from the discussions held so far. One approach is that existing technical and scientific means are sufficient to identify a system for verification of compliance with a test ban. To our mind, this approach would make it possible to define the modalities relating to verification.

However, the other approach contends that it cannot be presumed that all technical problems have been resolved with regard to verification. We are apprehensive that this approach will lead the work of the Group into a labyrinth of technical details which will make it difficult to attain our objective of defining the modalities for the verification of compliance.

The negotiations on chemical weapons are now in an advanced stage and detailed requirements as to what a treaty should comprise have now been identified. The convergence of views of the respective positions is an encouraging factor in the negotiations. These developments have led us to believe that the prospects for an agreement are now in sight. Every effort should therefore be made for the realization of a chemical weapons convention when we meet again next year.

The proposal by the delegation of India for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to undertake appropriate and practical measures on the prevention of a nuclear war has been supported by the majority, while a few other delegations were of the view that further clarification of the issues involved would be necessary before consideration could be given to the establishment of an ad hoc working group. The informal exchanges of views which have taken place during this session have been most useful for they have paved the way for further discussions which could make it possible to deal with this issue in an appropriate working group. The desire by all delegations to deal effectively with measures on the prevention of a nuclear war is not in doubt. Needless to say, the complete prevention of a nuclear war can

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

negotiations, contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and confirmed at the second special session, is an important indicator of their true attitude regarding the solution of this urgent disarmament problem.

The attitude shown towards the discussion of the question in the Ad Hoc Working Group on agenda item 1, set up by the Committee on Disarmament at the first part of the session, gives rise to serious fears that the Committee may be used as a screen for the policy of the United States of continuing nuclear weapon tests.

The delegations of the socialist countries share the view of the majority that in order to hold negotiations on agenda item 1 on a constructive basis, it is necessary to broaden the mandate of the Working Group so that its functions include that of elaborating the scope of the future agreement. They also express regret at the refusal of the delegations of two nuclear-weapon Powers to participate in the Working Group and hope that they will reconsider their position in this respect in the near future.

The delegations of the socialist countries note with satisfaction the progress made in working out the elements of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The draft basic provisions of a convention submitted by the delegation of the USSR played a decisive part in the achievement of that progress. To consolidate the results achieved, all delegations must participate constructively and show flexibility. The socialist countries continue to consider it very important that the future convention should take account of new developments in the field of chemical weapons, including all aspects connected with binary or multi-component types of such weapons.

The success of the negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons can be ensured only through the speediest possible achievement of political agreements on the key problems of the convention, and not by making the solution of those problems dependent on the settlement of certain technical questions. The group of delegations of socialist countries will further and support all proposals and initiatives aimed at the speedy achievement of agreement on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

One positive result of the 1982 session is the increased attention given by the Committee to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The proposal submitted by the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question and the draft mandate it contained met with a positive response in the Committee.

It is to be regretted that the opposition of the United States of America has made it impossible to undertake concrete negotiations with a view to preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

The delegations of the socialist countries will continue their efforts towards the solution of this urgent question. They note with satisfaction the awareness of its importance shown by the delegations of the Group of 21, which submitted a draft mandate two days ago, and some western States.

The socialist countries still believe that the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important prerequisites to general and complete disarmament. Concomitant with the lack of progress in the

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to a close. In the brief span of the abbreviated summer part of this session, we have, I believe, achieved some modest accomplishments. My remarks today will focus on these areas of work where progress has been made, and I will as well comment on several issues where our position has been either misunderstood or misinterpreted.

First, with regard to a prohibition on chemical weapons, my delegation would like to register a degree of satisfaction at the progress that was made in the chemical weapons Working Group. The Chairman of the Group, the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, deserves the gratitude of all delegations, in particular for his inauguration of a method of work which allowed substantial results to be achieved. The nine contact groups were able to cover an impressive amount of material, and to report results to the Committee which clearly indicate that substantive progress has been made since we began our work in August. These results will provide an excellent basis for further progress at the Committee's 1983 session.

A number of other delegations have made important contributions to progress toward the prohibition of chemical weapons, an objective that we all agree is a matter of the greatest importance for the Committee. The contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany on the important question of verification of a chemical weapons convention is particularly noteworthy.

My delegation has also taken note of the proposals of the Soviet Union submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which have also been put forward in the Committee. These proposals seem to indicate a certain degree of flexibility on two of the key issues related to verification of a chemical weapons convention which, of course, we all welcome. We look forward to further amplification by the Soviet Union of the particulars of these proposals. There are, of course, many other unresolved verification issues. We hope that mutually acceptable solutions will be found to overcome these difficulties and thus allow progress to be made.

In sum, my delegation believes that the work of the Committee this year on a prohibition of chemical weapons has been advanced, largely through intensive work in the space of this brief six-week session. We hope these achievements are an indication that even greater advances will be possible during the course of our 1983 session.

With regard to the work of the nuclear test ban Working Group, we are, of course, disappointed that our efforts to begin substantive work under the mandate were blocked by one group. By comparison with the productive results in the chemical weapons Working Group, perhaps the best that can be said, in view of our failure to adopt a programme of work, is that in wrestling with this problem we have had several enlightening discussions related to issues of verification and compliance.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the Group's report.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, first of all, may I be permitted to express my great appreciation of your able and skilful chairmanship and thank you especially for the very efficient way in which you have been guiding our work during the present month. In our close co-operation with you, we welcome every one of your accomplishments as our own achievement. I wish you, therefore, a successful conclusion of the Committee's report on its activities during the present session and offer you our further assistance and support in the fulfilment of this task.

May I also take this opportunity to convey words of appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his contribution as Chairman during the month of August.

I welcome with satisfaction our new colleagues in the Committee, the distinguished representatives of Peru and Yugoslavia.

To those of our colleagues who have recently left Geneva or are shortly going to leave, I should like to bid farewell and wish them the best of luck.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce today to the Committee on Disarmament the Group's draft report on its activities in 1982. The text of the draft report is contained in document CD/334 and is available, I hope, to all the distinguished delegations in this Committee. By the way, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to two errors in the report: the first is in paragraph 12, where the words "the next" should be inserted in the first line after the words "It was agreed that"; the second is that paragraph 17 should be deleted and paragraph 18 then becomes paragraph 17. All the report will therefore be reissued for technical reasons.

In view of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I prepared a special report to the Committee on Disarmament which is contained in document CD/281/Rev.1, dated 27 April 1982. The report described, inter alia, in chapter III, the state of negotiations in the Working Group at the end of the first part of the Committee's session. Hence, in today's presentation I shall try to confine myself to the second part of the session of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons which, in accordance with the Committee's decision of 23 April 1982, started on 20 July 1982. In this connection, I only wish to recall that at the beginning of the 1982 session the Working Group on Chemical Weapons started its work with a new mandate by which the Committee decided "to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group ... to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date ...".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Accordingly, from the beginning of the summer session, the Working Group continued to conduct intensive discussions and consultations aimed at elaborating the provisions of the future convention. After another round of detailed consultations within the Group based on the revised elements and comments thereto, and on such a constructive and valuable document as the "Basic Provisions" of a convention presented by the delegation of the USSR as well as on various proposals made by other delegations, nine informal, open-ended contact groups were established with the task of examining in depth specific problems involved and working out possible options and working hypotheses which could help to overcome existing divergences and advance the process of elaboration of the convention at the next stage of negotiations. These informal contact groups dealt particularly with the following spheres of the future convention:

The scope of the convention;

Definitions of technical terms which will be used in the convention;

Verification procedures, including particularly:

Declarations of the possession of stocks of chemical weapons and of the means of their production, time-frames and the forms of such declarations;

The process of and plans for the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and facilities;

National legislation and verification measures;

National technical means of verification;

An international verification system;

Other issues, inter alia, the convention's preamble, its relationship with other treaties and international co-operation in the implementation of the convention as well as many other aspects.

The reports of all contact groups were subsequently discussed and, where necessary, revised during the Working Group's consecutive meetings.

The consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, on certain technical questions resulted in 1982 in providing the Working Group with the recommendations on standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations and for acute inhalation toxicity criteria. These recommendations are of direct relevance to the future convention.

The Working Group, through its intensive work in 1982 and its full devotion to the noble goal of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, has again strongly reaffirmed not only that the conclusion of such a convention is one of the highest priorities in our negotiations but also that it is possible to reach agreement on it through a harmonized, collective effort. It is in such a way that I interpret the dedication and tireless effort of all co-ordinators and practically all delegations in seeking -- and finding -- compromise solutions

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

and/or convergences of views in some areas and sectors of the future convention. I hope that the reports of the co-ordinators of the contact groups which are attached to the Working Group's report adequately reflect all the willingness to negotiate and to try to find agreed solutions. At the same time, they constitute a very good background for further negotiations. I wish to emphasize especially the willingness for further negotiations because -- being far from complacent -- I know how much time and effort must still be put in before the draft convention is ready.

Having this in mind and taking into account the progress which has been made by the contact groups in clarifying many issues as well as in seeking possible spheres of understanding through alternative and optional formulations and whenever possible through working hypotheses, I tried to sum them up in the form of possible compromise wordings of the elements which I presented recently to the Ad Hoc Working Group. I fully realize that it is far from being a perfect paper. I have not had such ambitions. I do hope, however, that it will help delegations in the drafting process and provide their respective Governments with a better knowledge of the present state of the negotiations. In this connection, I hope that the document entitled "Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention", has already been circulated as a document under the number CD/333. Such was indeed the general wish of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

As is stated in paragraph 17 of its report the Group agreed, inter alia, "to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it should continue its work under the present Chairman between 17 and 28 January 1983 ...". In thanking the members of the Group for the confidence thus expressed, I endorse the said recommendations and hope that they, as well as the whole report, will meet with the Committee's approval. May I take this opportunity to appeal to all the delegations to take advantage of the recess to study the background material of this session so that we could make further tangible progress in January 1983 both in the work of the Group and in the consultations on technical issues.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my introduction to the Committee of the draft report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons by wholeheartedly thanking all the delegations for their valuable contribution to the Group's work. My special thanks are directed to the co-ordinators of the contact groups, Ms. Nascimbene of the Argentinian delegation, Mr. Melescanu (Romania), Mr. Lundin (Sweden), Mr. Skinner (Canada), Mr. Steele (Australia), Mr. Altaf (Pakistan), Mr. Duarte (Brazil), and Mr. Thielicke (German Democratic Republic). I am deeply convinced that no word of appreciation can be regarded as overestimating their contribution. We have had again this year sometimes a hard time. Our endurance has again been tested. But I am happy to emphasize that the Group has been trying to overcome the difficulties in a spirit of compromise. For myself, as its Chairman, this is the best reward for my own effort and the not easy job in the Chair.

My sincere thanks go to Mrs. Waldheim-Natural for her assistance as Secretary of the Working Group during the spring session and to Mr. Bensmail for his help and valuable advice during the summer session. I thank very much the secretariat staff and the interpreters for their excellent collaboration during the whole 1982 session.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

the wording of our reports as if they were legally binding treaties. Perhaps this is simply in response to a psychological mechanism of compensation, of which we are quite aware. Such decisions cannot be construed as engaging Governments to the result of the work undertaken, and they certainly do not create any final commitments. The work of this Committee on chemical weapons is a case in point, and I do not need to recall here that no delegation around this table feels engaged by the significant results achieved in this field so far, although we may all agree that substantive progress has been made in this session towards facilitating agreement. In this Committee, agreements are usually reached at working group level, before being formally approved at the Committee level, where consensus is also necessary; in any case, ample allowance is made for reservations. Further on, the texts submitted by the Committee on Disarmament are reviewed by the General Assembly, and if adopted, they are presented to Governments as mere recommendations. The final judgement on whether or not to join an agreement will necessarily be made, in the last instance, by the sovereign decision of the Government itself; and even the executive decision to sign an international instrument must be confirmed, in most constitutional processes, by the procedures of ratification, which usually involve national exposure of the issues to the judgement of public opinion. It is thus difficult to understand, for instance, why China and France decided on a negative attitude as regards their participation in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test-Ban.

One is forced, therefore, to ask the inevitable question: why do some delegations in this Committee persist in raising obstacles to the normal performance of its negotiating function, as if every procedural, or even substantive step would entail irrevocable commitments of a political and legal nature?

The Governments of nations where public opinion plays a role in the conduct of international affairs may overemphasize issues relating to their defence and security needs in response only to the perspective of their own national interests; conversely, Governments of nations where public opinion is not a relevant factor may deliberately engage in rhetoric with the aim of promoting dissension among their adversaries. Both attitudes, when used to impede progress in this Committee, become extremely harmful to the orderly conduct of work, since both are at variance with the decision-making process inherent in multilateral procedure. Such ambiguity of attitudes and behaviour could perhaps be dispelled if all delegations represented here attached the same meaning and value to the expression "in good faith".

I wish to thank the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, for his reaction to the observation of my delegation, as well as of other delegations, concerning the compliance of his Government with a partial test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, my delegation is not yet convinced by his arguments, neither those of a juridical nor those of a political nature. But my delegation was happy to hear from the distinguished Ambassador of the United States the renewed commitment of his Government to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and I would like to state that all doubts on the part of my delegation on this matter will be dispelled when the United States delegation decides to engage in meaningful and substantive negotiations on a total ban on nuclear-weapon test explosions.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Argentina, Mr. García Moritan, to whom I now give the floor.

It seems to me that our Committee has done a great deal for itself and that it has done the best it could in the very short space of time available to it and within the narrow limits set by its working conditions, both external and internal.

The Committee's efforts have to a large extent been concentrated on the important lines of chemical weapons.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has achieved noteworthy results. The French delegation had some doubts at first about the method of working groups suggested by the Chairman. It is glad to be able to say that these doubts were unjustified, and it wishes to compliment the Chairman on the organization of the work proved entirely successful. The establishment of the five contact groups permitted a thorough consideration of the various aspects of a subject; it served to highlight those subjects on which a consensus was in sight; it was particularly, it adds it wishes to thank the very many proposals received in the form of papers, reports, and notes, and to express its appreciation of the reports, definitions, suggestions, and studies of which the Committee has benefited. It wishes to express its appreciation of the interest of international organizations.

In some cases the contact groups adopted working hypotheses which might serve as a basis for finding solutions and for facilitating further work. The French delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the co-ordinators of the contact groups, their reports, which are annexed to the report of the Working Group, should prove very useful during our subsequent work.

With regard to radiological weapons, the consultations actively conducted by Ambassador Haxthorn, the Chairman of the Working Group, have had the effect of opening up channels of communication between delegations and of creating an atmosphere which will permit the resolution of questions of principle and of technical details. The Working Group will continue to be concerned with the progress of the work and will continue to be interested in the progress of the work.

The Working Group has also been concerned with the protection of civilians and with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Working Group has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

A third Working Group has held meetings during our summer session. It has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Working Group has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Working Group has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It has also been concerned with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

It seems to me that our Committee has drawn this lesson for itself and that it has done the best it could in the very short space of time available to it and within the narrow limits set by its working conditions, both external and internal.

The Committee's efforts have to a large extent been concentrated on the important issues of chemical weapons.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has achieved praiseworthy results. The French delegation had some doubts at first about the method of contact groups suggested by the Chairman. It is glad to be able to say that its doubts were unjustified, and it wishes to compliment Ambassador Sujka whose innovations in the organization of the work proved entirely successful. The establishment of the nine contact groups permitted a thorough consideration of the various elements of a convention: it served to highlight those aspects on which a consensus was in sight; more particularly, it made it easier to tackle the very many problems remaining to be resolved, including those of the scope of the convention, definitions, declarations of stocks and the initiation and rate of their destruction and the problem of methods of international verification.

In some cases the contact groups adopted "working hypotheses", which might serve as a basis for finding solutions for the outstanding problems. The French delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the co-ordinators of the contact groups; their reports, which are annexed to the report of the Working Group, should prove very useful during our subsequent work.

With respect to radiological weapons, the consultations actively conducted by Ambassador Wegener, the Chairman of the Working Group, have had the merit, it seems, of persuading certain delegations to adopt an attitude which will permit the resumption of negotiations on the principal object of the convention in question: the prohibition of radiological weapons. The working paper presented by the Chairman will undoubtedly constitute a useful basis for this purpose.

As regards the question of the protection of nuclear installations, which several delegations wish to be dealt with at the same time, the proposal put forward by the delegation of Japan will perhaps help those delegations to find a solution in an appropriate framework.

A third Working Group has held meetings during our summer session, in its case for the first time -- the Working Group set up to examine the issues relating to verification which would arise in connection with a nuclear test-ban treaty. On 5 August last, the French delegation explained why it felt unable to participate in that Working Group. Its attitude in that respect, I should like to repeat, in no way means that it underestimates the importance attaching to the elaboration of an effective and non-discriminatory system of international verification.

The other items on our agenda have been discussed by the Committee itself.

Item 2 -- cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- rightly occupies the most important place in our report. Once again, however, the report reflects the differing positions of States members rather than any progress in the approach to these fundamental problems. We continue to believe that progress will depend on a correct appreciation of the relative sizes of national nuclear forces and of the hierarchy of responsibilities flowing therefrom, and on respect for the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Broadly, we associate ourselves with those delegations which have expressed concern over the intensification of the arms race and the aggravation of international tension, on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness of the Committee's work on the other. Indeed, the incapacity of the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating forum is particularly striking against the background of the acute aggravation of the international situation and the heightened danger of the outbreak of a global nuclear war.

If there have been any positive results of the Committee's work in 1982, these, in our view, relate mainly to the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. As many heads of delegations pointed out at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and also here in this Committee, the submission by the Soviet Union of a draft text of "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" represented a very positive contribution to progress in the negotiations on this question. Under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Sujka, the representative of Poland, concrete negotiations on a wide range of issues relating to a future convention were successfully started within the Committee. The work done in the various contact groups set up on Ambassador Sujka's initiative -- in spite, it may be said, of the objections of certain delegations -- and the Chairman's document containing a consolidated text of compromise wordings of the elements of the future convention will undoubtedly provide a useful basis for future negotiations. Nevertheless, we cannot be fully satisfied even with the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are coming to the very definite conclusion that certain States are in no hurry over these negotiations. It looks as if their successful conclusion might frustrate certain plans for the creation of new types of chemical weapons. We regret that the Committee failed to reach agreement on a deadline for the completion of the negotiations and that by interrupting our work for several months we are, as it were, breaking off in mid-sentence.

I should like now to comment on the activities of the Committee on Disarmament from a wider viewpoint in a historical perspective, so to speak. Not a single agreement in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament has been drafted in the Committee since 1976. The expansion of the Committee's membership and the adoption of rules of procedure for its work in 1979 failed to change things for the better. Moreover, although a number of drafts have been submitted to the Committee in recent years, some have not been considered at all while in the case of others it has proved impossible to reach final agreement owing to the attempts of certain delegations to link them artificially with various other issues.

The reasons for this situation are well known. Both we and many other delegations have spoken about them at this session and at earlier sessions of the Committee. It is more and more often being said, as was the case at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that the Committee on Disarmament is failing to fulfil the task set before it. We agree with those judgements. Experience has shown that, in a number of cases, the Committee is not only not facilitating negotiations but is in fact becoming a kind of brake, an obstacle to negotiations. The most negative aspects of the Committee's activities which have become apparent in recent years are, in our view, the following.

First. The starting of negotiations in the Committee on the most acute problem of our time -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- has been blocked because of the position of the United States of America and certain other States. For the same reason, the Committee has also been unable to embark on

DOCS
CA1 EA360 C44 ENG
1982
Conference on Disarmament (Geneva,
Switzerland)
Chemical weapons -- final records
(PV) : ... session
43258715

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01029376 2

