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
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

NUCLEAR TEST BAN

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1994 SESSION



COMPILED AND EDITED BY:
NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OTTAWA, CANADA



JANUARY 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT


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PREFACE

PV

This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1994 session relating to the issue of a Nuclear Test Ban. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

**NUCLEAR TEST BAN
STATEMENTS MADE IN PLENARY SESSION
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX**


1994

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
117	CD/PV.666	2-3;4-6	President/Errera	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	7-8	CD Secretary- General/Petrovsky	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	10	Mexico/Marin Bosch	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	11-13	Sweden/Norberg	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	14;16-18	USA/Holum	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	21-23	Canada/Shanon	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	23-26	UK/Weston	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	26-28	Japan/Tanaka	25.1.94
	CD/PV.666	30	President/Errera	25.1.94
118	CD/PV.667	5-6;9	Netherlands/Wagenmakers	27.1.94
	CD/PV.667	10	Germany/Hoffman	27.1.94
	CD/PV.667	12;13-14	Ukraine/Slipchenko	27.1.94
	CD/PV.667	15;16-17	Egypt/Zahran	27.1.94
	CD/PV.667	19	Senegal/Ka	27.1.94
119	CD/PV.668	2-3	Finland/Blomberg	1.2.94
	CD/PV.668	5	Algeria/Meghlaoui	1.2.94
	CD/PV.668	7;9-10	Russian Federation/Berdennikov	1.2.94
	CD/PV.668	12-13	Belgium/Guillaume	1.2.94
	CD/PV.668	19	President/Errera	1.2.94
	CD/PV.668	20	Mexico/Marin Bosch	1.2.94
120	CD/PV.669	6-7	Romania/Neagu	3.2.94
	CD/PV.669	9-10;11-12	Japan/Tanaka	3.2.94
	CD/PV.669	12-14	USA/Ledogar	3.2.94
121	CD/PV.670	2-3;4	Bulgaria/Daskalov	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	7;9-10	Ukraine/Hryshchenko	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	11-13	Indonesia/ Brotodiningrat	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	14-16;17	Hungary/Boytha	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	20-23	Myanmar/Hlaing	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	26	Islamic Republic of Iran/Nasseri	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	28	Mongolia/Yumjaw	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	30	UK/Weston	10.2.94
	CD/PV.670	31	President/Errera	10.2.94
122	CD/PV.671	10-11	Poland/Dembinski	17.2.94
	CD/PV.671	15-16	Turkey/Arar	17.2.94

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
122	CD/PV.671	17-20	Islamic Republic of Iran/Nasseri	17.2.94
	CD/PV.671	23	President/Errera	17.2.94
123	CD/PV.672	2	President/Hoffman	24.2.94
	CD/PV.672	5;6	Australia/O'Sullivan	24.2.94
124	CD/PV.673	2-3;4	Austria/Hohenfellner	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	6-8	Sri Lanka/Goonetilleke	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	9-11	AHGSE Chairman/Dahlman	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	12	Japan/Kunieda	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	13	USA/Ledogar	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	14	France/Besancenot	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	14-15	UK/Weston	3.3.94
	CD/PV.673	15	Japan/Kunieda	3.3.94
125	CD/PV.674	3	CD Secretariat/Mackby	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	5	Coordinator of the Western Group/Shannon	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	7	Sweden/Norberg	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	9	Republic of Korea/Ho	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	10-12	Norway/Skogmo	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	13-14	Argentina/Sanchez Arnau	10.3.94
	CD/PV.674	20-24	Brazil/Lampreia	10.3.94
126	CD/PV.675	4-5	USA/Ledogar	17.3.94
	CD/PV.675	6-8	Japan/Tanaka	17.3.94
127	CD/PV.676	2-3	President/Boytha	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	3-7	Algeria/Meghlaoui	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	7-9	Egypt/Zahran	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	13-14	Japan/Tanaka	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	15	Switzerland/Moser	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	18-21	China/Hou	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	25	Sweden/Roth	24.3.94
	CD/PV.676	25-26	Netherlands/Gevers	24.3.94
128	CD/PV.677	2-4;5	Czech Republic/Venera	31.3.94
	CD/PV.677	5;6-7	Ukraine/Slipchenko	31.3.94
129	CD/PV.678	3;6	New Zealand/Graham	19.5.94
	CD/PV.678	7;10	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/Calovski	19.5.94
130	CD/PV.679	2	President/Boytha	26.5.94
131	CD/PV.680	2-4	President/Chandra	2.6.94

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
131	CD/PV.680	7-12	Sweden/Norberg	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	12-15	Finland/Patokallio	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	16	Israel/Lior	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	18	Brasil/Lampreia	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	19-21	AHGSE Chairman/Dahlman	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	34	Japan/Tanaka	2.6.94
	CD/PV.680	34	AHGSE Chairman/Dahlman	2.6.94
132	CD/PV.681	2-3	Egypt/Zahran	9.6.94
	CD/PV.681	4-7	Pakistan/Kamal	9.6.94
	CD/PV.681	8-9	Greece/Boucauris	9.6.94
133	CD/PV.682	2	Ecuador/Pinoargote	16.6.94
	CD/PV.682	7	Chile/Berguno	16.6.94
	CD/PV.682	9-12	Brazil/Lampreia	16.6.94
134	CD/PV.683	3-4	Norway/Bjerke	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	6-7	Republic of Korea/Ho	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	11	South Africa/Eksteen	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	13-14	Slovakia/Kubis	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	21-22	Islamic Republic of Iran/Nasseri	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	24-25	China/Hou	23.6.94
	CD/PV.683	27-28	President/Chandra	23.6.94
135	CD/PV.684	2-4	President/ Brotodiningrat	30.6.94
	CD/PV.684	6-8	Netherlands/Wagenmakers	30.6.94
	CD/PV.684	14;17	Democratic People's republic of Korea/Han	30.6.94
136	CD/PV.685	3-5	Nigeria/Fasehun	28.7.94
137	CD/PV.686	4	Egypt/Moussa	4.8.94
	CD/PV.686	6-7;9	USA/Holum	4.8.94
	CD/PV.686	10;13	Mexico/Marin Bosch	4.8.94
138	CD/PV.687	2	President/ Brotodiningrat	11.8.94
139	CD/PV.688	3	President/Nasseri	18.8.94
	CD/PV.688	4-5;8	UK/Logan	18.8.94
	CD/PV.688	9;11	Finland/Blomberg	18.8.94
	CD/PV.688	12-14	Algeria/Meghlaoui	18.8.94
	CD/PV.688	17-18	Australia/Starr	18.8.94
140	CD/PV.689	2-3	Malta/Bartolo	25.8.94
141	CD/PV.690	4	Slovenia/Pertele	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	5	Slovakia/Kukan	1.9.94

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
141	CD/PV.690	10-11	Islamic Republic of Iran/Velayati	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	14-16	Japan/Yanagisawa	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	18;19;22	Netherlands/Ramaker	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	25-26	Brasil/Jaguaribe	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	31-32	AHCNTB Chairman/Marin Bosch	1.9.94
	CD/PV.690	34-36	India/Chandra	1.9.94
142	CD/PV.691	3-4	AHCNTB Chairman/Marin Bosch	6.9.94
	CD/PV.691	4-6	AHGSE Chairman/Dahlman	6.9.94
143	CD/PV.692	2	President/Nasseri	7.9.94
	CD/PV.692	10	Egypt/Zahran	7.9.94
	CD/PV.692	12;13	China/Hou	7.9.94
	CD/PV.692	14;15	President/Nasseri	7.9.94



The PRESIDENT (translated from French):

... Those who, just a year ago, were worried about the future of the Conference on Disarmament were indeed mistaken. Following the conclusion of the Convention banning chemical weapons, the Conference embarked on its own reform. For the first time it started a substantive debate on transparency in armaments. In particular, for the first time since nuclear weapons appeared, it decided to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and soon, perhaps, a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Thus we see the proof that the Conference both reflects the international situation and acts as the instrument of the will of the international community. The cold war had halted its operations. The end of the East-West confrontation has cleared the log-jam in its work. However, it is not enough just to look on as progress is made. We must also be actively involved in change. Here I believe we have a twofold obligation. First of all to complete without delay work to expand the membership of the Conference. How can we justify the Conference's remaining a prisoner of outdated ideological formats now that international balances have undergone such profound change? Who can deny the need to include new States whose military

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3

(The President)

capabilities and strategic roles correspond to today's concerns in the field of arms control and non-proliferation? We must reach agreement without delay on a new make-up for the Conference which will guarantee its representative nature and thus its legitimacy. It is my intention to appoint a new special coordinator to propose a rapid solution to this urgent question.

... In setting its objectives, in its working methods, in its very spirit, the Conference is a reflection of current international events. If we keep to the facts, we cannot but note that the present-day strategic situation is sending contradictory signals. On the one hand, there are some very positive developments: the end of the East-West confrontation, which the European countries are the first to welcome, because it has allowed many of them to recover their freedom and the power to control their own destinies, and it has allowed all of them to rediscover the ties which have been woven in the course of a long-common history. The implementation of a real process of disarmament, the results of which are already impressive: the INF Treaty, the START I and II agreements, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Convention banning chemical weapons, the launching of negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, an agreement to negotiate a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, faster progress is being made towards universality in the NPT. More than 15 States, including China and France, have recently acceded to the Treaty. Algeria and Argentina have just announced their intention to do so. Peace processes, in which the question of arms control plays a decisive role, have been initiated in several areas of tension: in Cambodia, and of course in the Middle East.

(The President)

... Finally, this session sees the beginning of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Obviously a lot is at stake in these negotiations. They are beginning on the basis of a number of essential elements contained in the decision adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993, in resolution 48/70, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly, and in the future mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. We believe that these elements are the following. First, the fact that the treaty will need to be universal. All the countries with a nuclear

(The President)

capability will therefore have to be parties to it. This is essential for the treaty's entry into force. It is difficult to imagine the acknowledged nuclear Powers agreeing to new constraints if other countries remain free to develop clandestine nuclear armament programmes.

Secondly, the need for international verification. The treaty will also have to be internationally verifiable. Who would agree to join an agreement whose provisions could be easily breached? Who would accept the constraints of verification if there were no guarantees that it would be dependable and impartial?

Lastly, the need for truly multilateral negotiations. This is a precondition for universality. All the countries which are to accept restrictions under the treaty must be involved from the very outset in drafting it. Hence, I repeat once again, the urgent need to expand the membership in the Conference.

(The President)

... If we really wish to make progress on these various subjects, if we really wish to shoulder our responsibilities in the new international situation, we must bear in mind a few basic considerations. The first is that international security henceforth involves efforts shared by everybody and can no longer be based on the responsibility of just a few. However convenient such an assertion might have been, it is difficult to show today that the only threat to peace lies in the nuclear weapons possessed by the five nuclear Powers. It is just as difficult to deny that the build-up of conventional weapons and the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in regions of tension, constitute a real danger, first and foremost for the great majority of developing countries which suffer both pressure from powerful neighbours and restrictions on transfers of technology which result from the very risks of proliferation. This leads me to a second, no less important truth: that there is a clear link between the results of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the disarmament effort. It is difficult to see how the disarmament process could continue in a context of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The third consideration is that it is essential to comply with commitments undertaken. A sovereign country takes on international commitments, particularly in the field of security, only if it is convinced that the treaty it is signing is in keeping with its interests. But at the same time it must have an assurance that everything will be done to ensure that the commitments undertaken by all parties will be respected by all parties, and that failure to comply will be sanctioned. For example, what would be the use of the efforts we are making to give the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the universal character it deserves and to extend it in the best possible conditions, if at the same time it were to be shown that compliance with its provisions was not guaranteed? I am thinking in particular of North Korea: this case cannot, we feel, be viewed merely as a regional issue; because it has to do with respect for an international standard, it is of concern to all of us. Hence the new importance attached to verification regimes, as we can see in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The chemical weapons Convention and, soon, the

(The President)

nuclear-test-ban treaty or the convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This leads us to a fourth and last fact: that a multilateral approach to disarmament and non-proliferation issues is increasingly indispensable. A rule of international security, if it is to be subscribed to by as many States as possible, if it is to be respected, has to be drawn up jointly and provide for collective means of implementation. The time is past when two super-Powers could negotiate a disarmament treaty between themselves and then submit it for endorsement by the international community. It is no affront to anyone to recognize this.

Each of us will have understood, in this recapitulation of a few truths, to what extent we view the Conference on Disarmament as being at the heart of these changes and these new approaches. Some had ventured to assert that, with the end of the cold war, disarmament was a thing of the past because it was supposed to be only an ideological instrument in the East-West confrontation. Events have given that idea the lie. The disarmament process has become a reality. In taking on substance, it has changed its nature and has become more rich in content: it covers weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons, it applies to the regional as well as the global level, it includes confidence-building measures as well as non-proliferation. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament has a strengthened role to play. Because of its specific status - its limited but representative membership, its position as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the rule of consensus on which its operations rest - it can make a major contribution to the creation of a safer world. Provided that we have the will to do so, this is within our grasp.

The consultations I have held on organizational matters lead me to believe that we can certainly embark on substantive work very soon. When we have heard the speakers on the list for today in plenary, I will invite the Conference to consider rapidly in an informal meeting the steps to take in order to make progress in our work. I intend in particular to deal with the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for this session; the question of the President's statement on the agenda and the organization of the session; and lastly consideration of requests for participation in our work from non-member States of the Conference. Immediately afterwards we will resume the plenary for an official confirmation of the agreement among members of the Conference on these three subjects. In the next few days, I will be continuing my consultations with members on other pending organizational matters.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations):

... I shall now read to the Conference the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

... "I also pointed out that notable among such achievements was the decision of your Conference to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That decision had been made possible by the crucial commitment of nuclear-weapon States to such a treaty. It represented a culmination of the efforts of the international community as a whole to bring about the long-cherished goal of the total prohibition of nuclear testing.

"The recently concluded session of the General Assembly further confirmed this positive trend towards the consolidation of the pattern of cooperation among Members of the United Nations in the vital sphere of security, arms limitation and disarmament, as exemplified by the growing number of resolutions adopted by consensus in this field. This will no doubt positively affect your deliberations and negotiations in the Conference. The resolution on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, sponsored by more than 157 Member States at the forty-eight session of the General Assembly, and adopted by consensus, is a milestone in the efforts of the international community to ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

"I am gratified that, pursuant to this resolution, and following consultations during the inter-sessional period, the Conference will now

(Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

give priority to negotiations for a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would undoubtedly contribute effectively to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security. It would also contribute greatly towards the successful outcome of the 1995 review and extension conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. I am sure that your Conference will seize the opportunity now before it achieves, as a matter of urgency, this long-sought goal of the international community.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... Now I wish to read the message from the Government of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament dated 25 January 1994.

"For decades the international community has been advocating the complete cessation of all nuclear testing. Both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly of the United Nations and other multilateral forums, Mexico has insisted upon the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race through the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT).

"In the General Assembly, Mexico has been one of the principal promoters of the 100-odd resolutions adopted on this item. Since the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1962, Mexico has called for prompt agreement on a CTBT. In the light of the difficulties that emerged in the Conference, we explored another path, that of amending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty.

"After more than 2,000 nuclear tests and 30 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, the Government of Mexico rejoices in the Conference on Disarmament's unanimous decision of 10 August last to undertake finally the negotiation of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. That decision, which today we shall put into practice, was endorsed and strengthened by the General Assembly in its historic resolution 48/70 of 16 December 1993, which reflects the will of the entire international community to proceed quickly and expeditiously in the solution of this question of utmost importance for everyone. The Conference on Disarmament will now have to begin an intensive dialogue with a view to drafting without delay a CTBT whose prompt conclusion will send a political message of great significance. The Government of Mexico commits itself to contributing to the search for a text embracing compromise solutions that, in turn, will ensure that the treaty enjoys the widest possible adherence and that it is internationally and effectively verifiable."

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden):

... It is with great hope and satisfaction that I take the floor today, as there is now, at last, a consensus within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference will very soon, maybe already today, take a decision to establish an ad hoc committee with a clear mandate to negotiate such a treaty.

Sweden has on several occasions submitted treaty proposals for a multilateral text on a comprehensive test ban. A new draft treaty text, including a verification protocol, has now been presented and circulated in document CD/1232. It was presented by my delegation during informal consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee on 9 December last year. In producing the draft we consulted with many delegations and received many valuable comments, which we have taken into consideration. Today I have the honour to officially introduce the Swedish proposal in the plenary of the Conference.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will mainly serve two purposes, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Through START I and II as well as other agreements and unilateral decisions there is already a clear trend towards nuclear disarmament. A test-ban treaty is therefore primarily directed at non-proliferation. As is stated in the preamble of the proposed treaty text, a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests would be an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As to the scope of the proposed treaty, it includes a total ban on all nuclear explosions, i.e. also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. There is in the view of my delegation no practical use of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such explosions could on the contrary serve as a tool for developing nuclear weapons. When formulating the article on scope (article I), we have been guided by the wording of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which is also referred to in the preamble and which has served well for 30 years. Under the proposed text it is also prohibited to cause, encourage, assist in, permit or prepare nuclear explosions. My delegation is fully aware of the difficulty to define and verify preparations for a nuclear test. This element has, however, been included, as it is in our view logical in this context to include at least direct preparations leading up to a nuclear test.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

In the proposal it is suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, would be the "implementing agency", assigned, inter alia, the task of verification of compliance with the treaty. We have proposed IAEA since it seems reasonable to make use of an existing and viable organization active in the nuclear field, instead of establishing a new one. IAEA has long experience in international verification work and international cooperation involving sophisticated technologies, with particular experience regarding on-site inspection. Of course, new expertise has to be added to the Agency in areas relevant to CTB verification which are new to IAEA, for example in seismology and hydroacoustics. But at the same time it is to be expected that economic benefits stand to be gained from the fact that existing administrative and support resources within the organization could be used.

The verification system is outlined in a protocol to the draft treaty. The protocol is proposed as an integral part of the treaty. The intention is to create an efficient and cost-effective verification system that will give all parties an essentially equal possibility to satisfy their verification needs. The proposed verification system consists of a global monitoring system and on-site inspections. The core of the monitoring system would be a two-tier network of seismological stations, one called the Alpha network, established and operated by the Agency, and one called the Beta network, established and operated by the States parties. The seismic network would be complemented with networks of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere and hydroacoustic signals in the oceans.

From these stations vast flows of data would be received and processed by an international data centre to be established within the Agency. The centre would provide a useful service to the States parties by rapidly distributing the easily accessible results of the analysis for their final assessment. The parties may if they wish ask, through the Agency, for clarifications or further information from another party on whose territory an event has occurred. In cases of uncertainties repeated exchanges of information may take place. If the unclear situation still remains thereafter, a State party may address a request for an on-site inspection to the Director-General of IAEA, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Board of Governors of the Agency. That body may decide to launch an on-site inspection, the decision to be taken with a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

An on-site inspection upon request, a sort of challenge inspection, is an important feature of the verification system. This is meant to be the ultimate means to verify compliance with the treaty, if uncertainties have not been removed through exchanges of information. Challenge inspections will, in our view, occur only on rare occasions. The rule for a two-thirds majority in the Board of Governors is meant to eliminate the possibilities of abuse. It is of importance to carry out an on-site inspection as soon as possible after the request is made. It is stipulated that the on-site inspection shall begin in no case later than seven days after the decision of the Board of Governors. The inspection team shall report to the Board of Governors. Decisions on the report shall be taken by the Board with a two-thirds majority. In case of non-compliance the Board shall report the findings to the Security Council of

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

the United Nations. It may be noted that if clear breaches of the treaty obligations occur, a State party may lodge a complaint directly with the Security Council.

A large number of high-yield chemical explosions are carried out each year all over the globe, mainly for mining purposes. Appropriate procedures are needed to handle these events so that they do not jeopardize confidence in the treaty. Therefore we propose that chemical explosions with a yield exceeding 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency 15 days in advance and that they may be subject to on-site observation by the Agency. Explosions with a yield of between 100 and 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency not later than seven days after the explosion. There will also be a possibility to establish declared sites for parties that regularly conduct large explosions, for example in a mine. A declared site shall be open to on-site observation by the Agency, which also may place recording equipment at the site.

Sweden, like many other countries, has actively worked for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty for several decades. The issue has been on the agenda of this Conference and its predecessors since the early 1960s. Until recently an agreement on a nuclear test ban has proved elusive. But times have changed. In the year 1987 47 nuclear tests were carried out. Since September 1992 only one nuclear test has taken place. The present moratoria on nuclear testing are conducive to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and contribute to a favourable atmosphere in the coming negotiations. Therefore, my Government urges all nuclear-weapon States to extend existing moratoria when they expire, and to declare a moratorium if they have not yet done so.

The Conference on Disarmament now has an historic opportunity to abolish nuclear testing for all time. The prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty have never been more favourable. The Swedish treaty proposal is aimed at facilitating the work of the Conference on a nuclear test ban. My delegation hopes that it may serve as a basis for the negotiations.

Let us now seize the opportunity and work energetically and rapidly to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty of unlimited duration equipped with a satisfactory verification system.

(Mr. Holum, United States)

... The end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United States will do everything in its power to make the most of them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a message to the Conference from President Clinton:

"I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This Conference has several important items on its agenda as the 1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and it may assume others, such as a ban on fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes. None is more important than the negotiation of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority. It reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will support and supplement the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and will further constrain the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons.

"Regional instabilities, the end of the cold war, and the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons have created new and compelling circumstances to encourage progress in disarmament. Accordingly, I decided last July to extend the moratorium on the United States nuclear-weapons tests and committed the United States to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, I called on the other nuclear-weapon States to observe a testing moratorium, and I do so again today.

"I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the United States delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest time of a comprehensive test-ban treaty that will strengthen the security of all nations. You have my best wishes during this important Conference."

- and it is signed by President Bill Clinton of the United States.

(Mr. Holum, United States)

... With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the major items of business that will occupy you in the days ahead. In the short time I have been here in Geneva, I have already sensed the great anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or CTBT. And we should be excited. A CTBT is long overdue. We are beginning the final steps of a journey of too many years.

Let me be clear at the outset: United States policy - announced by President Clinton on 3 July - is one of strong support for concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time. Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, a CTBT becomes even more important. It will be an important part of our efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and will place a major restraint on the nuclear-weapon States. The United States has been working hard - as have many of you - to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations. We were pleased to be able to co-sponsor the United Nations resolution supporting the objectives of a CTBT. Its acceptance by consensus provides a strong base from which to launch your negotiations. The consensus at the United Nations shows there is now virtually universal support for a CTBT. While the issues are complex, they are not beyond our immediate reach; we should be able to work out the essential elements of a treaty expeditiously. "At the earliest possible time" means just that. Obviously, no country can unilaterally set the pace, and we should avoid arbitrary deadlines, but I assure you that as compared to some past deliberations on this issue, the United States will be out front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our heels.

A CTBT will be fully successful only with the participation and support of the five nuclear-weapon States and with broad international adherence. The nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility to contribute to these

(Mr. Holum, United States)

negotiations, and you have our commitment that the United States will meet its responsibility. For the United States, a tangible demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our continuing moratorium on nuclear testing. In his message to you which I read a few minutes ago, the President has again urged the other nuclear-weapon States to refrain from testing.

... Our objective of reshaping the nuclear contours of the post-cold-war security landscape does not end there. The successful implementation of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the implementation of unilateral initiatives, such as reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic arms reduction agreements, including START I and START II, were significant contributions to the process of halting the spread

(Mr. Holum, United States)

of nuclear arms. Now we can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT extension, but also negotiations for a global agreement to prohibit further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in his address to the United Nations last September.

... We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons; but we can control them. We can limit their impact and their influence. Deep reductions in nuclear-weapons inventories, strengthened and extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a CTBT, a global ban on fissile material production, and other measures will alter fundamentally the role of nuclear weapons in the world of the twenty-first century. All these steps will contribute to the important goal we all share - a safer and more stable world.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada):

... The CD once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort; this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and to the non-proliferation architecture. It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the review conference in 1995 for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

progress towards a CTBT, or better the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

All the nuclear-weapon States have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the forty-eighth General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon States continue not to test. If a moratorium were adhered to by all five nuclear-weapon States until we successfully conclude a CTBT, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

I would like to outline the principles which will guide my delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT. First, the Treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time. Second, the Treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all States. Third, the verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, as appropriate. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process. The international seismic monitoring system should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of GSE and GSETT-III will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion. An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyse and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective. It is our view that the United Nations Security Council could determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty. As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Tanaka which have led to the generally accepted position that we should move quickly to establish two working groups: one on legal and institutional issues and the other on verification.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... Finally, I would like to indicate that Canada will shortly be tabling a compendium of CD documentation on the nuclear-test-ban issue as well as a separate volume compiling treaty and draft treaty texts relating to nuclear test bans. Many of you will be familiar with similar compendia we produced for the chemical weapons negotiations and on which I have received many favourable comments. It is our hope that this compendium will prove a useful reference tool for delegations in the coming months as we turn our attention to the negotiation of a CTBT.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban-treaty is an objective long aspired to in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Turning that aspiration into reality has been a long process. It has, along the way, produced the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. But until recently the security environment in which this goal has been pursued has militated against its rapid achievement. That environment has now changed. The United Kingdom Government continues to attach importance to the role of nuclear weapons for the preservation of our security now and in the foreseeable future. But we recognize also that the need to ensure effective measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased. We were therefore happy to join consensus in August last year on the decision to give the Conference's nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. In the light of this consensus, and in the new security environment, the prospect for achieving the aspiration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty must now be very good indeed. The United Kingdom welcomes that prospect, and is committed to working hard for a successful outcome to these negotiations.

For us, a successful outcome will mean the conclusion of a treaty which makes a real contribution to non-proliferation by interposing a substantial obstacle in the process of developing nuclear weapons. I doubt that any among

(continued)

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

us have illusions that a ban on nuclear testing will in itself prevent the manufacture of a rudimentary nuclear weapon. But in limiting the scope of nuclear-weapons development, it will, we believe, play a valuable complementary role in reinforcing the non-proliferation regime.

The crucial instrument of that regime remains the non-proliferation Treaty itself. We continue to believe that there is an overwhelming case for the Treaty's indefinite extension irrespective of what progress we are able to make on a CTBT. If the prospect of a CTBT being in place to complement the NPT's effectiveness serves to increase the confidence some parties have in the ability of the non-proliferation Treaty to stop proliferation - and if this prospect serves to encourage those parties to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT through indefinite extension, we should welcome that. But an opposite relationship is also valid: that the prospect of indefinite extension of the NPT will be an important factor in convincing us that we can confidently move towards the conclusion of a CTBT.

The United Kingdom Government believes there are two elements essential to enable a CTBT to play an effective role in non-proliferation. First, the treaty should have as large a number of parties as possible. The ultimate aim should be universal adherence. Second, it must have an effective credible and efficient verification regime.

How do we set about ensuring that the treaty we conclude provides for these essential elements? On the question of adherence, we must obviously look to the mechanisms we agree for entry into force. One option might be to follow the model of the chemical weapons Convention, with entry into force conditional on ratification by a fixed number of States. But adopting this formula would provide no guarantee of adherence by all - or indeed any - of the countries whose commitment to the treaty we would regard as necessary if it is to play the non-proliferation role we want from it. We would suggest therefore that, at a minimum, all members of the CD should ratify the treaty before it enters into force. Given that we proceed in this forum by consensus, it is surely not unreasonable to expect that a treaty whose terms we have all been prepared to agree should be ratified by all without undue delay. In this regard, in particular, we look forward to the earliest possible progress on enlarging the CD.

For a CTBT genuinely to help our efforts to counter the threat of nuclear proliferation, the United Kingdom believes that an effective verification regime is essential. Such a regime should be able to detect, and therefore deter, at reasonable cost, attempts to evade the provisions of the treaty. We should aim to avoid constructing an excessively costly and over-elaborate verification system, but at the same time we should ensure that the system is sufficiently sensitive and capable to inspire confidence among the parties that there is a strong likelihood that attempts to evade the treaty's provisions can be detected and identified.

The ultimate goal of universal adherence would not be served if would-be parties were not convinced of the verification regime's ability to detect violations of the treaty even where these were of low nuclear yield and when

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

attempts had been made to conceal them. But let us remember also that this goal may not be served if potential parties think the cost of the regime unjustifiably high.

It will be an important task of these negotiations to reach a more precise estimate of the likely costs of a verification regime, and to decide how these costs should be apportioned. But I should at this stage like to place on record our belief that all parties should bear some share of the cost of verifying the treaty. We are, after all, agreed that the aim of the treaty should be to provide for the security of all parties.

We believe that the two main elements of a verification regime would be a monitoring system and provision for intrusive on-site inspection. The principal objective of on-site inspection should be to clarify the nature of any suspect event which might be detected - but not necessarily clearly identified - by the monitoring system. The verification regime will require a global network of seismic stations, but seismic monitoring will of course not be the only means of monitoring. The regime should also provide for other methods of detection - bearing in mind that an effective seismic regime could encourage a country determined to evade the treaty's terms to test in environments other than underground. We will, in addition, support the proposition that a greater degree of detective capability may be required in some regions of the world than in others.

Naturally we hope the verification regime will be sufficiently effective to deter violations of the treaty. But where it fails to do so, it will be necessary to ensure that there is provision within the treaty for action to be taken. We believe it will be necessary to include in the treaty an article on measures that could be taken in case of any such violation. We believe that the chemical weapons Convention provides a good starting-point for determining what sanctions should be provided for by the CTBT.

An important question for us to consider will be how to describe in the treaty what it is we shall aim to ban. We believe that a broad formula such as "any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" should be the one we adopt in our treaty. This formula is familiar to all of us as the one used in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. It has been well understood throughout that Treaty's life, and as such offers us a ready-made definition which could serve our treaty equally well. It would, in addition, parallel the language of the non-proliferation treaty, article 1 of which refers to "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

On the question of the duration of a CTBT, we believe that the assumption which guides our negotiating practice should be that we are aiming for a comprehensive test-ban treaty of indefinite duration. This need not mean, however, that we rule out any provision for a review of the treaty after a certain period. Such a review would be able to assess whether the treaty and its verification regime were operating effectively. It would enable us, should it be necessary, to make amendments to that operation. Furthermore,

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

the prospect for an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty will be an important factor conditioning and sustaining our assumption that we are aiming for an indefinite comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

My purpose in this statement has been to look ahead to what we expect to be some of the main issues which will confront us in our work, and to suggest how the United Kingdom intends to approach them. If I have omitted some issues, I have done so for the sake of brevity, and not because I consider them unimportant. But I make no apologies for setting out what to some may seem a demanding set of requisites for our treaty. I have done so because we believe our objective in these negotiations must go well beyond the achievement of a merely symbolic gesture. Our aim is to help produce a credible and effective contribution to non-proliferation, and my delegation is ready to work with energy towards this end.

I should like to make it quite clear that the United Kingdom would regard the rapid conclusion of an effective treaty as an entirely satisfactory outcome to these negotiations. But the rapid conclusion of an ineffective and inadequate treaty would emphatically not be a satisfactory outcome. It is for this reason that we continue to doubt the wisdom of imposing upon ourselves a deadline for the completion of these negotiations.

The United Kingdom has no interest in prolonging negotiations unnecessarily: We must, however, ensure that we do not sacrifice the objective of achieving an effective treaty to that of achieving a quick one. That said, let us work with urgency and vigour towards the conclusion of a credible and effective treaty. For our part, we stand ready to start today.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words addressed to my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka, who will introduce his report on the consultations he held during the inter-sessional period concerning the mandate and organization of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan):

... As you know, the Conference on Disarmament, in the decision contained in document CD/1212 of 10 August 1993, requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

the organization of, the negotiation. Accordingly, I held six informal open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee, one drafting session, and innumerable bilateral discussions during this period.

I would characterize the consultations regarding the mandate as successful, because the Ad Hoc Committee agreed in its informal consultations on a draft mandate on 13 December 1993. This draft mandate has been distributed to all delegations, as CD/WP.449. In it the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. It also provides for the establishment of at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation. I should like to recommend that the Conference on Disarmament adopt this draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

I would like to express my appreciation again to all delegates for their time and efforts as well as their spirit of compromise in the informal open-ended consultations, as I think that it was an important achievement to agree on a mandate, and I am pleased that it stipulates the establishment of two working groups.

Another significant accomplishment during the inter-sessional period was the adoption by consensus in the General Assembly of the resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which was sponsored by 157 countries. In this resolution the General Assembly, inter alia, fully endorses the decision of 10 August of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Also during the inter-sessional consultations I should like to note that a number of documents were introduced which should stimulate discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. Sweden introduced a revised draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1232); Mexico introduced a working paper on behalf of the Group of 21 entitled "Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" (CD/1231); and Australia introduced a draft structural outline for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1235).

Regarding the organizational aspects of the negotiations, my informal paper of 30 November 1993 included five parts, from the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to the formulation of a rolling text of a CTBT. Different views were expressed on various parts of this paper, especially regarding how and when the working groups should start their work. There was no agreement either on how or when a rolling text should be formulated.

Previously, before the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, I also held consultations on various organizational issues surrounding the negotiation and on the questionnaire, which I prepared at the request of the

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Group of 21 and distributed on 1 September. I reported on the results of my consultations and replies by delegations to the questionnaire on 11 October, at the informal consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee. I also distributed this report as an informal paper of the Chairman at those consultations. It included proposals on the organization of the negotiations regarding frequency of meetings, structure of the Committee, programme of work, participation of experts, the role of the Group of Scientific Experts, the treaty text, as well as a draft mandate for the Committee.

At that stage it was already widely recognized that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban should meet as frequently as necessary, including during the inter-sessional periods. Accordingly, in the resolution of the General Assembly on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, delegations requested the Secretary-General to provide the CD with additional administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations.

Regarding the participation of experts, it was recognized that, while special-purpose expert meetings which address specific issues might contribute to the negotiating process, generally speaking, experts should form part of their delegations. As for the role of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, it is my considered opinion that it is important for them to make every effort towards the early and successful achievement of their Third Technical Test (GSETT-3).

Turning to the question of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1994, based on my early discussions with delegations, I considered it necessary to reach consensus as soon as possible on the next Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. However, despite all the efforts I have devoted to this issue during the inter-sessional period, I have not been able to secure agreement. On the other hand, I understand that this question is being seriously addressed by you, Mr. President, in coordination with the efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, as part of your consultations on how to start the work of the Conference this year. I sincerely hope that we will soon be able to hear a satisfactory outcome of your consultations.

Finally, I conclude my report by expressing my sincere wish that the new Ad Hoc Committee will soon solve the problems which we have been unable to resolve during the inter-sessional period and conduct the important negotiations successfully.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 666th plenary meeting is resumed.

I should like first of all to deal with consideration of the draft mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This draft mandate appears in document CD/WP.449. May I take it that the Conference decides to adopt this mandate?

It was so decided.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... The Netherlands attaches priority interest to the negotiation in this year's CD session of a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would be of great benefit to our non-proliferation efforts and also to the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Netherlands delegation therefore warmly welcomes the establishment, in the opening plenary on 25 January last, of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated to negotiate a nuclear test ban. This smooth start augurs well. I express the hope, Mr. President, that under your inspired leadership the CD will also agree without delay on the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. This is a proper moment to express gratitude to Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan for his commendable performance as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, during both the regular session of the Ad Hoc Committee and the inter-sessional meetings. Thanks to his efforts, we are now in a position to start negotiations as such.

My delegation looks forward to a fruitful general debate on a nuclear test ban, with contributions from all members of the Conference on Disarmament, especially from those delegations that have urged that such a debate take place. A more academic debate on a test ban has gone on in this forum for years. Consequently it will be possible to identify without too much difficulty the basic parameters of a treaty which will command wide adherence and which will provide for an efficient verification regime. I would like to offer a few parameters for such a treaty. First, a test ban must be a comprehensive one: tests of peaceful nuclear explosions should be included in the ban. This should be spelled out unequivocally. A common

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

understanding on the scope of the ban is essential if fruitful negotiations are to begin soon. Mere references to certain treaties are not sufficient in the light of the obvious possibility of differences of interpretation of existing treaty texts. Second, precisely because of the obvious non-proliferation aspects, the negotiations should proceed in a climate free of further nuclear testing. As matters stand now the argument that further technical benefits are required before halting all tests is not completely convincing. The present level of technical expertise should be deemed sufficient. Adequate alternatives to testing can be developed further through simulation techniques. Thirdly, the debate must at an early stage focus on the required verification techniques to be negotiated. The ban does not necessarily have to dispose of the whole plethora of such techniques. The ensuing verification measures between them must not be too complex. The CD should make a judicious choice with a view to ensuring that the NTB verification regime becomes effective and manageable from both a technical and a financial point of view. Fourthly, attention will have to be devoted to issues like the proper duration of the future treaty and a sanctions regime to obviate treaty violations. In short, I look forward to a debate which should swiftly determine the prohibition we want to negotiate and the means to effectively verify that ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... Last but not least, I would like to say a few words on the subject of the expansion of membership of our Conference. Presently, it is difficult to imagine a compromise solution acceptable to all. The efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, and those of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, testify to the intricacy of the issue. The Ambassador of Mexico submitted an intriguing new proposal on 25 January last. It is the conviction of my delegation that the CD will have to adapt and to expand if it wants to shed its old remnants of bipolarity and become a truly multilateral and representative negotiating body, fit to help complete the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s. I submit that an enlarged CD membership obtains critical relevance in negotiating a nuclear test ban and in ensuring widespread commitment to the eventual treaty.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

... A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be the core issue of this year's deliberations of the CD. I wish to congratulate Ambassador Tanaka on his untiring efforts as the Chairman of last year's nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee to provide the CD with a mandate and the organizational outline to negotiate such a treaty. My Government, as outlined in Foreign Minister Kinkel's 10-point initiative on non-proliferation, has long advocated a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear test ban. We believe that such a treaty is important in terms of both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy. An advanced negotiating process on a comprehensive test ban would also have a positive influence on the climate for an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. We should do our best to achieve negotiating results by 1995. Today I will not deal at length with the structure and contents of the envisaged treaty. I will content myself with a few remarks. In our understanding, with a view to strengthening and developing the international non-proliferation regime, the scope of a nuclear test ban should not only comprise the nuclear explosion as such. Rather, it should also include preparatory or assisting activities directly preceding nuclear explosions. We advocate an effective international and universal verification regime, which should be able to respond to this scope of a nuclear test ban. A verification regime based merely on seismological data could only cover a nuclear explosion after it has taken place. This will not be sufficient. We should invest some more efforts in finding out which verification technologies for which environment are most appropriate for that purpose. Any verification regime we develop should meet the requirements of universal acceptability, feasibility and affordability. We will also have to deal with possible non-compliance with the treaty and, to this end, on-site inspections will be of paramount interest.

... Apart from the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee, which for obvious reasons will be the most important committee this year, we welcome the speedy re-establishment of all other ad hoc committees.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine):

... The Conference on Disarmament has commenced its 1994 session being faced with a set of challenges it has to meet in order to prove its ability to provide adequate responses to the most acute questions in the field of disarmament and international security. While concentrating the efforts of the participating States on the areas where real progress can be made and tangible results can be obtained relatively soon, the Conference must not, however, lose track of its ultimate purpose and ensure continuity of the disarmament process. By the same token, acknowledging the significance of a CTBT as a priority item on the agenda of the 1994 session of the CD and its direct link to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, we regard non-proliferation as a part of this process rather than a means of the mere securing of the status quo.

CD/PV.667

13

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

... The inability of the Conference to find a positive solution to the membership expansion problem - notwithstanding resolution 48/77B of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly - not only blocks full-scale participation of the countries which wish to be and can be its active members. It also puts certain limits on the activities of the Conference itself, especially now when the Conference is about to start

CD/PV.667

14

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

negotiating a CTBT designed as a document of truly universal character. The very process of work on the CTBT calls for the involvement of all States in possession of the "threshold" level of nuclear technologies in particular the USSR successor States which have nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. It should also be taken into account that consensus on resolution 48/77B in its part concerning allocation of additional resources for the work of the CD was reached only on the presumption that the expansion will take place at an early stage. It is with this understanding that we support the proposal tabled by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico at the first plenary meeting of the 1994 session, regarding the date of 31 March 1994 mentioned in this draft decision as one by which the positive resolution of the problem of the CD membership expansion should be achieved.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

... In addition, I had the honour to introduce, on your behalf, the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the 1993 session to the First Committee of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I highlighted then the significance of the decision taken by the Conference on 10 August 1993 giving its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I also had the privilege of conducting intensive consultations on the elaboration of the draft resolution in the First Committee on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a source of satisfaction that this resolution, which, inter alia, welcomes the determination of the Conference to fulfil its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community in the light of the evolving international situation with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items on its agenda, was adopted by consensus.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

... For several decades now, Egypt has been a staunch supporter of the cause of nuclear disarmament. Egypt is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is at the origin of numerous initiatives in this field. Emanating from this position, Egypt learned with satisfaction that during 1993 several nuclear-weapons States declared moratoria on nuclear testing. It is our hope that the near future will see a definitive end to all nuclear test explosions. It is therefore with great expectation that we look forward to participating actively in the negotiations in the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee, which we believe must be given primary priority so that it may move promptly in 1994 towards concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

... With the rapidly approaching 1995 NPT review and extension conference it is important for us to stress again the positive influence that a concluded CTBT and comprehensive NSAs would have on the successful outcome of this

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

conference. Bearing this in mind we cannot but stress the dire need to conclude a CTBT in 1994 and to achieve significant progress in the field of NSAs.

(Mr. Ka, Senegal)

... The present international climate, dominated on the one hand by positive signs that point to great possibilities and great hopes for general and complete disarmament and on the other hand by challenges and serious threats to international peace and security, impels us to unite our efforts with a view to completely putting an end to nuclear testing, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the use or threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction. If profound changes have now markedly altered relations between States and have led to opportunities for building peace and security on cooperation and détente in several regions of the world, nevertheless real threats have re-emerged and have become a source of increasing concern to the international community.

CD/PV.668

2

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland):

... The international community has now embarked on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty will be a true step towards a more secure world. Finland will contribute to these negotiations. We support a rapid process that will lead into a worldwide treaty which will put an end to all nuclear testing, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With intensive effort the bulk of the work could be done by the end of this year.

In this context, I wish to outline briefly our views on some key points in the coming negotiations. First, we support the scope of the treaty as proposed by Sweden in the revised draft which was presented in December last year. The Swedish text could serve as a basis for the negotiations. Second, a workable treaty requires effective verification. In this respect, the chemical weapons Convention established a modern standard. Seismic monitoring is the primary technical means for the verification system. The right to conduct challenge inspections is essential to determine that parties are not engaged in prohibited activities. It also serves as a deterrent to potential violators. Third, proper verification of the test ban requires proper organization. For reasons of technical competence and cost-effectiveness Finland believes that this task of the future treaty could best be handled within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is important that the test ban be negotiated in a multilateral setting. The

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

credibility of the treaty requires it. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament is able to move rapidly into practical negotiations in the working groups.

(Mr. Mechlaoui, Algeria)

... Algeria has always devoted particular attention to the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. Hence our great relief following the understanding that was reached during the inter-sessional period on the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We hope that this mandate will be implemented with the same spirit of cooperation, understanding and speed as that which presided over the discussions held under the effective guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. We also hope that the interest shown in the conclusion of a test-ban treaty will not be temporary. As we have already had occasion to say in the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period, resolution 48/70, which describes the negotiation of such a treaty as a "priority task", was co-sponsored by almost 160 States Members of the United Nations and adopted by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament must therefore respond to this veritable appeal from the international community. In this regard, by submitting to a moratorium on nuclear testing throughout the period of the negotiations, the nuclear Powers would greatly contribute to the success of our work.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian):

Mr. President, first allow me to greet you as the representative of the friendly country of France and congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. You are taking the Chair at a highly crucial time when the essence of the question of the future role of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in modern global politics is being resolved, when the Conference is being assigned new and complex tasks, first and foremost that of drawing up an international treaty relating to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We are convinced that you will be able to resolve successfully the procedural issues pertaining to the beginning of the session of the Conference. In this we are counting on your diplomatic skills, your many times proven capacity to find solutions to the most intricate problems. In carrying out the duties of President you can of course count on the cooperation and support of the delegation of the Russian Federation.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

... As you know, during the Moscow meeting the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America expressed support for the speedy completion of negotiations on a CTB and declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process. The Presidents appealed to other States to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held. In this connection I would like to place special stress on Russia's readiness in principle to accept as of now a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Our approach to the negotiations will be designed to ensure that they are largely completed if possible by spring 1995. These negotiations will undoubtedly be a priority activity of the Conference on Disarmament in 1994. They must receive the most favourable treatment in terms of organization at this Conference. We express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB at the last session of the Conference, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, under whose leadership not only important preliminary work for the negotiations was done, inter alia regarding the verification of the future treaty, but also a negotiating mandate was agreed for the Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like to share some of the views of the Russian delegation concerning the main provisions of the future CTB treaty. In our view the issue of the scope of the treaty should be resolved on the basis of existing international arrangements, primarily the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, with the addition of course of a ban on underground tests. We believe it inadvisable to include in the scope of the treaty the issue of so-called preparatory activities for nuclear tests. Our studies of this issue demonstrate that, firstly, it is extremely difficult to identify preparatory activities for nuclear tests which are not dual-purpose in nature, and, secondly, a ban on preparatory activities would make the verification mechanism of the future treaty significantly more complicated and more expensive.

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(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

The CTB treaty should be of a non-discriminatory nature. By this we understand equal rights and obligations set forth in the treaty for all parties to it without any exclusions. Of course, the non-discrimination principle should also apply to the verification machinery that will be provided for in the treaty. The Russian delegation proposes that the treaty should provide for an effective international verification mechanism making maximum use of existing monitoring capabilities. During negotiations on the verification mechanism the Russian delegation will also pay close attention to the financial side of the issue, without detriment, of course, to the effectiveness of verification. The treaty should contain provisions on notifications of large-scale explosions involving chemical explosives and also allow for the possibility of international observation during the preparations for and the conduct of such explosions. In considering the question of the international organization for the implementation of the treaty, our main yardsticks will be competence and an acceptable level of costs associated with its establishment, running expenses and operations. The CTB treaty should be of unlimited duration. In connection with the need for the treaty to be truly effective in the sense of encompassing not only all the nuclear Powers but also States that have the potential to develop nuclear weapons, we are convinced that the treaty should enter into force after a certain number of instruments of ratification have been deposited - 65, for example - provided that they include the instruments of all States that on the date of the treaty's signature possess nuclear power stations and research reactors. The treaty should provide for the most stringent sanctions against a State party violating its main provisions, including the application by decision of the United Nations Security Council of economic or other coercive measures provided for in the United Nations Charter. The Russian delegation believes that the CTB treaty should not be linked with any other issues in the field of arms control or the strengthening of international security, and that no problems in those areas should be linked to a CTB treaty. Experience has demonstrated that, as a rule, linkages of any kind prove counterproductive. At the same time we of course recognize that there is an objective relationship between efforts to conclude the CTB treaty and the strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, as is reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB adopted by the Conference.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French):

... The new colleagues whom I have just mentioned join us in this forum at a crucial time for the Conference on Disarmament. Just a year ago the Conference, in drawing up the treaty on chemical weapons, proved that a few countries - if they were motivated by sufficient determination - could devise a system of international commitments that was subsequently endorsed by four fifths of the States on the planet. To what do we owe this success? I think essentially to our methods of work. As they are based on the rule of consensus, we could not build rules to be imposed on a country unless it had previously accepted them. We could persuade, we could not impose. Hence the importance of mutual confidence in all our work. We may have different approaches, often we even have divergent philosophies, but if we have a common aim, if we have the will to reach it, we will succeed if we maintain a climate of total confidence among us. This climate of confidence made possible the drawing up of the treaty on chemical weapons, which remains to date the CD's best claim to fame, but it also presides over the work of the various ad hoc groups of the Conference. We can even see it in the title of some, as in the case of NSAs, but we see it above all in the entire philosophy which determines our work: how can we speak of transparency in armaments, how can

(continued)

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

we accept the principle of participating in arms registers, if there is not at the base this confidence that I am referring to here? In this body we have created a climate of collective confidence; it generated equally collective responsibility. This is the consideration that prevailed yesterday in choosing the CD as a forum for the negotiation of a CTBT; it is the best argument for deciding tomorrow to add to our work the negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The most important task that awaits us this year is the negotiation of a treaty on the halting of nuclear tests. We have to set to work urgently and I would like to take this chance to thank and congratulate Ambassador Tanaka for his excellent work in setting us on the right track as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group until now. We must begin immediately, without more ado, even though we might regret the fact that all the attempts that have been made so far to broaden the membership of the CD have been unsuccessful. In this field, Belgium thinks that we should be able to receive in the Conference any country that shares the same objectives as ours and is ready to seek ways and means of reaching them on the basis of the confidence described above.

There is a saying in English: "Where there's a will there's a way". For this particular issue, we all clearly announced on 10 August last our resolve to reach an agreement on halting nuclear tests: it is for us to seek ways and means of bringing this about. Belgium is a country that has never had the ambition of becoming a nuclear Power, but recognized the positive role that nuclear weapons have played in maintaining peace for almost half a century. Nuclear weapons intimidate, and that is their role in deterrence, but they are also extremely dangerous and that is why we uphold non-proliferation. In order to bring this about, we must first of all give guarantees and reassure those that have none. We will succeed in producing an agreement on the halting of nuclear tests only if it is accompanied by a series of verification measures designed to allay the fears of all concerned. This is the most important point in the entire negotiation and you may be assured that Belgium will do everything within its power to reach the desired result. To that end it is necessary to devise an effective international system that is capable not only of detecting a nuclear test that has occurred but will also sound the alarm if any nuclear tests are imminent. We are not here only to note the violation of international obligations, we are gathered here in the interest of non-proliferation. The verification system we set up must therefore take into account everything that precedes a nuclear test and can give warning of its imminence. In this connection, we note that the negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also something we are going to have to confront with the need for the development of a verification system: this could to a substantial extent complement the one we will set up for the CTBT. Let us therefore devise an effective multilateral system that will encompass these aspects, but let us keep it flexible and financially manageable. The experience of IAEA could be very useful to us in this matter. We know the objective, we have the context; on the basis of past experience, we have an exceptional climate of confidence. I have no doubt that under your guidance we will have the drive necessary to ensure a rapid and sound start to our work.

(The President)

... I propose that Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico should take the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The chairmen of the ad hoc committees do not usually speak in this Conference on the very day of their appointment. However, I would like to say a few words on the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. I shall not try to conceal the pleasure that I feel at this appointment. As I had occasion to say at our inaugural meeting a week ago, Mexico has been a tireless promoter of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. As a student of Alfonso García Robles and Luis Padilla Nervo, this appointment has very special significance for us. At the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, which will take place on Thursday, 3 February in the afternoon, as you announced, I will invite the members and observers of this Conference to engage in an intensive dialogue with a view to expediting our work on this topic of key importance for all of us. This dialogue will be designed to bring about agreement on the provisions of the future treaty. To use the English expression, it will be a "treaty-specific" dialogue. I would also like to place on record our appreciation for the results achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 under the guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. Allow me to conclude by thanking the members of the Conference, and very specially my colleagues in the Group of 21, for their solidarity and support.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

... The need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, fresh momentum is gathering for renewed efforts towards the realization of this goal, a process in which Romania is ready to play a full

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

and constructive part. The conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime and would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT review conference. In addition, it will dispel all the concerns about environmental damage by nuclear pollution. A universally applicable and internationally verifiable test ban would strengthen international security, contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear-weapon programme and represent a further step towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation shares the view that the ban should be effectively verifiable by means of both seismic and non-seismic technologies. The core of the future international verification system could be the seismic data exchange network, on which extensive work has been accomplished by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE). As an active participant in the GSE, Romania fully supports the tremendous efforts made by the Group and its contributing scientific experts to establish a solid verification architecture to serve the needs of a CTB treaty.

Now, due to the substantial and painstaking efforts deployed in the inter-sessional period by Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and lately by you, Mr. President, and thanks to the understanding and the spirit of compromise and cooperation of all delegations, we have the necessary means to proceed smoothly to effective negotiations, i.e. an Ad Hoc Committee with a clear negotiating mandate and a Chairman. My delegation expresses its full confidence in the diplomatic talent and ability, in the experience and professional skills of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico - the freshly elected Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee - and pledges its full support to all endeavours in order to achieve concrete results in drafting a treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions in all environments.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan):

A breakthrough was achieved on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban last year, which had long been regarded as an issue of the highest priority of the Conference. In the favourable political circumstances created by the declared or de facto testing moratorium of the nuclear-weapon States, a historic decision was taken on 10 August to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Building on this decision, a draft specific mandate for the negotiations was agreed to, during the course of the inter-sessional consultations, and was formally adopted at the beginning of this year's session of the Conference on 25 January, Mr. President, under your presidency. The mandate, I believe, has laid an appropriate ground for the forthcoming substantive negotiations on this important issue. Also at the last plenary on Tuesday, we could agree on a Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I, having had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year, am very pleased by these developments and would like to take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues here for their cooperation extended to me. I also would like to congratulate Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico on having been elected Chairman of the Committee this year to lead the important negotiations, and express our hope that the Committee will make important progress under his chairmanship.

Japan has long attached the greatest importance to the issue of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Another landmark last year was the consensus adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the CTB resolution urging the Conference to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation has a definite objective for the 1994 session of the Conference, and I believe that this objective is shared by all delegations which have assembled here. Namely, we will make every possible effort to contribute to rapid progress in the negotiations on a CTBT. In so doing, my delegation urges at the same time all nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from testing to maintain the present political climate favourable to the CTBT negotiations.

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(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

It is, of course, a matter for the Ad Hoc Committee itself to work out in detail how the negotiations are to be initiated. At this stage I confine myself to stating that it is the hope of Japan that we will discuss the basic elements of the treaty and identify the key issues to be addressed in an efficient manner, so that we may be able to start the drafting of a CTB treaty text as soon as possible. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines for the entire negotiation of the treaty, since if we rush we may end up with an incomplete and inappropriate content of the treaty. Nevertheless it is essential to proceed to the drafting work at the earliest possible date.

Having said this, I would like to introduce our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. As to the scope of a CTBT, Japan is of the view that any nuclear-weapon test explosion should be prohibited, including those which are called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

The question of verification is the most difficult but important issue in the negotiation of a CTBT. We understand from the discussions we have had so far that there is general agreement that the seismic network which has been elaborated over many years by the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) can provide an effective means of verification. We should be reminded, however, that the next technical test by the GSE to be conducted with a view to establishing the network (GSETT-3) will only begin in January 1995 and that in the meantime a number of points remain to be clarified, including such points as, for instance, how much it would cost to set up the network and how such a network would be operated. Therefore, it is essential to find solutions to these questions as soon as possible in order to reach an early conclusion of the negotiation of a CTBT. From this standpoint, Japan decided to host a workshop on CTB verification in the middle of March this year, to consider the problems of CTB verification mainly based on seismological methods, for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of the CTBT negotiations.

As to the verification system itself, we should aim to elaborate an effective verification regime, based on the combination of a monitoring system, of which the seismic monitoring network will be the key component, and on-site inspection. At the same time, due consideration should be given to the achievement of cost-effectiveness of a verification regime by making extensive use of national technical means of States parties to the treaty. Furthermore, such a verification regime needs to be flexible to adapt itself to the advance of technologies, and to improve the capability of detecting smaller and covert nuclear explosions.

With regard to on-site inspection, the points to be addressed are such matters as when it is needed, how it is conducted and what is the range and content of activities. For the elaboration of these points, our experience in the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention may serve as good guidance.

On the questions of adherence and entry into force, while it is essential to ensure the widest possible adherence, it may not be advisable to provide unnecessarily heavy conditions on the entry into force of the treaty.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

... The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been playing a pivotal role in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the subject which should be addressed with the highest priority now by the international community. Next year will be the critical year in that the future of the NPT will be decided upon. I believe that the negotiations and deliberations in the field of nuclear disarmament to be held this year in the Conference, especially on a CTBT, "cut-off" and NSA, are decisively important in building a favourable political environment which will have an impact on the success of the NPT review and extension conference to be held next year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

We believe that the Conference has sufficient potential to deal successfully with these issues. Maximum use should be made of this potential to realize the hopes of the international community for greater stability and security.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America)

... The importance the United States attaches to the 1994 session of the CD, as we begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, was symbolized by the message from the President of the United States presented to the first plenary meeting of the Conference by John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In that message, President Clinton reiterated the United States commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all nuclear explosions at the earliest possible time. This commitment has been put into action in a number of ways: by the United States moratorium on testing, by the United States appeal to all other nuclear-weapons States to show the same restraint; by United States support of the historic CD decision last August to negotiate a test-ban treaty; and by United States support and co-sponsorship of the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution on a CTBT.

United States support for a CTBT is based upon fundamental concerns about international peace and security. Others share these concerns; many States represented here have spoken of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of nuclear weapons in particular. More than 30 years ago, the signatories of the partial test-ban Treaty established the goal of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time," a goal that was reaffirmed by the non-proliferation Treaty. With the end of the cold war much of the hostility and misunderstanding that created the threat of nuclear annihilation disappeared. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons now poses another threat to international security. This threat makes essential the unlimited extension of the NPT, and gives added meaning to the CTBT as a means to retard and even prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A major United States aim is to ensure that the treaty achieves the broadest possible participation, since it is only through the widest participation that a CTBT can fully meet our overall non-proliferation objectives. A second major goal is to seek cost-effective, robust monitoring and verification measures in the treaty to guard against those who might seek to violate its provisions.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The CD embarks on CTBT negotiations with a wealth of multilateral negotiating experience. The partial test-ban Treaty and the chemical weapons Convention are useful models and tools for use in the work before us. A prime issue as we begin negotiations is the overall structure of the treaty, which could follow the CWC model. This appears to be the approach followed in Australia's proposed outline (CD/1235 and Corr.1), or "table of contents" for a treaty. We look forward to commenting on treaty structure in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and hope the Committee can reach quick agreement on structure which will serve as a guide for its work.

On general treaty obligations, or the scope of the treaty, the United States believes that the treaty should constitute a comprehensive ban. It should not be a threshold treaty; rather, it should focus on nuclear-weapons explosions and rule out all nuclear explosions any time anywhere. Moreover, the United States has long believed that any nuclear explosion could provide military benefits. Therefore, there should be no exceptions for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a comprehensive prohibition can be achieved by employing language similar to that of article 1 of the partial test-ban Treaty, which concerns "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion," a formulation similar to that contained in the NPT. This is the approach reflected in the Swedish draft treaty text (CD/1232), and we endorse such an approach which provides an appropriately broad definition of what we want to achieve.

The United States does not yet have a fixed view on entry into force (or EIF), but we do have some general ideas. To achieve non-proliferation goals, the CTBT must gain wide - even universal - adherence. It is also essential that all nuclear-weapon States be party to the treaty at EIF. The United States would favour an approach designed to garner early adherence by a significant number of key States, but we would have some doubt about making EIF contingent on ratification by a specific group of States, beyond the nuclear-weapons States. Hence we believe that the considerations that led to the rather conservative entry-into-force provisions of the CWC should not apply to the CTBT.

Conversely, we believe the CWC could well serve as a model for development of a CTBT sanctions regime. We naturally hope that effective CTBT verification provisions will have a deterrent effect on would-be violators. Nevertheless, the CTBT should provide for rigorous, non-discriminatory collective action against violators and for ultimate recourse to the United Nations Security Council.

The international verification regime will be the central element in this treaty. We believe that such a regime must ensure high confidence among the parties to the CTBT that there is compliance with the provisions of the treaty, without creating an unnecessary burden for participants. At the same time, any verification regime must be constrained by the limits of monitoring technology and the costs of operating a regime.

In our view, an effective CTBT verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability consisting of multiple components, e.g., a seismic network, atmospheric sampling for radionuclides and gaseous debris,

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

and provisions for on-site inspections. This system should be capable of identifying and attributing with high confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of less than a few kilotons' yield in broad areas of the globe.

Responsibility for effective verification will have to be shared among the parties individually and also in the context of an international structure for treaty implementation. The costs of establishing, operating, and maintaining monitoring networks will have to be shared equitably. We will need carefully to assess monitoring resources already available internationally, and to identify those that can help form the basis for an international system.

Clearly an international organization will be required to manage the exchange of relevant monitoring data, to provide a forum for rapid review of requests for on-site inspection, to administer the conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to provide a forum for the discussion and collective assessment of treaty compliance questions presented by the parties to the treaty. We believe that such an organization can be kept within acceptable managerial and cost-effective parameters. Some delegations have proposed that IAEA undertake these responsibilities, but the United States has reservations about this approach.

Caution should be applied in regard to how far the CTBT verification net should be cast. We have not been able to identify any pre-test activities unique to a covert nuclear-weapons programme that could reasonably be monitored under a CTBT, without considerable technical and political difficulty and enormous increase in cost. We have strong doubts regarding pre-test verification and believe this field should be reserved for NPT-related activities.

My statement includes preliminary comments on some of the main issues that we will be working on collectively in the months ahead. I look forward to presenting more views on verification and other elements of a CTBT as thinking in Washington progresses further. As a nuclear-weapons State, my country feels a special responsibility to make a meaningful contribution to these CTB negotiations. We intend to carry out that responsibility with our stated CTBT goals and the necessary maintenance of our security in mind.

Now that the Conference has re-established the NTB Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a CTBT, and has approved, as Committee Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, the way is clear to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I can assure you that the United States delegation is ready to go to work.

Mr. DASKALOV (Bulgaria):

... Our approach to the global problems of disarmament and international security was outlined at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. My country supported the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the fissile material production ban, as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the NPT's extension. In the field of conventional arms control we supported greater transparency through the United Nations Register, which had a successful start last year. Our country was one of the 82 States that submitted the data required for the Register. We are in favour of the strict regulation of the arms trade and prevention of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Bulgaria will take part in the work of the group of governmental

CD/PV.670

3

(Mr. Daskalov, Bulgaria)

experts who are to prepare a review conference on the Convention on weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.

... I should like to express the position of my country, in concrete terms, on some major items on this year's agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Following the breakthrough achieved last year with the conclusion of a chemical weapons Convention, the next great chance for this multilateral forum would be to reach a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Particularly encouraging is the positive development in the positions of some nuclear countries. Considerable results have also been reached by the Group of Scientific Experts dealing with the development of verification procedures for a future treaty. What remains to be done are final serious efforts aimed at reaching a universal nuclear-test-ban treaty, unlimited in its duration and subject to international and effective control. For that purpose the Conference is to concentrate on as many existing resources as possible. Along with the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, working groups on verification, legal and institutional questions could be set up. According to its capability Bulgaria will contribute to the successful accomplishment of these negotiations. As far as we are concerned we are also thinking over the possibility, under favourable international circumstances, to participate in a future organization on verification of the implementation

CD/PV.670

4

(Mr. Daskalov, Bulgaria)

of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is known that for years now Bulgaria has been taking part in the voluntary exchange of seismic data and has at its disposal expertise and equipment.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

Ukraine's disarmament priorities for the 1990s are determined both by the obligations undertaken under international agreements which are already in effect as well as the new ones that are only now being elaborated, primarily at the Conference on Disarmament. Ukraine has signed the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and is now actively preparing for its ratification. Together with other States we support the convening of the review conferences on biological and inhumane weapons, and support the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty (CTBT). We are ready to implement our commitments under the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol and we are ready to participate in the search for solutions to other important disarmament problems addressed by the Conference on Disarmament and other international forums.

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(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

... Steadily pursuing the path of elimination of all its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine naturally is interested in seeing to it that the process of nuclear disarmament embraces all nuclear States, that it becomes universal and irreversible. The decision of the Conference on Disarmament to renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty is an important step in this direction. This decision is important both in essence and as a symbol. It marks a new stage in the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Ukraine believes that drafting of the treaty in the near future is quite possible. The result will be the end to the development of new types of nuclear weapons and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that the future treaty should be open for both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty should include protocols on verification activity as an integral part.

Ukraine supports India's position that participation in verification activity under the treaty has to be non-discriminatory, provide equal rights and establish the same obligations for all States as well as requiring equal implementation of the CTBT provisions. We are for the creation of an effective verification mechanism which under appropriate conditions would provide for the possibility of reimbursement of expenses incurred in carrying out such activity.

Ukraine considers negotiations on a CTBT an important element of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of preparations for the NPT review conference. We believe that it is quite realistic to set the goal of reaching agreement on the text of the treaty before the review conference is convened in April 1995. Being guided by the desire to conclude the CTBT as soon as possible, we consider it to be important that political, legal and verification aspects of the CTBT be discussed in parallel. Ukraine treats with understanding the desire of the five nuclear States to have a key role in the drafting of the conceptual provisions of the CTBT, but we are convinced that each State should have an opportunity to make its contribution to the drafting of the treaty. First of all, this concerns the successor States to the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR as well as the States which have a "threshold-level" nuclear capability.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

Later on the nuclear States should be ready to assume clearly defined international legal commitments concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and refraining from the threat of use of such weapons. We are deeply convinced that any such guarantees should be unconditional in character and rule out any exceptions to the ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It is obvious that the provision of such guarantees as well as the conclusion of the CTBT will create a favourable environment for the successful review of the non-proliferation Treaty and its extension.

Mr. BRODODININGRAT (Indonesia)

... At the outset, I would like to reiterate the considered view of my delegation that the drastic reduction of the threat of nuclear war with the end of the cold war should in no way be perceived as diminishing the need for nuclear disarmament, and hence enabling us to relax our efforts. On the contrary, the welcome improvement that has dramatically marked the relationship between the nuclear Powers represents a critical momentum which must be generated through more active and serious efforts towards the achievement of effective nuclear disarmament. Many references have been made by various delegations in this Conference on Disarmament to the fact that the new and improved international political climate has provided us with solid ground on which to advance negotiations on both conventional and unconventional weapons. What is now needed is to follow up these references, and to build upon our success with the chemical weapons Convention, with a common resolve and concrete actions. It is against such an arrière-pensée that I should like, at this juncture, to briefly address the issue of the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their interrelationship.

With regard to a CTBT, there have been a series of appreciable grounds for hope which indicate that we are indeed on the right track. The continuing observance of the nuclear-test moratoria by the majority of the nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

States, the Conference's decision of 10 August 1993 to give the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate, the subsequent acceptance by the Conference, thanks to the untiring efforts of our distinguished Japanese colleague Ambassador Tanaka, of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, and the consensus adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 48/70 on a CTBT - as well as the appointment of another distinguished colleague, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, to chair the Ad Hoc Committee - do represent major steps in the right direction. It is the hope of my delegation that the Conference on Disarmament could further capitalize on those positive developments by avoiding protracted discussions on procedural and non-substantive matters and instead "speedily taking the bull by the horns".

In this context, we are encouraged to note the statement by the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, before this Conference on Disarmament plenary two weeks ago, particularly when he underlined the United States policy as announced by President Clinton on 3 July 1993, strongly supporting the conclusion of a CTBT at the earliest possible time. We call on all other nuclear-weapon States to follow this example by making the same commitment, thereby widening the window of opportunity for the achievement of a CTBT. For its part, Indonesia's commitment to the achievement of a CTBT is beyond question. In the last five years we have spearheaded efforts toward this end through the PTBT amendment conference and it is in pursuance of the same objective that we stand ready to reinforce such efforts through the Conference on Disarmament.

Now that agreement has been reached on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the object of a CTBT which we are aiming for has been further clarified. It must be universal, comprehensive and multilaterally and effectively verifiable. While, of course, fully agreeing with this, my delegation is of the opinion that the principle of universality should be seen as a common objective rather than as an individual precondition. All of us should aim towards adhering to the treaty, rather than each and every one of us waiting until the rest have joined. As for the principle of comprehensiveness, we share the view that the scope of a CTBT should also cover peaceful nuclear explosions as well as testing through super-computer simulation. We feel that comprehensive coverage is needed to prevent vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the future. With regard to the principle of verifiability, we hold the view that the verification system would be made more effective if the current seismic method could be supplemented with, and refined through, other non-seismic techniques. As far as the time-frame is concerned, we support the call to conclude a CTBT before the NPT review and extension conference in 1995, and this brings me to the issue of the interrelationship between a CTBT and the NPT.

The view expressed by many of us on the desirability of concluding a CTBT before the NPT review and extension conference does represent a general feeling that there is a link between a CTBT and the NPT. We share that general feeling. Indeed it has always been the opinion of my delegation that

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

not only will a CTBT make vertical proliferation much more difficult, but also that it can be expected to drastically reduce the risk of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, my delegation is more cautious when it comes to jumping to the conclusion that a CTBT represents a guarantee for an indefinite extension of the NPT. This caution emanates from the capital importance that we attach to article VI of the NPT, which clearly provides that "each of the Parties to the Treaty [i.e. each nuclear-weapon State] undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". It is obvious from the reading of this article that, without in any way belittling its significance, a CTBT should be perceived as just an important step in the right direction toward an effective NPT. Important as it may be, it should not be regarded as the basic justification for an indefinite extension of the NPT. Even less desirable would be for us to entertain the idea of a loose time-frame for the CTBT negotiation and, worse still, to treat this CTBT as a "hostage" of the NPT extension.

Turning now to the subject of the NPT, let me first observe that references are increasingly being made to the shortcomings of the Treaty. These, in our view, should not be seen as a negative development, but should be constructively directed towards strengthening the Treaty in the context of the preparations for the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. The two most frequently quoted NPT shortcomings are, undoubtedly, the divisiveness which it has created between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in relation to articles I, II, III and IX on the one hand, and the doubtful compliance with article VI by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the other. At this point, my delegation would venture to think aloud and mention two other related issues in the present NPT which perhaps need our closer attention. The first issue is the asymmetry between the control and verification mechanism relating to the non-nuclear-weapon States and those relating to the nuclear-weapon States. Whereas, by virtue of article III, all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have accepted the IAEA safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of their obligations assumed under the Treaty, no mechanism whatsoever is foreseen in the Treaty to control and verify the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, such as stipulated under article VI. The second issue pertains to the extremely difficult amendment procedures required by article VIII of the Treaty. Our concern over this issue is increasing, particularly in connection with the growing pressure for the indefinite extension of the NPT, which may leave amendment procedures as the only possible opportunity for subsequent improvements. Hence the prospect of running the risk of perpetuating the present shortcomings.

To conclude on a positive note, my delegation is looking forward to a productive negotiation in the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB and serious preparations for the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. We stand ready to extend our full and active cooperation in this extremely important exercise.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary)

... So far the Conference on Disarmament has always succeeded in surmounting the obstacles that emerged in the way of its negotiations. In 1992 the Conference faced the challenge of overcoming deep divisions and concluding the chemical weapons Convention. That process gave ample proof that a common

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(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

denominator can be found even between basically different conceptual approaches if there is a willingness to negotiate and compromise. In 1993, just a few weeks after the chemical weapons Convention had been signed by more than 100 States, a number of opening statements raised a quiet question mark about the very sense of the CD's future. Yet again, the Conference stepped up and responded positively, by mandating an Ad Hoc Committee on the promising issue of transparency in armaments, conducting a lively and progressive debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and reaching a breakthrough decision to give this Committee a negotiating mandate. I do sincerely hope that at the beginning of the 1995 session we will be able to look back at 1994 as a year that kept up with the emerging trend.

One should have no doubts that the success of the 1994 session will be judged mainly on the basis of the progress we are able to achieve in the Ad Hoc Committee on banning nuclear tests. Only a collective effort of all participants can help us attain this goal. On its part, Hungary is ready to take its share of responsibility and participate actively in the upcoming negotiations. I would like to reiterate that Hungary has always been and continues to be a staunch supporter of a total prohibition of all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time and advocates the earliest possible conclusion of a nuclear test ban. Such a ban has to be universally applicable to all States whether possessing nuclear weapons or not.

In our reading the future treaty should not differentiate between nuclear-weapon tests and so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. The notion of widening the scope from the strict interpretation of banning nuclear explosions to also prohibiting certain kinds of associated activities merits further intellectual investment. It is obvious that assistance to other countries to engage in nuclear testing would run contrary to the purpose and the spirit of a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. The five nuclear-weapon States have already entered comparable obligations under the NPT, but this circle has to be widened. The Conference should also carry on exploring the possibilities of prohibiting preparatory activities, even though the issues of appropriate definition and verification in this field seem to be the most tricky obstacles on the road ahead.

Just as in the case of the chemical weapons Convention, the verification regime will constitute the backbone of the future treaty. We believe that verifying the CTBT should not be a political but rather a technical issue. The elements of the required technology are already at our disposal, waiting only to be integrated into an adequate system. This system should meet three basic criteria, namely technical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and transparency. The core of the verification system will undoubtedly be formed by a seismic monitoring network, which pushes the activities of the seismological expert group even more to the forefront of interest. For long periods in the past, this group has virtually been the only place where practical and progressive work was conducted having in mind the issue of banning nuclear tests. The experience gained from the two series of technical tests have already provided answers to numerous questions that would pop up only at later stages of the negotiating process.

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

The full-scale phase of the third test aimed at developing, testing and evaluating an experimental international seismic monitoring system is scheduled to commence on 1 January 1995 and run without a definite time-limit. It gives me great pleasure to inform you that Hungary will - for the first time - participate in the test run of the seismological data network. May I express once again our gratitude to the Government of Germany for their cooperation that enabled us to create the technical background required for our involvement?

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

... The issues of a nuclear test ban, negative security assurances and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes deserve utmost attention on their own merit, but the upcoming extension and review conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is likely to contribute as a multiplying factor to their significance. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime would benefit enormously from early and substantive progress in these areas. A successful NPT conference in 1995 would also give further momentum to the negotiations within the CD. The correlation between these processes, however, should be handled in a very cautious manner. We cannot but oppose any misinterpretation of this sensitive relationship that would create a formal and artificial linkage. In our judgement, such an approach would endanger the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and diminish the chance for success within the CD. Supporting both the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and the earliest possible conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on the mentioned issues, we certainly share the belief that an "all or nothing" approach poses unacceptable risks and might end up with reaching the less favourable option.

Last but not least, I wish to stress that increased openness and transparency have gained wide recognition in matters of international security. In fact, the notion of transparency is present in nearly every item on our agenda, be it the concept of open seismic stations, the problem of data accessibility in the NTB verification system or the need for a transparent negotiating process on other questions. The issue of transparency in armaments, which is about to celebrate its second anniversary on the agenda of the Conference, is also an expression of the recognition that transparency and openness can have a significant contribution to reducing tensions and enhancing stability. Existing transparency regimes, like the United Nations standardized system for reporting military expenditure or the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, add further pieces to the emerging trend and serve as reliable proof that transparency is not merely a useful but an ever more indispensable element of the new generation of tools backing up preventive diplomacy. We keep emphasizing that transparency in armaments is basically a cooperative undertaking, giving participants an impetus on the road to building trust. The possibilities of its development should be continuously explored.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar):

... I shall devote my statement today to the nuclear issues on the agenda. When this Conference completed its negotiation of the draft Convention on chemical weapons, doubt was cast on the future of the CD. My delegation is delighted to find the CD, one year afterwards, continuing as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as vibrant and vigorous as ever. In fact, the CD is passing through a very important epoch in its history, namely the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This is very welcome, as my delegation has all along held the view that it should indeed give the nuclear issues the top priority which they deserve.

Resolution 48/70, entitled "Comprehensive test-ban treaty", sponsored by a record number of 157 co-sponsors and adopted without a vote at the recently concluded forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, sends a clear signal that the whole international community

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(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

favours the early conclusion of a CTBT. We in the CD should therefore spare no effort to undertake intensive negotiations with a view to reaching a final draft text of a CTBT before the conclusion of the 1994 session.

We are aware that a CTBT cannot be a letter-perfect constraint against manufacturing of any nuclear explosive devices such as clandestine manufacture of crude nuclear devices. Despite such shortcomings, a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will curb and prevent the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and development of nuclear-related space weapons. It will thereby contribute to the cause of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the enhancement of international peace and security.

Never in the history of the CD have we had a better opportunity to negotiate a CTBT than at present. Never has the international political and security environment been more favourable. It is therefore imperative for all of us to seize this rare opportunity to bring the negotiation of a CTBT to a successful conclusion in a most expeditious manner. The present nuclear testing moratorium, declared or de facto, observed by the nuclear-weapon States is also another factor helpful to the negotiation process in the CD. We hope that this will be maintained throughout the period of the negotiation process.

In the view of my delegation, a CTBT should, inter alia, embody the following elements and principles. The scope of a CTBT should be comprehensive; the treaty should ban all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time. The ban should also cover so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, which are practically indistinguishable from nuclear-weapon tests and which have little practical use for genuinely peaceful purposes. The treaty should be non-discriminatory, universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable. The treaty should be of unlimited duration. The verification regime should be multilateral in character and must have the capacity to effectively monitor compliance with the provisions of the treaty on a global scale. Seismic monitoring should constitute the central element of the verification, to be supplemented by other technical means such as radionuclide sensing and satellite photography, and by on-site inspections. The verification system should not be too cumbersome; it should be cost-effective. The on-site inspection procedure should be used only on rare occasions as a measure of last resort; and should not be unnecessarily intrusive. The treaty should not contain any provision that could be interpreted as restricting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

As regards the definition of nuclear tests, my delegation subscribes to the view that such a definition should be simple, practical, and easy to apply. The definition of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion", contained in article 1 of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, is still relevant and meets our requirements. We will do well to adopt this time-tested, practical and useful definition, or to use it as a

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

basis to work out an appropriate formulation. My delegation feels that we should avoid unnecessary protracted negotiations on what will constitute a nuclear-test explosion.

Despite the complexity of technical issues, the principal barriers to be overcome to achieve a CTBT are political, not technical. As far back as 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary to achieve final agreement on a CTB. We do not therefore see any reason why we should not be able to conclude a CTBT expeditiously, once political decisions are taken on key issues.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

My delegation feels that CTBT and NSA are essential elements in an effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Tangible results in these areas will go a long way in making the 1995 NPT review conference a success.

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... But my question remains: are we not, in a way, simply deceiving ourselves by assuming that part of the problem has been resolved and only another part remains? Moreover, it is common knowledge that some members prefer to postpone the expansion as much as possible and, specifically, until the negotiations on a CTBT have been concluded. Are we not, through this proposal, reducing pressure for a prompt decision and helping those who wish to see the whole idea shelved for some time?

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

It goes without saying that a CTBT will be the priority issue of this year's deliberations of the CD. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Tanaka for his tremendous work, especially for elaborating the draft mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is encouraging to note that this year the NTB Ad Hoc Committee has smoothly started its work under the able guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, and it is prepared to start substantive discussions on such key issues as the scope, verification, organization, entry into force and compliance of the treaty. Since the beginning of the CD session many interesting views have been expressed both in the plenary and in the Ad Hoc Committee on a CTBT. The Group of 21 presented its preliminary views on a CTBT in working paper CD/1231. The position of my delegation on some key issues of a CTBT was reflected in the above-mentioned document of the Group of 21.

The early conclusion of a CTBT would undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and, in particular to the successful outcome of the NPT extension conference of 1995. Mongolia believes that, as a cornerstone of the present non-proliferation regime, the NPT should be strengthened and extended indefinitely at its forthcoming review conference.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I too would like to apologise for speaking without being inscribed on the list of speakers. I do so because I think it would be helpful to give an immediate reaction to the important statement by the distinguished representative of Iran. In the view of my Government, two wrongs do not make a right. While we detest the behaviour of the Iraqi regime as much as anyone, we believe the United States is mistaken in opposing the admission of Iraq to the Conference. We have made clear the importance we attach to the admission of such countries as Iraq, particularly in the context of the CTBT negotiations. We believe, however, that Iran is wrong to oppose the admission of Israel, particularly at a time when the Israeli Government is participating fully and positively in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Iranian proposal to agree to the entry of all the countries in Ambassador O'Sullivan's package except for two is therefore unacceptable to my delegation. In the circumstances, we believe that the only answer is for you to appoint a special coordinator, as you intend, to continue the consultations on the whole question of expansion, but taking into account particularly the ingenious proposal of our distinguished Mexican colleague.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

... We have listened with great interest to the important statements made so far, especially by representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, on their positions concerning comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - our top priority this year. The significance of these statements for our objectives cannot escape anyone. We study them with due care.

Turning to the views of my delegation in regard to a CTBT, I should like first to say that we share in the appreciation expressed to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, for his endeavours last year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The in-depth examination of various aspects of detection and verification techniques, and the subsequent elaboration of a treaty-specific mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1994, offer us a chance to proceed expeditiously to purpose-oriented work on the provisions of a multilateral treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests for all time. In the view of my delegation, we will be greatly assisted in this task by the Swedish draft CTBT text with its annexed draft protocol and by the Australian working paper containing a valuable draft structural outline of such a treaty. Both these documents represent useful reference points in our work and we are grateful to Sweden and Australia for their contributions.

While a CTBT is long overdue, we can well understand the caution transpiring from suggestions that "haste should be made slowly" and that a "greater premium should be put on a good treaty than on an early one". It goes without saying that neither a good nor an early accord would be facilitated if the appeals of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton for a continued test moratorium were to go unheeded.

The scope of a ban covering "all tests for all time" is referred to in the 1963 PTB Treaty. It seems to come close to what we should be aiming at - some 30 years later - in a CTBT viewed, first and foremost, as an effective

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

non-proliferation instrument. While such an instrument - in our view - should cover "peaceful nuclear explosions" and dismiss any "threshold" idea, we find attractive and warranted arguments against extending the scope of the ban to cover also "preparatory activities". Such activities would not lend themselves to precise definition nor to easy and foolproof verification. What is certain about such a ban, however, is that it would militate against the need for verification that is cost-effective. It could, moreover, come dangerously close to tampering with the recognized principle of freedom of scientific research and interfering with legitimate peaceful activities.

The provisions on the entry into force of the future treaty should, in our view, satisfy at least two requirements. First, they should not set the entry-into-force hurdle discouragingly high, thus in effect delaying entry into effect of the treaty; and secondly entry-into-force should be conditional on mandatory support of the CTBT by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, by the recognized nuclear-capable "threshold" countries as well as by those which are known to operate research and power-generating nuclear reactors. A mandatory ratification of the future treaty by all members of the CD, especially following enlargement of its membership, would come close to meeting these requirements.

Provisions on a credible and effective verification system may pose the greatest difficulty, if only because of their sheer weight in the treaty. We believe that such a system, by and large, patterned after the CWC verification mechanism, should envisage, inter alia on-site challenge inspections and a sanctions system meaningful enough to deter would-be violators. A seismic monitoring system would, of course, stand at the core of such a mechanism. Institution-wise, a satisfactory yet financially conservative solution should be assured by a judicious marriage between the Vienna-located International Atomic Energy Agency, with its recognized experience, manpower and administrative infrastructure, and a CTBT-specific organism responsible for monitoring data exchange and the handling of related activities. The presentation by the representative of the IAEA yesterday at the NTB Ad Hoc Committee was extremely useful and we thank him for this and for the answers he gave to many questions asked by various delegations.

Let me, at this juncture, make also one observation of a more general nature. Now, we believe that while the elaboration of an effective and universally applicable CTBT, on the one hand, and the extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, on the other, represent but two sides of the same broader issue of non-proliferation, these goals should be sought on their own merits. Any attempts at establishing whatever artificial linkage between them would be certainly unhelpful. At the same time, of course, it would be less than realistic to deny the existence of a clear feedback relationship between them.

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

... The Conference, being the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has important and urgent matters to deal with on its agenda. The negotiations which have just begun on the nuclear-test-ban treaty are a topical example. The urgent need to conclude a multilaterally negotiated and universally verifiable treaty, which, if it is to be effective, must enjoy universal participation, fully justifies the need for expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. It would therefore be irrational to have stated before the Conference that this future treaty should be signed and ratified, aside from the recognized nuclear Powers, by the threshold States and also by those which possess nuclear power or research facilities, without taking into consideration that most of these States have no opportunity to participate as full partners in the negotiations. It would be illogical to invite some of these States to participate in the future seismic network, stipulating that their incorporation in the system is of capital importance for future compliance with the treaty, without taking account of the fact that they possess no right to participate in the decision-making process. It would be unfair to seek to share the rights and duties fairly among all the parties to the treaty without that fairness being established to allow possible States parties to participate legitimately in the decision-making machinery when those rights and obligations are negotiated. My delegation has repeated several times before this august body that if the Conference on Disarmament intends to maintain its credibility, it must spare no effort to adapt itself to the changes that have occurred in the world. These changes, whose effects are far-reaching, are sufficiently compelling that the member countries should abandon the illusory prestige of belonging to a select club. Otherwise, many countries which for a long time have wished to participate in this work will inevitably lose their motivation and as a result the credibility of the Conference will be jeopardized, coupled with a reluctance to accede to the instruments prepared by it. Turkey, since it is prepared to contribute as best it can to the work of the Conference, is profoundly disappointed and

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

frustrated by the outcome of the last session, when an extraordinary opportunity for the expansion of this body was not grasped.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran):

... For years, the international community has been calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. This is indeed a disarmament issue that came to birth almost at the same time as did nuclear weapons. Thirty years ago, there was the apparent conclusion that one has to settle, for the time being, for only a partial ban so that, at least, space and the ocean beds would be excluded from testing. Today, finally, we have come to a point - keeping our fingers crossed - that a comprehensive test ban seems at reach. The Conference on Disarmament has an important task ahead of it in negotiating and concluding a treaty. Yet the enthusiasm has been marred, at times, by several conditionings and linkages raised at the very outset of negotiations. Even at this very early stage, we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, feel the pressure and duress building up in and around negotiations.

It is fine to derive from all this that we need to move forward and fast and to conclude a treaty urgently and during the shortest possible time. There are many dangers on the way that threaten the fate of negotiations. At the same time, though, one cannot take comfort in having to negotiate and feel that positions, including essential positions, may be compromised to avoid a situation that negotiations would be harmed, or ceased.

It is true, of course, that the non-nuclear-weapon States are the strong proponents of the nuclear test ban and that they are most keen to see the negotiations succeed. But it is not fair that this sense of eager enthusiasm be misinterpreted and abused.

The approach which has generally been followed so far gives the impression that nuclear-weapon States are making a huge sacrifice to have merely committed themselves to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. As such, they have attempted to set, in various ways, the terms of negotiations. It is also implied that the objective, the main target I should say, is to stop any possible nuclear test by those who are on the verge of becoming nuclear. It seems the nuclear-weapon States believe that a special situation should be reserved only for them; that what is done by them is not a source of concern for others and that they should deal with their nuclear weapons and whatever

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(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

relates to it within their own set of coordinates. The impression is given that the threat that needs to be contained is that of the possible newcomers, those on the threshold.

We are all aware that the CTBT is a non-proliferation scheme intended both to avert vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. We are also aware that no commitments to nuclear disarmament are yet made. In fact, even an intention for complete nuclear disarmament is not yet registered despite the enormous changes in international relations following the cold war. We do not, nevertheless, agree to the notion that the threat is limited to the emerging nuclear-weapon States and to horizontal proliferation. Indeed, we non-nuclear-weapons States see this exercise as only a step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is the cardinal objective. Everything else finds meaning only under its shadow; be it the CTBT, PTBT, NPT, START, test-ban moratoriums or the prohibition of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. In fact, it is for this reason that we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, welcome such negotiations; that we will move one step towards nuclear disarmament and that we remove the reasons cited for the maintenance of nuclear weapons one after the other.

We see the test ban as the last hurdle to overcome. We shall soon expect a time-bound framework for complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. We therefore wish to invite nuclear-weapon States to take more prudence into the conditions, the restraints they are putting forward.

Before we start negotiations we have been told that there will be no entry into force unless all nuclear-weapon States and all those on the threshold join in. The suggestion has then been made that the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerges, the negotiations will stop and thus the Treaty will fail to exist. We have also been told that the negotiations may be arrested if, despite the prevailing moratorium, a nuclear test is carried out. At the same time, calls for exceptional provisions are already on the table.

A provision for nuclear tests for "safety purposes" for the nuclear States is being requested; "safety", I believe, meaning the ability to keep the current stockpiles of nuclear weapons operational, properly targeted and risk-free. On this, I must say, if there is to be any special provision, it should be one that would be accorded to all equally. We cannot start the CTBT while already contemplating privileges and exceptionalities. The CTBT, by its scope, must be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities.

On the current moratorium on testing it has been stated that it must hold, and hold perfectly, if negotiations are not to collapse. Of course, we too believe in the significance of this moratorium and believe too that it should not be broken. It should, instead, be extended indefinitely and should include a solid commitment from all nuclear-weapon States. Other States, particularly those on the threshold, also should refrain from testing. It is, therefore, understandable to interpret such positions as a means to deter possible new testing. But it is inconceivable that the negotiations should,

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

in reality, be hostage to someone's failure to observe the moratorium. These negotiations have their own virtue and should not be threatened by events here and there.

As to the conditions raised for the entry into force, if they are aimed as a lever to ensure universality, one may find merit in them. Indeed, these are conditions that would be extremely useful if they are set forth solemnly in relation to the NPT. It will be a big boost to the NPT to state, firmly, that it would only be extended if and only if all nuclear-weapon States, as well as all those on the threshold, join and remain fully committed to it, and to amend the Treaty in such a way that it would be nullified the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerged. The raison d'être of the NPT is to forbid the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. This has not been the case. Therefore, such firmness may indeed prove to serve the NPT and its survival well.

On the question of the relationship or, more properly said, the linkage between a CTBT and the NPT we have heard various statements. In the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-eighth General Assembly it was stated that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States view the successful outcome of the CTBT as decisive to the fate, to any extension of the NPT. We have heard, on the other hand, from some nuclear-weapon States that the CTBT will not even be negotiated if the extension of the NPT could not be guaranteed. I believe we can conclude from this, as a shared position supported by all, that the CTBT and NPT are interlinked and the conclusion, extension, success and survival of any one depends fully on the other. It should not any more be a question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg. We need and require both. One cannot be without the other.

I would attempt now to present our views on some other issues relevant to the negotiations on the CTBT. On verification, I believe, we must first concentrate on the current situation and the sort of nuclear tests that we have seen so far. To focus on future possibilities in nuclear tests complicates our work. It is, yet, something that we need to bear in mind. As we want a foolproof treaty and a long-lasting one, we may be compelled to envisage the impact from the advance of technology in the future. We cannot even disregard, outright, the possibility of a simulated nuclear test by supercomputers. But, again, we must be cautious not to lose focus, not to make things more complex and move within a framework that will keep the treaty feasible, promptly achievable and realizable.

It appears that the seismic network is the only viable and ready-to-use option as the core of the verification. Other mechanisms may gradually be applied as complementary, but it is essential that any such mechanisms should be under international control.

As regards the organization for the implementation of the treaty, if IAEA is to be entrusted with this task, it should not only become technically prepared, but it needs as well to make adjustments in its decision-making structure. These adjustments are, incidentally, also needed for the extension

(Mr. Nasserri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

of the NPT; adjustments that would enhance the role of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and to the eventual CTBT and give them priority in its main decision-making body vis-à-vis the non-members.

On the suggestion to prohibit preparations, the idea as we understand is to foresee measures against preparations the moment they are detected and reported. This is a matter that deserves further study. Logic has it that if one is preparing for a test, why should others wait until the hand is on the trigger and not move to stop it in advance? The problem lies, on the other hand, in how to define preparations, how to trace them, who should report them, who will decide, how one avoids abusive reports.

It is clear that many complications and complexities stand in our way if the idea of prohibiting preparations is taken up. The idea, however, guides us to think more seriously about the existing sites. No doubt if any State has any site available for nuclear tests it remains only one step from the test itself. We should, in our endeavour, examine how we can best deal with this question. I believe one possible approach is to request all parties to declare the sites that have been used or are ready to be used for nuclear testing as well as the specifically designed equipment contained in them. We may decide then that such equipment must be destroyed under verification and the site must be closed.

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, arguments have been raised that no such thing exists and that any nuclear test can have a military application. Our objective is, of course, to have a comprehensive treaty, one that leaves no loophole. As such, we are inclined towards a position that no test of whatsoever nature would be permitted. We are, none the less, apprehensive about the notion of duality of use. A notion prevalent in the developed world that if there is an intention, almost anything with a peaceful use may be diverted for military application and, therefore, must be monitored, controlled or banned. We have had devastating experience in this regard. We have suffered. In the chemical field we saw this notion shaped into export limitations on many chemicals beyond what the CWC provided for. In the BWC, many substances, necessary ingredients for vaccines and serums, have been controlled under the pretext of dual use. In the nuclear arena, the situation has been much, much worse. Technology and material related to peaceful use have been heavily curtailed despite clear commitments for their accessibility in the NPT. Indeed, it has become a matter of course for the developed countries in the fields of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological technology that the developing countries should be deprived of many things perceived by them to have dual use. It is this persistent noting that makes us hesitate on what is now being suggested about the prohibition of all nuclear tests including peaceful ones. This is an issue, therefore, that should be extensively elaborated and carefully examined before it is concluded.

What I have just presented reflects our general views on the CTBT at this inaugurating phase of negotiations. We shall proceed to participate in negotiations with a view to conclude the convention at the earliest possible time. Hence, alongside the NPT, PTBT and other non-proliferation treaties, we will have curbed further vertical and horizontal proliferation and will be better-equipped to aim directly at nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With your permission I would now like to say a few words in closing. My term of office as President is coming to an end. I do not intend to embark on an assessment of the results we have arrived at in the course of the last few weeks. Like each of you, I am pleased that the Conference has been able to decide on its agenda expeditiously for this session, to establish the ad hoc committees on a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. Likewise, we have happily been able to appoint two special coordinators entrusted respectively with the question of fissile material and the updating of the agenda of the Conference. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its work promptly and set up its two working groups. All this is positive and it shows that where there is a will, problems can be overcome.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 672nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... We set ourselves ambitious goals and we rightly did so. We have started serious work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and I am impressed by the manifest will of participants in the negotiations to make rapid progress. Consultations have begun to determine the role of the CD in the area of the cut-off that might lead to negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of certain fissile material. The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will hopefully be able to make decisive progress in accordance with its mandate. The Conference on Disarmament is the natural forum for the negotiation of all these treaties.

This year's agenda of the Conference on Disarmament coincides with the objectives my Government has long been advocating. I have already made it clear in previous sessions that my delegation wishes to contribute to successful and constructive negotiations on the issues aforementioned. It is along this line of thinking that I accepted with great pleasure the chairmanship of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification. However, it is for the same reason that I eventually had to give up the chairmanship of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee you originally entrusted me with. The questions relating to negative security assurances are also a very important issue and should not be dismissed as a second-ranking question. They should be dealt with the full attention of a chairman not committed to other functions within the CD. That is why I can only welcome my esteemed colleague Ambassador Guillaume as the new Chairman of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee. It is a matter of course that my delegation will try to assist him in his endeavour to find an agreement on this very crucial issue.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

... The Conference on Disarmament, like many other aspects of international life, has been released from the cold war constraints and, for the first time, can get down to its task of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. It has managed to deal with one category of weapons of mass destruction, the Convention banning chemical weapons, and is now turning its attention to two others: the ban on testing nuclear devices and the ban on production of fissile material for making nuclear weapons. Beyond these particular matters there are other items of interest on the CD's agenda: finding a binding legal instrument to give security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons; and efforts to get some sort of handle on the unrestrained and massive flows of conventional arms.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

... The future arms control and disarmament agenda will require the elimination of cold war assumptions, the construction of a common approach to security on a basis of shared or highly congruent interests, and the search for mutually acceptable arrangements that break out of the typical cold war cycle of perceived threat and counter-reaction. Much of this activity will necessarily be on a regional or bilateral basis, but those regional arrangements are likely to build on norms and mechanisms set out in global agreements. In some cases such as a CTBT and other weapons of mass destruction, it seems likely that regional progress can only be achieved through a global resolution of the issue. The CTBT negotiations, even more than the CWC, have the potential to break out of East/West and North/South mindsets.

Mr. HOHENFELLNER (Austria):

... The fogs of uncertainty which obscured last year's CD session have by now risen. On 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament, by deciding to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, has now set itself a new and important goal. On 25 January this year, the direction was further clarified by the adoption of a well-defined mandate for the CTBT negotiations and, finally, on 1 February, a consensus could be reached on the designation of a successor to Ambassador Tanaka as Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

We congratulate also an old friend Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for having been elected to chair this very important committee as a former student of Nobel Peace Prize winner Alfonso García Robles. In the same year when García Robles graduated in international law, the Nobel Prize for Physics was awarded to the Austrian scientist Victor Franz Hess, who, after World War II, strongly opposed nuclear tests. Hess's research principally dealt with radioactivity and atmospheric electricity. It brought him eventually to the

(continued)

(Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria)

study of radioactive fallout from nuclear bombs. Symbolizing the legal and scientific endeavours to be undertaken in the working groups explicitly foreseen by the NTB mandate, these two brilliant personalities stand for the genuine search for peace which ought always to prevail over military considerations.

The end of the cold war has brought with it a whole set of far-reaching measures in the field of nuclear disarmament: treaties like START II, in which the United States of America and the Russian Federation agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by more than 70 per cent, would not have been achieved without the sweeping changes of recent years. These profound changes in world affairs have set the wider political framework for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Now, after the political thaw which permitted a number of formerly "frozen" topics to surface, the international community sees itself confronted by an impressive negotiation package on nuclear issues. This package will require careful handling, lest it falls apart. It is composed of the following elements: the already mentioned CD negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the review conference foreseen in article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the extension conference foreseen by article X of the same treaty, which will be held together with the review conference in April/May 1995; the forthcoming negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and, finally, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee on "negative security assurances".

While some countries stress that no positive outcome could be expected from the 1995 NPT review and extension conference unless substantial progress is achieved on a CTBT and the so-called "negative security assurances" negotiations, other representatives point to the opposite, i.e. that no substantial progress will be made in the field of a CTBT, unless an indefinite extension of the NPT has been accepted by all States parties. Our minds rather ought to be focused on mutual benefit options encompassing the nuclear negotiation package as a whole, bearing in mind that the elements of this package have a mutual influence on each other. Since agreement would in any case not mean the end of the discussions on nuclear issues, but rather a new beginning, it seems to us to be wiser to pursue a partnership rather than a confrontational approach.

(Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria)

... In our view, a CTBT should contribute to furthering the non-proliferation goals of the NPT, but this cannot remain the sole aim. The fact that nuclear test explosions can easily have serious consequences for people and their environment is a sufficient reason to ban them once and for all. Austria will make every effort to contribute to an early successful conclusion of these negotiations.

... We have noted with satisfaction that the expertise of IAEA is being increasingly used by the world community in many different situations. We are certain that the wealth of knowledge this organization has accumulated over the past 35 years will also be most valuable to a future CTBT verification regime. We think that such a verification regime could operate most efficiently and cost-effectively either entrusted to IAEA or - should this pose difficulties - in close proximity to IAEA.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

... Given its importance, my delegation would like to deal with the items on this year's agenda which are related to the main aspects of nuclear disarmament. One of the most important tasks that the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to fulfil during its current session is to commence immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The importance that the international community attaches to a CTBT is clearly seen from the fact that more than 150 Member States co-sponsored the United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/70, which urged the Conference on Disarmament "to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty". The trust and the confidence placed in the Conference by the General Assembly must be maintained.

In the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to it, it is important for the CD to agree on a set of priorities to conduct its work. Most significant among them is the need to commence negotiations immediately and conduct those negotiations in all honesty and sincerity with a view to concluding them with the least possible delay. On our part, we support those delegations who expressed their desire to conclude negotiations during 1994. In this regard, my delegation is heartened to note that some delegations have already submitted draft structural outlines for a CTBT. It is the hope of my delegation that the CD would reach agreement on this matter soon, which will facilitate commencing our substantive work on a draft treaty.

We should not begin our negotiations with a preconceived notion that one group of countries - either the nuclear-weapon States or, for that matter, the non-nuclear-weapon States - is making concessions to the other group. This is a common endeavour, and its final outcome would be to the benefit of the present and future generations.

An equally important factor is the need to continue current nuclear test moratoria. The nuclear-weapon States should permit CTBT negotiations to be conducted in an atmosphere devoid of nuclear-weapon tests. While welcoming the example-setting call made by the United States Administration to other nuclear-weapon States, we urge those States (NWS) to facilitate negotiations by not undertaking nuclear tests during this crucial period.

In the course of the first part of this session so far, many delegations have expressed their views in regard to major aspects of a CTBT. My delegation would welcome a draft CTBT to embody the following elements.

A clear and unambiguous definition of what constitutes nuclear testing. Several delegations have expressed the view that the definition contained in article I of the 1963 PTBT, which covers "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion", is a basis for the CD to proceed on this matter. Indeed, this formulation provides us with a base to start our work on the definition.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

My delegation shares the view expressed by several delegations that the CTBT should be comprehensive in scope, and it should ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

The treaty should cover all types of nuclear tests, both for military and peaceful purposes. We recognize the fact that non-military nuclear explosions could be conducted to achieve certain engineering and scientific benefits. However, due to a variety of factors, including economic reasons and growing public awareness and objections, not much progress has been reached in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite the fact that the NPT provides for and even encourages maximization of benefits from peaceful explosions, the difficulty is in relation to a distinction between a peaceful explosion and an explosion meant for military applications. With a treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests, the urge to seek military benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions would be quite considerable. We should, therefore, not provide for tests which are described as explosions for peaceful purposes, as such tests could be used to obtain weapons-related information.

In its application and verification, the treaty should be non-discriminatory for all participants. Verification should be international in character and geared to effective monitoring and compliance using seismic and non-seismic monitoring and on-site inspection. In view of the high cost of monitoring, care should be taken to ensure that the verification regime is cost-effective and for this purpose due consideration should be given as to how such a regime could utilize existing international mechanisms, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

One of the most important aspects worthy of mention falls into the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The PTBT should not be used as a pretext to deny the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the NPT countries, their right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as has been provided for in article IV of the NPT. The apprehensions expressed by developing countries during the CWC negotiations and indeed after the signing of the Convention should be borne in mind in addressing the task of drafting the treaty.

These are but a few areas which the Conference has to focus on, in the coming months. Given our experience with the CWC, it is only normal to expect further inputs by interested delegations to facilitate the Conference in the task of carrying out its mandate. The current co-operative international environment facilitated by the end of the cold war politics affords the Conference a golden opportunity to negotiate a treaty banning all nuclear tests. We should seize this window of opportunity to conduct our negotiations in an expeditious manner. As the United States President Clinton himself recently observed, "This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority". I would like to assure you and members of the CD of our full support and cooperation towards the realization of this objective, hopefully by December 1994.

Although not directly linked, yet related to the subject of CTBT, are issues connected to non-proliferation. Being one of the first signatories from the South Asian region, Sri Lanka has an abiding interest in the NPT.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

With over 150 States parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to of all arms control agreements. As we come closer to its 1995 review and extension conference, we ought to take a dispassionate view of the Treaty and look into the shortcomings of its implementation so far and address them fairly and squarely. Above all, we have to recognize the fact that since the entry into force of the NPT, many a country has crossed the threshold and acquired nuclear-weapons capability. Against this background, we should take all measures within our means to secure universal adherence to, and compliance with, the convention. Equally important is for nuclear-weapon States (NWS) not to seek to use the Conference merely to tighten horizontal proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their good will by taking effective steps to take deeper cuts into vertical proliferation and also live up to the commitments made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I do appreciate this opportunity to present the results of the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/1245, which has been circulated. This session was held from 7 to 18 February and experts and representatives from 29 countries participated. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

The Group's session was focused on the planning and the preparation of its forthcoming large-scale technical test, referred to as GSETT-3. As you may recall the objectives of GSETT-3 are to: develop and test new concepts for an international seismic monitoring system, building upon previous experience; to provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information; and to develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be set forth by the Conference on Disarmament.

This extensive global experiment could provide the nuclear test ban Committee with more specific information relating to a future international seismic monitoring system (ISMS), as follows. The station network designed for GSETT-3 could provide a basis for the final design of the ISMS. The functions and products which have been designed for the experimental International Data Centre could be a guide to the functions and products required from the ISMS. The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good foundation for an operating manual for the components of the ISMS. The hardware and software developed at the experimental IDC which is being established in Washington, D.C. and at existing and new seismological stations, and the experience gained by system operators around the world, would provide a valuable infrastructure that could facilitate the rapid implementation of the ISMS. The results and experience which will be obtained as GSETT-3 evolves could be used in modifying the system design and in estimating system capabilities, staffing requirements and

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

operating instructions of the ISMS. And finally, GSETT-3 could provide valuable information on costs associated with the establishment and operation of the ISMS.

The Ad Hoc Group established at its session in August 1993 three working groups to facilitate the planning, the operation and the evaluation of GSETT-3. Based on documents prepared by these working groups the GSE undertook in-depth consideration of the various aspects of GSETT-3. As a result of the efforts of the working groups, substantial progress has been made regarding the preparations for GSETT-3. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid progress in establishing and starting operations at the IDC. Plans for conducting and evaluating GSETT-3 have been developed in considerable detail and an outline has been established for the extensive documentation needed for the experiment. There are, however, some areas of concern, as noted by these working groups. Few countries have so far provided stations for the ongoing tests; this may delay the testing of procedures at the IDC. If the desired participation is not obtained before the end of the year this might put the whole test in jeopardy. The successful operation of the IDC during GSETT-3 depends on supports from participating countries for both software and personnel. A plan was presented for involvement of personnel from a number of countries in the operation of the IDC, thus obtaining international staffing of that important facility. Significant contributions from experts and national data centres in the participating countries are needed for the evaluation of GSETT-3. More detailed summaries of the present work in the working groups are annexed to the progress report.

I would like to emphasize the importance of securing adequate participation in GSETT-3. Obtaining a station network with good global coverage is essential to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. Although some countries have, during the last two weeks, made valuable commitments of important stations, still only 19 of the 53 stations selected for the primary, or alpha, network have been provided by their host country. It is therefore most important that a number of countries, most of which are CD members or observers support GSETT-3 by providing the desired stations. A summary of the countries from which commitments are needed to obtain adequate station coverage during GSETT-3 is annexed to the progress report. The Ad Hoc Group appreciates the offer by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to assist in obtaining a wider participation in GSETT-3. In addition to contributing seismic stations, a country might participate by providing a national data centre or personnel to support the operation of the IDC or in the evaluation process. Countries may also, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, provide technical and financial assistance to other countries whose participation is essential.

The current plans call for the full-scale tests to begin by 1 January 1995. A schedule to meet this goal is given in the progress report. It is difficult to assess, at this time, the ultimate duration of commitments needed for GSETT-3. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should, however, be prepared to support their national facilities and their communication links for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment on 1 January 1995.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

As previously noted, the infrastructure of the international seismic monitoring system is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques, for example radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound. During the session the Group received two national reports on networks for monitoring radionuclides in the atmosphere.

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of three informal technical meetings since its previous session. During 9-11 August 1993, Finland hosted an informal workshop in Helsinki on the issue of seismic detection methods. On 2 November 1993, the United States hosted a tour and an informal demonstration for CD ambassadors of the facilities of the experimental International Data Centre (IDC) being developed for GSETT-3 in Washington, D.C. During 10-14 November 1993, Italy hosted a workshop in Erice, Sicily on planning and procedures for GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group agreed to invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification to its next sessions. The Ad Hoc Group received a request from the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to provide a report summarizing the knowledge and experience on the upcoming GSETT-3. The report should contain elaborations on the overall concept of GSETT-3, the functions and components of such a system and matters of organization and cost. In order to be timely for the Ad Hoc Committee it was requested that the report be presented to the committee on 23 and 25 March 1994. The Ad Hoc Group appointed a small group to prepare a draft of such a report to be presented in layman's language so that it can be directly used in the work of the NTB Committee and its Working Group on Verification.

To finalize the requested report and present it to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 21 to 25 March in Geneva. Thereafter the Group envisages to meet early in the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, at a date to be agreed upon during the March session, to continue its preparation for GSETT-3.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan):

... Today I have taken the floor to address a problem which the GSE faces in its preparation for GSETT-3. My delegation thanks Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the GSE, for the report which he has just presented to the Conference and wishes to avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our appreciation for the work of the GSE conducted under the able guidance of Dr. Dahlman.

In this report there are the following references, in its sixth paragraph, to the problem of the lack of sufficient commitments for GSETT-3:

"The Ad Hoc Group expressed grave concern over the lack of commitments of participation of seismological facilities and stations to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. A good global distribution of seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.

"... Countries can participate in GSETT-3 by contributing seismic facilities in their countries, by establishing communication links from these facilities to the International Data Centre, by participation of national data centres and by contributing to the evaluation process. In some cases, bilateral and multilateral cooperation will be important. Countries can also assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential."

Please look at page 8, that is the second page of Annex I of the report, to identify the countries which we are talking about.

Accordingly, my delegation echoes the appeals made by the Chairman of the GSE and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to those countries whose participation is indispensable for successful operations of GSETT-3, to commit themselves to the important experiment which is expected to form a basis for the verification system of a future CTBT. If the countries in question have not yet expressed the commitment at this stage simply because of the delay in the decision-making process, we will urge them to decide quickly. If there are any other reasons for the difficulty in making the commitment, we should discuss them and seek a solution. We are looking forward to hearing soon positive responses to our appeal, which, we consider, is indeed a serious appeal of the Conference on Disarmament as a whole.

Mr LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, please accept also my congratulations. The United States delegation will assist your efforts at this busy time.

I take the floor to acknowledge and endorse the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman has introduced on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). I think we are all pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way, and we attach great importance to this seismic experiment. The GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation.

I would also stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to a successful experiment, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important. A good global distribution of both alpha and beta seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.

The recent GSE session saw several opportunities for valuable exchanges between the GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. The upcoming report by the GSE to the verification Working Group on the overall concept of an international seismic monitoring system and the implementation of such a system in the GSETT-3 experiment should provide the working group with pertinent information. Both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion.

Finally, there has been some concern raised about a proposal by the GSE to study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from monitoring systems other than seismic. It seems to make sense to my delegation to develop to the extent possible, a single data exchange system to handle all types of data. We should not rule out thinking about how this would be done.

The United States believes that the GSE should consider and discuss how to transmit, process, archive, retrieve, and distribute other types of data, such as data collected by some system of internationally or nationally operated radionuclide samplers, and hydroacoustic and acoustic and possibly other sensors. But, such consideration must be guided by the pace of work in the verification Working Group and must not detract from the GSE's priority task - the implementation of the GSETT-3 experiment.

(Mr. Besancenot, France)

My delegation would like to thank Dr. Dahlman for introducing the report on the thirty-seventh session of the Group of Scientific Experts. It values the work done on this occasion and endorses the proposals made in the document. Nevertheless, there is a recommendation which my delegation is not in a position to approve: the recommendation in the third subparagraph of paragraph 11 that the Group of Scientific Experts should study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for non-seismic monitoring techniques.

In its statement in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 14 February, my delegation clearly indicated that the principal task of the Group of Scientific Experts should, in its view, be to prepare for the full-scale international seismic monitoring network test known as GSETT-3. Accordingly, the issue of synergy between the various means of detection, and in particular the possibility that the means of communication and the data bank planned for the seismic network might be used for the benefit of other - non-seismic - monitoring techniques, should be examined by the Committee only at a later stage. Logic dictates that the Committee should first define the various components it deems essential for developing a credible verification system, before addressing ways and means of optimizing complementarity between these different means of monitoring.

In this context, my delegation does not of course rule out the possibility that the Group of Scientific Experts may subsequently be entrusted with the task of studying how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for other non-seismic monitoring techniques; but it cannot endorse the proposal contained in the report of the thirty-seventh session of the Group that this should be one of the functions of the Group of Experts at this stage.

My delegation wishes the Group of Experts to take this position into account, failing which it could not accept the recommendations contained in the report of its thirty-seventh session.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... I should like to congratulate Dr. Dahlman on his report and to thank him for it. My delegation attaches great importance to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and in particular to the work it is doing on GSETT-3. In our view nothing should be allowed to divert the Group's attention from their work on this. We note with satisfaction from paragraph 9 of the report that the Group is indeed concentrating on this aspect of its work. I should just like to make two comments. First, the establishment of the proposed GSETT-3 network is of paramount importance to the work of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

understand that not all the States on whose territory it is proposed to operate an alpha station have yet committed the necessary resources to participate in GSETT. We urge that those States who are not yet committed consider, as a matter of some urgency, their willingness to participate and allocate the necessary resources as soon as possible, so that the GSETT-3 network can be fully evaluated. Secondly, in the view of my delegation, it is sensible for the GSE to be in a position to respond to requests from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or from its verification Working Group. We believe, however, that the direction is best provided by the verification Working Group. Early in the next part of this session, we will have, I am sure, a clearer idea of the verification needs of the CTBT. If the proposed International Data Centre is to play a major role in processing and archiving the data, they will need to know what volume of data from other monitoring systems could be expected, and how this should be handled to meet the needs of the treaty in the best possible way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words. Now I would like again to give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan): Mr. President, I thank you for granting me the floor for a second time today. With respect to paragraph 11 of the GSE report, which is, like other paragraphs, a result of discussions of the GSE, the Japanese delegation supports its contents and appreciates the Group for its decision to include this in its report. This is because, in our view, the GSETT-3 data exchange system, in particular the experimental International Data Centre, might also be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from other monitoring techniques. Therefore, as long as the GSE is willing and able to study this possibility, we don't have to discourage them from doing this and, indeed, we should encourage them to proceed in that direction.

(Ms. Mackby, Secretariat)

.. In addressing you today, we wish to draw attention to several specific issues of importance to us:

"The comprehensive test-ban treaty. We congratulate you on beginning negotiation for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Women have led efforts promoting such negotiations for a very long time.

"We are hopeful that the work of this Committee will lead to a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty permanently prohibiting all nuclear-weapons testing. We call on those Governments currently adhering to a moratorium on testing to prolong the moratorium after July 1994 with other nuclear Powers following suit.

"On the issue of treaty verification and compliance, we call for the implementation of an effective, efficient and non-discriminatory verification regime. The treaty should, in our view, contain a provision on the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, we call on the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to further specify, strengthen, and institutionalize peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms as a means of ensuring treaty compliance. The treaty should be used to communicate a universal commitment to the non-violent settlement of international disputes. We also wish to refer the members of the Conference to the "People's test-ban treaty" which NGOs submitted to you a year or so ago.

"The rationale for a comprehensive test-ban treaty extends beyond peace and disarmament concerns. The radiation produced by nuclear-weapons testing is adversely affecting public health globally through the contamination of food, air and water. It is damaging the gene pool, and causing high rates of infant mortality, cancer, leukaemia, birth defects and immune system disorders.

"The non-proliferation Treaty. We view the negotiation of a CTBT as facilitating the discussion of the larger non-proliferation issue. Early negotiation of a CTBT will strengthen the prospects for a successful outcome of the non-proliferation Treaty review and extension conference in 1995. As preparations continue for this conference, we stress the urgent need to open genuine negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, and address the discriminatory nature of some of the provisions of the Treaty.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada):

... The Western Group is pleased to note the particular points made about the Conference on Disarmament's efforts in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The non-governmental organizations presenting this statement are undoubtedly aware that, on the issue of treaty verifications and compliance, their objectives and ours are very similar. We are grateful, however, for the recalling of the importance of some provision in the treaty to solve, through cooperative measures, differences which may arrive in ensuring treaty compliance. We will do well, in our efforts to agree on a settlement-of-disputes mechanism, to recall the spirit and the substance of these valuable suggestions. We will look forward to new ideas and contributions.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, first I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to join previous speakers in warmly welcoming in our midst the 1994 women's gathering in connection with International Women's Day. We thank them for the important message just read out by Ms. Mackby. In the past few years substantial progress has been made in the field of disarmament. The START agreements foresee drastic reductions of existing nuclear arsenals, and negotiations have started in this Conference with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Steps are furthermore being taken towards the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is important that this process enjoys universal support. In this context, Governments as well as NGOs and private individuals play an important role. We therefore highly appreciate the message of the women's gathering. Over the years, many women have made significant contributions to the cause of peace and disarmament. In this context, I would like to recall the names of my compatriots, Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson. They both represent a deep commitment to global peace and disarmament, both in their capacity as official representatives of my country and as women. They indeed constitute a source of inspiration for all women who work for disarmament, peace and security.

(Mr. Ho, Republic of Korea)

... Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of an effective, verifiable and comprehensive multilateral test-ban treaty which will attract the adherence of all States, my delegation reaffirms its full support for multilateral efforts to conclude the CTBT, and at the same time extends its deep appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its subsidiary bodies, for their continuing effort to conclude the CTBT. My Government has consistently encouraged international efforts for the early conclusion of the CTBT, with a firm belief that the early conclusion of the CTBT would be a positive step toward the 1995 extension of the NPT. My delegation expects that there will be substantial progress in the global effort to conclude the CTBT. For this purpose, all existing proposals for the draft CTBT should be taken into account, and efforts should be taken to facilitate the prompt achievement of a consensus centred on the rolling text. Our desire is to use the present momentum to establish an effective verification regime and a solid institutional foundation. It is also our hope that concrete progress will be made to conclude the CTBT before the 1995 NPT extension conference.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President in this important period of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has for the first time embarked on real negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is an issue of political importance to all States in this room, and indeed to global security in the longer term. As the sole international negotiating forum for disarmament the CD shoulders a heavy responsibility in getting these negotiations on track with a view to reaching an agreement as soon as possible. We believe it is essential that the negotiations proceed in earnest and without procedural delays. My delegation is convinced that the

(continued)

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

Conference will benefit from your wise and able leadership, Ambassador Hoffman, in facing up to the challenge. I offer the full support of my delegation in your endeavours.

... This is the first time my delegation addresses the Conference since the start of the CTBT negotiations. I would like to offer a few preliminary views on some of the issues facing us. First of all, we recognize that there are interactions between progress towards a global ban on nuclear test explosions, and the possibilities for maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons. We believe it in our own and in the best interests of all countries to adhere to a non-proliferation regime, since a further spread of nuclear weapons can only diminish regional and global security. This aim is best secured by international legal instruments. We are pleased that negotiations on a CTBT are now proceeding in parallel with the preparations for the NPT review and extension conference. Substantial results on the CTBT by the end of 1994 will contribute significantly to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. On the other hand, lack of substantial progress on the CTBT could indeed put the NPT conference in serious jeopardy. Secondly, national moratoria on nuclear testing have produced an auspicious political atmosphere for the negotiations. Such moratoria are also conducive to the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, there is increasing political concern in many countries, including my own, for the environmental impact of nuclear testing. The Norwegian Government urges the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further nuclear tests.

A CTBT should indeed be global, banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. The definition given in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 provides a good basis for the CTBT scope definition. Peaceful nuclear explosions will have to be included, as they have been in the Swedish draft treaty proposal. We believe this draft is a most useful starting-point for the negotiations. A CTBT verification regime should be sufficiently strong and effective to ensure that any potential violator stands a severe risk of being detected. A 100 per cent control system is probably not achievable, or affordable. A global seismic network would form the basis for the verification system, supplemented by other techniques that might be deemed useful and fall within acceptable cost parameters. We look forward to the third global seismic test (GSETT-3) that is now being prepared by the Group of Seismic Experts. It is of particular importance that commitments are now given from the States possessing alpha stations to take part in the experiment. Norway stands ready to take an active part in this crucial test. Within available resources we are prepared to provide technical assistance to

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

countries who might need such assistance to take part in GSETT-3. For monitoring of a CTBT we would at present envisage a small, dedicated monitoring agency, drawing on available international expertise as necessary.

Over the last week we have witnessed a most useful presentation of non-seismic verification techniques within the verification Work Group. Some of these seem to offer useful supplementary methods of providing global coverage in all environments for the supervision of a CTBT. During the last session Norway submitted a working paper on non-seismic methods, particularly devoted to hydroacoustics. I hope it will be possible to engage our experts in the sessions devoted to these methods during the month of May. As negotiations progress in the Conference, my delegation will seek to make its contribution also in other fields.

We should not expect the CTBT to be a perfect agreement from all perspectives. It will be a compromise between differing interests and concerns. The perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good. Otherwise, we will not achieve a treaty in a time-frame when it is still politically relevant.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... My country is committed to the results of the negotiations for the realization of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Consequently, above and beyond the position we have set out in the Ad Hoc Committee, we would like to comment in greater detail here on some of the aspects of that position and explain others. One of these is the concept of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this connection, and in view of the fact that a country that is a member of this Conference has expressed some doubts about the content of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and about this type of explosion, I would like to provide clarification on this point. Tlatelolco allows, under certain conditions, something that the NPT prohibits: the possibility of carrying out what are called peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite this, no such explosions have ever been carried out in the region, nor is the possibility that any member country of the Treaty will carry one out being envisaged. Indeed, the interpretation of the member States, as reflected in various OPANAL documents, is that the carrying out of such explosions could be permitted only if the technology necessary was different from that used in the production of nuclear weapons. Obviously this is not the case. Likewise, under the Treaty all the States parties must sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In practice this is the same type of agreement signed by the countries belonging to the NPT, prohibiting the explosive use of nuclear energy. Indeed, we cannot fail to point out that the two countries of the region which might perhaps have been best placed to carry out this type of test, Argentina and Brazil, have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, by virtue of which they undertook to apply safeguards to all nuclear material as well as to all activities of the same type carried out on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control, for the sole purpose of verifying that such material was not diverted for nuclear weapons or for "any other nuclear explosive device".

In addition to this, Argentina and Brazil included in article I, paragraph 3 of the bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, signed in Guadalajara, Mexico on 18 June 1991 and ratified by the Parliaments of both countries, the following clause:

"Bearing in mind that at present no technical distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes, the Parties also undertake to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories, and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or from participating in any way in, the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear explosive device while the above-mentioned technical limitation exists."

On the basis of this Latin American consensus on the matter, and considering that any nuclear explosion in itself produces benefits in the military sphere, our position is clearly in favour of ensuring that the treaty that we are

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

negotiating here prohibits explosions of all types at all times in all places. We also believe that the treaty should clearly stipulate a comprehensive ban and should not be subject to any threshold. However, with regard to what are called "preparatory activities", we believe that the extension of the ban to the various stages of these could affect activities that are not actually being carried out for testing purposes. Indeed, we fear that they might complicate the verification regime of the treaty. However, the subject deserves greater analysis and we are prepared to consider the various points of view on this matter.

The credibility of the nuclear-test-ban treaty will to a very great extent depend on the verification regime. Therefore, an effective verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability composed of various elements - seismic, hydroacoustic, atmospheric sampling of radionuclides and waste gases - as well as provisions for on-site inspection. The exchange of information among States parties could also help identify any violations. On-site inspections should be a special and decisive deterrent element, and therefore the treaty should contain effective and efficient procedures for controlled inspection. The verification regime will have to rely on information from all possible sources, either supplied by international organizations or by States parties. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction at the very good work being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts under the leadership of Dr. Dahlman and in response to the request he made during the last plenary meeting of the Conference, I have pleasure in announcing my country's undertaking that all our seismological stations will participate for the attainment of the objectives and the success of Group of Seismic Experts' Technical Test No. 3 (GSETT-3). We will also contribute to the work of this Group through the participation of an expert starting with the meetings that will take place during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

As far as institutions are concerned, it is very clear for us that a small international organization should be set up for the application of the treaty, especially its verification and compliance regimes. This body should be able to handle the exchange of important information concerning monitoring and constitute a forum for the rapid review of requests for on-site inspections, as well as for the discussion and joint treatment of any questions relating to compliance with its provisions submitted by States parties to the treaty. Obviously the treaty will have to have a sanctions regime that will include strong collective action in the event of violation of its provisions, including, in the final analysis, resort to the United Nations Security Council. In this connection we believe that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could usefully serve as a model for devising an appropriate sanctions regime. Yet above and beyond any consensus that we might reach on all these aspects, the success of the NTB Treaty will only be possible if it enjoys the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States and broad international support, the only means of attaining the desired goal of non-proliferation.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil):

... Several speakers have highlighted the relevance of this year's work, particularly on account of the negotiation of a CTBT. My delegation has no doubt that it constitutes the most important issue before us and we are confident in the CD's capacity to meet the international community's expectations in this regard. We are encouraged by the work already done and are grateful to the delegations of Sweden and Australia for the papers they

(continued)

(Mr. Lambreira, Brazil)

have provided. Let me also put on record our special thanks to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, who has recently left us and who has made such a direct and personal contribution to our present undertaking.

As many others here represented, my Government has been a long-standing supporter of a CTBT. We have always maintained that there is an indissoluble link between disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBT represents the instrumentation of such a concept, inasmuch as it affects both dimensions of this same question. It must be recalled that the traditional purpose of a CTBT has been to put a curb to the nuclear arms race, as an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament, as has already been spelled out in even broader terms in the partial test-ban treaty. There have been significant and positive changes in the international scenario since these matters were first discussed. They have not, however, altered the need to pursue that goal or diminished the relevance of a CTBT for its achievement.

Some delegations consider the future CTBT as an additional instrument to avoid horizontal non-proliferation. We welcome the further assurances that the Treaty shall bring in this regard. We consider, however, that a CTBT, to be effective, must have an impact on vertical proliferation. The CTBT has to have a direct bearing on horizontal proliferation or it will not fulfil one of its objectives, but it also has to have a direct bearing on the nuclear arms race and the ability to improve and update nuclear weapons or it will not fulfil its other objective. We have to work within these boundaries, and we have already given this Committee a clear mandate in this direction. Furthermore, from Tlatelolco to IAEA safeguards, there already exists a number of relevant multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at impeding horizontal proliferation. The CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but one that must be elaborated in light of existing agreements in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and international security. What we now require is a treaty of a different nature. One that takes a broader step, long overdue, to curb vertical proliferation.

As you know, Brazil is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty, not on account of its non-proliferation commitments, which we entirely share, but because we have perceived always inherent inequities in that instrument. Our commitment to non-proliferation has been reinforced since 1990, through a series of joint initiatives we undertook with Argentina, of which you are all well aware. Central among these is the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is a full-scope safeguards agreement, as is well known, providing the same assurances on horizontal proliferation as those required by the NPT. I am very glad to say that the Brazilian Congress has recently approved this agreement last month and that my Government promulgated it on 24 February.

We wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, under whose competent guidance we were able to reach agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. The mandate calls for "a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable" treaty. Universality requires that the treaty be open to the signature of all States and that we engage our best efforts to assure their adherence. To fulfil this determination it is my Government's

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

belief that the treaty has to be non-discriminatory, meaning that it should stipulate equal rights and equal obligations. This condition is specifically relevant to the basic undertakings, the verification regime and the mechanisms for the application of sanctions that are to be established.

For Brazil, the central achievement of a CTBT is to enshrine in an international document the commitment of States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to engage no more in nuclear testing. We engage in these negotiations with a very open mind and are ready to give serious consideration to all earnest proposals, as long as they fall in line with our basic requirement of a universal and non-discriminatory treaty. We are therefore flexible, which is not to say that we do not have our ideas related to the treaty. I would like to share with you some of our thoughts.

The first basic issue to be addressed is the scope of the undertaking. Ideally, we would like to see a treaty that bans all nuclear experiments aimed at the development, maintenance or improvement of nuclear weapons. We acknowledge that this is a very broad commitment, but we also consider it to be the one that fully reflects the long-standing aspirations of the international community and that adequately covers the two objectives we have identified. On the other hand we have also to acknowledge the political, technical and financial limitations we face. Therefore, without losing sight of our ultimate objectives, we are prepared to accept a more limited scope.

We accept that the CTBT is not to be a treaty banning nuclear weapons, but neither is it to be one in which we construe an explicit or implicit legitimation of those weapons, for this would be in direct opposition to its traditional objective. We wish to avoid a debate on these issues as we believe it would be repetitive and fruitless. We believe it can be done without detriment to the consistency and effectiveness of our work. In order to do so, we must concentrate on what we increasingly perceive as our common objective, namely the prohibition of all types of nuclear explosive tests in all environments for an unlimited period of time.

We are ready to accept the proscription of peaceful nuclear explosions. This is, however, a delicate question and requires careful attention. We acknowledge that there are presently no distinctions between explosive devices for peaceful purposes and others. We also acknowledge that peaceful nuclear explosions can serve for the development of nuclear weapons or for their improvement. That is why in our view they must be prohibited. But we must not impose limitations on potentially important scientific and technological developments. We have no precise proposals in this regard, but we perceive this concern to be shared by other delegations and we are convinced we can find an appropriate way of incorporating it into the treaty.

We do not favour the inclusion of a broad and all-encompassing proscription of preparation in the undertaking. Several delegations have pointed out the problems this might engender. The first one relates to the difficulty if not impossibility of distinguishing preparation of licit activities from that of proscribed ones. The second relates to the

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

verification requirements it would impose. Our concerns do not mean that we rule out any aspect of preparations, such as the monitoring of nuclear test sites.

In order to provide States members with the confidence required by the relevance of their commitments, the CTBT must have an effective verification regime. We must not, however, be over-ambitious in this task and set verification standards that become impossible to achieve. The CTBT is of course a political instrument. Its essential value lies in the commitment of States parties. We all aspire to an effective verification regime, but we cannot hold the scope and the commitments we are going to undertake hostage to excessive verification demands. When elaborating the verification system it is very important to take into account that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but that it will integrate a number of other instruments, mechanisms and regimes to which it bears close relation. We cannot conceive the CTBT's verification system as being unrelated and completely independent from IAEA safeguards and the future verification of a cut-off agreement. The verification of a CTBT does not necessarily require the accounting of nuclear material. But the accounting of nuclear material can indicate that member States are not diverting it for nuclear explosive purposes, thus providing the assurances required by a CTBT. If we take this into account, we can reduce the costs of the future verification regime and strengthen its effectiveness. IAEA safeguards require more than US\$ 70 million annually. We do not believe we are in a position to overlook these figures and not to avail ourselves of the potential savings we may be able to achieve. Furthermore, we do not believe it wise to set up completely independent verification regimes for treaties or agreements that are essentially related to each other. This will again be very much the case if we can conclude an agreement on the cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear explosive purposes.

There is in our view a growing consensus on the understanding that seismic verification will constitute the basis of the additional verification required for underground testing. The Group of Scientific Experts has been examining this question for many years and its findings represent a valuable contribution to our work. My Government has recently committed itself to participation in such a Group. In order to reduce costs, national capacititation in this area has to be fully taken into account. This is, however, a delicate question that requires further consideration, for the multilateral verification regime must rely on unbiased and independent data.

With the possible exception of the accountability of all nuclear material, no single verification procedure or technique can effectively cover the full spectrum of potential nuclear explosions. That is the case with seismic verification. The CD has been examining a number of complementary techniques, directed mainly at environments other than underground. We hold this to be an important exercise, but we caution against speculation with unproven methods and undertaking over-ambitious proposals. On-site inspections may also come to play a very important role, even if only to be used on rare occasions. On account of the complex technical and operational problems involved, as well as the political questions raised, we strongly favour the evolutionary approach proposed by the delegation of Australia for the verification regime.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

We have not discussed in detail the question of the organization that the treaty will require. We share the view that this question can only be adequately assessed once we have more clearly defined other issues such as scope and verification. My delegation does not believe that we are yet at a stage where we can determine whether the CTBT will require the establishment of new intergovernmental decision-making bodies. In order to carry out its verification responsibilities, however, it will certainly require a technical secretariat, which may be entirely new or set up within IAEA.

There have been a number of suggestions related to the organization. Some have mentioned the need for a new multilateral agency, with two deliberative intergovernmental instances and a technical secretariat. The first intergovernmental body would be open to all member States, the second, more restricted, would take the form of an executive council. The Australian proposal is the creation of a small CTBT organization co-located in Vienna with IAEA, in order to make the best use of its capacitiation. The Swedish proposal is to entrust the verification of the CTBT to IAEA and to its Board of Governors the responsibility of decisions related to compliance and the need for additional verification such as on-site inspections. We find merits in both the Australian and the Swedish proposals.

The entry into force of the treaty should not be overcomplicated. This is a delicate question related to security concerns of all States. The ratification of the CTBT by all States having significant nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power stations and research reactors, has been suggested as a requirement for the entry into force of the treaty. The longer the list of required ratifications, the more probability of any single delegation impeding the entry into force of the agreement. That is not what we want. Again, in this instance we believe it is important to recall that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument. We therefore believe that when considering the conditions that might be required for the entry into force of the treaty, we should take into account what other binding multilateral commitments of relevance to the commitments of the CTBT States have already undertaken. This would facilitate the entry into force, without affecting legitimate security concerns of member States.

The rapid and significant developments of the international scene in recent years have allowed for the present propitious political climate for the negotiation of a CTBT. Let us make the best use of these circumstances and not lose the sense of urgency and responsibility required to achieve this long-standing objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Last July President Clinton extended the United States moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing through September 1994. Last August he stated in a report to the United States Congress that he would decide in 1994 whether to extend the moratorium beyond September. He said that his decision would take into account the status of the CTBT negotiations and the willingness of other nuclear Powers to show reciprocal restraint in forgoing nuclear testing.

The United States continued its moratorium, even after China conducted a nuclear test last 5 October. The President, however, did direct the United States Department of Energy to take such actions as were needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests in 1994, provided our legislative requirements had been met. The President said his decision on whether to test would be based on fundamental United States national security interests, and would take these four factors into account: the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear arsenal in preparation for a CTBT; the extent to which China and others have responded to the United States appeal for a global moratorium on testing; progress in the CTBT negotiations; and finally the implications of further United States nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives.

In accordance with existing United States legislative requirements, the President this month made a report to the Congress, in which he addressed these four points. Regarding the first point, safety and reliability, the report concluded that United States nuclear weapons are safe and reliable. Additional tests could help us prepare for a test ban and could provide for some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, these benefits would be outweighed by the price we would pay in undercutting our own non-proliferation goals. Regarding the second point, the response to our appeal for a global moratorium has been positive, with one exception, the Chinese test in October 1993. The United States will continue to urge China to refrain from further testing.

Regarding the third point, progress in CTBT negotiations, the United States is encouraged by progress to date. The CD has established an ad hoc committee and its two working groups. There have been extensive discussions of substantive issues, and detailed presentations on techniques we will need to consider in reaching decisions on the verification regime.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

We have discussed the overall structure of the treaty and what elements might be included. And we have begun the important process of tabling and discussing treaty text. There is much yet to do, as we all realize, but my delegation continues to look forward to concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

Regarding the fourth and final point, implications on our broader non-proliferation objectives; the United States continues to believe that a global moratorium on testing will put us in the strongest possible position to negotiate a CTBT, to work for indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in 1995, and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Accordingly, taking all these factors into account, the President has decided to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear testing through September 1995. In this regard, I would like to read for the record a statement by the White House Press Secretary, dated two days ago, 15 March 1994:

"The President informed Congress yesterday (March 14, 1994) that he was extending the moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States through September 1995.

"The President's decision was based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, weighing the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) against:

-- the restraint the other declared nuclear powers have shown in not responding to China's nuclear test last October with tests of their own;

-- the encouraging progress recorded in the CTB negotiations since they formally opened on January 25;

-- and, the adverse implications further U.S. nuclear tests would have on our broader non-proliferation objectives, including, most notably, our interest in securing the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next year.

"The President will decide next year whether to extend the moratorium beyond September 1995, taking into account the same four factors noted above."

I have asked that the White House statement I just read be circulated as an official CD document.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Today I have taken the floor to express, at this time, Japan's views on the CTBT negotiations.

On 3 February, in the plenary meeting of the CD, I already introduced our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. Since then, two working groups have duly been established and we have entered the phase of serious negotiations on a CTBT by engaging ourselves in discussions and debates on substantive matters. Therefore, my delegation finds it opportune if we can further elaborate our views on a CTBT in the light of what has already been made clear and would be debated in the near future.

Before going to my today's subject, I would like to welcome the decision made by the United States of America to extend the nuclear test moratorium through September 1995 which was announced on 15 March by the White House and was just introduced by Ambassador Ledogar. A right decision was made at a right moment. It will certainly serve favourably to the negotiations on CTBT in the CD.

Let me make clear our basic attitude on a CTBT. The treaty we are negotiating should be universal, and internationally and effectively verifiable. It should also be non-discriminatory, and the adherence not only of the nuclear-weapon States but also of nuclear threshold countries would be crucial to the CTBT. In order to successfully accomplish the negotiations in a prompt way, it would be advisable to take fully into account the CWC, PTBT and other existing treaties and make articles as clear and succinct as possible. The CTBT should establish a truly reliable and a cost-effective verification regime which can systematically benefit from the utilization of already existing facilities and national verification systems as much as possible. In conducting our negotiations, we should not lose sight of the fact that there is a considerable knowledge gap between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and that both nuclear explosion technologies including those for evasion and verification technologies are of incessantly evolutionary nature. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines but we consider it desirable to be able to reach a stage, by spring 1995, where we can have a prospect of a successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations at hand.

Now let me turn to the contents of the treaty on which we are negotiating. First, I would like to make it clear that the purpose of the treaty is twofold: nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. We cannot accept a choice of either of them. Both form the ultimate goal of the treaty.

Second, the scope of the treaty should be total prohibition of any nuclear explosion in any environment without any exception. With regard to its preparation, the word "prevent" means, in our view, that the State party should ensure the prohibition of the preparation of any nuclear explosions by natural or legal persons, so we can dissipate our concern over the preparation for an imminent test by using the word "prevent", as in the case of PTBT. It will also be possible to set a clause, according to which consultation or clarification can be sought by any State party in case a doubtful situation emerges.

(Mr. Tanaká, Japan)

Third, a definition clause is not necessary, we are of the opinion that by today the concept of a nuclear explosion has been more or less established. Discussion on definition may only lead our negotiations into an endless circuit. On the other hand, it should be made clear that any State party should not be hampered from promoting research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are not designed to be released in an uncontrolled way. Concerning the obligations imposed on States parties to prohibit natural or legal persons' activities of certain categories, the CTBT should take the approach of enumerating each activity of natural or legal persons to be prohibited. Otherwise, the contents of prohibition regarding natural or legal persons will become less clear and the States parties will have difficulty in setting those obligations in the form of national legislation.

Fourth, the duration of the treaty should be indefinite.

Fifth, as for compliance and settlement of disputes, we can follow the examples set forth in articles 9, 12 and 14 of the CWC and establish relevant articles on clarification, consultation, procedures of settlement of disputes, and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council.

Sixth, on verification. Whether the forthcoming CTBT will be a worthy one or not, it all depends on the verification system. Verification of a nuclear explosion is a relatively easy task but at the same time no single verification means is perfect to detect all those explosions. Yet, we can anticipate steady technological progress in the field of verification so that in the future more exhaustive types of verification system can be introduced. Therefore, a realistic verification system can be envisaged in a form of a package of different verification means with a possible introduction, in the future, of more advanced and efficient means. Seismological verification network forms the core of the verification system. The pressing question is how to transform the GSETT-3 experiment into the reliable verification system of the CTBT, as well as to ensure the successful implementation of GSETT-3 as is originally planned.

In considering the monitoring of radionuclides, the existing monitoring system implemented by IAEA, WHO, UNEP and others, as well as radionuclide monitoring conducted by many countries should be first evaluated fully.

With regard to on-site inspection, only a kind of challenge inspection, the naming of which may necessitate further consideration, should be considered. This inspection will be triggered off when a member State party suspects a possible nuclear explosion and its request for on-site inspection is approved by the organization. The training of inspectors will be conducted by States parties either independently or within a framework of bilateral cooperation and the organization will keep lists of inspectors presented by each State party. At the same time, the possibility of using IAEA inspectors may be addressed.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

For the sake of economy on verification system and also of the need to keep the military classified information, it would be wise to make as much use as possible of national technical means, including hydroacoustic means, satellites and others.

Seventh, the organization will be composed of a conference of States parties, a secretariat and an international data centre. The need to establish an executive council will be made clear only after we come to know how frequently the conference of the States parties can meet.

The secretariat should be of small size. In principle, the analysis and evaluation of data and information collected by the monitoring system or presented by States parties should be met by each State party. But the secretariat can be involved in the analysis and evaluation of data and information so long as this function will not necessitate unwieldy enlargement of the secretariat.

Eighth: entry into force. I have already addressed our view on the question in Working Group II. The CTBT, once it is established, should enter into force as soon as possible. It is very important that all the nuclear-weapon countries adhere to it and all the nuclear-capable countries become States parties to it. But it doesn't seem wise at this present time to admit to give any country or countries a power of veto. We think we can approach this question from a numerical point of view, for example 30 countries, but this question should be elaborated further by engaging ourselves in more detailed and thorough discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 676th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... The current activities of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be conceived as "conducting business as usual". The Conference has seized the historic opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive and global ban on nuclear testing. The international community had to wait a long time for these talks to begin, yet the intensity of the work carried on in this domain indicates a genuine interest to find solutions to the political and technical problems that have to be faced. The well-structured discussions on the possible contents of a treaty are very substantial and promising. There, of course, remains a lot to be done before a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty can be concluded.

The time allocated to the negotiations on a nuclear test ban clearly indicates the importance attached by the Conference to this item of our agenda. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of other items of the agenda that are hardly less important to address. As Chairman of the

(The President)

Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, I cannot fail to underline the significance attached to the question of increasing transparency related to military matters. Not only am I honoured by assuming the presidency of this important subsidiary body of the Conference, but I also feel professional satisfaction in attempting to fulfil my duties in this regard. I am personally convinced that transparency in armaments is a topic of the multilateral disarmament and security forums that should continue to get the attention it requires. It cannot be contested that transparency in armaments, if appropriately pursued, can become a major element of security equations both in a global and regional sense, and in this context I thank already those distinguished members who have made pertinent statements in the course of discussions we had so far.

Mr. MEGHLOUI (Algeria) (translated from French):

... I should like to speak to the question of the nuclear test ban. My delegation reaffirms the relevance of the recommendations and views expressed in Group of 21 documents CD/1231 of 11 February 1994 and CD/1252 of 23 March 1994, which set out a general approach that we share. I would, however, like to add a few comments which the Algerian delegation will clarify further in the course of the negotiations.

For the time being, the positive impression that we have of the negotiations under way has been tempered somewhat by statements made here and there in support of particular rights to be reserved to certain Powers. We would say that our concern for a rapid and positive outcome to the

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(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

negotiations could not lead us to accept the reproduction of a situation of inequality. We believe that the majority of States place the test ban in the perspective of universal, general and complete nuclear disarmament. It would therefore be a mistake to believe that some States could be accorded the right to retain indefinitely a monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons.

I should now like to turn to certain aspects of the treaty. First of all its general characteristics. The test-ban treaty must be universal, non-discriminatory and open to signature by all States and should include no clause favouring any of the signatory parties in any manner, shape or form. As to the definition of tests, the wording in the partial test-ban Treaty, although imperfect, offers a sufficient basis. It does leave open a doubt as to nuclear explosions that do not have the status of military tests, which it seems to cover, but it has the merit of avoiding the attempt to reach a consensus, which would be very difficult to achieve, on greater precision. As to the scope of application of the ban, the treaty should ban all tests of nuclear explosives everywhere.

Let us take a closer look at some of the aspects of the scope of application. The ban should cover preparatory activities, even if this ban raises difficulties in terms of verification, because verification should not serve only to allow the recording of a violation of an international commitment, but also to prevent it. A single test would imperil the balance created by the treaty. Under the existing system of international relations, detecting preparatory activities conducted by a permanent member country of the Security Council, for example, could lead to diplomatic actions designed to dissuade it from carrying out a test; a posteriori notification that such a State had carried out a nuclear test would be pointless. The ban should not be tied to any particular yield threshold. It is true that this ambitious objective will pose major verification problems, because it is always possible to envisage a situation in which some low-intensity explosions might not be detected. However, above and beyond the general commitment of States to act in good faith in applying rules accepted in a sovereign manner, a verification regime that benefited from the development of technologies would one day detect any violations of the treaty.

As to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we are waiting for convincing and scientifically well-founded explanations to prove that a ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by means of a treaty is absolutely necessary, that it does not block potentialities for economic and social development, and that it could be uniformly respected. The fact that it is impossible to distinguish between two possible uses arising from a scientific discovery has never previously been judged sufficient to justify a halt to experiments in any particular area. Is it possible, without an in-depth discussion on this subject and without an adequate exchange of knowledge and findings drawn from explosions for peaceful purposes conducted previously, to decide in a treaty that they will henceforth be unlawful? Posing this question in no way diminishes our commitment to finding a consensus on banning such explosions. As to simulations, we would certainly prefer to have them banned. But we know that such a ban would be unreliable in the absence of means of verification. We also know that a ban without appropriate

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

verification machinery is dangerous for the general balance of the treaty and its viability: banning simulations without having means of verification might imperil the entire proliferation system. As to safety tests, maintaining such a "right" for certain nuclear Powers would make nonsense of the commitment to a complete and universal test ban. Moreover, it would once again start up a sterile debate on the purpose of the international non-proliferation regime as a whole. What would be the justification for a new unequal regime? What viability would it have?

As to the verification system, the objective to be set as regards verification affects the entirety of the system to be established. We think we should not limit ourselves to simply recording violations or reacting a posteriori, but as far as possible we should try to prevent them. Monitoring of sites is a means of prevention. On the other hand, we must not seek perfection in advance, but devise machinery capable of continuous improvement. The clauses of the treaty should not, however, automatically depend on verification, otherwise they will be constantly called into question by technological developments. The verification system must be non-discriminatory. This means that it will be based on a single set of rules in terms of rights and duties for all the signatories. This system should complement and reinforce the arrangements currently in force, or those to be put into effect in the future, and not constitute a parallel system. The best possible use must be made of all existing international verification machinery in order to limit costs.

Quite clearly, the scope and verification aspects are very closely associated. We are under no illusions as to how the future verification system will be applied: the countries that have the means to observe preparations are the same ones that have surveillance capabilities. They are also the ones that might be tempted to carry out safety tests.

The costs incurred in connection with inspections should follow the pattern stipulated under the chemical weapons Convention: they will be borne by the organization for routine inspections, and by the State requesting them for challenge inspections. We have no preference for any particular means of verification, provided that it is universally and uniformly applied. Seismic monitoring and the detection of radionuclides seem the best-known and best-understood means. Why not start building the notification system around these two methods?

Training and access to technology: no clause should be interpreted as limiting the right of States to acquire nuclear facilities and technologies for peaceful use. This is not simply a rhetorical claim - for many dual-use technologies the developed countries find it normal to apply a double standard based on the relations they have with the recipient State rather than its real objectives. The universal nature of the right to development must be taken into account.

To enhance the verification system, its universality and its non-discriminatory nature, verification techniques and procedures which are currently known only to some Powers must be made more widely known, on the

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

pattern of what has happened with the Convention on chemical weapons. Standardization of methods of interpreting recorded signals makes this essential. This would enhance the verification system as a whole.

While recognizing the relevance of the discussion of who will be responsible for verification of the future treaty, we tend to favour more rational use of the resources already available. We will not oppose any consensus that may emerge on the creation of an autonomous body which would draw on the experience of IAEA, for example. However, cost must remain a constant concern. Should a new organization be created, we believe that it would be a good idea for it to follow the structure suggested for the chemical weapons organization, in other words a conference of States parties and an executive council set up on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.

The system of analysis for seismic or non-seismic phenomena should be neither centralized nor monopolized by a limited number of States. All States parties should have access to the same information.

As to the duration of the treaty, it must be unlimited in time but contain machinery for periodic review. As to entry into force, the constraints of the future treaty necessitate accession by as many States as possible before it enters into force. All the proposals that we have heard so far involve limits. In particular, there is no link between entry into force and the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. The suggestion made by the Russian delegation - accession by States with nuclear power stations and reactors - is noteworthy: it is easy to count and identify these States. However, most countries which possess nuclear reactors accept the surveillance machinery of IAEA. Would the general system of non-proliferation really be strengthened if the entry into force of the treaty were dependent on ratification by these States alone? In any event, we consider that ratification of the treaty by the nuclear States is essential for its entry into force. We could associate ourselves with the reproduction of the formula taken from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would allow entry into force before ratification of the treaty by all States. As was shown by the pull-along effect during the final phase of negotiation of the Convention banning chemical weapons, national declarations could play an important role when the negotiation and drafting of the treaty have reached a sufficiently advanced level. As to sanctions, the treaty should contain provision for sanctions against States parties which violate their treaty obligations. However, in keeping with the principles of equality and non-discrimination on which this treaty should be based, we feel that these sanctions should be provided for in the body of the treaty itself. The idea of expressly contemplating sanctions against States which do not sign the convention seems to us indefensible. It violates numerous principles, including that of sovereignty, and would constitute a disastrous precedent in international relations. We would prefer the idea of incentives to sign.

Turning to links with other international treaties, the future treaty is simply one element in the general non-proliferation system. There is an undeniable interdependence between all international instruments relating to disarmament. Except in so far as we must avoid all discrepancies between

(Mr. Mechlaoui, Algeria)

commitments made under the future treaty and other multilateral instruments, there would be no point in attempting to reproduce imbalances in rights and obligations which, under the pretext of stability, aim at perpetuating existing situations. As to withdrawal clauses, we believe that no clause in the treaty should be capable of being interpreted as entitling a State party to denounce the treaty, and hence to carry out tests, and hence to call into question the entire international non-proliferation system, and hence - finally - to imperil the security of the other members of the international community.

Before concluding, I should like to state our conviction that we must start drafting the treaty as rapidly as possible. We will shortly arrive at a critical deadline concerning the entire present system of nuclear non-proliferation. The negotiations under way on the nuclear-test-ban treaty, like those which we hope will shortly be carried out on the issues of negative security assurances or on the production of fissile material, in fact constitute a foundation for the work of the NPT review conference.

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Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic):

... On 10 March, I delivered before the meeting of the CD a statement which outlined Egypt's position on the issue of transparency in armaments. And today, prior to the conclusion of the first part of the CD session of 1994, I was keen to define our position on the nuclear items on our agenda being given priority by the CD this year.

Our meeting here reflects a general consensus on the need to protect mankind from the ravages of weapons of mass destruction, weapons which cannot ensure the absolute security of any State. We must therefore pool our efforts with a view to elaborating more effective means to ensure real collective security, primarily through the conclusion of additional disarmament treaties and instruments and by setting up appropriate monitoring and verification mechanisms to ensure compliance with their provisions in the light of the improved international relations which characterize the post-cold-war period. With this in mind I would like today to address some of the important issues which the CD is currently dealing with. Prominent among them is the

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, an issue to which we all attribute high priority and which has become the most important issue currently being negotiated in the CD. I will also deal with Egypt's position on an issue of high priority for us, namely security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, in addition to a new item that we have agreed to include on our agenda, namely a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes.

With respect to the basic obligations of the comprehensive test-ban treaty which we are currently negotiating, and the elements that we believe should be reflected in the provisions of the treaty, as we have previously stated in our interventions before the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, under the capable chairmanship of our colleague and friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, our position is as follows: first, the treaty must prohibit all forms of nuclear test in all environments, whether in the atmosphere, under water or underground, without any distinction among member States.

Second, the treaty should not be viewed merely as a symbol of an international instrument to promote non-proliferation but must be considered as a step leading to the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty must contain provisions which ban any activities likely to encourage, assist or provide an appropriate environment for carrying out nuclear tests, including preparatory activities for such tests.

Fourth, the treaty should not set any threshold and must also avert the possibility of improving or modernizing existing nuclear weapons in the possession of some States.

Fifth, the ban must encompass all nuclear tests, even those that are allegedly peaceful, so as to prevent any future military benefits being derived from such tests.

Sixth, the verification mechanism under the treaty must be of universal application, non-discriminatory and subject to international monitoring. It must also be technically effective, and we are therefore eager to learn about all possible forms of verification, whether seismic or non-seismic and on-site, while following a sophisticated approach which allows for benefits to be derived from any technological advances in this field whenever possible.

Seventh, the basic objective of considering the creation of an international institution to supervise the application of the provisions of the comprehensive test-ban treaty is to ensure monitoring of compliance with its provisions. We therefore believe that it is important that this institution should be neutral, of an international nature and provided with advanced technical capabilities tailored to the responsibilities attributed to it, especially verification activities. The cost must be appropriate, without imposing a heavy additional financial burden on member States, and currently existing mechanisms should be used whenever possible. The institution

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

should comprise an executive body which represents member States and which effectively carries out its international responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the treaty's provisions.

Eighth, the treaty should be universal and include all States and primarily the five permanent member States of the Security Council, in addition to all other States that possess nuclear weapons without exception, as well as an adequate number of other member States to be agreed upon so that the treaty may enter into force at the earliest possible time.

Before moving on to another subject, I would not want to miss the opportunity to welcome the decision by the United States Government on 15 March last to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing to September 1995. We call on all nuclear-weapon States and all threshold States to follow the same approach and to freeze those tests voluntarily until the entry into force of the treaty currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an approach will have a positive impact on our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Let me at the outset congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference when it addresses important issues for the international community and assure you of our full cooperation.

I have taken the floor today to report to the Conference on the Tokyo Workshop on CTB verification held last week. The Government of Japan hosted a workshop on CTB verification from Monday 14 to Wednesday 16 March, aiming at identifying problems of CTB verification based primarily on seismological methods and trying to seek ways to cope with them in order to promote the CTBT negotiations, and acquainting the workshop participants with Japanese seismic monitoring technologies which could be applicable to the international seismic monitoring system (ISMS).

A total of 38 experts and officials from 24 countries, i.e. Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States actively participated in the discussions, briefings and demonstrations held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Meteorological Agency. In the plenary meeting where both seismologists and officials in charge of CTBT negotiations were present, they discussed the issues of effectiveness of seismological verification technologies, estimated cost of seismological verification, operation of a seismological verification system in a CTB, and means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Netherlands, the United States, Norway and Australia, whose representatives made presentations on the four issues respectively, and other participant countries for the comments which their representatives made.

Although the discussions were held in an informal manner to encourage the participants as qualified individuals to exchange their views freely, with no aim of adopting a final document or a report of conclusions, the Japanese delegation feels it may be useful to highlight for the Conference some of the interesting points raised in the workshop.

With respect to "effectiveness of seismological verification technologies", among the important questions addressed in the workshop were such questions as how one could identify a possible nuclear explosion out of so many seismic events taking place every day and who should be responsible for conducting such a task. A reply given in the workshop was that while the ultimate responsibility for the identification work might rest with the national data centre of each State party to the CTBT, the international data centre could do significant work and that the room left for the final judgement of the national authority might be relatively limited. In this connection it was pointed out that the IDC would expeditiously publish seismic bulletins which would include information on the origin time, the location, the depth, the body and surface wave magnitudes of the seismic events detected by the monitoring network, and would keep all relevant information on seismic waves, and that the identification work might be greatly facilitated by such information made available by the IDC. If a seismic event is located at the

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

bottom of the ocean or in a highly populated area, it is unlikely that it was a nuclear explosion. If the epicentre is found to be deeper than 10 kilometres, the event is probably a natural earthquake. The ratio of the body and surface wave magnitudes and the pattern of the wave-form will make a decisive contribution to identifying whether the seismic event in question is a natural earthquake or not. Though it may be difficult for the IDC to give a final analysis on all seismic events, it was argued in the workshop that it would be useful to agree to the procedure with which the IDC would group all seismic data into two categories, namely those which indicate that the event in question is a natural phenomenon and those which raise a doubt that a nuclear explosion may have occurred.

As for "estimated cost of seismological verification", cost estimates for GSETT-3 were given. It was stated that the overall annual operational costs for GSETT-3 might be US\$ 30 million, as the communication costs could be as high as \$12 million, and a suggestion was made to consider exemption or reduction of local tariffs to cut significantly the communications costs. No doubt these figures will provide an important basis for the consideration of a future CTBT verification system. Some of the issues which require decisions of a political nature will be how these costs should be borne among the CTBT organization and States parties, and whether we need to consider making a special fund in the future organization.

With respect to "means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB", the participants were reminded of the valuable CD papers including a questionnaire which had already been circulated in the verification Working Group.

And last but not least, the Japan Meteorological Agency showed the participants the automated seismic detection system already in operation in Japan. The Agency completely opened to the seismic experts the program of a fully automated method for detecting the arrival times of seismic waves and its application to an on-line processing system, providing them with the papers and floppy disks on the theory with the formulae, diagrams, tables, charts, etc. Japan believes that this method can substantially contribute to the formation of a reliable and cost-effective CTBT verification system.

In conclusion, the Japanese delegation hopes that the Tokyo workshop has given additional food for thought to the participant countries and will make some contribution to the important CTBT negotiations under way here in Geneva.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French):

... My Government notes with pleasure that this session of the Conference has commenced in a very positive manner and that organizational matters have been settled in a spirit that has shown the keen interest of these members in addressing questions of substance rapidly. My country is glad that clear priorities have been established to embark on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also welcome the fact that a Special Coordinator has been appointed for the question of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and we hope that the consultations now under way will rapidly lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate.

As the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty have begun, my Government learnt with particularly great satisfaction of the decision of the President of the United States to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing in his country until September next year. We welcome this initiative and hope that it will be followed by the other nuclear Powers. The joint observance of a moratorium will doubtless enable the Conference to make substantial progress this year in the negotiations it has just begun.

With regard to the content of the future treaty, I would like to be able to come back to this at a later stage. Today I would just like to say that it is of the greatest importance for my Government that this treaty should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, that it should be universal and non-discriminatory and that it should be accompanied by an effective system of international verification. Allow me to emphasize yet again how happy my Government is that your Conference is preparing to deal resolutely with this question, which has been under discussion for many years, and that at the same time and in the same spirit it is dealing with a number of other matters that could promote a favourable climate on the eve of the review conference on the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. The momentum acquired over recent weeks augurs well and encourages us to look forward to the vital deadline next year in New York with a degree of optimism.

(Mr. Hou, China)

Now I would like once again to outline China's principled standpoints and propositions on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament, the nuclear test ban and security assurances.

... In order to promote the process of nuclear disarmament and realize the goal of preventing nuclear war, the Chinese Government has recently taken further new initiatives. On 23 December last the Chinese Government formally proposed to the United States, the Russian Federation and other nuclear-weapon States that negotiations should be started among the five nuclear-weapon States with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of March the Chinese Government once again urged the other four nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to this proposal and once again invited them to send their delegations to Beijing for negotiations. It is the view of the Chinese Government that in the present international situation the conditions are right for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate and conclude such an international treaty. China believes that the conclusion of this treaty will significantly reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and provide security for the five nuclear-weapon States, especially the small- and medium-sized ones among them. It would also improve mutual trust and contribute to the prevention of nuclear

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(Mr. Hou, China)

proliferation. Finally, it will have an important role to play in realizing a comprehensive nuclear test ban and promoting nuclear disarmament. China is of the view that the questions of refraining from the first use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban are closely interrelated. It sincerely hopes that the countries concerned will give a positive response to China's initiative and start early negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. China also hopes that the five States will join together to promote vigorously the negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones, so as to make a decisive contribution to freeing mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to and actively participates in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. We have noted with pleasure that under the able guidance of the Chairman, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, the Ad Hoc Committee has quickly and smoothly proceeded to its work this year. It is our hope that the Committee will achieve substantive progress this year, which will be favourable to the CTBT negotiations and to the smooth convening of the NPT review conference.

As early as 16 years ago the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament correctly pointed out that "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind". Thereafter, this proposition was reaffirmed in the resolutions of successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. China has always actively supported this proposition. China has consistently pursued the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and stood for the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests within this framework. Proceeding from this fundamental position, China has always exercised maximum restraint in its nuclear testing. China's nuclear tests are few and far between, with the lowest number of tests among all nuclear Powers. China fully understands the sincere wish of vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States for the early conclusion of a CTBT in the belief that such a treaty will contribute to the realization of the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chinese Government issued a statement on 5 October last year reiterating its relevant principled positions and propositions. The statement emphasized that China supports the early conclusion of a CTBT and that it would join the other countries in this negotiation in an effort to conclude such a treaty no later than 1996. China joined the consensus on a resolution on the issue of a CTBT adopted by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. At present, following my Government's instructions, the Chinese delegation is actively participating in the negotiation with a businesslike and responsible attitude in order to make its contribution to the conclusion of an effectively verifiable CTBT which will be able to attract universal adherence.

(Mr. Hou, China)

It is gratifying to the Chinese delegation that at the outset of this year's session the Conference on Disarmament, under the presidency of Ambassador Errera of France, quickly set up an historically significant Ad Hoc Committee on the nuclear-test-ban issue, smoothly adopted a sound mandate and unanimously elected the very experienced Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as its Chairman. Now that the Ad Hoc Committee has started its work, we are confident that under the leadership of its skilful Chairman and the guidance of the chairmen of two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany and Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, the Committee will live up to the expectations of all sides in making substantive progress in the negotiation of a CTBT.

There are many complex issues before the NTB Committee. Now I would like to make some preliminary comments on the negotiation process. First, China fully supports the Ad Hoc Committee in vigorously negotiating a truly universal and effectively verifiable CTBT in accordance with its mandate. The purpose of such a treaty should be, as specified in the mandate, to "contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". Second, in view of the importance and universality of the future CTBT, the negotiations on a CTBT and the provisions thereof should fully reflect the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized norms of international relations. There is also the need to ensure the sovereign equality of States and a balance between rights and obligations. Third, we are of the view that the key provisions on the basic obligations and the scope of prohibition of the CTBT must conform fully with the fundamental purposes of the CTBT. To this end strict, precise and clear-cut texts should be worked out on the basis of sufficient and in-depth discussions and negotiations. There should be no loopholes or ambiguities which will give rise to different interpretations, misunderstandings or disputes in the future. Therefore, instead of copying the text of some agreements of the 1960s and 1970s, we should arrive at definitions and provisions truly in conformity with the purposes of the CTBT in the light of today's reality and possible future situations. For example, the CTBT should not become another partial test ban or a merely restrictive treaty. Rather, it should prohibit at any place and in any environment any nuclear-weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy.

Fourth, the proper solution of the verification problem is another complex and difficult task in the CTBT negotiations. We are of the view that verification is closely linked to the provisions on the scope of prohibition and the basic obligations and therefore should be worked out after the settlement of the issues related to definitions. We believe that the verification clauses and arrangements should be strict, effective, fair and reasonable, and should reflect the basic principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the verification of disarmament and arms control agreements. While States parties to the treaty should abide by the treaty and honour their obligations to accept fair verification, they are also entitled to share verification-related information and relevant resources and technology. Abuse of verification leading to unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of States parties and infringements of their security must be prevented.

(Mr. Hou, China)

Fifth, it is our view that seeking an appropriate solution to the issue of security assurances to States parties is to be one of the tasks in the CTBT negotiations. The CTBT is an international legal instrument with a direct bearing on the paramount security interests of States parties. As correctly provided for in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the CTBT should promote the process of nuclear disarmament and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. For this purpose the treaty should contain provision for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties which do not possess nuclear weapons. At the same time it should also provide for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We are deeply convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States enter into the above-mentioned obligations it will add to the substance of the CTBT, further the treaty's universality and constitute a major contribution to international peace and security.

Sixth, like many other delegations we have to stress that the Ad Hoc Committee must also resolve the extremely important and complex issue of entry into force of the CTBT. It goes without saying that the article on EIF must be brought into line with the principles of universality and the main purposes of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament. The CD must also seek a speedy and appropriate solution to the important issue of its expansion, because this is not only related to the strengthening of the CD's role in international political and security affairs but also intertwined with the CTBT negotiations and the smooth resolution of the EIF issues. There should be no more excuses whatsoever to keep a large number of non-member States outside the CD and exclude them from taking part in the CTBT negotiations. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair on the question of expansion of the CD membership and hope that the positive efforts made by him and the President of the CD will be crowned with success. We also thank Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, for his important contribution. Members of the international community are anxiously waiting for a successful solution of this problem, and we can no longer let them down.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden):

... I have asked for the floor today to express for the record the great satisfaction of the Swedish Government at the decision of the United States to prolong its moratorium on nuclear testing through September 1995. In the Swedish view that decision, which was very timely, will have a positive effect on the ongoing negotiations here in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is our hope that France and Russia will also extend their moratoria and that China will undertake no new nuclear tests. My delegation is convinced that a total absence of tests during the negotiating period would influence the negotiations in a very positive way.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic):

... It is encouraging that the Conference has now embarked on serious negotiation of the CTBT. In view of the approaching NPT review and extension conference it is indeed high time to address this long overdue issue expeditiously. Let us hope that a year from now we will have an outline of the draft treaty sufficiently advanced so that it could contribute to the adoption of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely.

The first session of the CD this year has indicated a clear preference for a comprehensive test ban with no low-yield or so-called peaceful nuclear explosions authorized. Serious doubts were voiced with regard to the idea of monitoring preparatory activities. My delegation subscribes to both the need for a comprehensive nature of the CTBT and a realistic approach to what can be banned and verified. Pre-test activities may best be covered within the framework of the NPT, through the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards or, perhaps, through a set of confidence-building measures which may be agreed in future.

As was the case in negotiating the chemical weapons Convention, verification provisions will probably take most of our time and energy. We should not hesitate to draw on the experience gained in developing verification provisions of the CWC. However, we should not do it automatically, since besides similarities there are also substantial differences between the two subject-matters. While the CWC relies heavily on routine inspections and data reporting, the future CTBT will hardly require

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(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

any extensive routine inspection activities. In the case of challenge on-site inspections the nature of suspected activities will be completely different, though some procedural aspects of the activities of inspectors in the receiving country may be identical irrespective of whether an inspector visits a chemical industry facility or a site where a clandestine nuclear explosion may have occurred.

Perhaps we should constantly keep in mind that in the case of the CTBT we should aim at a cheaper international treaty than was the case for the CWC. The scope of verified activities should be much narrower and the organization for the implementation of the CTBT should thus be smaller in size and budget. Its secretariat may benefit from drawing on the relevant experience and expertise of IAEA, which may prevent the costs of its activities from growing too high.

At the same time we can hardly conceive of such an organization acting without an executive body. It must have an operational ability to review requests for on-site inspections, to assure smooth conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to address treaty compliance questions raised by parties to the treaty. The organization should also be in a position to act independently and be responsible not only for data collection and data exchange but also for data interpretation. This could assure full access of the States parties to the relevant information. At the same time transparency and openness of the organization's activities should make it possible for any State to apply its own processing to the raw data if it is willing to do so. Such a modus operandi will contribute to prompt carrying out of on-site inspections in situations which seem justifiably suspicious.

No delegation seems to question that seismic monitoring should represent the core of the future verification system. As the negotiating process unrolls, views may differ on what other monitoring techniques may be required and to what extent. It is our view that we should make recourse only to such additional measures which may reasonably increase confidence with the treaty. Some of the techniques mentioned so far may seem intellectually exciting, if not exotic. But we should undertake an in-depth analysis of individual measures in order to determine whether their application may be useful for the detection of a clandestine nuclear explosion and be cost-effective. Moreover, it would be wasteful if we chose not to benefit from what national technical means may contribute to compliance with the CTBT. Commercially available satellite imagery could be used rather than, for instance, permanent Earth monitoring exclusively for CTBT verification. If exchange of data stemming from other than seismic monitoring is agreed, it would facilitate the activities of the organization if all data are collected, processed and distributed through a single data exchange system.

Entry into force is another issue where we should strike the right balance between the need to assure the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States and the threshold countries and the creation of favourable conditions for the treaty's early entry into force without institutionalizing a sort of

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

veto right of any country. We support those who expressed the view that the required minimum number of ratifications should be lower than in the case of the CWC.

Czech experts have been actively participating in the Group of Scientific Experts since the beginning of its work. We are prepared to participate also in GSETT-3, and we shall provide the seismic station and the national data centre which participated in GSETT-2. We support the carrying out of GSETT-3 as originally planned. It should not, however, fail to contribute directly to the negotiating process aimed at the early establishment of the international seismic monitoring system for the CTBT.

My delegation cannot fail to appreciate the moratorium on nuclear testing observed by the four nuclear-weapon States. The recent decision by President Clinton to prolong the moratorium on testing through September 1995 was an encouraging step in the right direction. We would also like to appreciate the valuable workshop on CTBT verification organized by Japan in mid-March.

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

... Treaties with limited participation in the security field belong to the past. The chemical weapons Convention, the future CTBT, not to speak of the NPT, can play their role fully only if their membership is evolving towards universality. States will be more prepared to join international treaties which they had a chance to negotiate directly. The CD, in view of its responsibility in disarmament and security, should not permanently ignore this fact. We are looking forward to a solution which would allow all those interested and prepared to contribute, to join the Conference already this year. Continued efforts to pick up a few among those who have applied for membership so far may complicate unnecessarily the decision on the first extension of the CD in 16 years. Let me, in conclusion, wish good luck to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil in his efforts to resolve this problem.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine):

... First and foremost, we note with satisfaction that participants in the negotiations on a nuclear test ban have made very significant steps towards their ultimate goal of elaborating a comprehensive, truly universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. Useful discussions on this issue - the key to the Conference on Disarmament's current work - have been taking place at plenary meetings, and especially at the sessions of the timely established and efficiently steered working organs of the Conference: the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and both of its working groups. In our view, they have created a milieu favourable for reaching agreement on a number of principal structural elements of the future NTBT without undue delay. We are of the opinion that steady progress in the NTB negotiations would be contributing to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and - equally - to successful preparations for the NPT Review Conference.

CD/PV.677

6

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

... Being fully aware of the high sensitivity and complexity of this problem, we deem it necessary to join a number of those in this hall who have on previous occasions warned the Conference that further tardiness could jeopardize the impressive progress achieved by its members on other items of its agenda. It is especially evident in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, where negotiations have entered the phase when active involvement of the delegations of non-member States is of critical importance. It is equally clear that our delegation, as many others, cannot participate in the work of the

CD/PV.677

7

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups to the full extent and on a regular basis without adequate experts' backing and other resources which can be provided only on the basis of our Government's decision directly dependent upon the regularization of Ukraine's status within the Conference.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

... During a period of more than 30 years, a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing has become almost the Holy Grail of multilateral disarmament. New Zealand's efforts to promote a halt to nuclear testing by all States, in all environments, for all time, are well known. It had long been our belief that the CD has responsibility for negotiating a treaty to secure that objective.

The decision of the Conference in August last year to begin negotiations in 1994 on item 1 of its agenda was therefore greeted with much enthusiasm in New Zealand. The determination of the international community to support this process, vividly conveyed by the passage in the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the first consensus resolution on the subject, has not diminished. Indeed, expectations remain high.

New Zealand wants an effective CTBT concluded in rapid time. We believe that this is an entirely realistic goal given the encouraging progress made during the first part of this session under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and the working group chairmen. We are also aware that nearly half of the Conference's meeting time this year is already behind us. In the coming months New Zealand will therefore be working with others to ensure that no time is wasted in putting together a text which meets the desire of the international community for a treaty which provides for a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban.

I am aware that the design and costing of an effective verification regime is a priority in this regard. I am therefore pleased to be able to confirm that New Zealand's contribution to the elaboration of the seismic core of the treaty's verification package, through our long-time participation in the GSE, is being complemented by a contribution to this week's expert sessions from our experts in the field of radioactivity monitoring, drawing on the experience we have gained in our own region, the South Pacific.

It will be important in the coming months to ensure the best possible atmosphere for these negotiations. New Zealand believes that the nuclear-weapon States can demonstrate their commitment to progress by refraining from further testing. It is pleasing to note recent reaffirmations of that commitment.

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

... To my delegation the deliberations of the CD on all items of this year's agenda are very important. We would like to note with satisfaction the competence of the elected chairmen of the established committees. It is not, however, a surprise that the CD has shown the greatest interest in the work of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, chaired by the so much devoted diplomat to the cause of prohibiting all possible nuclear tests, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marin Bosch. He has our full support.

(Mr. Calovski, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

... We share the position that all energy and negotiating skills should be employed in achieving agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, agreement which could be supported equally by nuclear and non-nuclear States, by big and small States. Most countries have no ambitions to become nuclear Powers but they accept the position that nuclear weapons are extremely dangerous, that they are a permanent threat to international security and that the best way to uphold non-proliferation is to ban all possible nuclear tests. We are aware of what is at stake and how complex it is to achieve a universally acceptable and verifiable nuclear-test-ban agreement which will annul the danger of nuclear war and will not pose obstacles to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The agreement should take fully into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the interest of all nations, big or small, developed or developing. In any case it would be a political agreement since it requires a political will and commitment to be achieved. Thus, it should be major instrument in strengthening international relations and a hope for better future of mankind.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 679th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... On the substantive side, thanks to the efforts of all delegations, the work of the Conference has continued to run smoothly. The Conference is making remarkable progress in the field of the nuclear test ban, and exciting and forward-looking discussions can also be witnessed on nearly all other items on our agenda. I am convinced that these positive developments should give a definite answer to all the doubts and reservations questioning the Conference's ability to adapt the complex challenges of the changing international environment. It is this ability that should also help us in finding a solution for the long overdue issue of expanding the membership of the Conference. I have to take note with regret that the circumstances that influence the development of this subject have not yet changed to such an extent that would have allowed the Special Coordinator to report on substantial progress. I urge all delegations to find ways and means to overcome the remaining obstacles, and once again I would like to assure the next President of the Conference as well as Ambassador Lampreia of the full support and cooperation of the Hungarian delegation in his efforts.

This concludes my remarks at the end of the Hungarian presidency.

The PRESIDENT:

... It is, therefore, no surprise that significant strides have been made during the last few years in the field of nuclear disarmament. Thus many of the targets of the Indian action plan envisaged during the first phase, i.e. 1988 to 1994, have been attained. Apart from the far-reaching measures of arms reduction, both nuclear and conventional, a treaty banning chemical

(continued)

(The President)

weapons has already been concluded. For the first time in 1994 the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament dealing with this subject has been given a negotiating mandate.

Hence 1994 is an immensely important year for the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, it is also not irrelevant to recall that the first initiative for a ban on nuclear tests was taken by India's first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, as early as 1954. It would be useful to reiterate that had the CTBT come into existence earlier, there would have been fewer and qualitatively inferior nuclear weapons in existence. We say this not to begin a litany of regrets but to impress upon the CD the urgency that must attend the task at hand. We have to be vigilant and careful that our efforts in this regard are not allowed to peter out into halfway or partial measures.

A CTBT has a very important place in the context of nuclear disarmament. It finds a place in the first stage of India's action plan for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. We would at this stage like to comment on the following aspects of the proposed CTBT.

Firstly, structure and scope. The CTBT should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. It should inhibit in a non-discriminatory way the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the horizontal as well as vertical dimensions. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress or to perpetuate a division of the world into two categories of nations. We believe that no test should be carried out under the pretext of safety purposes. The ban should be comprehensive and not establish thresholds.

We support the idea of the closure of nuclear-weapon test sites. We believe that we have to be careful when approaching the idea of banning preparatory activities. Preparations which make a nuclear-weapon explosion imminent should certainly be within the scope of a CTBT; however, research and scientific activity related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be unnecessarily targeted. It is essential therefore to examine this aspect further and to work out a clear definition of preparatory activities that need to be covered.

Secondly, verification. As for the entire treaty, the verification system under a CTBT should also be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and should guarantee equal access to all States. It should be internationally supervised and effective.

One of the most important requirements of a CTBT verification regime is that it should provide necessary confidence to States parties that nuclear explosions carried out in any environment will be detected, located and identified unambiguously in an appropriate time-frame, and thus deter any potential violator. Further, the system should be cost-effective so that the capital, operational and maintenance costs of the system do not result in an

(The President)

unreasonable burden to the concerned States parties. The cost-effectiveness and the degree of confidence provided by a typical verification system need to be optimized so that the CTBT can enjoy universal adherence.

We believe that seismic verification would form the core of a future verification system. India had participated in GSETT-1 and GSETT-2 experiments and has committed to participate in GSETT-3 also and encourages more countries to participate in it in order to make the CTBT an effective and technically verifiable treaty. We have also considered the utility of some non-seismic techniques such as radionuclides and perhaps hydroacoustic, but are yet to be convinced of other non-seismic methods. On-site inspections should only serve the purpose to cover the gaps left by these methods and should be taken only if there is a substantive suspicion of violation.

Thirdly, organization. We believe that a CTBT organization, preferably a separate specific organization, should serve the purpose of the implementation of the CTBT verification regime. The CTBT organization should have the capability of analysing and exchanging both international seismic data and other non-seismic data.

Fourthly, entry into force. We favour a CTBT which should attract universal adherence. Entry into force should not be complicated to delay the process. Entry into force should come into being once ratification has been effected by a reasonable and representative group of countries.

I would like to avail of this opportunity to thank Ambassador Bosch of Mexico for his leadership in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We look forward to his rolling text on a CTBT this month. Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinsky, the chairmen of working groups, also deserve our full support for their untiring efforts.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden) :

Very valuable work has, during the last weeks, been accomplished in the Working Group on Verification of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, especially concerning the use of non-seismic verification techniques within a verification package for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The time has now come to be more specific about how we want to verify a CTBT. This is not to be a technological exercise, it is rather to find a balance between political and legal obligations, confidence-building measures and technical verification and on-site inspection arrangements. Our task is to find a balance that is acceptable to all of us. That has to be a balance that meets the security needs of all concerned, and we appreciate that those needs might be different for different countries. We are looking for verification arrangements that will develop and maintain the credibility of the treaty. We also want to create a cost-effective monitoring structure and one that is robust and does not by itself create numerous false alarms or other problems that might diminish confidence in the treaty.

In the view of my delegation we do have a good basis for our forthcoming deliberations. The Australian working paper on draft treaty elements (CD/NTE/WP.49) is an excellent compilation of old and new ideas. It constitutes, together with the Swedish draft treaty text, a good basis for our further consideration. A lot of other interesting papers have also been presented in the Working Group on Verification and a valuable compilation of non-seismic methods has been made by the Friends of the Chair. All this will enhance our common knowledge and facilitate our consideration.

In our draft treaty, contained in document CD/1232, we tried to reflect what we interpreted as commonly shared views and ideas. Now it is time for each country to be more specific about its needs and desires as to the requirements on the verification system and on its technical arrangements. We have noted with great interest that some delegations have already been fairly specific on their approaches.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

I will now try to be as specific on the Swedish verification requirements as is possible at this stage. In our view the verification arrangements should fulfil some basic criteria. They should, inter alia, help provide confidence that all parties abide by their treaty obligations; deter clandestine activities; be capable of detecting reasonable explosion scenarios in all environments; enhance confidence in the treaty and counteract false alarms; and provide treaty parties with information useful for national interpretation and assessment.

To meet those goals in a credible way, a verification system has to utilize a combination of different technologies. I will try to pinpoint those technologies that in our view seem most useful to satisfy our verification needs in a cost-effective manner. I will first turn to the technologies useful for monitoring underground explosions.

To provide assurance that no clandestine explosion is carried out underground, the treaty must, in our view, contain provisions for a seismological verification system with global coverage. The system designed and to some extent tested by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is likely to fulfil those needs. In our draft treaty we have proposed that the verification agency is given authority over the Alpha stations, which are crucial for event detections. We believe that it is important not only for the credibility of the system but also for the smooth and cost-effective operation of the system that the agency has the authority to directly influence the technical equipment and the operation of the stations. To get a global system with stations at desired locations the costs of establishing and operating the stations have to be shared in a fair manner among the parties to the treaty. There might, as suggested in the Australian working paper, be different ways to ascertain the agency's authority and to achieve international funding. We are on our part quite open to different technical solutions.

The main difficulty with seismological observations is the large number of earthquakes that are being observed. The anticipated system might detect some 50,000 earthquakes each year. To maintain the credibility of the treaty it is in our view necessary to have provisions for on-site inspections to ascertain the nature of events that might not be confidently identified by observations at larger distances.

We must also find a pragmatic way of handling the large number of chemical explosions, most of them connected with mining activities, which will also be observed. We anticipate that some 3,000 such explosions each year are strong enough to be observed by the seismological system proposed by the GSE. We must handle these explosions without overly burdening the verification system or impeding the legitimate activities that generate those explosions, but at the same time ascertain that no clandestine activities are being conducted. In our draft treaty we suggest the possibility of declaring certain facilities as explosion sites and making them open to ad hoc inspections and we also suggested a scheme for reporting individual larger explosions outside such declared facilities. There might be other

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

possibilities, and we are eager to find cost-effective arrangements to ensure that these legitimate activities are not weakening the credibility of the treaty.

The availability of satellite images of an area prior to and after the occurrence of a seismic event might facilitate the interpretation of that event. Satellite images might also facilitate the planning of on-site inspections. The satellite images needed are available commercially today from SPOT and other similar systems. We therefore have an open mind on whether or not there is a need to make special provisions for such data in the treaty and if or to what extent the IDC should assist individual countries in analysing and making available such data.

Although the probability of observing radioactive noble gases from a clandestine underground test is low, we still think that such observations might enhance the credibility of the verification system and provide increased deterrence against clandestine activities. We therefore regard it as desirable to establish a capability to detect such gases worldwide in connection with the system to monitor airborne radioactive particles.

When it comes to possible clandestine explosions underwater in the deep oceans one may argue whether or not that is a likely threat scenario, but my delegation does not think it can be totally ruled out. Seismological observations are useful also for detection of underwater explosions, especially if they are conducted at great depths, when seismic signals are substantially stronger than for explosions of similar yield conducted underground. The seismological system is thus of great value for monitoring possible explosions also in the oceans.

Hydroacoustic observations are even more capable of detecting weak explosions in the water or at low altitudes above the water over large oceanic distances. In our view it would be highly desirable to include a system for hydroacoustic observations covering the deep oceans in the verification system. The hydroacoustic observations are quite similar to the seismological and could easily be integrated in the analysis together with the seismological data. Hydroacoustic observations will also greatly facilitate the identification of observed seismic events by differentiating between an underwater explosion and an earthquake occurring beneath the ocean floor. More than 70 per cent of all observed earthquakes occur beneath the oceans. This will in itself be a considerable achievement and greatly facilitate the interpretation of the seismological data.

Sophisticated hydroacoustic systems have been developed and established inter alia to detect and track submarines. Although Swedish experience is limited to the shallow waters of the Baltic, which is of no relevance in this context, it is our understanding that only a very small fraction of the capability and the instrumentation used for submarine detection is needed for the observation of explosions in this context. It might therefore be possible to utilize a small part of the already existing hydroacoustic observation systems around the oceans to provide hydroacoustic data to the verification

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

system. My delegation appreciates the United States offer to make available data from two hydrophone arrays in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans operated for other purposes. We urge other countries operating such systems to consider the "dual use" also of their facilities and thus make available part of the data collected and the station information needed to utilize these data.

As is well known there are no verification provisions in the partial test-ban treaty. To establish a credible CTBT verification regime the Swedish delegation, however, sees the need for verification arrangements that cover also explosions in the atmosphere. As presented in our draft treaty we would like to see a global system for the monitoring of airborne radioactive particles. We have in technical working papers described in considerable detail such a system containing some 100 globally distributed stations. A working paper presented during this session provides additional technical details especially on the design of automatic monitoring stations, which could be connected to the international data centre in the same way as the seismological stations. If there is general agreement, which we think there is, that a global system for monitoring radioactive particles in the atmosphere should be one of the elements of the verification system, then it is important that we form some sort of working group, including experts, to define and test such a system without further delay.

One of the limitations of a radioactivity monitoring system is the uncertainty of the location of the source. This is due to the uncertainties of estimating the path that the particles have taken from the source to the recording stations through the complex weather pattern. During the expert presentations in the Working Group on Verification several technologies have been discussed to enhance the capability of estimating a more precise location of a possible explosion in the atmosphere. We also see the need for improved capability to accurately locate possible atmospheric explosions. In our view the most rational and cost-effective way would be that countries that already today operate satellite-based detection equipment, sometimes referred to as "bhang-meters", would undertake to make information on and data from these systems available to the treaty parties. Data from such systems would in our understanding also be useful in monitoring possible explosions in outer space, although we do not see the conduct of such explosions as a very likely scenario.

We have also analysed acoustic methods, where we have many years of experience in Sweden, and ionospheric monitoring. We have found that although there might be situations where such observations may give a contribution, we do not feel that they on balance would significantly improve the verification capability. We therefore, from our perspective, see no need to have these technologies included in the verification package.

We see the need for an international data centre to collect and analyse data from the stations monitoring seismic signals, atmospheric radioactivity and possibly hydroacoustic signals and to distribute the results of its analysis to the treaty parties.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

There has been much discussion on the role of the IDC and on how extensive an analysis it shall carry out. Our view is that it is the responsibility of each State party to make the assessment and the identification of observed events and to determine if further action, for example a request for an on-site inspection, is deemed necessary. The IDC shall to the extent possible facilitate this assessment by providing States parties with compiled and analysed information based on data reported from the global networks of seismological, radiological and possibly hydroacoustic stations. The analyses shall be carried out according to agreed procedures designed to provide States parties with the most useful information. The IDC might also provide individual States parties with additional computations on demand. The products of the IDC merit further consideration and we will revert to this issue in further detail at a later occasion.

In this statement I have not specifically dwelt on the problems of costs but concentrated on the package of verification methods that from a Swedish perspective would be needed to adequately verify a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Of course we have to revert to the problems of costs. However, as a first step we have to define which verification package is needed to adequately verify a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Swedish view on verification arrangements and technologies can thus be summarized as follows. We see a need for a global seismological monitoring system along the lines developed by GSE; a global system to monitor radioactive particles in the atmosphere; an international data centre to collect, analyse and provide information from the global monitoring systems; on-site inspection arrangements; and arrangements to confidently establish that large chemical explosions and sites for such explosions are not misused for clandestine activities.

It would in our view also be desirable to have a system for hydroacoustic observations based on existing recording stations; a global system to measure radioactive noble gases integrated with the system to monitor radioactive particles; and data made available from existing satellite-based sensors, "bhang-meters", to detect and locate explosions in the atmosphere and in outer space.

In addition, as a general rule, this verification package could and should be complemented by findings of national technical means, made available to the international organization.

We have found the expert presentations on verification measures in the Working Group of the nuclear-test-ban Committee most valuable. It is now important not to lose momentum, but rather increase the efforts to provide as solid a technical basis on the non-seismic techniques as we have on seismology thanks to the work of GSE and its global testing. We would therefore like to propose that such work, including testing, be initiated on radioactive and hydroacoustic monitoring with the aim of integrating also those techniques

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

into the international verification system. Such work has to be pursued hastily, so that a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be agreed on in the near future.

Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland):

... A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is a goal to which Finland has been committed for more than 30 years. We remain committed. Such a ban would be a further step towards nuclear disarmament. It would be of significant help in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A test-ban treaty would strengthen the international non-proliferation regime built around the non-proliferation Treaty. The conclusion of the test-ban treaty, or the imminent prospect thereof, would smooth the way toward the indefinite extension of the NPT next year, another goal to which my country attaches the utmost importance.

The first round of the test-ban negotiations was encouraging. With determination and with a keen eye for the essential the negotiations can be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, has, with the able assistance of the working group chairmen, guided the work with a masterly hand. We look forward to more of the same on his part. It is our hope that he would present a complete draft treaty text before the summer break. The Australian draft, building as it does on the pioneering contribution of Sweden, already provides a solid basis.

On the basis of a Chairman's text, much of the drafting could be accomplished during the last round of this year's session. We are also in favour of continuing the work throughout the autumn, if so required. At the moment, it seems that inter-sessional work would be needed for the purpose of building the verification package for the Treaty.

It is important to maintain the present good atmosphere in the negotiations. The maintenance of testing moratoria is of great significance in this regard.

Like others, we have seen reports that China might conduct a nuclear test in the near future. We certainly hope that there is no substance to these reports. We urge China to join the moratoria and to refrain from testing.

A nuclear-test-ban treaty should ban nuclear test explosions. Full stop. That means no nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions,

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

ever, anywhere. The ban should leave no loophole whatever for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions - and I use the term "so-called" advisedly.

Nor do we believe that it is necessary or politic to try to define what constitutes a nuclear-test explosion. The concept is clear enough for arms control purposes. In our view, banning nuclear testing is one thing, banning nuclear weapons another. The one cannot bring about the other.

The test ban should become universal. In particular, it is important that all five nuclear-weapon States and other States with significant nuclear capabilities become parties to the Treaty from the very beginning.

However, we are not in favour of writing special categories of States into the treaty's provisions concerning its entry into force. Granting in effect the right of veto to some States could unduly delay the entry into force of the Treaty. The goal of universality would not be served thereby.

Our goal is an effectively verifiable treaty. The verification regime should give a sufficient guarantee, at a reasonable cost, of detecting activities that would represent a violation of the test ban.

The regime should be able to verify the absence of nuclear explosions in all environments, including in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State. Verification should induce compliance with all the basic treaty obligations.

Seismic monitoring will be at the core of the verification regime. The work in this area is well advanced thanks to the long-standing efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts. Success with the experimental international seismic monitoring system will be an important step towards an operational monitoring network.

Finland will participate in the GSETT-3 experiment with a national data centre and a FINESS Alpha station. In addition, Finland is prepared to offer one or more Beta stations and to provide supplementary data through our national network. We urge all States involved in the CTBT negotiations to participate in GSETT-3.

We support the establishment of a global network to measure airborne radioactivity. We would be ready to participate in such a network. To the extent possible, the network should be built around existing national stations. It would be practical to make use of different technical solutions so long as they are capable of reaching the required level of performance. In our view, the network of stationary units should be complemented with portable ones. Portable units would make the network more effective and less cumbersome - less desk-bound if you will.

We support an international experiment concerning the functioning of a radionuclide network, involving also portable units.

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

In addition to seismic and radionuclide monitoring, it seems that hydroacoustic measurement would be a useful and cost-effective means of monitoring large ocean areas.

Naturally, we are prepared to look into other means of verification as well. We would not, however, like to see an overly elaborate and therefore costly verification regime. The aim is not perfection. The aim is to deter any nuclear-test explosions and to give adequate assurance of detection should deterrence fail.

For a small country with limited resources such as mine, it is important that the verification regime produces information in a compiled, digestible form. The prospective CTBT organization should be tasked to analyse the raw data for the benefit of all those States parties who so desire. Final judgement as to possible violations of treaty commitments would, of course, be up to the States parties.

Effective provisions for on-site inspections will be required for situations in which treaty compliance is in doubt. Inspections should be conducted by the CTBT organization at the request of any State party. During inspections, the organization should be able to use high-performance mobile units equipped, inter alia, for radionuclide measurement.

It is in the interests of all treaty-abiding States parties that an inspection is carried out quickly, unless the governing body of the CTBT organization determines that the request is patently unfounded.

In our view, the CTBT organization does not need a permanent corps of inspectors. However, a small group of experts within the organization could be designated in advance to assist in on-site activities and to perform additional measurements in areas beyond national jurisdiction or in the territory of a State party upon its request.

All in all, Finland supports an evolutionary approach to verification. As technology evolves, as it surely will, so should the tools of verification. Therefore, it would be practical to incorporate the details into a separate verification protocol which could be amended through a simple and expeditious procedure.

National technical means will be valuable in complementing the international verification regime, and should be recognized as such.

As to organization, Finland supports a close functional link to the International Atomic Energy Agency. A close interrelationship exists between test-ban verification and IAEA safeguards. Existing IAEA safeguards already provide a baseline for test-ban verification. Conversely, proposed elements of the CTBT verification regime, particularly radionuclide monitoring, can contribute to safeguard implementation.

(Mr. Patokallio, Finland)

In our view, a functional link between the two could best be secured through an arrangement whereby a small CTBT organization is co-located with IAEA in Vienna.

(Mr. Lior, Israel)

In speaking before the CD today I wish first to express my hope that in future Israel will be able to address this forum in the capacity of a full member.

I would like to focus very briefly on some aspects of a CTBT. As we clearly stated in our working paper submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (circulated under CD/NTB/WP.72 on 26 May 1994), Israel supports the banning of nuclear-test explosions. It is within this context that Israel joined the consensus on the CTBT resolution at the forty-eighth United Nations General Assembly, and supports the negotiations conducted presently at the CD on concluding that treaty. Israel believes that the future CTBT should be effectively verifiable and attract universal adherence, and we intend to assist and contribute in the formation of the treaty.

It is our view that a well-defined scope, focusing on banning nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, would facilitate the acceptance of the treaty on a timely basis.

Israel supports the establishment of a verification regime aimed at assuring compliance with the CTBT. It should be dedicated to the monitoring, detection and identification of nuclear explosions without lending itself to abuse. Basically, the verification regime should comprise three elements: a global monitoring system, a non-routine event-triggered consultation and clarification process, and in rare cases - on-site inspection.

It is Israel's position that the prospective CTBT organization should be cost-effective, professional and impartial. Its structure should enable each State party to exercise its rights in the various organs, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis.

Israel supports a global and universally applicable CTBT. Such a treaty should also play a supportive role at the regional level. Israel expects all States of the Middle East to join the prospective CTBT as an important step towards regional stability and security.

Let me conclude by expressing the hope that the ongoing negotiations in the CD will produce a comprehensive test-ban treaty which will enable all States to join it.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

... The second quote from Ambassador Amorim relates to nuclear disarmament: "More than ever, Brazil and the other members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco have the right and the duty to engage ourselves in the promotion of a global process of disarmament. The logic of the cold war gave a doubtful and precarious argument to the balance of terror. The fact that it has been overcome makes the enormous nuclear arsenals yet in place still more irrational and intrinsically obsolete. It is up to countries such as ours, which have renounced such weapons and provided all possible verification guarantees of our commitments, to call for the nuclear Powers to make significant steps in the same direction, opening themselves to verification measures that retain the same multilateral and universal character. This process initiates its first steps with the negotiation of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests in the Conference on Disarmament. It is our hope that present obstacles be quickly overcome so as to allow for progress in the complete elimination of the nuclear threat."

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group held about two months ago, from 21 to 25 March 1994, with the participation of experts and representatives from 23 countries. The progress report of the meeting is contained in document CD/1253, which is in front of you.

This session was convened following a request by the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to summarize the knowledge and experience on the upcoming GSE Third Technical Test (GSETT-3). The report more specifically was to elaborate on the overall concept of GSETT-3, the functions and components of the system, and matters of organization and cost.

The GSE report is contained in document CD/1254 and was introduced to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 24 March. In that connection experts from the GSE gave presentations, in their national capacities, to the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification. The following presentations were made, as you may recall: Dr. Peter Basham (Canada) on seismic techniques, Dr. Frode Ringdahl (Norway), the Scientific Secretary of the Group, on the overall structure of GSETT-3, Dr. Steven Bratt (United States) on the International Data Centre and Dr. Heinrich Haak (Netherlands) on organization and cost. Although the report was thoroughly introduced and discussed some two months ago, it might be useful to briefly summarize its main conclusions to facilitate the forthcoming consideration of seismic verification techniques tomorrow in the nuclear test ban Committee's Working Group on Verification.

GSETT-3 is to be a realistic test on a global scale of a well-defined international seismic monitoring system. The system is based on a two-tiered network of more than 150 seismological Alpha and Beta stations. The Alpha stations, which are transmitting uninterrupted data on-line and with no time delay to the International Data Centre, would provide data for the detection and initial location of the seismic events. The Beta stations, from which data will be retrieved automatically by the IDC when needed, will be used primarily to improve location accuracy.

An Alpha network initially of 57 stations has been defined for GSETT-3 based on experience from earlier technical tests, extensive technical and scientific investigations and computer simulations. These stations have to meet specific requirements as given in the Group's report. The GSE has recommended that at least 100 Beta stations be included in the international seismic monitoring system. The technical requirements for the Beta stations might be less extensive than for the Alpha stations.

The 57 Alpha stations are distributed around the world in 34 countries. To date we have commitments from 13 countries for 21 stations. We still need 36 Alpha stations in 21 countries, and we also need about 100 Beta stations distributed all over the globe, and I again appeal to States to provide the required stations and other national facilities needed for GSETT-3.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The International Data Centre is the focal point of the international monitoring system, acting as a data collection, processing and distribution facility. It will receive and store large amounts of raw data and conduct extensive and well-specified analysis to define and locate seismic events worldwide. The information provided by the IDC to each participating State is thus an easily accessible synthesis of the reported station observations containing origin time, location, depth and size of all defined events. During GSETT-3 the International Data Centre will also compute and compile other parameters which may be useful for the identification of seismic events and provide those parameters to participants for national assessment.

The Group of Scientific Experts has accepted the kind offer by the United States to develop and host the experimental International Data Centre for GSETT-3 in Arlington, Virginia. The procedures used at this experimental IDC will follow, as far as possible, the procedures currently envisaged for the eventual IDC. The products and services provided by the experimental IDC will include an automatically produced list of all detected seismic events based on data from the Alpha stations. This list will be provided within one hour of the occurrence of the events. An amended list with improved event locations, obtained by automatic processing of data also from the Beta stations, will be provided within four hours so this is a very rapid process. A final bulletin, where qualified analysts have reviewed the data and the computations, will be provided within two days. The IDC will also provide a continuous assessment of the actual capability of the network and thus provide information on the weakest event that at any given moment can be detected in the various regions of the globe. To carry out its task during GSETT-3 it is planned that the IDC will have an international staff of 40 to 50 people.

The Group has conducted extensive theoretical studies of the projected detection capability of the station network to be used during GSETT-3. An example of such computations given in the Group's report shows 90 per cent detection thresholds from below magnitude 3 in parts of Europe and North America to above 3.4 in parts of the continents and above 3.8 in parts of the oceans in the southern hemisphere. Magnitude 3 corresponds to a threshold 10 times and magnitude 3.5 to a threshold 3 times lower than magnitude 4, and magnitude 4 is the seismic magnitude produced by a fully contained and coupled explosion in hard rock with a size of approximately one kiloton.

The GSE has also considered the important question of the accuracy of event locations. If the locations are based on observations primarily at large distances from the events, which is the case for the preliminary analysis based on Alpha stations only, then an uncertainty of the order of 20 kilometres might be expected. If stations closer to the event are added to the analysis - and this is the rationale for the Beta stations - then the location uncertainties may be reduced to some 5 kilometres. This is a reduction by a factor of 10 to 20 of the area within which an event can be found with a given probability. This is most significant when considering, for example, an on-site inspection.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

GSETT-3 is thus providing the definition and design of a station network and an International Data Centre that could provide a basis for the design of a seismic verification system. The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good basis for operating manuals for the eventual system. The IDC, the seismological stations and other facilities which will be utilized during GSETT-3 would also provide valuable infrastructure and practical experience that could facilitate the implementation of an international seismic monitoring system under a treaty.

In its analysis of the cost of GSETT-3, the Group found that considerable investments have already been made in developing and establishing facilities to be used in the test. The total investments already made in seismological stations and the IDC are estimated to be about US\$ 150 million, of which \$120 million refers to stations and communications and \$30 million to the IDC. The total remaining investments planned to be made in GSETT-3 facilities amount to \$27 million. \$19 million is planned for improving the station network and the communications and \$8 million to finalize the experimental IDC. The annual operating cost for GSETT-3 is about \$26-30 million. The cost of operating the Alpha network, the communications and the IDC are each about equal and amounts to \$7-8 million per year, and the cost of operating the Beta stations is about half that amount.

This was an attempt to briefly summarize some of the conclusions of the GSE report CD/1254, which contains more information that might be useful in your consideration of the seismological part of the verification system.

During its March session the Ad Hoc Group also received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban Working Group on Verification. The Group also noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop in Tokyo, Japan, during 14 to 16 March 1994. Twenty-three experts from 21 countries attended the workshop, which contributed to the development of GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 8 to 19 August 1994, in Geneva. This session will be devoted to further planning and preparations essential for GSETT-3 and responding to requests from the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Group on Verification for specific tasks of a technical and scientific nature.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I apologise for taking the floor at this late hour, so I will omit my congratulatory words to you and pass immediately to business. I listened with great interest to the statement made by Dr. Dahlman on the progress of GSE. He gave very concrete figures on the detection capability of the seismic network which the GSE is now developing, and I know that some of these technical questions are to be dealt with in the verification Working Group of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I wish to take advantage of the presence of Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the GSE, to give some expert advice. He gave very concrete figures on the detection capability of the seismic stations, but all these figures are on the assumption that the explosion takes place in a fully contained and coupled explosion in hard rock, and what I would like to know is if there is any formula with which we can translate this into finding out the detection capability of the same network if the explosion takes place under water. We would like to know if such an automatic formula exists and if not, we would like to know how easy or difficult it is to evaluate the detection capability of your seismic network for underground explosions. As we are discussing non-seismic verification technologies and the decision-making week is approaching, it is very important to hear the views of a seismologist on this evaluation and, should you find it difficult to reply at present, we would be glad if you could brief us during one of the verification working groups this week.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Japan for the points made by him and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and I now give the floor to Dr. Dahlman to answer the queries put to him.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The figures I quoted in my introduction of the progress report are taken from the report prepared by the Group of Scientific Experts. There have been discussions on detection capabilities in the Group of Scientific Experts, but at this moment we do not have any particular consensus on the formulas to be used to transfer this capability defined in hard rock into other materials. I think various delegations may have somewhat different views, and I would be happy to discuss this issue with you but not as the Chairman of the Expert Group.

Mr. ZAHHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic):

... The final document reaffirmed the Non-Aligned Movement's belief that general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains an ultimate objective to be achieved and that a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced approach to the question of international security should be adopted. The Conference also once again emphasized the utmost priority which the Non-Aligned Movement accords to nuclear disarmament and to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference also urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate as a matter of priority an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Conference also stressed the need to set a target date for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and for the commencement of negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned Ministerial Conference urged the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority. The Ministerial Conference also urged nuclear-weapon States to suspend all test explosions pending the conclusion of that treaty. That part of the document relates to the work of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Concerning negative security assurances, which has a Committee within the Conference on Disarmament, the Non-Aligned Ministerial Meeting called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on the provisions of an international legally binding treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a final alternative the Conference also indicated that the adoption of a resolution within the Security Council providing for effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, through a ban on the use or threat of use of

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

such nuclear weapons, could positively contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although that did not constitute an alternative to an international treaty or convention in this respect.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I intend to present Pakistan's policy views today on the subject of the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as on the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Both of these fall squarely in the domain of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and because that is the context in which we see them, I wish to refer briefly, in the first instance, to the initiatives and proposals that Pakistan has made over the years towards the objective of nuclear disarmament in general, and towards nuclear non-proliferation in our own region in particular. These proposals, to which we remain totally committed, include the following.

First, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which was mooted as early as 1972, and which has been endorsed repeatedly by the United Nations General Assembly since 1974. Second, a joint declaration between Pakistan and India renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, proposed in 1978. Third, an agreement with India on a system of bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis, proposed in 1979. Fourth, simultaneous acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards by Pakistan and India on all nuclear facilities, proposed in 1979. Fifth, Pakistan's readiness to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty simultaneously with India, proposed in 1979. Sixth, the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, proposed in 1987. Seventh, the convening of a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of regional and other interested States, proposed in 1987. Eighth, and finally, the holding of five-nation consultations to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, proposed in 1991.

... I will now turn to the CTBT. My delegation has been following with great interest the ongoing debate on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as well as the consultations being conducted by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, on the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

(continued)

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Pakistan has always supported United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We consider a universal and non-discriminatory CTBT as an important step towards halting the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby an important measure towards complete nuclear disarmament. A CTBT which does not achieve both of the two objectives would fail to halt the nuclear arms race.

Although we welcome the fact that after several years of concerted efforts, we have finally started negotiations on a CTBT, we are disappointed by the provisos put forward by some delegations for their continued participation in the negotiations.

To our surprise, exceptions have been requested for continued nuclear tests for safety purposes. Such demands would be unacceptable, as they would be against the very spirit of the treaty. Also they will leave the treaty open to exploitation and abuse. In our view, the best course would be to dismantle those nuclear weapons whose safety becomes doubtful, rather than testing them to verify their serviceability. Such a measure would indeed be a positive contribution to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Some delegations have linked their continued participation in the CTBT negotiations to the success of the NPT review and extension conference in early 1995. We feel that such linkages and conditions serve no purpose, and could only be detrimental to the negotiating process. The nuclear disarmament obligations of nuclear-weapons States are enshrined in numerous international documents, including the Final Document of SSOD-I, the threshold test-ban Treaty, as well as the NPT. These obligations need to be reaffirmed and pursued in good faith.

We agree that the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions contribute towards nuclear proliferation. However, this issue has no relationship with the question of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We feel that nothing in the treaty should preclude the transfer and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Countries like Pakistan, which have scarce natural resources, will continue to rely on the development of nuclear technology for their energy needs.

There have been proposals in support of defining a nuclear test and the environment in which tests should be banned. We feel that such an approach will make the treaty vulnerable to abuse in the future. A broad definition, such as a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for all times, would be most appropriate.

As regards the issue of whether "preparations" for a nuclear test should be banned under the treaty or not, we feel that this issue needs further consideration. Our preliminary assessment is that it will complicate the verification regime. Also, it may lead to allegations and counter-allegations, which could unnecessarily create friction and tension among countries. The CTBT is meant to ban nuclear testing. Adequate

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

penalties in the treaty for violations should be sufficient to preclude complicated and possibly divisive provisions relating to preparations for testing.

As regards the verification regime, we are of the view that it should be cost-effective. As already proposed, a separate organization, co-located with IAEA in Vienna, would be preferable. The cost should be shared according to the United Nations scale of assessment.

It goes without saying that seismic monitoring should form the core of the verification regime, complemented by agreed non-seismic monitoring measures, as necessary.

The verification regime should be such that it promotes confidence among all States parties. It should not only be able to detect a rudimentary test by a newcomer, but also disguised nuclear tests like decoupled nuclear explosions.

In our view, all States parties to the treaty should be required to declare their nuclear test sites. States parties should also undertake to close their nuclear testing sites, and destroy testing equipment under their jurisdiction and control.

We agree with the contention that it is outside the purview of a CTBT to ban nuclear weapons. However, as one objective of the treaty is to curb vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would not be out of place to draw an inventory of all nuclear weapons held by the nuclear-weapon countries. This will ensure that no new nuclear weapons are introduced after the entry into force of the treaty. This measure is important in the light of the fact that it would be possible to develop new weapons, ostensibly through computer simulations, even after the entry into force of a CTBT.

The proposal that high-yield chemical explosions should be declared deserves further consideration. In our view, countries like Pakistan will find it difficult to provide advance notification of their high-yield chemical explosions due to the lack of a mechanism to monitor such activities.

On the question of entry into force, we feel that, at a minimum, all nuclear-weapon countries, and all those having nuclear research or power plants, should accede to the treaty before it comes into force.

It is in this context that I would like to briefly touch on the important issue of the expansion of the CD. In our view, a CTBT would not be truly universal in character if certain countries, most of whom have applied for the membership of the Conference, are kept out of the negotiating process. We also fear that the enforcement of a CTBT may become hostage to the expansion issue, given that some countries have linked the entry into force of the treaty to ratification by all members of an expanded CD. In our view, therefore, the expansion issue cannot be put off for long, as it may have

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

serious ramifications. We hope that Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia, in his capacity as Friend of the Chair, would be able to resolve the issue soon, to the satisfaction of all concerned parties.

Having outlined Pakistan's standpoint on a CTBT, I would now like to turn to the question of the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

Mr. BOUCAOURIS (Greece):

... New challenges are facing the Conference which has lived up to its tasks and reputation on chemical weapons. The main focus is now on nuclear weapons. At first sight a threefold problem (extension of the existing non-proliferation Treaty, conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and negative security assurances), it is in fact a multifaceted one and, as such, extremely complicated.

Still, the whole problem can be summed up in very simple terms: sadly, no watertight measures providing security guarantees from such weapons can be conceived or implemented. Indeed, contrary to the past, production or acquisition of fissionable material has become substantially easier over the years, worryingly at all possible levels.

This said, there is still much hope for one or more international legally binding regulations, whereby some minimum guarantees are supposed to be provided. In such a system the key issue is compliance of the signatories with provisions they have agreed to be bound by, which presupposes an efficient verification scheme, consisting of both routine and challenge inspections, which in turn means possible impingement on State sovereignty and acceptance thereof.

(Mr. Boucaouris, Greece)

If this matter is settled, the degree of security that can be obtained through an international convention varies with the degree of compromise reached on the verification-compliance issue. This, of course, is not the only problem. Cost-related issues are important, such as the cost of inspection methods, particularly as regards implementation of a CTBT. So are problems about the cost of keeping a long, permanent roster of inspectors. The Swedish idea of entrusting IAEA with the work is interesting and, to a certain extent, cost-effective. The main problem is that those determined to tamper with the rules on inspection will do so, whether the inspectors are national or international. All the more reason, then, to explore further the Swedish proposal.

Mr. PINOARGOTE (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me through you to congratulate the distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, since the intelligent and sustained efforts that they have made, particularly as regards negotiations on the CTB, are giving rise to serious expectations and strong hopes concerning an international community that will be able to avoid the horrendous possibility of new nuclear attacks against mankind. The Government of the Republic of Ecuador, particularly encouraged by this situation, has reactivated its request for membership of the Conference on Disarmament, as a reliable and positive demonstration of concrete support for these endeavours.

The Government of my country is particularly interested in participating in the Conference for the following reasons: the negotiation next year of the extension of the NPT and the positions adopted by certain potentially nuclear States; the environmental need to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing, particularly in the Pacific, so as to avoid pollution of fisheries and other marine resources; the limitation of conventional weapons and the investment of resources in development, particularly given the post-cold-war trend towards low-intensity, low-technology conflicts in so-called third world countries; and avoiding the strong possibility of armed conflicts arising from unresolved border problems in the various regions, fuelled by easily available weapons from former socialist countries.

(Mr. Berquño, Chile)

... The proposition that national security does not exist in isolation and cannot be invoked to undermine the security of others is one that leads us to take a stand concerning the detonation of a nuclear device which breaches the moratorium and impedes the efforts that this Conference on Disarmament is making to bring about the final cessation of all nuclear tests. The living conscience of peoples rejects the attempt made in these tests to legitimize nuclear weapons, and still more to conceive of them as instruments of force or the threat of force in terms that are incompatible with General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). For that reason I must associate myself with the statements that the distinguished Ambassador Marín Bosch and other representatives made deploring the decision of the People's Republic of China.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): My delegation is much satisfied with the progress already achieved in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This has undoubtedly been possible due to the energetic, but careful manner in which the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Marin Bosch, has conducted the work of the Committee and to the dynamism of the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. We are thankful to them all. We very much favour Ambassador Marin Bosch's decision to produce a rolling text before the conclusion of this part of the CD's session.

We are approaching a phase of important definitions and we would like to contribute to the debate with some observations related to verification. First of all I would like to make two considerations, which we believe merit special attention. The first one is that the CTBT cannot be perceived as an isolated instrument, but one which will join existing ones, and hopefully be joined by future ones, such as a "cut-off" agreement, in a broad legal framework which incorporates all understandings related to disarmament, non-proliferation and international security in its more ample terms. This recommends that in the process of elaborating the CTBT and its verification arrangements we do not dissociate ourselves from existing instruments and verification mechanisms. That is why we favour a close relationship with IAEA.

The second comment is that the CTBT is a political instrument wherein the essential values lie in the commitment of States parties. Verification is important inasmuch as it strengthens the confidence generated by the regime. It must be clear, however, that we are not engaged in the elaboration of an instrument where verification becomes an end in itself. Furthermore the existing technical, political and financial constraints do not allow for a foolproof verification system. We must not, therefore, act as if we were pursuing one. We face a situation where the old proverb "the perfect is the enemy of the good" cannot be more suitably applied.

We have opted for a verification approach that essentially relies on experience acquired in the past through the reciprocal monitoring undertaken by a few countries, particularly the declared nuclear-weapon States. This approach is based on the ability to detect and identify several physical phenomena which are directly, and sometimes exclusively, associated with a nuclear explosion. Besides its inherent merits, at that time there were no clear options to detect activities in areas of high sensitivity, which generated continuous suspicion. Besides the experience already gained in the past, this approach has the benefit of being essentially non-intrusive. We must not, however, allow it to make us lose sight of two important elements. First of all, that a nuclear explosion requires a minimum amount of highly fissionable material, which is not readily available and which, to a large extent, is already accounted for through existing verification mechanisms. With the eventual conclusion of a "cut-off" agreement, this element can be of even greater relevance to the verification of a CTBT. Second, it does not

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

take into due account the fact that a nuclear explosion, and even more so one from which we intend to derive maximum technical information, requires a carefully chosen and prepared site. The system we are projecting is to have, in theory, a homogenous detection capability, whereas we know, even without taking into account relevant political and strategic considerations, that certain specific locations are more suitable as potential test sites. We can of course mitigate this concern through the appropriate use of on-site inspections or of transparency procedures. We are not advocating a revision of the work on verification we have done so far, but having a broader look on this important question and hopefully helping direct some of our future considerations.

We have dedicated most of our efforts in the negotiating process of the CTBT to the establishment of the verification regime of the treaty. We have adopted the basic premise that the international system should be based on two pillars: a continuous monitoring system and on-site challenge inspections. The Group of Scientific Experts has considered the question of seismic monitoring for well over 15 years. We've had a thorough, though by no means exhaustive discussion of the possible techniques to be utilized in the monitoring system. We have already decided to incorporate the seismic technique as the basic monitoring technique. We had an introductory discussion of the question of on-site inspections. In short, we have done a lot of work. There remain several crucial points to be decided, but we already have the basic requirements to start drafting and to tackle some of the pending issues which call for political negotiations.

The first point that we must now address relates to the development of the monitoring network. We believe that a process of natural selection of the techniques required for the non-seismic monitoring system has taken place, as made evident by the comparative attention given to each one. It indicates that we should start drafting the provisions for the utilization of a radionuclide network and should give a detailed technical consideration, examining the technical requirements of each station, as well as their number and geographical distribution. The further work of the GSE will help in our assessment of the possible need for hydroacoustic stations to supplement the detection capacity of the seismic network. Other techniques are not to be ignored, and further work can be carried out, but they are not to be seen as essential or sine qua non conditions for the future regime.

A point which my delegation believes requires additional technical consideration relates to on-site inspections. We have given a closer look to challenge inspections, though my delegation is still unclear about several points. We believe we have to examine in more detail the question of differing degrees (and costs) of challenge inspections. We also believe that sporadic technical audit missions might have to be undertaken by the technical secretariat to assure the reliability of the monitoring stations. They could also be envisaged in relation to the utilization of national stations providing information to the system. We would need further examination of this issue. Many political decisions to be made, such as the procedure for triggering a challenge inspection, depend on an adequate assessment of these questions.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

Another matter which has to be examined more closely relates to the utilization of existing technical means relevant to the verification of a CTBT, including those available on a national and on a multilateral basis. We believe this possibility should be fully explored. We must be aware, however, that the utilization of technical data provided through national technical means poses the question of their technical and political reliability. This is a delicate question which will require further consideration. We must not however part from the concept that the verification regime must rely on unbiased and independent data. Several procedures of a technical and political nature can be envisaged to contribute to the increased reliability of such information, among which I would cite its more transparent use, the possibility that it be examined by an intergovernmental body of the future organization prior to any executive action being undertaken, and the possible opening of stations to occasional multilateral audits.

The use of data obtained from outside sources, national or multilateral, also raises the question of the degree to which the technical secretariat of the future organization should process and analyse information. Much has already been said on this matter. We believe that positions are not really that far apart. We accept that the technical secretariat should not have a political decision-making role. That applies to assessment of information and of compliance. On the other hand, it should have full technical capacity to process and analyse the raw input information received and to condense it into a compact readable form. This applies to information obtained from the seismic and other monitoring systems of the organization. The secretariat also has to be able to analyse technical information received from national technical means. The information to be routinely provided to member States should consist of this compact understandable form. Obviously interested member States can have any and all information made available to the secretariat through its network.

In order to be able to perform these tasks we envisage the need for the intergovernmental deliberative organs of the organization to provide the technical secretariat with long-term political directives or criteria related to the assessment of data received. This is important to avoid overemphasizing conjunctural political criteria.

We are exceedingly concerned with the cost of the verification regime and favour a compact organization with close technical ties with IAEA. We believe we already have enough information to be able to consider the question of the relationship of the future CTBT organization with IAEA. We know IAEA does not have the technical means to carry out the verification package we are designing for the CTBT. But then, no other multilateral organization does. On the other hand, we believe that the future organization would have immediate gains from the utilization of IAEA infrastructure, both physical and human. We also believe there are important reciprocal benefits for the verification itself. This applies to cross-information beneficial to safeguards and to CTBT verification, on a mutually reinforcing mechanism. Furthermore, with the advent of a "cut-off" agreement the increased information would enhance even further the cumulative gains. We would not favour the establishment of an entirely new organization unrelated to IAEA.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

We understand that several actions and decisions related to the administration of the CTBT may require specific decision-making intergovernmental bodies, distinct from those of IAEA. We believe this could be solved along the lines of what has already been done in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has as its own organization OPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. OPANAL has a General Conference, open to all States parties, a Council, which undertakes the routine decision-making and supervises the verification system of the Treaty, and a small secretariat. The verification is done through IAEA. In the case of the CTBT the technical arrangements could be either the setting up of a specific unit dedicated to CTBT verification within IAEA or an agreement between both organizations specifying the procedures to be followed and the services and facilities to be rendered by IAEA. We tend to favour the first option, but we agree that final decision has to await further developments of the verification regime and a more precise definition of the scope.

(Mrs. Bjerke, Norway)

... A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing has been a priority disarmament issue for the Norwegian Government for many years. We are geographically close to the nuclear testing grounds on Novaya Zemlya. Norwegian public opinion remains concerned about the environmental impact of nuclear testing. A comprehensive test ban will reduce the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of national and international security policy, thus reducing an incentive for proliferation. Moreover, such a treaty constitutes a reasonable quid pro quo on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in return for a firm commitment to a strong non-proliferation regime of unlimited duration. A nuclear testing ban is also an additional insurance against further nuclear degradation of the environment.

We are pleased that the unilateral moratoria on testing remain in force for the majority of the nuclear-weapon States. The recent nuclear-test explosion in China is highly regrettable. It has been met, rightly, with strong and negative reactions from the international community. We once again urge China to refrain from further testing and to join the other nuclear-weapon States in a moratorium.

The nuclear-weapon States bear the main responsibility for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are encouraged by the vigorous start of the negotiations and remain committed to make our contribution to the establishment of a workable and verifiable nuclear-test-ban regime. In our view, there is now a solid basis for starting work on a complete treaty text, both in terms of scope of the treaty, legal and institutional elements and the essential parts of the verification regime. There now exists a unique opportunity to achieve a CTBT which must be exploited while the political momentum is there. Negotiations should therefore be speeded up in parallel with the preparations for the NPT review conference. This would facilitate the preparatory work and contribute substantially to the outcome of the 1995 conference.

An international seismic monitoring system should form a central part of a CTBT verification regime. In order to be effective, a global system like this must have sufficient flexibility to accommodate data from any other supplementary monitoring systems that may be part of the overall verification system. In this way, the cost of establishing and operating the verification system can be kept down, without sacrificing quality or efficiency. The international verification system should be internationally funded, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of costs. International funding would avoid placing unreasonable economic burdens on countries whose participation is essential in order to provide adequate global coverage. It would facilitate the establishment of new seismic stations at appropriate locations.

(Mrs. Bjerke, Norway)

Furthermore, it would ensure that all stations and communication links could be operated to the required standards. The international data centre would be in an excellent position to negotiate favourable rates for communication links, and would be able to support a technical staff to provide cost-effective assistance to individual countries, thereby enhancing the quality and reliability of the station network.

Maximum use should be made of existing facilities, such as seismic stations and facilities for radioactivity sampling. In this way the monitoring system will benefit from investments already made and from technical capabilities that have already been established in various countries.

Norway has several of the most advanced seismic array stations in the world. The third global seismic test - the GSETT-3 experiment - will help to identify the stations in various parts of the world that are most suitable for an international monitoring system, as well as revealing where modernization and additions may be necessary. Norway will be an active participant in this important event.

(Mr. Ho, Republic of Korea)

... It is my Government's firm belief that the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the process of nuclear disarmament, and to the enhancement of international peace and security. This treaty should be of a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable nature. In this regard, my Government reaffirms its fullest support for the early

(Mr. Ho, Republic of Korea)

conclusion of the ongoing negotiation on the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). At the same time, my delegation extends its deep appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its two subsidiary working groups for their unswerving efforts to make substantive progress in the negotiation of the CTBT. It is widely believed that the early conclusion of the CTBT would provide positive momentum for the successful extension of the NPT next year. With this in mind, I would like to make some preliminary comments on the major issues relating to the CTBT negotiations.

My delegation is of the view that the draft structural outline of the CTBT, tabled by the Australian delegation in CD/1235, seems to provide an appropriate and well-balanced basis for the development of structured negotiations on the CTBT.

The CTBT should play a constructive role in further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in a non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable manner. My delegation holds the view that the treaty should define its scope in simple, straightforward and general terms. In this sense, the wording tabled by the Swedish delegation in its draft treaty (CD/1232) seems to be appropriate; that is, any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion should be prohibited irrespective of the purpose. However, the treaty should not contain any ambiguous wording that could be interpreted as restricting research and scientific activities for peaceful purposes.

The verification system under the CTBT should be sufficiently reliable, effectively verifiable and cost-effective. Indeed, the verification system constitutes a key component of the CTBT regime. The CTBT verification system should be based upon an evolutionary approach. The verification system should be complemented by a package of seismic and non-seismic technologies. It is widely believed that seismic verification will form the core of the CTBT regime, and that a number of other non-seismic techniques will be needed to complement seismic verification. In addition, it should include on-site inspection activities in an effort to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness to the maximum.

In order to secure the effectiveness of the CTBT regime, my delegation considers it should attract the universal adherence of all States. It is our desire that all States with nuclear weapons, and all those States with the capability to develop nuclear explosive devices, accede to the CTBT regime. This will ensure its universality. However, we should prevent possibilities of the entry into force of the CTBT becoming hostage to a few States.

For the purpose of securing universal, non-discriminatory and effective compliance, a series of strict sanction measures should be devised within the framework of the United Nations. In this connection, I would like to reiterate my Government's concern about the recent nuclear tests made by the People's Republic of China. My Government attaches great importance to all nuclear States observing a moratorium on nuclear testing while negotiations for conclusion of the CTBT are in process.

(Mr. Eksteen, South Africa)

... Let me now turn to matters of direct concern to this Conference. South Africa fully supports the work of the Conference on Disarmament. As a valuable arena we regard it as the principal multilateral negotiating forum for the generation of disarmament initiatives. We therefore hope to see its work expanded in future. As an observer, South Africa is greatly encouraged by the energy and enthusiasm with which negotiations towards a nuclear-test-ban treaty are proceeding. We pledge our continued cooperation in the work of the verification experts. We also fully support the efforts of Ambassador Shannon in his consultations to find an appropriate way of beginning negotiations for a possible instrument prohibiting the production of fissionable materials. We hope that, in the not too distant future, both the CTBT and the cut-off treaty will be seen as milestones on the road to complete nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Kubis, Slovakia)

... The years 1994 and 1995 are of fundamental importance for global disarmament efforts. We find ourselves at the threshold of a new era. We must not miss the chance. My country strongly supports the earliest conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. It would be a significant contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and at the same time it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal. Having this in mind we believe that the treaty should ban all nuclear explosions without any exclusion. The ban should be comprehensive and universal. It should prohibit all nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for ever.

Let me use this floor to voice an appeal that all nuclear-weapon States join the moratorium on nuclear tests and contribute in this way to speedy and successful progress in our common endeavours.

The Slovak Republic understands that there will be no confidence in the test-ban treaty without it being supported by a reliable verification system. The verification system should be global, non-discriminatory and efficient. It must provide sufficient guarantees of compliance with the treaty and if necessary be able to detect, locate and identify any violator. My country supports the endeavours undertaken by the Group of Seismic Experts, which has accumulated knowledge and experience in the field of possible verification systems for nuclear testing. Results from two global monitoring tests concluded by various seismic stations around the world have to be learned carefully and implemented into an appropriate scheme for the future verification regime. We support the idea of a global compliance monitoring network based on the three-environments verification package complemented by findings of national technical means. We consider complementing of the said network by on-site inspections indispensable. We see a role for an international organization, either independent or under the aegis of IAEA, to collect, process and distribute the acquired data, at the same time favouring a reasonably small, efficient and highly cost-effective verification mechanism.

My country supports a pragmatic and evolutionary verification system which should remain open for inclusion of new methods at later stages. We should also bear in mind that the necessity to create an utmost effective verification system should not become a reason for delaying the conclusion of the treaty.

Entry-into-force procedure of the CTBT should not be complicated and causing delays. The treaty should enter into force as soon as possible, i.e. after being ratified by a reasonable and representative number of countries, including all nuclear-weapon States.

As I already stated, speedy progress in the negotiations and success in concluding the CTBT would be a positive signal facilitating a significant extension of the expiring NPT. We consider the extension of the NPT (for an

(Mr. Kubis, Slovakia)

indefinite period of time) an act of utmost importance and a precondition of creating a curb for nuclear proliferation and accelerating further progress on the road toward complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 review and extension conference will be vital to ensuring that the declared nuclear Powers take steps to fulfil article VI of the NPT.

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... The mandate should also leave the option open for the eventual outcome of negotiations to become part of, or be attached to, the NPT rather than constitute a separate treaty; hence promote universal adherence to a more balanced, more comprehensive, non-proliferation Treaty.

In my previous statement at the plenary, I addressed various aspects of negotiations on the CTBT. Many of those issues have now been discussed in detail preparing the basis for a rolling text which the Chairman, Ambassador Marín Bosch, is about to present.

One important issue that we must focus upon and find an agreement relates to the scope of the treaty. It is essential that non-explosive explosions or so-called laboratory tests be included in the scope in order to close the door on these possible options that may remain open for advanced nuclear States. The predominant legal opinion holds that the formulation included, in this context, in the PTBT does not cover the above-mentioned tests. An explicit and direct reference, therefore, is necessary within the text of the CTBT.

We also emphasize, once again, that the existing nuclear test sites must be included in the scope. We are pleased to note that a large number of members have underlined the significance of this issue. My delegation has presented a working paper in this regard which shall be followed by further details at an appropriate time in the negotiations.

A critical decision is also needed on the approach for verification. There is general concurrence that the CTBT should be concluded at the earliest possible time for reasons that are clear for all of us. The discussions on possible complementary methods of verification have been useful as they have been both illustrative and highly informative. What we can conclude from these discussions is that the only way to arrive at an early conclusion of the CTBT is to establish the verification mechanism on the basis of the existing seismic verification technique and on-site inspection including monitoring of the nuclear test sites.

The non-seismic complementary techniques, on the other hand, may not become operational for years to come. Even the radionuclide technique, which is generally perceived as a possible feasible verification mechanism, requires at least three years, on the basis of conclusion of discussions held by Dr. Marshall, Friend of the Chair on non-seismic methods, to be operationalized.

In the working paper that my delegation forwarded on this issue, we also explained that non-seismic techniques relate to testing in other environments generally included in the PTBT. As no violation of PTBT has been registered, so far, it is both prudent and safe, at this stage, to limit ourselves to a

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

general agreement on modalities of non-seismic techniques with the understanding that an agreement on any of these techniques, in later stages, will lead to their inclusion as a complementary verification technique in the future.

As regards the structural and legal issues we should certainly avoid a complicated bureaucracy. Therefore an executive council is not at all necessary and decisions may be made by the conference of the States parties or the committee of the whole as Japan has proposed.

For the entry into force of the Treaty the numbers are not so important as the categories of States are. All nuclear-weapons States as well as threshold States must join for the EIF to be realized. At the same time, we cannot overlook the possibility that the fate of the treaty may become hostage to a refusal by one or a few countries to join. We cannot allow the possibility of a veto. This matter may only be resolved through the provision of incentives within the treaty for States to join through, inter alia, facilitating technical and scientific cooperation in peaceful areas and disincentives in the form of punitive measures for those who opt to remain outside the treaty.

On the issue of withdrawal we need to have clear provisions for any measures and consequences that might follow. The experience of the NPT and other treaties have proven that countries receive drastically different treatments in such circumstances. Israel, for instance, which has stayed outside the NPT and pursued the development of nuclear weapons contrary to the basic objectives of the NPT, has received favourable treatment consistently and has been extensively assisted. North Korea, on the other hand, is under close scrutiny and tremendous international pressure because of its withdrawal from the NPT. What is intended here, of course, is to stress the prevalence of extreme selectivity without prejudice to our principled positions on each of these two issues.

The CTBT must, therefore, lay out clear procedures to ensure an even-handed, non-selective approach in cases of withdrawal. The same disincentives and punitive measures envisaged for States who remain outside the treaty should also apply to States who withdraw. A special provision is required none the less for nuclear-weapons States and other nuclear advanced countries. As punitive measures cannot be a real disincentive for them, withdrawal of these States or their remaining outside the treaty will be tantamount to the nullification of the treaty as a whole and should be disallowed.

My delegation shall continue to participate actively in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee with the view and hope that the treaty would be finalized before the 1995 NPT conference.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The time is getting late so I do not intend to make another lengthy statement. I neither intend nor would permit myself to abuse this solemn forum by criticizing any other countries but I cannot but make a brief statement here. I would like to inform the plenary CD of the following matters.

On 10 June 1994, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China made a brief statement on the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear tests. On instructions from my Government I requested you, Mr. President, to have that statement circulated as an official document of the CD. The document has now been circulated as CD/1263-CD/NTB/WP.121. Please allow me, Mr. President, to express my thanks for your cooperation. Now please allow me to read out the brief statement by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry for the record in the plenary.

"China has consistently favoured the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and, within this context, the introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Proceeding from this fundamental

(Mr. Hou, China)

position, it has always exercised great restraint in conducting nuclear tests and the number of nuclear tests it has conducted is extremely limited.

"China fully respects and understands the position and concern of the many non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of nuclear testing. At this moment it is participating in negotiations on a complete nuclear-test-ban treaty, and it supports the idea that the negotiations should result in a treaty no later than 1996. The treaty should be a step towards the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We call on other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We are ready to continue our unremitting efforts alongside the international community for the early realization of this ultimate goal."

The PRESIDENT: Before we conclude our business for the day, I would just like to make a few concluding remarks because this is the last occasion on which India will be occupying the presidency in the plenary in the CD during this period. I would just like to mention that my work as President has been smooth thanks to the large measure of excellent work done by my predecessors. It has indeed been an honour to preside over this Conference, as disarmament is an issue to which my country attaches the highest importance and because this body comprises such a wealth of talent and expertise on matters related to disarmament. The second part of the session of this Conference will be coming to an end on 1 July; much work has been done in this session, especially in the working groups, in the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB where a large number of working papers have been submitted on various issues. Good progress has also been made under the dynamic leadership of the chairmen of the working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski; their Friends of the Chair have done excellent work; Ambassador Marin Bosch, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, is continuing his consultations on his rolling text and we support him in all his endeavours. Purposeful discussions have also taken place in the

(The President)

ad hoc committees on transparency in armaments, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Chairmen of these ad hoc committees also deserve full credit for performing their tasks with their customary distinction. During my presidency I have had the occasion to consult the Special Coordinators on "cut-off" and on the review of the agenda, as well as the Friends of the Chair on the expansion of membership of the CD. Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on "cut-off", has already met the groups. I learned that Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, the Special Coordinator on the agenda, is continuing his consultations and plans to hold his first meeting shortly. Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil has also been active and is consulting delegations on the important issue of expansion. My best wishes go to the special coordinators and Friends of the Chair on expansion of membership of the Conference for successful completion of their tasks. I would like to convey my gratitude to the Group Coordinators and to the delegation of China for the constant support and advice they have given me. I would also like to particularly thank the Secretary-General and Mr. Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and his colleagues for the excellent and efficient manner in which they have helped us in our tasks. I would also like to wish Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia all success in his task which he will be taking up next week and I assure him of my fullest cooperation in his work as President and in his work even when he will not be President.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 684th and last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament during the second part of our annual session.

... The end of the cold war has not completely removed the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and a resulting reduction of the threat of nuclear war should not be perceived as diminishing the need for nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, we can draw on many positive developments that have taken place in the crucial areas of limiting armaments. The quantitative growth of nuclear weapons will hopefully be soon arrested. The total number of nuclear warheads

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(The President)

has declined. The successful conclusion of START II between the United States of America and the Russian Federation has significantly reduced the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. The declared moratorium of nuclear tests has continued to be observed by the majority of the nuclear-weapons States. The Convention for the elimination of chemical weapons will proscribe the military use of these instruments of mass murder.

... Within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, serious negotiations are taking place on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) under the leadership of our distinguished colleague Ambassador Marín Bosch, assisted by two other esteemed colleagues, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. For many, if not all, of us the importance of a CTBT, which should represent an effective instrument against the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and a major step toward nuclear disarmament - not to mention an urgent measure to protect the environment - cannot be overstated. What is now called for is a demonstration of political will to complement the seriousness of the technical negotiations, in order to ensure the conclusion of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, multilaterally and effectively verifiable - and hopefully universal - CTBT, within the time-frame that will make it a truly credible component of a balanced nuclear non-proliferation

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(The President)

package. In this regard, it is perhaps about time for the negotiating process to produce a text that would allow governments to have an overall view and enable them to form a political judgement on the matters involved.

Negative security assurances (NSA) is another issue before the Conference that needs our urgent and more serious attention, particularly since it is bound to also have some influence on both the CTBT negotiations and the NPT review and extension conference. In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the heads of State and government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally binding convention governing the issue, as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta in 1992. This position has recently been reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo when they stated that "security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed the position of the Jakarta summit on the matter, and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention in this regard." Hence, fervent hopes have been placed by the vast majority of the international community in the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA, under the chairmanship of our honourable colleague Ambassador Baron Guillaume, to explore all necessary ways and means of advancing the work and focusing the negotiations on its original mandate.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands):

... In this year's CD session the limelight is on the negotiation of a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Deservedly so, because after a smooth start in January last the negotiations have proceeded seriously and fruitfully, under the leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, and a substantial amount of tangible progress has been registered.

Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, dealing with verification under the dynamic chairmanship of my German colleague and friend, Wolfgang Hoffmann, has taken the heavy bull by the horns and tackled head-on the complicated issues of monitoring and verification of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. The well-established experience of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) has been used to deepen knowledge on seismic monitoring techniques. Preparations for fully-fledged and realistic testing of seismic systems, through the GSETT-3 exercise, are well under way. It will give us considerable insight, necessary before the future seismic system will actually begin its task of the monitoring and verifying of a treaty.

The meetings of experts on non-seismic monitoring techniques under the eminent guidance of the British Friend of the Chair, Dr. Peter Marshall, were highly successful and prepared the ground for making decisions on the inclusion of such techniques in a verification protocol.

The Netherlands favours a simple combination of techniques of proven capability and synergy to assure reasonable compliance with the treaty as well as to deter and to detect possible violations. The capability of the future system should be properly offset against the need for scrupulous cost-effectiveness. That is why my Government subscribes to the personal

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

conclusions of Dr. Marshall that the future monitoring and verification system should include three non-seismic techniques, that is, monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere and of the presence of noble gases, hydroacoustics and a limited infrasound network. The latter might possibly be combined with a system, also rather limited in size, of detecting electro-magnetic pulses. Thus, the non-seismic network would, in the Netherlands analysis, have at its disposal a sufficient detection and localization capability.

Although no consensus yet exists, more clarity has certainly been obtained with regard to the subjects which should become part of a future treaty.

Working Group 2 on legal and institutional matters, under the gentle and efficient stewardship of Ambassador Dembinski, has developed such momentum that it has started drafting articles for the future treaty. Most of those articles transcend abstract legal and institutional provisions. They are of major relevance for ensuring the effectiveness of a treaty of truly global dimensions. Articles on the scope, on the entry into force and on the organization of a CTBT have yet to be agreed upon but, in the Netherlands' view, we are making substantial progress.

As to the scope of the CTBT, the Netherlands favours a prohibition of all nuclear tests, nuclear-weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, in all environments and for all time.

The issue of entry into force is of direct relevance to the universality of the CTBT and its value as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. To achieve that goal the future CTBT should be adhered to by the nuclear-weapons States and all States with relevant nuclear capabilities, especially the nuclear threshold States. On the other hand, the pertinent formula should not be too rigid and hold entry into force hostage to non-adherence by one particular State or a group of States. The treaty should help in creating the conviction that the security interests of all States - be they nuclear, nuclear threshold, nuclear-capable or non-nuclear - are best served by adhering to the CTBT.

The monitoring and verification regime of an effective organization of the CTBT is essential to ensure compliance with a future treaty. That organization cannot do without smooth and efficient collection and distribution of data received by and from the international monitoring system. Expeditious decision-making on whether to impose sanctions is indispensable to ensure that the main prohibition of the treaty can be enforced in a credible manner. Forgoing such snap decision-making would in the final analysis be of benefit to no one.

We are entering a challenging phase in the negotiations. Although additional work of a more technical nature is needed on some aspects of verification, all the careful and thorough preparations have now to be translated expeditiously into a treaty text. Consultations have to be continued on areas where no consensus exists.

(Mr. Waagenmakers, Netherlands)

The year 1994 seems to be the year of the questionnaire. I submit that the CD should produce composite treaty texts rather than questionnaires. But seriously, when resumed in late July the negotiations will benefit greatly from the product of our work in the form of a composite text. I congratulate Ambassador Marin Bosch on his achievements in this regard.

The significance of a CTBT as an important contribution to ongoing non-proliferation efforts would only be enhanced if the Conference on Disarmament could succeed in negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As all delegations now apparently agree that the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum for conducting these negotiations, it is about time to have an ad hoc committee established with an appropriate mandate to get negotiations started. The Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, is to be commended for his efforts.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

It is a widely held view that the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) should be aimed at nuclear disarmament and eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and it should also be a starting-point to serve this aim.

Many countries now demand that CTBT should not be like some disarmament arrangements made in the cold war era which are unequal and discriminatory. The negotiations for the treaty should proceed not with the outdated method practised during the confrontation period, but with a new, active approach in conformity with the changed international situation.

My delegation hopes that the independent demands of many non-nuclear-weapon States will be taken into full consideration in the drafting of the treaty and the treaty be adopted at an earlier date.

My delegation considers that the work of technical cooperation for peaceful nuclear activities and monitoring of the treaty will have to be separated from each other. Past experience shows that if the technical organization concurrently undertakes monitoring work, its technical cooperation work is subjected to restriction and double standards and partiality grow within the organization.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

... My delegation deems it urgent to expand the membership of the CD in view of the universality of CTBT and the requirement of the changed situation. Since there exist no special rules and precedents in qualifying and selecting membership of the CD, it will have a negative effect on the negotiation character of the CD if the qualification issue of membership is affected by bilateral relations.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria):

... In its previous configurations and in its present form, the Conference on Disarmament has been the most pre-eminent forum for global disarmament negotiations. With the end of the cold war, the Conference should be able to fulfil its role as a universal multilateral negotiating forum on all disarmament matters. Our optimism about a more functional and effective CD is based on the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our success in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention should be repeated, in earnest, on such priority issues as the nuclear test ban, fissile material cut-off and negative security assurances. No less important is the drawn out issue of the expansion of the Conference. Indeed, the acceptability of our

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(Mr. Fasehun, Nigeria)

decisions on these important issues is dependent on how reflective the membership of the CD is of post-cold war changes. The CD should be expanded in time, before the conclusion of the CTBT negotiation.

Nigeria has long been an ardent supporter of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Our advocacy of a total ban on nuclear-weapons testing began immediately after our independence. Our position, shared with the majority of States, was ignored. Hundreds of tests later and selective proliferation thereafter, the international community has begun to address seriously the issue of a nuclear test ban in all environments. We note the progress made in the broad discussion on all aspects of a comprehensive test ban. But there is still a long way to go. We ask that the negotiation be accelerated to enable the early conclusion of the treaty, preferably this year.

Disarmament agreements are outcomes of complicated negotiations between States parties to such agreements. What undergirds an agreement and speeds conclusion is political will. Absent a political will, there will not be agreement. Further, there is no definitively "good agreement". The "goodness" of an agreement cannot be determined by the contents of the agreement alone. Other factors such as confidence-building measures undertaken by the parties to the agreement, cognate issues that impinge on the agreement, and the balance of obligations and responsibilities, particularly of major military Powers, are important in concluding whether a disarmament agreement is good or not and whether it is a genuine non-proliferation and/or disarmament agreement. The CTBT must meet all these criteria to be considered a good agreement. Its strength cannot be determined solely by how comprehensive and sophisticated its verification system is.

As its title implies, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion anywhere, any time and in any environment. The prohibition should be for all times and places without exception. To ensure transparency and to nurture confidence, all existing nuclear test sites should be declared, verified and closed.

Nigeria supports a verification system that can detect, identify and locate the source of any nuclear explosion. Such a system should also be cost-effective. We anticipate that a global seismic monitoring system will be the backbone of the verification system. Non-seismic techniques, such as radionuclide monitoring and hydroacoustics, that have proved their effectiveness should be deployed to complement global seismic monitoring. We see no need, at present, to deploy all available techniques of verification. However, there should be provision in the treaty to ensure that the verification system keeps pace with technological developments. The treaty should also contain provisions for on-site inspections. On-site inspection is important to dispel suspicion of violation and as a way to enhance confidence in the treaty.

As to organization, Nigeria's preference is for IAEA to be the agency to monitor the implementation of the CTBT. However, we are flexible and stand ready to consider a separate CTBT organization. Such an organization should

(Mr. Fasehun, Nigeria)

be slim, with few bureaucratic and technocratic overlays, but yet efficient enough to collate, analyse and exchange data on verification. The body should be accountable to the conference of States Parties.

With regard to entry into force, the CTBT should aim at universal adherence; yet the treaty should not be held hostage by any State. Consequently, we support the view that the treaty should enter into force once a reasonable and representative group of States have deposited instruments of ratification.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

... First, after long years of deadlock, the Conference on Disarmament has finally engaged in a negotiating process which should result in a comprehensive test-ban treaty, thus halting definitively all nuclear tests, in all environments, for all times. We are hopeful that such a treaty will indeed prevent horizontal proliferation and the emergence of any new nuclear-weapon States, and cap any further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should not, however, be a reason for complacency. Experience has shown that testing is not the only indispensable road that leads to a nuclear capability. It is therefore a must that a CTBT be rapidly and effectively complemented by other long-overdue nuclear disarmament measures.

Mr. HOLUM (United States of America):

... The Conference on Disarmament has accomplished a great deal in recent years, and much since its opening in January. In one sense, our progress in the CD is more than any of us had a right to expect - a testament to the abilities of this body. But in another sense our recent efforts are not enough. The United States is more committed than ever to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible time. None of us can rest - none can be satisfied by our noteworthy progress to date - until the world's nations have agreed once and for all to stop testing nuclear weapons. So I am here neither to criticize the CD nor praise it unconditionally, but rather to exhort it.

Last January I was privileged to report to you President Clinton's commitment to achievement of a comprehensive test ban "at the earliest possible time". Six months later, he has asked me to return here to tell you that those instructions to our delegation remain fully in effect and that "earliest possible time" means just what it says. It most assuredly is not diplomatic code for "a relaxed pace". It does not mean take all the time allowed by United States law. It means take only the time necessary, negotiating diligently and in good faith, to write a sound treaty.

President Clinton's commitment to the test ban is authenticated by another decision, our continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite China's tests, President Clinton has extended our moratorium for a third year, through September of 1995.

I ask you to consider carefully what that means. The President's decision to extend the testing moratorium balanced the potential value of additional tests against restraint by others, against the impact on our non-proliferation goals, and against progress in the test-ban negotiations here. In practical effect, this means that, where the United States is concerned, the central and profound policy decision that many seek has already been made. If things here and elsewhere go as we hope, the testing moratorium the United States adopted in 1992 will last forever. This practical reality is underscored by the President's definitive declaration to the United Nations General Assembly last September, when he said, "In the face of disturbing signs, I renew my call on the nuclear States to abide by that moratorium as we

(Mr. Holum, United States)

negotiate to stop nuclear testing for all time". Simply put, we are prepared for the conclusion that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear test, that we will never test again.

As we contemplate that reality, these negotiations - and other developments, including preparations for the NPT Conference next year - should be given even greater energy and purpose. The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an end to all nuclear explosions, period. No thresholds. No exceptions. And by that I mean not just all explosions, but all States. Success demands in particular the full support and participation of all five nuclear-weapon States. And we seek universal adherence.

Of course, the United States and the other nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility in this negotiation, and of course we also have special experience and knowledge that can aid it considerably. So we will continue to work closely with the other nuclear-weapon States to propel this effort toward fruition.

I wish to commend Ambassador Marín Bosch, Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, as he accelerates the Committee's work. The United States supports his efforts to develop a complete text from contributions developed in the working groups on verification and on legal and institutional issues under the leadership, respectively, of Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. Nevertheless, much time has passed and much work remains to be done. We need a document that will both focus and energize our work. And we look to the Committee Chairman for his leadership to bring this about.

Now, when I last spoke to you, I said the United States would be out front pulling in these negotiations, rather than in the back dragging its heels. We plan to persist in, and indeed, to intensify, our efforts to fulfill the President's instructions. So I urge the Conference to make use of all the time possibly available to it, even outside the normal term of the CD, to move these negotiations forward. The United States delegation is prepared to work continuously in the NTB Committee and its working groups in the period after 7 September and prior to the opening of the 1995 session so as to make all possible progress this year and prior to the start of the NPT Extension Conference in April 1995.

A kind of linkage has grown in the minds of some between the NPT Extension Conference and progress in other areas. All parts of the international arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament architecture are, of course, interrelated. But it is a disservice to major regimes or initiatives to posit any kind of rigid "quid-pro-quo" relationship between them. The NPT should be extended because of its own intense merits to world peace. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is an opportunity whose time has arrived. We should seize it not because it goes well with NPT, but because it deserves to be done.

(Mr. Holum, United States)

... President John Kennedy was fond of saying that from those to whom much has been given, much is expected. The CD's remarkable success with the CWC and its notable progress on the CTBT prove it is a body of great ability. And so the world expects much of it, of you.

... We have now had five decades of nuclear testing and are in the fifth decade of calls to stop it. By any fair description, the world's pursuit of a CTBT has been a long-distance race. Such races are not won by limping across the finish line, or even by being satisfied with moderate progress. They are won with concluding surges of energy and commitment. We are in the final stages of our race. The finish line is within our view. We must pick up the pace. We must agree to cease nuclear explosive testing without exceptions, without artificial linkages, without delay - to conclude a CTBT before the chance of our lifetimes has passed.

CD/PV.686

10

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, accept the warm congratulations of my delegation for the manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference. Indonesia and Mexico have worked closely in many fields, including that of nuclear disarmament, a subject we shall address today. But first, permit me to extend a cordial welcome to our colleague from the Netherlands and to wish all the best to Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Benhima. The presence of Foreign Minister Amre Moussa is testimony to the importance his Government attaches to this forum in particular and to disarmament in general. We also listened with interest to the remarks by Mr. John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly, very particularly to his appeal to proceed towards the achievement of a CTBT.

... Our long struggle for nuclear disarmament, which includes the chapter on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose full implementation is happily about to be attained, is known to all. We consider the chairmanship of the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee as a recognition of our efforts in this field. So far this year the Committee has made important progress but we feel we could and should work more quickly, especially with a view to the drawing up of a rolling text, which would undoubtedly facilitate the negotiation of a CTBT. That, in turn, would contribute to the success of the 1995 Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... To conclude, we should like to insist that, when examining the contents of its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament consider also the problem of nuclear non-proliferation, as well as the broader question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in all its aspects. We made this suggestion a few years ago and we reiterate it now. The discussion of those subjects could serve us as a compass to chart a future course. It has been but a short while - with the intensification of the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (whose instrument of ratification my Government is about to deposit) and now with the CTBT negotiations - since the Conference on Disarmament forsook the indolent charm that characterized it for many years - I repeat, for many years. We are now in a situation to play to the full the role for which the Conference was created.

CD/PV.687

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The PRESIDENT:

... The Conference on Disarmament is entering the final stages of negotiations in which all its subsidiary bodies are now preparing the report to be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for approval, to be subsequently presented to the upcoming General Assembly of the United Nations. It is indeed gratifying to note that, apart from preparing the technical part of the report, the Ad hoc Committee on NTB chaired by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Marín Bosch, continues its intensive negotiations on substantive issues in which both the chairmen of Working Group 1, on verification, and of Working Group 2, on legal/institutional issues, Ambassadors Hoffman and Dembinski, have respectively managed to produce material which can be further developed to form expeditiously a rolling-text for a CTBT, hopefully during the envisaged intersessional period.

CD/PV.688

3

(The President)

... On nuclear issues, where nuclear deterrence has largely become an obsolete and irrelevant doctrine, new avenues need to be explored and the related agenda items revitalized. Nuclear disarmament should really now be the aim of our work and we must not spare any effort to make this goal realizable within a reasonable period of time. For the moment, however, early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is a first priority for all of us in the Conference. Progress has been encouraging in this regard, yet we should not lose sight of the fact that much work still lies ahead. I urge all delegations to cooperate for early preparation of a rolling text.

Mr. LOGAN (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament at an important moment in its history. We are coming to the end of a particularly useful session in which we have done some ground-breaking work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are also looking ahead to a crucial Conference next year on the future of the non-proliferation Treaty. I would like to focus on both of these, and, in particular, to outline our thinking on options for NPT extension.

Before turning to these issues, however, I wish to say a few words about the CD itself. First, my Government believes that the strength of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum would be substantially enhanced by the expansion of its membership. In particular, to continue to exclude from membership countries whose ratification of a CTBT will, in our view, be vital cannot but handicap our efforts. I strongly hope that the present impasse on this issue can be overcome so that all interested countries are fully engaged in the Conference's work. We continue to believe that all those countries that have applied so far should be admitted as members as soon as possible.

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(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have, rightly, been the focus of the CD's work this year. We have made important progress. I am glad to say that we are now on the verge of securing a goal that has thwarted the international community for over 30 years.

At the outset of our deliberations on a CTBT some observers expected a treaty to be completed within a few weeks. That was always unrealistic. Despite the hard work which so many members of the CD have put in, it long ago became clear that negotiation of a good treaty is not a simple matter and will demand considerable effort from all parties. I would like to emphasize the importance of concluding a good treaty. By good, I mean a robust and durable treaty that will have the widest possible adherence and will be effectively verifiable. This is essential if it is to make a meaningful contribution to our non-proliferation goals. We must make sure that we get the treaty right, even if it takes longer than we might like to do so. After all, we are looking to negotiate a treaty of unlimited duration from which withdrawal cannot be lightly undertaken.

I should emphasize that we have no interest in prolonging the negotiations unnecessarily. But equally, it would be mistaken to impose artificial deadlines for completing the negotiations if that would lead to an unsatisfactory treaty. We would be delighted if a satisfactory treaty could be agreed before the NPT extension and review conference is held in the spring of next year. But even if it were not, we are confident that the momentum now exists to carry these negotiations to a successful conclusion in due course. Artificial deadlines will not help that process. On the other hand, we have also made clear that our commitment to work constructively for a CTBT reflects our assumption that the NPT will remain in force as well.

Although we are now nearing the end of this year's formal negotiating session, and I know you have a busy autumn in front of you, both here and in New York, I hope it will be possible to make full use of all available time for inter-sessional work. This would leave us well placed to resume negotiations during the next session. The United Kingdom delegation will continue to play an active and constructive role. In particular, I am glad that we have been able to make available the expertise and experience of Dr. Peter Marshall as a Friend of the Chairman of the verification Working Group.

(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

... Our conclusions, therefore, are as follows: first, that we must sustain the excellent progress which has been made towards finally negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty; secondly, that we must overcome the artificial obstacles that have been put in the way of beginning negotiations for a cut-off convention; thirdly, that we must continue to address the issue of security assurances, while not forgetting that important security assurances have already been given to all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT; and lastly, that the NPT must be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. The United Kingdom is working hard to secure all these objectives, and will continue to do so.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

... The need for a global approach highlights the urgency of reviewing the composition of the Conference on Disarmament. We regret the present deadlock which is undermining the credibility of the whole Conference. The Conference was last enlarged in 1978, an aeon ago as far as world politics is concerned. Yet the doors remain closed. Ultimately what is at stake is the role of arms control in today's world. We expect the present CD members to make every effort to include the proposed 23 countries as members soon, well before the end of the test-ban talks.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

... Rapid conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a goal which Finland has long supported, would make a contribution to the success of the NPT 1995 Conference. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee under the able leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch could come up with a comprehensive draft text still within this year's session. Such a rolling text would provide a good basis for continuing the drafting work intensively during the inter-sessional period.

Let me in this context reiterate our view that the test-ban treaty should be truly comprehensive: no nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, ever, anywhere. The treaty should contain an international verification system from the very beginning that would deter possible violators.

In our view, a functional interrelationship exists between verification of the test-ban treaty and the activities of IAEA. It should be duly reflected in setting up a CTBT organization.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French):

... I would like to begin by paying Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, a well-deserved tribute for the role that he is playing in order to make headway in our work. We also pay tribute to the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann and Ambassador Dembinski, as well as all the delegations that, either through direct contributions or through the assistance of their experts, have enabled the Ad Hoc Committee to embark resolutely on the task of drawing up a treaty.

Having said this, it must be noted candidly that the progress made, although significant, has not yet enabled us to settle certain fundamental points which might prove stumbling-blocks for the finalization of the treaty.

(continued)

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

Moreover, we have noted demands that seem to us to affect the very spirit of the agreement secured on 10 August 1993, when the Conference decided to negotiate a comprehensive and universal, internationally and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty. By way of example, exceptions authorizing certain types of nuclear test would run the risk of opening the door to abuse of the treaty, which would then be devoid of meaning. Several delegations have indicated that to present as peaceful objectives being pursued through a nuclear test was a contradiction in terms. In the same line of thinking, we believe that the procedure we should adopt with regard to existing nuclear weapons is not that tests should be conducted from time to time to ensure that they are "safe" or reliable but that they should be purely and simply dismantled, in accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of States and repeated declarations in favour of disarmament.

We are nevertheless happy to note that the Conference has recovered a climate of cooperation and calm which it should never abandon. Discussions that have been going on since the beginning of the session are taking place in conditions which offer substantial grounds for hope. Now that the two working groups are basing their discussions on written documents, I would like to address certain elements of the future treaty. First of all, we think that nothing should be able to be interpreted as restricting or regulating the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. This necessity is a condition for the universality of the treaty. Second, the treatment of questions dealing with the monitoring system has shown how much this depended on close and multifaceted cooperation among the States parties (for instance, the installation and link-up of the various monitoring networks, the setting up of inspection teams, the exchange of information, etc.). This raises the question of the differentiated capabilities of States in their participation in the monitoring systems and the benefit they will draw from it. Certain delegations have already expressed the willingness of their countries to provide technical and financial assistance to underpin this cooperation. We think we must begin to make this readiness tangible, in particular so as to reduce the time-lags needed to set up integrated monitoring networks, which some experts estimate will take years.

Third, a proposal has been made to define the bans on tests in the light of the environments in which they might take place. Such a choice would be likely to lead to numerous violations of the treaty. Certain States have a regrettable propensity to interpret international instruments in the light of narrow national interests. We think that a generic definition, such as a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments and for all time, seems desirable.

Fourth, participation in verification activities should have a non-discriminatory character, give equal rights and identical obligations to all States and ensure the application of the provisions of the treaty on equal terms.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

Fifth, concerning entry into force, we think that at least all the nuclear-weapon States and all the countries with research programmes in the nuclear field or nuclear plants should accede to the treaty. However, we should try and find a mechanism that would prevent entry into force from being dependent on the particular will of one State or group of States.

Sixth, no State or group of States should have a permanent seat in any of the structures of the organization that will be set up under the treaty, or hold a right of veto. In particular, the membership of the executive council should be based on principles of rotation and geographical balance. This formula would not prevent a given region from designating the same State or States to represent it in the executive council, whenever it wished.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

... In the post-cold-war environment the role of arms control and disarmament in cooperative security is one of increasing importance and enhanced potential. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures have been, and remain, central elements of international and regional efforts towards global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides the cornerstone for such efforts, has delivered benefits not just to international security in general, but specifically in terms of trade and other cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Australian Government believes that the fundamental underpinning of cooperative security and peaceful cooperation in nuclear matters provided by the NPT makes its indefinite extension in 1995 imperative. I would note that the recent meeting of the South Pacific Forum expressed the desire of its member countries to see the NPT extended indefinitely. The Forum also called for the early conclusion of the CTBT.

The Conference on Disarmament has been addressing these complementary arrangements - a comprehensive test ban, security assurances, and the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. I would like to address each of these as well as other items on our agenda.

This body has been talking about a CTBT and to some extent preparing technically for NTB negotiations for years. And work on a possible arrangement has been undertaken intermittently for decades before this. The verification technologies under consideration are known and proven, though cost-effective international networks have to be developed. Against this background the importance of seizing the opportunity afforded by the consensus to ban testing and the restraint in testing by most nuclear-weapon States is obvious to us. Our efforts will be a litmus test of the CD's capability to respond to post-cold-war opportunities.

The CD is the world's disarmament negotiating body, but to speak plainly, this body does not have a long record of achievement. The CWC is its major product and that 20-year negotiation only produced results in the wake of the cold war and the hot war in the Gulf. Surely it is not necessary to have an international upheaval in order to imbue this body with the sense of urgency

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(Mr. Starr, Australia)

needed to achieve results. That should flow from the unambiguous call by the international community for a priority effort, and such a call was made on CTBT at the last General Assembly.

My delegation sets no deadlines; we recognize that it is one thing to talk about negotiations and another to undertake them. The organizational task of processing a range of views and information into text is formidable. But these last few weeks have shown the value of addressing our task with an added sense of urgency. Delegations generally accept the need to produce a comprehensive and relatively coherent, though bracketed text, which does justice to the substantial products of our negotiations so far. If we are to achieve this and continue to get results beyond September we must retain that sense of urgency which is not driven by artificial deadlines, but by the sense of this body meeting the expectations of world opinion and seizing this historic opportunity.

Without this, there is a risk of losing the plot, of sadly drifting into years of protracted haggling. Let me be clear. We are not advocating a hasty, and thus possibly superficial approach to the negotiations. We are not proposing that States abandon basic national interests. But we are urging strongly that in the common interest States work actively and urgently to fit these around an agreement on a test-ban treaty that is tolerable to all the negotiating parties.

CD/PV.689

2

Mr. BARTOLO (Malta):

... The expectations are high for the international community to conclude a speedy and comprehensive test-ban treaty. The steady momentum which has been maintained throughout this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament represents a clear indication that its deliberations and negotiations could result in such a test-ban treaty. A number of delegations have expressed their views on this matter and a number of key issues have already been discussed. However we understand that more time is needed to consider the converging views. As was done during the negotiations that led towards the chemical weapons Convention, we feel that the time has come for a first draft of a rolling text as a basis for the future work of the Conference on Disarmament which undoubtedly would facilitate the work of delegations in the months to come. Nuclear-weapon States have more responsibility and are better suited to conduct negotiations that would lead to a CTBT.

Nuclear weapons have proliferated over the decades and we should keep in mind that the impact and size of such weapons remain a threat to the security of other States be these nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States. A CTBT should

(Mr. Bartolo, Malta)

ban all nuclear test explosions and such a ban should leave no loopholes and be universal. The task ahead for the Conference on Disarmament is critical and we have to respond to the expectations of the international community.

The actions of certain States have demonstrated that they possess the potential, capability and inclination towards producing nuclear weapons. This poses a major concern for all States in all regions. The prospects of a CTBT that would reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime therefore should encourage those States deeply involved to intensify the negotiations and reach compromise solutions that would ensure the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and that such Treaty is internationally verifiable.

(Mr. Peterle, Slovenia)

... We believe that a successful movement towards the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the conclusion of the agreement on negative security assurances by all nuclear super-Powers would have a significant influence on the general attitude of States concerning the extension of the validity of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Mr. KUKAN (Slovakia):

... The comprehensive test-ban treaty belongs without any doubt to the most significant issues discussed in the framework of this Conference. The present favourable political situation offers a great opportunity not only to reduce the existing nuclear potential, but to undertake all the necessary measures to curb its further development as well. It would be an unjustifiable mistake to miss this great chance. Being aware of the urgency of the problem and exceptionality of this moment, the Slovak Republic supports the early conclusion of an efficient treaty. We are interested in reaching such a treaty which would ban all nuclear explosions without any exception and forever. Simultaneously, we would wish this treaty to enter into force as early as possible. Moreover, it would be appropriate to provide for the indefinite validity of the treaty.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... We shall, at the same time, examine the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. While negotiations seem to evolve steadily towards a

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

treaty, it is important that the pace be maintained so that the CTBT will be concluded by the time of the NPT review.

Mr. YANAGISAWA (Japan):

... I feel honoured to address the Conference - which the Japanese Foreign Ministers, Mr. Shintaro Abe and Dr. Taro Nakayama, addressed in 1984 and 1991, respectively - at this time, when the Conference is engaged in such an intensive and important discussion of disarmament issues in the post-cold war era, in particular a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), a task of the most historic significance. It gives me very great pleasure to convey to the Conference the best wishes for success in its endeavours of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, both of whom stressed to me the importance of stressing to the Conference the disarmament policy of the Government of Japan and the interest in and desire for disarmament of the Japanese people.

(Mr. Yanagisawa, Japan)

... We must strive to attain non-proliferation. We should, also, in no way relax our efforts for nuclear disarmament, given the fact that there still exist nuclear weapons enough to destroy all the world and human civilization. Japan, which desires to see the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, welcomes the START agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation and hopes that they will be implemented soon. In addition, Japan welcomes especially the fact that negotiations on a CTBT are being intensively conducted in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan considers extremely valuable the moratoria on nuclear testing announced by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, and the de facto suspension of nuclear testing by the United Kingdom, which together created a favourable environment for the commencement of the CTBT negotiations, and greatly hopes that China will follow suit. This year, remarkable progress has been made on the CTBT negotiations, under the very effective guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and a rolling text, which will be the basis for subsequent negotiations, has been worked out. These developments deserve to be evaluated very highly. The Committee has decided to continue negotiations after the formal conclusion of the 1994 CD session, and Japan hopes that further, and accelerated, progress will be made in those negotiations. Japan ardently desires to see agreement reached on the CTBT, and Ambassador Tanaka and members of his delegation have been instructed to make every possible effort to that end.

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(Mr. Yanagisawa, Japan)

Japan has participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), for example, sending Dr. Shigeji Suehiro, formerly the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency, Japan's leading authority in the field of seismology, to the GSE meetings from the outset, believing that Japan can make a valuable contribution in the field of verification of a CTBT, especially in seismology, an area extremely relevant to the implementation of the treaty. Japan annually receives about 30 trainees in seismic engineering from developing countries in the training course of the Japan International Cooperation Agency. I am happy to be able to say that some of the experts representing their countries in the GSE today are graduates of that course. Japan is determined to continue to provide various kinds of technical and human resources contributions in that area.

Japan considers it extremely desirable that a satisfactory CTBT be agreed before the NPT extension and review conference in the spring of next year, and ardently hopes that we will at least have made meaningful progress by that time.

Along with the CTBT, Japan attaches great importance to the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive purposes as a global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measure. The adoption of the "cut-off" resolution by consensus in last year's United Nations General Assembly, supported by all United Nations Members, including all the nuclear-weapon States, was indeed a very important event.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands):

... Eight years have passed since I left Geneva as deputy head of the Netherlands delegation to the Conference on Disarmament and headed for New York. In these years the international climate in which the Conference on Disarmament is functioning has profoundly changed. Since my return I noted a new mood, a new sense of purpose in a CD reinvigorated by a successful outcome of a long and highly complicated negotiating process to ban an entire category of weapons, chemical weapons. Since then the CD has set itself new tasks. I am impressed by the progress made in a relatively short time in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

... With the new international climate now prevailing, conditions have never been more propitious for making rapid progress also on the nuclear issues this Conference is working on. First and foremost in my mind are the strenuous efforts aimed at the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). These negotiations too, take place against a propitious background: four of the five recognized nuclear-weapon States observe declared or de facto moratoria on their underground nuclear testing. The Netherlands hopes sincerely that these moratoria can be maintained until they, so to say, "evaporate" at the moment a treaty enters into force that will ban nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time.

Under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has now entered into a true negotiating mode. My delegation is particularly pleased with the serious and hard work carried out in the two working groups on verification and legal and institutional issues. A rolling text with important elements for the future CTBT will be included in this year's report of the CD to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This is, as a working method, an essential step in the negotiating process. My delegation fully supports the idea of continuing our work during the period between the end of this session and the beginning of the 1995 session of the CD. The extensive groundwork done thus far will no doubt quickly result in more treaty text after further inter-sessional negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban later in the year.

Although optimistic, therefore, on the negotiating process, my delegation is of the opinion that the time has now come to thoroughly address a number of fundamental issues involved in negotiating a test ban. Not all provisions of the future treaty can be dealt with any more only on their own merits. Many of the provisions are clearly interrelated. Unless and until at least a considerable degree of consensus is reached on fundamental issues such as the scope of the ban, the organization and the functions and competences of its organs, entry into force and, last but not least, the size, structure and institutional/legal set-up of the international monitoring system, progress liable to be made on other parts of the treaty will turn out to be limited.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

... The Netherlands is of course fully aware that the Treaty is not without controversy. It clearly sees the concerns of those who maintain that over the years the NPT has emphasized the cause of horizontal non-proliferation to the detriment of attention to what is called vertical proliferation. We agree that the one cannot be seen in isolation from the other. But the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a worthy one in itself, and, as I indicated earlier, significant progress has been made in capping and reducing vertical proliferation. Much work, certainly, remains to be done in order to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the world's security architecture. This Conference is making its own contribution to this end by negotiating a CTBT. Hopefully before long a ban on the production of fissile material will follow. While horizontal proliferation remains a cause of concern and therefore of constant vigilance, the prevention, yes the redressing, of what has come to be known as vertical proliferation is on the right track. For the first time in the nuclear era, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation go hand in hand.

It is in this spirit that the Netherlands approaches the remaining preparatory stages of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, and for that matter, the conference itself.

Mr. JAGUARIBE (Brazil):

... We are arriving at the conclusion of our scheduled session, though we will still meet inter-sessionally in a hopefully productive period to continue to elaborate the future CTBT. We believe the overall balance of this year's work is positive in spite of shortcomings in the work of some committees and of our persistent inability to reach an agreement on the expansion of the membership of the CD, a fact that is doubly distressing to my delegation.

We have this favourable assessment because in its work on the CTBT, the CD has again made evident its ability to progress on relevant matters when there is political commitment. We have to maintain our momentum and to ensure that this commitment is not effaced when we enter the final stages of our negotiation.

I would like to briefly touch upon some of the main issues we have considered this year. The CTBT has been the object of previous interventions of my delegation in the plenary. I do not want to repeat our positions, but I would like to emphasize some points of a general nature which have increasingly attracted our attention.

The CTBT has to be an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty. This basic assumption has to permeate all levels of negotiation, from the basic undertaking to the verification regime. We have repeatedly emphasized that the CTBT is first and foremost a political instrument, wherein the essential value lies in the commitment of States parties. Verification is important, inasmuch as it strengthens the confidence generated by the regime. We are prepared to consider, as we have been doing throughout the negotiations, all proposals made for the verification regime, including those that determine a higher level of verification requirements than we consider necessary.

If we are to have a sophisticated verification regime, we must be assured that it can provide a solid basis for subsequent technical assessment of the nature of the events it detects. If no technical answers can be provided, then we are faced with essentially political decisions and the whole

(Mr. Jaguaribe, Brazil)

verification apparatus to be set in place serves little purpose. If technical answers can be provided, then the organization must have all the required expertise to carry out these functions, without detriment to the right of States parties to maintain their own national capacity. I am sure all delegations can perceive the difficulties that would be posed by the need to rely solely on countries that have an established capacity in this area for the technical assessment of events, due to the inability of the secretariat to provide it. I can here recall, perhaps slightly out of context, an observation that is generally made in relation to matters such as these: the socialization of costs and the privatization of benefits. In short, the question that comes to mind is the following: if events can be technically assessed by individual States parties, why does it seem difficult to have the secretariat have this capability?

We believe that the logical consequence of this is the need to have ample analytical capability in the secretariat. This does not mean that we want the secretariat to have a political decision-making role, which has to remain the exclusive domain of the States parties, through the appropriate deliberative bodies of the organization. This political decision, however, must be based on the fullest level of technical evaluation possible, and States parties should be able to rely on the secretariat for that.

We believe, as we have previously stated, that this will imply the need for agreed criteria, not exclusively of a technical nature, to be provided to the secretariat related to the assessment of data received. The technical criteria to be developed would consist, among other things, of a harmonization of the methods presently utilized to assess data and any refinements which a consolidated and integrated verification regime such as the one envisaged would allow. This process would have to be undertaken by a preparatory committee, but we envisage its continuity under the supervision of the Executive Council. The criteria of a non-technical nature would have to be non-discriminatory and based on technical assumptions. They would be set by the intergovernmental bodies of the organization, to help the secretariat in sorting the data obtained.

These measures could be adopted without hindrance to the right of any interested State party to proceed to its own evaluation and to submit results and proposals derived therefrom to the intergovernmental bodies of the organization.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... I shall now introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and I will do so in English - which tells you the language of the original draft.

(continued in English)

It is an honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is contained in document CD/1273. This report was adopted by the Committee on 24 August 1994. As you may recall, the mandate of the Committee directs it to "negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to hold a general exchange of views on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Ad Hoc Committee and its two working groups have worked on establishing the elements and elaborating draft language on the legal and institutional aspects as well as the verification regime of the treaty. The Committee decided to include the results of its ongoing negotiations on the draft treaty in the rolling text which is contained in the appendix to the technical part of the report.

Part 1 of the appendix represents the elaboration of provisions of the treaty which command a certain degree of consensus. Part 2 of the appendix contains provisions which need more extensive negotiation. Part 3 comprises a list of documents containing proposals of delegations. The Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that the appendix to the report as well as the documents listed in the report and other relevant documents be used for further negotiations and drafting of the treaty. It further recommends that work continue on the treaty during the period 28 November to 16 December and possibly longer. Lastly, the Committee recommends that it be re-established at the outset of the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament with its present mandate.

I should also note that this Ad Hoc Committee report covers the period up to 24 August. As work has continued since then, it will be updated in a

(Mr. Marín Bosch,

revised report to be submitted to the Committee on Monday, 5 September for its consideration and adoption. It will then be introduced to the plenary on 6 September.

Allow me to conclude by offering my sincere appreciation to the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann of Germany and Dembinski of Poland, as well as for the work of the Friends of the Chair. Allow me finally to thank the secretariat and, in particular, the Committee Secretary, Ms. Mackby.

CD/PV.690

34

Mr. CHANDRA (India):

... I take the floor today primarily to express our views on the future of CTBT. I had occasion to speak on this subject on 2 June 1994, but since then there has been further evolution in our thinking and I would like to make the following comments on some aspects of the proposed CTBT.

The CTBT should be comprehensive: extending to all environments and envisaging no threshold. It should aim for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States for all times. There should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances. We have closely examined the various views expressed on "preparations" to be included in the scope of the treaty. While inclusion of imminent "preparations" is laudable, defining the term is difficult, its verification would also be costly. Accordingly, we feel that "preparations" need not be directly referred to in the article dealing with basic obligations. We favour special monitoring arrangements for established nuclear-weapon test sites and eventually some transparency norms could be negotiated.

I would like to thank all the Friends of the Chair in the Working Group on Verification for their valuable contributions. In particular, Dr. Peter Marshall of the United Kingdom deserves special thanks for his dedication and excellent papers produced by his teams. The options given in the working papers on verification techniques would help us considerably in taking decisions in this regard.

As for the entire CTBT, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory and should guarantee equal access to all States. Accordingly, we do not favour the idea that countries that have accepted full-scope safeguards as part of their obligations under the NPT need not accept all aspects of a CTBT verification regime. At present, we believe that a cost-effective combination of seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasonic monitoring techniques would be adequate to verify a CTBT in the lower atmosphere, under water and underground. A nuclear-test explosion in outer space would require the use of EMP sensors, optical flash and

(Mr. Chandra, India)

fluorescent sensors and satellite monitoring. Inclusion of these techniques in a verification regime is, however, questionable as it would provide only marginal utility in terms of assurance while enhancing the cost manifold.

Of the four verification techniques, an international seismic monitoring network is considered by us as the most critical. Besides a seismic station offered for participation in GSETT-3, India also has few radionuclide monitoring stations which may be upgraded. For CTBT verification, radionuclide monitoring would extend to cover short-lived isotopes in particulate form and noble gases - krypton and xenon. We do not share the view expressed by some that radionuclide monitoring be on-line because of the financial implications. Co-location of seismic stations with infrasound arrays should also be considered as a cost-effective measure. This would enable infrasonic data to be provided on-line. Regarding hydroacoustic monitoring, we had suggested a reduction in the number of moored stations by careful examination and by establishing some coastal seismic stations.

The secretariat and the IDC should have the capability to both detect and discriminate between events. Many States do not have the capability to analyse large volumes of data. In our view, for practical purposes, the daily IDC bulletins should be prefaced by an analytical summary. Any anomalous event should be brought to the attention of the Executive Council immediately. Of course, all States would enjoy access to IDC data to derive their own analysis and interpretation. In all cases, the IDC should play an analytical role and not be limited merely to data collection and dissemination.

On-site inspections would be the most intrusive element of the verification regime. This would be a necessary part of the verification regime for deterrence purposes as well. We visualize routine visits only for authentication purposes and an on-site inspection to be a rare event. On-site inspection would have to be approved by the Executive Council after due consideration and in an appropriate time framework, in which provision should be made for obligatory consultation and clarification to clarify the ambiguity.

I would like to thank Mr. Jaguaribe of Brazil, the Friend of the Chair on organization, for his paper WP.154. We have kept our options open on the organization till further negotiations are completed on the various verification techniques. We believe that the structure of an international organization would consist of a conference of States parties, an executive council and a technical secretariat (including the IDC). It is also felt that a scientific advisory group may be constituted to provide independent and relevant inputs to the Executive Council. This would be relevant when the Executive Council is required to take a decision on sensitive issues like for instance review of technological developments.

On entry into force, we would like particularly to thank Ambassador Vattani, the Friend of the Chair, for providing six options. Different views have been expressed for EIF, from a limited requirement of ratification by the five declared nuclear-weapon States to the expanded

(Mr. Chandra, India)

membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Our view has been that while the former is too limited, the latter would unnecessarily delay the EIF of a CTBT. Certain other countries which are key to the success of a universal and non-discriminatory CTBT must be included at the outset. We therefore believe that EIF should be based on ratification by a reasonable and representative group of countries.

The duration of the treaty should in our view be unlimited. Given the possibility of technological developments, it would be necessary to have provisions for a periodic review conference. As in the other international treaties, the decision-making and substantive issues in the Executive Council or the conference of States parties should be on the basis of a two-thirds majority, present and voting.

In regard to the "Preamble" section, we feel that a clear linkage to nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons should be established. Since we are not a signatory to the NPT, any reference to the same would not be acceptable to us. In a larger context, we believe that the norm of non-proliferation and disarmament should be strengthened by a non-use agreement.

We look forward to a work programme for the inter-sessional period closely linked to textual progress in the rolling text with the aim of concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, I have the honour to submit to the Conference the revised report by the Committee which is to be found in document CD/1273/Rev.1. As you will recall, last Thursday I had the honour to introduce the Ad Hoc Committee's report and now I am presenting its first revised edition which, as the President has just said, contains the changes made in the negotiations held between 24 August and yesterday, when the Committee approved the document in question. May I say that the alterations by comparison with last week's report are very few and are basically to be found under the following headings: status of the protocols, page 27; preamble, pages 30 and 31; various parts of the section on

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

verification, that is, pages 62 through 69, and, concerning footnotes, a series of changes agreed to in the past few days. I have the impression that this document could be approved by the Conference in the plenary we shall be holding tomorrow.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I will today report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts held from 8 to 19 August 1994 and introduce the Group's progress report contained in document CD/1270 and Corr.1. The Group's session was attended by experts and representatives from 33 countries.

The session was devoted to finalizing the planning of the Group's third Technical Test, which we refer to as GSETT-3. This test is a joint effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System. A report summarizing the overall concept of GSETT-3, its functions and components and matters of organization and cost was presented to the CD on 2 June 1994 as document CD/1254.

The main conclusion of the recent session is that the Ad Hoc Group, after reviewing the planning situation, decided to go ahead with GSETT-3 as planned and to start the full-scale testing by 1 January 1995. The Group recognizes that not all of the seismological stations envisaged for participation will be ready to provide data by 1 January, but the Group nevertheless considers that the number of stations already committed, or expected to be committed during the remainder of 1994, will permit full-scale testing of the system by 1 January.

The Group's elaboration was based on draft GSETT-3 documentation containing operational manuals for the experimental International Data Centre and participating stations and plans for the evaluation of the results and experiences. These extensive documents, comprising more than 500 pages, were prepared by the three working groups earlier established by the Group. I would like to recognize the important work carried out by the working groups under the guidance of the three convenors: Mr. Mykkeltveit of Norway, responsible for planning, Mr. Muirhead of Australia, responsible for operations, and Mr. Massinon of France, responsible for evaluation. Status reports from the three working groups are annexed to the progress report.

The planning of GSETT-3 and the preparation of the draft documentation was greatly facilitated by an informal workshop on preparations for GSETT-3 convened in Alexandria, Virginia, United States of America from 25 to 29 April 1994 and attended by 28 participants from 12 countries.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Group agreed that the reviewed and amended operational manuals and other planning documents have to be revised by the working groups as the detailed planning is proceeding. A modern electronic information handling system has been implemented to provide all GSETT-3 participants with the most current information on-line.

The issue of the duration of the test has been raised several times also outside the Group of Scientific Experts. The Ad Hoc Group discussed the issue, but finds it difficult to give any precise indication of the duration of GSETT-3. The Group therefore reiterates its earlier view that for financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their participation for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment, which means for the whole of 1995.

The Group reviewed the current status of participation. Annex 1 to the progress report and the corrigendum lists those countries which so far have committed Alpha and Beta stations and Gamma data. Gamma data are supplementary seismic information provided by National Data Centres on a voluntary basis to be used in the evaluation of GSETT-3. Annex 1 also lists countries from which commitments are still lacking. As for the Alpha stations, which primarily are determining the detection capability of the system, 38 stations in 17 countries are currently committed out of the 59 stations in 35 countries specified for the Alpha network.

As for the Beta stations, the Group has received information from 30 countries on plans to contribute data from, in all, 93 Beta stations, out of which 76 stations in 22 countries have already been committed. The Beta stations are primarily used to improve the location of seismic events detected by the Alpha network and data are retrieved automatically by the experimental International Data Centre using electronic means when needed. The Group has recommended that at least 100 Beta stations be used in GSETT-3. While 93 planned Beta stations might look quite close to the anticipated 100, the geographical distribution of the Beta stations so far available is most uneven.

Even if participation has increased substantially the last few months - and the Group has good reasons to believe that further commitments are to be expected soon, there is still a strong need to ensure commitment from remaining Alpha stations and to obtain an adequate global coverage of Beta stations. Most of the stations needed are in fact in operation today and many are connected to international data exchange channels. What we are lacking is the formal consent to utilize data from those stations in GSETT-3. I have, on behalf of the Group, approached a number of countries to seek such formal approval and I urge your support in getting the necessary commitments.

In some other cases there is a need to establish new or upgrade existing stations or to establish and finance necessary communication links between a station and the experimental International Data Centre. The Group recognizes that a country whose participation is essential to GSETT-3 might need support in this respect, and the Group encourages other countries to assist by providing technical and financial support.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The experimental International Data Centre (EIDC), now being established in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, is a key facility for GSETT-3. The Group noted with great satisfaction the rapid progress in developing and conducting operations at the Experimental International Data Centre. To establish and operate the Experimental International Data Centre is a substantial undertaking, technically and financially. The IDC staff today amounts to 30 persons, a number that will increase to 45 by 1 January. International staffing of the Experimental International Data Centre is an important objective, and during the Group's session some 10 qualified international applicants were selected.

The Experimental International Data Centre is up and running and today receives data routinely from 12 Alpha and some 20 Beta stations. It receives more than one billion data units (bytes)/day, corresponding to about half a million pages per day, and locates on the average 20 seismic events each day. When the full-scale testing begins in January it is expected that the centre will receive 10 times more data and define and locate 10 times more seismic events. The flexible software at the Experimental International Data Centre also makes it possible to compute and provide a number of different parameters to facilitate the evaluation of the IDC products.

A thorough evaluation is an essential element of GSETT-3 and the Group has established a plan for an extensive evaluation process in which individual countries contribute through their National Data Centres. The evaluation will cover the functions and the technical systems at stations and at the Experimental International Data Centre and the procedures for exchanging, handling and analysing data. It will also include a careful review of the operational manuals in light of the practical experiences gained. The capability of the system to detect and locate seismic events and to provide further information on reported events will also be evaluated.

The Group discussed a proposal for cooperation with the scientific community and concluded that such cooperation is and will remain essential. The Group agreed to provide the data collected during GSETT-3 to the scientific community in a suitable manner and at a suitable time.

GSETT-3 has now left the planning stage and is gradually developing into a full-scale phase when an experimental global system is up and running. This test will not only involve a lot of technical facilities around the world, it will also involve hundreds of people in many countries who now will work hard and cooperate closely to make GSETT-3 a successful undertaking. We are now dependant on their skill and dedication and on the support they get from their countries and their authorities to conduct their important work.

The evaluation of GSETT-3 has started and is a continuous process. The Group expects that the first preliminary results from the full experimental system will be available soon after the full-scale phase has commenced. The Group therefore suggests that subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened from 20 February to 3 March 1995. The main task during that session will be to review, evaluate and report on initial results from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 692nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Mexico, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21; the representative of Canada, in his capacity as Special Coordinator on "cut-off"; the representative of the Netherlands, who will speak in his capacity as Coordinator of the Western Group on "cut-off"; the representative of Chile, who will also speak on behalf of a group of non-members; the representative of Poland, who will speak as Coordinator of the Eastern European Group; and the representative of Morocco. However, before giving the floor to those speakers, and in accordance with my announcement at the plenary meeting held yesterday, 6 September, I should like to put to the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, as contained in document CD/1273/Rev.1. May I take it that the Conference adopts this report? I see no comments.

It was so decided.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): Mr. President, as this is the first time I take the floor while you are presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, let me express to you the congratulations of my delegation for the skill and wisdom with which you have steered the work of the Conference during this last part of the session which is coming to an end today. Let me also express the satisfaction of my delegation to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico for the work which has been done under his wise chairmanship in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in order to advance the negotiations on a draft CTBT in full cooperation with the chairmen of the two working groups, namely Ambassador Dembinski of Poland and Ambassador Hoffman of Germany. My delegation hopes that negotiations on this treaty could be concluded in the course of the inter-sessional period or during the first part of the 1995 session of the CD, an event which will have a very positive impact on the work of the 1995 review and extension conference of the NPT.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, as this is my first speech at the plenary meetings under your presidency, first of all I would like to express my warm congratulations on your taking up the presidency. We are happy to see our friendly and distinguished representative of Iran taking the Chair. At the time when this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is at its end, I wish to congratulate you for the progress achieved under your presidency. This progress has been reflected in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly. It also includes a rolling text on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We would also like to congratulate all the delegations with respect to this and take this opportunity to express our thanks to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Bensmail, for contributions they have made.

Under the guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Baron Guillaume of Belgium, the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances has undertaken a significant amount of work and efforts, and some progress has been made. This has been reflected in our report. The Chinese delegation hopes that the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve a breakthrough, thereby making a contribution to the negotiations on a CTBT and the NPT conference.

... In June this year, during the negotiation of a CTBT in the Geneva Conference, China made suggestions on the draft articles concerning "security assurances for States parties".

The PRESIDENT:

... I should now like to take up the draft annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly and formalize the agreements reached at our last two informal meetings. In accordance with past practice, I shall proceed to its adoption section by section. As I noted before, the blank spaces will be filled in by the secretariat. In addition, the reports of the ad hoc committees, as well as the paragraph just agreed upon on "cut-off" - which are integral parts of the annual report - will, of course, be incorporated by the secretariat.

... Section III - "Substantive work of the Conference during its 1994 session". Any comments on paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 24? No comments. Part A - "Nuclear test ban". Here, the number of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be changed to CD/1273/Rev.1. Any comments on this part? No comments. Part B - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". With regard to paragraph 29, under "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", the text, as agreed earlier today, will be incorporated. Any comments on this part? No comments. Part C - "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Are there any comments here? I see no comments. Part D - "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In paragraph 32, last line, after the symbol number of the document, CD/1271, the words "as amended at the 691st plenary meeting" will be added, as agreed. Any other comments here? No comments. Part E - "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Here similarly, in paragraph 33, the words "as amended at the 691st plenary meeting" will be added after the symbol number of the document on the last line. Any comments? Part F - "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

(The President)

Any comments on this part? I recognize none. Part G - "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". Any comments? No comments. Part H - "Transparency in armaments". Here, the same formula as used in paragraphs 32 and 33 will apply in paragraph 36: after the symbol number on the last line, the words "as amended at the 691st plenary meeting" will be inserted. Any other comments? Part I - "Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures". Any comments here? No comments. Part J - "Consideration and adoption of the annual report of the Conference and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations". Here, in paragraph 39, the date of 7 September 1994 will be inserted. Any other comments? No comments. Section III is adopted.

We have now concluded our consideration of the draft annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. May I take it that the report as a whole can be adopted?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Would any delegation wish to make a statement at this stage? I see no request for the floor. This concludes our work for the 1994 session. Before adjourning, however, I would like to make some concluding remarks as President of the Conference.

We have concluded a long and arduous session. Thanks to the very thorough preparations undertaken by the first President of the Conference for this session, Ambassador Gérard Errera of France, we were able to make a successful and substantive start to our work and four ad hoc committees were immediately set up to concentrate on the four priority items on our agenda, that is, on a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, transparency in armaments and negative security assurances. We also appointed special coordinators to deal with the issues of the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as well as the review of the Conference's agenda. A Friend of the Chair was also appointed to continue consultations on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. We also pursued our efforts aimed at the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. My duties have been made less onerous thanks to the untiring efforts of my predecessors in this function, namely Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Chandra of India and Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia.

Under the able guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban worked intensively and produced a substantive report which contains an invaluable basis for the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am sure that the forthcoming inter-sessional negotiating period will bring about further progress along the road to the long-awaited goal of the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

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