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**DRAFTING COOPERATIVE SECURITY:  
CANADA AND THE CSCE, 1990-94**

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## SUMMARY

This paper examines Canada's contribution to the development of the conflict prevention and management capability of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 1990 and 1994. During this period, the CSCE evolved from being a series of meetings that served primarily as a forum for Western criticism of Eastern human rights practices to a full-fledged organization with a "hands-on" role in dampening potential and actual conflicts throughout Eurasia. Canada has been among the most ardent advocates of this evolution, viewing the CSCE's flexibility, wide-ranging agenda and broad membership as well-suited to address the problems facing Europe in the Cold War aftermath. Canada also saw the CSCE as an ideal vehicle for retaining a Canadian voice in European security deliberations. Beginning in early 1990, Canada fed into the CSCE a series of working papers that helped to shape the thinking of participating states regarding the CSCE's development. Canadian ideas found substantial echoes in the major CSCE documents of the period.

The themes guiding Canadian thinking were the need for the CSCE to: 1) become a vehicle for building "cooperative security" by paying attention to the whole range of inter-state relations, including military security, economic well-being, democratic development and respect for human rights; 2) develop an institutional framework, so that the CSCE could address pressing issues as they arose; and 3) establish mechanisms for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Canada made this last a priority within the CSCE and made several contributions at both the conceptual and operational level. These included, inter alia, efforts to ensure that the CSCE:

- retained its multidimensional focus and <sup>and</sup> its comprehensive membership;
- developed a broad menu of instruments for conflict prevention and resolution;
- strengthened "human dimension" commitments and linked their implementation to the CSCE's developing conflict prevention machinery;
- created a Conflict Prevention Centre with a dual mandate to support 1) the political prevention and management of conflict and 2) the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures;
- established long-term missions, which have proved to be one of the most successful aspects of the CSCE's conflict prevention work;
- created a framework for CSCE peacekeeping; and
- improved its political cooperation and institutional ties with other security organizations, such as the UN and NATO.

Canada was not the first or only state to put forward many of these ideas, but Canada frequently exercised an influence disproportionate to its size. Canada's skill lay in having thought enough about the CSCE and how Canada wanted it to develop such that when others were ready to move in a certain direction, Canada could insert a well-developed proposal for doing so.

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## ACRONYMS

CFE - (Treaty or negotiations on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe  
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States  
CSBM - confidence- and security-building measure  
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
CPC - Conflict Prevention Centre  
CSO - Committee of Senior Officials  
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EC - European Community  
ECE - UN Economic Commission for Europe  
EU - European Union  
FSC - Forum for Security Cooperation  
FUM - Follow-Up Meeting  
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
HCNM - High Commissioner on National Minorities  
IMF - International Monetary Fund  
MBFR - (negotiations on) Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions  
NACC - North Atlantic Cooperation Council  
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NNA - neutral and non-aligned (participating states)  
ODIHR - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights  
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
UN - United Nations  
WEU - Western European Union

# 1. INTRODUCTION

The signing, in January 1989, of the Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was heralded as a milestone in East-West relations. The Vienna Concluding Document launched two sets of arms control negotiations -- one on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), involving all CSCE participating states, and a second<sup>1</sup> on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE), involving NATO and Warsaw Pact members -- and established a procedure that enabled participating states to question each other about their human rights practices. This was no small achievement for a body composed of 35 states sprawled across three continents, embodying a range of democratic and totalitarian governments and divided, for the most part, into two ideologically- and militarily-opposed blocs, taking decisions under a rule requiring consensus. It was a far cry from the first CSCE document of some 14 years previous, in which arms control negotiations had deliberately been established completely apart from the CSCE and the very mention of minority rights was denounced as interference in states' internal affairs.

Yet even with the Vienna Concluding Document the CSCE was still more the froth than the broth of security deliberations in Europe. To the West, the CSCE served primarily as a forum for criticizing the East's human rights record. Although viewed as helpful in promoting contacts and confidence between East and West, the CSCE was neither expected nor designed to deal with inter-state conflict. Even in the CFE negotiations, the alliances were to be the main players. The CSCE remained a gypsy, existing from meeting to meeting with no fixed address or long-term schedule. The leaders of participating states had not met as a group since 1975 -- an indication of the priority accorded to the CSCE by its constituent governments.

How much more remarkable, then, that in the five years since 1989, the CSCE has acquired a permanent secretariat, parliamentary assembly and centres for conflict resolution and democratic development, become host to a group of ambassadors in permanent session, and held two summits and numerous foreign ministers' meetings at which the most pressing European security issues have been the staple of discussion. The CSCE is the focal point for European arms control negotiations, deploys missions in half a dozen [Eurasian] hot spots, and <sup>operat with</sup> <sup>has</sup> [sports] procedures for crisis management and conflict resolution that include the authority to dispatch <sup>conf. prevention</sup> peacekeeping forces to anywhere within CSCE territory. And all this has been arrived at through the consensus of participating states, whose number has burgeoned to 53. <sup>a framework</sup>

*delivered itself Regional of under Chaps VIII of U.N. Charter*

What follows is a study of Canada's contribution to this prodigious institutional development, particularly in the area of conflict prevention and management. There are several reasons why such a study is worth conducting. First, the years since 1989 have been an extraordinary period for the CSCE, as it has tried to move from being a tool for the peaceful transformation of Europe to one for managing the effects of that transformation. The CSCE now offers the most extensive array of conflict management mechanisms of any regional grouping in the world. Whatever the future may hold for the CSCE, it is interesting

<sup>1</sup>As an autonomous conference within the CSCE framework.

to examine how the organization evolved during these key years and the thinking of at least one participating state with respect to that evolution. Second, the immediate post-Cold War period has seen the blossoming of the notion of "cooperative security," which Canada and others made a concerted attempt to put into practice in the CSCE. An examination of how, and how successfully, this was done, may be instructive as states now seek to apply the concept elsewhere. Third, the years in question have seen important changes in Canada's link to Europe, both in respect of the traditional primacy accorded to European relations in Canadian foreign policy and in respect of the character of the European link. A study of Canada and the CSCE since the end of the Cold War is in large part a study of Canada attempting to shape its "role" in Europe when Canadian troops have been withdrawn from the continent and economic issues loom large.

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Though it touches on the question, this study is not an assessment of how well the CSCE has fared in addressing post-1989 conflicts in Europe; nor is it a detailed history of CSCE negotiations, structures and missions. Rather, it is a look at what Canada did during the late 1989-early 1994 period, and why, to help develop the CSCE's institutional capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the CSCE area.

While I was preparing this study, several present and former Canadian officials generously shared with me their recollections of Canada's involvement with the CSCE since 1989. I would like to thank Eric Bergbusch, Alan Bowker, Greg Cooney, Sheila Coutts, Mark Moher, David Peel, Gilles Poirier and Timothy Williams for their insights. I am particularly grateful to Jill Sinclair who, in addition to recalling her extensive experience with the CSCE, opened her filing cabinets to me. I am also indebted to Ted Mackay for facilitating my research and to Bill Wilson for assistance in locating relevant documents. Any omissions or errors in what follows are my own.



## 2. TURNING FENCES INTO GATES: THE CSCE TO 1989

Security is not gained by erecting fences, security is gained by opening gates.  
- Finland's President Urho Kekkonen at the first CSCE Foreign Ministerial Meeting,  
Helsinki, June 1972

The CSCE was born as a bargain between East and West, in which the former gained Western recognition of the postwar European political status quo and the prospect of East-West economic cooperation and the latter gained a *droit de regard* in the East's treatment of its citizens.<sup>2</sup> The CSCE's founding document, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, consists of three main sections, known as "baskets."<sup>3</sup> Basket I enumerates ten principles guiding relations between participating states and covers matters related to security. Basket II deals with cooperation in trade, industry, science and technology, and environmental protection (and is followed by a declaration of intent regarding questions related to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean). Basket III covers cooperation in humanitarian fields, to wit, human contacts, information, culture and education, collectively called the "human dimension." A fourth "basket" deals with follow-up to the conference. The Final Act principles include, inter alia, respect for sovereign equality, renunciation of the use or threat of use of force, inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention in internal affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for human rights.

The Helsinki Final Act is not a legally binding text. Rather, it is a politically binding document, as signified by the phrase "mindful of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference," found in the paragraph immediately preceding the signatures. It was a major Western objective throughout the negotiations to ensure that the non-judicial nature of the text was explicitly recognized by the Soviet and East European parties, who instead hoped to produce a postwar peace treaty and territorial settlement. Adherence to CSCE commitments is thus primarily an indication of political trustworthiness.

The Helsinki Final Act established the CSCE as a process, not as an organization or an institution. The procedure for ensuring that decisions were executed took the form of periodic comprehensive "follow-up" meetings, supplemented by experts meetings and ad hoc conferences on specific subjects. There were no permanent administrative or political organs attached to this process. The host country for each CSCE event set up a secretariat in turn.

The CSCE was not intended to play a large or direct role in conflict prevention and management in Europe. These tasks fell to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Though it was hoped that the CSCE would further cooperation and trust between the two blocs and thus help lessen conflict in an amorphous way, the CSCE was not expected to interfere in prevailing security arrangements. In practice, the CSCE did not much deal with security issues. It was most active in the third basket, setting important standards of state behaviour

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<sup>2</sup>The West also gained an agreement to begin, parallel with but not linked to the CSCE, negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, known as MBFR.

<sup>3</sup>The term comes from a British diplomat, who recalled that his mother used to sort balls of wool into different baskets according to their colour.

and enabling the West to call the Soviets and the East Europeans to the carpet on human rights issues. But there were two respects in which the pre-1990 CSCE did help prevent conflict. First, the Helsinki Final Act established a very modest set of confidence-building measures involving the obligatory prior notification of major military manoeuvres in border areas and the voluntary invitation of observers to such events. These were improved on in the 1986 Stockholm Document, a major achievement considering that by the time the Stockholm negotiations opened in 1984, all other East-West military negotiations had been suspended. The CSCE CSBMs developed into a network of dialogue and habit of openness that paved the way for the security cooperation that was to follow.

Second, although the Helsinki baskets were the results of bargaining and compromise, they in the end reflected the fact that questions of security, economics and human rights are firmly intertwined. The Helsinki Final Act gave the West a right to enquire into human rights cases in the East and to challenge the failure of states to live up to obligations. Dissidents throughout the Soviet bloc invoked the Final Act's provisions in their campaigns and the West made compliance with those provisions a condition of improved relations. While the crumbling of the East bloc was due ultimately to the social and economic failure of communism and the consequences of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts at reform, it was accelerated by the Helsinki process. Thus the CSCE helped to engender the change from one security situation to another, in which multilateral methods of conflict management could more easily be agreed upon.

From the CSCE's inception, Canada was one of the CSCE's most vocal participants. Canada approached the Helsinki process with hope that it would help to heal Europe's divisions, tempered by realism that hostility was deeply rooted and productive dialogue would take time, patience and commitment. During the CSCE's first fourteen years, Canada, along with the United States, led the West in pressing for Eastern implementation of Basket III commitments and in trying to strengthen those commitments. For Canada, the CSCE provided a seat at the table in East-West discussions, enabled dialogue with East European and neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries, and offered a means of promoting political, cultural and economic ties with Europe. Though Canada was disappointed by the glacial progress in implementing Final Act undertakings, it continued to believe that the CSCE principles, if adhered to in their entirety, formed a solid basis for the conduct of civilized relationships between governments, and between governments and their own citizens. This Canadian attachment to and habit of activism within the CSCE -- reflected in an institutional voice for the CSCE within the Department of External Affairs -- contributed to making the CSCE a strong candidate for Canadian emphasis when, not long after the conclusion of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting, the future of Europe seemed up for grabs.

### 3. AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE BELLE OF THE BALL

The CSCE is becoming "the girl everyone wants to dance with."

- *Telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Bonn to Ottawa headquarters, May 22, 1990*

In 1989, the postwar Soviet empire began to disintegrate. After almost four decades of totalitarian rule, communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe collapsed fast and unpredictably. The Soviet Union itself, under Gorbachevian glasnost and perestroika, had abandoned its ideological aggressiveness and turned inward to concentrate on political and economic reform. Politicians and pundits waxed about the demise of the Cold War, the disappearance of the East-West fault-line, the prospect of a "new" Europe -- free, prosperous and at peace. More sober commentators murmured about an "old" Europe of national, ethnic and religious hatreds, and pointed to the East's inefficient industrial sectors, large foreign debts and undemocratic habits. Few doubted that European political and military relations were on the verge of a reordering as fundamental as those effected in 1919 and 1945.

Canada was cheered by and preoccupied with the changes, which had potentially profound implications for the nature and extent of Canadian involvement in Europe. In the fall of 1989, the Department of External Affairs initiated a review of Canada's policy towards the region, intended to determine the best way to ensure that Europe reformed itself in a way that was amenable to Canadian interests. These interests ranged across areas of trade and investment, science and technology, environment and culture. Above all, Canada's interest was in stability and peace. Offspring of Europe, Canada had shared both the profound benefits of Europe's political and social ideas and the tragic costs of Europe's wars. It was clear that the new regimes would need help to build democracy and implant the rule of law, to make the transition to a market economy, and to deal with unbottled ethnic tensions. It was also clear that the European security framework would have to be revised to accommodate the de facto end of the bloc system, and to encourage the transition of the USSR to being a stable partner in cooperation. What was seen as at stake was the "successful replacement of the bitter postwar order we have endured since 1945" and the prospect of "a Europe woven together by a web of interdependence which would make the calculation of war irrational."<sup>4</sup>

Already, Canadian officials were seeing possibilities for an enhanced CSCE role in European security. In late 1989 and early 1990, the Department of External Affairs CSCE Coordinator visited Washington and several European capitals, exploring CSCE questions. January 1990 saw the first draft of a paper on "The CSCE in a Changing World: Canada's Role." The paper raised ideas and themes that would be fine-tuned through the coming months as Canada considered how the CSCE could be taken advantage of and reshaped to help promote stability in Europe.

Canadian diplomats saw the CSCE as being well-suited to addressing the problems

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<sup>4</sup>Statement 90/09, Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at McGill University Department of Political Science and Economics, Montreal, February 5, 1990.

likely to emerge in the Cold War aftermath. The CSCE had a number of advantages over other, existing fora or the creation of new fora. These included:

- 1) **comprehensiveness:** The Helsinki process already dealt with the major related subjects that, in Canada's view, required increased multilateral attention in the region -- confidence-building and arms control, economic and environmental cooperation, human rights and humanitarian cooperation.
- 2) **flexibility:** As a <sup>political</sup> process rather than an <sup>bureaucratic</sup> organization, the CSCE could readily be adapted to new purposes and priorities, and could provide political impetus in support of new aims.
- 3) **wide membership:** Perhaps most important, the CSCE was the only forum that contained, on an equal footing, all European states (except Albania) and Canada and the US. It appeared to be the only political body that could translate the enticing notion of a Europe whole and free into reality.

There was more than a little Canadian self-interest involved in promoting the CSCE as the major vehicle for restructuring European political and security relations. Many of the CSCE's fields of interest were similar to those of other <sup>single-free</sup> more Euro-centric bodies, including the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the European Community (EC) and the Council of Europe. If the CSCE, born in and of a divided Europe, failed to prove its relevance to changed circumstances, other organizations, in which Canada was not -- or was only subordinately -- involved, would take its place. Even before the toppling of the Berlin Wall, it appeared that Canada would play an increasingly minor role in Europe as European economic integration and political cooperation intensified, primarily through the EC. The relaxation of Cold War tensions, welcome though it was, was likely to promote this trend and risk marginalizing North American, and especially Canadian, interests in European calculations. There was thus a sense that Canada had to position itself early and carefully to influence the changes in Europe in directions conducive to continued Canadian involvement.

Canada was not alone in emphasizing the CSCE's potential role in the "new European architecture." By the spring of 1990, the CSCE was being seen by a growing number of states as potentially central to the future political development of Europe -- albeit to a different extent and for different reasons. Eastern and Central Europeans regarded the CSCE as the logical successor to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union saw the CSCE as a means to avoid being left out of European corridors. Germany valued it as a means to calm fears about a reunited Germany. The US emphasized the CSCE's role in encouraging democratic institutions and free market economies in Eastern Europe. European neutrals saw the CSCE as their entrée to the post-Cold War security process.

If the CSCE were to assume the place Canada and others hoped it would, it would have to be reinvigorated and restructured. The Helsinki process was not designed for efficiency. The consensus procedure, though leading to roundly-supported decisions, was cumbersome; participating states did not meet in permanent session; there was no focal point for administrative and logistical support; and there was no established way to convene a meeting outside the program agreed at each follow-up meeting. How, and how successfully, could the CSCE be adapted to respond quickly to Europe's changing demands? How extensive and what kind of security functions would a revamped CSCE have?

Canada started to answer these questions publicly on February 5, 1990, when then

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark made the first of two major statements on Canadian policy towards Europe. Speaking at McGill University in Montreal, he outlined Canada's interests in developments in Europe and defined the considerations guiding Canadian policy towards the region.<sup>5</sup> Paramount among these was the requirement for stability -- political, economic and military. This meant a continuing role for NATO, as the guarantor of Western security, but a "new NATO" with an expanded mission that took into account the "psychology and politics" of security relations. It also meant fuller use of the CSCE, as a means of linking Europe -- East and West -- with North America, and of laying the framework for political and economic cooperation. According to Clark, ways had to be found "to further institutionalize, politicize and broaden the role" of the CSCE. The CSCE was to "become the drafting board for the new European architecture."

Clark followed up with details on May 26 in an address entitled "Canada and the New Europe," delivered at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus, in Toronto. In the interim, officials had completed the European policy review, Cabinet had approved a policy framework that allocated a key place to the CSCE and Ottawa (in March) had circulated to Canadian missions in Europe the first in a series of CSCE "Strategy and Action Plans," instructing posts to review the Canadian approach with host governments and to open dialogue with them. The aim of Canada's strategy was to support and reinforce the CSCE as the key pan-European forum to address security, economic and human dimension questions. The main ways of doing this, as elaborated in the action plan and Clark's Humber College speech, were to ensure that the CSCE: 1) took a comprehensive approach to security; 2) developed an institutional framework; and 3) established mechanisms for crisis prevention and conflict resolution.

### **A Comprehensive Approach to Security**

In Canada's view, security in Europe would result from across-the-board action in the political, military, economic and social spheres designed to promote stable and prosperous polities. This mandated a continuing emphasis on all three CSCE baskets. Canada wanted to avoid the CSCE being pressed solely into a Basket I focus, a real danger given the interest of many West Europeans in giving high priority to the EC in economic matters and to the Council of Europe in human dimension matters. In Clark's words, the CSCE should become "a true instrument of cooperative security, one which would supplement deterrence with reassurance.... [A]s the nature of European security extends beyond military balances to political stability and economic prosperity, there is a central role for the CSCE in the areas of human rights, economic cooperation and environmental action."

The phrase "cooperative security" was no speech-writer's contrivance. In February, just as the European policy review was winding down, the government had launched a second review, this one of Canada's security policy, involving officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence and consultations with persons outside government. By May the review had reached the report stage. Noting the decline in the importance of military threats to Canadian security, the report proposed that Canada focus more on other

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<sup>5</sup>Statement 90/09, included in Annex.

kinds of threats and adopt a new approach to, and concept of, security. The new approach, termed cooperative security, would take into account military concerns, but focus equally on non-traditional elements of security, including economic well-being, democratic development and environmental quality. It would be achieved through dialogue, consultation and cooperation at the regional level covering the whole range of inter-state relations.

In looking at the range of institutions and instruments that could be used to promote cooperative security, Canada viewed the CSCE as an ideal candidate. Its broad mandate and attention to three baskets were ready-made for the approach. Although Clark in July was to call for a cooperative security dialogue in the North Pacific, and in September would spell out cooperative security guidelines at the UN General Assembly, Canada saw the CSCE as affording the best opportunity to make the security policy review operational.

In Basket I, security would result from a series of related political agreements and understandings, military arrangements, confidence-building measures and verification mechanisms. "Hard" security issues such as conventional force reductions, military strategies and force structures would continue to be dealt with in and through NATO, as would firm military commitments. Even here, however, Canada favoured a gradual cross-over to a broader CSCE framework. The CSCE would have a role in mandating a further round of conventional force reduction talks, which should be among all 35 CSCE participating states, not just the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, Canada felt the CSCE should develop a fuller role in conflict prevention and mediation, as will be discussed below.

With respect to Basket II, security would be enhanced by the successful transition from command to market economies in Eastern and Central Europe. Although specific tasks in this area could be left to economic institutions such as the ECE, the OECD, the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the CSCE could encourage the process by establishing a political framework for economic cooperation and by developing common principles of economic activity. Canada advocated establishment of a permanent CSCE forum for economic dialogue.

Continuing attention to Basket III would be essential to security in Europe. The most likely threats would stem not from calculated territorial aggression but from ethnic rivalries, mistreatment of minorities, resurgent racism and uncontrolled migration. The protagonists were more likely to be sub- or cross-national groups than nation states. Canada viewed the ability of participating states to comment on internal issues and to hold CSCE states accountable for their actions in terms of their CSCE commitments as crucial to post-Cold War security management.

### **Institutionalization**

This was fundamental to Canada's European strategy. In order for the CSCE to become an effective and preferred forum for addressing security, economic and social questions, there had to be a regular or permanent venue where participating states could discuss pressing issues as they arose. In the past, proposals for CSCE institutionalization -- which had emanated primarily from the USSR and Eastern Europe -- had been anathema to Canada and other Western countries. They regarded the CSCE's lack of a permanent seat as one of its greatest assets, enabling the process to avoid the fixed and crowded agendas,

formalism, bureaucracy and inflexibility that bedeviled some other international bodies. Now that the European security agenda was more tractable, an institutionalized CSCE could be useful, even necessary. Moreover, it would give Canada a permanent seat at the European table. The challenge was to define "institutionalization" in a way that steered clear of cumbersome bureaucratic machinery, avoided redundancy with existing bodies, and ensured the CSCE had ongoing relevance and vitality. As Clark said at Humber College: "The goal is concrete progress, not talkathons."

- In Canada's view, the basic elements of an institutionalized CSCE would be:
- annual meetings of CSCE foreign ministers and biennial meetings of heads of government, to provide continuing high-level political involvement and direction;
  - a CSCE Assembly, where parliamentary delegations from member states could meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern;
  - an ongoing agenda of meetings in all three baskets; and
  - a small, permanent secretariat.

In the interests of effectiveness, Canada also raised the possibility that the CSCE might have to modify, "on a selective basis," its consensus decision-making rule.

### **Mechanisms for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution**

Even while celebrating the changes in Europe and hoping for prosperity and peace, Canada anticipated that the transition from despotism and centrally-planned economies to democracy and market-based economies would be difficult and likely to generate tensions and instability. It thus decided to make its priority within the CSCE the establishment of mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflict in the CSCE region.

The high-level political body -- meetings of foreign ministers or their designated representatives (called, in early Canadian documents, a "European Security Commission") -- would have the supervisory role in conflict prevention and a key role in conflict resolution. Canada proposed that the ministers should be supported by a small, permanent "Institute for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," which would provide expertise in dispute settlement, facilitate communication between participating states, refine crisis prevention methods, and offer administrative support. In addition, Canada suggested the establishment of a separate CSCE "Verification Agency" to facilitate and coordinate verification and confidence-building activities mandated by the CFE and CSBM negotiations.

Canada also proposed the creation of a crisis prevention "mechanism," which could be invoked by any participating state or the Institute director and would take the form of a "crisis panel" composed of a representative from each state directly involved, a representative from a participating state jointly agreed by the states directly involved and a chairperson taken from a pre-established roster. The panel would facilitate dialogue among concerned parties, conduct fact-finding investigations and recommend a strategy to resolve the crisis -- be it mediation, arbitration or even (suggested Clark) peacekeeping.

If these failed to resolve the crisis and hostilities broke out, the "mechanism" would move into the conflict resolution phase. This would involve the immediate convening of a meeting of foreign ministers or their representatives to review the situation and recommend a course of action. Early Canadian proposals suggested amending the consensus principle such that states directly involved in the conflict would not participate in meetings where the course

of action was being decided.

In looking at the possibility of institutionalizing a genuine conflict prevention and resolution function within the CSCE, Canadian officials -- while optimistic, in proposing such features as easily-triggered panels, amendment of the consensus rule, and the possibility of peacekeeping -- tried to guard against being too naive or too CSCE-centred. They recognized that saddling the CSCE with unrealistic mandates could doom the process to irrelevance as much as failing to amend it would. The CSCE was not the panacea for Europe's ills. The management of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes in Europe could, and hopefully would, take many forms, involving the EC, NATO, the UN, great power diplomacy and bilateral problem-solving. Canada hoped, however, that the CSCE could complement such processes and grow over time to become a central forum for European conflict management.

### **Preparing for Paris**

Canada recognized that it did not have the definitive blueprint for the CSCE's development. Neither, however, did anyone else. Canada wanted to get its ideas into the debate early on, so that they could help shape that debate's evolution. Already a "critical path" was taking shape, in the form of the CSCE Summit to be held in Paris from November 19 to 21, followed by the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting (FUM) to begin in March 1992. Each of these was expected to make a major contribution to retooling Europe's security arrangements.

A CSCE summit had first been proposed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in late 1989, as a means of enabling participating states to jointly assess the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and to set guidelines for future developments. Gorbachev's proposal was endorsed by NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers at the Open Skies conference in Ottawa on February 13, 1990, and by neutral and non-aligned foreign ministers at a meeting in Valletta (Malta) on March 3.

The Paris summit would be the first CSCE meeting to be attended by heads of state or government since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. CSCE restructuring was expected to be at the top of the agenda. Canada's proposal joined a host of others for institutionalizing the CSCE and beefing up its conflict prevention and management capacity. In a speech to the European Parliament on December 20, 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called for regular CSCE meetings, including at the head of government level, an ongoing CSCE forum, and permanent structures, including a centre for reducing the risk of war, a centre for emergency ecological assistance and a European human rights institute.<sup>6</sup> German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher -- a devoted CSCE advocate -- raised in a New Year's address and subsequently elaborated proposals for biennial summit meetings, annual foreign ministers meetings, a migrant secretariat (to work in the capital of the host country of the next summit) that could also assume some crisis control functions, as well as an ongoing economic conference and a

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<sup>6</sup>The USSR had previously brought forward all three projects in the CSCE at one time or another, and the risk reduction centre had been discussed in the CSBM negotiations in Vienna.



permanent centre for conflict prevention and discussion of arms control agreements.<sup>7</sup> Although the US preferred to postpone discussion of specific institutionalization until after the CFE Treaty was agreed, US Secretary of State James Baker talked of a "new Atlanticism" in Prague in January and advocated greater attention to Basket II.

The Netherlands proposed, in a January 25 address by Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, biannual or annual foreign ministers meetings, summits every two years, working groups of officials between meetings, and an undefined "citizens' forum." Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki called on January 30, in a speech before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, for a "Council of European Cooperation" as a permanent political organ of the CSCE, consisting of ambassadors with staff assisted by a small international secretariat. At the Ottawa Open Skies Conference in February, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis put forward a plan involving biennial meetings of foreign ministers and a body for parliamentary cooperation. In March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proposed a voluntary CSCE conciliation mechanism for dispute resolution, with a small staff to coordinate the mechanism. Denmark suggested a consultative mechanism to resolve disputes. Turkey advocated a permanent secretariat. At their March meeting, NNA foreign ministers advocated progress towards a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the holding of periodic ad hoc consultative meetings at the level of foreign ministers and senior officials. Czechoslovakia proposed a European Security Commission in the framework of the CSCE, initially to fulfil coordination, consultative and verification functions.

By the summer of 1990, the question was not whether CSCE institutions should be created but how extensively they should be developed. After much discussion in NATO (caucus), the West on July 6 put forward its ideas in Paragraph 22 of the London summit declaration, recommending annual head of government or ministerial meetings, biennial CSCE follow-up meetings, a CSCE secretariat, a conflict prevention centre, a mechanism to monitor elections and a CSCE parliamentary body. *Refer to Cdu's agenda.*

During the spring and summer of 1990, Canadian officials continued to flesh out the ideas put forward in the Humber College speech. In Canada's view, facilitating the peaceful settlement of differences lay at the heart of the process of strengthening the CSCE. If the CSCE were to assume a more prominent role in European security, it would have to offer a wide and flexible set of political tools capable of addressing conflict arising from different causes and in different stages of progression, ranging from incipient tension to full-blown war. In May, Canada developed a paper on "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution in Europe" which it shared initially in the NATO caucus, then more broadly with other participating states. Crisis prevention was defined as efforts to defuse tensions between participating states with the aim of avoiding conflict. Conflict resolution was defined as efforts to terminate peacefully and as quickly as possible actual conflict between two or more participating states. Several considerations shaped the Canadian ideas:

- institutionalization should be kept to a minimum;
- the proposals were for addressing conflict *between* states. Separate provisions could

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<sup>7</sup>Genscher later proposed a panoply of agencies with responsibilities ranging from human rights and conflict resolution to transportation and environmental protection.

and should be made for addressing sources of conflict *within* participating states; conflict prevention had to include an effective political process, had to cover both broad political and military areas, and had to have a supporting secretariat for both substantive and administrative tasks.

In July, Canada submitted two papers to the Summit Preparatory Committee (Prepcom), which was meeting in Vienna. The first, tabled July 11, set forward Canada's objectives for the Summit.<sup>8</sup> In Canada's view, the Summit's deliberations should be governed by three basic principles: 1) the comprehensive nature of the CSCE -- i.e. its three baskets -- should be preserved and reinforced; 2) while pursuing institutionalization, the flexible, political and pragmatic nature of the CSCE process should be preserved; and 3) the right of full participation by all participating states in CSCE activities should be maintained -- i.e. no shunting aside of North American members. This paper also proposed an outline for the summit declaration.

The second paper, tabled at the end of July after attempts to develop a joint paper with West Germany failed, laid out more broadly the Canadian proposal for the development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and resolution capacity.<sup>9</sup> In this paper, Canada proposed that the CSCE should provide its members with mechanisms that would *automatically* be triggered to defuse tensions and resolve conflicts.

The institutional framework proposed was that described in the Humber College speech. Overall responsibility for conflict prevention and management would fall to a "Council" of foreign ministers or their designated representatives. The operative side of ministers' work would be delegated to a permanent body, now called a "Centre for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict" rather than an Institute for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The Centre would consist of an executive director assisted by a small secretariat, including experts in dispute settlement, and would possess sophisticated communications capabilities.

In Canada's view, the Centre's functions would fall under two broad rubrics: 1) support for political efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts; and 2) support for the implementation and verification of CSBMs.<sup>10</sup> The first would include such tasks as helping the conflict prevention "crisis panels" proposed by Clark -- described in detail in the July paper -- undertake fact-finding, dialogue and conciliation efforts; it would also involve assisting the Council's attempts at conflict resolution should tensions result in hostilities. The second would include technical and administrative tasks in the areas of information exchange and data management. This could involve establishing and managing a communications network capable of serving CSBM, CFE and Open Skies communication requirements; managing data compilation, storage and access in relation to agreed CSBMs; organizing annual implementation assessment meetings and other meetings agreed under the CSBM

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<sup>8</sup>Included in Annex.

<sup>9</sup>Included in Annex.

<sup>10</sup>Though Canada had earlier proposed a separate verification centre, it had since determined that support for this idea was not high.

negotiations; undertaking research related to the verification of CSBMs; organizing seminars; and preparing a CSCE military yearbook. Although Canada did not envisage the Centre having an active role in verifying obligations devolving from various treaties -- that would remain the responsibility of individual states parties, just as matters regarding compliance would be dealt with elsewhere -- it did want the Centre to possess a clearly identified capacity for information exchange and verification support. Canada reasoned that the implementation of transparency and verification provisions in the CSBM and CFE agreements (and experience gained therein) would be of direct relevance to CSCE conflict prevention efforts.

The Canadian paper represented the most fleshed out contribution to date for the development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and management capabilities, and the Prepcom drew extensively from the Canadian document in preparing the "basic elements" paper that would form the basis of the Charter of Paris. In August, Canada shared a revised version of its paper with selected delegations, including a mixture of East, West and NNA, hoping to gather support for its approach. As preparations for the Summit intensified, states were coalescing around three poles:

- 1) those who thought the proposed Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) should be limited to the non-political function of supporting the arms control and CSBM process.

In this view, the Centre would reduce the risk of conflict by increasing the flow of information between states regarding military matters. Broader conflict prevention and resolution tasks should be left to the high-level political consultative forum that would undoubtedly be agreed at the Summit. Voluntary conciliation procedures could be provided separately, as an adjunct to the political forum. Supporters of this conception included France, the UK, the US and the Netherlands, and the NATO paper tabled at the Prepcom took this approach. These states argued that conferring a more "political" character on the CPC would set it up in competition with the ministerial forum, resulting in a lack of clear direction and, eventually, contradictions between the two.

- 2) those who thought that, in addition to providing support for arms control and CSBM implementation, the CPC should be entrusted with specific responsibilities in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, including providing participating states with a dispute settlement mechanism.

Advocates of this approach included Canada, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Poland and Hungary. They argued that the CPC would have a greater chance of living up to its name if it immediately engaged political attention and encompassed a full range of conflict resolution tools. Since the CPC would remain under the direction of and accountable to the CSCE political consultation fora, in particular to meetings of foreign ministers, the question of competition or contradiction would not arise.

- 3) the Soviet Union, which favoured an encompassing and intrusive CPC to coordinate verification and monitoring activities and to play a broad role in conflict prevention and mediation.

In making its case for the middle option, Canada ran up against several difficulties. There were the teething pains associated with a diverse group of North Americans, West and East Europeans, and neutrals learning to work outside traditional dividing lines. There was a division between "old" and "new" CSCE hands that cut across all delegations and led to

tension even among Canadian officials about how things "ought" to be done within the CSCE: those who favoured a focus on the human dimension and adherence to long-tested procedures feared the Canadians were pressing too far too fast. There were also problems with the EC's growing tendency to caucus on its own: delays waiting for the EC to cobble together its position frustrated discussion within the NATO caucus. Although Canada heard sympathetic voices within Western Europe, especially Germany and Denmark, it found its most enthusiastic supporters among the Central and East Europeans, in particular Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In early October, CSCE Foreign Ministers met in New York to give a final push to preparations for the Paris Summit.<sup>11</sup> Addressing the gathering on October 2, Joe Clark observed that the major challenge facing summiteers would be to help create conditions in which democracy and prosperity could thrive and in which the emergence of antagonisms could be forestalled.<sup>12</sup> He enumerated five areas that Canada considered important towards this end. First was the need for the CSCE to have strong political direction and leadership. In Clark's words, the CSCE could not become "a distant bureaucracy or a simple set of principles." Canada wanted the Summit to establish regular meetings of heads of government and foreign ministers, where substantive decisions could be taken. Second, Canada wanted the CSCE to develop a parliamentary arm. Third, the Summit should give approval and form to a Centre for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict -- one that would assist the implementation of CSBMs but would also "eventually" have an "enhanced" role and resources related to fact-finding, conciliation, mediation and arbitration of conflicts." Even if it proved impossible to have a political dimension to the Centre reflected in Summit documents, Canada wanted, at minimum, language that was sufficiently open-ended to permit an eventual conflict resolution component to the Centre's work. Fourth, the Summit required a CFE agreement. Finally, the Summit should "reinforce and consecrate" the transatlantic and pan-European nature of the CSCE.

Not mentioned by Clark, but clear in Canadian preparatory material for the Summit, was the desire to ensure that the CSCE's careful balance among the areas of security, economic and scientific cooperation, and the human dimension was preserved. Above all, Canada wanted the summit to confirm the central role of an enhanced and institutionalized CSCE in the emerging European security framework, as a complement to NATO's collective security guarantee and to the EC's role in European political and economic development.

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<sup>11</sup>This oft-forgotten meeting was the first -- and to date only -- CSCE meeting to be held in the United States.

<sup>12</sup>Statement 90/57, included in Annex.

#### 4. HISTORIC EXPECTATIONS: THE CHARTER OF PARIS

"We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation."

- *Charter of Paris for a New Europe, November 1990*

The CSCE Paris Summit of November 19 to 21, 1990, was attended by the leaders of all 34<sup>13</sup> CSCE participating states. The mood was euphoric. Delegations celebrated the collapse of repressive regimes in East and Central Europe, lauded the reunification of Germany, and toasted mutual ambitions for closer cooperation between East and West. The desire for new institutions to fill the void left by the demise of the bipolar system led to strong support for the CSCE's institutional and functional development. The French government called the summit a second Congress of Vienna and, indeed, participants felt themselves charged with turning a fluid and uncertain situation into a lasting peace.

The Summit provided an opportunity for NATO and Warsaw Pact states to sign the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, which proclaimed a new, non-adversarial approach to European security. Leaders also endorsed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (the "two plus four" process). The crowning Summit document, however, was the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,<sup>14</sup> signed by all CSCE leaders.

The Summit's exultant mood was reflected in the Charter, which was both a declaration of intent and a program of action. The document was divided into three sections. The first contained a commitment to strengthen democracy and to cooperate in promoting economic liberty and "social justice," words inserted by Canada; pledged a new era of friendly relations among the participating states; endorsed a substantial new set of CSBMs (agreed in Vienna shortly before the Summit); defined the broad lines of future cooperation to build CSCE "unity"; and concluded with a declaration of support for the UN and for global solidarity. This last -- the Charter paragraphs on "The CSCE and the World" -- was the result of a Canadian effort, reflecting Canada's strong commitment to the United Nations, its belief that cooperative security must be pursued through linked global and regional efforts, and its related view that the CSCE, in rededicating itself, should not become isolated or insular.

The second section of the Charter set out guidelines for the CSCE's future. It outlined the arms control and disarmament agenda leading up to the Helsinki FUM; mandated experts meetings to discuss cooperation in strengthening democratic institutions (Oslo, November 1991) and in protecting national minorities (Geneva, July 1991); and reaffirmed commitments regarding the elimination of racial and ethnic hatred (another

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<sup>13</sup>The drop from 35 was due to the reunification of Germany.

<sup>14</sup>Included in Annex.

Canadian contribution), the protection of human rights, and cooperation in the cultural, economic and environmental spheres.

The third section dealt with new CSCE structures and institutions. Here, the Charter established:

- meetings of Heads of State or Government on the occasion of follow-up meetings (which, as a rule, would be held every two years);
- annual -- or more frequent -- meetings of Foreign Ministers, to be known as the "Council." Council meetings were to provide the central forum for political consultations within the CSCE process;
- a Committee of Senior Officials, to prepare the meetings of the Council, carry out Council decisions and consider issues relevant to the CSCE;
- a Secretariat in Prague, to provide administrative support for the political consultations (the Secretariat opened in February 1991);
- a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, "to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict"; and
- an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections within participating states.

The Charter also called for the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly.<sup>15</sup>

A supplementary document to the Charter set out more fully the institutional arrangements. The CPC's initial role would be to support the implementation of CSBMs. This would include facilitating consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities, the annual exchange of military information, the communications network, the annual implementation assessment meetings, and cooperation regarding hazardous military incidents. However, the Charter noted that the Centre might also assume other functions "which may be assigned to it in the future by the Council of the Foreign Ministers" regarding procedures for the conciliation of disputes as well as broader tasks relating to dispute settlement. The CPC would have a small secretariat consisting of a director, two officers and administrative and technical personnel. This secretariat would be supervised by a Consultative Committee composed of representatives from all participating states. As a rule, these would be the heads of delegation to the CSBM negotiations.

The Charter of Paris thus took the first steps towards institutionalizing the CSCE along the lines envisaged by Canada, by providing for regular ministerial meetings, a CSCE assembly and a Conflict Prevention Centre. It also, by calling for enhanced cooperation and commitments in all three baskets, met Canadian aims in reinforcing the comprehensive nature of the CSCE. In addition, the Charter, thanks to Canada's persistent urging, reinforced the transatlantic link, affirming that "the participation of both North American and European states is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process."

Although Canada did not obtain as strong a CPC as it would have liked, the Charter contained within it a clear basis for future development of the CSCE's conflict prevention

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<sup>15</sup>Parliamentary delegations met in Madrid in April 1991 to discuss practical questions related to the forum's establishment, and the inaugural meeting of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was held in Budapest in July 1992.

role, both in the institutions established and in the language used. The Charter promised that participating states would "not only seek effective ways of preventing, through political means, conflict which may yet emerge, but also define, in conformity with international law, appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of any disputes which may arise." Canada hoped that the rudimentary institutions and web of political consultations established by the Charter would provide a way for this function to be brought to bear. Paris set forth participating states' intention for the CSCE to become an organization that would help states resolve their disputes without violence and perhaps even prevent their disputes from developing, through systematic, deliberate political management of inter-state tensions.

## 5. SCULPTING THE STONE: FROM PARIS TO HELSINKI

This new architecture...embraces all the countries of Europe and North America and all the issues that affect and contribute to their security....

Human rights, economic liberty, migration, social justice and equal security are all facets of a single stone.

- *External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall to the First Meeting of the CSCE Council, Berlin, June 19, 1991*

The Charter of Paris laid the institutional basis for CSCE conflict prevention and resolution that Canada had been hoping for. The task leading up to the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting was to build on that foundation. In March 1991, a pre-Helsinki strategy and action plan, approved by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was distributed to posts in CSCE countries. The areas on which Canada intended to concentrate were:

- enhancing the CSCE's conflict prevention function, exercised by the Council of Ministers with the support of the CPC;
- determining a procedure for convening meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials in emergency situations;
- ensuring high level political involvement in the CSCE process;
- strengthening the human dimension; and
- maintaining an "appropriate" economic dimension, so that CSCE development would be balanced across all three baskets.

### Conflict Prevention and the CPC

Canada continued to believe that a CSCE conflict prevention function was a sine qua non for the emerging European cooperative security architecture. This alone, in the absence of a collective defence alliance or positive security guarantees, would help give the Central and East European states, and to some extent the USSR, a sense of security. The Council of Ministers and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) would have to be the focal points for conflict resolution, given the political nature of the task. However, because of the necessarily occasional character of their meetings, the Council and the CSO would need support, expertise and bureaucratic or logistical continuity, which is where the CPC came in.

The first meeting of the CPC Consultative Committee was held shortly after the Paris Summit, on December 3 in Vienna. In it, and subsequent Consultative Committee meetings through the spring of 1991, the pre-Summit division over the CPC's functions reopened. The "minimalist" camp, led by France, the US, the UK and Switzerland, wanted to concentrate the Centre's work exclusively on the mandate conferred by the Paris Charter, i.e. the application of CSBMs. Over the long term, the minimalists favoured the CPC evolving towards a "European Security Forum" as a combination of all efforts (negotiations, discussions and verification) in conventional arms control in Europe, combined with a continuous review of defence-related issues. Most EC members were sceptical of the CPC's ability to play a real role in the prevention and regulation of conflict; they believed that by reinforcing its role in the military domain, the Centre could at least preserve a semblance of living up to its name.



The "maximalist" group, consisting of Canada, Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Ireland and Italy, while fully agreeing with the CSBM role, continued to advocate a broader vocation for the CPC, one that would enable it to assist the Council of Ministers more directly in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Over the long term, this meant a military *and* a political CPC, in close interaction with the CSO and the Council.

Canada feared that restricting the CPC to a military focus would leave the CSCE without the ability to deal effectively with future European conflicts, most of which would probably arise over non-military issues. Moreover, a CPC with a broad political mandate, including dispute settlement, would help to reassure Central and East European states that they would not be abandoned by the CSCE if their security were jeopardized. It might also counteract the growing feeling of isolation in Moscow and make the continued existence of NATO easier to bear. Language in the Paris Charter indicating that the CPC was "to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict," and could assume other functions assigned to it in future, provided reference points for Canada returning to the charge, particularly at Senior Official and Council meetings.

At the first CSO meeting in Vienna on January 28-29, 1991, Canada circulated a working paper on the CPC's evolution and development.<sup>16</sup> In the area of arms control, Canada proposed that the Centre could facilitate information exchange and data management for CSBMs, CFE and Open Skies (once negotiated), and could support national verification efforts. In the broader area of cooperative security, Canada argued that the CPC should be able to assume diverse conflict prevention functions at the direction of the Council. As an early test of what the system might bear, Canada was concentrating on two initiatives. The first was advocating broader use of the CPC communications system. In line with establishing a cooperative security focus for the Centre (i.e. enabling it to deal with any conflict, no matter what the source), Canada proposed that the system could be used to facilitate the exchange of information between participating states for the human dimension mechanism,<sup>17</sup> and could be linked to the CSCE Secretariat and to the Office for Free Elections to help those bodies fulfil their mandates.

The second initiative was to tie the CSCE's newly-established peaceful settlement of disputes mechanism to the CPC. Dispute settlement mechanisms had an undistinguished record in the CSCE. Experts meetings had been held in 1978 and 1984 to attempt to elaborate a system that would involve a series of stages from inquiry, mediation and conciliation through to arbitration. Both meetings ended without substantive result, largely because of USSR opposition to mandatory measures. At the Vienna FUM, the USSR accepted the principle of compulsory recourse to a third party, making possible a third meeting on dispute settlement, held in Valletta from January 15 to February 8, 1991. In light of the expectations generated by the Paris Summit, it was considered important that participants eschew academic discourse in favour of practical results.

Canada submitted to the Valletta meeting a working paper entitled "Dispute

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<sup>16</sup>Included in Annex.

<sup>17</sup>Described below.

Settlement and Institutional Arrangements -- Basic Concepts" that set out commonly accepted meanings for various terms relevant to dispute settlement (e.g. negotiation, consultation, good offices, fact-finding and inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication). The meeting resulted in agreement on a procedure that would allow a party to a dispute to request the establishment of a mechanism consisting of a to-be-determined number of experts selected by common agreement of the parties. Provision was made for failure to agree and for the right of parties to reject nominees. The mechanism's work methods were extremely flexible and its "comment or advice" could relate to negotiation or to the adoption of other dispute settlement procedures, such as fact-finding, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration or adjudication. An absence of agreement on the mechanism's comment or advice could be brought to the attention of the CSO.

At Valletta, states failed to agree on what body would serve as the "nominating institution," which would maintain a register of persons' names for use in the mechanism, select names if the parties did not reach agreement, reselect names in case of rejections and notify parties of the composition of the mechanism. Canada, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the USSR and later the US believed that the CPC was the logical body to perform this function. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France and Switzerland favoured the CSCE secretariat, arguing that conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes were quite different things and that the CPC's tasks should remain closely linked to cooperative measures agreed in the CSBM framework. Post-Valletta, the Netherlands advocated a third option, namely use of the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, on the grounds that the Bureau already possessed the requisite staff, facilities and international legal expertise.

It would be up to foreign ministers, at their meeting in Berlin on June 19-20, to determine the nominating institution and Canada intended to push strongly for the CPC. Far from being an arcane debate about institutional fief-building, the issue of the nominating institution was, in Canada's view, crucial to the CSCE's future conflict prevention and management role. Securing the mechanism in the CPC would legitimize the CPC's broader role in assisting the Council in conflict prevention and resolution, and would send a signal to Central and East European states -- the most likely users of the mechanism -- that the West was serious about addressing their security concerns through the CSCE. Canada believed that the long term effect of the move would far exceed the immediate benefits of the institutional arrangement.

### **CSO Emergency Meetings**

The Charter of Paris mandated the Council to examine the development of provisions for convening meetings of the CSO in emergency situations. In Canada's view, this was of utmost importance. It was difficult to imagine how the CSCE could deal effectively with conflict if there were no way for the political consultative process to address urgent questions as they arose. However, states differed on the procedure for calling such meetings.

The US argued that the CSCE consensus rule should be maintained for the convocation of emergency meetings, to prevent capricious use of the procedure, a concern shared by the USSR. Several West European countries argued that while consensus should be maintained within CSO deliberations, it should be possible to convene a meeting without

consensus -- otherwise, in all likelihood, an emergency meeting would never be called. As a compromise, Canada proposed a "screening mechanism" that would oblige any state requesting an emergency meeting to explain in detail why such a meeting was necessary. It also proposed that the emergency procedure be established on a trial basis by the Berlin Council meeting, with the decision regarding permanent establishment being postponed to the Helsinki FUM. The EC also proposed a screening mechanism, which would require the provision of information within 48 hours and a two to five day waiting period before the meeting took place.

### **High-Level Political Involvement: The Berlin Council**

The meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin on June 19-20, the first high-level meeting since the Paris Summit, would set important precedents for future meetings and go a long way towards determining the relevance of the Council and, by extension, the CSCE, to the post-Cold War problems of Europe. In the seven months since Paris, there had been a diminishment of interest in the CSCE on the part of the West, as NATO developed the idea of outreach and the EC cautiously explored similar possibilities; there had also been a retrenchment on the part of the USSR. The Central and East Europeans had lowered their initially over-ambitious hopes for the CSCE, but were still searching for a political/security framework to replace the vacuum in which they found themselves. In Canada's view, the CSCE continued to be the most logical vehicle for keeping the USSR constructively engaged in Europe and for securing the political and security interests of the new Eastern regimes. It was important that the first Council meeting demonstrate the CSCE's value by leading to tangible results. In Canada's view, these should include:

- designating the CPC as the Valletta nominating institution;
- broadening the CPC communications network;
- entrusting the CPC with elaborating procedures for fact-finding missions;
- naming the CPC as the forum for consultations to prepare the post-Helsinki arms control negotiating mandate;
- instructing the CSO and the CPC Consultative Committee to submit a report on the possibilities of assigning the CPC broader tasks related to dispute settlement; and
- arriving at a means of convening emergency CSO meetings.

The Berlin Council was broadly successful in meeting these objectives. Ministers decided that the CPC communications network would preferably be used for all communications in procedures in emergency situations, thus the CSCE Secretariat would be connected to it. They endorsed the report of the Valletta meeting and agreed to designate the CPC as the nominating institution for the CSCE dispute settlement mechanism. They requested their representatives to the CPC Consultative Committee to start informal consultations aimed at establishing new post-Helsinki negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all CSCE participating states. In addition, Ministers requested the CSO to prepare recommendations on the further development of CSCE institutions and structures, with the understanding that the Consultative Committee would contribute sections concerning the enhancement of the role of the CPC.

The Council also settled on a procedure for convening emergency CSO meetings: any state could request that such a meeting of the CSO be held, after first seeking

clarification from the state or state involved in an emergency situation. In so doing, it had to state why the matter was urgent and why the emergency mechanism was most appropriate. As soon as 12 or more participating states had seconded the request within a maximum period of 48 hours, the meeting would be held two to three days later. Any request addressed by the same state on an identical subject between two regular meetings of the CSO would be inadmissible.

Thanks to a Canadian initiative, Ministers also affirmed the necessity of halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promoting restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. They agreed this should be a priority of CSCE governments and determined to maintain a dialogue on these issues.<sup>18</sup> The meeting also admitted Albania to the CSCE, bringing CSCE membership to 35.

### **The Human Dimension**

Canada had long placed a strong emphasis on the CSCE's third basket. The first CSCE meeting completely devoted to questions of human rights took place in Ottawa in May-June 1985, and Canada had been the most persistent advocate of strengthened human dimension commitments at the 1989 Vienna FUM. Canada's special interest in human dimension questions was due in part to the existence of large and vocal East European ethnic communities in Canada -- frequently mirrored in the composition of the Canadian cabinet -- and in part to Canada's own experience in dealing with minorities.

In Canada's view, attention to the human dimension was an important part of the CSCE's ability to prevent and manage conflicts and related directly to the CSCE's ability to deal with conflicts internal to participating states. As post-Cold War tensions were already sprouting from questions related to the treatment of minorities, Basket III issues had to be firmly tied to CSCE bodies for dealing with security problems.

At the Vienna FUM, participating states adopted a "human dimension mechanism," a procedure that enabled states to enquire of and make representations to other states concerning human rights commitments. It involved the following stages:

- participating states could exchange information in the case of presumed violations of humanitarian undertakings;
- participating states could hold bilateral meetings for the purpose of examining and resolving humanitarian issues;
- any participating state could bring questionable cases or situations to the attention of other states;
- any state could convey information relating to questionable situations at meetings of the human dimension conference or at meetings organized in the context of CSCE FUMs.

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<sup>18</sup>This initiative stemmed from Canada's non-proliferation "program of action" launched in February 1991, and paralleled Canadian efforts in several multilateral fora, including NATO, the G7 and the OAS, to achieve high-level declarations committing governments to combat proliferation. However, the initiative was also consistent with Canada's view that the CSCE should remain attentive to broader security concerns beyond Europe.

The Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, held in Copenhagen from June 5-29, 1990, expanded the scope of the human dimension by adopting principles of free elections and the rule of law, expanding the scope of human rights, and addressing the issue of minority rights and tolerance. Canada submitted at Copenhagen a proposal for strengthening the 1989 mechanism by adding a stage that would consist of sending rapporteurs to the site of alleged human rights violations, but the suggestion did not attract the necessary consensus.

At the Third Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, held in Moscow from September 10 to October 4, 1991, Austria picked up on the Canadian proposal, and supporters were able to secure a concluding document that provided for the establishment of mediation and rapporteur missions even without the consent of the receiving state. In the most intrusive scenario envisaged, if ten participating states agreed, a mission of three rapporteurs chosen from a panel of experts could -- according to a convoluted series of steps and delays -- establish facts, report on them and give advice on possible solutions to a "serious" threat under the human dimension. The kinds of questions implied were those related to the abuse of minorities' rights and other proximate causes of conflict in Europe. It was a conditional but sensible step forward, and a provision enabling the CSO to engage the mechanism by consensus tied the human dimension into the CSCE institutional framework, complementing the conflict prevention machinery.<sup>19</sup>

Canada continued to want to develop the CSCE's human dimension to reinforce the cooperative security approach. However, it was clear even at Moscow that the ability to move forward in Basket III would be limited because the political will of most participating states -- except, ironically, the new democracies of East and Central Europe -- had reached a plateau at Copenhagen. New commitments were starting to rub up against Western states' own minority sore spots, and to conflict with their domestic legislation or constitutional division of powers. There seemed to be general agreement that the focus should shift from developing new normative standards to implementing existing commitments. Leading up to Helsinki, Canada intended to focus on implementation and monitoring, as well as on promoting respect for minorities. Canada was of the view that European conflicts were increasingly likely to involve groups inspired by ethnicity, ideology, religion or language. CSCE agreements according to which respect for minorities was a factor in security and stability, and in which the duty to protect minorities had primacy over the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, had to be made operational. Measures for dealing with conflict had to be brought into play before, not after, tensions erupted in violence. Canada wanted the CSCE to be engaged in potentially troubling situations at an early stage, thus proposed at an October 1991 CSO meeting in Prague that the human dimension should be a

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<sup>19</sup>Notwithstanding these provisions and the symbolic importance of its location, the Moscow meeting was for the most part uninspired. The sense of urgency injected by ministers in the opening days of the conference quickly evaporated. Despite impassioned statements by Canada, Germany and others that national minorities were central to European stability, the concluding document contained weak, open-ended language about whether national minorities even existed. Canadian proposals on the equality of women and the independence of the judiciary were adopted largely intact, mainly because they were among the only proposals for which the ground was prepared well in advance.

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standing item on the agenda of CSO meetings. This suggestion found favour.

### **The Economic Dimension**

Just as Canada believed that security in Europe could not be ensured without respect for human rights, it was equally of the view that human rights could not be secured in the absence of economic development. Canada wanted to maintain the integrity of the CSCE process itself, the principle of the interdependence of the three baskets and the ability of the CSCE to promote an interdisciplinary approach to security. The primary question was to see how Basket II would develop within the context of CSCE institutionalization.

The CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held in Bonn from March 19 to April 11, 1990, had achieved a substantial concluding document committing all participating states to principles of market economics, and linking economic development to fundamental Western values such as multi-party democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The document suggested that the possibility of CSCE meetings "aimed at periodic review of progress and providing new impulses for economic relations among participating States" should be examined at the Paris Summit or the Helsinki FUM.

Canada had proposed that the Paris Summit should decide to convene an economic meeting during 1991 to review progress and discuss future cooperation in all areas of Basket II. The Helsinki FUM could then consider establishing an annual Basket II conference, which would relate to, but not duplicate, the work of existing institutions. In the end, the Charter of Paris did not call for an economic meeting. Going into Helsinki, Canada continued to advocate follow-up to both the Bonn Conference and the Sofia Meeting on Environmental Protection (held in 1989), and to call for institutionalization of Basket II.

Basket II lent itself well to the work of existing economic institutions such as the OECD, ECE, EC and EBRD, and Canada welcomed the development of strong cooperative relationships between these organizations -- which aimed at developing solutions to specific problems -- and the CSCE, which aimed more at establishing a political framework for economic cooperation. However, Canada felt strongly that it should remain the task of the CSCE to follow up on decisions in the Basket II area. It wanted CSCE tasking of other organizations to be very precise and did not want to establish a *droit de regard* on CSCE economic activities by outside organizations.

### **Looking to Prague**

As seen by Canada, the CSCE's "conflict prevention mechanism," post-Berlin, consisted of a mixture of political commitments (e.g. to settle disputes by peaceful means) and institutional arrangements. The latter included:

- 1) a political-level "management structure," in the form of meetings of heads of government, foreign ministers and senior officials;
- 2) a direct management body, in the form of the CPC Consultative Committee; and
- 3) a support unit, in the form of the CPC which, in addition to supporting the implementation of CSBMs, could assume broader tasks related to dispute conciliation and settlement.

Other components of the conflict prevention mechanism included the provision for convening emergency CSO meetings, which enabled the CSCE to respond to problems in timely

fashion, and the Valletta procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The CPC's support to CSBM implementation and related activities, including the communications network and military doctrine seminars, was a further aspect of CSCE conflict prevention, as was the human dimension mechanism in its strengthened form in the Moscow Document.

The Canadian goal post-Berlin was to improve on these various components. Now that the CSO could meet to deal with emerging crises, it needed a menu of crisis management options, working through the CPC as implementing agency. Procedures such as mediation, good offices, fact-finding, arbitration, monitoring and peacekeeping would have to be developed and tailored to deal with the communal conflicts the CSCE was most likely to face. The dispute settlement procedures would have to be made compulsory and their writ extended beyond the narrow range of international conflicts to which they then applied. The human dimension mechanism would have to be more closely tied to the conflict prevention machinery. Also, Canada continued to hope that participating states could agree on a system that would automatically provide for the initiation of CSCE conflict prevention measures.

As delegations moved forward to the next Council meeting, to be held in Prague on January 30-31, 1992, the main questions on the agenda were the proposed enhancement of the Conflict Prevention Centre (as per the Berlin document) and the possibility of CSCE peacekeeping forces.

### **CPC Enhancement**

In Vienna, the CPC Consultative Committee was attempting to agree on ways to enhance the CPC as a contribution to the general recommendations on the development of CSCE structures and institutions being prepared by the CSO for ministerial consideration at Prague. Opinion on the appropriate scope of the CPC continued to range from the cautious to the ambitious: the US believed that the Centre had not been entirely successful in carrying out the tasks already assigned to it and wished to avoid saddling the Centre with more, while others, led by Canada, Germany, Poland and Hungary, continued to see opportunity for CPC expansion in the crisis management, conflict prevention and security dialogue spheres. Related to this debate was one on the appropriate division of labour between the CPC and the CSO, which centred on the question of *when* the CPC should become involved in a potential conflict. Those in favour of a more political CPC argued that the Centre should be involved at an early stage, before the dispute heated up. Others were of the opinion that dispute settlement and crisis management should remain the purview of the CSO. The Yugoslav war -- with which the CSO had been dealing since July 1991 -- pointed to the fact that future European crises were likely to be more political than military in nature. If the CPC remained limited to the military sphere, its actual conflict prevention role could turn out to be quite limited.

Further complicating the debate was uncertainty about the role the CPC would play in the post-Helsinki security forum. Several states were drawn to a British proposal to make the CPC Consultative Committee the new arms control negotiating-cum-supervisory body. Others, including Canada, favoured a Finnish proposal for leaving the Consultative Committee focused primarily on implementation issues and creating a second, parallel body for negotiations. This would allow the CPC to concentrate on verification and conflict management mechanisms. It was difficult to make assumptions about the CPC when the

shape of the security forum itself was just beginning to be discussed, but Canada wanted to avoid allowing consultations on the security forum to dictate the CPC's future.

In day-to-day operations, the CPC was in fact proving less effective than hoped. Many states had not provided the CPC with even the most basic CSBM information. Discussion of the production of a yearbook and the establishment of a data bank was at a stalemate pending resolution of a dispute about Soviet information exchanged in April 1991. Even then, states seemed reluctant to include certain types of data and were squabbling about whether the yearbook had to be produced in all six CSCE languages. On the other hand, the civil war in Yugoslavia, the failed coup in the USSR and growing signs of ethnic tension throughout Europe were leading to renewed interest in strengthening the CSCE's ability to deal with conflict. While Canada and others agreed that the CPC had not fulfilled initial expectations, they believed that much of the problem was due to the failure to give the Centre adequate tools to do its job.

Most states agreed that if the CPC were to act effectively it had to have more instruments at its disposal: fact-finding and monitoring missions, good offices and arbitration capabilities, verification tools. In September 1991, Germany distributed to the Consultative Committee an "illustrative model" recommending that the CPC be given responsibilities for facilitating regular consultations between participating states on all aspects of security, enabling the exchange of information between CFE signatories and other CSCE members on CFE implementation, and arranging for fact-finding missions and observers, especially in connection with Paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities).

In mid-October, Canada circulated to participating states a working paper on "The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism of the CSCE."<sup>20</sup> This proposed that:

- the CPC should be designated the CSCE institution for the resource list of experts associated with the strengthened human dimension mechanism;
- the mandate of the Consultative Committee should be broadened to enable it to become the body responsible for implementing Council or CSO decisions in areas where it has been mandated authority; i.e. it should strengthen the existing procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes and develop additional instruments and procedures for the timely dispatch of fact-finding missions, conciliators or mediators;
- consider establishing a compulsory conflict prevention and resolution mechanism (i.e., the procedure for crisis panels and reference to Council originally proposed in the Humber College speech);
- develop guidelines and operational procedures for the establishment of CSCE monitoring missions and/or peacekeeping forces;
- consider ways in which the CPC could support national verification efforts; and
- provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on security-related issues, such as conventional arms transfers, non-proliferation, and UN disarmament issues.

Canada also proposed improving the CSO's ability to respond quickly and effectively to crisis situations by reducing the time lag between the request for an emergency meeting

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<sup>20</sup>Included in Annex.



and the actual holding of the meeting, reducing the number of seconding states required, and permitting the CSO to take decisions and recommend action even in the absence of agreement from the parties involved in the situation. Canada also wanted this last to apply to the CSO's invocation of the strengthened human dimension mechanism.

Canada's elaboration of the proposed crisis management procedure continued to go further than any other yet tabled. In addition, Canada's proposals for support of verification efforts and for dialogue on arms transfers, non-proliferation and UN issues, as well as suggestions for linking the CPC's work to that of other CSCE institutions had not yet received much hearing.

At the same time that Canada circulated its paper, four papers on the same subject were tabled in the Consultative Committee by Austria-Hungary-Poland, Finland-Switzerland, the US and the EC respectively. All of these broadly agreed on three categories into which future CPC tasks could fall: 1) security dialogue; 2) conflict prevention and crisis management; and 3) implementation of CSBMs. Beyond this, opinion ranged widely, with minimalist and maximalist visions again coming head-to-head. The minimalists, which included the EC, the US and Sweden, balked at the CPC assuming crisis management functions -- regarded as the purview of the CSO -- and wanted no reference to such instruments in the Prague Council document. More generally, the minimalists doubted that the CSCE could prevent or resolve conflicts, especially as membership grew beyond 35, and advocated that the CSCE call on other international organizations in dealing with conflicts and crises. Although the organizations remained unspecified, Canada assumed they would have a Euro-centric focus, i.e. the Council of Europe in the area of human rights and the EC in conflict prevention and resolution.

Canada, which continued to regard the further development of the CPC as essential to transforming the CSCE into an operational institution with the capability to prevent and resolve conflicts and manage crises, was feeling some dismay that its views were less widely shared than it had hoped. The maximalists, including Canada, Austria, Poland, Hungary and Finland wanted specific mention of the CPC's role in conflict prevention and crisis management, including a reference to fact-finding missions, monitor missions and good offices. Canada also wanted to see a reference to multinational verification. Although Canada had agreed with the CSCE's remit of the Yugoslav conflict to the EC, it insisted that the CSCE should keep the issue under constant review. It continued to believe that the CSCE -- as the only pan-European and transatlantic security forum -- should play a central role in conflict prevention and crisis management. This would best serve Canadian interests and respond to the concerns of Central and East European states.

### **Peacekeeping**

Proposals for CSCE military forces, which had first been raised before the Paris Summit, began to seem less academic after fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991. Canada had noted the CSCE potential for peacekeeping as early as May 1990, in Clark's Humber College speech. At the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall repeated the call for CSCE peacekeeping, as did German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Preliminary ideas on how CSCE peacekeeping might be implemented began to circulate shortly

thereafter. At the October CSO meeting, Poland distributed a "non-paper" that looked at the details of how missions might be fielded, provided, trained, commanded and financed. In December, Canada produced a paper that examined conceptual issues, including the principles that might govern CSCE peacekeeping operations.<sup>21</sup> Canada suggested that there must be threat to regional security; parties to a conflict must agree to work towards a political settlement; the operation must be accountable to a recognized political authority; the intervention by peacekeepers must have the consent of the parties to the conflict; the mission must have clear and workable mandate; and the mission must have sound financial basis. At the same time, Canada was exploring how NATO might provide visible support to strengthening the CSCE conflict prevention and management capabilities. It thought that NATO might offer a training program for observers/peacekeepers, with participants invited from all CSCE participating states or, more ambitiously, that NATO might coordinate planning for the provision of an eventual peacekeeping force for use under the CSCE mandate.

A "Friends of Peacekeeping" group, launched by Canada on the margins of the October CSO meeting in Prague, subsequently regrouped in Vienna and decided to adopt the Canadian paper as the drafting text for a proposed presentation to the Prague Council. The group included Austria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Sweden. Their paper on "CSCE Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines," which proposed including peacekeeping operations among the options available to the CSCE for preventing and resolving crisis, gained considerable support at a CSO meeting in Prague, January 8-10, 1992. The peacekeeping the "Friends" had in mind involved civilians as well as military personnel, would be without enforcement powers, and would be based on consensus and consent. Canada wanted the Prague Council conclusions to include at minimum a directive to the Helsinki FUM to consider possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping and, preferably, a ministerial endorsement of the paper on principles and guidelines.

### **The Prague Council**

The Council meeting in Prague, held January 30-31, 1992, came at a time when the CSCE's credibility in conflict prevention and management was being challenged by the war in Yugoslavia. That experience severely dampened the enthusiasm for the CSCE that had surrounded the Paris Summit. The CSCE's powers seemed more declaratory than operational. Many were suggesting that the CSCE should "farm out" its mandate: security to NATO, economics to the EC, and the human dimension to the Council of Europe.

In Canada's view, the challenge was to establish reasonable credibility against reasonable expectations. The CSCE was still the only post-Cold War institution with a comprehensive mandate, a pan-European and transatlantic membership, and the political authority to demand adherence to commitments. The CSCE was not intended to be a collective defence alliance like NATO. Rather, it aimed at increasing participants' security by achieving consensus on principles and mechanisms designed to promote a responsible community of nations whose relations were based on cooperation rather than conflict. If that

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<sup>21</sup>Included in Annex.

cooperation came into question, the CSCE should have the political machinery for crisis management.

Canada's goals for the Prague Council were to:

- confirm the comprehensive mandate of the CSCE (i.e., no "farming out");
- enable the CSCE to deal more effectively with conflict by expanding the menu of tools available to the Council and the CSO, including CSCE peacekeeping;
- rationalize the CSCE's structure and improve its cost-effectiveness; and
- ensure the CSCE's continuing comprehensive membership by welcoming all new governments in the region. (i.e. *C. Arino*)

A major item on the Ministers' agenda was consideration of the "Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Procedures," a series of recommendations prepared by the CSO that dealt mainly with improving the CSCE's capability to deal with crises and to prevent and resolve conflicts. The Council adopted the Document and annexed it to its conclusions. Inter alia, the Prague Document agreed that the CSO would meet more regularly, at least every three months, and noted that the CSO could delegate tasks to other CSCE institutions or ad hoc groups of participating states. The persistence of the Canadian and other "maximalist" delegations paid off in the way in which the Prague Document enhanced CPC functions: the Consultative Committee would serve as a forum wherein participating states would "conduct comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications"; it would also serve as a forum "for consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention and for cooperation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council or by the CSO acting as its agent." In addition, the Consultative Committee could draw a situation to the attention of the CSO, which could then convene to address the issue.

The Consultative Committee was empowered to initiate and, with CPC assistance, execute, fact-finding and monitor missions in connection with Paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (unusual military activities). Also, in addition to existing support to implementation of CSBMs, the CPC was empowered to "fulfil other functions as regards the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control," if so requested by the parties to those agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee. These were both items that Canada had worked for.

Looking ahead to further development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and management capability, Ministers requested the FUM to study possibilities for improving fact-finding and rapporteur missions, monitor missions, good offices, counselling and conciliation, and dispute settlement. They also, further to the efforts of Canada and "Friends," requested the FUM to "give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping" -- an ambiguity that masked differences between those who thought the CSCE should be able in its own right to call upon peacekeeping resources, and those who believed it should remit this role to others with the necessary assets, i.e. NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).

In the human dimension, the Prague Document changed the name of the Office for Free Elections to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and gave it additional functions. These included organizing regular meetings to address the implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments and carrying out tasks in

connection with expert and rapporteur missions as per the Moscow Document. The Prague Council also adopted a procedure called "consensus minus one," which enabled the CSCE to act without unanimous consent, if necessary, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The formula adopted by Ministers emphasized peaceful means in dealing with a violator and called for actions consisting of political declarations or unspecified "other political steps to apply outside the territory of the state concerned."

Canada's hopes for Basket II institutionalization were realized with the decision that the CSO would periodically convene as the "Economic Forum" in Prague.

Ministers adopted a declaration on non-proliferation and arms transfers, in a German follow-on to a Canadian initiative. As well, ten new states joined the CSCE: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Croatia and Slovenia were granted observer status. While some states worried that inclusion of the Central Asian republics would dilute the CSCE's effectiveness and undermine its rules of good behaviour, Canada strongly advocated such expansion. The ex-USSR was likely for some time to be a zone of instability and the CSCE was the best instrument for exerting some kind of moderating influence.

While Canada was pleased with the Prague Council's improvement of the CSCE's security management ability, it believed that the CSCE still needed the capability to identify situations that could degenerate into conflict, so it could take action before, not after, violence erupted. At the Helsinki FUM, Canada intended to focus on consolidating and strengthening the menu of tools for conflict prevention.

## 6. PROBLEMS AND PROMISES: THE HELSINKI FOLLOW-UP MEETING

### Promises and Problems of Change

- *Title of the opening section of the Helsinki Summit Declaration, July 1992*

The Charter of Paris contained a blueprint for "A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity" in Europe. However, by the time the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting opened on March 24, 1992, significant portions of Europe appeared distinctly unpeaceful and disunited. Fourteen new states had been added to the CSCE since the Paris Summit. Slovenia, Croatia and Georgia were added at the FUM's opening, and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the FUM's progression, bringing the total to 52.<sup>22</sup> There was a lack of confidence in any super-European organization, let alone the CSCE, to deal with the problems all these states were facing. In the East, difficulties in moving to market economies were causing local hardships and feeding disputes involving territory and minorities. In the West, an extended economic downturn and growing popular concern about Europe's future -- which culminated during the FUM with the Danish electorate's rejection of the Maastricht treaty on European unity and crippling strikes by French truckers and farmers -- fuelled pessimism. Throughout the FUM, which lasted until July 8, the escalation of violence in several participating states -- most notably Yugoslavia -- repeatedly drew attention away from developing tools for dealing with future crises to the task of responding to crises at hand.

The FUM was opened by an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. The meeting then broke into working groups to deal respectively with institutions and structures, conflict prevention and crisis management, the human dimension and economics, environment, science and technology. These groups collectively arrived at the Helsinki Document 1992, styled "The Challenges of Change," which contained a summit declaration of political goals and priorities and a set of decisions designed to implement them. The Document addressed Canadian interests in a number of ways, beginning with the definition of security.

### Comprehensive Security

While the CSCE had always implicitly addressed security from a broad perspective, it now, in the Helsinki Document, specified this understanding explicitly. The Document talked of the concept of comprehensive security, understood to mean:

- 1) security must be cooperative, i.e. no country must strengthen its security to the detriment of other states;
- 2) security is indivisible, i.e. absence of conflict is directly linked to respect for human rights, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law, and the development of economic, environmental, scientific and technical cooperation; and
- 3) the attainment of security depends on flexible global, regional and subregional linkages. The Helsinki Document declared that the CSCE henceforth saw itself as a "regional arrangement" in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, thus opening the

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<sup>22</sup>Macedonia's membership was blocked by the EC.

way to direct collaboration with the UN in the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts.

### **Institutions and Structures**

Helsinki left existing CSCE structures largely unaltered, while attempting to increase their efficiency. FUMs would be replaced by short "review conferences," preceding biennial summits. The Document confirmed the oversight and coordination functions of the Council and the CSO, and increased the support to the Chairman-in-Office (i.e. the Foreign Minister of the country designated host of the annual Council meeting) by formalizing three extant practices: the preceding and succeeding Chairmen could assist the present chair in a "troika"; the Chairman could call on ad hoc groups of a limited number of participating states to carry out certain tasks (a significant development in a process that had, until then, relied on plenary working bodies); and the Chairman could designate a personal representative to carry out clearly mandated tasks.

Most importantly, the FUM confirmed the rise of the CSO within the CSCE decision-making structure. As the agent of the Council, the CSO was now responsible for supervising and coordinating all CSCE activities. It was also given a central role in early warning and the political management of crises, peacekeeping operations and peaceful settlement of disputes (see below).

### **Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management**

The focus of the FUM was the development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capability. Canada chaired the working group responsible for drafting the relevant portions of the Helsinki Document. With the exception of peacekeeping, where substantial provisions were developed essentially from scratch, "development" meant attempting to create an ordered set of measures from the chaos of instruments and ad hoc procedures that had sprung up since Paris. This was done by establishing a spectrum into which mechanisms and institutions could be fitted, stretching from "early warning" through management of crisis on the ground. Initial discussion papers from Hungary and the UK reemerged as Hungarian and EC proposals which formed the basis for drafting a three-stage hierarchy of conflict prevention and management that met Canada's interests in developing a broad range of flexible instruments.

### Early Warning and Preventive Action

In stage one, any state, group of states or the newly-created High Commissioner on National Minorities could bring an issue of concern to the attention of the CSO for action. Ideally this would allow the CSCE to identify emerging problems and galvanize political will to deal with them early on, before they resulted in violence -- which is exactly what Canada had been aiming at since its earliest proposals for crisis panels. Early warning was a Dutch concept, as was the proposal for a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The latter was conceived as an instrument for averting at an early stage conflicts involving national minorities or, if this proved impossible, for warning the CSO of potential conflict situations. The HCNM was expected to gather information on situations involving national minorities and, after consulting with the CSO, to go to the scene to obtain firsthand

information, offer unofficial good offices, and make further recommendations to the CSO regarding action to help the parties resolve their differences. It was hoped an independent figure of a sufficiently high level to command respect in all quarters, working quickly and confidentially, would avoid shortcomings caused by the CSCE's more cumbersome plenary procedures. Since the High Commissioner's support was to come from and his briefings to go through the ODIHR, the post brought human dimension issues firmly into the conflict prevention and management sphere.

### Political Management of Crisis

In the second stage of the hierarchy, the Helsinki Document outlined and coordinated the institutions, mechanisms, missions and political consultative processes the CSCE had already established. The CSO, acting on behalf of the Council, would have overall responsibility for managing crises. It could set up frameworks for negotiated settlements, dispatch rapporteur or fact-finding missions, or initiate good offices, mediation or conciliation missions. In a move that proved to be of pivotal importance to the CPC's future, the Document extended the CPC Consultative Committee the authority to send rapporteur or fact-finding missions, a procedure used during the FUM in the case of Serbia-Montenegro. In a move to regularize and encourage responsible use of missions, agreement was reached that all participating states should share their costs, which had previously borne on volunteer basis.

### Operational Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

In addition to mention of fact-finding and rapporteur missions, the Helsinki Document conflict prevention and management menu culminated in procedures for CSCE peacekeeping as a complement to political processes. Here the FUM broke new ground. The CSO could launch a peacekeeping mission to supervise and maintain ceasefires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid or to assist refugees while efforts to find a political solution to the conflict continued. The Document was clear that peacekeeping must be conceived as a complement to, not a substitute for, a peaceful settlement process. Three conditions had to be met before CSCE contingents could be sent: 1) the existence of an effective and durable ceasefire; 2) a written agreement between the CSCE and the parties concerned; and 3) guarantees by the parties regarding the safety "at all times" of the personnel involved in the operation. Such peacekeeping operations would be carried out under a clear political mandate from the CSCE. However, they could be supported by the resources of regional organizations such as the EC, NATO, the WEU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The text on peacekeeping was difficult to develop, reflecting differences among traditional peacekeepers (Canada, Norway, the Central and East Europeans, and neutrals) who wanted simple, clear rules that would be pragmatically flexible; the EC, which was attempting to address larger CSCE structural issues via peacekeeping; and the US, which did not see the need for spelling out in such detailed language the conditions under which CSCE peacekeeping could be conducted. Lengthy and contentious discussions focused on the roles of various CSCE institutions in the chain of command, the conditions under which peacekeeping missions could be formed and dispatched, and the role to be played by other

organizations. Canada circulated a non-paper on peacekeeping in which it proposed that a CSCE-mandated peacekeeping operation could draw on NATO's resources, infrastructure and operating procedures through the common membership of 16 CSCE countries in NATO; any peacekeeping operation would, however, be a CSCE, not a NATO mission, and could involve participation by other CSCE states as well. This provision was difficult to adopt because France wanted to keep NATO from becoming the prime CSCE military arm. A compromise was arrived at through the understanding that when calling on an outside organization, the CSCE would take decisions on a case-by-case basis and after consultation with the participating states that were members of the organization in question, not with the latter as a body.

The primacy of political over military considerations led to agreement on a complex chain of command. Peacekeeping operations could be proposed to the CSO by any participating state, through the Chairman-in-Office. After the CSO agreed by consensus and the CPC Consultative Committee developed the terms of reference, the Chairman-in-Office would assume operational guidance, assisted by an ad hoc group located at the CPC. The ad hoc group would provide operational support for the mission and monitor it. It would also act as liaison between mission head and participating states by providing information to the CPC Consultative Committee.

#### Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

The Helsinki Document also contained a section on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. At the Prague Council meeting, Ministers noted but did not adopt a French proposal to convene a group of legal experts to elaborate a draft statute for a CSCE Court of Arbitration and Conciliation. In Helsinki, 15 countries joined France in submitting a formal proposal for such a court. The proposal would allow any CSCE state party to force another to submit to conciliation procedures over any CSCE undertaking. If they wished, state parties could also agree to binding arbitration procedures for a) all CSCE principles, or b) all principles except those dealing with territorial integrity (self-determination), national defence and sovereignty or jurisdiction over territory.

A number of countries, including the US, the UK, Turkey and Canada had serious doubts about the utility of a rigid, legalistic approach in the political context of the CSCE, especially since the CSCE had already agreed to similar procedures at the political level (the Valletta mechanism) and other supranational bodies, such as the International Court of Justice and Permanent Board of Arbitration, provided legal avenues. Also, the proposal failed to address the crucial problem of disputes within states.

The UK presented a non-paper that proposed improving the Valletta mechanism by dropping its exceptions clause -- the Valletta provisions applied neither to intra-state disputes nor to high-stake inter-state disputes (those that dealt with territorial integrity or national defence) -- and elaborating a CSCE conciliation procedure. The US also put forward an informal proposal, this for the Council or CSO to be empowered to mandate conciliation on a consensus-minus-the-disputants basis. In the end it proved impossible to reach agreement at the FUM; instead the Helsinki Document called for a meeting in Geneva to pick up where the working group left off.



## CSBMs and Arms Control

The Helsinki Document launched a new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Open to all CSCE states, the FSC would provide a framework for three functions: negotiation of further arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures; consultation and cooperation on security questions, such as the predictability of military programs and capabilities, non-proliferation and arms transfers, liaison and exchanges; and consideration of ways to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict. The first two functions would be exercised by the Forum sitting in "Special Committee." The third would fall to the CPC Consultative Committee, sitting as the Forum.

## **The Human Dimension**

The FUM revealed substantial disagreements over the human dimension. Many EC members thought the CSCE should become an organization primarily devoted to Basket I issues, while Canada and the US thought the CSCE should retain a comprehensive approach. Canada wanted Helsinki to institutionalize the Conference on the Human Dimension as a permanent feature of the CSCE; it also wanted a stronger emphasis on monitoring implementation. States had used the human dimension mechanism a number of times in its first year of operation, but had rarely invoked the mechanism since the Paris Summit.

After a rather lacklustre implementation review, the FUM developed a framework for monitoring compliance with CSCE commitments by establishing biennial human dimension implementation meetings. It also tasked the ODIHR with organizing regular seminars related to current political concerns (e.g. migration, national minorities, tolerance and free media). Canada secured language on indigenous populations, tolerance and non-discrimination, humanitarian cease-fires and respect for humanitarian commitments in time of conflict.

## **The Economic Dimension**

The Helsinki Document elaborated on the purpose and organization of the annual Economic Forum agreed at the Prague Council<sup>23</sup> and called for intensified cooperation in several areas. In the hope of bringing life and practical cooperation to Basket II, Canada offered to host a CSCE experts' meeting on sustainable forest development in 1993. Canada wanted this to be a new type of CSCE meeting that might establish a model for future ones: the purpose would not be to negotiate a document -- in fact Canada preferred not to have diplomats at the table -- but to have a true exchange of views that would have a direct impact in promoting cooperation among CSCE countries. The meeting was held in September 1993 in Montreal and resulted in agreement on a set of criteria for sustainable forest development.

*and to underline the Transit*

## **Other**

The Helsinki Document also announced the CSCE's intention to deepen cooperation with non-participating states, in particular Japan, which would be invited to attend CSCE

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<sup>23</sup>The first Economic Forum, held in Prague from March 16 to 18, 1993, allowed a frank discussion between international institutions, government representatives and private businessmen on the importance of maintaining a favourable business climate, developing human capital and integrating environmental and economic factors.

meetings as an observer. Canada and Italy were the main backers of this initiative, which was carefully worded to enable Japan to be associated with the CSCE's work in areas directly related to Japan's interests, but avoided opening the door completely to all non-CSCE countries on all issues, thus creating a mini-UN.

## 7. BEYOND RHETORIC: FROM HELSINKI TO BUDAPEST

The time for rhetoric is passed. There are outstanding problems which we have, sometimes under the guise of getting our institutional house in order, neglected.... The experience of the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the need to address conflicts *before* hatreds and the pursuit of conquest spin out of control.... Persistence and not artificial optimism or pessimism must be our guiding principle.

- *Draft of speech by Foreign Minister André Ouellet to the Fourth Meeting of the CSCE Council, Rome, November 30, 1993*

Prague and Helsinki made considerable strides in rationalizing and developing the CSCE bodies and work methods that had originated in Paris. The challenge facing the CSCE ministerial meeting to be held in Stockholm in December 1992 was not so much to overcome institutional limitations as it was to engender the political will to use the mechanisms already in place. Threats to security in Europe were coming from the fact that participating states were still far from exhibiting a common approach based on CSCE principles, particularly regarding respect for human rights. There were at least a dozen ethnic conflicts raging in the former Soviet Union, from Georgia to Tajikistan. The war in Bosnia had -- rather inaccurately -- taken on a religious aura that pitted Muslims against Christians. Xenophobia and anti-Semitic acts were on the increase in all CSCE countries. Continued economic recession and the threat of uncontrolled mass migration was testing the good will of countries like Austria, Germany and Spain in dealing with asylum-seekers. Instruments available to the CSCE still needed to be improved to be able to adequately meet these challenges. More importantly, they needed to be more frequently and energetically applied, especially in the area of preventive diplomacy.

Canada's strategy was three-fold: 1) to emphasize a return to first principles, i.e. the need to implement CSCE commitments on human rights and the peaceful settlement of disputes; 2) to encourage active use of CSCE conflict management instruments; and 3) to make existing mechanisms and institutions function more effectively and coherently.

### **Preventive Diplomacy**

By the time of the Stockholm meeting, it was becoming clear that the CSCE's real strength lay at the lower end of the conflict management spectrum laid out in the Helsinki Document, namely early warning and preventive diplomacy. Using mechanisms established at Prague and by the FUM, the CSCE had dispatched a number of short-term fact-finding and rapporteur missions to points throughout the CSCE area. These included a fact-finding mission to Kosovo (May-June 1992), a rapporteur mission to detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina (August-September 1992), and a rapporteur mission to Croatia (September-October 1992) launched under the human dimension mechanism. At Canada's urging, the CSCE also undertook fact-finding in Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan) and launched in March 1992 a conference intended to work towards a negotiated settlement to the crisis there, the opening of which was prevented by the escalation of hostilities in the region.

An important Canadian innovation was, after heading the May-June mission to Kosovo, to propose that long-term missions be put into place in the Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina regions of the former Yugoslavia to promote dialogue and prevent the spillover of conflict. This marked the beginning of a new type of activity that has proved to be the CSCE's greatest contribution to security and stability in Europe: long-term conflict prevention missions. The same Canadian-led mission that led to this suggestion was also uniquely successful in the objectivity of its report, which was commented on by several delegations and caused many of them, particularly the Russian, to improve their estimation of the utility of CSCE missions.

In September 1992, the CSO launched a long-term mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, as well as a monitoring mission to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia to prevent the spillover of conflict from elsewhere, and sanctions assistance missions to countries neighbouring Serbia-Montenegro (initially Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary; later Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Albania and Ukraine) to advise customs officials on the best ways of monitoring the application of UN economic sanctions. In November, the CSO mandated a mission to Georgia to initiate discussions with all parties to the hostilities in Ossetia with the aim of promoting civil order and political reconciliation. In February 1993, the CSCE launched a mission to Estonia to promote stability, dialogue and understanding between Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities. March saw the establishment of a mission to Moldova to facilitate a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict between forces from the Republic of Moldova, forces of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniestr Moldovan Republic and Russian soldiers stationed in the region. Canada contributed personnel to most of these missions, and headed the sanctions assistance mission in FYR Macedonia and the long-term mission in Moldova.

The missions were established relatively quickly with minimal infrastructure and modest costs. They were effective in establishing an international presence in potential hot spots and, in some cases, in initiating or supporting a framework for political dialogue. A CSCE presence in the form of a personal representative or mission contributed to establishing a practical relationship between the countries in question and the CSCE. In some cases, the mission was participating states' main means of finding out what was happening in the region. Missions also let the residents and governments of the areas to which they were sent know that they had not been forgotten by the international community. In addition, they provided an opportunity to educate hosts about the meaning of CSCE principles and how these might be applied. However, particularly in the early stages, mission mandates were often unclear or unrealistic, their reports seldom discussed in detail and their recommendations not pursued. Canada wanted to strengthen the CSCE's ability to deploy missions and to ensure more systematic follow-up to recommendations, many of which fell in the human dimension area.

### **Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

The CSCE experts meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes held in Geneva from October 12 to 23, 1992, took the four proposals mooted at Helsinki and agreed to include them all as options in the CSCE's dispute settlement roster. The first improved the Valletta document by simplifying the mechanism for intercession of a third party. The

second was a draft Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, based on a Franco-German proposal. The Convention established a two-chamber court: one chamber would permit non-binding conciliation of any dispute brought to it by parties, the other would permit binding arbitration. The third provided for a voluntary conciliation procedure, based on the UK proposal. The fourth provided for directed conciliation, as proposed by the US.

Canada was particularly partial to the US and UK texts, which offered flexible instruments and marked a substantial improvement over the Valletta mechanism, gave the CSO a stronger political role and provided it with instruments that could assist the decision-making process. As noted earlier, Canada had reservations about the legal Convention, but signed the document on March 31, 1993 (the last day it was open for signature), after taking into consideration the number of European signatories, the costs involved and the reaction of the provinces, since the text contained binding obligations in the field of human rights, a provincial jurisdiction.

### **Restructuring**

Notwithstanding the rationalization undertaken at Helsinki, the institutional framework established at Paris was no longer adequate to deal with the increasing financial and organizational demands being placed on the CSCE. During the FUM, Canada had promoted informal discussions on the need to streamline CSCE decision-making processes and to consolidate the institutional framework, including financing. There was general agreement on the types of reforms needed, but differences of opinion on how quickly these changes could or should be made.

States agreed that the Council should establish the post of Secretary General as the CSCE's chief administrative officer. They also agreed that there should be a way for the CSCE's work -- particularly conflict management -- to proceed on a permanent basis between the infrequent and overly-charged meetings of the CSO. In Canada's view, the latter was key. The CSCE had to be able to give systematic attention and guidance to the growing number of conflicts in the CSCE area if it were to demonstrate its ability to deal with real problems and issues in Europe. The use of the representatives to the CPC/FSC in Vienna as some type of permanent body (accountable to the CSO) was a popular idea, and Poland and Russia had put forward proposals to this effect. The US proposed the establishment of a special group of the CSO to meet regularly in Vienna. This came up against an EC desire to have new tasks in Vienna assigned to the CPC Consultative Committee. Canada thought the mandate of any new permanent body should be oriented to discussions and decisions on operational issues, leaving political declarations and decisions to the Council and, exceptionally, the CSO. The objective was to ensure that the CSCE got ongoing work underway in Vienna as soon as possible.

Also being mooted was the possibility of amalgamating all CSCE institutions into a single structure. Canada was sympathetic to this idea, believing that the CSCE needed a critical mass of infrastructure if it were to effectively support diverse CSCE activities. Vienna was in practice becoming the focal point for CSCE activities, and Canada thought it would make sense to locate the CSCE secretariat and the CPC in the same place. But this touched acute political sensitivities on the part of the host countries of institutions, and Canada itself had supported the placement of bodies in Prague and Warsaw to show support

for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In addition, the EC had floated the idea of changing the CSCE process to incorporate voting and decision-making by qualified majority. Although Canada had supported steps to move away from consensus in certain defined cases (e.g. CSO emergency meetings, "consensus-minus-one" in the human dimension), it was reluctant to support radical modifications to the CSCE's consensus rule. Canada believed that the process of trying to reach consensus was a useful exercise in itself, especially for the new democracies of East and Central Europe and Central Asia, which were unaccustomed to compromise and multilateral diplomacy. Moving to a voting mechanism would make it too easy to override those countries, thus alienating them from the CSCE process. In Canada's view, consensus led to stronger decisions and brought countries up to higher common standards, rather than leading to the lowest common denominator. Until there was a greater degree of commonality in participating states' respect for human rights and degree of democratic development, Canada thought it best to leave the consensus rule unmodified, other than when clearly necessary to improve the CSCE's conflict management ability.

### **The Stockholm Council**

At the Council meeting held in Stockholm on December 14-15, 1992, Ministers dealt both with conflict management and with restructuring issues. In the area of conflict management, they adopted the recommendations of the Geneva meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. They tasked the CPC with taking rapid steps to strengthen its support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peacekeeping activities. They also appointed the ex-Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Max Van Der Stoel, to the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities. In addition, they expressed their intention to strengthen cooperation with other organizations, in particular to increase coordination with the UN.

On restructuring, Ministers established the post of Secretary General to act as the representative of the Chairman-In-Office as well as the CSCE's chief administrative officer. They also instructed representatives of the participating states to meet regularly in Vienna between sessions of the CSO. In addition, they tasked the CSO with conducting a wide-ranging review of CSCE structures and operations.

The Stockholm Document also incorporated a Canadian proposal for the Chairman-in-Office and a team of CSCE experts to undertake a tour of newly-admitted participating states. Of the then 52 CSCE countries, a relevant number was still not represented in Vienna and only at times at CSO meetings in Prague. Canada was concerned that this absenteeism hampered further discussion of topics that were important to the states in question (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh); it also cast doubt on the validity of the CSCE decision-making process. In making the tour, which began in April 1993, the Chairman-in-Office could engage these states, explain the CSCE to them, hear their concerns and answer their questions. Also with the aim of encouraging full participation, Canada contributed funds for newly admitted states to attend various experts meetings and conferences.

### **The Rome Council**

The Rome Council meeting, held November 30-December 1, 1993, dealt with three

main themes, identified in interventions by Italy, Germany and a non-paper circulated by Canada:

- 1) strengthening conflict prevention and management mechanisms;
- 2) further integrating the human dimension into the CSCE's conflict prevention efforts; and
- 3) enhancing cooperation with other organizations.

### Conflict Management

For Canada, the task following Stockholm was to continue to streamline decision-making processes, institutions and missions to make the CSCE more effective at conflict prevention and resolution. A Canadian paper offering suggestions to this effect was circulated at the April 26-28, 1993 meeting of the CSO in Prague.<sup>24</sup> Canada wanted to see more political emphasis and resources placed at the conflict prevention end of the spectrum, where the CSCE's strength lay. Further to the Stockholm directive to strengthen the CPC's ability to provide operational support for missions, the Consultative Committee agreed in early 1993 to establish a mission support section within the CPC, with a small staff. Canada strongly supported this move, which put mission financing and logistics on a sounder basis and led to a set of standard operating procedures.

Canada wanted the CSO to get away from drafting political declarations and to devote more time to dealing with practical issues such as mission establishment and follow-up. Canada believed that the "Vienna Group" of ambassadors, established by Stockholm, could take some of the burden off the CSO and make the CSCE more responsive to problems as they developed. However, even the Vienna-based representatives typically did not have the necessary background and did not choose to spend the time on items that were not directly crisis-related. Canada thought this might be helped by making better use of the ODIHR and missions as channels via which specific problems could be identified and short-term, focused expertise offered. The CSCE now had over a year's experience with missions. Canada thought it was time to undertake a review to determine what did and did not work, so that the CSCE could capitalize on its experience and increase its efficiency in pre-empting and managing crises. It proposed at Rome to task a Canadian with preparing such a report.

The Rome Council meeting reviewed the situation in a number of regions of tension in Europe and the CSCE role in managing conflicts, including in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. Ministers decided to create a long-term mission to Tajikistan -- the first in Central Asia -- to facilitate dialogue, promote respect for human rights, and promote and monitor compliance with CSCE principles. The Council also agreed that the mandate of the CSCE mission to Georgia should be broadened to include human rights and democratic development.

General discussion on strengthening CSCE instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management was dominated by the issue of whether, and under what conditions, the CSCE should cooperate with Russian or CIS peacekeeping operations within the area of the former Soviet Union. There was widespread recognition that instability in areas bordering

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<sup>24</sup>Included in Annex.

Russia constituted a security threat for Russia and for the CSCE as a whole; however, many states had concerns about legitimizing the presence of Russian forces in the "near abroad" by covering them with a CSCE mandate. Several delegations suggested that criteria should be developed for accepting CIS peacekeeping under CSCE auspices. Others were sceptical about developing criteria and preferred a case-by-case approach. Canada argued that certain basic principles had to be respected for the CSCE to give support to any third-party intervention, i.e. the consent of the parties had to be given, the impartiality of the peacekeepers had to be assured, and there had to be a political process underway that the peacekeeping operation would support. Beyond this, the degree of CSCE involvement should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Ministers decided that the issue should be further considered by CSCE delegations in Vienna. They did, however, agree that the CSCE mission in Georgia should elaborate "possible arrangements for liaison with joint Georgian, Russian and Ossetian peacekeeping forces with a view to establishing more comprehensive monitoring and oversight."

With a view to improving the CSCE's efficiency, Ministers decided to replace the Vienna Group with the "Permanent Committee" of the CSCE in Vienna. The Permanent Committee would have enhanced decision-making authority and be responsible for day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE, including dispatching conflict management missions. The intention was that the CSO could then become what its name implied: a high-level body of officials from capitals meeting three or four times a year to take strategic policy decisions. The CPC Consultative Committee was dissolved and its functions allocated to the Permanent Committee and the FSC. In addition, the Secretariat became a single structure concentrated in Vienna, with the ODIHR in Warsaw and a small conference secretariat in Prague also reporting to the Secretary General in Vienna. Canada was particularly pleased with the decision to create the Permanent Committee -- a permanent body for ongoing political consultation, decisions and operational tasks across the spectrum of CSCE activities -- and hoped that the institutional changes mandated at Rome would result in a more effective, action-oriented CSCE.

### The Human Dimension

Canada continued to believe that conflict prevention at its most basic level had to begin with the full implementation of CSCE commitments, particularly with regard to democratic development, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights. One of main problems facing the CSCE was that participating states had endlessly reiterated the fundamental importance of observing commitments but then did not appear to pay attention to what they had said. Canada believed that participating states should be more vigilant and outspoken in drawing attention to violations of human dimension commitments. It advocated more frequent use of the human dimension mechanism, more follow-up to the seminars organized by the ODIHR, and more resources for the HCNM, who was dealing with minority issues in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Albania and the FYR Macedonia and was proving to be quite effective in his early warning role. Canada also thought that the Vienna Group could pay regular attention to human dimension issues.

The Rome Council's consideration of the human dimension followed closely upon the recommendations of the Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, held from



September 27 to October 15, 1993 in Warsaw. That meeting acknowledged the centrality of the human dimension to CSCE efforts and affirmed that implementation of human dimension commitments had to be a focus of the CSCE's conflict prevention efforts. At Rome, Ministers agreed that:

- the decision-making bodies of the CSCE would consider human dimension issues as an integral part of deliberations relating to European security;
- greater emphasis would be given to the human dimension in the mandates of CSCE missions and in the follow-up to their efforts;
- the role and resources of the ODIHR would be strengthened;
- future Human Dimension seminars (following those in 1992 and 1993 on tolerance, national minorities, migration and free media) would be held on migrant workers, local democracy and the Roma (Gypsies); and
- the resources of the HCNM would be increased.

### The Economic Dimension

Ministers directed the Secretariat to provide ongoing support to the Economic Forum and its follow-on activities and requested the new Permanent Committee to include economic discussions in its deliberations. This would include identifying means to increase cooperative projects with international economic, financial and development organizations.

### Cooperation with Other Organizations

It was clear that existing multilateral institutions such as the CSCE, NATO, the WEU and the UN individually had neither the authority nor the capacity to cope with the many pockets of tension in the CSCE area. However, these bodies had thus far been unable to arrive at a systematic and coordinated approach to the resolution of regional conflicts. Canada had argued strongly for enhancing cooperation between these organizations, particularly in deploying conflict management missions. Canada wanted to continue to develop the growing relationship between the CSCE and the UN, as the CSCE moved forward into areas identified in *An Agenda for Peace*, such as early warning and preventive diplomacy. Canada also wanted to consider ways in which the CSCE could call on NATO experience and assets not just for peacekeeping but also in other CSCE conflict management efforts.

At Rome, Ministers endorsed recent efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office (Sweden) to develop more substantial relations with the UN and agreed these efforts should continue. They requested the Chair to pursue talks with other regional and sub-regional organizations with a view to establishing improved arrangements for consultations and coordination of activities.

### Looking to Budapest

The next major event on the CSCE agenda is the Budapest Review Conference and Summit to be held in October-December 1994. Between now and then, CSCE states will focus on implementing the decisions taken by the Rome Council and on preparing the work program for Budapest. In Canada's view, the way ahead seems clear, if not easy. The CSCE's institutional development is more or less complete. What is required now is fine-

tuning to ensure that the various institutions function in a coordinated and useful manner, as well as continued efforts to drum up participating states' will to engage the institutions as needed.

Whereas the initial post-Cold War period was one of cheery optimism for the CSCE, captured in the Paris Charter, followed by a heavy dose of realism, reflected in the more subdued Helsinki Document, the CSCE is now entering a third phase, marked by the completion of much of what it set out to do in Helsinki, a growing awareness of its preventive diplomacy limits, and the reappearance of a less-benign Russia. As was evident during the Rome Council meeting, the CSCE will continue to face serious problems arising from conflicts in the CSCE area, the difficult process of political and economic transition still underway in the East, and its relationships with other regional organizations.

In Canada's view, one of the central purposes of the Budapest meeting should be to situate the CSCE in the range of transatlantic institutions, i.e. to clarify the purpose the CSCE serves and to define how it fits into the overall European security architecture. Canada continues to regard the CSCE, given its character, its mandate and its membership, as the only regional security organization capable of dealing with the root causes of insecurity in the broad European region. However, while the CSCE can be effective in conflict prevention and human rights promotion, it is not well-suited to peace enforcement or large-scale peacekeeping. Thus Canada regards the CSCE as a complement to other regional and global organizations, one that must evolve drawing on its comparative advantages. These advantages include:

- a set of politically-binding principles and commitments across the whole range of security issues, traditional and non-traditional;
- a comprehensive mandate, and a comprehensive membership;
- the consensus rule, which gives all participants equal say;
- operational flexibility;
- a lean and cost-effective institutional structure; and
- a wide range of established mechanisms and instruments for use in conflict prevention.

The key issues in the period leading up to Budapest involve determining how those advantages are best applied in the areas of conflict management, the human dimension and relations with other organizations.

### Conflict Management

Further to the Rome meeting, one of the most pressing issues requiring clarification is the CSCE's response to proposed cooperation with "third party" peacekeepers. While Canada had hoped that the peacekeeping provisions it worked so carefully to develop in Helsinki would offer reasonable guidelines without imposing undue rigidity, they in practice proved so stringent to be unusable. Work is now underway in Vienna in two areas: 1) development of a generic paper to supplement the Helsinki Document's Chapter III; it is hoped this will better reflect the reality of on-the-ground situations and provide scope for monitoring third-party military forces as peacekeepers; and 2) development of the specific operation for monitoring CIS peacekeeping forces in Georgia. The West must determine

whether its desire for stability is reason enough to allow the Russians relatively free reign in areas of the former Soviet Union. Given that the Russians are going to intervene to maintain calm on their borders anyhow, Canada believes it is better that the CSCE claim a right and responsibility to keep watch over them than to turn a blind eye.

A further issue has to do with improving the effectiveness of CSCE conflict prevention missions. The report promised by Canada at the Rome meeting has been completed. It contains several suggestions for improving mission effectiveness, which Canada will be pursuing in the run-up to Budapest.

A broader issue involves the future of the military-security negotiations under the aegis of the Forum for Security Cooperation. Proposed Russian amendments to the CFE Treaty risk unravelling the fragile compromise of Treaty provisions. A weakened CFE Treaty would undermine confidence in the secure and stable balance of conventional forces that has facilitated the CSCE's conflict prevention work.

### The Human Dimension

In the human dimension as in Basket I, there is no need for new institutional machinery. The task is to get states to use the existing machinery and to react adequately in cases where it is used. Canada would like to see the human dimension instruments become vehicles for constructive self-analysis rather than for finger-pointing, e.g. participating states should be encouraged to identify where they might be having difficulties in developing domestic legislation to implement human dimension commitments. To this end, Canada would like to try to make the human dimension mechanism more accessible and less tainted; currently, it is difficult for states to engage the mechanism in a constructive way (e.g. self-invocation for the purpose of securing CSCE assistance), since using it is tantamount to admitting a human rights problem exists. In addition, Canada wants to broaden the HCNM's mandate; currently, he can only become involved if a situation involves national minorities and if there is a potential for conflict. Again, this leads to a stigma that inhibits positive use of his office.

### Cooperation with Other Organizations

The CSCE has the best-developed relationship with the UN of any regional organization, including letters of understanding, provision for observer status and regular consultation. In Canada's view, the challenge now is to operationalize that cooperation. Canada also wants further development of the operational relationship between the CSCE and NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The CSCE's relationship with the EC -- now the European Union (EU) -- is rather more problematic for Canada. The EU's increasingly assertive approach to European security issues means that the West Europeans bring well-crafted and supported positions to the CSCE table; however, it also results in a certain rigidity in EU positions and a growing tendency for the EU agenda to become the CSCE agenda.

### Other

Canada is pursuing other issues in the run-up to Budapest, including consolidation of the CSCE's institutional framework. For example, Canada has proposed that CSCE review

conferences are an anachronism that should be done away with, given that CSCE issues are discussed every day in the Permanent Committee anyhow. Review conferences could be replaced by biennial or ad hoc meetings of heads of state and government preceded by a two- to three-week CSO meeting. Canada would like to maintain the review conference functions of enabling participating states to assess implementation of commitments and to take new normative commitments where necessary; however, the former could be done through an annual human dimension implementation meeting and the latter through Permanent Committee negotiations.

Canada is also placing continued emphasis on maintaining the comprehensiveness of the CSCE, which in practice means heading off efforts by the Council of Europe to absorb the human dimension, or of the EC to take Basket II issues out of the CSCE.

In short, Canada's activities in the CSCE continue to be focused on the main themes identified in the May 1990 Humber College speech: maintaining the CSCE's comprehensive scope; improving the CSCE's institutional effectiveness; and refining the CSCE's tools for conflict prevention and management.

## CONCLUSION

The period since the Vienna FUM has seen a sea change in participating states' interest in using the CSCE to address security problems and in the CSCE's ability to do so. Canada has been one of the most ardent champions of giving the CSCE teeth to deal with conflicts in the CSCE area and, since early 1990, has (fairly) consistently advanced and supported initiatives towards this end. The Canadian contribution has been at both the conceptual and the operational level. 2

### Concept

At the level of concept, Canada has insisted throughout that the CSCE should retain its multidimensional focus and its comprehensive membership. This reflects Canada's understanding of the requirements of cooperative security. It led to Canadian efforts to strengthen human dimension commitments and to tie their implementation to the CSCE's developing conflict prevention machinery, something which happened through such devices as CSO consideration of human dimension questions, use of missions to address human dimension problems, and the initiation (by the Netherlands) of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities. Canada put less effort into, and saw less success, in maintaining an active Basket II, in part because the plethora of European economic institutions -- the EC, EBRD and ECE, as well as the international OECD, IMF and GATT -- meant there was little left for the CSCE to do in this area. In addition, Canada never clearly explicated just how the economic dimension could be linked to conflict prevention mechanisms, other than to note that failures and strains of economic development can lead to intra-state tensions, which Canada was in practice attempting to tackle through the human dimension anyhow. Nonetheless, the CSCE maintains an agenda of activity in all three baskets, and all three are now firmly institutionalized.

Canada has also been a strong supporter of maintaining the CSCE's broad membership. It has sought continued reference in CSCE documents to the importance of the transatlantic dimension. It has also promoted the active participation of all ex-Yugoslav and ex-Soviet states, reasoning that it is better to have these states attempting to live up to CSCE commitments, and to provide an avenue for outside encouragement and pressure, than not. Canada was not keen on the 1992 decision to suspend rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from the CSCE, which eventually led to the scotching of the long-term mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.

Similarly, Canada has been a leading advocate of improving the CSCE's political cooperation and institutional ties with other security organizations, such as the UN and NATO, and in encouraging outside observers (earlier Japan, now Korea) to sit in on CSCE meetings. Again this reflects Canada's multilateralist inclinations and its view of security as being achieved through overlapping, interlocking global and regional institutions.

Another conceptual contribution came through Canada's insistence that the CSCE's strength lay in conflict prevention and resolution, and that it should establish a broad stable of instruments towards this end. As early as May 1990, Canada set out a detailed vision of how the CSCE's crisis prevention and conflict resolution function might operate. It proposed institutions for political consultation and oversight, and operational mechanisms ranging from

low key fact-finding and good offices, to more formal procedures for mediation and arbitration, right up to peacekeeping, operating in some cases without consensus if necessary. The Helsinki Document's Chapter III, which Canada had an important managerial role in drafting, reflects the type of spectrum Canada had in mind.

### Operation

Canada has made a number of contributions to operationalizing the CSCE's conflict prevention and resolution capacity. One of the more important of these was insisting on a dual mandate for the Conflict Prevention Centre, one that incorporated support both for the political prevention and management of conflict and for the implementation of CSBMs. In the end, the CPC's greatest value has turned out to be in the former area, particularly in fielding preventive diplomacy missions. The mission support unit has given the CPC -- theretofore poorly staffed, undertasked and marginal to European security issues (even in CSBM implementation) -- a new lease on life and a major role in on-the-ground crisis management. Because the unit is the only link between the Chairman-in-Office and the mission in the field, the CPC has come to serve a helpful political as well as logistical function.

Canada also made a notable contribution in advancing the idea of long-term missions, which have proved to be one of the most successful aspects of the CSCE's conflict prevention work. The Canadian-led Kosovo fact-finding mission from which this idea sprang also had a seminal influence in demonstrating that it was possible for a CSCE mission to produce an unbiased report: this encouraged revision of sceptical attitudes towards missions, particularly on the part of the Russians, which in turn helped to secure the future of missions within the CSCE.

Canada helped to spearhead efforts to create a framework for CSCE peacekeeping. Although the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Document's Chapter III have never been applied, they complete the CSCE's spectrum of conflict management tools, provide a practical way of cooperating with NATO and the UN, and are now being refined to allow CSCE monitoring of peacekeeping by other organizations.

No less important, Canada has contributed resources to the CSCE. In addition to its assessed contributions,<sup>25</sup> Canada has made voluntary payments to support CSCE causes, including aiding the participation of newly admitted states in CSCE meetings and hosting a forestry meeting in Canada. Canada has also seconded personnel whose quality and dedication have facilitated the accomplishments of several CSCE missions. Canada has not, however, held the Chairmanship, something it may wish to seek if it wishes to maintain its level of influence within the CSCE.

Finally, a contribution that goes beyond the scope of this paper but deserves to be mentioned is Canada's work in advancing the CSBM, CFE and Open Skies negotiations, particularly on the verification side. Since the delegations to the Vienna negotiations also served as national representatives to the CPC Consultative Committee and in some cases to

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<sup>25</sup>Canada contributes 5.45% of the common CSCE costs. This amounted to some \$941,600 in 1990-91, \$777,000 in 1991-92 and \$1,900,000 in 1992-93. These amounts do not include Canada's contributions to the arms control and CSBM negotiations.

the CSO, there was a good deal of cross-fertilization between the arms control and conflict prevention processes. The patterns of interaction and openness established in the arms control negotiations were usefully exploited in the development of conflict management mechanisms.

### A Strong Voice

*although not initially  
universally accepted*

Canada was not the first or only state to put forward many of these ideas. For example, by spring 1990, there was little doubt that the CSCE would be institutionalized, that it would have a conflict prevention centre, and that regular high-level political meetings would provide the guiding hand in conflict management. The withering of Cold War structures and proliferation of conflicts post-Paris made the CSCE a more palatable choice for response. Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy -- all worked to advance the CSCE's conflict prevention and management capability; even the US and Russia helped to keep the human dimension alive. Canada's contribution often consisted of lending support to others' initiatives or of working within informal coalitions of states, such as the CPC "maximalists" and the "Friends of Peacekeeping." However, in such debates and coalitions, Canada frequently exercised an influence disproportionate to its size. The Canadian ability to get its ideas across was due to the priority placed on the CSCE in Canada's European policy, which led to the development of a series of CSCE "strategy and action" documents by an energetic CSCE division in the Department of External Affairs, documents that were in turn condensed into working papers and fed into the CSCE at key junctures by a highly competent Canadian delegation in Vienna. Canada's skill lay in having thought enough about the CSCE and how Canada wanted it to develop such that when others were ready to move in a certain direction, Canada could insert a well-developed proposal for doing so. In an important sense, Canada was in the right place at the right time with the right ideas -- and was prepared to follow through.

Just as the structures created by the Paris Charter have been substantially amended since then, so have Canadian ideas been pragmatically flexible. About the time of the Helsinki FUM, Canada dropped the idea of crisis panels -- a staple of earlier Canadian papers -- after recognizing that compulsory mechanisms would continue to be non-starters. The original proposal had to some extent been a device for ensuring the CSCE would be quickly engaged in a crisis situation, an idea Canada continued to pursue by supporting the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities and advocating the establishment of the Vienna Group. However, even as Canadian ideas have evolved with a view to making the CSCE more effective, Canada has retained its bottom line of comprehensive mandate, transatlantic dimension, central role in conflict prevention and management, limited bureaucracy, and implementation of commitments. If one compares Canada's 1990 proposals with what the CSCE is today, there is a considerable degree of overlap. Canada deserves credit for achieving, by no means single-handedly, many of its objectives. Were these objectives worth achieving?

## Relevance

Developments in 1993 were marked by a continued lack of progress toward more stability in the CSCE area. Shooting wars were ongoing in the Balkans, Transcaucasia and Tajikistan. Ethnic tension continued to increase the danger of further conflicts. Fragile emerging democracies were faced with fundamental challenges incompatible with basic CSCE values. And human rights violations continued unabated.

The above comes not from a critic of the CSCE but from its own Secretary General, in his annual report. Given the turmoil in the CSCE area, have all Canada's efforts come to naught?

The CSCE's success in conflict prevention is difficult to gauge: in cases where the CSCE has been active, one does not know whether lack of war is due to the CSCE's intervention or whether war would never have broken out in the first place. The CSCE did not prevent conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, but it is unrealistic to expect that it could or should have. The CSCE conflict prevention institutions were hardly in place when the war broke out, and the CSCE was never given an opportunity to manage the conflict, a task that was appropriated by the EC and later the UN. Even in ex-Yugoslavia, the CSCE has had a small beneficial effect, with its sanctions assistance and "spillover" missions. In Kosovo, the mission probably saved lives by acting as a restraint on Serb militiamen and on Albanians who might have become more violent had they not had the CSCE to turn to. However, the long-term Kosovo mission was undermined by the decision to suspend Serbia-Montenegro from the CSCE, which caused Serbia to get rid of the mission.

Outside the Balkans, mission success has varied depending on the extent to which disputing parties have been amenable to outside influence and on the amount of political support accorded the mission by Vienna and capitals. Dealing typically with deep-rooted tensions and labouring under vague or overly ambitious mandates, missions have nonetheless been able to act as ombudsmen and go-betweens in often byzantine disputes, and have provided a source of advice about issues as basic as constitution-writing and the application of human rights. Indeed, one of the CSCE's greatest triumphs was encouraging the modification of Estonian citizenship and language laws. Hardly the stuff to pacify Europe, but an achievement that eases human suffering and may forestall the emergence of conflict down the road. The missions have put an international spotlight on potentially nasty corners of Europe, meant that situations that could have deteriorated did not do so, and led to very small steps forward. The HCNM has also worked very well, as a low-key independent figure, in negotiating minority questions.

The Canadian-commissioned study of the effectiveness of missions, conducted in early 1994, concluded that all missions studied had exercised a restraining influence on contending groups, although only in rare instances were they able, in spite of efforts, to move in the direction of conflict resolution. Two test cases are unfolding right now, in Nagorno-Karabakh (the "Minsk process") and Georgia (Ossetia), where the CSCE has been given the responsibility for dealing with active conflicts.

Missions are likely to lose their credibility if they stay for a long time and there is little discernable improvement in the situation. Only now is the CSCE starting to look seriously at the issue of follow-up to mission recommendations, something that gets closer to



the CSCE's real problem when it comes to conflict prevention and management: that of political will.

CSCE institutions, now that ideological solidarity no longer motivates its participants, could provide institutional impetus for decisions and actions which states may not be prepared to take on their own. Yet institutional impetus is of little use if states are not prepared to fund and, more importantly, to authorize collective action. Political will is the cornerstone of CSCE activity. All the "early warnings" received, all the dispute settlement procedures in place, and all the resources the institutions can muster are useless without participating State willingness to address problems and conflicts, and to address them multilaterally through the CSCE.<sup>26</sup>

The Canadian position throughout has been to endow the CSCE with conflict prevention and management tools so that the CSCE is ready and able to act when the will to use it arises. Moreover, Canada -- with a functionalist bent to its foreign policy -- has hoped that the very process of deepening commitments and creating mechanisms by consensus will help to generate political will. This "build it and they will come" attitude has contrasted with the more sceptical "if they come, build it" attitude of some other Western delegations. The jury is still out as to which is more effective. As it stands, the CSCE is not yet as central to post-Cold War European developments as Canada had hoped, but it is by no means on the sidelines. As one in a range of complementary organizations, it is not a bad option. And, by early on staking a strong position in the debate over the CSCE's evolution, Canada helped to secure for the CSCE, and thus for Canada, a continuing role in European security issues.

The future extent and nature of that role will depend on a number of factors. The CSCE may grow in importance as Russia reasserts itself, since the CSCE is the only European security organization in which Russia is a full member. However, as the Central and East Europeans become more sure of themselves and more engaged with the EU and NATO, Canada's ability to find ready allies within the CSCE may lessen. Moreover, since the questions facing the CSCE have less and less to do with the construction of mechanisms and more and more to do with the day-to-day management of continuing problems, Canada's voice may diminish in relation to those who are closest to those problems. Even on the margins, however, there is likely to be room for thoughtful Canadian contributions. For example, in the current development of the generic peacekeeping paper and the Georgian monitoring operation, it is delegation interest rather than unique expertise that spurs Canadian participation (since Canada's experience in peacekeeping is now equalled by most Europeans). But precisely because Canada has no special interest at stake, it is often able to spot practical problems of implementation that states closer to the situation, with their own agendas at hand, have missed. Canada cannot assume an automatic audience for its interventions, but it can -- if it invests the necessary time in preparation -- continue to make

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<sup>26</sup>*The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C., September 1992), p. 7.

high-quality, practical contributions to the organization's handling of European security questions. And if, as seems likely, the CSCE's greatest value continues to come in dealing with human dimension questions and in promoting security dialogue, Canada has the advantage of a sound track record and experience that long predates the Paris Charter.

## ANNEX A: THE CSCE'S CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT MACHINERY

*Below is a list of the CSCE institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, with their meeting or document of origin indicated in parentheses.*

### Political Supervisory Bodies

Heads of State or Government - meet biennially (Paris Charter 1990)

Council of Foreign Ministers - meets annually (Paris Charter 1990) *C; D*

Committee of Senior Officials - meets three-four times per year (Paris Charter 1990)

Permanent Committee - ongoing (genesis in CPC Consultative Committee, Paris Charter 1990; immediate predecessor in Vienna Group, Stockholm Council 1992; renamed and expanded, Rome Council 1993)

### Institutions and Offices

Conflict Prevention Centre (Paris Charter 1990)

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (created as Office for Free Elections, Paris Charter 1990; renamed and expanded, Prague Council 1992)

Forum for Security Cooperation (Helsinki Document 1992)

High Commissioner on National Minorities (Helsinki Document 1992)

### Mechanisms

Human Dimension Mechanism (created Vienna Concluding Document 1989; improved Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension 1991)

Provision for convening emergency CSO meetings (Berlin Council 1991)

Mechanism for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Valletta Meeting 1991)

Provisions for early warning, missions and peacekeeping (Helsinki Document 1992)

Provisions for voluntary and directed conciliation (Stockholm Council 1992)

CSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Stockholm Council 1992)

*See Gen?*  
*On Mil Activity*

## **ANNEX B: THE CSCE'S SCHEDULE, 1990-94**

### **1990**

March 19 - April 11: Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, Bonn  
June 5-29: Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen  
July 10 - November 17: Preparatory Committee for the CSCE Summit, Vienna  
October 1-2: CSCE Foreign Ministers Meeting, New York  
November 19-21: CSCE Summit Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Paris  
December 3: First Meeting of CPC Consultative Committee, Vienna

### **1991**

January 15 - February 8: Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta  
January 28-29: First Meeting of the CSO, Vienna  
May 28 - June 7: Symposium on the Cultural Heritage, Cracow  
June 19-20: First Meeting of the CSCE Council, Berlin  
July 1-19: Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva  
September 10 - October 4: Third Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Moscow  
November 4-15: Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, Moscow

### **1992**

January 30-31: Second Meeting of the CSCE Council, Prague  
February 19-21: CPC Seminar on Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production, Bratislava  
March 4-6: CPC Seminar on Armed Forces in Democratic Societies, Vienna  
March 10-23: Preparatory Meeting for the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, Helsinki  
March 24: First Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, Helsinki  
March 24-July 8: Follow-Up Meeting, Helsinki  
July 3-5: Inaugurating Session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Budapest  
July 9-10: CSCE Summit, Helsinki  
September 22: Opening of (ongoing) Forum for Security Cooperation  
October 12-23: Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Geneva  
November 16-20: Human Dimension Seminar on Tolerance, Warsaw  
December 14-15: Third Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm

### **1993**

April 20-23: Human Dimension Seminar on Migration, Warsaw  
May 17-21: Mediterranean Seminar, Valletta  
May 24-28: Human Dimension Seminar on Case Studies on National Minorities Issues, Warsaw  
June 7-9: CPC Seminar on CSCE Peacekeeping, Vienna  
July 6-9: Second Meeting of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Helsinki  
September 27 - October 1: Seminar of Experts on Sustainable Development of Boreal and Temperate Forests, Montreal  
September 27 - October 15: First Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, Warsaw

November 2-5: Human Dimension Seminar on Free Media, Warsaw  
November 30-December 1: Fourth Meeting of the CSCE Council, Rome

**1994**

March 15-17: Second Economic Forum, Prague

October 10 - December 2: Review Conference, Budapest, followed by Summit

## **ANNEX C: IMPORTANT CSCE DOCUMENTS AND RELATED CANADIAN SPEECHES AND WORKING PAPERS, 1990-94**

Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, at McGill University, Montreal, February 5, 1990.

Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus, on Canada and the New Europe, May 26, 1990.

Working Paper by Canada, July 11, 1990.

Working Paper by Canada, "Centre for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict," July 1990.

Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation Meeting of Foreign Ministers, New York, October 2, 1990.

Charter of Paris for a New Europe, November 1990.

Working Paper by Canada, "Conflict Prevention Centre: Evolution and Development," January 28, 1991.

Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting, Berlin, June 19, 1991.

Summary of Conclusions, Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council, June 19-20, 1991.

Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, October 1991.

Working Paper by Canada, "The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism of the CSCE," October 1991.

Working Paper by Canada, "CSCE Peacekeeping: Concept and Guidelines," December 1991.

Notes for An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting, Prague, January 30, 1992.

Summary of Conclusions, Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, January 30-31, 1992.

Speech by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, March 24, 1992.

Summary of Conclusions, First Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, Helsinki, March

24, 1992.

Non-Paper by Canada, "CSCE Peacekeeping," March 1992.

CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change.

Summary of Conclusions, Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council, December 14-15, 1992.

Paper by Canada, "The Continuing Evolution of the CSCE: Looking Towards Budapest," April 1993.

Speech by the Honourable André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Fourth Meeting of the CSCE Council, Rome, November 30, 1993.

Decisions, Rome Meeting of the CSCE Council, December 1, 1993.

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