





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

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THE  
DEFENCE OF CANADA,  
BY  
A CANADIAN LANDHOLDER.

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The Dominion of Canada possesses all the elements which should make of its inhabitants a great people—courage, energy, endurance, enterprise, intelligence, patriotism and morality; but whatever the attributes of the people may be, no community can be said to be deserving the title of a great nation which is content to rest its political existence on the forbearance of a more powerful neighbour. Yet that such is now the condition of Canada will probably be conceded by most of the readers of these remarks.

It is customary to believe, at least to assert the belief, that England will spend her last man and her last shilling in defending Canada in the event of her being attacked; and indeed as the only attack that can be anticipated must come from the United States, and as the only cause for such an attack would be found in the attachment of Canada to Britain, it would be an indelible stain on the escutcheon of England if she were to leave Canada defenceless. It is believed that the English people in the mass are sound on this question, that they fully recognize their obligations in this respect, and that in the event of war with the United States England would put forth her whole power to defend Canada.

There are, however, two different methods of defence: the direct, and the indirect.

The direct method would consist in opposing an invading army on Canadian soil.

The indirect method would consist in waging a naval warfare against the United States sea board, in the hope of inflicting such damage to the enemy as should compel him to make peace on our own terms; a method which would have the disadvantage of leaving Canada temporarily to her own resources, to wage an unequal contest against an invading enemy greatly her superior in numbers and in all the appliances of war.

Now in order to defend Canada directly with any prospect of success, it is necessary that certain precautionary measures should be adopted; and these depend mainly on the Canadian people themselves.

It would be a pure delusion to imagine that Canada can be a successful field of battle for England against America, if the communications of that battle field with its base of operations are by a line three thousand miles in length across a stormy ocean, while the enemy is fighting at his own door.

The base of operations for the defence of Canada against the United States must be found in Canada itself; and the manner in which that base should be organized beforehand, so as to render the successful defence of the country, with England's co-operation, not only possible but easy, at a minimum of cost, it is the aim of these remarks to demonstrate.

However desirable and advantageous it might be in the abstract that Canada should constantly maintain any thing like an adequate force of highly trained Militia, the financial circumstances of the Dominion, the sparsity of population as compared with the area of country, and the industrial habits of the people, all forbid the expectation that such a force will ever be provided as an insurance against a contingency, which although possible is not certain, nor in the opinion of many, even probable. But neither would the measures herein advocated be found to be unreasonably costly; nor would their adoption lay any unequal pressure on a small proportion of the hard working inhabitants of the country, such as those who have given their time hitherto to its military service have had just cause to complain of. And indeed unless some such measures be adopted, England would only be acting with justifiable prudence if she should decline to commit a single regular soldier in so far advanced a position, without any adequate support against an enemy possessing such vastly superior resources immediately available.

It is confidently believed that the Government of Canada want no urging in this matter; and that they are prepared to introduce as liberal a measure for the defence of the country as it would be possible to carry in parliament. But the people should take the initiative, and by a display of public opinion on this vital question, strengthen the hands of the Government in doing that which they are earnestly desirous to do, viz: in placing Canada above those apprehensions of invasion, and that general sense of insecurity, which has sensibly interfered with her material prosperity.

Even in a commercial view, the money that might be spent for such a purpose would be the best investment that could be made of the public funds. The great want of this country is capital to develop its magnificent capabilities. The great obstacle to the

influx of that capital has been the defenceless condition of the country and the uneasy sense of insecurity resulting therefrom. The different legislatures are busy devising laws to encourage emigration, but such laws alone can have but a very limited effect in that direction. Emigration can never be *forced* by any means. Emigration can never be attracted by any means to a comparatively poor and thinly inhabited country, where the emigrant can only depend for his subsistence on the cultivation of the soil, which he must first rescue from the wilderness at the cost of an appalling amount of labour and hardship. But emigration flows naturally to those countries where money is being expended in public improvements; and if these are real improvements, that is, if they really develop new means by which the inhabitants of the country may enrich themselves, the emigrants who came to labour will take root in the land.

If we can by any means dispel the belief that the stability of Canadian institutions is uncertain, and dependent on the caprice of a powerful neighbour, English capitalists who are now receiving three per cent for their money will be only too glad to invest it in a country which would in the supposed case present itself as so remunerative a field for its employment.

To come to the means :—

1. The militia bill now before parliament provides for the yearly training of 40,000 men. This force should be made a really reliable advanced guard of the main Canadian army, which might be depended on as immediately available on any sudden call. But the country should insure the cheerful service of the officers and men composing this advanced guard by treating them literally.

2. The militia bill likewise provides for the formation of the *cadres* of a first battalion of regular militia in every regimental district throughout the country by the appointment of the officers and non-commissioned officers, all of whom are to be trained for a certain number of days in each year in camps of exercise. The privates of all these battalions will be enrolled through the operation of a very simple machinery, and may be called out for service in case of need in such proportions as may be deemed necessary.

It is evident that if we could have the officers and non-commissioned officers, representing an army of 100,000 men, fairly instructed, and the privates available though untrained, Canada could not justly be reproached with having no army. It is true that that army would, at the outset of a war, require the support of entrenched camps in the different centres of population, where the militia of the district would soon acquire organization and disci-



pline through the efforts of the trained officers and non-commissioned officers.

3. Now comes the question as to the arming of the privates of this army. They must of course be armed and with the same weapon as the British soldier ; but there are insuperable objections to the distribution of 100,000 of these valuable arms among the different regimental districts. They might indeed be stored at the entrenched camps, to be issued only when by reason of emergency the militia of the district are there assembled. But this plan admits of no previous acquaintance with the weapon.

The operations of the Dominion Rifle Association may be made the means of reconciling the difficulties attending this question, in some such manner as the following :

An enthusiasm for rifle shooting must be created ; but in a poor country, such as Canada, it is impossible that private subscription can offer the same inducements to emulation in rifle shooting, as have been easily supplied by the wealthy classes of England. The Government should therefore devote a liberal sum in each year to provide prizes for competition ; and it would be good to establish as the minimum public contribution, an equal sum to that which might be raised in each year in the Dominion by private subscription.

Next let the Government announce that it will retail Snider Enfield rifles at a reduced price to every resident Canadian, under certain conditions of fitness. The appropriation of 200,000 dollars annually for this purpose would place 35,000 of these weapons in the hands of the young men of the Country at the price of 12 dollars for each rifle ; the balance of 6 dollars per rifle being borne by the government and being represented by the above appropriation.\*

In this manner we should have within three years 100,000 of these arms in the hands of the very men who would form the rank and file of the militia in case of war, who would take care of them as being their own property, and who would be incited to attain skill in using them through the enthusiasm for rifle shooting which it is confidently hoped the newly formed association will create.

4. *Entrenched camps.* The construction of entrenched camps on proper principles in the great centres of population, would render the successful defence of Canada *possible* even without any military force organized beforehand. This is, of itself and taken alone, by far the most effective measure of defence that can be adopted. Without these camps, the organization of any such

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\* NOTE.—This suggestion is borrowed from an excellent pamphlet published in the autumn of 1866, by Dr. Hewitt.

Military force as it is possible to anticipate in Canada would be of little avail; and no force, however numerous, possessing no previous organization, could oppose a disciplined enemy in the field with any prospect of success; for without previous organization and training, in the attempt to oppose disciplined troops, great numbers would only ensure great slaughter.

The construction of these camps, in combination with the other measures above advocated, would, it is confidently contended, render the successful defence of Canada not probable, but certain; in the hypothesis that the people at large desire to maintain their connection with England.

As the subject is one of great importance, and one on which every Canadian should possess the necessary data for forming a judgment, it is thought advisable here to argue the question somewhat in detail. The following remarks are borrowed from a pamphlet published by Colonel MacDongall in 1865.

“The basis of all reasoning on the defence of Canada must be that, in the first instance, certainly, the defenders will not be what is called a manœuvring force, and that, in the presence of an enemy practised in war, they could not safely quit the shelter of fortifications, except for the purpose of a sudden dash or sally. With the force it is assumed the Americans could wield, the tide of their invasion would overspread and submerge the country. The entrenched camps proposed to be constructed would then show like so many island rocks above the general flood—places of refuge isolated for a time and self-sustaining, from which the defenders would watch their opportunity for offensive action, if such should present itself. Each camp would, in short, form the base of operations for the organized militia, and the levy *en masse* of the surrounding district.

“It is not to be supposed that the militia must of necessity shut itself up within its camp on the first alarm; it would be employed in any such operations in the field to delay the advance of an enemy which it might prudently undertake, avoiding anything like a battle except under very favourable conditions, and falling back, when necessary, on its own secure base.

“The number of men actually enrolled in the militia would bear a small proportion to the number who would turn out to defend their homes and property, provided a fair chance were afforded them of opposing the invaders with any prospect of success; and this fair chance could be provided in no other manner than by the construction of a few entrenched camps at central points, on which the militia, as well as the levy *en masse* of each district would *swarm* on the first alarm, and into which the grain and cattle of the surrounding country should immediately be gathered.

“ In this manner, and in this manner alone, every man in Canada capable of bearing arms or using a spade or axe, might be utilized in the defence of his country; and although the territory of Canada would be over-run in the first instance at a cost of vast loss and suffering to the colonists, the province could never be conquered so long as there existed an organized force supported by impregnable fortifications, and daily increasing in efficiency; for a hostile army would be very unlikely to remain in Canada in winter, since it is obvious that if it were to go into winter quarters it would be liable to constant surprises, being in an enemy's country, and within reach of a sudden combined movement from perhaps two or more of the fortified places. If the invading army attempted to maintain the investment of one or more of the camps during winter, the danger to which it would be exposed from the same cause would be greatly increased.

“ The greatly increased range and accuracy of modern artillery bestow on the defence of any deliberately-prepared position an advantage over the attack which it has not hitherto possessed. It will be impossible for an assailant to force a position the guns of which, protected from counterbattery by works whether of earth or masonry, sweep all the approaches to a distance of 3,000 yards, with an accuracy and destructive effect that were unknown to the shorter range of the obsolete ordnance.

“ On the other hand, any town fortified after the old system—that is to say, surrounded by a continuous fortified *enceinte*—may be destroyed by shells from a great distance. But no towns will in future be so fortified; and important places will be protected by a series of detached forts disposed on a large circumference; the forts themselves mounting the heaviest ordnance; being of an area so contracted as to be capable of being defended, each by a comparatively very small garrison; and presenting a small mark for shells, from which missiles also the garrisons would be provided with shelter.

“ A series of such forts disposed round any place it is designed to protect, and occupying the most commanding points of the surrounding country, constitute in the aggregate one of those fortresses, to which we have applied the term of entrenched camps, in the scheme for the defence of Canada.

“ In general terms, the advantages of entrenched camps are :—

1. They oblige an enemy to commence his approaches at a great distance from the town they are designed to protect;
2. They are too strong, even when occupied by troops of inferior discipline, to be taken by assault;
3. They are too extensive to be successfully invested, and, unless completely invested, it is next to impossible to take a place by regular approaches;
4. The forts composing the

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system can be defended by a comparatively very small garrison, leaving the great mass of the defensive force massed in the interior, and able to direct its operations against any point in the besiegers' lines.

"An entrenched camp composed of a system of forts—say, for example, nine in number—would mark a circumference of about nine miles. The radius of this circle would be one mile and a half.

"Supposing the enemy to commence his first parallel at the distance of 3,000 yards from the forts, then, since the circumferences of circles are to one another as their respective radii, it follows that the development of the investing lines must be rather more than 18 miles. Supposing, now, that the besieging force numbered 100,000 men; that number distributed over 18 miles would give a proportion of about 5,500 men to a mile. Suppose finally that apart from the garrisons of the forts, 50,000 men were massed in the interior of the camp, it is evident that, by a sudden sally, the mass of the defensive force might be directed against any point at pleasure of the weak investing line, and would there meet with opposition from, at the utmost, 10,000 men. These sorties could be repeated daily, the time and the point of attack being varied every day, so that the besiegers could never know when and where they might be attacked. It seems utterly impossible that the regular operations of a siege could be pushed under such circumstances. For such sorties it is by no means necessary that the defensive force should be highly disciplined, as it would not in such operations ever be required to venture more than 3,000 yards from its secure base.

"Let us admit, however, for the sake of argument, that the besiegers were free to form their extended lines of investment, and to commence regular approaches against the place. The experience of a recent trial at Newhaven has demonstrated that one Armstrong hundred-pounder shell gun, firing from a distance of 1,000 yards, made a clear breach 30 feet wide in a well-rammed earthen parapet 25 feet thick, in less than three hours. The same result could probably be achieved by two such guns firing at the same description of parapet, from a distance of 3,000 yards, within the same time—since the accuracy of fire varies hardly at all at the two distances above stated, and the explosive effect is always the same. How then would it be possible to carry on siege approaches in the face of such a gun, which would destroy the besiegers' batteries more quickly than he could erect them?

"It requires little argument to prove that the forts composing the system would each be impregnable to direct assault: provided with deep ditches and masonry *revêtements*, and the ditches swept with a fire of grape from works constructed in and across the

ditches for that purpose, none but madmen would think of assaulting such a work without having previously made a breach in it, and dismantled its guns.

"The argument is that, if an enemy invaded Canada in winter, these entrenched camps could be effectively defended by the organised militia and volunteers, aided by a small force of regular garrison artillery.

"Supposing Canada provided with five such camps, and the organised militia and volunteers to number 100,000 men; that number would be raised by the levy *en masse* to 300,000 at the least, giving an average number of defenders to each camp of 60,000 men. Deduct from each of these bodies 5,000 men for the garrisons of the forts, and you would have the interior space occupied by 55,000 men; and this without counting any of the regular troops.

"It is not to be supposed that the actual scheme of defence contemplates an equal number of forts or an equal garrison for all the camps; some would have more, some less: the numbers here given are only for the sake of convenient example.

"In summer, if an attack were threatened, the defenders of each camp would soon connect the forts by parapets of earth. In winter, parapets of snow, well stamped and watered, would be quite as effectual.

"Each fort, such as has been above supposed, would mount 20 guns and hold a garrison of 500 men. Dépôts of arms, ammunition and military stores, would be formed in anticipation at each camp, sufficient for the supply of the levy *en masse*, as well as for the organized militia of its surrounding district. And means should be prepared for housing and storing the grain and cattle."

To recapitulate; supposing the above recommendations to be adopted, we should have in case of need.

1. An advanced guard of 40,000 volunteers.
2. The trained officers and non commissioned officers representing an army of 100,000 men.
3. The privates of that army, a large proportion of them already armed with the best Military Rifle in existence and skilful in using it.
4. The entrenched camps, wherein the above named force would be concentrated at the first warning of real danger.

In short Canada would be secure in the consciousness of her own strength, and the feeling of confidence such a sense of security would engender, could not fail to react beneficially on the general prosperity.

The measures herein urged are perfectly within the financial means of the people of this Dominion. Apart from the cost of

fortifications, the maximum yearly charge on the revenue for the Militia service and for other purposes herein set forth, need not exceed twelve hundred thousand dollars (\$1,200,000). Is the object to be achieved worthy of that outlay? There never has been, and there probably never will be again, so favorable a time for disposing of this irritating question once and for ever; for it must surely be irritating, nay galling, to a Canadian to be told so often from the other side of the Atlantic, that his country is defenceless, that he knows it is so, and that he will not do anything to remedy the evil.

Although the writer feels certain the American people have neither the desire nor intention to go to war with us; although he does not believe it *probable* that such a war will be brought about through any combination of circumstances; although it may be conceded that out of twenty chances, nineteen are against such an event; still the one unlikely chance sometimes turns up, and who shall say that it may not do so in our own case.

Just as men in the management of their private affairs are content to incur a certain expense to provide against the consequence of a very improbable event, when they insure their lives and properties, each year, against death or fire; so the outlay required to be undertaken to provide against the possible chance of a war with the United States, should be considered in the light of an insurance to avert a great possible calamity.

The Fenian organization and designs have not been here advertised to because they are too insignificant to be taken into account; *contemptible* should be the word if a society of assassins could properly be so called. But so far as any attempts on Canada are concerned, the shade of Thomas D'Arcy McGee will guard our frontiers more effectually than a Military force; and the kindly and gifted man whom they have murdered, and who in life was their most dreaded enemy, will in his death prove their destroyer. All the true and sincere though mistaken men, of whom it is to be hoped there are some in their ranks, will fall away from that execrable society, which amid all the ameliorating influences of the 19th century, has reduced assassination to a system, and which has so desecrated the holy name of patriotism by linking it with midnight murder:—a society which, in the words of the New York Herald "being too weak to accomplish any good, has turned its hand to evil, most cowardly and detestable."

