




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


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
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A
FULL and FAITHFUL
R E P O R T
OF THE
D E B A T E S
IN
BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,
ON
MONDAY the 17th of FEBRUARY,
AND
FRIDAY the 21st of FEBRUARY, 1783,
ON THE
ARTICLES of PEACE.

L O N D O N;

Printed for S. BLADON, Numb. 13,
PATER-NOSTER Row.

A
FULL AND FAITHFUL
R E P O R T
OF THE
D E B A T E S
IN
BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,
ON
MONDAY the 17th of FEBRUARY,
AND
FRIDAY the 21st of FEBRUARY, 1861,
BY THE
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT.

L O N D O N:
Printed for S. BARNARD, Newgate Street,
PATON & CO. Stationers Row.

... ..

H O U S E

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C O M M O N S.

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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1783.

THE House was more crowded with members and strangers, than it has been known for many years. There were upwards of four hundred and fifty members in the house at one time. About four o'clock the order of the day was called for; and the clerk at the table read the Articles of Peace with France and Spain; and the Provisional Articles with America.

— *Mr. Thomas Pitt* then rose to move the address; he began with saying he felt mixed sentiments of regret and satisfaction: that whilst he congratulated the house and the country upon seeing the progression towards certain ruin stopped, and a period

put to such a complication of evils as had scarce ever combined together, — he could not without pain reflect that in the course of so few years, all our boasted empire upon the continent of North America was reduced to little more than the acknowledged possession of France at the outset of the last war. That a peace was always unpopular, — if the war was prosperous, the hopes were disappointed, — if disastrous, the concessions were humiliating, — that if he had any thing to build upon popularity, or if prudence was his character, he should content himself with a silent vote upon the occasion, rather than draw upon himself clamour from without doors, and the attack of party spirit within. That, however, popular prejudice gave way to time, and truth sooner or later carried conviction with it. That as to Ministers and the candidates for Ministry, he looked upon them as dealers in the same merchandize, that they discredited each others wares to recommend their own, and to draw customers to them. That thinking men admired their ingenuity, but reduced their arguments to their just value.

That the question before the house was simply this, whether *such* a peace was better than *such* a war. — He then proceeded to shew the necessity of peace from the state of the country. He proved by papers upon the table, that the interest of the public debt, was increased from less than four millions and

a half at the beginning of Lord North's war, to near nine millions and a half at present. — That this six years war had cost us therefore considerably more than all the successes of the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Chatham, and all the wars put together from the time of the revolution for near a century. — That it had entailed a permanent burthen upon the land of England in her reduced state, of ten shillings in the pound additional land-tax; that our expence in peace would be from fourteen to fifteen millions per annum, with an income of eleven millions: that he remembered the close of the last war, and how necessary peace was then thought by some of the wisest authorities. What would they now say were they to give their opinions upon the present question. The price now paid by us for our peace to France and Spain, was the sacrifice of one small island in the West-Indies, two Floridas, the island of Minorca dismantled, therefore useless to us, and some immaterial advantages in their fishery and in their settlements in the East Indies. — Price paid by France at the last peace, Dominica, Grenada, the Grenadines, Tobago, St. Vincents, her possessions in Canada and North America, humiliating restraints upon her fishery, — in Europe, Minorca, — in Africa, Senegal, — in India she consented that her settlements in Bengal should be defenceless, and contented herself with the trade after abandoning all her

projects of dominion ; and Spain yielded up the two Floridas. —

That as to America their independence was no concession, since you could not deprive them of it. That the extent of their boundary was no disadvantage to you, but was well chose to prevent all future contests by lakes and rivers, common to both countries ; that Canada left us more territory than he hoped would ever be settled from this country. That the interest of the sincere Loyalists were as dear to him as to any man, but that he could never think it would have been promoted by carrying on that unfortunate war which Parliament had in fact suspended before the beginning of the treaty. That it was impossible after the part Congress was pledged to take in it, to conceive that their recommendation would not have its proper influence on the different legislatures — that he did not himself see what more could have been done on their behalf, except by renewing the war for their sakes, and increasing ours and their calamities. That those who had constantly been holding out to us the prosperities of this country, her inexhaustible resources — the subjugation of America and all the golden dreams with which we were so long deluded, would he doubted not, condemn this peace as ignominious, or any other, by which we did give the law to the belligerent powers ; that they talked and acted as foolish gamblers, whose passions

bind

bind them more strongly to persevere the more their losses galled them — that wise men would think you could not too soon rise up from a losing game, and that all he should answer to such arguments was, to rejoice that such a spirit of infatuation did no longer guide our councils. That if others who felt as he did the necessity of peace, and had knocked at every door to sue for it, agreeing with him on the premises, rejected the conclusion, it would remain for them to prove that there was some difference so essential in our favour between the present terms and what they would have adopted, as to compensate the expence of another year's war — in which case he did not doubt the king of France would yield instantly to those conditions, upon paying the sixteen or twenty millions, such a delay would incur to Great Britain. He then adverted to the necessity of changing our plan of commercial regulations, and concluded with expressing his hearty thanks to the ministers for having brought us out of our difficulties under every possible discouragement, which nothing but their courage and firmness could have got the better of. That he might possibly differ with them in their future measures, but he should always feel pain in so doing, from the recollection of the very important service they now did their country.

He then moved “ That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, to return his Majesty the Thanks of this House for his gracious condescension

" descension in ordering to be laid before us the Pre-
 " liminary and Provisional Articles of the different
 " Treaties which his Majesty hath concluded, and
 " to assure his Majesty, that we have considered them
 " with that attention which so important a subject re-
 " quires. To express in the most dutiful manner to
 " his Majesty our satisfaction, that his Majesty has,
 " in consequence of the powers entrusted to him,
 " laid the foundation, by the Provisional Articles,
 " with the States of North America, for a Treaty of
 " Peace; which we trust will ensure perfect recon-
 " ciliation and friendship between both countries,
 " That in this confidence we presume to express to
 " his Majesty our just expectation that the several
 " States of North America will carry into effec-
 " tual and satisfactory execution those measures,
 " which the Congress is so solemnly bound by the
 " Treaty to recommend, in favour of such persons
 " as have suffered for the part which they have taken
 " in the war; and that we shall consider this cir-
 " cumstance as the surest indication of returning
 " friendship. And to acknowledge to his Majesty
 " our due sense of that wise and paternal regard for
 " the happiness of his subjects, which induced his
 " Majesty to relieve them from a burthensome and ex-
 " pensive war, by the Preliminary Articles of Peace
 " concluded between his Majesty and the Most
 " Christian and Catholick Kings. To assure his
 " Majesty, that we shall encourage and promote
 every

" every exertion of his subjects of Great Britain and
 " Ireland, in the cultivation and improvement of
 " those resources which must tend to the certain
 " augmentation of our public strength, and that,
 " with these views, we shall most diligently turn
 " our attention to a revision of all our commercial
 " laws, and endeavour to frame them upon such
 " liberal principles as may best extend our trade and
 " navigation, and proportionably increase his Ma-
 " jesty's naval power, which can alone ensure the
 " prosperity of his dominions."

Mr. Wilberforce seconded the motion, he in-
 voked against the commercial bills, which had
 been entertained; at the beginning of the war,
 but which never could have been resisted, as the
 consequence and event had demonstrated. The
 immense sums, which the nation had already in-
 vided, to no purpose, had nearly exhausted our
 resources; and the state of those resources, to-
 gether with the little success, which from what
 had passed, we had any reason to expect in fu-
 ture, ought to deter us from every hostile idea,
 and induce us to receive with thankfulness a
 peace, which in our present circumstances, was
 the only means of our political salvation. He
 asked, if notwithstanding our successes in the last
 campaign, we had a right to expect to be able to
 act otherwise than on the defensive; and if that
 was the case, he maintained that such a war would

be

be our ruin. He then descanted on the treaties with France and Spain, and endeavoured, as Mr. Pitt had done, to shew that the peace was not as disadvantageous to us, as from our melancholy situation, we had reason to have apprehended. He then touched upon the Provisional Treaty with America, and dwelt with some emotion on that part of it which related to the Loyalists; it was there he felt for his country; it was there he saw her humiliated; it was there he saw her at the feet of America: But still what could ministers do? Were they to renew the horrors of war, and plunge their country once more into expences which she never could be able to bear? He was of opinion they ought not; because, the end, in his opinion, even if it should be attained, bore no proportion to the means; and the means were as little proportioned to the end; for as the strength of this country, in the moment of its greatest exertion, was not sufficient to reduce the Americans by force, so they could not now make better terms for the Loyalists than they had done; for determined as the Americans were, previous to the treaty, to treat the Loyalists as traitors and rebels to their country, so nothing but such a force as we had not been once possessed of from the beginning of the war, could beat the Americans out of this determination. He concluded by expressing his hearty approbation

probation of the peace, and consequently of the motion that he rose to second.

Lord *John Cavendish* rose next: he said that in great part of what had been advanced by the honourable member who made the motion, he perfectly agreed with him, but differed in some points most essentially. That honourable member, he contended, had not fairly stated the question that naturally occurred upon the peace: The honourable member said, that the question was, whether such a peace as we had now got was preferable to the renewal of the war: if this was really the state of the question, he verily believed there could not be two opinions in the House; for no man could wish for a revival of the war; but he took the question to be more truly this, "Whether a better peace than this could possibly have been obtained in our present situation of affairs?" To this question he was not yet prepared to give an answer; it was of great extent, and required very serious consideration; and here a very natural objection occurred to every man; the address moved for by the honourable gentleman stated, that the House *had* seriously considered the preliminaries; now he must say that this assertion was *not* founded in *fact*; for the House had not considered the preliminaries, much less had members considered them seriously. It was possible that the present peace might be the best that could have been obtained; but this was what

the House knew nothing of as yet; it had not yet begun an enquiry into that point; nay, the business was not concluded; for if the treaty of Holland was to be considered as a part of the general pacification, the whole work was as yet incomplete; and therefore the House would act wisely by deferring to give any opinion till the whole should be completed and before them. As to the resources of the country for carrying on a war, he would say nothing of them: he was not acquainted with them, but still, let them be what they might, he was ready to go so far in the address as to pledge the House to abide by the peace, such as it was, and consequently to renounce all idea of renewing the war: But he who had found fault with the peace of 1762, because he thought too much eagerness had been shewn on our part in negotiating it, the reason of which was that the minister of that day found it necessary, for his own interest, that peace should speedily be made, he, of course, could not precipitately and without consideration approve the peace of 1783. He concluded by moving, in amendment, that instead of the words "*have* considered," should be inserted the words "*will* consider;" and then moving that all the rest of the original address should be left out, he proposed the following words:

" His faithful Commons will proceed to consider
 " the same with that serious and full attention which
 " a subject of such importance to the present and

“ future interests of his Majesty’s dominions de-
 “ serve. That in the mean time they entertain the
 “ fullest confidence in his Majesty’s paternal care,
 “ that he will concert with his Parliament such
 “ measures as may be expedient for extending the
 “ commerce of his Majesty’s subjects.

“ That whatever may be the sentiments of his
 “ faithful Commons on the resolution of this in-
 “ vestigation of the terms of pacification, they beg
 “ leave to assure his Majesty of their firm and un-
 “ alterable resolution, to adhere inviolably to the
 “ several articles for which the public faith is
 “ pledged, and to maintain the blessings of peace,
 “ so necessary to his Majesty’s subjects, and the
 “ general happiness of mankind.”

Mr. *St. John* made a short speech in support of the amendment. He said that the ruin of the nation from the excess of debts, and the increase of taxes, was the ground upon which the objections to wars in general were built, by all former advocates for peace; and as they were mistaken in their prognostications, when the debt of the nation did not amount to twenty millions, so it was possible the advocates for the present peace might be equally mistaken. It had been asserted, that we were to have continued merely on the defensive; but to this opinion he would by no means subscribe: for the relief of Gibraltar, by Lord Howe, in the face of a superior force, shewed that we were secure from any attack at home; and the

glorious victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies, and the consequences that it had produced, demonstrated that we were able to act offensively in that part of the world.

Lord North declared, that during the thirty years he had served his country in that House, he had never felt more concern than he felt at that moment: it was his firm intention not to have delivered any opinion on the peace; and his friends knew perfectly well, that it had been all along his earnest wish not to be obliged to deliver his sentiments on a peace which at bottom it was out of his power to approve. Though no minister himself, no, nor a candidate to be one, but being a man who was once a minister, he felt so much for persons in that situation, that he would have most sincerely wished the gentlemen who have at present the direction of his Majesty's affairs, had permitted him to keep his resolution not to throw any embarrassments in their way; but as they had thought proper to call upon him, not to accede to a treaty which was already concluded, not to give his silent assent to a treaty that was already ratified, but to express his approbation of a measure which was disapproved, not only by him, but also, if he was well-informed, by some of his Majesty's Cabinet Council, who had been actually engaged in concluding the negotiation of the peace, and who consequently were much better informed than he could possibly be, as to the question, "Whether a better
peace

peace might have been made or not?" He confessed that he was disappointed at the conduct of Ministers this day: he thought that it would have been sufficient for them that their peace should not have been opposed; and therefore he must say, that it was too much to call upon gentlemen to approve of it. He expected, on the contrary, that they would have imitated the wise example set them by the able, honest, and upright minister, who had concluded the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: the war which was terminated by that treaty, might have been called an unfortunate war; but still that honest minister, wrapped up in his own probity and integrity, and looking down equally upon incense and upon censure, contented himself with laying the treaty before the House; but without ever thinking of moving either by himself or his friend, for a vote of approbation of that peace. "I have laid the articles before you," said he, "canvas them, twist them, weigh them; do what you please with them; if they are attacked, it is my business to defend them; but I have nothing to move upon them myself." Such did he expect would have been the conduct of Ministers this day; and his disappointment gave him the more concern, as they had by their manner of proceeding, forced him either to approve a peace, which he condemned; or to put on the appearance of a man who wished to distress Ministers, than which nothing was more foreign from his intention or desire.—

Com-

Compelled, therefore, as he was, to give his reasons, why he could not approve of the peace, he would state them as briefly as he could. In the West, he understood St. Lucia had always been looked upon as a counter balance to Dominique, Saint Vincent's, the Grenadines, and the other ceded islands; he was therefore convinced, that nothing could have induced the French to treat with us on the principle of *uti possidetis*, because while St. Lucia remained in our hands, together with such other islands as we are this moment possessed of, we unquestionably held the balance of power in the West Indies; and therefore it would have been unsafe for the French to make peace, without recovering that island from us; the consequence was, that we must, or rather ought to have been *quoad hoc* masters of the terms of the peace: but instead of this, the French so far dictate to us, that we absolutely lose the advantage that ought to have arisen from the possession of that valuable island. The honourable member who had moved the address had said, that with respect to the right of the French to fish on the coast of Newfoundland, they had always enjoyed it, and that on the present occasion the locality only of the exercise of that right had been changed: but surely in this point, if the honourable member had told the truth, he had not surely told the *whole* truth; for the difference between the extent of coast on which the French had enjoyed the

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right of fishing formerly, and that on which they
 were to enjoy it in *future*, bore just the proportion
 of *seven to 100 miles*; for formerly they could dry
 their fish along a part of the coast no more than *seven*
miles in length; but now, by the change of locality
 only, as it was said, they could dry their fish on a
 coast no less than *one hundred and ninety miles* in ex-
 tent. The restoration of Grenada and St. Kitt's
 might be thought to be valuable as to induce ministers
 to restore St. Pierre and Miquelon to France: but
 now was that restoration to take place? By former
 treaties these two possessions were to remain naked
 and defenceless, without fort, without fortification,
 the consequence was, that the Newfoundland fishery
 was a check upon the French, which might prevent
 them from going to war with us, as the very first
 consequence to France after a rupture would be the
 loss of her Newfoundland fishery, and of Miquelon
 and St. Pierre. But now, that these two places were
 to be restored, and France freed from the obligation
 of not fortifying them, a very great difference indeed
 would ensue to this country: for formerly, at the
 first dawn of a war, these two places lay at our mer-
 cy, and the French fishery never failed to be destroy-
 ed; but now, as they were to be permitted to fortify
 Miquelon and St. Pierre, we shall no longer have
 that check upon the French for the preservation of the
 peace which formerly we enjoyed: and hence it was
 fair for him to say, that we had made concessions
 which

which would deprive us of the principal check, we had upon the French for going to war with us, as the defenceless state of Miquelon and St. Pierre left them and their whole Newfoundland trade at our mercy; but now, these places being fortified, their fishermen would find an asylum, and protection unknown to them in former wars. From this point, therefore, he would argue, that there was not a place restored to us for which we had not given value; — thus St. Lucia for three islands he had already mentioned; Miquelon and St. Pierre, with the right of fortifying them, together with an extent of coast for fishing of 100 miles, instead of seven miles, might be thought an equivalent for Grenada and St. Kitt's; as Goree and Senegal were for what was left us on the coast of Africa: thus it was that the French got value for value for every thing they surrendered in the West Indies, and were able to keep Tobago into the bargain. With respect to India, he must in conscience say, that we had made still greater concessions in that quarter; for we had restored to the French the whole trade they formerly enjoyed there, as far as Cape Comorin, together with the right of raising fortifications. Here he was in particular called upon to refuse his approbation to the peace, till he should know that we were actually at peace with France in that part of the world, or not. By the XVIIth article of the treaty with France it was stipulated, that “ In case France has allies in India, they shall be invited,

“ invited, as well as those of Great Britain, to accede
 “ to the present pacification; and for that purpose,
 “ a term of four months, to be computed from the
 “ day on which the proposal shall be made to them,
 “ shall be allowed them to make their decisions;
 “ and in case of refusal on their part, their Britannic
 “ and Most Christian Majesties agree not to give
 “ them any assistance, directly or indirectly, against
 “ the British or French possessions, or against the an-
 “ cient possessions of their respective allies; and
 “ their said Majesties shall offer them their good
 “ offices towards a mutual accommodation.” —

Now in order that this article should be mutual and reciprocal, it ought to be less indefinite; the parties to whom it alludes are not upon an equal footing: in the first place, the Nabob of Arcot, our ally, being possessed of several territories, of which he had become master at different times, as the Poligars, for instance, it was not an easy matter to determine whether those, or what part of his dominions, were his *ancient possessions*? With respect to the recommendation to them, or invitation to accede to the present pacification, he was at some loss on that head. With respect to the Nabob of Arcot, our ally, he had not a doubt but he would most readily accede to the pacification; but he would not say as much for Hyder Ally, the ally of France; for being already possessed of Arcot, as long as he refrained from attacking what may be called the *ancient* possessions of the Na-

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bob,

bob, the terms of the treaty to which that Prince should be invited to accede, would leave him at full liberty to strip the Nabob of Arcot of the greatest part of his dominions: to this he must add, that, contrary to the terms of the treaty of Paris of 1762, the settlements which were to be restored to the French, were to be fortified if they pleased. Therefore as their trade in that part of the world was to be restored to its former state and settlement; and as the possessions which were to be restored to them, were to be fortified at their pleasure, so he must say that in India, the advantages of the peace were on the side of France.

The next thing he would consider, was the treaty with America: unsuccessful as we had been in the war with that country, he was certainly prepared for concessions and sacrifices; but he was free to say, that the concessions which were made, had surpassed those which he had ever had in contemplation in the most calamitous state of our affairs: he did imagine indeed, that among the concessions which this country would be obliged to make to America, would be that of the dependence of the latter upon the former; but he had never dreamed of those concessions, which were now to be made? — The honourable gentlemen had said, that mutual *reciprocity* was to be the basis of the treaty; this might possibly be the case; but if it was, the *reciprocity* was certainly *all on one side*: if boundaries were to be fixed, which should

should not be liable to misinterpretation and dispute, there were boundaries established both by nature and act of Parliament; why had not they been adopted in the present treaty? If a boundary was to be given to America, where had been the necessity that *twenty-four nations* of Indians should be ceded to the Americans? The Ohio was the natural boundary: but *reciprocity* was to be the foundation of the treaty, and hence probably it was, that *forts* also were to be ceded to the enemy; and among the rest, a fort within twenty-five miles of Montreal: this, no doubt, was founded in *reciprocity*; other forts were also ceded to the new republic, one of which was so strong, and built at an extraordinary expence, that it could withstand the siege of a regular army. The British cannon was not to be removed from America, and the American cannon was to be left behind; this to be sure was not a subject worth quarrelling about; but it served to shew the *reciprocity* of the treaty. The second article of the Provisional Treaty contained some very remarkable things; it states that a line drawn “through the Lake of the Woods, through the said Lake, to the most N. W. point thereof; and “from thence on a due west course to the River “Mississippi.” Now this being duly considered, would be found to be absolutely impossible; for this line would run far beyond the source of the Mississippi: thus he would agree as to the *reciprocity*; the mouth of this river is in the hands of the Spaniards;

its source in the possession of the Americans; one side of it is within the boundaries ceded to the Colonies; the other is in the hand of the Spaniards; thus the river, the half of which is given to us by the treaty, belongs wholly to other powers, and not an inch of it, either at north or south, at west or east, belongs to us. This, no doubt, would establish the *reciprocity* of advantages beyond a cavil.

He next observed, that the honourable mover of the address had said that the boundaries of the colonies had been extended solely for the purpose of taking away all handle for future quarrel or discontent. Did the honourable member imagine, that putting all the carrying-places into the hands of the Americans, was the most effectual way to prevent quarrels? In his opinion, no more effectual mode could be devised for creating dissensions: — giving up old friends and allies, and bringing the Americans to within twenty-five miles of Montreal, did not appear to him the means most conducive to peace and tranquillity. But above all, he objected to the article relative to the Loyalists, those gallant, but unfortunate men, were not, and ought not to be considered as traitors and rebels; because when they took up arms, it was at the call of their King, and in obedience to that allegiance which they had sworn to him: their loyalty therefore should have met a better return, than that they should be made the subject of an odious exception; that those who had deserved of this country
every

every grace, every favour that it could bestow, should be abandoned to the impotent recommendation of a Congress, whose authority to levy money, was disputed and denied by every state in the confederacy. What! could not the surrender of New-York, Long-Island, Staten-Island, Penobscot, Charles-Town, the extension of boundaries, the acknowledgment of Independence, have enabled us to call for some terms for the brave Loyalists? For those men who had risked family, fortune, and life in vindication of the cause of Great-Britain. Here he felt the degradation of this country; here he saw the triumph of American vanity; or rather here he saw the glory of America reared upon the ruins of that of Great-Britain. What! was America so fixed and determined on this point, that she was resolved to pursue the war, when she could not raise a farthing to carry it on, sooner than restore to the Loyalists their estates? Or would the French and Spaniards, once satisfied on the great points which they had at heart, countenance the protraction of the war, for the vindictive purpose of preventing the Loyalists from regaining their estates? It was improbable, if not impossible; and therefore he must condemn, instead of approving this article. With respect to the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland, which was to be secured to the Americans, it had been said, that they used always to enjoy it: it was truly said; but then it was because they then were British subjects; but in this the boasted
reciprocity

reciprocity was to be discovered; for while the Americans were to have this fishery secured to them, there was no provision whatever for securing to his Britannic Majesty's subjects of Newfoundland, Canada, the Bahama and Bermuda Islands, and Nova Scotia, that right of fishing, which they also used formerly to enjoy on the coast of America.

He next considered the treaty with Spain. The honourable gentleman who moved the address, had said, that East Florida was no longer of any use, since West Florida was in the hands of the Spaniards; but as for himself, he would certainly argue very differently; for he would say that the one had become more valuable, since the other had passed into the hands of the enemy. Exclusive of the natural value of fertility of East Florida, it would have been the means, in our hands, of providing for the Loyalists, and all those friends of ours in the colonies, who would wish to quit the dominions of Congress, and take shelter in ours. St. Augustine was not a large passage; but since, by the fortifications at Cape Nicola Mole, our Jamaica trade was obliged to come through the Gulph, there would now be no port to shelter them; on the contrary, as not a spot on that whole coast could now be called our own, numberless privateers could lie in wait for our Jamaica-men, and pick them up as they passed through the Gulph: formerly indeed, when this Florida did not belong to us, it might be asked, did we on that
account

account feel all these depredations from privateers; he would answer *no*: but then the reason was obvious; Georgia then belonged to us, which afforded our trade a shelter and protection from the attack of enemies, and the inclemency of the weather. — Last of all, he took notice of Dunkirk; which the honourable member who moved the address, had passed over in total silence: it had formerly been considered of infinite moment to this country, that there should be no fortification there; and it must not be immediately inferred that the French no longer think it of consequence, because they did not fortify it this war: the fact probably was, that they might have other reasons different from those which might be supposed to arise from an idea that the place was of no consequence.

In former wars, the French fortified it as much as they could during the war; but at the peace, they were obliged to destroy all the fortifications: while the event of the present war remained uncertain, they probably did not wish to lay out immense sums in raising fortifications, which at the peace they might possibly be obliged to demolish: but as they were now free from any restraint on that subject, there was little doubt but they would avail themselves of the peace to place those fortifications again on a respectable footing: at all events, we were sure to lose much in point of national pride, and France would gain in proportion to our loss, as she would be

rid of the presence of a British commissary, who would not suffer a wall to be built, if the French had been inclined to erect one. Upon the whole, if the peace really deserved approbation, he certainly was one of those who would most heartily approve of it, if, on due deliberation, he should find it deserving of praise; but to proceed at this moment to approve, by a vote of Parliament, was a matter for which he was not at all prepared; nay, it would be nothing short of a condemnation of all his own principles, and of his own conduct, in having refused to accede to this very peace; while he was in office, and which peace was most undoubtedly within his reach.—But gentlemen would see that it would be highly improper to proceed hastily in so great and momentous an affair; many things remained as yet to be explained; and until they should be explained, it would be absurd indeed to approve of the preliminaries. That part of them, which related to the cutting of logwood, was as yet a matter of obscurity to the House and to the nation; and he was afraid, that from the manner in which the fourth article of the treaty with Spain was worded, the logwood trade would be greatly cramped, if not nearly destroyed. — “ The article states, his Catholic Majesty shall
 “ not for the future suffer the subjects of his Britan-
 “ nic Majesty or their workmen to be disturbed or
 “ molested, under any pretence whatsoever, in their
 “ occupation of cutting, loading and carrying away
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“ logwood, in a district of which the boundaries shall
 “ be fixed; and for this purpose they may build
 “ without hindrance, and occupy without interrup-
 “ tion, the houses and magazines necessary for them,
 “ their families, and for their effects, in a place to be
 “ agreed upon either in the *Definitive Treaty*, or within
 “ *six months* after the exchange of the ratification; and
 “ his said Catholic Majesty assures to them by this
 “ article, the entire enjoyment of what is above
 “ stipulated, provided that these stipulations shall
 “ not be considered as derogatory in any respect from
 “ the rights of sovereign.”

From this article, it appeared in the first place,
 that for at least *six months* after the exchange of the
 ratifications, and in the mean time the trade must
 suffer excessively: and in the next place, the boun-
 daries of the district were not yet known; nay the
 very district itself was not known; so that such a
 one might be assigned to our logwood cutters, as
 might be absolutely useless. This surely required an
 explanation; and to say before hand, that we ap-
 proved a peace, which afterwards we might be obliged
 to condemn, would be folly in the extreme.

His Lordship concluded by informing the House
 that as soon as they should have disposed of the
 amendment of the noble Lord, to which he assented
 most cordially, and the more so, as it was calculated
 to support the prerogative of the crown, in making
 peace, and the faith of the nation, in adhering to it

when made, he would move another amendment, stating the claims which the brave and unfortunate Loyalists had for support on the justice and humanity of this country.

[While Lord North was speaking, a dog happened to find his way into the House, began to bark, and set all the members in a roar — Lord North laughed heartily; and when the House was restored to order, he threw it again into the loudest fit of laughter, by jocosely addressing the chair, and saying, “Sir, I was interrupted by a *new Speaker.*”]

Mr. *Powys* made a short speech in favour of the original motion: he said, that though the noble Lord who had moved the amendment, wanted time to consider the peace, and examine the different articles, yet *he* was free to declare, for himself that he was at that minute ready to pronounce his unequivocal opinion of the treaty, which was, that taking the good and the bad together, he was perfectly satisfied with it, when he considered, that if it was to be given up, or departed from, this country must see the revival of an accursed war, which had brought it to the very brink of political perdition:— The noble Lord said, that the House had not yet considered the articles; and that therefore the address was not founded in fact. But what would the noble Lord say on that subject, when the debate of this day should be over? The House had

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been now for four hours debating on the question; and if it should continue sitting till morning, would he say then that the preliminaries had not been considered?—For his part he would not hesitate to say, that by that time they would have undergone a consideration as grave and as serious as the nature of the question required; and if gentlemen should suppose themselves incompetent to form an opinion by the time the House should divide upon the motion, he believed that they might consider till Doomsday, without being able to come to a determination. For his part he was a plain, simple man, and he stood up in that House, as he ever had done, and as he trusted he should continue to do all his life, an independent individual, who was free to judge for himself; and as such he was resolved to give his suffrage in favour of the address. It was with no little surprise that he saw so strange a coalition, as he discovered by the amendment proposed by one noble Lord, and seconded or supported by another; but still strange confederacies ought not now a days to be subjects of surprise: great and arbitrary monarchs of Europe had stood forth the protectors of an infant republic; and from what he this day saw, it was quite consonant with the spirit that had induced these to take the part they had done, that the *high* and *mighty* sticklers for royal prerogative should make an intimate alliance with the humble worshippers of the majesty of the people.

ple. The ministers in this House, were like Britain in this last unfortunate war, without allies, without friends, without any support, but such as they would derive from the goodness of their cause; there were indeed a few *refugees* with them; and he hoped they would take care to reward them well, and not to leave it in the power of the opposite party to say, that they had deserted these *loyal refugees*. As to the person who was supposed to be the head of the present administration, he would say nothing of him but this, that he had no very high opinion of his character; but let his character be what it might, the peace he had made, such as it was, was a blessing to this country, and it should have his support.

Lord *Mulgrave* said, that since the peace was made he would abide by it; how great soever should be his disapprobation of the terms, because it was necessary for the well-being of the country, that as the constitution had vested in the crown the right to make war and peace; as his Majesty has set his name to the treaty; and as the national faith stood pledged for the maintenance and support of it, the King's personal honour, the honour of his crown, and the interest of his people required that the peace should be inviolably observed; for if parliament should break in upon the constitutional prerogative of the crown, what nation would treat with us? What nation would trust to the royal signature

of our Sovereign, or the great seal of his kingdom?— In reading over the different treaties, one would imagine that the preamble to each had been adapted to the articles which followed it; but when he read the articles which actually stand under each preamble, he was induced to think that they had been substituted in the room of those which had been originally penned; and hence he was led to presume that the terms had been absolutely dictated to us; and he was the more hurt at this, as he was of opinion that our strength both by sea and land, was such as ought to have imposed silence on any court that should have presumed to dictate terms of peace to us. He would have been happy, he said, if he could have remarked in the conduct of the enemy, a desire to make such a peace, as it would be both for their interest and ours should it be lasting: but it grieved him to see that France seemed to have nothing more in view, than to take such measures as would enable her to be prepared for a war, which she foresees can be at no very distant period: if this was not the fact, why should she insist on being freed from the obligation of keeping Dunkirk, Miquelon, and St. Pierre demolished? It was not in time of peace that the fortifications of those places could be of any service; it was only in time of war that they could be so: the want of fortifications at Miquelon and St. Pierre always left these islands, and the French fishery at Newfoundland, at our mercy; and this was a tie upon

upon them, which made them circumspect, and cautious how they attempted to break the peace: but this tie, this check would be removed, the moment they found themselves at liberty to fortify those places, where they could station a force sufficient to afford a protection to their fishery; thus he saw, that even in the very moment of peace, all the measures taken by France were calculated for war, and were, in the strict sense of the word, preparations for hostilities! to make peace on such grounds as these, was to the last degree impolitic and absurd; for he believed in his conscience, that a more baneful principle of policy did not exist, than that of making peace for the sole purpose of going to war again the moment a favorable opportunity should occur. During the negotiation for the peace of 1762, the French wished to play the same game, and after ceding, or offering to cede Canada, wished to retain Louisbourg in the island of Cape Breton, and maintain it as a fortress; but they knew that such a proposal never could have been adopted by a wise and clear sighted minister, such as the late Lord Chatham was, who in an instant would have seen through their plan, and discovered that they wanted a place of arms, from which they could afterwards, when opportunity served, attack those very places, which they were then about to surrender; but foreseeing that (the then) Mr. Pitt could not be imposed upon, they relinquished the idea, and asked only for possession of *Ile Royale*, a place

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place without walls, without works, without defence. In the present administration, his Lordship said, he could find the name and the talents of that great statesman; he wished that he could also find in it, his experience and knowledge. France asked for, and obtained all those places which could be of no advantage to her in time of peace. In agreeing to the suppression and abrogation of all the articles relative to Dunkirk, from the treaty of peace concluded at Utrecht 1713, we have given France an opportunity of fortifying that place so as to annoy us greatly in time of war. It was a convenient harbour for shipping, and but a very short way from our coast. If the intentions of France were pacific, and that they did not look to a speedy rupture, why should they wish to put Dunkirk in a situation capable of affording protection to their shipping, and attacking us at the same time, with all the advantage which so near a neighbourhood affords them. The same great and able statesman, saw the benefit that would arise to this country, from insisting on the terms of the treaty of Utrecht relative to Dunkirk, and therefore would not relinquish the stipulation concerning it. He argued thus, (and he argued justly) if France was sincere in her desire for a permanent peace, she would not make it a point to erect fortifications in Dunkirk, as that would be certain proof of her hostile intentions, and on that account she was not allowed to deviate from the terms of the treaty alluded

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to. From all these circumstances he concluded there was no great probability of a lasting peace. Had France sought a recompence for the expence she had been at on account of the war, he would have better hopes of the peace; he would then have thought she had no notion of commencing hostilities shortly again, but was resolved to live in amity and friendship with us. His Lordship took a very extensive view of the whole of the Peace, and seemed to be of opinion, it did not promise to be a permanent one. He laughed very heartily at this absurd and ridiculous idea of obtaining leave for the Loyalists to purchase back their estates, when Ministry must know they had not wherewithal to do it, as they were reduced to the utmost distress and want.

Mr. *Secretary Townshend* said, it was very extraordinary that gentlemen, after repeatedly calling on his Majesty's servants to state some time when the Preliminary Articles would be considered, yet notwithstanding, when Ministry, in conformity with their wishes, bring forward the discussion of them, they then as eagerly desire it should be postponed, as they were before anxious for hastening; there was an inconsistency in such a conduct, that every man possessed of common sense must see through the motives from whence it originated. The common decency and common respect for his Majesty, required we should no longer, after the Preliminary Articles had lain on our table for three weeks, defer the Address

to his Majesty, and he must confess, for that reason he was somewhat surpris'd at the amendment propos'd by the noble Lord. He said it was utterly impossible for Ministry to obtain better terms from America. Our hands were tied up from carrying on the war with America, by the resolution of the House last year. He did not mention it by way of censuring it; on the contrary, he esteem'd it as a wise and prudent measure, to put an end to a ruinous and destructive war. All he meant by it was to prove, that his Majesty's Ministers had no alternative but to make peace on the best terms they could. In granting the Independence of America, Government had done nothing that the resolution allud'd to above, did not effectually establish before: the Americans, therefore, being once declared independent, it was out of the power of this country to exclude them from a share of the fishery on Newfoundland. Their situation, the early period of the season they fish in, and a thousand other circumstances forbade it. They generally fish in the beginning of the year, we do not send out our vessels till about June, so that to prevent them from partaking of the fishery, we should constantly keep a respectable force there; and as to what has been ceded to France for her fishery, it is little more than she possess'd before, and is on the west side, which, from the best information he could get from naval officers, who were qualified to judge on the matter, was reckon'd to be the worst

part, not only for catching fish, but even those that are caught, are of an inferior quality; so that on this head he imagined France had obtained nothing of any consequence.

In regard to the boundaries of Canada, had they been left in the situation they were prior to the Provisional Treaty, they would have been an eternal bone of contention between us and America, because some of the boundaries of the Colonies were included in those of Canada — part of Virginia, in particular, was situated in this manner, so that to avoid all future discontents and dissensions, it was considered as the wisest step which could be adopted to draw such a liberal, fair, unexceptionable line between our possessions and theirs, as must for ever remove the seeds of discord between us. He declared we did not lose so much of the fur trade as some gentlemen would have the House to believe we had; we still retained a great deal of that trade, and that most valuable; for he was assured by very good judges, that the best furs are got to the northward. He could not agree with the noble Lord in the blue ribband, that the several forts along the lakes which we had ceded to America, were of that consequence he would insinuate; and for this reason, that we could erect others, which would secure us from any attempts the Americans might make to deprive us of the fur trade. It is true, he admitted, large sums had been lavished on those forts, but such waste of the public money

was

was no argument of their usefulness, any more than the idle expenditures of the treasure of the nation, which took place during the noble Lord's Administration.

He now adverted to the situation of the Loyalists, of whom he spoke with the greatest regard and compassion, and that they merited every thing that a grateful or a generous nation could bestow on them. He knew many of the Loyalists, and those the principal among them approved of the conduct of Administration — they were convinced, that every exertion that was possible, was made in their favour; that Ministry had the most friendly disposition towards them, and were determined to serve them as far as lay within their power.

He now considered what we had granted France in India, which he said was neither more nor less than those territories and trade that they formerly enjoyed, and which it was very natural for them at the head of a strong and powerful confederacy to wish to regain. Let us observe the state of the nation, our finances undoubtedly much exhausted, after so long and so burthenfome a war; the people groaning under the weight of taxes, and all ranks, rich and poor, universally crying out for peace. Will any man, after such a view, tell me, says Mr. Townshend, we had been too compliant to the demands of our enemies? Whatever possessions we have ceded on the coast of Africa, the country will find rather an ad-

vantage in getting quit of than retaining. They cost us a vast deal both in men and money. The garrisons, who were sent there from this country, dwindled away so fast, as to be a continual drain on the nation, so that he thought very little stress could be laid on our concessions in that quarter. On the whole, he was persuaded the peace would be found to be as good and honourable, and as glorious to this country, as could be reasonably expected at the end of an unfortunate and calamitous war.

Mr. *Burke* said, he never heard in the course of his life any thing so ridiculous as the defence set up by the honourable Gentleman in support of the Peace. In the first place he says, this country was in a very bad state — its finances exhausted, and its people averse to the continuance of the war; and he gave this as a reason, why we should accede to the terms of our enemies, and yet in the same breath he contradicts himself, and asserts, that what we have ceded is insignificant and trifling — things of no manner of value, but a parcel of rubbish we were glad to get rid of. How does this accord with the declaration of the superiority of our enemies? It is inconsistent, it is childish, and pitiful indeed. Ministry ought to speak and to act as men should do, and not have recourse to poor subtleties for their exculpation. They should defend themselves on the propriety and goodness of their own measures, and not in endeavouring to hide their own shame by involving others

in it. To tell the House that this or that person advised a peace on this and that occasion, was a sort of language he did not expect from gentlemen who had so often reprobated it in others. Let the Peace be tried on its own merits, that is the only method of judging it. It seemed, in the right honourable Gentleman's idea, that a spirit of generosity and donation had got possession of administration in that liberal scheme of concession, which was more remarkable than any other that the history of the world could produce an instance of; never was there, at any former period, a spirit of generosity or donation, if it could be called so, to equal the instances of British degradation before the House in the Treaty of Peace on the table; a treaty which employed most largely the right honourable Gentleman's sharpest powers of reprobation. Mr. Burke went into a minute investigation of what had fallen from the honourable personage on the side of the House in opposition to the amendment of his noble friend, and into the spirit, propriety, and policy of the Treaty itself. He denied that we were in a situation to warrant Ministers to cede the dearest rights and interests of a country which had, notwithstanding the melancholy and eloquent picture drawn by the honourable mover of the Address, been put upon the footing of relative consideration with her enemies, was not at all so totally divested of resources, or so infinitely inferior to her enemies as to oblige her to accept of conditions that

that could not be mentioned without the bitterness of the extremest sorrow and regret.

Mr. Burke then proceeded to investigate the articles : he pursued the different arguments introduced in support of them with the strongest powers of refutation, and declared solemnly on the whole, they were so degrading as to merit obliteration, if it were possible to effect it, out of the history of this country. He in the first instance attacked the preamble of the articles : it began, he said, in the stile of the most pompous and magnificent professions of reciprocity, and instead of reciprocity, all was concession. If granting every thing on one hand, without the most trifling degree of consideration on the other, was reciprocity, then did we enjoy indeed all the advantages of reciprocity : but until that doctrine was made reconcileable with the literal meaning of the word, by the transcendent powers of gentlemen in his eye, Mr. Burke must be decided that the reciprocity there meant was the most liberal concession on the part of this country, and the most trifling, or no return on the part of France, and the other contracting powers. The situation of our West-India islands, he peculiarly considered, environed, surrounded, *impounded* as they were by the powers of our enemies, it was impossible to think we were in the enjoyment of all the advantages to be otherwise derived from them ; it seemed as if there were absolute lines of circumvallation drawn round them. He

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supported this mode of argument, by stating the situation of our islands, which now remained to us, and those of our enemies; and Mr. Burke made it clear to a demonstration, as we possessed not the Gulph of Florida, and those islands which by the kind of *uti possidetis* stated by the honourable mover of the address were put into the hands of the French, left our possessions in the West Indies in a very poor situation indeed. The right honourable gentleman then took a review of the state of Canada, of the tea trade, of the cession of East Florida, our trade in the river Mississippi, &c. he adverted to the situation of affairs in the East Indies, and was very far from approving of the situation of things there; nor would he allow the title of a great statesman to a gentleman (Mr. Hastings) who had been alluded to by Mr. T. Pitt, at the same time that he paid every respect to Sir Eyre Coote, but without being able to conclude from his abilities, that we might not hear news from India that would be very disagreeable to us, which was more than probable to be the case. Mr. Burke did not conceive that any article of the treaty went to establish pacification in such a manner in India as was to be wished. He then took into his consideration the article relating to the demolition of Dunkirk: that, he said, ever since the treaty of Utrecht, had been uniformly an article in every treaty of ours with France; and as the wisdom of former ages had taught the French that that port was an object of vast utility

utility to them, it was just to suppose that the French would look with the same predilection, and see the same advantages in the establishment of that port as their ancestors did. The Loyalists, who were given up to the full enjoyment of a *monarchical constitution*, Mr. Burke much pitied. He animadverted very feelingly upon their situation; and took occasion to remark, in answer to the honourable gentleman [Mr. Powys] who had taken notice of the "*able supporters of regal power, and the humble worshippers of the majesty of the people*," that he had ever directed his opinions and his talents to the public good, and that in the majesty of the King he viewed the majesty of the People. After many thoughts upon that idea, and a very able reply to Secretary Townshend, and the mover, and seconder of the address, Mr. Burke gave his very cordial and decided approbation to the amendment.

The *Lord Advocate* made a very long speech, in which he supported the address very strenuously, reprobated the amendment, and was very warm in his panegyric on Ministers, and strenuous in his approbation of the peace. Ministers, in the learned Lord's opinion, were entitled to the highest applause for the spirit, manliness, and magnanimity of their conduct in opposing themselves to the storms that were raised without doors against a peace, which was the cry of the people, and which the necessity of the state so mutually called for. He was very humourous,

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and was very pointed on the noble Lord in the blue ribbon, and Mr. Fox, on their supposed confederacy and coalition, and of the warmth of their zeal *in the honey-moon of their loves*. He replied very largely to Lord North and Mr. Burke; said it was impossible to exist without a peace, and it was equally impossible we could get a better; that we were without allies, and that we were without resources; and notwithstanding what might be said of our navy, it surely was the case, that facts ought to be the criterion to judge of assertions, and that without facts assertions were not to be attended to. Many pompous declarations were made of the invincible state of the navy; this navy that was so lately reprobated, was now sprung up like mushrooms; day after day produced a ship of the line, and the nearer the House came to the discussion of the Preliminary Articles, the greater was the strength of our navy, and the more injurious the peace to the dignity of our naval empire. But bad as this peace was, the Lord Advocate said we owed even that to Lord Rodney's victory in the West Indies. It was to that victory we owed the present. Had it not been for that fortunate event, it were hard to get even such a peace. For, to instance our situation, the learned Lord said, that so entirely were we devoted, that the other powers of Europe had tacitly consented and assisted the mighty confederacy against us; for in neutral bottoms were transported every warlike store that the circumstances of

their wants could require. Lately, the right honourable Advocate said, a neutral ship of twelve hundred tons had sailed from Brest with warlike stores to the East Indies; and to our situation there he paid a very minute attention. He stated our situation in the West Indies; then attached himself to our American concerns, to prove the activity and the ability of Ministers in the business of the negotiation. He said, he had a letter from the merchants of Glasgow, requesting him to return thanks to Ministers, for the care they had taken of their interests in the negotiation, for that some had been paid, some secured, and some were in hopes of being paid the debts due by America to them. There could not be a better rule to judge of the necessity of peace than what he had mentioned, nor of the ability and activity of Ministers, than the instance he had just stated. And he asked the House, if any thing was advanced by two noble Lords, or the right honourable gentleman who spoke after them, that amounted to an argument to prove that the peace was dishonourable, that it was impolitic or unjust. With regard to the Loyalists, he said of them, they were an unhappy people, and Government, truly sensible of their situation, exerted every nerve for them; but if the war was not to be continued on their account, no better terms could be provided for them. A late instance in Holland exactly illustrated the internal government in America; Congress had no power over the provincial legislatures;

tures; every legislature had the cognizance alone of its own business; and Congress, being the delegates, were not invested with a power to decide in provincial criminal cases; so therefore it was impossible that Congress, without subverting the constitution of America, could make other terms for the Loyalists. The Lord Advocate made some very able remarks, stated about East Florida very largely, and concluded with his strongest opposition to the amendment.

Governor *Johnstone* was very decided in declaring that the peace was unwise, impolitic, and to the last degree dishonourable; and he did not see that the act of the last session vested the king with a power of granting away America; it was not in the literal meaning of it, whatever it might be by implication or construction. But that was a matter he did not seem inclined to argue about, the Commodore declaring, that as the independence of America was on all hands acknowledged to be actually gone away from us before the formally resigning it by the articles of the treaty; however, the Commodore could not bring himself to allow that the cession of East Florida was in the right of the Crown. He acknowledged the right of the crown, by virtue of the prerogative to make peace or war, but he contended that the cession of any part of the dominions of this country was constitutionally not in the Crown, and that the Crown had equally a right to cede

Jamaica, or any other part of the British territory, as that province. The Commodore said, it was an object of very great importance to this country, not only with respect to its situation, as a guard to our West India islands, but from the circumstances of its commercial produce, it returned in export to this country to the amount of two hundred and forty thousand pounds, and received in return more than one hundred and twenty thousand pounds British manufacture: besides, it was much more valuable to the Spaniards than the Havannah; the harbour was the best in the world, and the healthfulness of the climate, and the entire command of the navigation of the Gulph, made it invaluable to Spain. Ministers said they could not make a better peace; the Commodore asked them, could they make a worse. He took a retrospect of the commission he was joined in to treat of reconciliation with America, and urged some other circumstances on the matter, and, in reply to some remarks of the Lord Advocate, declared, if that commission had been sent three weeks sooner, before the French negotiations had arrived, absolute reconciliation would have taken place. He spoke much of the situation of affairs in India; took notice of the article in the treaty relating to East India affairs; and in answer to Secretary Townshend's having observed, that the *Secret Committee* had approved of the conduct of Administration, the Commodore observed, if it were the case,

case, very *secret* means were used indeed. The Commodore made some other pointed remarks upon the business, and on the vague and loose expression of our ancient possessions, mentioned in the article, which neither several of the East India Company Directors, with whom he had conversation on the subject, nor himself, could understand. He called upon any of the Directors or Secret Committee as were in the House, to state to the House what they knew respecting that matter, and to give the House all the knowledge respecting the business that they could possibly communicate.—The Commodore was decidedly for the amendment.

Sir *Henry Fletcher*, Chairman of the East-India Company, said a few words. The possessions in India were in so very fluctuating a situation, that it was hard to tell what were our ancient possessions. He had spoken to several Directors on the subject of the sixteenth article, and no two of them agreed. No one was able to tell what it meant, or how to ascertain what it gave or what it left. He said that Hyder Aly had some of our possessions, those possessions had been conquered from others; and Hyder Aly, who rose from a common soldier, won all his territories from others.

Mr. *Sheridan* made a very accurate reply to the Lord Advocate, and warmly touched upon the strokes the learned Lord threw out on the conduct of his honourable friend, (Mr. Fox) and the share he had taken

taken during the short time he was in Administration, to effectuate the great end of Peace. Mr. Sheridan then pursued the business of the amendment, and investigated the treaty on the table, which, he contended, was of the most disgraceful nature, carried the most indelible degradation in every article on the face of it, and relinquished completely every thing that was glorious and great in this country. If there was a single article that had a view to the interests of the empire, if there was a single article that had not concession for its object, he would not contend that the Peace was what every person who had heard of it pronounced it. The Sixteenth Article was one of the most inconsistent political productions that could possibly be supposed; it was couched in such vague and loose terms, that it must have relation to the impending treaty with Holland. It was with the view of finding out the extent of that article, and what reference it had to the treaty with Holland, and the political disposition it evidently had towards France, that the honourable gentleman made his motion on a former day, and which called forth the indignation of a Right Hon. person in his eye (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) as being inconsistent with the established usage of the house, unprecedented and preposterous in the extreme. This convinced him however, that the right honourable gentleman was more a *practical* politician than an *experienced* one; his years and his very early political exaltation,

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had not permitted him to look whether there had been precedents, or to acquire a knowledge of the Journals of the House. Had his youth permitted him to acquire such knowledge; his discretion would not have suffered his abilities, which Mr. Sheridan greatly admired, to be carried away by his heat and precipitancy; he would not with so much indignation resent the asking questions, which it was the duty of Ministers to satisfy, nor would he have acted so unprecedented if he had consulted the Journals, or had paid any attention to such material evidences of parliamentary order. If he had, the honourable gentleman said he would have found incontestible evidence, to prove the groundless authority of his indignant assertions; he would have found that it was not unprecedented to lay a depending treaty before the House; nay, that before a single step had been taken to compleat any of the points of it, it had been usual for Parliament to be in possession of the principles upon which it was proposed a treaty should turn. Parliament was called upon to assist with its advice on the vast subject of national importance, which peace must naturally, in all times be, as involving in it so much the general prosperity and happiness of Europe. Ministers in former days, had not the *ingenious modesty* and *handsome diffidence* of those of the present; they, distrusting their own abilities on a matter of such infinite importance, were not ashamed to call in the assistance of Parliament

ment. They were not so eager to *sport* their responsibility; nor did they fear that the House would interfere to rob them of the glory of their negotiations; nor did they, with the anxious solicitude of those, hide every iota of the progress of their negotiation, either with a view of astonishing the world with the splendour of their pacific acquisitions, or to shew their contempt of the wisdom of Parliament in the administration of their own transcendent abilities.

Mr. Sheridan, after having proceeded in this vein, introduced, in support of the conduct of Ministers, at the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, stated by the noble Lord in the blue ribbon, a farther precedent extracted from the Journals of the House, in Queen Anne's reign, before the Treaty of Utrecht, and which Mr. Sheridan read as part of his speech. It stated that her Majesty, notwithstanding it was the undoubted prerogative of her Crown to make peace and war, nevertheless, anxious for the happiness of her people, and relying on the affection of her faithful Commons, had ordered to be laid before them, for their advice and approbation, the principles upon which she conceived a general pacification could be most effectually established for the glory of her Crown, and the happiness of her people, at the same time informing them, that no step had been taken for the completion of the treaty, nor would there without their advice and approbation; thus Mr. Sheridan proved to a demonstration, that it was not only precedent to lay the

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the case of negotiation before the House in its de-
 pending state; but the principles upon which the
 treaty was to take effect before the negotiation for it
 had ever been commenced. How unlike that, was
 the conduct of the present minister, when the amend-
 ment of his noble friend, proposed for the time for
 consideration of the articles which they were called
 upon in so very extraordinary a manner to give their
 approbation to: they were told they had the articles
 for three weeks before them, and that they had
 ample time of course for reflection on them; at the
 same time that Ministers had the hardiness to make
 use of such language, they seemed to forget the al-
 most inquisitive exactness with which they shut out
 the members of that house from obtaining any
 knowledge of those circumstances, that could alone
 qualify them to decide with judgment, upon a treaty
 that either shewed Great Britain to be ruined beyond
 redemption, or that her interests and her glory had
 been sacrificed to views that were not immediately
 discernable.

The answer to every requisition for the produc-
 tion of any article that might lead to this necessary
 purpose, as was the case of his motion a few days
 before, Mr. Sheridan said, was in the language of
indignation, it was *indecent*, it was *unprecedented* and
preposterous in extreme, for gentlemen to introduce
 any circumstance of enquiry before the day ap-
 pointed for the discussion of the Treaty; and yet on

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that day, right honourable persons in his eye had with the *peculiar modesty* which so distinguished them, called on the House for their approbation of a treaty, which, it was argued with much *indignation*, it would be *monstrously indecent* in them to make any enquiries whatever into. But taking the pledge of their *baseness* and *modest confidence* in their own *superior abilities* as the criterion of its perfection, Ministers required the House to be so *preposterous* as to give a vote of approbation to a treaty, that with the most anxious solicitude they were even prevented from so much as speaking on, until the time they had been so confidently called upon to give it their approbation. And the object of his late motion, Mr. Sheridan contended, was justly affirmed by an honourable Commodore, to be of very great magnitude: if Trincomale was given up, our territories in India were in a most precarious situation; and Mr. Sheridan contended, after remarking on what had fallen from Commodore Johnstone and Sir Henry Fletcher, that the House ought absolutely to know the extent of the Sixteenth Article, and the situation of the negociation with Holland. After displaying much knowledge and application to the interests of this country, so inconsistently disposed of by that article, Mr. Sheridan dissected the article in the most humorous manner. To find the meaning of the different articles, grammatical order was to be inverted; for it was impossible to come to the meaning of them

by adhering to the rules of grammar. He then went into the definition of a *real British subject*, mentioned in the fifth article with America. The twenty-second article with France might have as well run to *prevent* all disputes that had *hitherto arisen*, as all disputes that may *hereafter arise*, and grounds enough were left for them. Deeds of disunion and future broils were sown in the inconsistency of a treaty that the poorest political dabler well might be ashamed of. The honourable gentleman drew a very affecting picture of his Majesty's loyal subjects in East Florida, consigned to a government, and to a religion, they detested. Independent of the impolicy of ceding that province, and he was not inclined to call the validity of the peace in question, for it was his determination, and that of his friends, to support the national fidelity. Mr. Sheridan execrated the treatment of those unfortunate men, who without the least notice taken of their civil or religious rights, were handed over as subjects to a power that would not fail to take vengeance on them for their zeal and attachment to the religion and government of this country. This was an instance of British degradation, not inferior to the unsuccessful petitions of government to Congress for the wretched Loyalists. Great Britain at the feet of Congress suing in vain was not a humiliation or a stigma greater than the infamy of consigning over the loyal inhabitants of Florida, as we had done, without any conditions

whatsoever. And to the eternal honour of France, and Spain, in their most distressful circumstances should be told, that in all their cessions, as in Canada, &c. they even provided by treaty for the civil and religious rights of their quondam subjects. Mr. Sheridan then read the addresses of the inhabitants of Florida to the Governor some short time back, breathing in the most animated style, attachment and loyalty to the religion and government of this country, and their detestation of the conduct of (as they styled them) his Majesty's rebellious subjects in the other colonies. Mr. Sheridan took a view of the fur trade, boundaries of Canada, &c. and was apprehensive the great sollicitude shewn by Administration to conciliate the affections of America, as it had been termed, would be a great means, in the marking of the boundaries, of creating future dissensions. He went very ably and with much political judgment into the different interests acquired by the Americans and French, and those left to us on the coast of Newfoundland. The logwood trade, of such vast consequence, left in a state amounting almost to non-entity, employed much of his animadversions.

The article of Dunkirk was also to be considered, supposing it even not to be of that importance it formerly was, and of which it might hereafter become to posterity, as strongly accumulating and filling the measure of our disgraces; that what had

had been for more than a century, the pride of our ancestors to enforce, we should so rashly concede, particularly when we were not in a situation considering our NAVY ; notwithstanding the learned Lord affected representation, and the relative resources of our enemies, for it was observed by an honourable Commodore, that the criterion of a nation's resources was her credit, and the rule of that credit, the interest she paid, and according to the honourable Commodore, Spain paid most enormous interest, and France was much in the same situation ; considering then those relative circumstances, and the naval situation of Holland, Mr. Sheridan contended, we were so far from being reduced to bear such degrading, such indelible degradations and impositions, we were intitled to an *honourable peace*.

The victory of Lord Rodney, the defeat of the siege of Gibraltar, our successes in the East Indies, were also enumerated to prove, that our situation was respectable, that if we were reduced in resources, our enemies had not encreased theirs, but had at least equally exhausted them. — Mr. Sheridan could not avoid remarking the artful attempt of the right honourable Secretary, to put the first amendment, and the second of the noble Lord in the blue ribbon, on the same event ; he took notice of Mr. T. Pitt's discrimination of the loyalists, the *real* loyalists, and the *viper* loyalists ; and yet though the honourable gentleman, in the peculiar stile of eloquence, which

which so much distinguished him, was very warm in discriminating those characters of the loyalists, and pledged his feelings to give every assistance to the real loyalists, yet in his address proposed to the throne, the *vipers* were equally recommended to the royal protection, and the House was equally to be bound for them as for the *real* loyalists. The honourable gentleman was most elegantly pointed in reply to the Lord Advocate, on his hints thrown out on Mr. Fox's administration, of *Peace being in the pocket* of certain members of a late Administration, &c. Mr. Sheridan said, that he had known his honourable friend's disposition when he came into power, and had the honour of acting with him, and he pledged himself that, though ardently peace was to be desired, though at any time peace is to be preferred, yet knowing, as he did, the relative circumstances of our powers, he never would have acceded to so *dishonourable* a peace; and for his own part, he did equally pledge himself, that if his honourable friend was of such a disposition, and during his Administration had brought such a peace to conclusion, notwithstanding his friendship and esteem for him, he, as an individual, would oppose it. It was impossible for language to describe his reprobation of it, or what he felt for the national degradation. But, he said, the true criterion for his honourable friend's intentions to be judged by, was his correspondence while in office, and he dared Ministers to

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move for its being laid before the House.—Here a great cry of “*move, move.*”—He then made some remarks on the coalition of the parties the learned Lord had alluded to, and the *boney-moon* of their loves, which Mr. Sheridan said, if it was the case, was rather to be called the *wedding-day*. Mr. Sheridan then attacked the learned Lord on his inconsistency, on his having declared he would support no man whose measures he did not approve. He asked the learned Lord, was it consistency then in him to support the patron of equal representation, to which Mr. Sheridan profess himself a warm friend. [The Lord Advocate shook his head.] Was it consistency to support the independence of America, of which he had ever been so determined an enemy? Mr. Sheridan put to the Advocate some other queries equally pointed, and equally unanswerable; and remarked that there was such a versatility in the politic of some men, that when interest called, every other consideration gave way; and if that was not the case, it was hard to suppose how the learned Lord’s adoration and high-sounding panegyrics of the noble Lord in the blue ribbon, with which the walls of that House were wont to resound, should now be transferred to those connections which had been heretofore so obnoxious to the learned Lord. Mr. Sheridan was here very severe on the Lord Advocate, and his early desertion; and his unfairness of using, in his peculiar situation, recrimination, which

which, at all events, could never be allowed as argument.—The *worshippers of the majesty of the people*, not the *sun of British glory*, to be set on the emancipation of America, which Mr. Sheridan relied would be quite otherwise, did not escape his observation.

Mr. *Bankes* supported the motion for the address, and in mild terms argued, that in circumstances so calamitous and gloomy as those of the British Empire on the present occasion, the peace which his Majesty's Ministers had concluded, was in his opinion not only good, but highly favourable, and such as we had no reason to expect.

Sir *William Dolben* called the House again to the consideration of the important question which he had before stated.—Whether the King's Ministers were authorised by the prerogative of the crown, to alienate from the state the American colonies. He averred that prerogative did not extend so far—it gave no power to alienate territories not acquired by conquest during the war; at least this was his most serious opinion. Then if it did not rest in prerogative, he contended that the act of last session gave Ministers no authority adequate to so important a measure: but he wished to have the opinion of the gentlemen of the gown; and he called upon them to give the House information on this most important point.—He freely owned that he was adverse to the terms of the peace; he thought them highly injurious

jurious to the interest of the country, and infinitely worse than we had any title to expect.

Mr. Mansfield said, that the question proposed by the honourable Baronet, was indeed of the greatest importance, and it would not be prudent in any man to hazard a light opinion. The prerogative of the crown was allowed to go great, and indeed undefined lengths, as the circumstances of the state might require that measures should be taken for which there neither was precedent or authority. In all such instances, however, the House would recollect that responsibility was placed in Ministers, and they were bound to shew whenever they ventured on any extraordinary extension of the prerogative, that there was absolute necessity for such conduct. This he understood to be the doctrine of the constitution. But with respect to the present question; whether the King's Ministers were authorised by the act of last session, to alienate for ever the independence of America, he was free to acknowledge that he thought that act gave them sufficient powers. It was clearly determined thereby, that it was the sense of Parliament, and Ministers were bound to act up to what they understood to be the sense of the legislature.

Sir Francis Basset supported the amendment, and argued with energy against the peace which had been formed.

Mr. James Granville contended with equal warmth, that the peace was such as we might reasonably expect

pect in circumstances of unparalleled dejection. He entered at length into the situation of the country, in a comparison with that of our adversaries, and insisted that we had no right in fairness to complain of the conditions which our Ministers had procured.

Mr. Fox then rose and took up the consideration of the important subject, at considerable length. — His situation, he said, on that day, was peculiarly delicate. — He was supposed to be actuated by motives of personal pique, and of setting up an opposition to the articles of the peace on grounds of envy, of jealousy, and of ambition. Those who knew him best would not impute to him such motives; and for the opinion of those who believed every calumny that was propagated against him, he had but little concern. This, however, was not the only delicacy of his situation. Allusions were made to former opinions which he had given, and assertions he had made in circumstances different from the present; and which indeed bore not the smallest resemblance nor affinity. It was proclaimed, as an unanswerable argument against every thing he could say, — did you not some months ago declare that almost any peace would be good — would be desirable — and that we must have peace on any terms. If, says Mr. Fox, I could suffer myself for a moment to be so far led away by conceit, and to fancy myself a man of so much importance as to excite the jealousy of the Minister — I might give ear to the reports

ports of the day — that every measure which the Minister adopted — every plan which he formed — every opinion which he took — and indeed every act of his administration, was calculated and designed to embarrass me. How well might I ascribe the present peace to this motive. You call for peace, says the noble person — you urge the necessity of peace — you insist on peace — then peace you shall have — but such a peace — that you shall sicken at its very name. You call for peace — and I will give you a peace that shall make you repent the longest day that you live, that ever you breathed a wish for peace. I will give you a peace which shall make you and all men wish that the war had been continued, — a peace more calamitous — more dreadful, more ruinous than war could possibly be; and the effects of which neither the strength, the credit, nor the commerce of the nation shall be able to support. If this was the intention of the noble person, he had succeeded to a miracle. His work had completely answered his purpose, for never did I more sincerely feel, nor more sincerely lament any advice I ever gave in my life, than the advice of getting rid of the disastrous war in which the nation was involved. That the Minister might have other views it was very probable. That he might think his situation depended upon peace; that he might think there was no other way of maintaining a disjointed system, and fixing himself in a seat, not gained by the purest means

means, nor supported by the firmest bottom, it was very possible; — and it was also very probable that in his eager pursuit of this object, he had overshot the mark, and neglected to take the steps which could alone secure the end.

But it was objected to him by a noble and learned lord, that he who had talked of having a peace in his pocket, and who had been so confident in his declarations that peace might certainly be obtained, ought to shew that the peace which he projected was better than that which was procured. In answer to this he would inform the noble and learned lord, that he had never said that he had a peace in his pocket. He had averred in his place in that House, that there were persons in this country, empowered by the Congress to treat of Peace with America. The fact was so: — They had made application to noble persons, friends of his, — to the Duke of Richmond, to Lord Keppel, and to Lord John Cavendish. They had authorised him to mention the fact in his place in that House; and it turned out, as he had declared, — that there were persons properly authorised, and anxious to treat of Peace. The noble and learned Lord called upon him to produce the peace which he had projected. This was a very loud and sounding word; but the learned Lord not being a Cabinet Minister, is at liberty to hazard bold things, which if he was, he was pretty sure he would not do. Will any one of the King's Ministers, says Mr. Fox, give me the same challenge? Will they call upon me
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to produce my peace? — I dare them to do it. I challenge them to do it. They know what it is, — they have it in the office: — If it is against me, let them take the advantage of it, and hold me up as a man capable of advising my Sovereign to make a worse peace, if possible, than the present.

I now come, says Mr. Fox, to take notice of the most heinous charge of all. I am arraigned with having formed a junction with a noble person, whose principles I have been in the habit of opposing for the last seven years of my life. I do not think it at all incumbent upon me to make any answer to this charge: First, because I do not think that the persons who have asked the question have any right to make the inquiry; and secondly, because if any such junction was formed, I see no ground for arraignment in the matter. That any such alliance has taken place, I can by no means aver. That I shall have the honour of concurring with the noble Lord in the blue ribband on the present question was very certain; and if men of honour could meet on points of general national concern, he saw no reason for calling such a meeting an unnatural junction. — It is neither wise nor noble to keep up animosities for ever. — It is not just nor candid to keep up animosity when the cause of it is no more. It is not my nature to bear malice, or to live in ill will. My friendships are perpetual, — my enmities are not so.

“ *Amicitia sempiterna, inimicitia placabiles.* ”

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I disdain to keep alive in my bosom the enmities which may bear to men, when the cause of those enmities is no more. When a man ceases to be what he was, — when the opinions which made him obnoxious are changed, — he then is no more my enemy, but my friend. The American war was the cause of the enmity between the noble Lord and me. The American war, and the American question is at an end. The noble Lord has profited from fatal experience. While that system was maintained, nothing could be more asunder than the noble Lord and I. But it is now no more, and it is therefore wise and candid to put an end also to the ill will, the animosity, the rancour, and the feuds which it occasioned. He was free to acknowledge that when he was the friend of the noble Lord in the blue ribband, he found him open and sincere: when he was the enemy, he found him honourable and manly. He never had reason to say of the noble Lord in the blue ribband, that he practised any of those little subterfuges, tricks, and stratagems which he had found in others: any of those behind-hand and paltry manœuvres which destroyed confidence between, and which degraded the character of a statesman and a man.

So much he said for the charge which had been made by the learned Lord. He would have thought it more prudent in that learned person, before he had lavished his charges so freely, to recollect the place from which he spoke; and that he who was so warm-

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ly the friend of the noble Lord in the blue ribband, and, what was worse, of the system which he had pursued, was now as warmly the friend of a system very different, and not less obnoxious. But the learned Lord informed the House, that he would always support Government, provided that he approved of their principles. That he believed to be literally the case; and that he might always support Government, he had no doubt but he would take care constantly to approve of their principles, whatever they might be, or whoever were the ministers.

It was also imputed to him, that he had when in office lowered this country before the States of Holland in a very unbecoming manner, and that then there appeared none of these proud thoughts, nor that high expectation which he now expressed. He had no desire, he said, to conceal what he had done with regard to the Dutch; nor if he had such a desire, would it be possible for him to gratify it. The letter which he had written was public, and all the world knew what had been his sentiments: he was therefore ready to acknowledge, that as the Dutch were undoubtedly plunged into this war without a cause, it was his idea that we ought to make them liberal offers of peace. Such offers were made: but they not only rejected them, but made such haughty demands, that the policy of the thing was changed; and he and his friends no longer thought them intitled to that favour and friendship which had been
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honestly proffered. Then they conceived that the States ought to suffer for their want of friendship; and that as we had been great losers by the war, we ought to look for recompence in the possession of Trincomale, and other objects.

This was clearly his idea still; and if it was true, as it was rumoured, that the claim was to be abandoned, he should think nothing was wanting to make the present the most disastrous and disgraceful peace, without exception, that ever this country had made at any time. They talked of our present circumstances, and referred to his language on a former occasion. Were our circumstances the same now that they were in the month of March last? Would any man of common sense and common honesty say, they were the same or similar? He averred, that that which would have been desirable then was not good now. Our state was mended. Our navy was much increased; that of the enemy was diminished. Our force in the West Indies was greatly superior to theirs. The American war, the millstone which hung about our necks, was gone; we had victories of the most brilliant kind — the nation had just emerged from its dejection; had just recovered its high tone of thinking and acting; every prospect was rich, and yet, just in this moment of fair expectation and honest hope, we are damned at once with a peace, which, perhaps, we shall never be able to recover.

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The honourable gentleman now went into a regular examination of the several leading articles of the peace. The whole was done, he said, upon the principle of concession. It was every where concession. If he wished to look for reciprocal advantages, no such thing was to be found. He said, he would not follow the course of many of his friends, in going over minutely the ground of the various concessions which had been made; but he declared upon his honour, that the terms were obnoxious in the extreme; and he pointed out a variety of the most exceptionable passages, and laid his finger on the points which above others were ruinous and fatal to our commerce. He concluded with declaring his warm approbation of the amendment of his noble friend.

Mr. Chancellor *Pitt* made a very able speech in answer to the various arguments that had been adduced against the motion for the address to the Throne. He was pointedly severe against the various gentlemen who had spoken against the address, and particularly against Mr. Sheridan. No man admired more than he did the abilities of that right honourable gentleman, the elegant sallies of his thought, the gay effusions of his fancy, his *dramatic* turns, and his *epigrammatic* points; and if they were reserved for the proper *stage*, they would no doubt receive what the honourable gentleman's abilities always did receive, the *plaudits* of the audience; but this was not the proper theatre for the exhibition of

these elegancies ; and he therefore must beg leave to call the attention of the House to the serious consideration of the very important question then before the House.

The clamours excited against the peace were loud in proportion to their injustice ; and it was generally the case, that where men complained without cause, they complained without temper. It was necessary to look back, notwithstanding all that the honourable gentleman on the other side of the way had said, to the language of that House, and to the sentiments of that House on this very subject. Had they forgot the resolutions of last session, by which Ministers were bound to recognize the independence of America ? Had they considered, that that resolution, in which he for one most heartily concurred, took at the same time from Ministers their advantage-ground in negotiation ; and deprived them of the opportunity of proposing independence as a boon to be conceded, as a matter to be offered as the price, or as the basis of peace ? Had they forgot the application made by the right honourable gentleman over the way to the Dutch, an application couched in terms to his feeling more degrading than any concession in the present peace ? Had they forgot the language of that day, when we were told, that we must have peace on any terms — peace for a year, for a day — just to give us a little breathing time ? Were not these things to be remembered ? or were they to be
told,

told, that times and circumstances were so completely changed, that what would have been desirable then, would not be so now? Were the circumstances so materially changed? Yes, they were; for these opinions were given, and these assertions made, when the right honourable gentleman was in office, and when the task of making peace was likely to fall on his own head. This was the change; this was the material alteration of circumstances which had taken place, and which now called for different conditions. The right honourable gentleman was no longer in place; he was no longer responsible for the terms, and therefore the circumstances were changed.

But to shew that there was no other change of circumstances, he went into a long and particular detail of the relative situation of the belligerent powers, their strength, their resources, their wants, their objects, and their prospects, deducing from this the inference, that it was absolutely and indispensibly necessary for this country to have peace; and that under all the circumstances of the nation at the time, the terms which we had procured were fair and advantageous. That he might shew this to be the case, he examined the articles, and spoke particularly to the points which had been complained of — the boundaries of Canada, the fishery of Newfoundland, the cession of the Floridas, the abandonment of the Loyalists, and the other topics which had engaged the attention of the House. He concluded

with recommending temper and moderation, and spurning at all unseasonable and invidious schemes of opposition, in a moment so calamitous and alarming to the state. The unnatural alliance which it was reported had taken place, was undoubtedly to be reckoned among the wonders of the age. It was not easy to reduce such an event to any common rule of judging of men, and went to a point of political apostacy, which not only astonished so young a man as he was, but apparently astonished and confounded the most veteran observers of the human heart. He was excessively severe on this junction, and spoke in most pointed terms of reproach.

Mr. *Sheridan* then rose to an explanation, which having made, he took notice of that particular sort of personality which the Right Hon. Gentleman had thought proper to introduce. He need not comment on it — the *propriety*, the *taste*, the *gentlemanly point* of it must have been obvious to the House. But, said Mr. *Sheridan*, let me assure the Right Hon. Gentleman, that I do now, and will at any time when he chooses to repeat this sort of allusion, meet it with the most sincere good humour. Nay, I will say more — Flattered and encouraged by the Right Hon. Gentleman's panegyric on my talents, if ever I again engage in the compositions he alludes to, I may be tempted to an act of presumption — to attempt an improvement on one of Ben Johnson's best characters, the character of the *Angry Boy* in the *Alchymist*.

Mr. Lee spoke with great earnestness against the terms of the peace, and declared upon his honour that in his mind they beggared all the treaties that ever had existence, in injury, and disgrace. With respect to the cession of territory — it was great and extensive in every quarter of the world. Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, beheld the dismemberment and diminution of the British Empire. But this alarming and calamitous as it was, was nothing when put in competition with another of the crimes of the present peace — the cession of men into the hands of their enemies, and delivering over to confiscation, tyranny, resentment, and oppression, the unhappy men who trusted to our fair promises, and deceitful words. This was the great ground of his objection; and he called it a disgraceful, wicked, and treacherous peace; inadequate to its object, and such as no man could vote to be honourable without delivering his character over to damnation for ever.

The Hon. Gentleman then adverted to what had been said of a junction between the noble Lord in the blue ribband and his honourable friend. Of such a junction he knew nothing; he would only say that if it had taken place; if they had done more than met on this question — he saw no harm, and no ground for charge. He had not been in that House while the noble Lord was pursuing his system for the reduction of America; but he believed that all who knew him, knew that he reprobated that system, that

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Mr.

he abhorred and condemned it as much as any man in this kingdom; but was this a reason for him to be the enemy of the noble Lord? or to confound the man with the Minister? Undoubtedly not. He always respected the private character of the noble Lord. He believed him to be honest and manly in his dealings — that his thoughts were upright, and his hands were clean — and we have the best proof, says Mr. Lee, that this is the case, for if his character had not been pure indeed, we should not have seen the noble Lord attended by so many friends when out of office. — He had observed his conduct narrowly, and he had seen none of that shuffling left-handed dealing, which made him the determined enemy of another noble person. When he was to decide which of the two men to prefer — the noble Lord, or the Earl of Shelburne, — he could not hesitate for one instant; because he could not hesitate for one instant to prefer openness to concealment, and honesty to artifice. He spoke in most severe terms of the Minister, and reprobated in the warmest terms the whole of his system.

The Hon. Mr. *Norton* said, he understood the Right Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to have, in a part of his speech expressed an inclination to separate the consideration of the European Treaties from that with America, which being answered in the negative, Mr. Norton added, that under all the circumstances, he was willing to approve of the two former;

former; but on account of the article relating to the Loyalists, he felt it impossible to give his assent to the latter.

Lord *Frederick Campbell* took fire at what Mr. Lee had said, and declared he came down to the House unbiassed, that he meant to vote honestly and fairly, and he meant to vote for the Address; but he would not bear to hear his character questioned for such conduct.

The *Attorney General* rose also extremely warm, and said, he did not understand such *swaggering* language. His character was as fair as his learned friend's, and who should dare to say, he damned his character by voting for the Address.

Mr. *Lee* explained his meaning, and shewed he had said, those that voted the peace honourable endangered their characters, which he took to be fair parliamentary language.

Mr. *Rigby* rose to still the troubled waters, and with a happy exercise of pleasantry, said, he desired to apologize for Mr. Lee as a young Member, for the unguarded manner in which he had delivered his opinion. Mr. *Rigby* called back the House to the real questions before them, termed the conjoined amendment an innocent lukewarm performance, and assigned his reasons for voting for the Address, as originally moved.

Mr. *Adam* concluded the debate with calling to the recollection of the House, the proceedings held in general on the ratification of treaties of peace.

Before

Before the last treaty, it was never practised to take Preliminaries in to consideration; parliament conceiving that they had nothing to do with the fact itself; and therefore they proceeded immediately against Ministers. He gave his reasons for voting against the Address.

At half past seven, o'clock, in the morning the House divided.

Ayes, for the Amendment - 224

Noes - 208

Majority against Ministers - 16.

A Committee was then appointed to draw up the Address, thus amended.

HOUSE

D E B A T E

HOUSE OF LORDS

ON THE ARTICLES OF THE PEACE.

Monday, February 17, 1783.

THE House proceeded to take the Articles of Peace with France and Spain, and the Provisional Articles with America, into consideration about four o'clock. The papers were read by the Clerk at the table; after which

The Earl of Pembroke rose, and trusted that it was unnecessary for him to take up any of their Lordships time in labouring to convince them of the propriety of approaching the Throne with an Address of Thanks, on the happy occasion of his Majesty having ordered the Articles of Peace to be laid before the House. Peace would relieve the kingdom from a load of taxes; revive the old, and open new channels of commerce; restore harmony and mutual affection between the subjects of Great-Britain and the United States of America; and contribute to promote the happiness, and establish the tranquility of Europe. He moved for an Address to the King; the same, literally, as that in the House of Commons.

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HOUSE

The Marquis of Carmarthen seconded this motion. The nation, he said, wished for peace, and he congratulated them on its happy accomplishment. The confederacy that had been formed against England was dissolved. The nation was eased of an intolerable and encreasing load of taxes. Trade would revive, and Great-Britain, pursuing the plans of wisdom, moderation, and peace, would still be one of the first powers of Europe.

The Earl of Carlisle said, that he wished for peace, as ardently as any man in this kingdom, and he would go great lengths to obtain it. The peace now made by virtue of the King's prerogative he considered as sacred and binding on the Empire, but he thought the conditions injurious to the interests, and derogatory of the honour of Great-Britain. It was contrary to natural justice and humanity to sacrifice to the cruel and inveterate malice of their enemies, men who had persevered, in the midst of the greatest perils and dangers, in their loyalty to Britain: men who had left their families, given up their fortunes, and risked their lives in the service of Government. So great a violation of public faith: so shameful a dereliction of his Majesty's most faithful and approved subjects, was a species of policy as unwise as it was pusillanimous; it discouraged all perseverance in loyalty in the day of trial and temptation, and encouraged a general spirit of revolt and insurrection. Protection and allegiance were mutual. No consideration of policy, if a disregard to good faith and eminent deserts might be called by that name,

name, could justify a desertion of the American Loyalists. The conduct of his Majesty's Ministers had not only been unjust and ungenerous towards these men, and especially to those who had borne arms in the defence of Government, but in manifold instances impolitic and improvident. He considered this as an action of such atrocious turpitude, that we should be damned in this world and in that which was to come, in his opinion, and in the opinion of the world. The Ministers had, through inaccuracy, or egregious folly, drawn such a line of boundary between America and Great-Britain, as delivered Canada and Nova Scotia, fettered, into the hands of the American Congress. The forts, the passes, the carrying places, the fittest tracts for the fur trade; all, all that was valuable was delivered up to our enemies. True we were to enjoy a free navigation on the river Mississippi. This indulgence we were to have by the Treaty. But how were we to have it? By what tenure were we to hold it? The line that bounded our territory carried us far wide of the Mississippi; and it was only by the connivance of the Americans that we could either navigate the Lakes, or that the Mississippi could be of any use to us. Nor was it only the Loyalists that we had abandoned. The five Indian nations, our allies; the Cherokees too, as well as the five nations; all these would henceforth lie at the mercy of Congress, and regret the confidence they had placed in what they fondly imagined, as they were taught to believe, was the greatest nation under the sun. The situa-

tion of Britain did not demand such exorbitant concessions. Her power was coming forward into full exertion, and our fleet, the glory and the bulwark of the nation, was rising, by a quick advancement, to a decided superiority over the united squadrons of France and Spain: Was it so recently, after the glorious achievements of a noble Lord, whom he had in his eye, in the West-Indies, and of Sir Edward Hughes in the East? Was it after the unparalleled defence of Gibraltar, and the glorious relief of that fortress by Lord Howe, that Great-Britain ought to record her own infamy by applauding an unsafe, a losing, a dishonourable peace? At a time too when France and Spain were exhausted; when Europe was threatened with other disturbances; when our minds were animated, and when there was every prospect of success, was it imagined that such concessions would have been made? Was it not enough that Ministers had ceded the territories, and abandoned the subjects of the Crown of Britain to their enemies? Must they be praised for such infamous transactions? He trusted that their Lordships would never stain their honour by approving an act that abandoned those whom we were bound in honour to protect, and which ceded with precipitation, over and above all that the Thirteen Provinces possessed, a territory, in extent, three times as great as the three British kingdoms. His Lordship moved an amendment; and the motion, with that amendment, run thus:

" To

“ To return our thanks to his Majesty for the communication of the Preliminary Articles of Peace, and for having put a stop to the calamities of war, by a peace, which being concluded, we must consider as binding, and not to be infringed without a violation of the national faith.

“ To assure his Majesty, that we feel, in the strongest manner, the obligation of affording every relief that can alleviate the distresses of those deserving subjects, who have exposed their lives and fortunes for the support of Great-Britain: and, at the same time, we cannot help lamenting the necessity which bids us subscribe to articles, which, considering the relative situation of the belligerent powers, we must regard as inadequate to our just expectations, and derogatory to the honour and dignity of Great Britain.”

The Earl of Coventry thought peace always a blessing: it was before their Lordships to consider, whether that which had been concluded between the belligerent powers was such as the nation was entitled to, considering her resources to carry on the war, and all other circumstances relative thereto. For his own part, he thought the peace was as good a one as this country had a right to expect, and could not therefore but approve of it. The advantages arising would be numerous, of great magnitude, and soon experienced. The man of landed property had no more taxes to apprehend; his burthen, indeed, was at present great enough; the peace would
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release him from every apprehension of an encrease. Those who had property in the funds would find their profits encrease, and their security bettered; two circumstances of the most agreeable nature.— His Lordship, after a few words, declared himself a friend to the motion before the House, as originally made.

Lord Walsingham said he was in a great measure anticipated by what had fallen from a noble Earl (Lord Carlisle) who had very ably commented upon the boundaries prescribed to the American territories. He questioned the right of the Crown to dismember the empire without the consent of Parliament; of territories not acquired by conquest during the war; arraigned the cruelty and injustice of abandoning the Loyalists, and our Indian allies; not less than twenty-five Indian nations, our allies and friends, were given up. He particularly stated the obligations we were under, by various treaties solemnly made, to protect the Indian nations, and he enumerated the treaties which had been made from time to time. The immense tract of land given up, not less than 5000 square miles, which in his mind the Crown could not alienate by prerogative, was at the same time the most valuable to this country of any that we could possess in Canada; and from which we had drawn all our furs. Lakes George and Champlain were totally given up: All the entrances into Canada were in the hands of the Americans: All the forts which had cost this nation so immense a sum

in building: All the passes of the Lakes: All the carrying places—nay, St. Laurence itself was, in one place, under the disguise of another name, given up to the Americans.

It is not in our power to follow the noble Lord in the delineations which he laid down of the geography of Canada, and the Lakes: But he pointed out minutely every advantage lost by the boundaries, and stated that that which was called a regulation of boundaries, was in fact a cession of Canada. He went into a long and particular examination of the boundaries agreed on for Canada, which were so defective and erroneous as to destroy all the value of the province. He touched on the other particulars of the three treaties, and objected to them severally. On the whole, he approved of the amendment suggested by the noble Earl, and thought it the only thing to which the House could agree.

Lord Hawke did not think that the peace, by any means, deserved those epithets that had been applied to it by the noble Lord who proposed the amendment. He thought it was as good a peace as we had any reason to expect, considering the host of foes that assailed us. The Loyalists, his Lordship contended, had not been abandoned. Congress had engaged to recommend their cause to the assemblies of the different Provinces. He was aware that the word recommend appeared feeble and inefficacious to those who were zealous friends to the Loyalists. He did not wish that the Loyalists should be abandoned; and

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he affirmed, that all that could be done for them, in the treaty, had been done. For what could Congress do *but* recommend the Loyalists? Congress possessed, indeed, the executive, but not the legislative power, and a recommendation of the Loyalists was all that was in their power. The Crown of Britain spoke, in the stile of *recommendation*, to Parliament. The language it used was not stronger. Congress, in like manner, recommended the cause of the Loyalists; that is, they recommended, they urged it with authority and earnestness, and he hoped they would recommend it with effect. He insisted upon the powerful combination that had been formed against England. He admired the conduct and valour of those military and naval heroes, who, in the course of this last campaign, had done so much honour to Britain. Their skill and bravery were not lost to their country. They enabled her to stand on good ground, and to demand good terms. The proper time for making peace was the time of victory. Could any of their Lordships promise with certainty, that next campaign would be more successful than the last. Here he painted the force that was opposed to Great-Britain in Europe, in America, in the West-Indies, and in the East. On the storm that was gathering in the East, he dwelt at length, and with the greatest pathos. The sun, said his Lordship, that illuminated for a short time your Eastern hemisphere is obscured by clouds, and no longer darts those enlivening

livering rays, which had almost restored us to our original vigour. From the whole complexion of things, a peace was wanted, and such a peace as we had procured was all that we could expect.

Lord Viscount Dudley declared the peace to be, in his mind, totally inadequate to our expectations, pretensions, and of which he could not by any means approve.

The *Duke of Chandos* thought the contrary. Our condition was such as demanded an immediate peace; and on a review of every particular, it would be found to be more than equal to what we had a right to expect.

Lord Viscount Townshend was very pointed in his remarks upon the conduct of Administration, who had disgraced this country beyond all former instances. To desert men who had constantly adhered to loyalty and attachment, was a circumstance of such cruelty as had never before been heard of. What was to become of the poor American Officers too, those who had drawn the sword in defence of this country? They were deserted likewise, and left to seek their fortunes any where out of English protection. The poor Loyalists should have had some tract of land assigned to them, where they might have lived free from oppression, wanton cruelty and resentment. His Lordship severely censured the boundaries as described in the Preliminary Articles, and imagined, that as the Americans had taken such care to secure what they had negotiated for,

they would in the end take all Canada into their hands. They had evidently been too cunning for us in their negotiation. Why could not some man from Canada, or respectable Canadian Merchant, who had been well acquainted with the country, have been thought of for the business, which Mr. Oswald had been sent to negotiate? Dr. Franklin, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Laurens had been an over-match for him; he either did not know, or appeared ignorant, how the country lay, that he had been granting away, as the bargain which he had made clearly indicated.—The Articles with France were full as exceptionable as those with America. The admission of that nation to a participation of the Newfoundland fishery, was a piece of the most dreadful policy and concession that ever disgraced a negotiation. The very thing which reared us so many fine seamen, was to be divided with that nation which was our natural enemy, and at all times inclined to dispute the sovereignty of the ocean with us. In the East-Indies the advantages allowed them were almost as great. They were to be at liberty to make a ditch round Chandénagor, for the purpose of draining it. This might be an innocent thing enough; but suppose it was converted into a regular fortification and had ramparts; were these things beneath the consideration of Ministers? Such an instance had occurred before; and the East-India Company did, without ceremony, fill up the ditch; but now it was allotted by treaty, and the French would, no doubt

doubt take the advantage of it. But still a more extraordinary thing than this was, the engagement entered into on the part of Great Britain, to procure a dependency round Pondicherry, which must of course be taken by force of arms ; some Nabob perhaps must submit to their being wrested from him.

The Articles with Spain came next under his Lordship's consideration. It was necessary to cede them something, and they had got Minorca. This his Lordship was not sorry for. He once trembled for the fate of Gibraltar. He was afraid that important garrison was to have been the sacrifice. Whatever might be thought of Gibraltar, he held it in the highest estimation. Some people reckoned the value of things by pounds, shillings, and pence, and others by different methods of computation. Gibraltar ought to be for ever retained in the possession of this country ; it intersected the two great ports of resort of France and Spain, and on that account was invaluable. But why we had granted Spain the possession of Florida he could not comprehend.—It would be a most severe check on us.—He could have no idea of the meaning of the navigation of Mississippi when we had not a foot of tract.—His Lordship concluded by expressing his satisfaction of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord near him, whose sentiments on the occasion had done him the greatest honour, and would accompany his name to posterity,

city, with every testimony of respect and admiration.

The Duke of Grafton was in hopes that the motion first brought before the House would have passed without those comments which had been made by noble Lords, who had already spoke in the debate; he thought the Address might have been carried with that unanimity which marked their Lordships proceedings at the beginning of the session. He wished that it might not be opposed from any factious motives, or by that kind of conversation which is expressive of general dissatisfaction upon all subjects alike. It would have a strange appearance abroad, that divisions should happen where unanimity only ought to predominate. With respect to the peace, all circumstances considered, it was as favourable a one in behalf of this country, as she had any right to expect. It had not been concluded without first being duly considered, and every circumstance maturely weighed. Those who wished a continuance of the war, should consider how sufficient resources were to be found for the purpose of carrying it on. There there would be great difficulty in finding; the nation had been greatly exhausted, and it became necessary to conclude a peace upon the best terms that could be procured, and Ministers had succeeded beyond his expectations in their endeavours. Was not it time to make a peace when our fleet in the West Indies, though

though superior for three months past to that of the French, could not recover even one of our lost possessions. According to some late and authentic advices, it was well known that there were in Cadiz Bay sixty sail of the line, ready for an expedition to the West Indies, a little time previous to the conclusion of the peace. These ships were to be joined by others from the Havannah with troops on board. There were likewise seventeen thousand troops in the island of St. Domingo ready for embarkation against Jamaica, and which was intended shortly to have taken place. It was then for noble Lords to consider what our inducement could be to carry on the war another year, and at the expiration of that time, how much our situation would be improved by it. From the circumstances he had mentioned, the temptation was not very great. The fleet in the West-Indies would not have been equal to that which was destined for that quarter of the world; and it was so much confined to situation, that the instant it fell to leeward, Antigua must have fallen.

His Grace was a warm advocate for the peace, and concluded by giving his assent to the motion.

Lord Viscount *Keppel* followed the Duke of Grafton. His Lordship began by observing, that in a late situation, which, he said, he unworthily filled, he had made it his particular study and care to put the navy of this country upon the most respectable footing. He thought the noble

Duke

Duke had exaggerated the account of the Spanish navy; it might indeed be numerous, but many of their ships were foul. According to some accounts that his Lordship had lately received, two or three were careening at the Havannah, and several very much out of condition in other places. The French had still more bad ships than Spain; their navies amounted together to about one hundred and twenty-three ships of the line, that of England to about one hundred and nine. What the noble Duke had said about the West-Indies had nothing so terrible in it to his Lordship. If the ships his Grace had mentioned had chose to have gone to the West-Indies then, and to have made a lodgement of the troops said to be in the island of St. Domingo, they must have come to an engagement, which would have been decisive, and the event of which his Lordship should not have feared to have risked. He begged to inform his Grace, that let the French or Spaniards have taken what course they would in the West-Indies or elsewhere, we had force to oppose them, both of ships and men, and that we were ready at the time alluded to by his Grace for active war, which was in contemplation. We were fully prepared for either offensive or defensive war. When his Lordship computed the navy of England at one hundred and nine ships, he included those which would be ready for service by May next. With such a navy as his Lordship had described, compared with that of France and Spain, could

could we be said to have gained that peace which, comparatively, we had a right to expect? No, by no means. He stood in a particular situation from the office he had lately filled, which, however, he was under the necessity of resigning, because he could not advise his Sovereign to conclude a peace, of which he did not in his conscience approve. We ought to have had a better peace; our situation entitled us to it. We had made an inglorious one, with ten ships of the navy of France in our possession; and they had not, at that time, one of ours. His Lordship mentioned the seven ships taken by Lord Rodney, and three others that had fallen into our hands, all of the line. He reprobated the peace in the strongest terms of expression, and gave his hearty assent to the proposed amendment.

The *Duke of Grafton* rose to explain:

The *Duke of Richmond* said, that, in considering the merits or demerits of the peace now under their Lordships consideration, it was necessary to take in a variety of circumstances, which would all be found to have their weight in a subject of that importance, which was then the object of their Lordships attention, and without which it would be impossible for their Lordships to form any judgment, and either approve or disapprove of the terms. It was first to be considered what was our situation at the time of making the peace, and how far those who had advised the conclusion, had
availed


availed themselves of the advantages of it. The cessions that had been made demanded particular attention, with an eye to the reason that authorised their being so given up; how trade and commerce was affected in all instances, both in the ceded territories and at home. There were many other particulars not before their Lordships, which it would be requisite for them to take into consideration, previous to the formation of a right judgment upon the matter. Such as the instructions to the agents, the letters in various correspondence on the point in question, the characters, the conduct, and the instructions of the principal agents in the business. Nay, oral conversations on the subject would form a great part of what they ought to scrutinize. And above all, they should not omit the minutest investigation of the relative force and weakness of the belligerent powers, the situation of their cabinet, the state of Europe in general—the probability of new wars,—and the prospect that there was of our gaining alliances—and a variety of more minute matters, which yet the good sense of every noble Lord who heard him would, upon reflection, be convinced must be absolutely necessary to examine and compare, before, in fairness and strict justice, a matter of such importance, as well to the Minister individually, as to the nation in general, could possibly be decided on. However, if one must form an idea of it partially, from the few materials before the House, his Grace freely owned he did not like

like the terms of the treaties, and could not therefore agree to the original address.



Lord Viscount Stormont took a wide range on the subject. He set out by acknowledging, that he agreed with the noble Duke who spoke last, that a full and fair judgment on this business could not be well formed, without a consideration of all of those articles his Grace had so properly described. But yet, how desirous soever he was of withholding his opinion, it was not in his power to do so. Ministers were resolved to force their Lordships to deliver their sentiments on the subject of the peace, merely from what lay upon their table; they must therefore only blame themselves for the consequences. For my own part, said his Lordship, I would with more pleasure than I can express, read any thing the noble Lord at the head of his Majesty's affairs could offer in defence of his own, and his colleagues conduct in the negotiation of this peace; for at present there appears to me *prima facie* evidence—Evidence, on the first view of the papers on the table, to convince me, that there is the grossest neglect, the most blameable ignorance, or shameful oscitancy in the construction of the present treaties, by which an irremediable wound is given to the dearest interests of this country, and an eternal stain brought upon the British reputation.

The noble Lord stated with great accuracy the question before their Lordships, viz. “ Whether the Preliminary Articles of Peace were such as





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"merited their applause, or deserved their disap-
 "probation." He considered them, for his own
 part, as injurious to the essential interests, dangerous
 to the safety, derogatory to the honour of Great
 Britain, and not warranted or justified by the situa-
 tion of the war. And first of all he observed, that
 in limited governments, like Sweden before the late
 revolution, and like Poland still, it might happen
 that no treaty of peace could be valid without the
 ratification of all the estates that composed the legis-
 lative power. Here he quoted Burlamaqui, on the
 Law of Nature and Nations. It was contended by
 some persons, that in such a case as the present dis-
 memberment of America, the prerogative royal of
 the Crown could not alone conclude a treaty for
 effecting that separation. But his Lordship did not
 rest his foot on that ground. The constitution had
 placed, and wisely placed, the making of peace or
 war in the executive power; and God forbid, said
 his Lordship, that I should ever see that privilege
 wrested out of it. As the noble Earl who had
 moved the amendment had said, the peace was
 concluded, and it was not now to be affected by
 any thing which that House could conclude on; the
 peace was to be held inviolate. What his Lordship
 considered was the fitness or expediency of it, in
 all those respects that naturally presented themselves
 to his view, when he considered the articles before
 them.

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He adverted to the shameful ignorance and simplicity, folly and absurdity, that appeared in the negociation and provisional articles of peace between England and the United American States. What reason could be given for sending out such a man as Mr. Oswald, to treat with the four American Commissioners? He was far over-matched by any one of them: Nor would any man compare him to Dr. Franklin, or Mr. Laurens, or any one of the Commissioners—*impar Congressu Achilli*—said his Lordship; for I am sure there was not one of them who was not an Achilles compared with him. But it was not Mr. Oswald, he said, that he had to do with, but those who confided in him and employed him.

The first question that the British Agent ought to have put to the American Commissioners, was, whether they had full powers to conclude and agree upon a general amnesty and restitution of goods to all Loyalists without exception? These were men whom Britain was bound in justice, and honour, and gratitude, and affection, and every tie, to provide for, and protect. Yet, alas, for England as well as them! they were made a part of the price of peace. Those who were the best friends of Britain, were, *eo nomine*, on that very account, excepted from the indulgence of Congress. Britain connives at the bloody sacrifice, and seeks for a shameful retreat, at the expence of her most valiant and faithful sons! How different from this was the conduct of Spain to the Loyalists in the Netherlands, in the reign of Philip

Philip III. on occasion of the famous truce in 1609, and also in the peace of Munster. Their effects and estates were either restored, or they were paid interest for them at the rate of 6 1-4 per cent. on the purchase money. [Here Lord Stormont repeated several of the articles of the truce between Philip III. and the United Provinces, which was concluded at Antwerp, 1609; which articles were also agreed to at the peace of Munster.] A general act of indemnity was passed, without exception of place or person. Lord Stormont also touched on the case of the Catalonians, who revolted from Spain, once when they put themselves under the protection of France, and again when they put themselves under the protection of Britain. In both cases, their privileges, lives, and properties, were preserved to them.— Even Cardinal Mazarin, so artful, so cunning and fallacious, and I am sure I mean not the most distant allusion to any of his Majesty's Ministers; (for the Parliament of Paris determined, that to call any person a Mazarin was a reproach to him, and that an action would lye) even he, though so little scrupulous on most occasions, deemed it sound and policy to observe good faith with the Catalonians. He negotiated the peace of the Pyrenees himself, and he took care, that an act of indemnity should be published in their favour, on the same day in which a proclamation was issued reclaiming their obedience. History, experience furnishes no example of such base dereliction. If they do, said

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Lord Stormont, let any noble Lord speak out, and on this subject I will be silent. From the Loyalists he passed on to our Indian allies, with whom we had had a long connexion, on whom we had bestowed the name of the Children of the King, and with whom, said he, you swore to preserve an inviolate friendship as long as the woods, and mountains, and rivers should remain.

His Lordship next turned his attention to the boundary line that had been agreed on by the American Commissioners, and that very extraordinary geographer and politician, Mr. Richard Oswald. There was, prefixed to the articles of peace between England and America, a very pompous preamble, setting forth that those treaties were the best observed in which were reciprocal advantages. He was a long time at a loss to understand the meaning of those words *reciprocal advantages*. But at last he discovered, that they meant only the advantage of America. For in return for the manifold concessions on our part, not one had been made on theirs. In truth, the American Commissioners had enriched the English Dictionary with several new terms and phrases; *reciprocal advantages*, for instance, meant the advantage of *one* of the parties; and a *regulation of boundaries* meant a *cession of territory*.

His Lordship then took a view of our concessions on Newfoundland, the ceded islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which being fortified, will command the entrance of the river of St. Laurence. The liberty

liberty accorded to the Americans to settle in Nova Scotia; the cession of Penobscot, a nursery of masts; the giving up of all that was important or valuable in Canada; the Floridas, important for their situation, and agreeable in respect of climate and soil—we might as well have ceded all Canada to them, as to have drawn such a line of separation; for all the forts which commanded the lakes were in their hands, and we were wholly defenceless, and at their mercy, in our navigation of the lakes: besides, we had given up to them by that boundary, a tract of country four times as large as Britain, and in that tract above six and twenty nations of our Indian allies, whose hunting ground we were obliged, by treaty, to protect, and from whom (setting aside those feelings which dignify human nature) we received most essential benefits in the article of their trade of peltry and furs. The noble Viscount dwelt on this topic with great energy, and declared himself at once astonished and confounded at the conduct of the King's Ministers in this respect. From this impolicy his Lordship turned to Newfoundland, and there he complained of Ministers giving to the French near seven degrees of latitude for their own exclusive fishing, and at the same time that we did that, we also gave the Americans a participation in all our fisheries, in all our creeks and harbours, and never made any stipulation for our fishing reciprocally in theirs. The granting of St. Pierre and Miquelon to the French was the next object that

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met the reprehension of his Lordship. If they fortified these two places, as they certainly might, if they pleased, his Lordship declared our fisheries on that coast to be altogether unsafe, and of course of little or no advantage to us. The noble Viscount referred to the various treaties which had been made in respect to this fishery, and showed what honourable pains the Earl of Chatham had always taken to preserve this fruitful nursery of seamen to the British Crown.—By the provisions made respecting this fishery, there would be an end at once put to the British trade. While he was Ambassador at the Court of Versailles, they set up a title to the fishery ceded to them by the peace of Utrecht, unshackled by reciprocity.—He wrote home for instructions—and received so clear, distinct, and at the same time so peremptory a statement of the English right to fish in common with the French, on the West side of the island, that they were satisfied, or at least they relinquished their claim for the time, and wisely postponed it until a moment should come more favourable to their ambition, when, perhaps, there should be an English Minister, so solicitous of power, so anxious to fix himself in his seat, as to hurry a negotiation to its end, without care or anxiety for the interest of the state which he was appointed to govern. He now considered the fishery as irretrievably gone; for there was not a syllable of reciprocity in the treaty, and we yielded, in full right, the possessions of St. Pierre and Miquelon,

Miquelon, which they would instantly fortify, and secure to themselves an immense trade. The concessions made to America in this particular, were also very material. The unsettled coasts and bays in Nova Scotia were to be opened to them, and we were to have no power to fish in their bays in return. Eternal jealousies would arise, and instead of securing a peace, we had, in truth, granted all this for the sake of involving the nation in a new war. The cession of the two Floridas he could not account for by any reason, either of necessity or prudence. There was no bargain in the business; for there was nothing granted to England in their stead. The manner in which these provinces were delivered up, was as mad as it was impolitic. No measure was taken for the security, or the relief of the planters and inhabitants, nor any provision made, by which they might be enabled to dispose of their property if they did not chuse to continue in the provinces, subject to the Court of Spain. The noble Viscount then exposed, in glaring colours, the folly of stipulating for the navigation of the Mississippi, when every thing that could make the Mississippi valuable was gone. We had no coast—there was no junction even with the lakes—no communication by which we could transport our furs to any market. In short, the article for the navigation of the Mississippi was an insult on our understandings, added to all the other injuries done to our property by the present peace.

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The noble Viscount passed to the West-Indies: Here there were equal marks of egregious folly: he entered into a long argument to prove that we had it in our power to have made a peace with France without the cession of Tobago. We were in possession of St. Lucia, which, whatever may be its intrinsic value, the French consider as invaluable. We were in possession of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which completely shut them out from the whole of the fishery of Newfoundland; and having therefore these strong points, we should have proposed to agree to a peace on the ground of *uti possidetis*. He was free to own, that this would not have been favourable to us in the West-Indies; but the fact is, that the French durst not agree to it. They durst not give up St. Lucia: They must have the fishery; and therefore, as they must resist the offer of *uti possidetis*, the alternative was plain—let us agree then on the footing of complete restitution. To this we were fairly and fully entitled. But, instead of this, we give up Tobago, an island of the utmost consequence to the manufactures of this country, as well as to its interests in the West-Indies. He mentioned a manufactory of cotton goods lately established in France, which only wanted the cotton of Tobago to make it the rival of Manchester. That was given to them, and there was no equivalent whatever given to us in return. On the coast of Africa the concessions were subject to the same complaint.

We had given up a most valuable trade, and had made such stipulations, in regard to the gum, as would finally extinguish our connection with that quarter of the world. But in the East-Indies, more perhaps than any where else, were the shameful and degrading concessions of the present peace to be found. The delivery of Chandernagore, with a ditch, and the promise to procure territories from our allies, were circumstances so humiliating and injurious, that he could not conceive by what strange fatality our Ministers were actuated in this respect. He entered into a long discussion of the articles respecting the East, and pointed out the injuries done to the Company in a forcible manner. In this quarter of the world we had driven the French from every thing. They had no claims—they had no power—they had no footing—and we might have found in the East-Indies a recompence for all our losses in the West, but the rule of concession was alone regarded by our Ministers in all that they had done. He enlarged on the importance of Dunkirk to France. In a war with England, that harbour, opened and repaired, would be capable of containing twenty or thirty ships of good size and burthen. These issuing out, at all seasons, would annoy our trade in its very center, and counterbalance in some measure the advantages of our local situation for commerce. Dunkirk, at the same time, would be of no use to the French, but in a war with England. In our precipitancy

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to allow the reparation of Dunkirk, therefore, the language of the Crowns, without any exaggeration or colouring, was plainly this: "To shew my good brother of France how earnestly I desire his friendship, I will give him up Dunkirk for the convenience of making war on my loving subjects."

Another thing in the treaty with France particularly struck him, as it seemed to indicate that the King's Ministers were as negligent of the high honour and dignity of the empire, as they were of its possessions. In the article respecting the capture of prizes, the Channel was no more called the British Sea, which, in all the treaties that were made during the present century, was uniformly called the British Seas. This was matter of very great consideration, at a time when we were conceding every thing that was either the object of pride or of interest. This was an insult which the sippant vanity of France would be fond to give, but which ought not to have been suffered. But considerations of this kind were beneath the attention of Ministers of the present day, who seemed to think that to make a peace at any rate, was to do a meritorious work, and such as the nation of course must applaud when applied to for that purpose. Under that idea, the present motion of address was made; not to thank his Majesty for his gracious condescension, or to congratulate him upon the return of peace, but to gain the thanks

of that House for a work that Ministers had done, and to go abroad into the world with the sanction of that vote of thanks, as it might most properly be called, and thereby set all those who might not be inclined so fully to subscribe to the merits of their negotiations at open defiance; but he hoped the noble Lords saw the intent of this, and would take care that men undeserving should not be authorised by any such high sanction, but, on the contrary, that all attempts to that effect should be spiritedly suppressed, and that the approbation of that House should never be unworthily obtained.

If his Lordship should be asked, if the present peace was a good one, and such as, under much greater calamities than those we had suffered, ought to be accepted of, he would lay his hand upon his heart, and answer positively, No! He had been brought up in the habits of independency, and would therefore on all occasions give an opinion accordingly. Would not every man of independency, answer on the present occasion as he did? Certainly he would; and where was the circumstance on the *prima facie* appearance of things, that indicated the least impropriety to his determination. Ministers would say, that if a peace cannot be had on the terms to be wished for, it is expedient that it be accepted of upon those terms which are offered. The principle of this proposition his Lordship allowed, but denied the application. It was a fact to be mourned, that

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the elements had fought against us, and the hand of Providence had sometimes been felt severely upon us; but we have had no disasters that had not been more than compensated for by the victories of our able and gallant commanders, in the different parts of the world: the successes of whom, and their merits, his Lordship took notice of, in the most pleasing manner.

The conduct of Ministers by coming down to that House, to supplicate its approbation of their actions, was unlike to that of some others, who had rendered their country the most acceptable services in the same sphere of action; who after having concluded perhaps as satisfactory a peace as was within the annals of this country, did not go to Parliament begging its approbation.

Lord Grantham replied to *Lord Stormont*. His Lordship began with remarking, that he had the greatest respect for the authority, which the noble Lord had alluded to in the course of his speech, and should have thought himself exceedingly happy, to have had it in his power, to have imitated the conduct of that great man, who his Lordship had held out to him as worthy of being remembered. Times were changed since the peace the noble Lord had hinted at was made, and many concurrent circumstances rendered it almost impossible to negotiate so well, as to place the nation in that agreeable state, which it found itself in at the conclusion of that peace.

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He assured their Lordships, that nothing had been entered into without first being considered in the most careful manner over and over again, and almost every possible contingency duly weighed. The difference betwixt concluding a peace with one enemy, and with a host of them, was as great as could be imagined, and productive of the greatest difficulties in negotiation. Add to this, England was without even a single ally to assist her on the greatest emergency. For his part, he considered the peace as good a one as she, considering our situation, could possibly have had. His Lordship did not perceive the light we had to expect a honor. But our reduced situation was in consequence of that blind and unfortunate pursuit of the war in America, by an Administration more obstinate than wise, and which war, if continued, would have brought final destruction upon the empire. His Lordship had not, he observed, been greatly in the habit of troubling their Lordships, but when he considered the particular situation in which he stood, he could not forbear to do it; indeed, there was a necessity for so doing. His Lordship said, he scorned to shelter himself from blame, by throwing it upon an innocent man or colleague; and therefore made no scruple to declare, that the reason why some words the noble Viscount had mentioned as proper to be inserted in a certain part of an article alluded to by him, was, that by some most unaccountable and unhappy mistake of his own,

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they had been left out. As soon as he found this, he was exceedingly alarmed and distressed, and took every possible means to remedy the evil. The articles had been sent off with this deficiency, and his Lordship had made an application, in which he was so happy as to succeed, and an instrument was signed and exchanged, calling the Channel and North Seas the British Seas; so that the evil was redressed by the only method that was possible.

His Lordship, in answer to the noble Viscount's objections to giving up the island of Tobago, observed, that it was a most disagreeable thing, no doubt, that such a concession should be made; and yet he did not know any possible case of cession where the consequences would have been so triflingly disagreeable as in the instance of Tobago. The inhabitants of which must be considered as those who frequently change their masters; and if their property be secured, they may not perhaps suffer much hardship by a change of allegiance.—With respect to the rest of the cessions that had been made to France, he could not look upon them in that humiliating light which some noble Lords had considered them in. It was necessary to make concessions to France; she was determined at all events to have them, as some equivalent for those humiliating ones which she herself was obliged to make at the conclusion of the last war. Noble Lords could not but recollect the submission France made to this country,

country, which galled her pride, and which were rather feathers coveted by the French for the sake of pride than use—these were the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and that we should depart from the old article for the demolition of Duakirk. These were not objects of consequence to England, nor such as she ought to struggle for at the hazard of a war. Such only were the things which had been given up to the French both in the East-Indies and in America, except indeed the island of Tobago, but their Lordships would reflect on our losses, and on our situation, and granting that there must be concessions, they would believe that the loss of Tobago was not so material.

Lord Sackville spoke in the most pointed terms of reprobation of every article of the peace, and declared it to be in every instance the most unwise, impolitic, and ruinous, of any treaty that this country had ever made. In regard to the abandonment of the Loyalists, it was a thing of so atrocious a kind, that if it had not been already painted in all its horrid colours, he should have attempted the ungracious task; but never should have been able to describe the cruelty in language as strong and expressive as his feelings. The King's Ministers had weakly imagined that the recommendation of the Congress was a sufficient security for these unhappy men. For his own part, so far from believing that this would be sufficient, or any thing like sufficient for their protection,

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and if they entertained any notions of this sort, he would put an end to their idle hopes at once, by reading from a paper in his pocket, a resolution which the Assembly of Virginia had come to, so late as on the 17th of December last. The resolution was as follows:

“ That the laws of this state confiscating property
 “ held under the laws of the former government
 “ (which had been dissolved and made void) by
 “ those who have never been admitted into the
 “ present social compact, being founded on legal
 “ principles, were strongly dictated by that
 “ principle of common justice, demand that, if
 “ virtuous citizens, in defence of their natural and
 “ constitutional rights, risk their life, liberty, and
 “ property on their success, the vicious citizens
 “ who side with tyranny and oppression, or who
 “ cloak themselves under the mask of neutrality,
 “ should at least hazard their property, and not
 “ enjoy the benefits procured by the labours and
 “ dangers of those whose destructions they wished.

“ That all demands or requests of the British
 “ Court, for the restitution of property confiscated
 “ by this state, being neither supported by law,
 “ equity, or policy, are wholly inadmissible, and
 “ that our Delegates in Congress be instructed
 “ to move Congress, that they may direct their
 “ deputies, who shall represent these States in the
 “ General Congress for adjusting a peace or truce,
 “ neither to agree to any such restitution, or sub-

mit that the laws made by any independent state of this union, be subjected to the adjudication of any power or powers on earth."

His Lordship having read the paper, demanded what Ministers had to say now for this boasted recommendation, for which they had stipulated with Congress? Could they say, that the unhappy men who had fought and bled for this country, who had given up their all and (a pang the more grievous to minds of feeling) the all of their little families; could Ministers say that these men who had said and done, and suffered all that was in the power of human nature for our cause, ought not to have had a better security than the present, from scorn, insolence, and ruin? A price founded on such a sacrifice as this, must be accursed in the sight of God and man! His Lordship added a few words of animadversion on other parts of the treaty similar to those which had been already used by the Noblemen who had spoken in favour of the amendment, particularly with respect to the boundaries, and this he spoke to with great information and accuracy. All the faults his Lordship said were on the American side—the immense district of country which supplied us with maize was gone—the Indian nations were abandoned—and we were insulted with the navigation of the Mississippi, where all its benefits were taken away. He then concluded, with giving his hearty approbation to it; but before he had done, he took notice of an expression

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expression which had fallen from a noble Duke (the Duke of Grafton) who had said, that it gave him pleasure to observe the delicacy with which the debate was conducted, in as much as the conduct of the late Administration, to which so much of the misfortunes of this unhappy country were imputable, were not so much as once mentioned. Now he was free to own, he was one of those who counted it no delicacy to forbear adverting to that period; a period indeed, which the present Ministers would do well to decline speaking on. For though it was disastrous, it was honest—it was honourable—it was every thing that could have commanded success, if one could look forward, and count upon certainty in subsidiary transactions.

Lord Viscount Howe uttered his thoughts on the subject in so low a voice, that there was scarce a possibility of collecting any thing which fell from him.²¹ However it seemed, that after giving an account of the state of the navy in the detail, he summed up its force, and said, that by May next, what with the number of vessels we had already, and those now in forwardness, this country might reckon upon ninety-nine line of battle ships tolerably fit for service; and, by the best accounts, the force of the united House of Bourbon might be about one hundred and twenty-five. He said, that by the latest accounts from Cadix, the Spaniards and French had sixty sail of the line lying in that harbour, in prime condition, and in every respect well equipped for

the most vigorous and active service. His Lordship's speech was of considerable length, and from such parts of it as reached us, and what we could collect from the allusions of those speakers who followed, appeared to be intended as a description of the weak state of our naval power, and of course a justification, in some measure, of the treaties before the House. He recounted the transactions of the late campaign—attributed a great deal of our success to chance; for, in a competition of strength with the enemy, we were greatly inferior. Many of the ships were in a poor condition; that, for instance, on board of which he hoisted his flag, the *Victory*, was very bad, and very unclean. He closed with observing, that if no other good attended the present pacification than the mere breathing time it gave us, we ought to count the interval a happy one, and instead of idly flinging away our remaining strength in unnatural squabbles among ourselves, unite and endeavour to make the best use of our time, in re-arming against the possibility of future hostility. This, he trusted, their Lordships good sense would consider to be the advice of patriotism, and not of party.

Lord Viscount Koppel said, his last accounts respecting the state of the Spanish navy at Cadiz, spoke it to be no more than forty-two sail of the line of battle ships; and he computed our force, good, bad, and indifferent, to be one hundred and nine. He could not, indeed, enter into the minutiae of the condition

condition of our navy ; he did not imagine it would be consistent with prudence ; but so much would he say, that he did not imagine the condition of our enemy's naval affairs was so good as our own, or that they had any thing like such a prospect.

Lord Viscount Howe shewed his Lordship, that the accounts on which he had founded his report of the state of the Spanish navy at Cadiz, were later than those his Lordship relied on ; but he could not, he said, subscribe to the mode his Lordship took of estimating the naval strength of Great-Britain, under the description of good, bad, and indifferent ; good and indifferent, a prudent man would think was stretching the account to the utmost verge of *shew* ; indeed, he could hardly say, utility ; but to include the *bad* in the statement, would be bad indeed.

Lord King said, he did not approve of the manner in which the war had been carried on ; nor was he more reconciled to the peace.— Vigour and spirit, which seemed to him essentially necessary to the dignity of martial or pacific transactions, were wanting in both cases. A noble Lord (*Lord Sackville*) had read the House a continuation of that lesson which America, from the very outset of the unfortunate quarrel with this country, had been constantly giving this country. The doctrine was as old as the creation, though we seemed to be ignorant of it. “ He who is not for me in a state of civil war, is, to all intents and purposes, against me.” The language of war is harsh and dissonant. The introduction

duction of a soft note into it, on any pretence whatever, only betrays an ignorance of the music. In plain terms, whenever there is a melancholy necessity for a war of the nature with that of America, tenderness in the beginning will, upon a review of events, be found cruehy in the end. For his own part, his Lordship declared, that if he had had the conducting of the war, he would have instantly, on the first accounts of the rebellious conduct of the Americans, sent off a powerful force to their country; and, instead of burdening the peaceful and loyal subjects which these troops had left behind, he would have left them to subsist themselves upon the properties of the rebels, until, by a salutary course of military physic, they had taken them down from their aerial sills, and reduced them to the standard of common sense and allegiance. The deficiency of spirit which his Lordship thought so culpable in the late Ministry, appeared also in this, and therefore he could not, consistent with his former opinions, give his approbation to a peace whose frame betrayeth so much imbecility.

The Earl of Shelburne then rose, and the House was all attention. The lateness of the hour, my Lords, said he, will not suffer me to take the liberty of trespassing so far on your patience, as my feelings would therein prompt me to on the present occasion: I shall not address your passions—that candid province I will leave to those who have shewn such ability for its government to-night. As my conduct

has been founded upon integrity—facts, and plain reasoning, will form its best support.—I shall necessarily wave the consideration of the critical moment at which I stepped into the administration of the affairs of this country—a moment when, if there be any credit due to the solemn, public declarations of men, who seemed then, and seem now, to have the welfare of the State nearest to their hearts—every hope of renovated lustre was gone, and nothing but dreary despondency remained to the well-wishers of Great-Britain. I am now speaking within memory, and consequently within proof. It is not for me to boast of my motives for standing forward at a period so alarming. My circumstances are not so obscure as to render my conduct a matter of dubiety, and my own explanation of my feelings would, I flatter myself, fall far short of that credit which sympathy would give me in the minds of men, whose patriotism is not that of words; I make no merit of my hardihood, and when I speak of mine, I wish your Lordships to understand me as speaking of the generous enterprize of my noble and honourable colleagues in administration. It was our duty as good citizens, when the state was in danger, that all selfish apprehensions should be banished. I shall not, therefore, expatiate on my reasons for coming into office, but openly and candidly tell your Lordships how I have conducted myself in it. A peace was the declared wish of the nation at that time. How was that to be procured best for the advantage of my country?

Certainly

Certainly by gaining the most accurate knowledge of the relative condition of the powers at war. Here a field of knowledge was required to be beaten, which no one man, vast and profound as it is possible to picture human capacity, would by any means be supposed equal to. Then if one man was inadequate to the whole task, the next question naturally is, what set of men are best qualified as auxiliaries in it? What is the skill required? A knowledge of trade and commerce, with all its relations, and an intimate acquaintance with military affairs, and all its concomitants.—Were men of this description consulted previous to, and during the progress of the treaty now before your Lordships? I answer, they were. And with this sanction Administration need assume no false brow of bravery, in combating glittering assertions without edge, and inflated speculations without stamina. Let us examine them, my Lords—Ministry, in the first place, is blamed for drawing the boundary they have done between the territories of the United States and those of our Sovereign in Canada. I wish to examine every part of the treaties on the fair rule of value of the district ceded—To examine it on the amount of the exports and imports, by which alone we could judge of its importance. The exports of this country to Canada then were only 140,000*l*. and the imports were no more than 50,000*l*. Suppose the entire fur trade sunk into the sea, where is the detriment to this country? Is 50,000*l*. a-year im-
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ported in that article any object for Great Britain to continue a war which the people of England, by their representatives, have declared their abhorrence of? Surely it is not. But much less must this appear in our sight, when I tell Parliament, and the whole kingdom, that for many years past, one year with another, the preservation of this annual import of 50,000l. has cost this country, on an average, 800,000l. I have the vouchers in my pocket, should your Lordships be inclined to examine the fact. But the trade is not given up, it is only divided, and divided for our benefit. I appeal to all men conversant with the nature of that trade, whether its best resources in Canada do not lie to the northward. What then is the result of this part of the treaty, so wisely, and with so much sincere love on the part of England clamoured against by noble Lords? Why this. You have generously given America, with whom every call under Heaven urges you to stand on the footing of brethren, a share in a trade, the monopoly of which you sordidly preserved to yourselves, at the loss of the enormous sum of seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds. Monopolies some way or other, are ever justly punished. They forbid rivalry, and rivalry is of the very essence of the well-being of trade. This seems to be the era of Protestantism in trade. All Europe appear enlightened, and eager to throw off the vile shackles of oppressive ignorant monopoly, of that unmanly and illiberal principle, which is at once

ungenerous and deceitful. A few interested Canadian merchants might complain; for merchants would always love monopoly, without taking a moment's time to think, whether it was for their interest or not. I avow that monopoly is always unwise; but if there is any nation under Heaven, who ought to be the first to reject monopoly, it is the English. Situated as we are between the old world and the new—and between the southern and northern Europe—all that we ought to covet upon earth was free trade, and fair equality. With more industry, with more enterprize, with more capital than any trading nation upon earth, it ought to be our constant cry—let every market be open—let us meet our rivals fairly—and we ask no more. It is a principle on which we have had the wisdom to act with respect to our brethren of Ireland; and, if conciliation be our view, why should we not reach it out also to America. Our generosity is not much, but little as it is, let us give it with a grace. Indeed, to speak properly, it is not generosity to them, but oeconomy to ourselves; and in the boundaries which are established we have saved ourselves the immense sum of 800,000*l.* a-year, and shewed to the Americans our sincere love and fair intentions, in dividing the little bit of trade which Nature had laid at their doors; and telling them that we desired to live with them in communion of benefits, and in the sincerity of friendship. But the Indians were abandoned

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doled to their enemies. Noble Lords have taken great pains to shew the immense value of these Indians; it was not unnatural for noble Lords, who had made so lavish an use of these Indians, to complain of their loss; but these who abhorred their violence would think Ministry had done wisely.— The Americans knew best how to tame their savage natures.— The descendants of the good William Penn would manage them better than all the Mr. Stuarts with all the Jews harps, razors, trumpery, and jobs that we could contrive. And now that I am speaking on the provisional articles with America, I shall dismiss this subject, though it is blended with others, before I proceed to the investigation of the rest of the objections to the treaties of pacification. Why have you given America the freedom of fishing in all your creeks and harbours, and especially on the banks of Newfoundland, say the noble objectors to this article? Why? because, in the first place, they could, from their locality, have exercised a fishery in that quarter for the first season (for there are two) without our consent, and in spite of all our efforts to repel them. In February, the first season commences, and that is entirely at their devotion; for our people have never, and can never take their stations there so soon. With regard to the other season, let us again revert to what I have already said respecting the fur trade; though we have not a monopoly, we have got such superior advantages in the article of dry-

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ing, curing, and preparing our fish for market, from the exclusive command of the most contiguous shores, that a rivalry can only whet our industry to reap those benefits our preferable situation in this respect presents to us. But why have we not stipulated a reciprocity of fishing in the American harbours and creeks? I'll tell your Lordships:—Because we have abundant employment in our own. Would not an American think it sordid in the extreme, nay, consider it bordering on madness, to covet the privilege of battenng our cattle on some of their steril wilds, when we had our own fertile Savannahs to have recourse to. Such would be the opinion entertained of Ministry, if it had childishly and avariciously made a stipulation of the nature the objectors think they ought to have. As to the masts, a noble Lord said, we were to have in such abundance at Penobscot. I will oppose a fact to his bare assertion. I have in my pocket a certificate from one of the ablest surveyors in our service, Captain Twiss, that there is not a tree there capable of being made a mast. But there remains somewhat in these provisional articles still to be considered, which I have never reflected on without feelings as pungent as any which the warmest admirers of the virtues of the Loyalists can possibly have experienced. I mean the unhappy necessity of our affairs, which induced the extremity of submitting the fate of the property of these brave and worthy men to the discretion of
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their enemies.—I have but one answer to give the House in this particular, it is the answer I gave my own bleeding heart, A part must be wounded, that the whole of the empire may not perish. If better terms could be had, think you, my Lords, that I would not have embraced them. You all know my creed. You all know my steadiness. If it were possible to put aside the bitter cup the adversities of this country presented to me, you know I would have done it; but you called for peace. To make it in the circumstances, which your Lordships all know I stood on, was most arduous. In this point nothing could be more grievous to me. Neither in public nor in private life is it my character to desert my friends—I had but the alternative—either accept the terms, said Congress, of our recommendation to the states, in favour of the Colonists, or continue the war. It is in our power to do no more than recommend. Is there any man who hears me who will clap his hand on his heart and step forward and say, I ought to have broken off the treaty? If there be, I am sure he neither knows the state of the country, nor yet has he paid any attention to the wishes of it. But still I do not despond with respect to the loyalists—I rely upon the wisdom, the honour, and the temper of the Congress. They were cautious in wording their treaty, lest they should possibly give offence to the new states, whose constitutions had not advanced to those habits of appearance and strength

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that banishes all suspicions; peremptory language is not the language of a new state. They must soften their applications. In all their measures—for money—for men—they have used the word *recommendation* to the Provincial Assemblies—and it has always been paid respect to. And, believe me, they do the Loyalists the offices not of friends, who surmise doubts on this occasion. But say the worst, and that after all, this estimable set of men are not received and cherished in the bosom of their own country. Is England so lost to gratitude, and all the feelings of humanity, as not to afford them an asylum.——Who can be so base as to think she will refuse it to them?—— Surely it cannot be that noble-minded man, who would plunge his country again knee-deep in blood, and saddle it with an expence of twenty millions for the purpose of restoring them. Without one drop of blood spilt, and without one-fifth expence of one year's campaign, happiness and ease can be given the Loyalists in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever in their enjoyment; therefore let the outcry cease on this head. But which of the two styles of language is the more likely to assist the Loyalists? The style of the address which declares the confidence of Parliament in the great intentions of the Congress—or the style of the noble Lords who declare that recommendation is nothing. It surely requires, my Lords, no great depth of penetration to distinguish between these things.

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A noble Viscount asks why Mr. Oswald was appointed as negotiator against such odds. It is very true Mr. Oswald has not the oratorical abilities of the noble Viscount, the Ciceronian style, nor the persuasive address. The noble Viscount would have spoken in a different language; but Mr. Oswald had other talents, and, in my opinion, talents of a superior quality—the talents of full information on the subject—great commercial knowledge—plain dealing—unspotted integrity—and a character which gave confidence to whatever he said.

With respect to the cession of the two Floridas, we must refer again to the exports and imports. Imports were not more than 70,000l. and the exports hardly exceeded 120,000l. To be sure I would not willingly take so much from the commerce of the nation; but amidst the millions of our trade, is this an object worth contending for at the hazard of continuing war? We will now, my Lords, consider the articles with France, and first let us look to Europe. I am asked, why overlook all the treaties respecting Dunkirk? Why, let me ask the question in return, why were not these treaties ever enforced during all the administrations which have passed away since the demolition of that harbour was first stipulated? This negligence is *prima facie* evidence of the little account in which the fulfilling of that treaty has hitherto been held; for were it otherwise, we had often since the power to enforce it. And I have heard that able seaman;

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the late Lord Hawke, declare, that all the art and cost that France could bestow on the bason of Dunkirk, would not render it in any degree formidable or noxious to Great Britain. But, as was well observed by a noble friend near me (Lord Grantham) France wished to have the feathers she formerly strutted with, restored to her; and, surely, no sober man would continue the war to thwart a fancy so little detrimental to us. However, if I am mistaken; if Lord Howe be mistaken; if former Ministers be mistaken; let the proof be produced. Till then, I trust your Lordships, if you do not now approve of the conduct of my administration; in this particular, you will at least suspend your judgments. We will now, if your Lordships please, advert to the objections respecting the cession to France on the coast of Newfoundland. This, to be sure, is not to be tried by the rule of imports and exports. But what is it? Seven degrees of latitude. These are founding words; but they are no more. By this part of the treaty future quarrels are guarded against. The concurrent fishery formerly exercised was a source of endless strife—the French are now confined to a certain spot—it is nothing compared to the extent we possess, and it is besides situate in the least productive part of that coast. But I would not have your Lordships pay greater attention to my bare assertion, than I trust you will to the assertions of those who take upon themselves to pronounce this part of the treaty wrong. I have

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here ready for your inspection the opinions of the ablest men on that subject. I applied to the person best qualified to point them out to me. The noble Lord near to me, (Lord Keppel) then at the head of the Admiralty, referred me to three officers in his Majesty's service, whose judgment and integrity he could rely on, and your Lordships, on the bare naming of them, will rely on them too. Admiral Edwards testimony must have its weight—the testimony of Captain Levison Gower, whose services the nation are to enjoy in peace as well as war—and that of Lieutenant Lane, who took an accurate survey of the whole coast, and who was well qualified for the task, as he served under and possessed the confidence of the famous circum-navigator, Captain Cooke. These officers all declare, that the best fishing was to the southward, which was entirely in the possession of the English; so that we must doubt the national spirit, and the national industry of this country, before we can pronounce, said his Lordship, this so much talked of exclusive seven league fishery an injury to Great Britain. As to the cession of St. Pierre and Miquelon, where is the proof that these places can be fortified so as to annoy us? I call on the noble objectors for their proofs—I call in vain, I know I do. I have here in my hand that which will satisfy your Lordships how idle all surmises are on that head. Here are certificates from the most skilful and experienced engineers, that neither St. Pierre or Miquelon would

admit the construction of a fortress, which could stand the attack of the smallest of your frigates. — Permits me, my Lords, to impress upon your minds, that the foundation of all the parts of the respective treaties before you was, as I stated in the beginning, not speculation or idle conjecture, but practice and solid experience. My language does not mock your understanding with assertions—it feeds it with fact. With this constantly in your eye, I court for myself and my colleagues, your Lordships decision on our conduct. And we will now, if your Lordships please, take a view of our affairs in the West Indies. All the islands there are restored to us, and in return, we cede St. Lucia and Tobago. St. Lucia, held in so much estimation now, may be tried more fairly by the value set upon it, at the last peace. As I said before, on all hands it is allowed that was not a humiliating, but a high and mighty peace for this country. Why, therefore, if this island was, as the objectors pretend, the key-stone that supported and connected the arch of all our power in the Leeward Islands—Why, I say, was not this island then retained? But I can produce the opinions of your most experienced seamen on this head, my Lords, which vindicate that Ministry as well as the present. And I do therefore claim the indulgence (until my position is controverted by superior evidence) to be believed, when I assert, that St. Lucia is not of that vast consequence some noble Lords would possess this House

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with the opinion of, in order to depreciate the merits of the treaty. With respect to Tobago, it is said, the cession of that island will ruin our cotton manufacture. Pray let me ask noble Lords, was our cotton manufacture a poor one before we possessed that island? As no noble Lord rises to assert the affirmative, I will be allowed to state it in the negative. It was not poor then. Why should it be poor now? We have been long in possession of that great branch of trade, consequently we can afford to give a greater price for cotton than any of our neighbours. Cotton, therefore, be it in the hands of friend or foe, will always, your Lordships may be assured, find its way to our door, in preference to that of those who cannot meet it with such a purse. But I know a few over-grown monopolizers of that article, or some selfish proprietors, would see the nation steeped in blood, sooner than they would forfeit, by the peace, one farthing of that emolument which they used to make when Tobago was in our hands. Let me comfort these worthy men, by telling them, that the islands restored to us, contain a vast number of acres, uncultivated, which may be applied to the growth of this so much coveted commodity. But let it be remembered, that we have kept Dominique—an island as valuable to this country, if not more so, than St. Lucia, if considered as a place of observation and strength. I have it on the authority of a noble Admiral, whose conquests in the West-Indies have been distinguished

by laurels that will bloom for ever. We will now, my Lords, proceed to the examination of the objections against the part of the French treaty that respects our affairs on the coast of Africa. Senegal is given up, and the gum trade is therefore lost. Is that inference just? Is not the faith of France engaged for our having a fair share of that trade. More than a share we never were in possession of. But what tie is this same *faith*? It will be asked, What tie? Why as strong a tie, as all men of reflection must know every parchment tie is between rival nations. Only to be observed while interest or convenience obliges. The ties of nations no man can be so wretchedly versed in history, or so miserably deficient in observation, as to place upon the parallel with those which are binding upon individuals; but you on enquiry your Lordships will find, that Senegal, which we have given up, is not so favourably situated for trade as Senegambia, which we have kept. The former has a bar dangerous to shipping; an inconvenience which the other is free from. In a word, by this article of the treaty, instead of losing any thing, we secure (as much as we ever had secured) a share in the gum trade, and we are not under the necessity we formerly were, of making that coast a grave for our fellow subjects, thousands of whom were annually devoted to destruction from the unwholesome healthiness of that climate, by means of our jealousy, which sent them there to watch an article of trade,

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which in vain we endeavoured to monopolize. I must now, my Lords, call your attention to what concerns the part of the treaty respecting the East-Indies. Here Ministry are asked, why they restored Pondicherry to the French? and why they gave permission to them to run a ditch round Chandernagore. Two cogent reasons can be given for this conduct? The first is the unwillingness, and the inability of this country, to prosecute the war; and the other is, the distracted state of the British dominions in that part of the world. Your Lordships must soon be fully acquainted with the whole of the melancholy truth I only glance at on this occasion. My Lords, by the last accounts from thence, the troops were declared to be four months unpaid, and of course upon the eve of a mutiny. Nay, in such miserable situation were the affairs of the East India Company in that quarter, that they were obliged to mortgage their commodities to wealthy individuals, who would not (so reduced is the credit of the Company in that quarter of the globe) take their solemn assurance for the faithful disposal of the stock at the East India sales here, but employed agents to see the business more securely transacted. Do your Lordships know that there are one million four hundred thousand pounds of these draughts yet unpaid? that there are two hundred and forty thousand pounds more coming home? And that your Lordships may form some estimate of the extravagance of the usury at which the Company were

obliged

obliged to borrow from these people, when some of the very agents employed by those usurers, have twenty thousand pounds a year commission for their trouble. Is it necessary, my Lords, to say a word more for the necessity of conceding these matters to the French, who were at the very moment forming alliances with Hyder Ally, our most formidable and inveterate enemy, to drive us entirely out of the country. Our old foe, Monsieur de Buffs, in the decline of life, almost at the age of eighty, leaving France purposely to form alliances. — And what have we to withstand their force when formed? Will unpaid troops fight, think you? But say that it was possible to expect such disinterested conduct from a common soldiery, will, or rather can famished troops fight. Our account about the same time tells us, that our forces sent out against Hyder Ally, were in daily dread of being starved to death. What stand could an army of infantry (for we had no horse) make against that potent prince, and his numerous, well-appointed, formidable cavalry? None. They would be as chaff before the wind. Do your Lordships know too, that all hopes of peace with the Mahrattas are frustrated—that we have been deceived by idle stories of applications being made to men of power in the Mahratta States, who promised to exert their influence, but it was found, that they had no influence upon earth? While, therefore, the French Court were ignorant of the sad condition of our affairs in that quarter, while they were as yet unacquainted

acquainted with the result of Monsieur de Buff's negotiation with the Indian Powers, was it not prudent in the British Ministry to concede, as they did at that moment, when there was a probability that they had conceded what was no longer in their power to keep? I have now, said his Lordship, gone, as well as my memory serves me, through the detail of all the objections which have been made to the treaty between us and France; and, I trust, your Lordships see, from the facts to which I have all along referred you, the necessity and the policy of our conduct in this particular. Let me, before I conclude, call to your Lordships minds the general state of this country, at the period in which the pacific negotiations were set on foot. Were we not at the extremity of distress? Did not the boldest of us cry out for peace? Was not the object of the war done? Was not the independence of America solemnly recognized by Parliament? Could that independence be afterwards made a stipulation for the restoration of tranquillity? On an entire (not a partial) view of our affairs at that time, is there any honest sensible man in the kingdom, that will not say the powerful confederacy with whom we had then to contend, had the most decided superiority over us? Had we scarce one taxable article that was not already taxed to the utmost extent?—Were we not one hundred and ninety-seven millions in debt? and had we not the enormous sum of twenty-five millions

millions unfunded?—our navy bills bearing an enormous discount—our public credit beginning to totter—our resources confessedly at an end—our commerce day by day becoming worse—our army reduced, and in want of thirty-thousand men to make up its establishments—our navy, which has been made so much the boast of some men, in such a condition, that the noble Viscount, now at the head of the profession, in giving a description of it, strove to conceal its weakness, by speaking low, as if he wished to keep it from going abroad into the world. But in such a day as this it must be told—their Lordships must be told what were the difficulties which the King's Ministers had to encounter with in the course of the last campaign. Your Lordships must be told how many sleepless nights I have spent—how many weary hours of watching and distress. What have been my anxieties for New-York! What have I suffered from the apprehension of an attack on that garrison, which, if attacked, must have fallen! What have I suffered from the apprehension of an attack on Nova Scotia or Newfoundland! The folly, or the want of enterprize, of our enemies alone protected those places; for, had they gone there instead of Hudson's Bay, they must have fallen. What have I suffered for the West-Indies, where, with all our superiority of navy, we were not able to undertake one active or offensive measure for want of troops; and where, if an attack

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had been made where it was meditated, we were liable to lose our most valuable possessions! How many sleepless nights have I not suffered for our possessions in the East-Indies, where our distresses were undescribable! How many sleepless nights did I not suffer on account of our campaign in Europe, where, with all our boasted navy, we had only one fleet with which to accomplish various objects! That navy, he was fair to own, was well conducted. Its detachment to the North Seas, to intimidate the Dutch, was a happy and a reasonable stroke; but the salvation of the Baltic fleet was not all to be ascribed to ability—accident contributed to that event—accident contributed to more than one article of our naval triumphs. How many of ~~our~~ ships were unclean? The noble Viscount has told us the case of the fleet with which he was sent to the relief of Gibraltar. He could hardly venture to swim home in the Victory. How many of our ships were in fact undermanned? Did the House know this? Did they know that our naval stores were exhausted—that our cordage was rotten—that our magazines were in a very low condition—and that we had no prospect of our navy being much better in the next campaign than it was in the present. [The noble Earl, during all these queries, directed his eyes to Lord Keppel, until the noble Admiral called him to order.] Do the House know all this? The noble Lord is offended at my directing myself to him; I have no

idea of imputing blame to the noble Viscount. His abilities are unquestioned; but when the greatness of the navy is made not only a boast, but an argument, it is fair to examine the fact. Are not these things so? and are not these things to be considered, weighed, and taken into the account, before Ministers are condemned for giving peace to the country? Let the man who will answer me these questions fairly, tell me how, in such circumstances, he would make a peace, before he lets his tongue loose against those treaties, the ratification of which has caused (for myself at least I will speak, and I believe I may also answer for my colleagues) so many anxious days and sleepless nights. It is easy for any bungler to pull down the fairest fabric, but is that a reason, my Lords, he should censure the skill of the architect who reared it. But I fear I trespass, my Lords, on your patience too long. The subject was near my heart, and you will pardon me, if I have been earnest in laying before your Lordships our embarrassments, our difficulties, our views, and our reasons for what we have done. I submit them to you with confidence, and rely on the nobleness of your natures, that in judging of men who have hazarded so much for their country, you will not be guided by prejudice, nor influenced by party.

Lord Viscount Keppel made a short reply to the noble Lord, in the course of which he said, that he

he had not been invited to be present when the opinions of Admiral Edwards, and the other officers, had been asked on the Newfoundland fishery, otherwise he might have given his opinion of what had been said. In respect to what the noble Lord had thrown out with regard to the state of the navy, and the embarrassments and accidents of the last campaign, he was not solicitous of the noble Earl's praise, and he was not much hurt at his insinuation—he would abide by what he had said—the navy of England was not only in a flourishing, but a vigorous state; and we had the happiest prospects before us for the next campaign.

The Duke of Richmond said the peace was no peace of his; he could find a hundred faults with it; and as to Gibraltar, his Grace did not well understand the noble Lord when he threw out, that no one had ever said, that it might not be given up in certain cases. His Grace thought, that their Lordships ought necessarily to have the treaty with the Dutch laid before them, before they came to any determination on the Preliminary Articles; and he begged to know from the noble Earl, whether the rumour was true, that the important bay and settlement of Trincomale was to be given up.

The Earl of Shelburne disclaimed any disrespect toward Lord Keppel, and with respect to Gibraltar, he again insisted upon it, that it had been said, that it might not be given up in such and such instances.

instances. His Lordship said it was no secret, what the treaty would be with Holland. The Cape of Good Hope was to be ceded to the Dutch, and *Trincomale* was also to be given up.

Lord Loughborough, in a long and most elegant speech, reprobated the articles of pacification, and strongly supported the proposed amendment. His Lordship expatiated on the present state of the country, compared the accounts given him of it by a noble Lord, who had lately relinquished the superintendance of the naval department, and of the noble Viscount, his great and illustrious friend, (to whose professional judgment he paid the highest respect) who now occupied his place. Their statements, he said, of the comparative strength of this country were different. Still, however, from their collected details, the naval consequence of this nation was obviously deducible — In such circumstances, what terms of pacification were reasonably to be expected? He had heard, on former occasions, the military force of this country lessened both in respect to its real importance and numbers. He had been told that our army was an army that only existed on paper, and that though rated at 100,000 troops, its component parts did not amount to near that quantity of men. He had been careful to investigate this circumstance, and by the assistance of an ingenious, a well-informed, and accurate military friend, he had found that its number, in fact, amounted

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to 72,000 *effective* men. However persons, therefore, might affect the look and language of dependency on particular occasions, however they might mis-state facts to give force to argument, or however professional men might differ in sentiment with respect to the real state of the first objects of national concern, he thought himself authorized to say that our condition was respectable, and that we had every reason to ask or to demand equal and honourable terms of peace. Had our conduct however been suitable to such ideas? Had we acted agreeable to our dignity as a nation? Did not our situation entitle us to honourable terms of capitulation? But had we not unanimously supplicated? And great as our resources were, high as the re-animated spirit of the nation was, had we not basely surrendered to the enemy at discretion? Look at the articles before you, (continued his Lordship) and you will find nothing in them but *cession, concession* from beginning to end. They affect, indeed, to hold out a reciprocity of interest to the capitulating parties; but in what is this specious appearance founded? Is there one mutual advantage which we now receive, or can ever hope to derive from the treaty before you. Even the peace you have supplicated and obtained, when properly examined, will be found to communicate no substantial good to this country, to be shadowy in its nature, and even to contain, in its first principles, the "*prolific seeds of*
"*discord.*"

"disband," which must shortly break out into open hostility and war. The present cessation of arms is, in fact, no peace. It is only a *temporary surrender of arms*, which will shortly be resumed; and if it serve any purpose at all, it is such as my noble friend (Lord Howe) has described it to be; it gives us a "breathing time" to prepare ourselves for returning with a renewed alacrity to the charge: Nor is this treaty only unsafe in its nature, and destitute of that security which is the object of every well conducted system of general pacification; the principle on which the noble Lord employed in the formation of it has proceeded, is to me the most exceptionable that could be stated. The noble Lord has enlarged upon the extensive views, liberal principle, and honest renunciation of privilege, on which he has established his system of general pacification. He entertains the most flattering prospects of mutual advantage to America and this country, from these magnanimous conceptions and generous donations. He discards the idea of monopoly, which has raised this country to an unrivalled pitch of splendour, and throws himself on the generosity of a distant and independent nation. But on what grounds does the noble Lord found his Utopian system? From what experiences, from what histories does he derive those fond hopes of mutual and substantial connexion, of immense advantage, of profitable commerce, with a state we have endeavoured

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vouled it vain to conquer, and have been compelled to declare. Have such maxims as these raised this country to its former height and glory? And is not the adopting them, in fact, exchanging those wise principles, which animated and conducted our forefathers, for a system of new-fangled maxims, unsafe in their nature, untried, and dangerous in their complicated operations. Nor does any principle, but that of the most prodigal and gratuitous concession, seem to have animated the noble Lord in conducting the treaty of peace. As a sacrifice to this favourite inclination, he has resigned immense territory in the east, and in the west, ceded islands, and evacuated fortresses without equivalent; relinquishing the certainties of immediate advantage for the fond and shadowy prospects of future commerce and aggrandizement. Need I go over these grounds of argument which have already been so ably explained to your Lordships, as an illustration of my position on this subject? Need I direct your attention to that immense cession of empire which has been made in Canada, and to those important military fortresses which you have found from experience to be so advantageous in carrying on your wars in those parts of the globe, which were your own by right, and which you had purchased by blood.—I do not speak of renouncing claims which you could not vindicate, or relinquishing privileges which you could not assert; and unable to redeem a conquered

quered country, which was once yours, ought you
 not surely to have retained those possessions which
 the fortune of war had rendered your own? You
 have evacuated Charles-Town, a place which I
 have been well informed, by a letter I have seen
 from that brave, active, and ingenious officer
 Major Moncrieff, was as impregnable as Gibraltar;
 and you have given away St. Lucia, the most im-
 portant island you had captured in the West-Indies,
 to the French.—Upon what principles these ces-
 sions can be explained, except that of the most
 benevolent Quixotism, I am at a loss to divine.—
 The *uti possidetis* has in all treaties and in all de-
 scriptions of right been acknowledged a safe and pru-
 dent maxim.—Here it seems abandoned and re-
 probated.—But these are not the only conces-
 sions which have been made, the only rights which
 have been abandoned. In relinquishing those ter-
 ritories which belonged to the British empire, solemn
 treaties have not only been violated, but also the
 religious principles of those subjects who have been
 betrayed, have been wantonly abandoned.—In
 Roman Catholic countries little or no toleration
 is given to the exercise of the Protestant reli-
 gion.—Yet by the treaty on your table the free-
 dom and religious privileges of faithful subjects are
 resigned into the hands of intolerant religionists,
 without stipulation or provision.—I call on your
 Lordships in general, and upon some of you
 (pointing to the bench of Bishops) more particu-
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larly, to say, whether you can approve a treaty so inimical to the religious toleration of the human race.—

Nor are these the blackest horrors which mark this treaty.—It abandons the loyal friends of this country.—It leaves them to the mercy of their enemies.—Is there still a remnant of generosity in the mind of Britons, and shall they not reprobate such an act of the foulest desertion with abhorrence.—To these unfortunate men you promised protection.—They have relinquished their all on your account, and as a recompence for their heroism and disinterested conduct, you repay them by a *recommendation*—To whom? to those very persons whose hands are reeking with the blood of their relations and friends.—In the history of treaties, in the annals of nations, or of the human species, are there such instances of ingratitude and of treason to mankind.—The Catalonians, even under the pressure of Spanish bondage and of Spanish conquest, secured to themselves the protection of their friends.—Francis the First, after having received the most signal defeat in the history of monarchs, declared, he had lost all *but his honour*. On this point he was invincible, and it was the magnanimity of this exalted sentiment which in a more happy moment relieved his fortunes, and raised him to his former glory.—By the treaty before you Britons have lost their honour, and it will remain on record as an awful testimony, not only of the

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treachery

treachery of this nation, but also of the baseness of human race. —

His Lordship concluded with observing, that the concessions which had been made, and the territories that had been given away, were in virtue of his Majesty's prerogative. — He considered this as a dangerous and unconstitutional exertion of this principle. — He was too much fatigued to go into a discussion of this subject, but asserted, that it was his deliberate opinion, that Majesty was invested with no such unlimited power, that he would support his judgment and principles, by precedent as well as by the best authors, and he would meet the question whenever their Lordships pleased.

The Lord Chancellor left the woollack, and made a long and most able answer to the noble and learned Lord who had just sat down. He could claim to himself, he said, no part of the attention of the House on the grounds of eloquence and oratory. These belonged peculiarly to the noble Lord who had so long and so ably endeavoured to fascinate their Lordships, and whose skill and address in managing the passions of his auditors was not to be equalled, and by a man of plain meaning, and sober understanding, whose only wish was to discriminate between truth and fiction, such as he was, not to be coveted. All the gay chimeras of a fertile imagination had been adduced; and he had no objection to see noble Lords indulge themselves in the display of their talents for the inventive; but he did object to their pressing their
chimeras

chimera into a solemn debate, and substituting
 them for argument and reason. The noble and
 learned Lord would forgive him for treating what
 he had said lightly, as he professed, upon his ho-
 nour, that his plain and narrow conception did
 not reach his meaning. He had thought proper to
 pledge himself to bring before their Lordships the
 proof, that the prerogative of the crown did not
 reach so far, as to warrant the alienation of ter-
 ritories, in the making of peace, which had not
 been acquired by conquest during the war. If this
 doctrine was true, he should consider himself as
 strangely ignorant of the constitution of his coun-
 try, for till the present day of novelty and miracle,
 he had never heard that such a doctrine existed.
 He fancied, however, that the noble and learned
 Lord had thrown down the gauntlet on this sub-
 ject, more from knight errantry than patriotism,
 and that he was more inclined to shew the House
 what powers of declamation he possessed in the sup-
 port of hypothetical propositions, than anxious to
 define, or to confine a power wisely vested in the
 executive branch of our Government, unquestioned,
 as to its utility, and much less as to its existence.
 He was the more convinced of this, when he heard
 the sources mentioned from which the noble Lord
 chose to draw his testimonies and arguments. One
 would have thought, that when a great, experie-
 ned, and justly eminent lawyer hazarded an opinion
 respecting a most important point of the constitu-

tion of this country; that he would think it necessary to produce proofs from the records and authorities of the State, or that at least he would shew, that the common opinion and consent of men went with him; but instead of this, the noble and learned Lord resorted to the lucubrations and fancies of foreign writers, and gravely referred their Lordships to Swiss authors for an explanation of the prerogative of the British Crown. He, for his own part, rejected all books on the point before them. However full of ingenuity or speculation, Mr. Vatell, and Mr. Puffendorf might be on the *droits des gens*, and other points, which neither were nor could be fixed by any solid and permanent rule, he denied their authority—he exploded their evidence, when they were brought to explain to him what was, and what was not the prerogative of the British Crown. Having thought it necessary to say just so much, as to his way of judging on the question, he would inform the noble and learned Lord, that he accepted of his challenge—he was prepared to meet him, and to combat the question, not, however, with the weapons which the noble and learned Lord had used on that night, of vague declamation, and bratorial flourishes—these he contentedly left with all the plaudits which they were calculated, and, perhaps, intended to gain—but with undecorated sense, and simple argument. It was, in his opinion, more useful to stick to that rule of reasoning

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and deduction by which the mind was taught, that two and two make four, than to suffer their understandings to be warped, and their eyes to be blinded by the fashionable logic which delighted in words, and which strove rather to confound what was plain, than to unravel what was intricate.

But the question immediately before the House was, whether their Lordships should agree to approach the Throne with an address of thanks, for the peace which had been concluded fairly, honestly, simply approving of that peace—or whether they should approach the Throne with an address of thanks for the peace, and at the same time disapprove of, censure, and condemn that peace.— This was precisely the question; and he begged to ask their Lordships, roundly and fairly, whether the bare statement of the question did not manifest its absurdity? What, to thank his Majesty for a thing of which they disapproved—to thank his Majesty for a peace, which, at the same time, they declared to be “inadequate to their just expectations, inconsistent with the relative situation of the Belligerent Powers, and derogatory to the honour and dignity of the empire.” He desired to know, when this proposition was divested of all its dress and ornament, if it did not appear to them very inconsistent with the dignity of that House, who were to present the address, and of the Crown, who was to receive it. But, he said, it was thus artfully worded, for reasons which it

was not difficult to discover; but he thought it unworthy of their Lordships to do that by a side-wind, which if they thought fit to do, it became the nobleness of their natures to do openly. If they thought the King's Ministers deserved censure for the peace which they had concluded, why not inflict their censure in that way, which alone could make that censure a punishment, in a fair, manly, and direct manner, such as became the high character of that House.

The noble and learned Lord then came to enquire whether the peace, which had been concluded, was, under all the circumstances of our situation, such as their Lordships ought in fairness to censure. In doing this, he enumerated the various particulars which had been adduced in the debate, and contended, that the articles were not subject to the severe objections which had been made against them. — He could not forget the anxiety nor the language of noble Lords, who, but a few, very few months ago, were the most eager and clamorous for peace. When those persons apprehended, that the difficult task of making peace would fall upon themselves, then our condition was painted in all, and, perhaps, in more than its real gloom—and their Lordships were depressed and tortured with the accounts which were given of our navy, and our resources. Then any peace, it was declared, would be a good one. A peace for a year even—nay, for a month—for a day

was coveted—Any thing that would just give us breathing time, and serve to break the dangerous confederacy against us—would be a prosperous event. But when the grievous task was shifted to others—how did the language differ. The navy grew as it were by magic.—The resources of the state became immense.—The condition of the country flourishing;—and the Ministry were to be tried by the strictest and most rigid law. The noble Lord dwelt on this glaring inconsistency for some time, and concluded a long and most ingenious speech, with a high commendation of the Address, and the most direct censure of the proposed Amendment.

The Earl of Carlisle thought it necessary to shew that there was no ground for the imputed absurdity in the motion as amended. They were to thank his Majesty—for what?—For the *communication* of the Preliminary Articles of Peace—they were to hold that peace sacred because concluded—but they were with the manliness which became them, to declare that it was inconsistent with their expectations, and derogatory to the honour and dignity of the empire. In all this he could not perceive any thing absurd.

Earl Gower concluded the debate, with declaring his opinion shortly, that the peace did not come up to his expectations. He thought we were entitled, from our condition, to better terms; but he did not think himself at liberty to reprobate

reprobate it in the severe terms of the amendment. He was therefore in a strange predicament—he could neither vote for the address nor against it; and he should therefore withdraw.

It being near half past four o'clock in the morning, the House divided on the question—that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the address.

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	—		—
	72		59

Majority for the *Address* 13.

There were in the House at one time of the day 145 Peers, which is a greater number than has been known on any question during the present reign.

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HOUSE of COMMONS.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1783.

LORD John Cavendish having intimated, some farther propositions on the Articles of Peace, the House was amazingly crowded. The ordinary business was discussed, and about four o'clock,

Lord *John Cavendish* rose to open the business of the day. He began with observing, that, by some unaccountable means it had been reported abroad, that the majority of that House, on the division which took place, in consequence of the amendment he had proposed to the address on Monday last, had absolutely voted *against* the peace: some persons he made no doubt, might have had their views in propagating such a report, from which they expected to derive some advantages; but a more groundless report had never been sent forth into the world; for his amendment stated, in the strongest terms the English language could afford, that the House, let their opinion of the peace be what it might, would

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abide by the terms of it, and inviolably adhere to them. However, in order completely and effectually to destroy every report to the contrary, and to defeat the designs that some men might wish to answer, by countenancing such a report, he had drawn up a resolution, which he would submit to the House, declaratory of the strongest determination to maintain the peace. When the amendment which was proposed on Monday last, had been adopted, he had it in contemplation to move for papers, on which he intended to move an enquiry; but on re-consideration, as no criminal proceeding was intended against the ministers; as he did not wish to condemn the peace, with a view to censure ministers; as his only object was to shew that the terms of that peace were such, that ministers deserved no compliment from Parliament or the nation for having made it: he did not see any necessity for moving for papers, as the House had matters of public notoriety, on which they might ground their resolutions. — The relative situation of affairs of this country, and of the belligerent powers, was a ground which would support him in declaring, that he thought the peace inadequate to what we had a right to expect: every part of the three treaties was marked with concessions, which were the more mortifying, as we were in a situation to have resisted them. — To France, ministers had given away Goree and Senegal in Africa; Tobago and St. Lucia in the West-Indies; Miquelon and

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and St. Pierre, together with the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland, and curing their fish on a greatly enlarged extent of shore; and in the East-Indies, their former possessions were to be restored and enlarged. To Spain, Minorca and the two Floridas were ceded; and to America, not only independence was given, but an immense tract of land belonging to the province of Canada: to the Dutch he understood we were to restore every settlement of theirs now in our possession; so that, in fact, we had scarcely done any thing but make concessions to our different enemies; and this at a time, when in consequence of Lord Rodney's victory, Admiral Pigot was at the head of near forty-two sail of the line, and consequently of the dominion of the seas in the West-Indies and America, where the French had not above seventeen line of battle ships. The relief of Gibraltar had proved to administration that we were able to defend our coasts from insult, protect our trade and fortresses, and meet the united fleets of France and Spain. It had been urged, that our finances were in a bad condition: It was true; but ministers ought not to have attended solely to the state of their own finances; they should have taken into the scale the condition of the finances of the enemy, which they would have found such, as would have deterred the ministers of the different belligerent powers from reducing us to the desperate alternative of accepting a dishonourable peace, or re-

solving to prosecute the war, which latter measure our naval superiority in every quarter of the world might possibly have tempted us to adopt. He said, *in every part of the world*; but perhaps this assertion might be combated with respect to the East-Indies. However, when he considered the consequences of the last engagement in that quarter, and the number of the ships that were on their way to India, he would maintain, that if we had not a superiority there, we had something so very like it, that we had nothing to apprehend from the attempts of the French in that quarter. — With all these objects before his eyes, he had drawn five propositions, which he would read to the House: —

First Resolution, — Resolved, “ That in consideration of the public faith which ought to be preserved inviolate, this House will support his Majesty in rendering firm and permanent the peace to be concluded definitively, in consequence of the Provisional Treaty and Preliminary Articles, which have been laid before the House.”

Second, — “ That this House will, in concurrence with his Majesty’s paternal regard for his people, employ its best endeavours to improve the blessings of peace, to the advantage of his crown and subjects.”

Third, — “ That his Majesty, in acknowledging the independence of the United States of America, by virtue of the powers vested in him
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“ by the act of the last session of Parliament, to enable his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with certain colonies in North-America, has acted as the circumstances of affairs indispensibly required, and in conformity to the sense of Parliament.”

Fourth, — “ That the concessions made to the adversaries of Great-Britain, by the said Provisional Treaty and Preliminary Articles, are greater than they were entitled to, either from the actual situation of their respective possessions, or from their comparative strength.”

Fifth, — “ That this House do feel the regard due from this nation to every description of men, who, with the risque of their lives, and the sacrifice of their property, have distinguished their loyalty, and been conspicuous for their fidelity during a long and calamitous war; and to assure his Majesty, that they shall take every proper method to relieve them which the state of the circumstances of this country will permit.”

He concluded with moving the first.

The honourable *St. Andrew St. John* seconded the motions.

The honourable *Keith Stewart* said, the conduct of ministers had been condemned by the noble Lord, on account of the great superiority of our navy in the West-Indies; now he could assure the House, from good authority, that the combined fleets in Cadiz-harbour amounted to sixty sail of the line,

all

all destined for the West Indies, our boasted superiority could not be for any long continuance.

In the East Indies, it was true, on the arrival of Sir Richard Bickerton, we should have been able to have stood against the enemy; but when those ships arrived which France intended, and was preparing to send, we should then be much inferior to them. As to our fleet at home, it last year would have been greatly inadequate to our own defence, were it not for the dissensions in Holland, which were carried to a much greater height than even in this country. Our Baltic fleet was saved only by the dissensions that reigned in the Dutch fleet, which kept them inactive the whole year, and gave Lord Howe the opportunity of relieving Gibraltar: but was it reasonable to suppose that our success should continue always? or that the same cause that preserved us last campaign should exist still? Gentlemen should consider the danger this country must inevitably run this summer. If the war had been continued, the Dutch would certainly have exerted their force against us; by that time they would have fifty-five two deckers fit for sea, which added to the combined fleets of France and Spain, must have inevitably ruined us.

Mr. Secretary *Townshend* expressed his surprize that after the House had been led to expect a serious enquiry into the different articles of the peace; after they had been taught to believe that the address moved for on Monday last had been modified for no other purpose

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purpose than that of affording gentlemen time to consider maturely, and weigh with attention and deliberation, every part of the different treaties, the noble Lord should now call upon the House to condemn without consideration, what he could not approve, because he had not considered it: if enquiry should necessarily precede approbation; with much more reason ought it to precede censure; he was therefore really surpris'd that the noble Lord should have acted the part which he then appeared in.—As to the first proposition, it was certainly such as met his warmest approbation; it was not only proper, but, in his opinion, absolutely necessary at a time when reports were circulating, that the House of Commons disapproved of the peace. The noble Lord said, that he meant to maintain the peace; but he must give him leave to think, that the consequence of his amendment on Monday, and his 4th resolution this day, if carried, would tend much more to shake than confirm it. With respect to the second and third resolutions he would not oppose them; the second indeed, did not appear to him very consistent with the conduct of those who patronized the amendment, and condemned the peace: for to improve the *blessings* of a peace, which they called disgraceful, dishonourable, ruinous, was to suppose that ruin and dishonour were blessings: to the third resolution he could have no objection; the nation at large had panted for the end of the American war, which could not be attained

but

but by a recognition of the independence of the colonies; and that independence his Majesty was justified in recognizing by an express act of Parliament: the fourth resolution, which condemned the peace in direct terms, he was determined to meet fairly, and have it determined either in the affirmative or negative: for he would not endeavour to evade a decision by any parliamentary trick or artifice; as to the last resolution relative to the loyalists he was of opinion, to say the least of it, that it was premature; and therefore he would put the previous question upon it. After having said thus much, he observed, that from the knowledge he had of the unshaken integrity and honour of the noble Lord, who had moved one of the propositions, and was about to move the others, he was convinced it was not in his nature to act uncandidly by any man; but he might be led away by that respect, which he entertained for others, who knew how to choose their man when they wanted to have any thing done, that was not of itself evidently right; for they were aware that the most candid man in the nation was the most fit person to make the House think, that the measure proposed was not uncandid.

Sir *Peter Burrell* reprobated the Preliminary and Provisional Treaties, as the grossest insult that any Ministers had ever dared to offer to a rational House of Parliament. They were every way inadequate to the just expectations of the country, infinitely worse,
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he said, than the Treaty of Utrecht, and a lasting disgrace to the national character. The cessions made to France and Spain he declared unjustifiable, on any plea, that could be said to have existence; and as to the Treaty with the United States of America, Ministers had affected to cheat the nation, by a pretended intention of making reciprocity and mutual advantage its basis, and that the prevention of quarrels and disputes were main objects of it; but, for fear the nation should be deluded into these ideas by a perusal of the preamble and the first article, the very next shewed the palpable falsehood of the pretences, and put the matter out of all doubt. By the first article it was said, it was intended that no disputes should arise, whereas in the very next article seeds of endless disputes were sown. He went on to say, that wherever so much as a shade of reciprocity was discoverable, it was instantly darkened by some cession or unjust grant. He instanced the mischeivous allowance to the Americans to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, and the shallow affectation of saying, this was not a material grant, because in the same article, they were not allowed to dry or cure the fish. He shewed that the Americans by the Preliminary Treaty were allowed to catch fish, that the French by having their space of the Banks changed from the Western to the Eastern side, were enabled to dry and cure the fish for the Americans, and that as the French would undoubtedly demolish the fortifications and

works they had erected on the spot, and within the limits formerly allotted them to fish upon, the whole fishery would be ruined. He proceeded to the considerations of other points in the Treaties, and particularly dwelt on the *sixteenth* article of the Preliminaries with France, which, he said, was the most egregious piece of nonsense ever thrown upon paper, and much worse than the famous double creed of the Jesuits; that would only admit of two interpretations, whereas the sixteenth article would admit of twenty: indeed it was calculated to please and satisfy every reader; for it was so drawn, that it would bear any interpretation; and each man who read it, might explain it his own way, as the House had heard on Monday last from very high authority. It was said that better terms could not have been procured; that the necessity for peace was urgent, the means to carry on the war, small and few. Be it so. Would Ministers have dared to sign worse terms? Had France demanded the rest of our West India Islands? Had Spain insisted on Gibraltar and Jamaica? Had the United States of America required that the poor abandoned Loyalists should be sent back to sue for mercy with halters about their necks; and America claimed Canada? Would they have granted them those conditions? Was it owing to the forbearance of France, the humility of Spain, or the mildness of America, that these terms were not demanded? No, it arose from the House of Bourbon's knowledge that

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the nation would never bear the imposition of such conditions. They saw they had a weak and impotent Ministry to deal with, but their own policy and keen-sightedness would not let them go farther than they had ventured.

Sir *Cecil Wray* said, he expected that the papers relative to the instructions given to Mr. Oswald, respecting the Loyalists, would have been moved for, according to the notice given some days ago by the noble Lord who brought forward the proposition; but as they had not been produced, he could not possibly vote upon the fourth proposition, which related to the Loyalists. He said he deplored the state of the country, which seemed destined to be for ever torn in pieces by parties in that House. Not that he blamed gentlemen of great abilities and great connexion, for being ambitious of obtaining power. Such men could best serve their country, in high and responsible situations, and were wise in aiming at their attainment. The persons he blamed most in that House, were the country gentlemen, who lent their strength to every new party, and, by that, kept the country in a perpetual change of administration, without its ever having the benefit of a solid and firm government. He was an enemy to the Treaty of Peace, (as far as he was able to judge of it) not merely on account of the cessions that were made, but because we had not made greater. Since the fur trade was given, why was not Quebec ceded too?

He saw no reason for this country's sustaining the burthen of the expence of keeping it, since the other cessions made it of no value to us. Another possession likewise, to talk of giving up which he knew was unpopular; he would nevertheless mention. He meant Gibraltar, which was not worth a halfpenny to us, and yet to keep it would cost the nation at least six hundred thousand pounds, equal to one shilling in the pound upon the land-tax. He did not mean that it should be given away, but it might have been bargained for, and have fetched its price. For these reasons he did not approve of the peace, but till he had seen the papers that would prove the present terms inadequate, he could not vote for the motion then under consideration. Sir Cecil went on to say, that because he had voted with his honourable friend on a public ground on Monday, he did not hold himself bound to vote for a new Administration. Nor would he ever, let the personal consequence be what it might to himself, vote for an administration of which the noble Lord in the blue ribband was to make a part; because he considered that noble Lord's administration as the cause of all our calamities. How his constituents would approve of such conduct, he knew not; but if they did not approve it, he would serve them faithfully to the end of the session, and they might then elect another representative.

Sir *Horace Mann* was very severe against the articles of peace. He said, he had always acted independently

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pendently in that House. He had supported the noble Lord in the blue ribband whenever he thought him right, and opposed him whenever he thought him wrong. Sir Horace declared, he was firmly persuaded that Lord John Cavendish acted from himself; he argued, that the finances of France and Spain were to the full as bad as ours. Gibraltar, he insisted, had, during the last war, proved of infinite use to this country, by being a continual drain of men and treasure upon Spain. The conduct of Ministers to the Loyalists, he considered as an instance of the highest barbarity and ingratitude; since no act could possibly be more cruel, than abandoning them to the mercy of irritated men, whom they had long, from their attachment to this country, opposed as enemies. Our adversaries, he said, had dictated throughout the whole course of the negotiation; and we had conducted ourselves, not only as if the nation wanted resources, but as if it were destitute of honour. Our honour, however, was not yet gone; as an illustration of which assertion, he produced Lord Rodney's victory. He concluded with observing, that the peace must lower us in the eyes of all Europe, and that it could not be too severely execrated.

A loose and desultory conversation next took place upon the point, whether the first proposition should be put and carried, as there was no objection to it, or the debate upon the five propositions be taken at once.

once. In this conversation, the SPEAKER, Mr. Secretary Townshend, Mr. D. Hartley, Colonel Onslow, Lord North, and Sir Richard Sutton took part. At length it was agreed to put each motion separately; and the first and second resolutions were respectively put and carried *nemine contradicente*. The third proposition declaring that his Majesty in recognising the independence of America, in the present circumstances of affairs, had acted by virtue of the powers vested in him, and conformably to the sense of Parliament, was now put.

Lord Newhaven said he was a stranger to the powers by which his Majesty was said in this resolution to have acted; for he did not conceive that he had received any such powers from the act of Parliament passed last session; and he was as yet to learn that by virtue of his royal prerogative, he could dismember the Empire.

Sir William Dolben knew not how the King became vested with powers to declare his American subjects independent; certain he was that no such power was given by the act of last session, which he ought to understand, as he had seconded the motion for leave to bring it in; in that act a power was granted to the King to *suspend* such laws as he should find to stand in the way of peace; now to *suspend* a law is not to *repeal* it; and as the laws which the King was empowered to suspend, were such as had been made for the regulation of commerce, &c. with a *subject*,

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not a *sovereign* people; so of course, it was very natural that the idea of *suspension* should include the idea of a removal of the suspension, when of course the Americans were to come once more under the dominion of those laws, and consequently to become subjects; and therefore he must contend, that the act of last session did not give the King a power to alienate the dominions of his crown, and declare the inhabitants independent; and indeed it would be singular, that an act for empowering the King to declare America independent, should not so much as mention the word *independence*.

Mr. *Wallace* replied. He admitted that he knew of no prerogative of the Crown, which gave his Majesty a power to alienate his dominions, dismember his empire, and declare his subjects free from allegiance to him, and obedience to his laws: but at the same time he was as ready to maintain, that the power of recognizing the independence of America was fully and amply vested in the Crown, by the act which he had the honour to bring in last year; and the argument drawn by the honourable Baronet from the power to suspend laws, made nothing against the right of the Crown to declare America independent. And he must declare, that in framing the bill, he intended to enable the Crown by any means to put an end to the war in America; and therefore it was, that he had called the bill, A Bill to enable his Majesty to make a Peace or Truce with America. In
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the first place, the idea of making a peace or truce with any people, necessarily includes this other idea, that the people with whom a peace is made, is a sovereign people; for a Sovereign cannot make a peace or truce with his subjects: hence it was clear, from the very title of the act, that the object of it was to grant independence to America. But the honourable member had said, that the word independence was not so much as mentioned in the act; this was very true: and though in bringing in the bill, it was his intention to empower the Crown to acknowledge the independence, still he had purposefully omitted the word independence; because if it had been in the act, the Crown must have acted in conformity to it; and independence being once mentioned in the act, it would be impossible to treat afterwards upon any other principle than that of independence: but as it was possible that a truce, not a peace, might have been concluded, it became necessary to speak of *suspending* acts of Parliament, instead of repealing them, naturally involving the idea of a revival of hostilities, and consequently it was necessary there should be a power to suspend or repeal, just as the occasion should offer: but that the honourable Baronet should not entertain a doubt, but that the right or power of acknowledging the independence was vested in the King by that act, he begged he would recollect, that the act stated, that this power should be vested in the Crown, any *law, statute*

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tute, matter, or thing to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Sir *W. Dolben* declared, that he was so unfortunate as not to be convinced by the arguments of the learned gentleman. So great a power as that of freeing millions of subjects from their allegiance, ought not, and could not be vested by implication or construction of law; and he confessed, that he was not possessed of sufficient *foresight*, or rather *second sight*, to be able to discover in an act of Parliament, in which there was not a word of *independence*, a power to acknowledge the independence of America.

The *Attorney General* said, the honourable member was, perhaps, of that disposition that no arguments could convince him. — He was called to order by

Sir *Francis Basset*, who expressed his surprise that any member should *dare* to tell another, that no arguments could convince him.

The *Attorney General* proceeded. He said, there were persons in the world whom no arguments could convince: he insisted that the act of Parliament alluded to vested in the King the most absolute power to acknowledge the American independence; but he differed at the same time from the learned gentleman on the question of prerogative; for he would readily meet any lawyer on the subject, and undertake to prove, that, by virtue of the royal prerogative, the King could have declared America independent.

Mr. *Lee*, in opposition to the doctrine of the *Attorney General*, laid it down as a principle of law,

that the King could not declare his subjects free from their allegiance, and dismember the empire : but he admitted at the same time, that the act of Parliament alluded to, supplied the defect in the royal prerogative, and gave his Majesty a power which he did not possess before.

Sir *Adam Ferguson* agreed that the act of Parliament gave the King full power to recognise the independence of America ; but he maintained, that the power was not carried a step farther by that act : and therefore he must look upon Ministers as criminal, who had advised his Majesty to go beyond this power ; and not contented with recognising the independence of the thirteen colonies, had advised their royal master to cede to the Americans, and declare independent, an immense tract of land, which belonged not to the thirteen colonies, but to the province of Canada.

The *Solicitor General* begged the honourable Baronet would recollect, that the difficulty started by him was not within the compass of the motion, for it related simply and solely to the independence of the thirteen colonies.

Lord *North* agreed with Mr. Wallace, that the object of the act which had been the subject of discussion, was certainly to grant independence to America, though the word independence, for obvious reasons, had been designedly omitted.

Governor *Johnstone*, in order to prevent future opinions of the Crown from drawing down the recognition

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nition of American independence, as a precedent in support of an unbounded and unconstitutional prerogative of the Sovereign, moved, that after the words, *powers vested by his Majesty*, be added, *by act of Parliament*; in order to shew, that it was not by virtue of his prerogative, but under the authority of an act of Parliament, that his Majesty had declared America independent. This amendment was received; and the third resolution, thus amended, passed without opposition.

Lord *John Cavendish* then moved the fourth resolution.

Mr. *Powys* rose to oppose the motion: he wondered that an enquiry was not instituted: he did not say that it was a good peace; he believed there were concessions in it which ought not, and need not to have been made; but still, taking the good and the bad together, he liked the peace, and thanked the Ministry who made it; not because it was a good peace, but because he had broke the confederacy which had nearly ruined us. He was afraid that the resolutions of the House would shake the peace; and that this would be attended with the most disagreeable consequences; for it was possible, nay it was probable, that the idea would reach the Continent, that the Parliament disapproved of the peace; in that case the confederates would still remain armed; and while they remained armed, we could not disarm; so that we should be at the expence of supporting our war establishments without a war. He

wished the foreign Courts knew that the contest here was not about breaking the peace, but merely to determine who should be Minister: if the question was simply, whether the present First Lord of the Treasury should remain in office or not, he was of opinion, that question was decided on Tuesday morning, when that noble Lord got a pretty broad hint, that he was not popular enough to support an Administration. He then adverted to the coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox, and their friends; he said it might be necessary there should be some alloy in the coin, but gentlemen should take care how they debased it; there were sometime last summer, something like a sterling principle, which formed the basis of Administration; he should be sorry to see its lustre tarnished by a disgraceful coalition.

Lord *John Cavendish* said, the honourable member's wit had outrun his judgment: he then entered upon a defence of his friends, and an explanation of their system. As to the supposed coalition, he begged that Gentleman would recollect the state of affairs in the year 1757, when this country was torn with parties infinitely more than it had been within the last five years, insomuch so indeed, that there was not an Administration in the kingdom during so long a period as eight months; at length the necessity of the public affairs made men begin to forget parties; they were brought into good humour by long resistance; they became united at last; and

out of five different parties was found an Administration that carried the glory of the country to the greatest height; and he was convinced that the country could not be prosperous till all the House should shake hands, and unite cordially for the good of the community.

Mr. *Wilbrabam Beotle* declared, that before he was a member of the House, and while he attended as a stranger in the gallery, he had seen so much of party, that he resolved, even then, never to belong to a party, and he never had since attended a meeting of Members, where a word had been dropt tending to persuade gentlemen to give up their own opinions, and implicitly follow the leaders of a party: after having premised this, he freely declared himself to be dissatisfied with the peace, though he was willing to abide by it; but above all he must say, that his heart bled for the Loyalists, not because they had supported this party or that party; not because he was a friend to this party or that party; but because he himself was a *man*, and therefore could not but feel most sensibly for *men* in distress; and the more so when he reflected that they had been brought into that distress for having been friends to Great Britain.

Sir *Edward Afley* was willing to abide by the peace, and to vote against the resolution: he inveighed against Lord North's administration, but if possible, still more against those who were forming a junction with them.

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Mr. Macdonald rose, and in very strong and ingenious arguments opposed the resolution. But he first began by complimenting the noble Lord, who had moved these several resolutions. His strain of compliment was such, that he appeared to have been, at first, their advocate. He said, that he wondered how the idea could have arisen, that the noble Lord could have brought forward any motions, in which his head and heart were not agreed. Was not the name of the noble Lord used proverbially for integrity and ability? He was certain that the noble Lord would never bring forward any motion but what was agreeable to his ideas, and consistent with the honour and interest of his country. This was sufficient to induce him to give the vote his hearty concurrence, were it not for the following reasons: he thought that, by giving this resolution his vote, that it would be dangerous to the real welfare of the country. He thought that it would be demonstrating to the powers of France and Spain, that we were inimical to the peace; that we should excite their resentment, and rouse their preparations for another war. It was upon this principle that he considered the motion could not have but the most destructive and alarming tendency. It was convincing France and Spain, that we did not approve of the peace; and that, consequently, on the first occasion, a new war would be commenced. This idea would even be an incitement to them of not fulfilling the

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the ratification. He considered that this peace had its advantages, if it were only that of disjoining the interests and combinations of the belligerent powers. But he thought there was no possibility of obtaining even a peace upon other terms; and therefore he should give his disapprobation of this part of the motion.

Mr. Fox rose, and began with observing that he should not long detain the attention of the House; but that some points had fallen from some honourable Gentlemen, to which he could not longer delay his desire of making a reply. Yet he wished that he could have delayed his observations, until he had heard farther the sense of the House, which might probably have enabled him to have given them a proper and ample discussion in the course of the arguments he was going to offer. He said that he was not a little hurt to find that those Gentlemen with whom he had been in the habits of friendship, connexion, and system, now deserting the principles they had formerly preserved. He was very sorry to find that an honourable Gentleman (Sir Cecil Wray) for whom he had the most sincere and cordial friendship, so far mistake the principle of the motion of his noble friend; as to see it necessary to sound the alarm of independency, and to quit that cable of principle which he thought was sufficiently strong to have held the Gentleman's confidence. He was at a loss to conceive from whence this behaviour of his

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honourable friend's could have arisen. However, he should not condemn his principle, although he might lament the loss of his approbation. For he was assured of the propriety of his intention, though he might not approve of the necessity of his conduct in this particular.

An honourable gentleman on the opposite side of the house (Mr. Powys) had thought proper to censure a coalition of parties in a former debate. Indeed, he had even mentioned them in the present. But he trusted that there was no room for a censure of a coalition of parties, which had only existed from the necessities of that House to resist a system which had proved the destruction of every confidence and interest the House had trusted in them. He had to mention some circumstances which had reflected very materially on the conduct of a noble Lord, who had been the immediate cause and preservation of those from whom the censure had originated. But he should pass over this, to consider of an accusation which had been made on the conduct of a noble Lord, (Lord Keppel.) It was said, that during his administration, that the navy was not in a proper and adequate situation for the service. How far this was founded in justice or necessity, he should observe, not from the actual situation themselves, but from the relative situation of those with whom they were to encounter. For it could by no means be a proper mode of argument, to condemn his conduct from

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from this ship being foul, the other being unequipped, — but from the relative situation of the whole, to the service for which they were intended. He, therefore, called upon any person to produce an instance, not to hazard an accusation. He wished to know in what the fleet had been found deficient to the service for which they were required. It was, he was assured, so much on the contrary, that France, in the last year, had lost thirteen ships in their general quantity, and that we had increased seventeen in the course of last year. He was happy to have this opportunity of bearing testimony of the conduct of a gentleman who had been most illiberally treated by those who were under the greatest obligations of gratitude to his services. He calls upon any one gentleman in the House to contradict this assertion. It was easy to give general censure, but as difficult to corroborate this general censure by specific evidence. The honourable gentleman then proceeded to observe, that on the *prima facie* of the peace, there could not be a doubt of the Preliminaries and Provisional Treaty being inadequate to the relative situation of this kingdom with France and Spain. We had given America the possession of our fisheries, when it was considered relatively with what we had ceded to France. — We had given East Florida for no recompence. We had given St. Lucia to France for the restoration of three islands that could bear no sort of advantage to us that was competent to the

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advantage France would derive from the possession of St. Lucia. He then went into the consideration of *uti possidetis*, in which he clearly, ingeniously, and with great precision, demonstrated the difference of the principle of the *uti possidetis* and the principle of the general restitution. In this he drew a line, wherein he demonstrated that the conduct of the Ministry had lost even the advantages of both the principles. Had the *uti possidetis* been observed, France would not have had the cession of the Newfoundland fishery; nor would they have had a foot in the East Indies. On the other hand, he made the same application as a general restitution. He then adverted to the conduct of the late system to which he had always adhered. And to this reflection he was called upon by what had fallen from an honourable gentleman (Mr. Powys); he had reflected upon his own conduct; he had reviewed not only his conduct, but the connexion which had regulated this conduct; for he was free to own, that he had ambition; that he had a desire of possessing an office of political and public service. However he might have been desirous of this situation, he trusted that it was not without ability and integrity to render its possession worthy of the emolument and the confidence of the nation. But lest that he should not have been able to controul the perversity of human nature, he had taken care to have connected himself with gentlemen of known character and probity. He had taken care to have connected himself with men of

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of the first character and ability, by which his tendency to error might be corrected and restrained. It was thus that only human nature could counteract the evil tendency of their warped judgments, and prejudiced dispositions. In this situation he acknowledged he had found himself happy in a retrospect of his conduct, by which he contemplated himself as an adherent to a set of men, that could even give a sanction to inadvertency and fallability. Whatever weakness was the concomitant of human nature, he felt the connection with which he had uniformly joined a sufficient palliative. Their principles, their conduct, their abilities, commanded the confidence, however they might be the subject of complaint in the system of imperial interest. But the system of imperial interest could not suffer but from their necessarily leaving the system which they had found tending so immediately to the destruction and annihilation of the stability and existence of the constitution.

He then took notice of the observation which had been made, respecting the pension to which the right honourable gentleman (Sir Edward Astley) had alluded. He said, that he did not applaud the principle of the pension; but he must applaud the motion which has urged the grant. He said, that it was entered upon under the generous idea of serving even those who were known to have been in the opposite interest to those by whom the pension had been

granted. He trusted, therefore, that this could not, with any propriety, be an imputation to the conduct of any part of the administration, of which he could be considered an individual. He had, then, to revert to a part of his conduct which gave him the most heart-felt satisfaction. It was that wherein he and his friends had withdrawn themselves from an administration which had neither commanded their coalescence nor their countenance. There was a certain person in the administration, who was, in his nature, habitudes, and principles, foreign to the general system on which the administration had been formed. He was happy to find them follow him whom he should rather have followed. He could not but receive it as a gratification to that natural tendency, self-complacency, which is implanted in human nature, when he saw men who had, he was assured, espoused the present connection from principle, and not from party, dropping off from the corrupt and withering stem of administration. It was a satisfaction in him to see that the system which had been established since the demise of his very worthy and patriotic friend (the Marquis of Rockingham); it convinced him that no system could possibly exist, but what was supported by a fair, consistent, and established unanimity. The administration was destroyed for want of confidence. It was folly for any gentleman to talk of preserving the station of a man, who had not a support founded on the principle

ple of the real supporters of the constitution. He believed there was not a man in that House who could give his support to the present Premier. What was the basis of this support? Had he not trifled away their interest in every respect? Had he not made concessions in every part of the globe, without the least pretence to equivalent? The honourable gentleman then proceeded to give an instance, wherein the advantage of the war should have been pursued.

He said, that in respect to offensive war, it was true that offensive war was an object of our attention. But he thought that the principle of offensive war on which it had been pursued, was contrary to the interests of the country. Offensive war on garrisons, islands, and continental possessions, were only wasting treasure and human nature, for they would have been restored with the rest. Had offensive war been directed against ships, then the advantages we had gained would have been retained. It would then have been not in the power of any wanton and inconsiderate Ministry to have given away the naval acquisitions which we had gained. But now we had the fairest prospect of restoring the confidence of the people. It was only this which could give stability and permanency to the shattered system which characterized the present administration. He hoped, that now there was a prospect of reviving and establishing the system of which he had so long been proud of considering

sidering himself a member, there was now a certainty, whatever might be the hopes, the prejudices of certain worthy Members, who had more attachments to men than measures, of the present nugatory, shattered system, being repaired, and rendered sufficiently strong to bear the interests of the people. Now the sense of the nation was awake to conviction, they would no longer lend their assent to the destruction of their welfare. The obnoxious part of the Administration must recede from the countenance of his Sovereign. He had neither the sanction of people or Parliament; or, indeed, his wonted colleagues. So that from these considerations, he sat down with the greatest assurances of his seeing the interests of the nation once more placed on the basis of that system, which can only save it from destruction.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt rose as soon as *Mr. Fox* sat down, and made a speech of two hours and a half in length, which began dully, but brightened as it proceeded, till it burst into a blaze of genius and ability, that arrested the attention, and excited the admiration of every person in the House. We do not remember to have heard in Parliament a speech more comprehensive in its nature, more clear in its detail of facts, more forcible in its reasoning, more just in its conclusions, or more pointed and powerful in its ridicule. *Mr. Pitt* began by observing, that the ill consequences of the vote on Tuesday morning, which he had then deprecated and foretold; seemed

seemed at last to have made its way to the conviction of all, who had spoken in the course of the debate in favour of the motion, every honourable gentleman having particularly desired to be understood as not being adverse to the peace, but as wishing to confirm it, and by no means intending by his argument or his vote of Tuesday last, to weaken its stability. It was, Mr. Pitt said, rather an extraordinary means of endeavouring to convince the world, that gentlemen were determined inviolably to adhere to the articles of the Preliminary and Provisional Treaties, for them to move a question directly censuring Ministers for having made the Peace, and notifying to the public, as well the people at home as foreign powers, that the House of Commons were of opinion, that the Terms of the Treaties were inadequate, and such as the adversaries of Great-Britain were not warranted to demand, nor the Ministers to grant. As Mr. Fox had rested the merits of the question on the comparative strength of the two countries, Mr. Pitt said, he would allow the issue to be a fair one, and would join it. He then went into a most elaborate detail of the state of our navy, denying that the authority of the late First Lord of the Admiralty, great as it was, and as it confessedly ought to be, was that which he would submit to as the criterion of the cause in issue. He said, that high authority had acted in a manner which the House ought to know. When called upon to state the French

navy, with a view to Negotiation for Peace, it had
 so happened, that he had generally magnified their
 number of ships and their strength; when desired
 to give the state of their marine, in order to guide
 and direct others in their plans of war, he had
 then considered their navy in another light, and re-
 duced their number considerably. After this Mr.
 Pitt went into a description of the disposition of the
 marine of the House of Bourbon. He said, they
 had 60 sail of the line in the Bay of Cadiz; and
 several at Brest, and from their known intentions,
 previous to the peace, it was not to be doubted, that
 they would prove superior in maritime strength to
 us in the West Indies, superior in the East Indies,
 and, allowing for the ships the Dutch could send
 out, superior to us at home. Having argued for
 some time upon the state of our navy, compared to
 that of our enemies, he took a view of our military
 force, which he considered as equally inapplicable
 to the various services, had the war continued, cir-
 cumstantially accounting for his holding such an
 opinion. He next adverted to our finances, and
 described them as being in a state equally melan-
 cholly and comfortless. He reasoned a good deal on
 the various particulars of each subject that he
 touched; and having contended, that though our
 enemies might be in as exhausted a situation as our-
 selves, that Ministers were bound in duty and in
 justice to their country to act upon the necessities
 of Great Britain, rather than on those of other na-
 tions;

tions; he proceeded to advert to the other topics dwelt upon by Mr. Fox. He urged the absurdity of voting on Monday last an amendment to the address that had been moved on the ground, that the House had not had time to consider the treaties, and then at three days distance moving a resolution of censure upon the same treaties, without farther information, or a moment's discussion of the subject. He put this very strongly, and then took notice that one half of Mr. Fox's speech had turned upon the best mode of forming an administration, and upon excuses for having formed an alliance and a junction with a noble Lord, to reprobate and revile whom, in the grossest and most personal manner, had been the constant practice of the honourable gentleman for the past seven years. He hailed their new friendship with calling it, the *immortales et sempiternae amicitiae*. He said, it had been asked if seduction would be attempted on the wedding-day? The marriage, he declared, he hoped was not yet solemnized, and if so, he begged leave to *forbid the bands*. It was evident, he said, that the question of the day, however plausibly argued by the noble Lord who had moved it, and by the other gentlemen who had supported it in argument, was moved rather for the purpose of removing the Earl of Shelburne from his situation, than from any real belief that Ministers deserved censure for the concessions they had made, concessions which from the facts he had stated, were obviously the result of ab-

solute necessity, and were imputable to the noble Lord in the Blue Ribband, rather than to any other person. That noble Lord's lavishment of the public money, his weak and mischievous projects, his ill-conduct and ill-directed applications of the national strength, both military and maritime, with his total want of vigour, of wisdom, and of foresight, having induced all that pressure of calamity and of misfortune, which had weighed down the country, and forced his Majesty's Ministers into the necessity of purchasing peace at any price. If the removal of the Earl of Shelburne could be effected innocently, and without entailing on the country all the mischiefs that the present motion would induce, great as the noble Earl's zeal for the service of his country was, powerful as were his abilities, and earnest as his endeavours had been to rescue Great Britain from the verge of the precipice on which she stood, he was persuaded he would retire firm in the dignity of his own mind, conscious of his having essentially contributed to the ease and happiness of this kingdom, and to the prosperity of her first and dearest interests. — For his part, free he was to confess, that high situation and power were the objects of his honest ambition, and objects which he felt no shame in saying, he desired to possess, when they could be fairly and honourably acquired; he should retire not disappointed, but triumphant, triumphant in the conviction, that his talents, humble as they were, had
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been earnestly and zealously employed in promoting the welfare of his country, and that however he might stand chargeable with error of judgment, nothing could be imputed to him that bore the smallest complexion of an interested, a corrupt, or a dishonest intention. Nor would he, should he go out of office immediately, follow the noble Earl now at the head of his Majesty's Councils (as the self-created and self-appointed successors of the present administration had with so much confidence asserted was likely to be the case) retire to that fortress, which the Honourable Gentleman had some months ago said, would be a safe retreat for those who would find themselves duped by the noble Earl to whom he had alluded. He would march out with no warlike, no hostile idea, but hoping that the successors of the present Ministry would bring with them into office those principles which they formerly held, but which they had forsaken while in opposition; hoping likewise, that they would serve their country with as much zeal, and as much solid advantage, as he trusted it would one day be seen, and acknowledged, the Earl of Shelburne and his colleagues had done, he would promise them before hand, his uniform and substantial support on every occasion, where he could consistently and conscientiously lend them his assistance. Mr. Pitt took a vast range of serious argument, severe retort, and pointed ridicule in the course of his speech, declaring in his exordium, that he appealed to the sobriety and good sense of the

House, and ending his speech with hoping, that the vote of that evening would rescue his country from the distraction and distress into which she was once more going to be plunged by the prevalence of party.

Sir *Cecil Wray* rose again to explain. Sir Cecil declared he had meant in his former speech to throw no blame on great men seeking connections with others of great ability and weight in the country, but merely to say, he never would support an administration formed of a junction of men, in whose principles he had the fullest confidence, and any part of that administration which had nearly ruined the country. The noble Lord in the blue ribband had ever been the high asserter of regal prerogative, and the influence of the Crown. He, therefore, as an honest man, could never act with that noble Lord, and as his honourable friend and colleague had once before formed an alliance in administration, by which he had *burnt his fingers*, he cautioned him to take care how he proceeded, and not to burn his fingers again.

Lord *North* said, he had been so peculiarly alluded to, in the course of the debate, and so much had been said, that he was bound in duty to himself and to his connections, to take some notice of what had passed. A great deal, he observed, had been thrown out on the idea of his having escaped censure and punishment, and on that great lenity of those who had testified a spirit of forbearance upon that subject.


subject. For that lenity he was undoubtedly bound to make his acknowledgments, but he begged leave to remind the House, that he had never abandoned either this character or his connections, that he had ever been ready to meet enquiry, that he was yet ready to do it, and conscious of his own innocency, he was bold enough to say, he defied either censure or punishment. He should be extremely sorry, he said, if one honest man had just reason to say, he could not act with him, and if there existed, and it could be made out, that there was any real cause for such a declaration, he was ready then to pledge himself to the House, that he never would put himself in a situation to make it necessary for any man so feeling to act with him. With regard to the coalition that had been so much talked of that day, and on Monday last, the noble Lord who made the motion, had ever shewn himself so upright a character, a man so clearly actuated by public motives of the purest and most disinterested kind, that however they might for some years past have had the misfortune to differ in politics, yet he had never once had the smallest occasion to believe, that the noble Lord, even when he was most violent in the opposition to such measures, as he was then carrying on in what he thought the best grounds of national policy, was impelled to oppose but from an idea, that those measures were unwise and injudicious. There were times and circumstances, his Lordship said, when honest men, convinced of the integrity



integrity of each others intentions, however much they might have differed as to the means of carrying those intentions into practice, might fairly meet, and each abating somewhat of the violence of their own obstinacy, might form a junction on principles neither dishonourable to themselves, nor disadvantageous to their country. When a character so universally allowed to be disinterested in an eminent degree, as that of the noble Lord's, and whose public motives were so good, did him the honour to offer him his friendship, he thought himself happy to receive that honour with cordiality, to embrace the noble Lord with sincerity, and to rejoice at a circumstance of so grateful a nature. The noble Lord's public enmity to him was, he thanked God, at an end, and he trusted that their friendship would not be attended with any consequences at all likely to injure their country. With regard to the other Honourable Gentleman, who had also been much adverted to, on the same grounds of reasoning, he made no scruple to say, that in the heat and warmth of opposition, when, as the Honourable Gentleman over the way had expressed it, he had been villified and grossly reprobated, that Honourable Gentleman had undoubtedly run him hard, and sometimes treated him severely; but however his conduct might have been accusable on the score of want of wisdom, he trusted it had never merited censure, much less punishment, on the ground of want of zeal to promote what he conceived to be the true interests of his country, or

want



want of integrity. In the early part of that Honourable Gentleman's political life, when he had the happiness to have him for a friend, he had always found him open, manly, fair, and honest; as an enemy he had found him formidable; and formidable a person of his great abilities ever must be found by whatever Minister he acted against. The Honourable Gentleman who spoke last had said, he had been an asserter of the regal prerogative. He desired to know in what? He never had pushed the royal prerogative one inch beyond the limits defined and prescribed by law, and however loud the clamour might at one time have been raised against him, as a person desirous of ruling by the influence of the Crown, it had already been found that the charge was untrue. Whatever opinions might be formed of the principles of the coalition that had been so much talked of, the noble Lord and the honourable gentleman knew him too well, either to require or to expect that he would have sacrificed any one of his public principles, or done any thing to purchase their friendship; (much as it was to be desired, when it was obtained on just and honourable grounds) at all inconsistent with his character. After stating this very fully, his Lordship reminded the House, that in Monday's debate, he had asked if Congress, unable to raise a farthing to carry on a war in the heart of their country, were so determined not to grant the Loyalists what the Ministers ought to have insisted upon in their behalf, that they would rather have

suffered





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suffered a continuance of the war? He had, he said, since had more opportunity to enquire into the fact, and found it to be strictly as he had stated. In most of the States they refused to pay the tax levied by Congress for the service of the war. In Rhode-Island they rose forcibly on the officers that came to collect it, and drove them away; and in the Massachusetts the tax was discounted in the Province, and, consequently, the produce never carried to the public service. His Lordship descanted on these facts, and built several strong arguments upon them, to shew that Ministers, had they stood it out firmly, might have obtained more favourable terms from the United States. He also mentioned the Treaty of Utrecht as falling short of the disadvantages of the present Peace, but contended, that he should not depart from his former declarations, in voting for the motion then under consideration. That the carrying of it should be the cause of driving the Honourable Gentleman over the way from office, did not appear to him, by any means, a necessary consequence. The noble Lord who made it, had promised to adjourn the consideration of it, if his Majesty's Ministers would say, they thought the production of papers to give farther light to the subject necessary, and would produce them on any future day. Speaking of the recognition of the Independence of America, his Lordship said, he would long ago have consented unconditionally to grant it, had he dreamt that the reserve of the grant could have been made so little use of, or
 inconsiderable

turned

turned in so small a degree to the advantage of the country. Recurring again to the personal insinuations and charges that had been thrown out against him, he said, his being able to stand up against the thunder of Mr. Pitt's eloquence; and braving such thunder was at least some presumption of his innocence; and while his heart told him he had nothing to accuse himself with, he should undoubtedly boldly oppose himself to the accusations of others, be their abilities, their eloquence, and their character what they might.

Mr. Secretary Townshend made a short speech in opposition to the motion, which he considered as a direct and severe censure of Ministers.

Mr. Fox rose to explain something relative to the removal of the army from New-York, declaring, that had he done his duty when in office, he should then have written to the German Prince, whose troops were in that garrison, upon the subject, and after settling that they might be so disposed of, should have sent out orders for their removal to the West Indies; but understanding that some would be wanted for Halifax and Nova Scotia, he had not pursued those measures, because he thought them in some degree unnecessary. His successors, however, not having the same reasons for declining to take the steps he had mentioned, should have taken them, and he had it from the highest authority, that there were transports ready to take them on board, and convey them to the West Indies.

Q

Mr.

Mr. Secretary *Townshend* rose again, to declare, that let the authority be ever so high, the fact was otherwise. He stated that he had written over to the Prince of Hesse and the Marquis of Brandenburg to settle, that their troops in our service might be moved from the continent of America to the West Indies, where they would have been long since conveyed, but that Sir Guy Carleton had written home word, that were there not other insuperable reasons against their removal from New York, there were no transports to embark them in.

Mr. *Pitt* said, he never rose with more pleasure than to give his vote against the motion, and he would just trouble the House with the relation of a story which he thought applicable to the present conduct of a noble person.

There was a Barbarian, he said, who cut and mangled an intimate friend of his, and supposed he had killed him; pleased with the thought of what he had done, he went to the feast where his friend should have been, and enjoyed himself. The wounded person crawled to the entertainment, and his wounds were dressed, but such was the rancour of the Barbarian, that in the night he went up stairs and tore off the plaisters from the sores, and thereby exposed the wounds afresh.

Mr. *David Hartley* spoke for some time, but the House was exceedingly impatient for the question; however, the honourable gentleman insisted that

the peace was inadequate to the situation of the country.

Mr. *Chancellor Pitt* reminded the honourable gentleman, that he had, on the first day of the Preliminaries being laid before the House, said, the Peace was the salvation of this country. The Chancellor then proceeded to vindicate Lord Shelburne, and said, if the removing that noble Lord would be a public good, however he should regret the loss of a man, whose abilities and conduct he admired, he should be happy to think the country had benefited, and although power, emolument, and office, were pleasing things to him, he would give his abilities out of office to any good measure that any other Ministry might propose.

Mr. *George Onslow* rose, and vindicated Lord North. An honourable gentleman, he said, had called him a Barbarian; such language he thought quite unparliamentary, and if Lord North was the traitor to his country, which some men would indicate, why was he never impeached, dragged forth, and punished?

Mr. *Martin* and *W. Wilmot* both spoke against the motion.

Mr. *Hill* rose, and kept the House in a continual roar of laughter during the short time he spoke; he assured the Speaker, he would not detain the House more than five minutes, nor would he speak, as some others did, for five hours; for it was plain, let who would speak, they were the *Bore*, and
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