

Technical and Bibliographic Notes / Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages detached/
Pages détachées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Showthrough/
Transparence |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continuous pagination/
Pagination continue |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intérieure | <input type="checkbox"/> Includes index(es)/
Comprend un (des) index |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées. | Title on header taken from: /
Le titre de l'en-tête provient: |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Additional comments: /
Commentaires supplémentaires: | <input type="checkbox"/> Title page of issue/
Page de titre de la livraison |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Caption of issue/
Titre de départ de la livraison |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Masthead/
Générique (périodiques) de la livraison |

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below /
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
									✓		



The Volunteer Review

AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

VOL. VII.

OTTAWA, (CANADA,) TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1873.

No 13.

NEWS OF THE WEEK.

The Conservative party in the House of Commons intend to bring in resolutions having for their object the abrogation of the three new rules of International law, propounded for the benefit of the Yankees in the Washington Treaty. These people had done their duty by the Empire, such a piece of imbecility would never have been enacted.

The series of frauds or forgeries by which the Bank of England has been victimized, to the amount of £100 000 sterling, displays the most consummate patience and ingenuity, and must have been the work of a comparatively large number of persons. The forged bills on different firms had to be carefully prepared, each house or firm using a different paper, and water marks for its acceptances, all of which had to be initiated, and the negotiator must have been in possession of considerable funds, as he made very large deposits and did large business with the West-end branch of the Bank. It is a curious commentary on the ingenuity of dishonesty to know that the discovery of the frauds was due, not to wrong or over dating, but to the absence of dates on two of the acceptances.

Judge Facher has granted an order appointing N. James Jun., receiver of all the property of Bidwell, one of the Bank of England forgers.

In political matters the Gladstone *replac*rage is able to carry on the business of the country, divisions being unfavourable as regards a display of strength, while it is conceded on all hands, that at the general elections the Conservatives will gain at least fifty additional seats. Social difficulties growing out of the commercial and manufacturing monopolies beset the grand old kingdom. The farm labourers, the most abused class in the Empire, can bear the difficulties under which they labour, no longer. With wages at the same rate that they were one hundred years ago, and with cost of living advanced at least 100 per cent. the problem of life must be a hard one to solve

for those poor people, and it is hardly possible to think calmly over what the rascality of the Monopolists and their tools the Whig Radicals have doomed the bone and sinew of old England to undergo—that the price of labour at Manchester according to Mr. Gladstone should be kept down.

The Austrian Ambassador, Count Bernostoff, died in London on the 26th.

France, with its non-descript Government has paid already three and one-half milliards of francs for the war indemnity. As long as Thiers lives matters will probably progress favourably, but after him will it be the deluge or the Bourbon, it is evident either alternative must be encountered, and if such a thing as a clear headed statesman could be found amongst the French Generals, no difficulty would be met with in the effort to give France a stable government. It never can be that of the lax constitutional pattern which the late Emperor Louis Napoleon attempted. The great French danger is the press, and it must be kept under efficient control. Moreover, Paris must be taught that she is not the whole of France, and her dangerous classes, the *outriers* should be scattered in every direction. At present, the heavy hand of the German is on them, and they are kept under; but if the reorganization of the army has not been properly carried out, the day of German evacuation of French soil will be a woeful one for its people. Let us hope that Marshal Mac-Machon has imbibed the lesson taught by the late disasters, that the most dangerous enemies of the state are its insubordinate soldiery, and that the new French army will be able and capable of retrieving the disasters which culminated at Sedan.

Disaster, threatening and fierce, appears to be rapidly appearing on the theatre of Spanish affairs. At Madrid the troops are in a state of insubordination and disorganization fearful to contemplate. The only change for the unhappy country seems to be in the direction of a restoration of the Bourbons in the person of the Carlist, or Alphonist pretender. A levy *en masse* of the people of Catalonia and neighboring provinces is quite

probable, the object being to fight the Carlist guerillas who are devastating those districts and suspending whatever business the unhappy country possesses. The Cortes have abolished slavery in the Island of Porto Rica, and passed a resolution to sustain the integrity of the Spanish dominions, and involuntarily afterwards voted its own dissolution.

The *Imparcial* announces that Don Carlos has abdicated his claims to the Spanish Throne in favor of his son under the regency of Don Alphonse.

Gen. Caberar has been appointed to the supreme command of the Carlist forces in Spain.

The Portuguese Government has asked the Cortes to rectify the concession for laying a submarine cable between Lisbon and the United States touching at the Azores.

The Prussians celebrated the birth day of the Kaiser on the 22nd by a magnificent demonstration at Berlin.

His Holiness the Pope has appointed the following Bishops for the United States, where their services are very much needed, as between Mormonism, Spiritualism, Woman's rights, fifteenth amendments the Tammany rings, Congressional purity, the heathen Chinese and other reputable institutions, the morals of our neighbors are in a very poor state indeed: The Bishops elect are the very Revd. A. Corrigan, for the diocese of Newark, and the Revd. M. Gross for the diocese of Savannah.

The Grand Vizier has been obliged to send a sharp note to the authorities at Belgrave, relative to the tribute due from Wallachia to Turkey.

The Khiva expedition has already marched and the advance has been struggling through the snows on the steppes of Central Asia for more than a month. What is to come of it is a question of time, but if those fanatical tribes on the borders of Afghanistan would only combine, there would be small chance indeed, of any of the Czar's soldiers ever seeing Russia again. It is intended to turn the whole Cossack force of over 200,000 irregular horse into mounted riflemen—in other words into bad and inefficient infantry.

MOUNTED RIFLEMEN.

The following letter appeared on this subject from Sir Henry Havelock in the *Times* last week:—

"Colonel Hamley's able advocacy of the principle of Mounted Riflemen has directed so much attention to the subject lately that I venture to ask you to publish some particulars of the practical working of such a force which are but little known. Their having occurred under my own observation will, I hope, plead my excuse for making use of the first person in speaking of them where it is unavoidable.

"All through my father's campaign in 1857 the want of cavalry to follow up his successes was painfully apparent. Later in the first half of 1858, when we had abundant cavalry, their feebleness in pursuits when far detached from infantry, their great losses and small results, attracted much attention. This led me, among others, to think of a remedy.

"In July, 1858, Sir John Douglas, K.C.B., was directed to clear the Shahabad district. He had in all over 5,000 men, but scattered over thirty five posts in a vast district; while the rebels, some 4,000 men, including the old Dinsapore brigade, the 7th, 8th, and 40th Native Infantry intact, held a central position in a jungle, twenty miles long by three broad in the heart of the district. This position enabled them to baffle us. Whenever they were pursued, as we entered the jungle at one side, they left at the other, marched rapidly to a distant part of the country, and, as soon as pursuit was abandoned, from the limited marching power of our infantry under that sun, returned quietly to their old haunts in the jungle. Their speed made them complete masters of the situation. They collected the revenue of the district, and established such a reign of terror that no inhabitant dare furnish us with information or provisions. This game lasted from July, 1857, to September, 1858—fourteen months.

"Bearing this in mind, it occurred to me, as principal staff officer to Sir John Douglas, to propose, during an interval in the operations, the formation of a body of Mounted Infantry. Sixty men from the 10th Foot, good shots and accustomed to horses, were carefully chosen and drilled for three weeks to the alternate mounted and dismounted action of Dragoons—properly so called. In October the General again took the field. In pursuance of his plans, five columns were to converge round the Jugdespore Jungle by noon on the 13th of October, hem the rebels in on all sides, and make a combined attack on their position. All worked admirably until the last moment of the concentration. Then one column of the five was three hours late in completing the circuit. The Sepoys saw the breach, slipped through the gap immediately, and were once more at large in the district. There was nothing left for us but the old story of a long "stern chase" again.

"Now the Mounted Infantry came into play. A light column was formed of four troops of the 2nd Battalion Military Train, acting as Light Cavalry. To these were added the 60 mounted Riflemen of the 10th Foot, and 100 Irregulars; and I had the good fortune, as originator of the Mounted Infantry idea, to be entrusted with the command. We started in pursuit. Two strong columns of infantry, under Sir John Douglas and the late lamented Sir William Turner, moved on parallel lines on either side

of the rebels, while we, the mounted force, kept ahead of them to keep them back.

"To state the results briefly—we marched 201 miles in five days (one day 69 miles during 20 hours in the saddle), prevented the rebels the first night from crossing the Soane 'headed' them continually, and turned them back by our dismounted rifle fire on to the infantry columns.

"This was easy to do, by getting a couple of miles ahead of them, choosing a strong line of walls and banks across their road, placing the riflemen, dismounted and under cover, in the centre; extending the four troops of the Military Train (also armed with rifled carbines) two on each flank; and keeping the Irregulars, as a reserve and guard for the horses of the dismounted men in rear of the centre. At the time to do this was always chosen, when our information had brought up one or other of the infantry columns to within two or three miles, we never failed to delay the Sepoys long enough to bring them between two fires, and cause them heavy loss. Our patrols constantly kept the infantry informed of the enemy's movements—when and where to expect them, and how to make the shortest cuts to get at them. Our infantry marched on an average, 25 miles a day for five days, or 125 miles in all—a tremendous effort in that climate. But if it had not been for the Mounted Rifles, the infantry would never have seen the rebels again after they lost sight of him the first day.

"In short, the Mounted Rifles, either single handed or in combination with one of the infantry columns, brought the rebels to bay three times—on the 16th, 18th, and 20th of October; destroyed over five hundred of them, and by giving them no rest at night or day, so harassed the remainder that they were driven out of the district into the hills and thence into Central India.

"The Civil Power resumed its authority, and a district which had been for fifteen months in rebel hands reverted at once to peace and security.

"What 5,000 of our troops had not been able to accomplish in a year under the old system of slow movement, was done in five days by 2,000 infantry and 400 cavalry and Mounted Riflemen, and this wholly through the revival of the Middle Age principle of fire and rapidity of movement combined in Mounted Infantry. So much for the power of continuous pursuit.

"These Sepoys would easily have marched thirty miles a day for a week, if only allowed intervals of three or four hours at a time to undress and cook, as their religion requires. But this is what we did not give them. No sooner had they settled down to their cooking than a rousing Enfield volley drove them to the road again, and kept them going. This repeated on several consecutive nights 'broke their hearts' and drove them out of the districts.

"At the end of the American War the idea of Mounted Infantry was worked out on a grand scale. In April, 1865, when Lee was forced to evacuate the lines of Richmond, he endeavoured to retire south westerly, with some 50,000 men to effect a junction with General Johnston. Sheridan, with a division of 11,000 Mounted Riflemen, in four brigades followed in pursuit. As at Mars-la-Tour, the other day, his object was to seize the enemy, detain him, and hold him fast till the infantry should come up. But—different from the Germans—Sheridan accomplished this by the rifle fire of his dismounted men alone; using his horses alone to keep ahead of Lee, and outflank him on every side.—The result is well known. Sheridan

stuck to the Southerners till, on the 9th of April, two whole Federal Infantry corps—60,000 men—having come up, and two trains of provisions coming to Lee from the westward having been intercepted, his force reduced by famine and desertion to 42,000 men, was surrounded and forced to surrender. This brought the war to an end. Had Lee succeeded in joining Johnston—which but for the Mounted Infantry 'heading him back,' he inevitably would have done—the campaign might have lasted for another year.

"The battle of Mars-la-Tour (or Vionville) on the 16th of August, 1870, stands forth pre-eminently bright as the most glorious day for Cavalry that the world has ever seen. The undaunted bravery of the Prussian Horse, their entire devotion and unhesitating following of their officers, enabled 24,000 stubborn German infantry, backed by the numerous artillery, to keep over 82,000 French in check till the arrival of reinforcements insured their being shut into Metz. By these devoted charges, made by one half of 12,000 German cavalry present, three hours breathing time—from 1 to 4 p. m.—was gained. A full half of the cavalry were only slightly engaged, as a detailed statement of their losses shows. By 5 p. m. the Germans had 60,000 men on the ground; by nightfall over 100,000. The French allowed the 17th to pass away in inaction. By the morning of the 18th, 220,000 Germans barred the way to Verdun, and the opportunity for escape was gone.

"Judging by the light of after events, it may be said that the fate of France was sealed on the 16th of August—That those two German Cavalry divisions bore the destiny of half Europe and of two Empires on their swords; grand results of discipline and skill, of devotion as great as at our own Balaklava, and of military science twice as practical.

"But it still remains an open tactical question whether these results would not have been better gained—that is with less loss of life—by a combined application of charging and dismounted action instead of by headlong charging alone. For instance, the most brilliant charge—that of Bredow's brigade (7th Cuirassiers and 16th Uhlans), noble almost beyond anything in history—cost 349 officers and men, killed and wounded, out of about 850, and 519 horses out of the same number, and its effect is only momentary.

"No guns were carried off; the infantry that were ridden over (they had not time to form square, so skillfully was the charge led under cover of ground till the moment of impact) were not dispersed, but inflicted fearful loss on this brigade, by their rifle fire in its retreat.

"But had this brigade to put a hypothetical case as the only means of illustrating the argument—been followed in second line at a trot by one or two battalions of Mounted Riflemen, at some 500 yards' distance, a totally different result might have been gained. The Mounted Riflemen would have halted, dismounted, and immediately got into position on reaching the silenced guns that had been ridden through.

"Their horses would have found immediate shelter in the hollow which concealed the advance of the Cuirassiers till they were close upon the batteries. The Cavalry, passing on at full career some 500 yards further, would then have retired round one or both flanks of the dismounted riflemen, completely shrouded and protected by their fire. The French cavalry counter attack would have been checked at once. The ground

covered by that splendid charge would have been thus permanently held, the guns secured, and a salient point 800 yards in advance, and on a crest in the centre of the enemy's position, gained. The Mounted Riflemen thus thrown forward could have been reinforced, in less than ten minutes, by their own infantry, and in the meantime the returning Cuirassiers and Uhlans, retiring round both flanks under cover of their fire, and reforming as second line behind them in security, would have been an intermediate support. Their heavy losses in retreat, principally sustained from rifle fire, would have been avoided.

"Again supposing one half the 12,000 German cavalry present, or about the number that played a comparatively passive part had been employed, in dismounted action, against Bazaine's weak point, between the Bois des Ognons and the Bois de Vaux, above Gorge, and threatening his communication with Metz, is it not probable that they would have brought his forward march to a standstill just as effectually and at half the loss of life, as by the fearfully costly charges made on his front?

"I do not presume to put forward these questions as any speculative opinions of my own; but having had the advantage of discussing the subject, on the ground itself and just after the battle, with General Sheridan—an eye witness of the fight, and certainly the greatest living authority as to what Mounted Riflemen can do—I think it right to make public the conclusions he formed on the spot, only wishing that I could express them as forcibly or as lucidly as he did. These are questions that are occupying some of the keenest and most practical minds in the German Army at this moment. The opinion seems universal that an intermediate arm to act as above indicated in combination with cavalry, is a technical necessity to be brought on by breech-loading fire.

"Though the German Horse, in the complete demoralization after Wœrth, were able to ride all over the country, a few Uhlans accepting the submission of large cities like Nancy, and carrying terror everywhere, as soon as the Franc-Tireur movement became serious, this was stopped short at once. Under a little rifle fire from woods and hedges this free riding was paralyzed; no cavalry patrol could move without some Jagers, generally in a cart, to take care of it. Uhlans and even Cuirassiers felt themselves at a disadvantage, and armed themselves with the Chassepot whenever they could. The inference from this impulse of self preservation is a safer guide than any tactical theory.

"The disasters of the splendid French cavalry further point the moral of the helplessness of the *arme blanche* against breech loaders. Their magnificent Cuirassiers, brave and devoted as in the best days of the First Empire, were destroyed in headlong charges against infantry, without the slightest result. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 9th Regiments of that arm at Wœrth; the 5th and 6th at Mouson on the 20th of August; the Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville, or nine out of their eleven Cuirassier Regiments, were literally thrown away, in hopeless efforts under a false tactical system. In the same way the brigade composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique were annihilated at Sedan, without even breaking through the infantry whom they charged. The German fire partly of skirmishers, partly delivered in line, destroyed them at 150 yards. Only a few individuals ever reached the bayonets, there to be shot

down or captured. How invaluable to France might have been even this one brigade alone, which carried a long rifle and had been trained to fight on foot, if it could have survived to be used against the long German lines of communication in Nov. and Dec. By that time the French cavalry no longer existed. What even might 2,000 horsemen have effected if handled as Sheridan or Stuart, of Confederate fame, would have used them, when the siege train was on its slow way to Paris? How would it have fared with the rails and tunnels of the long miles to the frontier if the French had read the teachings of the American War as to cavalry aright?

"To look in another direction Russia has thoroughly adopted the Mounted Rifle idea. The Cossacks of the Imperial Guard were told, after a great review some twelve months ago, that they were henceforth to carry a rifle and work on foot. Already 42,000 breech-loaders has been issued to the Cossacks. Let it be remembered that Russia possesses over 200,000 of those light horsemen. When next we meet them, be it in Afghanistan or on the Danube, it will be as carefully trained Mounted Infantry that their excellent qualities will be utilized.

"For us this question is of more importance than to any other nation. Could we put 6,000 sabres in the field? And where are our cavalry reserves, of men or of horses for this handful? All the more urgent that we should not throw away a single man or horse whom we cannot replace, by adherence to an exploded practical theory. If we had 72,000 cavalry like Germany it would be different. Lastly this is the only way to bring out the real value of our Yeomanry. No country in the world is so suited as England for dismounted rifle action, because no other has such features of ground, where at every mile you find a crest on which riflemen can act in position under cover, while their horses are sheltered, close at hand, to the next hollow. The Yeomanry are coming out this year. Why should not a beginning be made with them? We have now an officer at the Horse Guards, better qualified than anyone else to give the details. Colonel Jenyns, C. B., Assistant Adjutant General, late 13th Hussars, trained his whole regiment to act in this way in Canada, in 1867-68."

The *Times* has the following remarks upon the above:—

A question of much interest and no slight importance to our military organization will be found discussed by an able correspondent in our Outer Sheet this morning. A first glance at the subject might well induce a non professional reader to think the problem an easy one, but it requires an exact and peculiar discrimination of objects and duties to place the matter in its proper light. Briefly stated, the question is, How to provide our Army with Mounted Riflemen? Now, as we have already some thousands of mounted troops under the name of Cavalry, what, it may be asked, is needed beyond providing those troops with rifles? To this answer is that as cavalry they would be spoiled by the process, and would not be Mounted Riflemen after all; horse soldiers and foot soldiers fight with different arms, are differently trained, and acquire different ideas of action. A man taught to use a rifle and to rely upon it would no longer be competent to make good use of a lance or a

sabre; so that while we should not get our Mounted Riflemen we should lose our Hussars. Cavalry as such, will be wanted in future wars as much as ever, and the proper efficiency of that branch of the service must not be impaired. Then, why not put infantry on horseback? That no doubt, is what in some way or other should be done; but this expedient also is attended with difficulty. Mounted Infantry are exceedingly apt to degenerate into indifferent cavalry. There is a strong, almost irresistible tendency in that direction, and a good foot soldier would assuredly endeavor to become more or less of a Dragoon. We cannot, however afford to damage our infantry. They must still be what they are, only, if practicable, with the means of moving more rapidly from one point to another.

By this time perhaps, the nature of the problem will be a little clearer. It is not required to train cavalry to fight on foot with the arms of foot soldiers, for that would only be spoiling them for their own work without obtaining from them any good work of another kind. Neither is it sought to teach infantry to fight on horseback; for that, as we have said would be to the detriment of their proper discipline and duty. The object is simply to constitute some method of rapid locomotion for the ordinary marching power of troops. Napoleon, it was said won his battles as much by the legs as by the arms of his soldiers, and the object is now to provide as it were, our soldiers with artificial legs, so as to enable them to keep up with cavalry and artillery. It is not necessary to organize any great numerical force for this purpose. A few companies of infantry available for such duties at the proper time would often be sufficient, and it will probably occur to the reader that there is an alternative which would secure the object in view without even exposing the troops to the temptations of equestrian service. During the Fenian outbreak in Ireland soldiers were commonly carried on the jaunting cars of that country, and so moved about from place to place at twice their usual marching speed without fatigue or inconvenience. Why, then, should not a company or two of "carmen" be organized in conjunction with Mounted Riflemen? Commodious cars might soon be provided from our carriage departments, and a couple of horses well managed, would take a load of eight men, with their arms and ammunition over a considerable distance. It is not supposed, apparently, that cars should be exclusively employed. They would, on the contrary, be attended by a certain percentage of horsemen, but all the troops would dismount and act together.

In an elaborate memorandum on the subject which has been prepared for submission to our military authorities, some curious suggestions are made towards neutralising the solutions of cavalry drill and practice. The men selected for the new training are on no account to be allowed the use of spurs, or indeed, any article of cavalry attire, except leggings. They must invariably dismount to fight, and employ their horses for riding only. They must be selected from infantry regiments, or if from other branches of the service, the candidates must have previously joined some infantry regiments for a period of three months and gone through a course of musketry instruction. The latter stipulation conveys, in fact the essence of the whole problem. In reality, the term "Mounted Riflemen" no longer carries the meaning which it had thirty years ago. All our soldiers—that is to say, all our foot soldiers—are now Riflemen alike

nor is there any practical distinction between the rifle corps still retaining their original designations and the ordinary regiments of the line. But, for the purposes in view, we must have Mounted Infantry, or, in other words, troops taught by special training to use the infantry weapon with the best possible effect. The weapons of cavalry and artillery are different also, whereas, it is the very essence of the case before us that the troops thus to be provided with new means of locomotion should be genuine foot soldiers, prepared to act as foot soldiers do. Of course, certain special recommendations would be desirable. The officers should be quick sighted, good horsemen, and accustomed to study country by hunting or other field exercises. It is also suggested that they should be ready, self-reliant, able to speak at least one foreign language, and acquainted with telegraphy. So, again, for the non-commissioned officers and men; they should be smart, intelligent, rather under than over sized, and as a matter of course marksmen, or first class shots. A few advantages in the way of pay would render the service attractive, and, indeed we can hardly doubt that, just as in our own generation all but foot soldiers have been made Riflemen, so a few years would suffice, if necessary, to turn half the Line into Mounted Infantry or Carmen.

The object, it will thus be seen, is to ensure the presence of a large force of infantry at a particular spot under circumstances requiring great quickness of movement. It will not do to arm cavalry with infantry rifles, for that would not make them genuine riflemen. Neither will it be sufficient to provide riflemen with horses, unless precautions are taken to prevent them from slipping out of their proper skins and figuring as cavalry. But we can certainly teach troops of the Line to ride, and yet to act, not as dismounted Dragoons, but as regular foot soldiers. It is simply a question of locomotion—of adding to the rapidity of an infantry march. In war time conjectures will infallibly occur at which such a resource would be invaluable. In certain situations both cavalry and artillery might be useless, or exposed to great peril for the want of a small body of infantry. The German cavalry discovered the necessity of the case in the late war and took measures accordingly. Our correspondent gives an interesting illustration of the subject, drawn from the Indian campaign of 1857. The Sepoy mutineers were men who could march under an Indian sun thirty miles a day for a week together—a feat, as we need hardly say, quite beyond the reach of the European soldier. Relying on this exceptional capacity, they watched their opportunities, got a start of our troops, and so contrived to elude their pursuers for more than a year together. At last a small body of mounted Riflemen was organised, and by the aid of this force the affair was successfully finished in less than a week. In conclusion we are judiciously reminded that no country in the world is so well adapted to this kind of practice as our own, "where at every mile you find a crest on which riflemen can act in position under cover, while their horses are sheltered close at hand in the next hollow." In another six months we shall have the Autumn Manœuvres again, and by that time, perhaps have provided ourselves with the means of testing to some extent the value of a suggestion which is certainly very reasonable, and which will not make any heavy demands on either the War Department or the Treasury.

THE LAUNCH OF THE RALEIGH.

The launch of the *Raleigh* on Saturday at Chatham adds a new frigate to the British Navy. The main features of her construction, which distinguish her from the old-fashioned type of frigate, are her capacity to carry a heavy armament of a modern character and her enormous engine power; and the objects which have been sought in her design are an exceptional speed and a power of protecting herself with a heavier artillery than is usually carried by vessels which may be able to match her in speed. These two characteristics give a special importance to the *Raleigh*. The first vessel of the kind built for the British Navy was the *Inconstant*, which was launched in 1868, and her success has been so great as to induce the Admiralty to gradually add a small squadron of such vessels to the Service. The *Active* and *Volage* succeeded the *Inconstant*, but were constructed with the idea of obtaining, substantially, the same advantages in a smaller compass. Since their construction it has been, after much discussion, decided that a high rate of speed and a heavy armament can only be guaranteed by wooden vessels of a large size. To obtain a speed of fifteen knots an hour it is absolutely essential to have engines of exceptional power and size; and it has been found impracticable, if not dangerous, to endeavour to obtain such a rate of speed in small vessels. So the construction of vessels like the *Active* and *Volage* was abandoned, and the *Raleigh* designed on a scale between the *Inconstant* and *Active*. And, indeed, since the *Raleigh* was laid down, so alive has the Admiralty been to the importance of increasing the strength of the navy in wooden vessels as to propose this year to construct two more vessels of the same kind—the *Boudicca* and the *Bacchante*. The tonnage of the *Raleigh* is 3210 tons; horsepower nominal, 800. She is built of iron on the tranverse system, and has iron girders and supports. This iron skin is coated with two layers of wood, the nearest the iron being teak and the outer coating of oak and mixed woods. She will carry twenty-six guns of various calibre, the largest being 12½ ton, or 200 pounders. It is this capacity to carry such a powerful armament which secures the *Raleigh* her special superiority over vessels like the *Active* and *Volage*. It is admitted now by most naval constructors, that although size is an unquestionable disadvantage to ships in naval warfare, and that although expence is another objection in the construction of vessels of a large tonnage, yet the powers of carrying a powerful armament is so essential, and is, for smaller vessels, so impossible of attainment, that those advantages are more than recompensed by this one advantage, which can only be secured in frigates and large corvettes. Thus the *Volage* has only a burden of 2322 tons, compared with the 4066 tons of the *Inconstant*, and her cost was, of course, proportionately different, but the armament of the *Volage* is only equal to that carried on the upper deck of the *Inconstant*. The *Volage* carries guns on her upper deck only, and these consist of six 7 inch muzzle loading rifled guns, two on each side of the quarter deck, and one on each side forward of the funnel, with a poor 64-pounder pivot on her top gallant fore-castle, and another of the same calibre on her poop. But she is unable to carry any guns on her main deck, and cannot therefore compare with the *Inconstant*, whose main deck battery consists of ten 12-ton rifled guns. This difference is so important, and marks so essentially the

difference between the two vessels, as to warrant the conclusion which, as we have already said, has been arrived at, that diminished size and cost have been purchased at too dear a price. For their own class of vessels, both the *Volage* and *Active* are perfect; they do not carry a pound too much weight, and their construction is so delicate as to be superior in some points to the *Inconstant*. In a cruise their speed would be surprising and their success would be certain, could they only escape the batteries of a heavier armed vessel, and maintain their engine power at the highest pressure. But the Government seem to have decided that such vessels are too delicate to be relied upon in rough work, and that they are too severely handicapped, both in size and armament, for the ordinary purposes of naval warfare. While the *Raleigh* has not the tonnage of the *Inconstant*, it has a sufficiently powerful armament, and is guaranteed a sufficient speed to make her a more useful and trustworthy vessel than either the *Volage* or *Active*. She will have the inestimable advantages of standing easily the racket of powerful engines; will, or rather should be, a match in point of speed for any armed wooden vessel afloat, and will carry an armament capable of meeting on equal terms any antagonist of equal speed. The question still remains to what extent we require the construction of wooden vessels like the *Raleigh*. The answer, at present, is that they cannot be dispensed with, and that their service in real action may be found, indeed, indispensable. Had the long sustained battle between guns and armor been settled this question need never, perhaps, have been asked, and the launch of the *Raleigh* would have been an error in judgment. But it is impossible to assert that the class of ironclads which must now be built can hope to satisfy every want in naval warfare. They have gradually developed such special characteristics, and are designed to meet two such apparently irreconcilable needs, as perfect protection from shot, and as perfect carriages for the largest guns that they can only be regarded as having a special mission. Then again, the introduction of torpedoes has levelled the differences of strength between wooden and ironclad ships, until at length it is recognised that to be deficient in the fastest wooden vessels we can build, which are capable of carrying fair armaments, is to want an element of real power in our fleets. The chances of naval warfare are still sufficiently open to leave many chances to our new wooden walls; but our wooden men of war must be superior in speed, construction, and armament to their predecessors. Battles will not be fought out by ironclads alone, nor can our ironclads by themselves be capable of giving that protection to our commerce which in time of war it would have a right to demand. These new vessels such as the *Raleigh* may find themselves in the position to follow Admiral Farragut's advice—"the best way to defend your own ships is to attack the enemy vigorously", and they would, we think, find it possible at times to follow this advice prudently as well as courageously. They would be exposed to the common enemy of all men of war, torpedoes; and they would have a friend too little recognised in such matters, smoke, while, probably, they would be superior in speed to any enemy. As an authority on these matters has said, in quoting the gallant Admiral's advice, he "nobly seconded the precept, as, in the wooden frigate *Hartford*, he fearlessly led his wood-built squadrons through lines of torpedoes and floating ob-

structions, most formidable batteries, and against even ironclad ships. The defensive value of gunpowder smoke was well illustrated when passing between long lines of batteries. On such occasions, Admiral Farragut never returned the fire in heavy shot or shell, but in clouds of grape, which annoyed his opponents and distracted their aim, while obscuring the sides of his ships in their own smoke."

On Monday the *Raleigh* was floated into the repairing basin to take on board her machinery, &c., and to proceed with her fittings, preparatory to being brought forward for commission.

MODERN WAR.—REMARKS OF ABLE OFFICERS.

SUB-LIEUT. HUBERT S.

Instead of centralizing military administration, Prussia has worked out the principle of decentralization and definite responsibility of individuals; and instead of leaving all to be done at the last moment, in a perfunctory manner, there is not a single step in the mobilization of her forces which has not been arranged beforehand. There is nothing new or startling in the Prussian idea. It is but the principle of division of labour carried in the organization of an army, as Adam Smith described it to be in a pin manufactory. Each official had a definite duty to perform and definite instructions how to perform it, so that no meddling is required from Berlin, and no uncertainty exists in the various districts. The War Office knows to an hour when each *corps d'armee* will be ready, and where each Division and Brigade will be with its general who knows his officers and soldiers, and who is served by a staff equally well informed.

Recruits in Prussia have to serve three years in the active army, though, for economical reasons, they are generally sent home months before the expiration of their term, then four years in the Reserve, after which they fall four or five years into the Landwehr, and need no longer expect to be put into the first line in war except under extraordinary circumstances. The Landwehr, together with young untrained men, have generally enough to do on the lines of communications, where they are being taught all things necessary to enable them to take their place in the front line should their help become necessary. The great fact is that the active regiments are always associated with their Landwehr battalions, their reserves, their depots of troops, arms, clothing transport and supplies of all kinds. Not an article of equipment has to be sent from Berlin or elsewhere. Everything they need is to be found close at hand in their own districts. There is no choking of railways with men hurrying to and fro before they can be equipped. Every commander of a district Landwehr battalion knows who are the men to be called up instantly from the Reserve to complete the active regiments and if any of them are not close at hand there are letters already written to recall them, enclosing railway orders for their use. Their clothes and arms are ready for them when they join, and they are then within a short distance of their regiments. All the transport of each Corps is present in its district. There is a definite plan to supply the extra horses required. In a given number of days, known beforehand, each Corps is certain to be perfectly ready for active service and in possession of every re-

quisite for a campaign; while arrangements have been made for the supply from its districts of all things likely to be expended during a war, whether it be short or long. The district feeds the children of its soil with whatever they can obtain in the enemy's country, and assumes at once the charge of the wives and families left behind. In the district, after the troops march, the remaining reserves and recruits are being taught their duties as steadily as in a time of profound peace, and a regiment calls these to its standard as soon as it has lost by wounds or sickness one-tenth of the men who marched with it. In a very few days after the War Office has telegraphed the order to mobilize, the country produces a number of small armies, each perfectly prepared to act instantly as an independent body or to join the others at a place ordered. Moreover, the plans for every conceivable campaign have been drawn up during the leisure time of peace; the railway arrangements have all been made, and only need one word from the Chief of the State to confirm the projects of the General Staff. In fact, the various departments have done their work so well in peace that the order for war puts upon them no stress whatever.

The tactical system of the Germans disclose a large experience of the past, an intelligent appreciation of recent changes, and the results of continual efforts to make the army a perfect instrument. Thus the value of one of Napoleon's inventions—the separation of a national force into a number of independent units, each capable of acting by itself—was fully understood and carefully maintained; but instead of being formed into one army, obeying a single commander in chief, a certain number of *corps d'armees* were aggregated into distinct armies, each under a responsible leader, the immense masses of modern times making this arrangement obviously expedient. Thus, too, the principle of giving subordinates in high command great freedom of action while carrying out a general scheme, observed by Napoleon towards his Marshals, was faithfully followed by Von Moltke; but even more ample liberty was allowed, in consequence of the vast proportions attained by war in the present day. Celerity, absence of complications, and self reliance were thus promoted; and though too much is not to be made of a mere matter of organization, the consequences were of undoubted value. Coming to tactics in a more technical sense, while the leading rule was steadily adhered to that the three arms should assist each other, and perform their proper functions in the field, the greatest care was taken to adapt them to the exigencies and uses of modern war, and to accommodate their action so as to fall in with the changes wrought by modern inventions.

Strategy is a science which is constantly in progress, and which always takes into reckoning the changes in the laws of arms in more recent times, as well as utilization of the new improvements in the means of communication—such as railroads and telegraphs.

The distinct formal movements by which an army is made to assume throughout a similar or corresponding formation are no longer possible in presence of modern weapons. It is absolutely essential in order to diminish the disastrous effects of the present arms that each small section of an army should be moved in such a manner as the local circumstances impose. An attack in column is no longer possible, and an attack in rigid line—except for short distances—

never was possible against properly posted enemies; and now, except under the very rarest circumstances, attacks cannot over be restricted to short distances. If an army then is to attack at all, it must do so in skirmishing order, with a proper system of supports and reserves. This mode of battle implies an increase in the space occupied by a given number of men. In proportion as the space occupied by a company is increased the difficulty of having men under control is augmented. Hence drill discipline is more necessary, and the combination of the most entire obedience with the greatest intelligence more desirable, than ever. It is obvious that it is now impossible for an officer to bring the same number of men under his eye as he could when they were more compact, and yet rapidity of movement and quickness in conveying and obeying orders are of greater consequence than before. The consequences of outflanking or of breaking the line are more serious than what they were.

Now, as heretofore, and perhaps more than ever, the fate of battles depends on infantry; but the action of the other arms must not be forgotten. The French generally threw away their cavalry in dashing but utterly hopeless charges, and did not employ it enough in reconnoitring; the Germans followed exactly contrary rules.

The cavalry divisions covered their army and its marches with a veil. Even before crossing the frontier the cavalry divisions in the centre of the army were pushed to the front. At the first entry into France they came upon the enemy at Picheren, at Weissenburg and at Worth. Immediately after these actions the cavalry division again led the way. The enemy's cavalry was, on the contrary, very inactive. The French generals did not appear to understand the employment of cavalry after the German fashion.

This noble use of horsemen acting as widelyspread *claircours*, and concentrating into immense masses when needed, is best obtained by the Prussian *corps d'armee* organization, with its divisions of Batteries and its Cavalry detachments each attached to a specific Division, so that the little army is complete in itself with some 3,000 men and 90 guns.

It must be laid down as a rule that on the cavalry lies the obligation under all circumstances to watch and gain information concerning the enemy at great distances. But it is the business of the leader to carry this out with a requisite economy of the powers of this arm; for he who considerably weakens his cavalry before the first engagement cannot expect anything from it either in or after it.

The stronger, however, the body of troops destined as coverers, the further it can be pushed forward, and the greater will be its sphere both for gaining information and covering.

The cavalry should always form the head of the column even in the mountains; but in this case their strength should be limited. Their business should be only to secure and give intelligence; thus patrols would be the extent of their employment on such a ground. Some dragoons should always be at hand to obtain quickly information of anything which may be observed on the flanks, which is often necessary on the march. Good riders on stout horses, with the confidence which these conditions afford, can do much.

(To be continued.)

CONTENTS OF No. 12, VOL. VII.

POETRY.—	
Flood Tide.....	142
EDITORIAL.—	
The Coming Contest.....	138
Garrison at Fort Garry.....	138
Commissariat.....	139
Lieut.-Col. Strange, R.A.....	140
The <i>Globe</i> and the Guards.....	140
The News of the Week.....	133
CORRESPONDENCE.—	
L.M.XLIX.....	140
Royal Dragoon.....	141
SELECTIONS.—	
On the Best Detail Formation for the New Infantry Tactics.....	134
Origin of Tolls in England.....	137
Minnesota Tree Planting.....	137
The Employment of Mitrailleurs, &c.....	142
The Present Power of England.....	142
Interior of the late Woolwich Infant.....	444
REMITTANCES.....	137
MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS.....	130



The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1873.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and in the corner the words "Printer's copy" written; and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage

Broad Arrow of 8th March describes the launch of the *Raleigh* steam frigate at Chat ham, and in a long descriptive article, which will be found in another column shows that the English Admiralty have at length awoken to the fact that floating gun carriages are not precisely the description of vessel of which the British fleet must be composed.

The utter failure of the Yankee importation known as the *Monitor* system, to satisfy the conditions of a fleet has led, as a matter of course, to reconstruction, and the only fault to be found with the specimen is its exceptional size, it is large enough to be termed a *first rate* if length and tonnage are an indication, although the armament is less than

that of the *Devastation* with its four 35-ton guns, and its great length will not tend to make the *Raleigh* a handy vessel. However, its construction is a step in the right direction which we hope to see followed out to its logical conclusion, and a sufficient number of the wooden walls of old England afloat to sustain the honor of the Old Red Flag so seriously compromised by the *Whig-Radicals*.

Taking this class of vessels as a type of the fast steaming and sailing line of battle ship, for we presume she possesses both characteristics, we can see no reason why she should not carry 25 ton guns on her main deck, and be enabled to exchange compliments with the ironclads of foreign powers. There is, however, a class of vessels which the British Navy very much requires, and it is that corresponding to the old 44 gun frigates, in this case vessels measuring, say from 1,500 to 2,000 tons with a draft of water of 16 to 18 feet swift; sailers with auxiliary steam power when requisite, in other words, vessels that could go any where or do any thing and could keep the sea for a year at a spell if required.

If Great Britain is engaged in war, she will have all Europe and the United States on her hands. The blockade of forts or inshore operation will be matter of impossibility for ships of the *Raleigh* class, her great length alone being a serious and insurmountable obstacle to the navigation of most rivers and very many estuaries, but to ships of the class designated such operations could be most safely confided, aided by gun boats of the *Staunch* class there would be no possibility of any refuge remaining unsearched or untouched on an enemy's coast.

Broad Arrow of 1st March has an article on "the Composite Gun Boats," whose launch we recently noticed, in which the construction of vessels of the *Staunch* class is strongly recommended. As we have always held that the ironclad fleet would be a failure, we have the satisfaction of witnessing the commencement of the reconstruction of the British fleet of such material as will fulfil the conditions required by the duty it has to perform and the element in which it is to live, we cannot agree with our contemporary in the value set on *Torpedoes* or on their assumed agency; in this case the constructors of the ironclads sought to accomplish physical impossibilities without a thorough knowledge of the mechanical laws governing the element with which they had to deal, and without considering the adaptability of those structures thereto, and the result which would have been arrived at much sooner if the interests of the manufacturing monopoly which directs the councils of Britain had been subordinated to the interests of the Empire.

The *Torpedo* failure is as notorious on this continent as the *Monitor* failure is and has been; it will take a long period we suppose

to convince the minds of the British authorities of its uselessness as an agent in offence or defence in naval warfare; Admiral FARRAGUT was a brave seaman, but the lesson attributed to him was taught and practised by the greatest seamen the world ever saw—NELSON—before the gallant Admiral's country had a Navy, and this our contemporary ought to know.

In another column we republish an extract from a letter of Sir HENRY HAVELOCK to the *Times* on "Mounted Riflemen," in which the subject is illustrated by the writer's experience during the Indian mutiny, and there can be no doubt he makes some good points, but a non descript corps such as he organised would be far better described under the name of *Irregular* cavalry, than the various brilliant and effective cavalry corps serving under that name with the Indian army.

It is evident a mounted corps destined to act as the original dragoon on foot or horseback could not be drilled to act efficiently as infantry or cavalry, their tactics should be peculiar to their own branch of the service and the title of Mounted Riflemen would be as great a misnomer as that of regular cavalry soldiers.

The remarks of the *Times* and Sir HENRY's letter puts this in a forcible light, but we differ from the writer in the idea of the use of such a force, rapid locomotion is no doubt exceedingly desirable for an army but it will not be found possible under ordinary circumstances to move forward the whole of a force with all its material in the presence of an enemy with the same speed as the cavalry.

It is to be feared the very exceptional circumstances under which the Prussian concentration was effected at the opening of the last contest, had a similar effect on the minds of the English people that the phases of the late war between the Northern and the Southern States exhibited, they are dazzled by success, and ready to adopt what was a mere contingent advantage as a principle on which future action should be based, such short-sighted views led to the adoption of the *Monitor* class of ships in the English Navy, led to the idea that this exceptional force of *Mounted Riflemen* was the great agent in the final triumph of the North, whereas it was only when the Southern cavalry were exhausted, those gallant troops organized, as our correspondent "Royal Dragoon" says, "for retreating," did or was capable of the least valuable service beyond robbing hen-roosts, which feat they performed with charming and praiseworthy impartiality.

What Sir HENRY HAVELOCK's letter points to is the fact that a certain number of men capable of riding and using their rifles under cover dismounted for the purpose of holding a column or advanced guard at bay till the

regular infantry columns moved up to the scene of action are a necessity of modern tactics, they would also be useful in covering a reconnaissance, being able to engage such small bodies of irregular riflemen as the *Franç's tireurs* and enable the cavalry to carry out their proper operations.

The *Irish jaunting car* idea is not one likely to be entertained by any man who knows what active service in the absence of roads and bridges really means, but it is sufficiently evident that Sir HENRY HAVLOCK'S idea, as applied to a permanent force can only be worked out by a separate tactical organization so that a field force in future would number *irregular* cavalry as one of its arms. It is evident that as world moves on it has become necessary to "carry coals to Newcastle," and the time may arrive when *horse marines* will be a requisite of the Naval service.

THROUGH the kindness of Lieut. Colonel H. C. FLETCHER, Scots' Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary to His Excellency the GOVERNOR GENERAL, we are enabled to present our readers with the first of a series of articles on "Modern War," compiled from the papers and remarks of able officers by Sub-Lieutenant HUBERTUS, of the Prussian Army, just issued from the Berlin Press.

In those days it is necessary that the soldier should be kept abreast of all mechanical and tactical improvements connected with his profession, and that he should not only master the practical but the theoretic problems involved in the opinions of officers and others who have written on the subject whether the propositions laid down be applicable or otherwise, and therefore we have endeavoured to place before the members of the Canadian Army all the opinions connected with the profession, from which useful and valuable information might be extracted. In this light "Modern War" will be found highly useful, many suggestions therein recommending themselves to common sense, and the practical experience prompting others, is of a character to recommend itself to any soldier's understanding.

THE following article is taken from the *United States Army and Navy Gazette* of the 15th March. If we may judge from the remarks of our talented contemporary the *Torpedo* humbug is about as miserable a failure as the celebrated *caloric* propelled ship.

It is evident the mechanically impossible problem has not yet been solved.

Special Despatch to the New York Times.

"NEWPORT MARCH 8.—To day fortune has smiled upon the *Lay* torpedo, and not only its inventor, John L. Lay, but all the officers of the torpedo station are confident from its trial to day, that notwithstanding the many

mishaps in the past, it is a success, and is all that it is claimed. The torpedo was launched and moved off in a beautiful manner, performing, under the direction of the operator on shore, a number of circular motions on the passage, which won the admiration of all the Government officials present. It proceeded up the harbor a distance of one and a half miles, in the remarkable time of twelve minutes and twenty-one seconds, as timed by Professor Farmer. Owing to the weather being hazy, the two miles which are to be run before the Government purchases the right to manufacture the torpedo, was not accomplished, as it was impossible to see or direct it, and, consequently another trial will be had.

"We publish the above despatch as we find it, though it is impossible to judge from the muddled report as to what are the real facts of the trial. The "circular motion" which excited the admiration of this correspondent were doubtless the zig zag movement of the torpedo going with the tide and not minding the helm. We should prefer to see a report as to the time she made from some naval officer who would state how much of the speed was due to favorable conditions. We see nothing in this account inconsistent with the report of the previous trial which we published last week from the *Times*, and which stated that after running out from the shore a distance of half a mile the torpedo became unmanageable.

"Among the points that have been made against the *Lay* torpedo boat are its extreme delicacy and complication, the inadequacy of its motive power, and the uncertainty of the operator over its motions. That these defects exist is abundantly proved by the several trials which have been made since the grand one last fall in the presence of the Torpedo Board, and a large representation from the Diplomatic Corps.

THE *New York Sun* describes the Forty-second Congress in the following terms which we republish for the benefit of those disciples of the Goldwin Smith School whose theoretic philosophy would import American *sentiment* into Canada for the benefit of its benighted people.

"Within the last one hundred and fifty years there have been more famous legislative bodies than this, but we do not remember one more infamous. There were conscientious gentlemen in the Senate and the House; but *prima facie* the case is against the whole of them. The entire term of this Congress has been characterized by a series of disreputable transactions which have no parallel in our history. We went through all the temptations of the war without seeing anything so outrageous as the doings of the two Houses over which Schuyler Colfax and James G. Blaine have now presided.

"The Forty-second Congress! As its members sneak home with the money of the people lining their pockets, even boys playing at their marbles in the streets will point to them, one saying to his comrade, 'There goes a member of the Forty-second Congress!' and the comrade, not deigning to raise his eyes from his play, will respond, 'And of course, a thief!'

"This is the Congress which some Macaulay of the next century will describe as more infamous than that Parliament which originated *Lay's* celebrated *Missis-*

issippi scheme; and more corrupt than those Parliaments which *Walpole* used to purchase as he bought Merino sheep and *Flinders* maros to stock his estates in *Sussex*. In fine, this is the Congress which the American people on Tuesday, as the clock struck twelve, hooted out of the Capitol!"

As an illustration of the results of vote by ballot and pure Republicanism it does not present any features of an unusually attractive character.

It has frequently fallen to our lot to point out the mis-government of mob rule, as exemplified in the United States, the following picture drawn by a leading New York journal of the "Louisiana difficulty," shows how frequently law, order, and common sense are set at defiance for party purposes. There is no necessity to hold up this as a lesson to the Canadian people, but the *London Times* and the Whig-Radicals would be all the better for making a close study of this phase of Republicanism pure and simple.

"The following is a condensed account from the *New York Sun* of the Louisiana embroglio. It may be a partisan view of the case, but it will at least furnish our readers with a knowledge of the situation.

"At the general election in November last Governor McEnry and his associates on the State ticket received a large majority of the votes. The same is true in regard to most of the members of that legislature which supports the claims of McEnry. On the other hand, Kellog and those who ran on the ticket with him, together with that body which in his interest pretends to call itself a Legislature, were defeated by large majorities.

These last so-called officials are a bogus cabal and owe their present positions and the power to plunge the State into civil war solely to the judicial usurpations of Durell, the United States District Judge, whose proceedings in this affair have by the Committee on Privileges and elections in the Senate been unanimously declared illegal, unwarranted, and gross violation of the Constitution. Though members of this committee made four reports, every one of them enunciated this fundamental proposition in the most explicit terms.

"From these premises it logically follows that the real Government of Louisiana is that whereof McEnry is the head, while that represented by Kellog is a sheer usurpation.

"From the outset General Grant has aided and abetted the usurpation. He instantly recognized the *ad interim* Governor, Finch back who was to hold on to the stolen chair of the Executive until the time for Kellog to seize it. By order of his Secretary of War, Colonel Emory, in command of the troops at New Orleans, took the decrees of Durell on the point of his sword and forced them down the throats of the legitimate rulers of the State.

"And why was this done? The conspiracy to overthrow the regular government of Louisiana originated in January, 1872. Gov. Warmoth, a Republican, was opposed to the renomination of General Grant. So Warmoth must be put down; and Casey, Collector of New Orleans and brother-in-law of the President, and Packard, the United States Marshal, and Lowell, the Postmaster, were left to devise the ways and means,

"Not long after this Warmoth broke with Grant and set up for himself. He carried with him a large and influential section of the Republican party of Louisiana. The carpet baggers being thus divided, the Democracy took advantage of the split, had the good sense to conciliate the disaffected Republicans, and the result in November was the purest election the State had seen since its re-construction, and the triumph of the Democratic Liberal ticket headed by McEnry, the candidate for Governor.

"But this did not suit the plotters in Louisiana or the Administration at Washington. So, armed with Duroll's decrees and Emory's bayonets, they determined to make short work of Warmoth and his legally chosen successor McEnry. They first impeached Warmoth by their bogus Legislature, and put corrupt Pinchback in his place, and in due time, and without the shred of an election return in their possession, swore Kellog in as Governor.

"The Warmoth-McEnry party then appealed to Congress. The Senate Committee, without a dissenting voice pronounced Duroll's decrees, judicial usurpation. The majority of the committee reported a bill ordering a new election. The Senate failed to pass the bill, and Louisiana now drifts on the current of events, no one knows whither.

"General Grant has already announced which side of this bitter controversy he will take. He informed Congress that if they did nothing he should continue to recognize and maintain the Kellog Government. And Congress did nothing. Though clearly in the right, the McEnry Government will have to succumb to the bayonets of the United States army. But a day of reckoning will yet come."

In another column will be found extracts from English papers on the "Central Asian Question," giving the manufacturers and cotton-ocracy's view of the state of affairs between Russia and England. The Prussian idea and the prevalent opinion in the French Capital,

There can be very little doubt that Earl GRANVILLE has put his foot in it again, that diplomatist being responsible for the *sneak-out* in 1870 when he first instructed Mr. Odo RUSSELL to declare the treaty of Paris would be maintained by England, "with or without allies," then disavowed his envoy and finally got GLADSTONE to display the powers of his rhetoric in persuading the House of Commons that it was Russia and not England that made the futile boast.

There is danger looming in the future out of this very question. An exchange says:—"There is a story afloat that a Russian house has ordered 200,000 tons of nitre, the largest order ever placed in the market" and pertinently asks what can they want with it? The interrogatory had better be put to the Whig-Radicals, and Gladstone would probably answer that the Russian Imperial family had rented a Scotch moor for the season and the nitro was needed to manufacture gunpowder of a special quality for grouse shooting. The German organs magnify the power and resources of Russia,

whilst the organs of the cotton-spinners and manufacturing monopolists treat the whole affair as a political and military intrigue, of which they alone understand the bearings.

The French idea will be found to be nearest the truth, and that England will have another arbitration on her hands preparatory to a sharp contest for that most difficult of all her possessions to defend from attack—India—is beyond reasonable doubt, and for that as well as all other political failures she has to thank the Whig-Radicals and their masters the manufacturing monopolists.

The value of our military organization is proved by the manner in which it is appreciated by the people of England—the follow extract showing that even in the matter of military education the colony to whom the *Times* tenders such unsolicited and impertinent advice can lead the parent state, must be peculiarly gratifying to the people of Canada—while it proves that the adoption of our system in its entirety would provide England with its greatest want—an efficient army.

"As in many of our colonies the main expense of the several Volunteer corps has to be borne by the officers, it may interest them to know what Mr. Cardwell said at the annual distribution of prizes to the successful competitors in the Inns of Court Volunteer Corps:—"The changes which had recently been introduced into the Volunteer service was calculated to increase the efficiency of the service, to draw them closer to the regular army. Parliament had for the first time—admitted—without exception the principle that it was the duty of the public to pay all the necessary expenses of the Volunteers. It had established, schools on the principle of the schools which were so successful in Canada, in order that the officers passing from those schools might acquire efficiency, and might earn a larger capitation grant for the corps. It was not perhaps to be expected that any large portion of their body should in that way have time to pass through the schools, though some had done, and more than forty had already obtained certificates for proficiency, and were earning capitation for their corps. He observed that the number of their enrolled members had diminished, but it was satisfactory to know that the number of their extra efficient was increasing, and that their marksmen were more numerous. He was sure that the regulations which were intended to promote the greater efficiency of the Volunteer service would have their cordial support, and would be received with pleasure."

Our readers are informed that the Military Department will not keep on hand or furnish any copies of the *Army List*, those officers requiring a copy must order it through some bookseller. The price is two shillings sterling for the monthly list.

The *John Bull* says a match between the Duke of Edinburgh and a Russian Princess is on the tapis.

REVIEWS.

The *London Quarterly Review* for January contains: Unpublished Letters of the Princess Charlotte; Laws and Customs of Sport; The Two Fredericks; State of the British Navy; Madame de Sevigne; Exhaustion of the Soil of Great Britain; Froude's English in Ireland; The Sonnet; History of British Commerce; Chaucer and Shakespeare; The Ministry and University Educational in Ireland. The Leonard Scott Publishing Company, 140, Fulton Street, New York.

The *Phrenological Journal* has been received.

DOMINION RIFLE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING.

The annual meeting of the Dominion Rifle Association was held yesterday at noon in the Railway Committee Room, the President, Lieut. Colonel Gzowski, in the chair.

The Secretary, Lieut. Colonel Stewart, read the annual report, to which was affixed a memorandum of the President expressing regret that the Council were unable to lay before the meeting a detailed statement of the doings of the Canadian Wimbledon team, because the team sent to Wimbledon was taken out of the control of the Association, instead of being as a body of Canadian Riflemen, representing the Association they were sent as a detachment of Canadian Militia. The memorandum urged that it was necessary in order to foster the spirit so favorable to the rifle movement in this country for the Association to determine that no other team should depart for Wimbledon as a detachment of the Canadian Militia, but as Canadian Riflemen representing and sent by the Dominion Rifle Association.

The Treasurer, Lieut. Colonel Macpherson, D.A.G., also submitted his report which showed the income of the Association to have been \$6,834, and the expenditure \$6,178, leaving a surplus of \$656, which added to that of last year \$827, gave a total balance in favor of the society of \$1,178. The principal expenditure had been for the Wimbledon team, which amounted to \$5,220.

The reports and memorandum were adopted.

The constitution was afterwards amended so as to provide that Rifle Associations which are not Provincial might become affiliated by an annual payment of \$20. The number of the Council was increased to 52, a representation of five members each being given to British Columbia and Manitoba.

It was also decided that for the future the annual prize meetings shall be held at Ottawa.

The following Council was then elected :
 Ontario—Major Mackenzie, M.P., Lt. Col's Brunel, Gzowski, Frank Buell, Gilmour, Kirkpatrick, Skinner, Ross, Scoble, Lewis, Chamberlain, Lieut. W. McK Wright, Judge Macdonald, Capt. Stephenson, and Mr. J. J. Mason.

Quebec—Lt. Col's the Hon. J. G. Blanchet, M.P., 17th Batt.; R. Masson, M.P.; C. J. Coursol, F. Marchand, 21st Batt.; A. McEaobern, C.M.G., 59th Batt.; C. E. Panot, 9th Batt.; T. H. Grant, Garrison Artillery; Fletcher, C. M. G., Brigade Major; McKay, Bde Gar Art; Major W P Worsley, Brigade Major, G.T.R. Bde; Lieut. Col's Lord Aylmer, 55th Batt.; J. Grant.

New Brunswick.—Captain Tourgar, Hon. J. Ferguson (Senator), E. B. Beer, 7th Battalion, Seymonds, S. K. Foster, Major McShane, 62nd Battalion, Captain Tilton.

Nova Scotia.—Lieut. Colonels Wyld, Reserve; A. K. McKinlay, 63rd Battalion L. E. V. Chipman, M.P., 68th Battalion; Hon. J. Bourinot, Senator; J. Bremner, 6th Battalion; G. Campbell, 78th Battalion, S. Mitchell, Garrison Artillery; Belcher.

Manitoba.—Messrs. Gerrard, Royal, Banatyne, Cunningham and Captain Howard.

British Columbia.—Messrs. A. de Cosmos, H. Nathan. E. Dewdney, J. S. Thompson, and H. Nelson.

Votes of thanks were then passed to the President and Secretary, and to Major Worsley, for the manner in which he had conducted the Canadian team at Wimbledon.

The meeting then adjourned.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor does not hold himself responsible for individual expressions of opinion in communications addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—In the report of the Inspector of Artillery, dated at Kingston, January 10th 1872, that officer strongly recommended that all Field Batteries be increased in strength to one hundred officers and men, under the command of a Major. Being a member of a field battery, I have looked anxiously for the General Order authorizing this to be carried out, knowing from experience the great necessity of it; a fact which will be made apparent to the most uninitiated when we compare our present establishment with that of the Royal Artillery, which from the fact of its men being thoroughly drilled and disciplined, ought to do with a less number of men than we could.

OH's	N.C.O	Gun's	& Dr's	
S.B. 6	Gun Bat'y	R.A.	8	34
	" 4 "	Can. Mil.	4	13
				220
				59

In fact our establishment is ridicu-

lously small, especially so when it is considered that very seldom is a captain able to get all his men out for training, there being always some of them absent from headquarters at the time, and from other causes. Another point I wish to touch upon is the unfairness of limiting the rank of commanding officers of field batteries to that of captain. Compare then the charge to that of an infantry captain who has simply to raise his 55 men, with no trouble about horses (which are more difficult to get than men), no harness, guns, carriages, innumerable small stores, a large quantity of ammunition, &c., &c., to look after and keep in good order. Colonel French recommends that the officer commanding the field battery should be a major, the justice of which no one I am sure can dispute who will consider carefully the great difference in the responsibilities of an infantry and field battery, when, Sir, it is considered that a field battery with its guns is equal to a battalion of infantry, I think that the rank of their respective commanding officers should be more fully equalized. This has been done already in the Royal Artillery by giving the officers commanding batteries the rank of major, and I hope that before long the same justice will be given to our commanding officers of militia field batteries. Why the officers concerned have not pushed this point themselves I am not aware, unless it be as is usually the case, that those officers who work the hardest are the last to complain, and cry out for their own advancement. Hoping that you will, through the columns of your influential journal, bring this matter prominently to the notice of the proper authorities I subscribe myself

Yours sincerely,
 SHRAPNEL.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

Montreal, March 27, 1873.

DEAR SIR,—In looking over your paper for this week I find a letter from Mr. Marsh, Winner of City of London Prize, asking information regarding the "National Rifle Association of New York."

I would inform you for his information that the opening matches take place early in May next, and that they are desirous of a team going from here. Several of us go on individually, (if we can obtain leave, of course is understood) to be present. I shall next week be in possession of the programme when I will forward you one for publication if you wish it.

Give your opinion through your paper of a term going down, and if we go will we be permitted to wear our uniforms?

Several old officers of the "Canadian Army" are on the Executive Committee, such as Captain David of the "Prince of Wales," Lieut. Townsend of ditto and a Mr. Fairbanks, of this city, so you see Canadians are everywhere.

P.S.—I can keep you pretty well posted on the New York Association's affairs as well

as other matters, so will drop you a letter once in a while.

We have to thank our correspondent, "Ixion" for information which is not to be found in the United States military organs. If a team should go from Canada they must obtain leave to wear their uniforms from the Adjutant General. We shall be happy to hear from our correspondent again and will comply with his request.—ED. VOL. REV.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—I was pleased to see your reproduction of the Times articles upon Lieut. Colonel Wood's V.C. lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution on the subject of Mounted Riflemen. The views expressed by the gallant lecturer are those of the leading military men of Europe, who with wonderful unanimity, agree as to the necessity of employing large forces of mounted riflemen in any future wars; of course quite distinct, and in no way affecting the absolute necessity of highly trained cavalry, who are still required as much as ever. My object in writing is to give credit to whom credit is due. My friend Lieut. Colonel Denison, of the Governor General's Body Guard—Toronto—has the honour of being the first to bring before the world the importance of these and other changes published in his work on cavalry some years since, and translated into several languages by European officers.

I know it is claimed by some English officers, that they had the *capo* Mounted Rifles, (by the way *only* recently disbanded) therefore were the first nation to recognize the necessity of this important arm—whereas this corps was in reality, a cavalry regiment dressed as riflemen. The first nation who proved the value of Mounted Infantry in recent wars, were our Cousins of the United States—for the old dragoon of bygone days, was a cavalry soldier taught to fight on foot as well as mounted.

I have much pleasure too in knowing that an improved system of picketing cavalry horses, brought by me before the English military authorities, has already been, in part adopted by them, for the use of the British cavalry; and I believe will yet be completely copied by all European cavalry

Your obedient servant,

J. F. TURNBULL,
 Major,

Q. O. Canadian Hussars.
 Quebec, 24th March, 1873.

The Colonial soldiers have led in many practical improvements—tactically as well as organically—we thank Major Turnbull for the allusion to the great services Colonel Denison has rendered the country, and congratulate our gallant correspondent on the services of his highly valuable and useful improvement in cavalry picketing, an improvement by the way very much needed in the British Army.—ED. VOL. REV.

THE SAILOR BOYS FAREWELL.

(We know not to whom belongs the authorship of the following lines—but all will agree with us in saying that nautical phrase never was more beautifully interwoven in sentiment of the heart's best love for those we cherish with the highest, holiest and purest affection.

Farewell to father—blessed hulk,
In spite of metal, spite of bulk,
His cable soon may slip;
Yet while the parting tear is moist,
The flag of gratitude I'll hoist
In duty to the ship.

Farewell to mother—first class she—
Who launched me on life's stormy sea,
And rigged me fore and aft;
May Providence her timbers spare,
And keep her hulk in good repair,
To tow the smaller craft.

Farewell to sister—lovely yacht;
But whether she'll be manned or not,
I cannot now foresee;
May some good ship a tender prove,
Well found in stores of truth and love,
And take her under lee.

Farewell to George—the jolly boat—
And all the little craft's afloat
In homo's delightful bay,
When they arrive at sailing age
May wisdom prove the weather gauge
And guide them on their way.

Farewell to all on life's rude main,
And though we may ne'er meet again
Through stress or stormy weather,
Yet summoned by the Board above,
We'll anchor in the port of love,
And all be moored together.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MITRAILLEURS DURING THE RECENT WAR, AND THEIR USE IN FUTURE WARS.

By Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Fletcher, Scots Fusilier Guards.

(Continued from Page 143.)

Captain Henry Brackenbury corroborates much that was said by Captain Gurdon, but reduces the effective ranges of the mitrailleuse to about 1,000 yards, possibly alluding to a weapon of less calibre. He had the advantage of noticing their destructive powers when well placed, and inefficiency in the hands of those who were ignorant of their proper use. The description he gives of the battle of Sedan presents so vivid a picture of mitrailleurs when well handled, that I hope I shall be excused if I quote it from his evidence. "Two or three days after the battle of Sedan, I was (he says) on the field: they had not long finished burying the dead. I was very much struck with the number of graves at one point, just between Douzy and Bazailles. I made enquires, and was told that great havoc had been committed there by some French mitrailleurs. It was pointed out to me where the battery of mitrailleurs had been in action, and I went there and found that evidently a battery had been in action, and for a considerable period, because there was a great number of empty mitrailleuse boxes lying about. I noticed in the first place that the position they had taken up was one that appeared to be splendid for the use of the mitrailleurs. It was just on the crest of very slightly undulating ground in a perfectly open field: they had a sort of glacis in front of them, extending down perhaps 800 or 900 yards and a gentle hill opposite, extending for 600 or 700 more. The crest of the opposite hill, the rise all being slight, was about 1,300 or 1,400 yards off. It was at this distance that they had done great execution." Subsequently he witnessed the employment of the mitrailleurs by the insurgents at Paris, who fired from the forts of Issy and Vauves at a range of 1,650

yards with very little effect. Captain Brackenbury concurs generally with the other evidence that mitrailleurs are suited for purposes of defence, and although he does not consider that an army provided with these weapons holds any very great advantage over its opponent who relies on field artillery, yet he believes them to be a valuable adjunct to that arm, and instances as a proof that the French Marshal commanding the 6th Corps regretted their absence from the right of the position at Gravelotte, and that the Prussian Officers looked on them with marked respect, and when called to face them, with decided aversion.

Mr. Charles Coffey witnessed the employment of mitrailleuse with great effect against a line of advancing Prussians at the action at Sillé le Guillaume, and coincides with the opinion of the French Artillery Officers with whom he spoke, that they were very valuable in war.

Major-General Walker, C.B., who was present with the German armies during the campaign, evidently agrees with the Prussian Staff in his opinion on the merits or rather demerits of the mitrailleurs. He sees no place for them in European warfare, as he believes them to be inferior to artillery, especially when good shrapnel shells are employed. He acknowledges their possible value against undisciplined troops badly provided with artillery, and in purely defensive positions, where the opponent is forced to advance on a fixed and narrow front, but deprecates any diminution in their favour of field artillery, and does not think that it is desirable to encumber infantry movements by attaching them to that branch of the service.

Colonel Hamley, who critically examined the evidence for and against the mitrailleurs condemns them absolutely for offensive operations, where, as must almost always be the case, the attack is to be preceded by a concentrated fire of artillery. Even for defensive purposes, in an open country, he considers that the effect, owing to their shorter range, would be less than that of artillery, but on the other hand, in certain positions where the area of attack is limited to 1,200 yards, and when the enemy is approaching on a narrow front, they might be most usefully employed.

On the German side there is but one solitary instance of the employment of the revolving cannon, a description of mitrailleuse placed under the command of Captain Count Thurheim, and attached to the Bavarian corps of Van der Tann. The mechanism of these guns appear to have been defective, and Count Thurheim, after experience of their power, restricts their employment solely to defensive purposes in entrenched positions.

In giving this summary of the evidence taken by Colonel Wray's Committee, I must guard myself from accusation of endeavouring to force conclusions by quoting only so much as would prove a case for or against the mitrailleuse. I have endeavoured fairly to convey the impression produced by the several witnesses, but I would recommend all who are interested in the subject, carefully to study the evidence for themselves, as it is almost impossible by selecting particular passages, to convey a perfectly correct impression of the whole.

The deductions from its perusal appear to be as follows: 1. That the French Officers and those who have witnessed the campaign from the French side, are generally in favour of the employment of mitrailleurs in the field. 2. That the Prussian Staff disapprove of their introduction into the army, except

for the very limited service of the defence of the ditches of fortresses. 3. That the English Officers, who were present with the German Armies, are with one exception of opinion that for certain purposes they may be useful adjuncts to field artillery. 4. Almost all who advocate their use, consider that they should form part of the artillery of an army, that they should supplement that arm, and that their place lies in defensive rather than in offensive tactics. 5. That their proper employment had not, possibly from want of opportunity, been carefully studied by French Officers previous to the war, and consequently that they were frequently unprofitably used. 6. That although the mitrailleuse or Gatling (for both were employed by the French) of larger calibre was superior in range to the lighter arm, yet that owing to its increased weight, the horses necessary for its transport would nearly equal in number those of a field gun, and consequently that its advantages being more than counterbalanced by this drawback, a field gun would be preferred.

Second Report of Colonel Wray's Committee.

After duly weighing the evidence—of which I have endeavoured to give a summary—Colonel Wray's Committee draw up a second Report, on the 21st November, 1871, in which they laid down distinctly, that the mitrailleurs should be treated purely as defensive weapons, and that they should in general be entrenched and kept, as far as possible, masked from artillery fire. That the so-called small Gatling of 45 calibre, of which the destructive effect against troops in the open at ranges up to 1,400 yards, is estimated as being nearly three times that of the 9 pounder field gun, should be so lightened as to be easily drawn with its carriage and ammunition by two horses, and on emergency, by one. That the field artillery should not be reduced by a single man or horse for the sake of substituting mitrailleurs; but that these latter should be kept with the reserves of an Army in the field for the express purpose of increasing infantry fire at critical moments, in the same way that guns of position are used for strengthening the fire of field artillery. That the mitrailleuse batteries should be provided with Nolan's range-finders.

With reference to the difference in opinion on these subjects between the German and French Officers, the Committee offer the following remarks, which I would recommend for your consideration:—"1. That the Gatling gun was very little used by the French. 2. That the French mitrailleuse was almost as heavy, and required as many men and horses as the field gun. 3. That the French appear, by all accounts, to have used their mitrailleurs with little judgment, firing them into all sorts of cover, at very long ranges, and without any special means of ascertaining the distances. They seem also to have frequently neglected the precaution of covering their mitrailleurs, either naturally or artificially, thus laying them open to destruction by the German artillery. 4. That the Germans had no opportunity of testing the merits of mitrailleurs for defensive purposes, having almost invariably acted on the offensive. 5. (and I would draw especial attention to this remark). That the Germans have no necessity for considering the question of introducing these weapons, being already well provided with a very large number of French mitrailleurs, which, having recently been tried at Berlin in comparison with Montigny and Gatling mitrailleurs, have been unanimously pronounced superior to either." An opinion,

I would observe, in which the Committee did not agree. I would also add, that as during the war the Germans were unprovided with an effective mitrailleuse, and as the destructive effects of the fire on the French weapon had been bruited abroad with the object of elevating the morale of their own troops and depressing that of the enemy, it became almost necessary for the Prussian staff to decry its powers, and disabuse the minds of these soldiers of an exaggerated fear of its effects.

[To be Concluded in our next]

THE CENTRAL ASIA QUESTION.

It would really seem, from the comments which the press has been making on the advance of Russia into Central Asia, as if it took especial delight in keeping us in a perpetual state of hot water. The excitement growing out of wars and the "rumours of wars" may be all very well as tending to keep the public mind at fever heat. It may also be found very efficacious in enabling the publishers of the daily papers to turn the "nimble penny," and fall like mamma upon a very large class of half-pay people who are looking out for something to do. To the trader and the merchant, however, such rumours are by no means acceptable. Not, be it remembered, that they are less patriotic than he whose profession is the sword, or he who lives by the manufacture of those compounds in which "villainous saltpetre" forms a component part, but because they are but rumours and nothing more, and being so interfere unduly with the direct action of trade. Rumours and "false teaching" did more than anything else to strand us in the arbitrations over the Washington Treaty and the San Juan question. Neady politicians and hungry place-hunters are ever ready to precipitate John Bull head foremost into the first quarrel that turns up. If he demurs to this off-hand kind of action he is "spirited" into committing himself irretrievably by the leading rangers of the day affirming that "public opinion" demands that he should be "up and doing." Now, as "opinion" has been largely invoked in regard to "the onward march of Russia in Central Asia," we may easily estimate its magnitude when we remember that not one in a thousand knows anything about the matter. We are not of those who are disposed to attach much credit to the *bona fides* of Russia, but we are of those who believe that too much has been made of this subject, and that a great deal of unnecessary alarm has been created, not only in this country, but on the Continent and in India, in reference to her designs in the East. We believe our Government to be equal to the occasion, and we believe—what we stated in a recent issue—that an interview has taken place between Count Schouvaloff and Earl Granville, and that the former is commissioned to tell his Royal master "that thus far he may go, and no farther"—in a word, that Earl Granville has put his "foot down," and that he means to keep it to the line defined. What need, then, of the constant badgering which characterises the outpourings of the daily and weekly press? The day is very far distant when Russia can undermine our influence in the East. Every day Eastern institutions are becoming more and more assimilated to our own, and we have ample evidence that her people are satisfied with our wise and liberal rule. Indeed, good government is the best possible bulwark we can set up between India and the assumed

subtle encroachments of the Czar. If it be true, as reported, that atrocious cruelties have been practised towards the Russian prisoners in Khiva, then Russia has a right to demand satisfaction of the Khan. Theodore dealt harshly with British subjects, and we went into Abyssinia and set them free. What we did in Abyssinia we have no right—good and sufficient grounds existing—to deny to Russia in Khiva.

A recent number of the *Vossische Zeitung* contains an exhaustive article weighing the relative strength of Russia and England in Central Asia, and points out that, by the recent transformation of the Russian army formerly employed in the Caucasus into an Asiatic army, admirably appointed, armed with breech-loaders and numbering 100 battalions, 36 batteries, and 20 squadron of horse, besides engineers, pioneers, and Cossacks, the Russian force is sufficient to defy all the efforts of Great Britain to protect and uphold the Central Asian States! The same journal considers that Russia only awaits any false steps that may be taken by the English Government, and it asserts that the British military forces are utterly insufficient to stop the advance of Russia. This may be true as to military preparations, but it is simply absurd when referring to "any false steps which may be taken by the English Government," and in speaking of "our forces being utterly insufficient to stop the advance of Russia." Let the reader take the disputed line in his mind's eye, and the line of troops and supplies required to reach it from the Russian side, and then remember that there are sufficient native troops in India in our pay backed by a railway system which would take them to any given point, and he will realize at once that we are not without the means of resisting Russian aggression in Central Asia. Our Indian railway system would enable us to send the troops "fresh and eager for the fray" to the very points assailed, while the Russians would have to march through a country rich in nothing but sand, and the further they marched the thinner would their line become. Under all the circumstances of the case, then there is little fear of the action of Russia in Central Asia weakening our position in the East. As we said before, it may suit politicians and place-hunters to hold contrary views, but manufacturers, and the Cottonocracy generally, know that they are only talking bunkum.

Our correspondence between our Government and Russia respecting Central Asia has since been published, and fully bears out what we have here stated. The aim of both governments is professedly to put an end to the internecine strife between Afghanistan and the neighbouring Khanates. With this object Afghanistan is to be the neutral line. At the outset of the negotiations Russia was indisposed, though she did not absolutely insist upon the suggestion, to recognize the rights claimed by the Ameer of Cabul over Badakshan and Wakhan to include those two countries within the limits of Afghanistan. Lord Granville pointed out that if Badakshan and Wakhan—justly deemed to be part of the Ameer's territories—were constituted into an independent state, the Ameer might be tempted to assert his claim by arms; that perhaps in that case Bokhara might seek an opportunity of acquiring districts too weak of themselves to resist the Afghan state, and that thus the peace of Central Asia would be disturbed, and occasion given for questions between Great Britain and Russia which it is on every account so desirable to

avoid." To this Russia replied: "The divergence which existed in our views was with regard to the frontier assigned to the dominions of Shere Ali. The English Cabinet includes within them Badakshan and Wakhan, which, according to our views enjoyed a certain independence considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts, considering the greater facilities which the British Government possesses for collecting precise data, and above all, considering our wish to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England."

However much we may be amused by the dexterity of the Muscovite jugglers, remarks the *London Post*, it is well to let them know that we are not duped by it. Count Schouvaloff's triumphant return from an apparently fruitless mission is a testimony against us easy to be deciphered by those who have eyes to see. There is no time for halting between two opinions. Our present policy lies in four words—"No agreement with Russia." While the sovereign of Kashara and Bokhara are signing treaties with the Czar in the belief that he is our ally—while millions of our Indian subjects are looking up to Russia as the greatest power on earth, and explaining the firing at a Delhi review as "a battle between the English and the Russians"—is it a time to stake our national honor and the safety of our Eastern Empire upon the moderation of the Government that invaded Wallachi in 1853, and the honesty of the Cabinet which tore the treaty of Paris in 1870? One more chance is now offered to us—a chance which may never occur again. Now, or never, is the time to re-establish our prestige in the eyes of Europe, to efface the stigma of Geneva and Berlin, to settle the question of Central Asia, once and forever, in the only way possible to Englishmen, according to the dictates, not of red tape and official sealingwax, but of courage, common sense, and the honor of the British nation.

In an exhaustive article in an influential Berlin paper of February 2, weighing the relative strength of Russia and England in Central Asia, it is said that by the recent transformation of the Russian army formerly employed in the Caucasus into an Asiatic army, admirably appointed, armed with breech-loaders, and numbering one hundred battalions, 36 batteries, and twenty squadron of horse, besides engineers, pioneers, and Cossacks, the Russian force is sufficient to defy all the efforts of great Britain to protect and uphold the Central Asian States. The same journal considers that Russia only awaits any false step that may be taken by the English Government and it asserts that the British military forces are utterly insufficient to stop the advance of Russia. The *Post of Berlin*, in its issue of February 3, says that in well-informed circles at St. Petersburg the assurances given by Count Schouvaloff in London are not fully endorsed. The eventual conditions to be imposed on Khiva are dependent upon the amount of resistance that may be encountered, and the sacrifices it may entail upon Russia. A permanent occupation of the country is certainly not contemplated, but probably a military cordon would be established unless the Russian Government should be provoked into the adoption of more decided measures. The *Peter-Loyd* is astonished that England should awaken to anxiety on such a stale question as that of Khiva. So long ago as 1557, it informs us,

Ivan the Terrible tried, and tried in vain, to establish commercial relations with the territory. Peter the Great made a similar attempt in 1702, and succeeded. In 1842 the Czar Nicholas made a treaty with the Khivans, which they learned to condemn before 1860, and hence Russia is justified in bringing them to order. Her only object is to unfurl the flag of civilisation in Central Asia; she has no afterthoughts. Russia never has. Later information is to the effect that the Russian force which is to be sent to Khiva consists of only 7,000 men, and that they will be mostly taken from the troops stationed in Turkestan and Orenburg. Regarding the geography of Central Asia, the Berlin correspondent of the *Times* writes under date February 19:—"The geographical information about the course of the Amou, supplied by the Duke of Argyll in a recent sitting of the Lords, is at variance with the Russian maps. According to these, only the southern headwater is called Amou, the northern branch going under the name of Sarchab, Sarab, or Birtagul. Now, as it is the northern branch which flows by Vakhán, and which is to be understood as forming the north-eastern boundary of the intermediary zone, it may be as well to call attention to the different name given it by the other contracting party. This is perhaps rendered all the more advisable from another circumstance. In its lower course the northern branch traverses a territory, which, though it does not belong to Badakshan nor to any other of the States mentioned in Lord Granville's note, yet, as it lies on the eastern bank of the boundary river, is to be regarded as neutralised. This territory forms part of Khuttelan, a region consisting of a number of diminutive Khanates, bounded by Hissar on the west and the Bolor Dagh on the east. As appears from this, Khuttelan, according to the Russians, includes Badakshan itself."

A portion of the English press takes a view of the Central Asian Question which is not particularly reassuring. They consider that trouble is not ended, but only postponed, further, the difficulty of guarding the neutral zone agreed upon is very great, and the duty is fraught with serious future complications. The Paris *Debats* refers to the subject also. "We are bound to consider," the writer says, "what will be the practical consequences of setting up this neutral territory, occupied as it will be by semi-barbarous tribes, between the possessions of the two Empires. Russia undertakes not to outstep the boundary assigned by her. Good! But if she is attacked by Khiva, Bokhara, Badakshan, or Wakhan, in the persons of her commercial representatives—and these tribes will be more than overtempted to do so because they will feel assured of impunity—what must infallibly take place? Russia will not put up with such aggressions, and if she is forbidden to repress them herself she will assuredly make England responsible for the damage done. England, in fact, will have to maintain order in the intermediate zone, from which she has insisted upon excluding the northern Power. This will be a task by no means easy of accomplishment, and one cannot help feeling that she has assumed a very heavy responsibility and a very onerous duty. It is very possible that, instead of having simplified the nature of the relations between England and Russia, Lord Granville has rendered them much more complicated, and increased those very occasions of conflict between the two Empires which recent negotiations professed to provide against. In any event the Central Asia question is

not terminated, as the English newspapers themselves are obliged to admit; it has merely entered upon a new phase, which, there is every reason to fear, may prove as critical as the previous one." All of which may be true enough, but surely the present settlement is a definite gain for the present. What if Lord Granville had not acted as he did? There must still have been complications, and worse than those the *Debats* suggests. And if no other advantage had been gained by the negotiations than placing Great Britain in its proper light before the military authorities, and showing that the nation has lost none of its courage or self-respect, that alone would be something.

Judgment has been rendered in the Memphis El Paso Railroad Company. The defendants are pronounced guilty of swindling and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Gen. Fremont is condemned to five years' imprisonment. The other defendants who were present were arrested to day as they were leaving the court.

A Chinaman was summoned as a witness in New York the other day, and to ascertain his views on the nature of an oath, the judge asked him what would be his punishment if he should swear to lies. "I shall never return to China, but always remain in New York," was the reply, and he was at once sworn.

In the year 1752 people went to bed, as usual, on the 2nd of September, but they did not get out of it till the 14th of the same month. How was that? This statement is often given out to young folks as a puzzle. The answer is that at that time an Act of Parliament was passed, to correct the calendar, which was then known to be eleven days wrong. A sheet almanac, now preserved in the Winchester Museum, records those eleven days by their absence from its list.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CHARACTER.—The power of positive ideas, and the power of positive affirmation and promulgation of them move the world. Breath is wasted in nothing more lavishly than in negations and denials. It is not necessary for truth to worry itself, even if a lie can run a league while it is putting on its boots. Let it run and get out of breath, and get out of the way. A man who spends his days in arresting and knocking down lies and liars, will have no time left for speaking the truth. There is nothing more damaging to man's reputation than his admission that it needs defending when attacked. Great sensitiveness to an assault, on the part of any cause, is an unmistakable sign of weakness. A strong man at a strong cause need only to live an affirmative life, devoting no attention whatever to enemies, to win their way, and to trample beneath their feet all the obstacles that malice, or jealousy or selfishness throws before them. The man who can say strongly and earnestly, "I believe," has not only a vital and valuable possession, but he has a permanent source of inspiration within himself, and a permanent influence over others.

REMITTANCES Received on Subscription to THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW up to Saturday, the 23rd Inst.—

ALMONTE, Ont.—Major James D. Gemmill	\$1.00
Capt. McDougall	1.00
RICHMOND, Ont.—Capt. Thos. Good, Jr.	1.00
NORTH BAY, Ont.—F. Macnaghten	2.00
STRATFORD, Ont.—Lieut. James Robb	2.00
Capt. Jas. C. McPherson	2.00
QUEBEC.—Major J. F. Turnbull	6.00
WATERLOO, Que.—Capt. Geo. S. Cold	2.00

DOMINION OF CANADA.



MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS,

Ottawa, 28th March, 1873.

GENERAL ORDERS (6).

MILITIA STAFF.

To be Deputy Adjutant General for Military District No. 11, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Militia from 21st March, 1873.

George Frederick Houghton, Esquire, formerly of Her Majesty's Regular Army.

Memo.—The Head Quarters of this officer will be at Victoria, B.C.

ACTIVE MILITIA.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

CONFIRMATION OF RANK.

Ensign Joseph Healey, M.S., No. 3 Company, 47th Battalion, from 21st February, 1873.

Ensign Edward G. Green, M.S., 10th Battalion, from 28th February 1873.

PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA.

63rd "Halifax" Battalion of Rifles

Captain and Brevet Major William Baron Q. F. O., is hereby permitted to retire retaining the rank of major.

CONFIRMATION OF RANK.

Lieutenant George Angus Ross, M.S., No. 4 Company, 75th Battalion, from 21st Feb. 1873.

2nd Lieutenant Donald Robb, M.S. 1st "Halifax," Brigade G. A., from 21st Feb. 1873.

By Command of His Excellency the Governor General,

P. ROBERTSON-ROSS, Colonel,

Commanding the Militia of the Dominion
and Adjutant-General.