

Statement

Secretary of
State for
External Affairs



Déclaration

Secrétaire d'État
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AS DELIVERED

AN ADDRESS BY
THE HONOURABLE BARBARA McDOUGALL,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
TO
THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

"PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING"

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Affaires extérieures et
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External Affairs and
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Canada

Canadians are the most experienced peacekeepers in the world. Since the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces were sent out 45 years ago, our forces have always been in demand. Ten per cent of all peacekeepers now on duty in the world are Canadian. We in Canada have always seen peacekeeping as a reflection of Canadian values, as a way of promoting our international objectives -- peace and security, respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, and a say in the decisions that shape the world.

The specific challenges that face us, however, have changed dramatically in the last five years. The end of the global Cold War has been followed by outbreaks of conflicts in many parts of the world. These conflicts are very different, one from the other -- just compare the situations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, for example -- and the range of diplomatic and military tools needed to deal with them has correspondingly expanded.

At the same time, the sheer volume of demand for international crisis management is now overwhelming. More such UN operations have been authorized in the last five years than in the previous forty. Partially as a way of sharing the burden, more and more regional organizations have also become involved -- the Organization of American States in Haiti, the Commonwealth in South Africa, or the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in former Yugoslavia. There are many situations where traditional peacekeeping, based on the consent of all parties, will not lead to a resolution of the conflict. We are faced with situations where the consent of all parties cannot be obtained, or where consent is inconsistent, or where effective authority does not in fact exist. The use of deliberate force has had to be considered more often, as other measures have failed.

If you work closely with the UN as I do, you can't fail to observe that now there is extreme pressure on the crisis management system, which has built up since its creation.

This system threatens to become seriously overloaded, not just in terms of the management of all these crises, but also in terms of the personnel and financial resources needed to deal with them on the ground. The UN budget for peacekeeping operations jumped from \$700 million in 1991 to \$2.8 billion in 1992. Associated financial and personnel costs have begun to stretch the resources even of major powers.

Canada has an established policy framework for contributing to the resolution of global conflict. Within this framework, however, new ideas are needed from all of us who are concerned with peace and security in the world.

This new thinking must extend beyond the halls of government and international institutions like the UN. Canada's commitment to peacekeeping has always been based on the support of the Canadian people. This support remains strong, as recent polls make clear. As we work our way through this period of crisis and change, the Government will want to ensure that this public consensus is maintained, to be responsive to the views of concerned Canadians and to discuss what our policies mean in terms of resource commitment.

It is against this background that I was pleased to chair a wide-ranging and stimulating discussion among experts last week at a seminar on "Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security." What was notable about that seminar was that its participants included not just military specialists but also representatives of the non-military side of peacekeeping -- election observers, humanitarian assistance workers and police, for example. I see it as contributing to a national discussion on this subject, and that is why I am especially glad to be able to meet today with the Committee.

In these opening remarks, I would like to focus on six instruments for crisis management. These derive from the "Agenda for Peace" issued last summer by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Taken together, they reflect a spectrum of ways to handle potential or actual conflict situations.

At one end of the spectrum, we find *preventive diplomacy*: the attempt to head off the outbreak of hostilities by dealing with underlying problems and root causes. It includes such measures as early-warning mechanisms to ensure that potential conflicts can be anticipated, perhaps in time to head them off; fact-finding missions and monitoring; confidence-building measures, such as mutual military inspections; warnings to potential combatants; sponsorship of consultations; and, offers to mediate.

Canada is already active in this area. In the former Yugoslavia, Canadians have taken part in a wide range of initiatives, including the EC-led CSCE monitoring mission, the Canadian-led CSCE fact-finding mission last June on the military situation in Kosovo and subsequent CSCE conflict prevention missions in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Canada also provided logistical and expert support to the fact-finding mission of the CSCE chairman-in-office to Nagorno-Karabakh, and will shortly be participating in a CSCE mission to Estonia. This is intended to stabilize relations between the Estonian majority and the large Russian minority.

A related option in the crisis management spectrum is *preventive deployment or preventive peacekeeping*. This involves the deployment of peacekeeping forces, before hostilities break out,

for purposes such as -- separation of forces, observation of frontiers and creation of demilitarized zones.

A recent example is the UN decision to send such a force to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Canadians from the UN Protection Force 11 (UNPROFOR), as you know, were asked to establish this operation pending arrival of a Scandinavian force this month.

Next, is *peacemaking* following the outbreak of conflict. This can include, for example, large-scale international peace negotiations like the ones begun on Cambodia in 1989, which resulted in the Paris accords of 1991. In this process, Canada chaired the key First Committee on Peacekeeping. Another example would be the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by the UN and the EC, in which I myself participated. This process, now with active United States support, remains the best hope for settlement of the dispute in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Also included under *peacemaking* are indirect means of exerting pressure on recalcitrant parties, without actually engaging in military action. One well-known method is, of course, sanctions and embargoes, as used against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. Canada participated in the naval embargo of Iraq and supplied a ship last year to the Adriatic sanctions monitoring fleet organized by NATO. A Revenue Canada customs officer leads the mission in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, which is helping to implement sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro.

Let me draw your attention to another such form of pressure: the establishment of an international court or tribunal for the consideration of criminal charges under international humanitarian law. I have urged that this be set up to hear charges arising out of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. A team of war crimes investigators and a leading legal expert have also been provided to the UN Commission of Experts that is compiling and analysing the evidence of atrocities.

Peacekeeping, as we have come to understand it, occurs in an environment where the parties to a dispute agree to a cessation of hostilities. This has been the case in Cyprus, the Golan Heights and the first UNPROFOR operation in Croatia. As I mentioned earlier, however, *peacekeeping* has evolved to incorporate objectives over and above supervising a cease-fire. In the case of both Somalia (as originally addressed by the Security Council) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR II), the initial goal of *peacekeeping* was the protection of humanitarian assistance under conditions of ongoing conflict. In El Salvador, the *peacekeeping* mission was essentially political and human rights-related; there were, at times, more civilians and police officers in place than military. In Namibia from 1989 to 1990, operations involved overseeing the creation of a new state and,

in Cambodia, essentially managing the country while competing factions shift from military to political competition.

We currently have 4 700 men and women with UN operations, plus Royal Canadian Mounted Police and civilian personnel. Our largest contingents are now with the two UNPROFOR missions in the former Yugoslavia (2 400 military and civilian personnel) and with operations in Cambodia, Cyprus and the Golan Heights. Our assessed contribution to UN peacekeeping in 1992-93 will come to about \$100 million, not including the value of our troop contribution in terms of incremental costs and other direct expenses.

Should peacemaking or peacekeeping fail, the fifth option is *peace enforcement*. Enforcement has been sanctioned by the UN under Chapter VII of the Charter only as a last resort -- Korea, the Congo, the Gulf War and Somalia being the main examples so far. Canada has taken part in UN enforcement actions; our largest current contingent is in Somalia, where we have 1 300 military personnel, including an infantry battalion and a Canadian navy vessel. The main emphasis in Somalia, as in many enforcement actions, has been to establish a secure environment in which civil peace can be restored and humanitarian relief operations carried out. Enforcement has also been discussed in the case of the former Yugoslavia. The situation is radically different there than in Somalia, however, and it is widely recognized (most recently by the new United States Administration) that imposing a political settlement by military force is unlikely to achieve a viable long-term solution.

Finally, the UN "Agenda for Peace" raises the concept of *peacebuilding*. It is not always enough simply to end a conflict, whether by peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The society in question must often be assisted to heal itself and rebuild, whether in political, social or economic terms. Some aspects are military in nature, such as helping the local armed forces reshape for democratic conditions, or clearing mines, which Canada is doing in both Cambodia and the Iraq-Kuwait border region.

More dramatic examples of peacebuilding involve long-term nationbuilding as envisaged by the UN in Namibia or Cambodia, or in its original plan for Somalia. I am speaking here of measures that run the gamut from refugee relief to resettlement operations, from emergency aid to economic reconstruction and from free elections to restoration of civil administration. As one of the participants in last week's seminar stated, peace does not automatically continue once the troops leave, but it can be maintained if there is an opportunity for a better life. The idea that international security has roots in development and democracy has, of course, long been part of Canadian policy.

Each of these options involves a different basic approach, different strengths and constraints, and different types and levels of resource commitment. Clarity of objective is fundamental. When we are contemplating action to handle a current or potential conflict, it is important to know whether we are sending our troops for preventive deployment, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Each involves different risks and costs, training, equipment and rules of engagement.

This being said, real life is not political science. Realities on the ground rarely lend themselves to definitions as clear as I have described. Conditions in Bosnia have never been those that would allow a classic peacekeeping operation -- and yet we are participating because the reality of human suffering is so compelling. If the Security Council decides to enforce the no-fly zone, this will mean an overlapping of preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions within the states of the former Yugoslavia. As well, situations evolve: Somalia (like the Congo) began as a peacekeeping operation and moved to enforcement when that was judged necessary by the Security Council to fulfil the humanitarian and other goals that it had set.

Experience has made it clear that one kind of action used in isolation may well lead to partial, short-term or ineffective conclusions. We have been peacekeeping in Cyprus for almost thirty years, without a political solution coming noticeably closer: peacekeeping has become a permanent fixture rather than the means to an end. This is one reason for Canada's announcement that it would no longer contribute forces to this operation. Peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but part of a larger process: when that process breaks down or is never engaged, peacekeeping is ineffective -- or even part of the problem.

The international community is seeking new approaches to crisis management. We have at our disposal a full range of potential actions, but we need to apply them more coherently. Better early-warning mechanisms, triggering earlier international responses, should be a priority. Human nature, ethnic rivalries, internal power struggles, border disputes, aggression in the name of religion, are as ancient as recorded time. We are unlikely to change them. What we can do is attempt to order our affairs in such a way as to minimize human suffering in areas of conflict and work toward the universal acceptance of peaceful settlement of disputes. This can be discouraging, indeed, because Canadian policy on global crisis management is conducted in an increasingly menacing environment. In this context, we are

addressing how Canada can best support and contribute to international efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts. For example:

- Are there ways in which we can help the international community improve its early-warning capabilities?
- What are the most effective Canadian contributions? Should we be concentrating, for example, on military tasks or on civilian activities?
- Can we better assist the United Nations in efforts to strengthen its own crisis management capabilities?

These are not theoretical questions. Our answers will affect the futures of men, women and children around the world. We must ensure that our limited resources -- political, diplomatic, civilian and military -- are used in the most effective way possible.

I would welcome your ideas.