




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

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THE
COLONIAL QUESTION :

A Brief Consideration of Colonial
Emancipation, Imperial Federalism
-AND-
Colonial Conservatism,

By W. H. FULLER, M. A.

KINGSTON :

PRINTED AT THE "BRITISH WHIG" BOOK AND JOB OFFICE.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

The following tract was written in April, '73. as a Thesis for the Degree of Master of Arts.

It is now printed at the request of several friends who perused it in MS, and who have desired its publication as giving in a brief, compendious form many of the arguments bearing on the different phases of the Colonial Question, collated from many sources.

Increasing attention is being attracted to the reciprocal relations and duties of Great Britain and her Colonies owing to the recent utterances on the subject of Mr. Blake and other public men of prominence, and this little pamphlet is issued as a modest contribution to the literature of the Question.

In some of its references the essay is out of date, but as the general line of argument has not been thereby interfered with, it was thought better to print the whole as it was written.

W. H. F.

THE COLLECTION

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INTRODUCTION.

Though the colonies of Ancient Greece had their origin in causes widely different from those which led to the establishment of the outlying dependencies of Great Britain, yet the political constitutions now possessed by the more highly advanced of the latter, resemble in many important particulars the mode of Government which obtained among the former. The first English Colonies were founded by exiles, who sought in the wilds of America the freedom denied them in their native land. Notwithstanding the inauspicious causes which planted the English flag on American soil, and tho' it might not unnaturally have been anticipated that the religious outcasts from home would cherish bitter feelings against the land on which they had been conscience-forced to turn their backs, the colonists of America were long devotedly loyal to the Crown, while they voluntarily assumed such burdens as to relieve their loyalty of unworthy suspicion. The recollections of the wrongs they had suffered and the privations they had endured did not sour into feelings of estrangement, being buried in the present enjoyment of prosperity and freedom, and in that personal allegiance which they bore their sovereign, the passion of loyalty then being difficult to uproot, and exerting a strong and living force, whatever may be its influence in these latter days when more store is set by the utilities than by traditional symbols of power and dignity. But the statesmanship which raised Plymouth Rock a monument of its illiberality was not less shortsighted than the fatuous blundering which lost England a great portion of her Western Empire—the glories of which, present and prospective, Burke eloquently dwelt upon in his appeal for conciliation—and converted what might have been the noblest appanage of the British Crown into an alien Power, in the breasts of whose people, after the lapse of a hundred years, still rankle the memories of

the Tea Tax. Rejected love curdled into enmity, and England was left of nearly all her colonial possessions. The loss was repaired to some extent, by conquests during the French Revolutionary War and by subsequent acquisitions from time to time, until to-day, notwithstanding the blunder of 1776, Great Britain holds sovereignty over the most extensive and prosperous colonial empire of which History makes mention.

These last named colonies, as said, were either wrested from hostile nations by the force of arms, obtained by treaty or cession, or established in obedience to that aggressive and adventurous colonizing spirit so marked a feature of the Anglo-Saxon character. In no case was a colony founded by England for the reasons which dictated its establishment by Greece. The latter erected colonies, in order there to transplant the surplus populations of the parent State, necessary to be weeded out that those who remained behind might have adequate room for freedom of action. The constitutions of these colonies reflected in an eminent degree the national characteristics of the Greeks, the first lessons taught them being independence and self reliance. "The mother country, tho' she considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to great favour and assistance and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet considered it, as an emancipated child, over whom she pretended to claim no direct authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of Government, enacted its own Laws, elected its own Magistrates, as an independent State which had no occasion to wait for the approbation or consent of the mother city." From this it will be seen, with the important exception that English colonies do not make peace or declare war, the colonies of Greece largely resemble the free colonies of Great Britain, to-day, in their mode of Government. At the present time the superintendency exercised by the Imperial Government over colonial affairs is of the most nominal character, the prerogative of the Crown to revise the legislation of the colonies being rarely asserted. This condition of independency is of late development, tho' but the revival of the policy first adopted towards the colonies by the Governments of Great Britain. That policy and the succeeding ones, Sir Charles Adderley,† a one-time Colonial Minister, divides into three chronological classes. During the period embraced within the first, the colonies were

*Smith's Wealth of Nations, p 228. †Review of "The Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell's Administration," by Earl Grey, 1853; and of subsequent Colonial History: By the Rt. Hon. Sir C. B. Adderley, etc. London: 1863; p. 3.

left to govern themselves, and throve abundantly, as the statistics collected by Burke (Speech on Conciliation with America) amply attest, tho' handicapped by false notions as to the advantages arising from monopolies of colonial trade. This policy, wholesome in many respects, was succeeded by the attempt, which proved fatal, at tampering with colonial self-government, and which lost the American provinces to England. Frightened by the successful rebellion of those Plantations, English statesmen sought to prevent the recurrence of a similar calamity by tightening the relaxed reins of power, governing the colonies from Downing Street, and asking no suit or service from them, while paying many of their expenses out of the Imperial Treasury. This, in turn, was abandoned, being as inexpedient in practice as it was false in principle. The right of self-government has, of late, been again conceded, in return for which the burden of their expenses as portions of the British Empire is being gradually transferred to colonial shoulders. Such is the colonial policy now put in force, and its wisdom cannot justly be quarrelled with, it being very evident that the colonies have arrived at such a stage of social and political development that they will not brook outside interference with their local affairs; nor are they, on the other hand, disposed to deny the justice of the proposition enunciated by the English Government, that the assumption of the *liabilities* of citizenship of the British Empire is the natural corollary of the concession of its *rights*. On the whole, the treatment received by the colonies, since 1776, has been generous, if not always wise; and the time has perhaps come or is rapidly approaching when the burden of expense should be more equitably distributed. Unlike other colonizers, Englishmen have not sought to make their colonies share the general expenses of the Empire, or to impoverish them in order to aggrandize the Mother Country. Spain ruthlessly drained her colonial possessions, but this policy defeated itself, and eventuated in killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. The history of the colonial enterprises of other modern nations is largely the same. On the contrary, says Adam Smith, "Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which, as it has extended its Empire has only increased its expenses, without once augmenting its resources. Other States have generally disburdened themselves upon their subject and subordinate provinces of the most considerable part of the expenses of defending the Empire."* To this

*Wealth of Nations, p. 256.

THE EMANCIPATION POLICY CONSIDERED.

"To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, and leave them to select their own magistrates, to enact their own laws, and to make peace or war, as they might think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be, adopted by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expenses which it occasioned. Such sacrifices though they might be agreeable to the interest are always mortifying to the pride of every nation . . . The most visionary enthusiast would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure, with any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted."* Time, the great excavator of buried reputations, has amply verified many of Adam Smith's economic theories, but the words above quoted show him, in this particular at least, to have been a false prophet. Such disruptive theories (not to speak of the delegation of the rights of self-government,) are promulgated at the present day, not alone by "visionary enthusiasts," but by men of considerable rank as political thinkers, and who command a respectable following in Great Britain. Even the Government of the present day† were recently infected by emancipationist principles, and were suspected of a desire to give them effect, until checked by the warning voice of adverse Public Opinion. But a very few years since, a Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, in a speech delivered at Halifax, doubtless under inspiration from the Colonial Office, threw out a hint that Canadian Independence would not be opposed by the Home authorities, who regarded Confederation as a preparative to the severance of the colonial tie. These tentative suggestions were alike coldly received in Canada and by the bulk of the British public, and in the short interval which has elapsed since their utterance a still healthier Public Opinion on the Colonial Question has grown up in the Mother Country, although there yet lurks a suspicion that the loyalty of the present Imperial Administration‡ is not active and real, but a deferential leaning toward the will of the

*Wealth of Nations, p. 254. †This was written in April, 1873, when the Gladstone Administration were in office. ‡The Gladstone Ministry.

majority. It is but just to observe, however, that as far as that suspicion arises from the carrying out of that feature of recent colonial policy which looks to the education of the colonies in the duty of self-reliance, it is unwarranted, as it must be generally admitted that most of the colonial obligations hitherto assumed by the Imperial Treasury should in the future be borne by the colonies themselves, which should share the expenses as well the benefits incident to the colonial connection.

To the adoption of the principles of Free Trade, and to the promulgation of the doctrines of that school of politicians to which the national recognition of those principles gave birth, are due, perhaps, more than to any other cause, the origin and development of what is currently known as the Emancipationist Policy, and which has been so ably championed by Mr. Goldwin Smith. The pith of the arguments advanced by the advocates of this policy is that it does not "pay" the Mother Country in pounds, shillings and pence to retain the colonies. "While," argues Mr. Smith, "we monopolized their trade in a general age of monopoly they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all."* The profit, it is urged, is all on one side, with no countervailing advantages on the other. This view of so imperial a question may be denounced as narrow-minded and mercenary, but so averse to sentimentality are those who press it that an answer must be found to the objection widely different from that which would have satisfied Englishmen when they boasted of being first in war as well as in commerce. It will not do to attempt to upset their matter-of-fact-theories with Carlyle's impetuous words:—

"Colonies are not to be picked off the street every day; not a Colony of them but has been bought dear, well purchased by the toil and blood of those we have the honor to be sons of; we cannot just afford to cut them away because McCroudy finds the present management of them cost money. The present management will indeed require to be cut away;—but as for the Colonies, we propose through Heaven's blessing to retain them a while yet! Shame on us for unworthy sons of brave fathers if we do not. Brave fathers, by valiant blood and sweat, purchased for us, from the bounty of Heaven, rich possessions in all zones; and we, wretched imbeciles, cannot do the functions of administering them! And because the accounts do not stand well in the ledger, our remedy is, not to take shame to ourselves, and repent in sackcloth and ashes, and amend our beggarly imbecilities and insincerities in that as in other departments of our business,—but to fling the business overboard, and to declare the business itself to be bad! We are a hopeful set of heirs to a big fortune!" †

*The Empire, p. 93. † Latter-day Pamphlets, p. 127-8.

Such outbursts as these would produce little effect upon the "dull cold ear" of the average politician bred in the Manchester school. To him, national honor and imperial *prestige* are but empty-sounding profitless words. In his matter-of-fact way he contends that, since the abolition of differential duties, England has derived no benefits from her colonial trade which she would not have reaped had they been independent States, and cites in proof of the assertion statistics of recent commercial transactions which, if admitted to be correct, would show that colonies are not more valuable customers of Great Britain than foreign nations. The statistics marshalled by Mr. Smith, who may be taken as the chief exponent of the emancipationist theory, in support of his separatist doctrines are not to be relied on, being erroneous in point of fact, while the deductions drawn from them are equally incorrect. Not only does Mr. Smith estimate the amount of the English colonial trade too low, but he jumps to the unwarranted conclusion that, inasmuch as it is much less than the foreign trade in amount, it is much less valuable, leaving out of sight the important factor of the problem—the difference in population of the countries he compares. It is hardly to be expected that colonists would buy as largely as foreigners, when the latter outnumber them thirty fold, excluding uncivilized countries from the computation. Mr. Jehu Mathews, in his ably written book on the Colonial Question,* demonstrates the fallacy of Mr. Smith's reasoning, and produces satisfactory proof that colonists consume 2000 per cent., more of British goods, per head, than is consumed by each foreigner generally, 1200 per cent., more than is consumed by each inhabitant of civilized Europe, and 550 per cent., more than is consumed by each American, the calculations being based on the Trade Returns of 1861, those of 1870 showing a slight difference in favour of the Americans.

This broken, Mr. Smith has another string to his bow. He

*A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION.—By Jehu Mathews, of Toronto, London, 1872. Mr. Mathews's book contains the ablest treatment of the subject which we have met. Though dissenting from the wisdom of the conclusions he reaches, we readily admit the argumentative skill with which he fortifies the positions that he assumes and the very extensive acquaintance with the subject which his manner of treatment betrays. His book is in striking contrast with many of the dissertations on the same subject, in which imperfect notions are frequently veiled in vague generalizations and frothy declamation. We are frequently indebted to Mr. Mathews for facts and figures, and desire here in a general acknowledgement to repair to some extent any omission to credit a specific obligation.

† The Empire, p. 25.

justly observes that "arguments drawn from the amount of the colonial trade prove nothing unless it can be shown that the prosperity of the trade in some way depends on the continuance of the political connection. The immense increase of our trade with the United States since the severance of their political severance with the Mother Country, proves that the reverse is the truth."* Mr. Smith here repeats the error which destroys his argument as to the value of the colonial trade, by omitting to state the facts that the Americans now number nigh forty millions, while at the time when they were colonists, they numbered but three and a half millions. It was strange indeed, taking these facts into consideration, if the Americans of the present day, even in the face of high tariffs, did not purchase more largely than they did a century since when British manufactures were comparatively in their infancy, and the consumption correspondingly limited. But there lurks still another error in Mr. Smith's argument. He also omits mention of the fact that the American consumption, per head, of British goods is less to-day than it was in the colonial times. Then the Americans bought English goods at the rate of £1 per head; in 1861 the rate had fallen to 11s. 4d., though at the present time, it is considerably above these last figures, and is likely to rise still higher. So that, from whatever cause arising, the American imports from Great Britain have suffered a large decline since the severance of the colonial tie. To the argument advanced by Mr. Mathews that a similiar decline would be felt by the colonial trade of England were the colonies to be cut adrift, though by no means a weak one, we cannot yield an unreserved assent, as it is more than doubtful that, in such an event, prohibitive tariffs would be adopted by the latter. Australia has already a tariff somewhat protective, and Canada a fifteen per cent. one.† Both these tariffs are revenue tariffs, and it is improbable that, in case of separation, they would be so raised as to exclude British manufactures, for the reason that, to make them prohibitive would be to destroy the customs' revenue, inasmuch as there would then be not sufficient imports, from the duties on which a revenue, adequate for the demands upon it, could be raised. A combination of revenue and prohibitive tariffs might be adopted, but that would not materially affect the amount of imports from Great Britain. The case of the United States does not weaken the effect of this argu-

†The date of the writing is 1873.

*The Empire, p 41.

ment, unless we look to the future, when the colonial population shall be as large as that of the Republic within the last decade. The large population of the latter has enabled its Government to levy highly protective duties, the wants of its people being so vast and so various that the imports were still sufficient to yield an ample revenue.

This phase, then, of the argument that the dismemberment of the Empire would entail a loss upon British Trade does not seem conclusive. It is showy and plausible, but inferential at best. We may, it is true, hoist the Emancipationists with their own petard, by pointing to the United States, and urging that similar results would follow in the case of the colonies, if separated, but the English-American trade is steadily increasing, and it is by no means improbable that, under a lowering scale of duties, within a few years the United States imports of British goods will be larger than the old colonial rate. Deductions drawn from the American case are dangerous to both parties to the argument to make. Colonists will continue to buy English goods so long as Great Britain maintains her trade supremacy, for the double reason that they are the cheapest in the world, and their consumption enables colonial governments to raise the customs' revenues. "Common institutions," says Sir Charles Dilke, "common freedom and common tongue have evidently more to do with trade than union has."³

But, the admission of the probability that Emancipation would not be followed by a decrease of the British colonial trade is subject to a very important qualification. The statesmen deserving of the name, cannot afford to overlook the possibility of England becoming involved in war, notwithstanding the growth of peace-at-any-price doctrines among a considerable portion of her people. In order that, in such a contingency, she may preserve her trade supremacy, "it is necessary to maintain a first-class rank if only to keep foreign markets open."⁴ But, this would appear impossible, if she denude herself of her colonial possessions. In time of war, if her merchant seamen are to penetrate to all quarters of the globe, as they now do, they must have adequate protection from English guns. But British cruisers cannot operate successfully in distant waters unless England retains the coaling stations which the Emancipationists counsel her to abandon; and this is all the more important, since the rule adopted by the Geneva Arbitrators declare coal contraband of war.

³Greater Britain, p. 307. ⁴British Quarterly Review, April, 1871.

The lack of such bases of supplies would paralyze the maritime arm of England. The uninterrupted flow of her trade is of vital consequence to Great Britain, of all nations, as nearly one half of the breadstuffs consumed by her people is imported, and if the importation were stopped, they would be brought face to face with starvation. This consideration will show that the colonies are not the sources of weakness which the separatists would have us to believe, nor yet so commercially profitless. Nor should the contingency that England may one day cease to be able to undersell foreigners in the markets of the world be kept out of sight, as no conclusive reason can be assigned why other nations should not go on imitating, until at last they excel their exemplar. Labour disturbances, which now take the shape of strikes, may assume wider and more alarming proportions, and precipitate England's commercial decline. Should such a contingency happen, England would be forced to abandon her extreme Free-Trade doctrines, which she put in practice when her manufactures were so firmly established that foreign competition was no longer to be feared, and return to a protective tariff. Thus, she would be prevented, as at present, exchanging her manufactured goods for raw materials and breadstuffs, and, consequently, she would be unable to pay for the latter with the former, unless she entered into treaties with other nations, guaranteeing them reciprocal advantages. Such treaties could not be profitably entered into by young countries, like the colonies, which can alone afford to import manufactures largely, and yet find employment for their people; and because the diversities of their produce could alone supply the wants of the Home market.*

Repudiating the plausible theory that trade follows the flag, and ignoring the commercial benefits which would accrue to England in case of war from their retention, the separatists contend that the colonies are from military and naval points of view, sources of unmixed weakness. Canada is especially pointed at in proof of this theory, it being the most vulnerable of the great colonies. But, even in the case of the Dominion, the arguments of the Emancipationists are not so strong as might be thought at first blush. Mr. Smith contends that by reason of the retention of Canada, England "stands always on the brink of a war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic.†" The worst method of averting a war is running away from it, and none the less is this true in the case of England, Canada

*A Colonist on the Colonial Question, p. 52. †The Empire, p. 131.

and the United States. Canada is unlikely to embroil the two States in war, but, should war arise between them, it is more than doubtful that England would be weaker, instead of stronger, from the loss of Canada. An Anglo-American war would, in case of Canada's separation, be a strictly naval one, carried on near the shores of England or the United States. It is eminently desirable for England that the battle should be fought in American waters, but how would that be possible, under the now recognized conditions of marine warfare, if the naval stations now held by England in British America, were abandoned by her? A very able answer to this pertinent inquiry was given by Sir John Rose, in one of a series of letters addressed to the *Times*, in 1870, under the signature of 'A Colonist,' a portion of which is here transcribed:—

"In my last letter I contended that the colony which is the most exposed of all was defensible in case of war, and that on the ground of military expediency it would be more to the advantage of England to defend than to retire from Canada. Let me now look at the alternative of the case: that Canada is given up, and that the whole Confederation in any future struggle is neutral. This, it is to be kept in mind, involves the consequence that, on no part of the Atlantic coast north of Bermuda, nor on the American side of the Pacific Ocean would England possess a single harbour where she could coal, or refit a vessel, or obtain supplies. To repair damages a ship must return to England, and if the United States were left free to operate with all their power against Bermuda, how long could that island be held? Being within easy access of the United States, it must, at all events, however guarded against reduction or actual capture, be closely blockaded, and for all effectual purposes, would be useless. If Bermuda fell, how long would the West Indies remain British? * * * * * And what of the fact that Newfoundland is within six days' steaming of Ireland? If all the ships of England are to be withdrawn from the American possessions, that island becomes at once a safe base of operations against Ireland, whence men and munitions of war could, and would, be despatched, as opportunity or the chances of success warranted."

The remaining feature of the Emancipationist policy,—that it is unfair to burden English tax-payers with the cost of colonial defence, does not call for extended consideration, as the attitude recently assumed by English Colonial Ministers has greatly weakened the force of the complaint by, to a large extent, removing the case, as will be made more apparent before the close. The tendency of late Colonial administration has been, and is, as was stated, in the direction of educating the colonies to see the injustice of England paying the expenses of colonial defence, and the lesson is being as cheerfully learned as might have been expected. The Australians, it is true, grumbled at the withdrawal of the troops, the Royal Commission, appointed in 1870 to consider the feasibility of a federation of the Australian colonies, in their Report protesting that such a policy was a dangerous one, but time, we believe, has

greatly moderated that view, if not altogether dispersed it. Canada, too, stands pledged to erect defensive works when Imperial exigencies demand them*. The justice of this policy can, scarcely, it is thought, be doubted, the self-governing dependencies being quite able to defray the expense, while the advantages flowing from the consciousness of self-reliance will furnish no mean ingredient to the national character of their different peoples. The saving, however, to the pockets of English taxpayers by the withdrawal of British troops from the colonies is by no means as considerable as some might suppose. Apart from the advantages of concentrating the forces of the Empire at its heart, the saving from their non-dispersion is simply the difference between the cost of their sustentation at Home and abroad.

While, then, it would appear that Emancipation would not be fruitful of those advantages to the mother country which its advocates contend for, it would be simply disastrous to the colonies, and nothing short of child-desertion. The colonies, at present, are not able to stand alone. As far as Canada is concerned, we have fresh and competent testimony on this point. In the House of Commons on the 31st March last,† the Premier, Sir John A. Macdonald, referring to the question of Independence, said "he believed that Independence and Annexation meant the same thing. He believed that Independence was absolutely impossible in the present state of the Dominion We could not walk alone; we must either retain our connection or sink into Annexation He believed that if we were separated from England, in five years we would be absorbed in the United States."§ Australia, of all colonies is best fitted for Independence, but, even in her case, it would be casting on her responsibilities to the discharge of which she is unequal. Separation means an army, navy and diplomatic corps for each separated member, and these it is unable as yet to support, even if the multiplication of armed forces were not opposed to the interests of Peace. What that expense would be, may readily be inferred from the fact that the small standing army of the United States, of about 37,000 men, cost in 1872, thirty eight millions of dollars, not to make mention of the other twenty one millions required for the naval service. But even a standing army and a navy would not, without England's

*The recent transference of the English guarantee of the Defence Loan to the peaceful purposes of the Pacific Railway would seem to look to the release of this obligation. †March '73. §Toronto *Globe* Report, April 2nd, 1873.

assistance, preserve Canada's autonomy. As Sir John Macdonald stated, absorption by the United States would be the certain fate of the Dominion. Badly as it fared in the Washington Treaty negotiations, there is every reason for apprehending that if it had been an independent State, it would have lost not only the sole property in the Fisheries, but its separate existence as well, persistent violations of the plainest rules of international duty in the past crushing out all hope that the conduct of the United States towards Canada as a separate nationality would be regulated by the laws of fair play or the comity of nations.

IMPERIAL FEDERALISM CONSIDERED.

The idea of an Imperial Federation, which, of late, has engaged some public notice is by no means a novel one. A century ago it crossed the mind of Burke, but was dismissed by him as impracticable.* His contemporary, Adam Smith, entertained a more favorable opinion of the project, and saw no insuperable difficulties in the way of its consummation. "If "to each colony," wrote Smith, "which should detach itself "from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow "such a number of representatives as suited the proportion of "what it contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in "consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in "compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its "fellow subjects at home; the number of its representatives to "be augmented as the proportion of its contribution might af- "terwards augment; a new method of acquiring importance, "a new and more dazzling object of ambition would be pre- "sented to the leading men of each colony."† The modern revival of this project is due, in a large measure, doubtless, to the reaction which has set in since the hold of separatist doctrines has waxed faint. If we cannot agree with the advocates of an Imperial Federation, it cannot but be admitted that they present a tolerably strong case in its favour. Some of the more formidable difficulties which stood in the way when Adam Smith wrote are now either out of sight or reduced to insignificant proportions. Distance has by modern invention been bridged in a manner scarce dreamed of a hundred years ago, and even annihilated by the electric wires which net the face of the civilized world and link together distant shores.

*Speech on Conciliation with America. †Wealth of Nations, p. 257.

"A Cornish miner and his family can now emigrate to the
 "Burra Burra, with greater ease, and at a less expense than a
 "hundred years ago, they would make their way to a Lanca-
 "shire coal pit. St. George's Channel, at the time of the
 "Union with Ireland was harder to cross in stormy winter
 "weather than the Atlantic is at present. Before the Panama
 "railway was opened, and the road to California lay round Cape
 "Horn, London was as near it as New York; yet California was
 "no less a State in the American Union."* British Colum-
 bia, we might add, is further distant from Ottawa than is the
 latter from London, travelling conveniences considered; and
 yet British Columbia is a member of the British American
 Federation. The objection to the scheme on the grounds of
 distance would not seem to be well-founded, for, though it
 might appear to be fatal in the case of Australia, it must not
 be forgotten that it is now in more rapid communication with
 London than was the latter with Oxford forty years ago. Nor
 must it be supposed that the age of maritime invention is over,
 that civilization will rest satisfied with its present achievements
 in subduing the perils and shortening the duration of ocean
 passages. There is ample reason for conjecturing that twenty
 years hence the steamships of to-day will be regarded as curi-
 osities of naval architecture. The triumphs of modern inven-
 tion increase in a geometrical ratio; but so self-sufficient and
 so unmindful of the lessons of the past are we prone to be,
 that we are little less short-sighted than our ancestors, who
 regarded themselves as arrived at the highest possible stage of
 advancement, and took no thought of what the future had in
 store. So difficult was travelling in the early days of the Re-
 public that Hamilton expressed an opinion to Josiah Quincy
 that the Union would not last thirty years, but would fall to
 pieces by its own territorial weight, and for want of those iron
 ligatures which he failed to foresee the invention of the railway
 would provide. Experience should teach moderns to be more
 trustful of the future. Distance, there can be little question,
 will every year be more completely abridged; and even the
 the Antipodes brought near to England to such an extent that
 we do not now dream of.

But, distance is by no means the chief obstacle opposed to
 the practicability of a federation of the Empire. The project is
 hedged on all sides with difficulties. The question of distance
 aside, there is, at the outset, the want of geographical unity
 which marks no successful Federacy already formed. Not-

*Short Studies on Great Subjects, by J. A. Froude, London, 1872, Vol.
 I, 210-11.

withstanding the distance of the Pacific States from Washington, there yet exists a geographical bond of connection with the Atlantic States, the like of which would be absent in the case of a British confederation. Nor is it wise to forget that the American Union was prevented from splitting asunder, only by one of the most stupendous struggles of modern or ancient times. Germany has built up a Federal Empire, but its constituent parts are so fitted together that their fusion into a homogeneous whole was not a very difficult task. Canada has adopted the federal form of government, but it possessed within itself the geographical elements of solidarity. Its future success, which its present prosperity would seem to warrant, is yet shrouded in uncertainty, two races, alien to each other, living within its borders. But "countries separated by half the globe," says Mr. John Stuart Mill, "do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or even members of one Federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests; they have not and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each others principles of conduct."* In addition to these, other prime conditions are wanting, and render Imperial Federalism impracticable. In the first place, as Mr. Mill elsewhere points out, there must exist a large amount of sympathy between the peoples to be united. As far as sympathy may be regarded as synonymous with loyalty, there is no lack of it among colonial communities, their fidelity to the Crown being of the most enthusiastic character. But the very reasons on which this fervid loyalty is founded would, it is thought, be extinguished by Federalism, As many who live under monarchical forms of government, sigh for a republican regime, not doubting that it would bring all manner of political blessings in its train, so distance lends enchantment to the colonial view of the Crown and robes it in a most attractive hue. Federalism, however, would quickly replace these colonial sentiments by others of a far less agreeable character. Let Englishmen and colonists be placed in the same political arena, and the conflicts which would ensue would rapidly engender among the latter feelings towards the mother-country of a far less reverential character than those now entertained. Colonists are

*Representative Government, p 132.

but Britons in distant lands, and cherish the same spirit of independence which marks their fellows at Home. Having tasted self-government, so dear to the Anglo-Saxon, they would be loth to sink their autonomy in federative union, even with England. Had Canada possessed representation in an Imperial Parliament she would never have tamely submitted to the lease of her Fisheries ; and she only ratified the act, when protest was useless, to make, as Mr. Lowe said of England, the best of a bad bargain. Equally averse would Englishmen be to colonial interference with what would be chiefly English affairs, though ranked under the generic title of Imperial concerns. On this point, Sir Charles Adderley expresses the opinion "that the English Parliament would not endure the influential interference of distant fellow-subjects in their general legislation."* And again : "I have already said that "the problem of a common representative Legislature of England and her colonies for Imperial purposes has been completely reduced by argument *ad impossibile*. Even if such a Council could be got together, and the subjects of its debates defined, we know the Colonies would not submit to "be taxed by English votes, nor we by the Colonial." † However great the sympathy now existing between the colonies and the mother land, the attempt to increase and intensify it by closer union would only result in abating it. Their interests are too diverse ; they have too long been accustomed to think and act for themselves to brook interference, one with the other. The true pathway lies along the middle course which is now being travelled.

A second condition necessary for the stability of a federacy laid down by Mr. Mill is that the separate states should not be so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength. This obstacle is not so formidable a one as that last recited, the colonies being incompetent for their own defence ; while, if England be able to withstand invasion without colonial assistance, it is not equally clear that she would be able without such aid to maintain her mercantile supremacy, for the reasons we have ventured to set forth above. Still another requisite enunciated by the same authority, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting parties. If this be admitted a vital one, its absence destroys the feasibility of the federal scheme. So unequal in strength would be the constituent parts, at the outset, and for many years to

*Colonial Policy, p12. †Ibid, p 421.

come, that a feeling of powerless insignificance could not but arise in the colonial mind, which would not be compensated by those balances which maintain the equipoise in other Federal combinations. Lord Brougham points out in his work on *Political Philosophy* the tendency of federation to create mutual estrangements, and even hostility, between the different parts—a tendency which would be greatly aggravated by the causes indicated. These feelings would be intensified by the difference in the habit of colonial and English political thought. Colonies are largely democratic in their politics, while England is a constitutional monarchy, under which have grown up institutions alien to colonial soil, an established church, a landed aristocracy and an hereditary House of Peers. No real political sympathy could exist between nations possessed of such diverse constitutions, for though the control over the monarchical adjuncts adverted to might not come within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Parliament, yet the political traditions inspired by their existence for centuries would effectually bar that active community of political feeling so necessary for the harmonious working of a federal scheme, the parties to which should be knit together by the warmest ties of partnership.

But when we come to investigate the practical, as apart from the theoretical aspects of the project, the difficulties thicken fast around us. The author of *Gine's Baby*, who contributed two articles on this subject to the *Contemporary Review*, in the beginning of 1871, confesses his inability to grasp the details of the vast scheme, and mould them into an even apparently practicable whole. "Attempts such as recently have been made," writes Mr. Jenkins, who is an enthusiastic champion of Federalism, "by able and sincere advocates, to limn out in detail the form of a British Federal system, are, from the conspicuousness of their failure, more likely to injure than to advance their cause." * This is a singular admission for so warm an advocate to make, and very like an instinctive confession that adverse judgment must go against his cause. Mr. Mathews, however, is not content with dwelling upon the abstract beauties of federalism, but boldly propounds a plan for confederating the empire, laying down, as necessary to the consummation of the scheme, the following measures:—

"I.—That the Colonies should be left in possession of the

*Contemporary Review, April, 1871.

- “ system of local self-government at present enjoyed by them.
 “ And that means should be taken to secure the same privilege to the United Kingdom.
 “ II. That the revenue required to meet the expenditure of the Federal Government should be raised on a uniform rate of taxation, though not necessarily on a uniform system, over the whole of the Empire, and that the inhabitants of it should be equally liable to military and naval service.
 “ III. That a Federal Legislature consisting of two chambers, should be formed, the Lower House to consist of representatives returned on one uniform system by the British Islands and the Colonies, and that provision should be made for colonial representation in the Upper House also.
 “ IV. That the Federal Legislature should succeed to all the prerogatives now enjoyed by the Imperial Parliament, excepting only those granted to the body, as bodies, appointed to legislate for the local government of the British Islands; and should also enjoy the right of taxation all over the Federation.” *

It is urged in defence of this plan that it would be largely beneficial to the United Kingdom, whose Parliament now staggers under the huge legislative burden annually imposed upon it. There is little doubt that this is a grievance for which a remedy will have to be found at no distant day, though that the mode above indicated will not be adopted is equally certain. The amount of work done, and the amount of work necessarily left undone are simply enormous. The legislative wants of the Kingdom are so vast and so various that it is impossible for the Imperial Parliament constituted as it is, to adequately attend to them. The time of the House is frittered away with private-bill legislation, when it should properly be devoted to affairs of Imperial state. The relegation of private and local legislation to subordinate tribunals, and the retention of jurisdiction over matters of national concern alone, are being gradually admitted necessary for the proper working of the legislative machine.

That the revenue raising processes of the different constituents of the projected Empire could be so assimilated as to produce financial harmony, there is grave reason for doubting. A uniform tariff is out of the question. This is admitted on all sides. England's tariff is a Free-Trade one, Canada's a revenue tariff, and Australia's to a large extent protective. To

* A Colonist on the Colonial Question, p. 69.

obviate the difficulty, which stands guard at the threshold of the inquiry, Mr. Mathews proposes that the local legislatures should be allowed to enact their own tariffs, a maximum rate of duties being fixed by the terms of the Union compact, and never to be exceeded by any member of the Federation, on goods the product of any other part of it, such tariffs to be fixed for periods of ten years. This plan, while it does credit to the ingenuity of its propounder, is at best a clumsy one, and contains in itself a condemnation of the Federal scheme, for there can be little hope for the success of a Confederation thus arrayed against itself. There can be no political unity unless there be financial unity, says a distinguished publicist, and this is confessed impossible by the proposal that the various sections of the Federation should levy hostile tariffs, one against the other. The fatality of such a confessed want of commercial harmony (which, it is true, *might* be avoided by direct taxation,) renders unnecessary an examination of the mode proposed for the distribution among the colonies and Great Britain of the expenses to be borne by the Federacy, for the impracticability of the method advanced for filling the Imperial Treasury does away with the need of inquiring the best plan for gauging the extent of the several contributions to it.

The representative features of the Federal scheme might, perhaps, be adjusted, were it not for the stumbling block opposed by the House of Lords, but apart from that difficulty, others only less formidable present themselves for consideration. To carry out the Federal idea, there would require to be local legislatures for England, Scotland and Ireland, and, in the case of latter kingdom, therein would be found, it is urged, a panacea for the various ills, real or assumed, which, afflict it. These legislatures would necessarily consist of Upper and Lower Houses, (the former hereditary chambers,) to be concerned with local legislation alone, as likewise would be the Federal Legislature, the popular branch of which according to Mr. Mathews's scheme, would "consist of representatives re-
 " turned on one uniform system by the British Islands and the
 " Colonies." Such 'uniform system' might be devised without great difficulty, but how would the Upper Chamber be constituted? Mr. Mathews has an answer ready to hand, so fertile is his ingenuity in constitution-making. "We would
 " suggest that one proportion—we will not say how much—
 " of the House should be elective; that a second proportion
 " should consist of men who had filled certain offices in the

"State, as is proposed by Mr. Mill in his hypothetical scheme,
 "for a second chamber in England; that a third proportion
 "should consist of members to be appointed by the Crown un-
 "conditionally; and that a few hereditary seats, might, per-
 "haps, be sprinkled in with advantage, to keep alive the
 "principle. The elective members, we would have chos-
 "en, in the Colonies, by both branches of the Colonial Legis-
 "latures, and in the British Islands, by the Upper Houses
 "only, in order to leave untouched the hereditary rights of
 "the peerage." * This plan, certainly, does not lack elabora-
 "teness. It is a most curious mosaic, the case bestowed on its
 construction attesting the difficulty of the work. It scarcely
 requires serious argument to point out the impracticability of
 the scheme, were the wisdom of introducing colonial legisla-
 tors into a House of Peers admitted. It is already contem-
 ded in England, with some show of reason and the corrobor-
 ation of some experience in favour of the contention, that the House
 of Lords is out of step with the times, that it fails to respond
 to national sympathies, first opposing, and in the end yielding
 an unwilling assent to popular measures. The reasons which
 exist for the maintenance of a Chamber so constituted, in Eng-
 land, exist in none of the Colonies. If it represents anything,
 it represents the landed interests of the Kingdom, but the col-
 onies have no such territorial magnates as are found in
 the English House of Lords. The representatives which the
 colonies might send to the Federal House of Peers could not
 well be lords, unless they received patents of peerage, with
 their certificates of election, and patents of peerage, without
 the wealth supposed to be necessary to maintain the dignity
 of an hereditary title, would be but idle mockeries. Nor would
 there be the least community or harmony of political sentiment
 between the British and colonial members of the Upper House.
 The question, however, does not invite serious analysis. It
 would be about as practicable to propose that the American
 Senate should be reformed by the introduction of additional,
 hereditary members; as to suggest that British peers and col-
 onial senators should meet together in legislative council. The
 incongruity would be too great to leave room for the slightest
 hope of harmony of thought, or action, or of useful and fruit-
 ful conference.

The project of a British Federacy, while prompted by a lofty
 motive, cannot reasonably be entertained. It is trifling with
 the aphorism that union is strength to urge that the closer

* Ibid, pp. 111-12.

union of the several political sections of the British Empire would result in greater strength to the whole. Union is strength only to a certain degree and under certain conditions. The constituent parts of the united whole must have certain well-defined affinities for each other, if they are to fuse harmoniously. The strength of the chain is the strength of its weakest link; and we have seen that there are several weak links in the chain with which it is proposed to bind the colonies and the Mother Land more closely together into a Pan-Britannic Empire. The points of divergence in essential particulars are too numerous, the lack of the necessary sympathy and similarities too marked, to allow us to entertain the hope that the bridal would be a happy one. The scheme is certainly a magnificent one, well calculated to dazzle political dreamers, and enlist the advocacy of doctrinaires. But it is, at once too vast and too intricate for successful consummation. The machinery required to put it in operation would necessarily be so ponderous, and yet require to be so delicately adjusted in its ten thousand parts, that its construction must be regarded as impossible by all who estimate things as they are, and not as they ought to be. And, then, its working? The difficulty of its management, its existence being supposed, would be equalled only by the task of keeping it in repair. It may not be brilliant statesmanship to err on the side of caution, but prudent and wise conservatism are often better than sensational constitution-tinkering. As has been said by an eminent professor of political science, "The wisdom of a statesman is the result of experience and not of theory." The hand once put to the plough, there could be no turning back to the present condition of affairs, which is by no means as black as it is painted. Should failure attend this effort at Empire-building, it would be a disastrous failure, and precipitate the very evils which we are told are now imminent, but of which there is no just cause for apprehension.

COLONIAL CONSERVATISM CONSIDERED.

Having attempted to show the unwisdom alike of the schemes of the Emancipationists and Federalists, it now only remains to consider the present relations subsisting between the Mother-Country and the Colonies, and whether any other modification or reformation of these relations is desired or desirable, and,

if so, in what direction the change should be made. It is unquestionable that Federation is not desired either by Great Britain or the colonies, whether Federation pure and simple, or any qualified form thereof. Only the other day a proposal was made in the English House of Commons by the member for Leith to the effect that it was desirable to establish an Imperial Council for the management of the general affairs of the Empire and to be fashioned as follows: The Ministry of Great Britain to be divided into two parts, one to take charge of domestic, the other of Imperial affairs. In the Imperial division there would be associated with the English Ministers colonial representatives, in due proportion, so as to make a Council of thirty-two in all. To such Council would be remitted the Government of India, the general policy of the Empire, the negotiation of treaties, the extent of armaments, the declaration or war and the conclusion of peace. Unfortunately, Mr. Macphie mixed up this romantic proposition with a very useful one, in reference to the subject of emigration to the colonies, and asking a special committee of enquiry. The consequence was, that attention was distracted from a very practicable to an impracticable question, the motion regarded by the Government as a side-blow to their Colonial Policy, and the request for a Committee whose enquiries on the subject of emigration might have been of the highest value, was denied. The coldness with which the proposition was received, showed however, if the Commons is a fair reflex of English public opinion, that the latter is averse to drawing more closely the bonds of union with the colonies. That that feeling is reciprocated in one of the colonies, at least, we have the evidence of the debate in the Canadian Parliament, during which the Premier made the speech, already quoted from, and in which he confessed the inability of Canada to stand alone. So little importance was attached to the motion "that an humble Address be presented to Her Most Gracious Majesty praying that the Imperial Parliament may be recommended to take into consideration a Confederation of the Empire, or some other plan that will give to Canadians the full rights and privileges of British subjects," that no leading member of either Party, save the Premier, thought it worth while to discuss it and those who did take part in the debate, with one or two exceptions, only rose to condemn the proposition, and to express their unreserved satisfaction with the present position of colonial relationship. From this it will be seen that the

uneasiness, said to be felt in the colonies and United Kingdom, is confined to an insignificant and non-representative few. It is true, as we have seen, that some soreness was felt in Australia at the time of the withdrawal of the troops from that colony, but the irritation has passed away, as time revealed the wisdom of the policy which dictated the withdrawal. A very deeply-seated feeling of loyalty pervades all the English dependencies, as far as the general public are aware, towards the present relations, which, though apparently too relaxed for abiding union, are yet far stronger than if more rigid. During no former period of the colonial history of the Empire were the feeling between Crown and dependency of a more amicable or satisfied character, or the wish of the latter against separation more firmly maintained.

But there are those who do not wish to disturb the political status of the Colonies yet, nevertheless, contend that the financial relations between them and the United Kingdom are unjust and unsatisfactory. They maintain that the Colonies should contribute an equitable share of those Imperial charges from the expenditure of which they derive direct benefits. They argue that a considerable portion of the Imperial expenditure in the colonies is for the benefit of commerce, and that, consequently, the latter should share it. This doctrine, which was preached by Adam Smith,* was, on the 7th March last, embodied in a motion submitted to the English House of Commons by Lord Eustace Cecil, and proposing that "each colony should be invited to contribute, in proportion to its population and wealth, such annual contingents of men, or such sums of money, towards the defence of the Empire as may by arrangements between the Home and Colonial Governments, be hereafter deemed just and unnecessary." It does not appear to have occurred to any of the gentlemen who took part in the debate which followed that, in the absence of any provision therein for colonial representation, the proposal involved a violation of the principle that taxation without representation is tyranny. The Under-Secretary for the Colonies, in reply, showed from the latest returns that "the total amount expended on the Colonies which might be said to be in their local interest was £475,000, of which the Colonies would pay fully one half. He should state the matter more fairly if he said that all the Colonies would make a full repayment for the expenditure incurred in their behalf, except those on

*Wealth of Nations, p. 225.

"the West Coast of Africa and the West Indian Colonies," which justly could not be charged with it. Mr. Knatchbull—Hugessen went on to observe that "a country which had several colonies was like a man who had estates in several countries; and, just as an individual had to pay something for his position in society, so a nation must pay something for its position in the society of nations. It was very difficult to gauge the precise sum which ought to be paid by a country like this. It would be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to see that that expenditure was not excessive; but this country would never wish to deal with our colonies with a parsimonious or niggardly hand." Mr. Gladstone followed in the same generous strain, deprecating such attempts to revive colonial taxation as sure to produce unfortunate results, and declaring it to be his opinion that it would be "far wiser, and possibly in the end far cheaper, to leave the matter to its free and natural growth; to be content with gradual progress, and to endeavour to create in this Empire that harmony and unity of feeling which should gradually eliminate marked distinctions in colonial policy. If we could bring about that state of things, we might safely trust the natural influence of free institutions and habits of freedom in the colonies to secure us, by free and spontaneous action, colonial aspirations to fulfil; in a large sense, the responsibilities of British citizenship." These are statesman-like views, and furnish a lucid exposition of the bent and aim of the modern colonial policy. It would, then, seem that perfect content is felt on either side, and that both are anxious to let well enough alone. But alarmists and pessimists would have us believe that we are walking on the brink of a precipice, over which a single false step will topple us. They declare, on the other hand, that it is a false policy to impose the burden of self-defence upon the Colonies, and that the latter will not care to continue the connection when the motive of self-interest no longer exists. This, if true, is scarce complimentary to the Colonists; but its incorrectness is at once shown by the fact that the carrying out of such a policy has not abated their loyalty one jot or tittle. Canadians and Australians are to-day, not one whit less anxious for the maintenance of the connection than when English red-coats garrisoned their towns at the Imperial expense. If the Colonies were held by England by so base a tenure, they would not be worth the retention. The desire for the continuance of the union derives

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its vitality from something higher and better than mere considerations of mercenary profit, for, apart from reciprocal commercial advantages, the colonies wish to share in the traditional glories, the present greatness and future prosperity of Britain. That the affection for the mother-land is not mere sentiment and nothing more, has been proved on more than one occasion, and would receive fresh testimony did circumstances call for action. While cherishing these feelings towards England, however, colonists do not desire closer union, but wish to be allowed to go on their several ways unmolested, hewing out their own destinies, perfecting their domestic policies as to them may seem best, developing their resources, and enrobing themselves with the dignities of nations worthy of the stock from which they sprang. "Those," writes Sir Charles Adderley, "who think colonial independence the forerunner of separation, I ask to consider the necessity of independence to a living connexion and whether dependence must not be rather the surest process through decay to severance. Life denied its natural element seeks for it elsewhere. . . . The kindred life of nations maintains itself by community of active energy, capacity of partnership, identity of interest and enterprise, united tendencies and congenial relations with the common origin The patron country may get some return for supporting dependencies in their servile submission to its policy. But self-sustaining Colonies are connected by a living link. The connection with them is an active partnership. England has the advantage of a territorial extension, liberating not taxing her resources ; and the Colonies have the credit and good will of England's trade and name. This is a union not likely to dissolve itself, but daily accumulating pledges for its continuance, strengthening itself, and excluding instead of inviting foreign aggression." *

There is, still, one matter without reference to which any discussion of the merits of the Colonial question would be conspicuously incomplete—the advisability of directing, by legitimate and well ordered means, the flow of British emigration more fully into Colonial channels. The overplus of population in Britain and the demand for an increased supply of labour in the Colonies are naturally the complement and supplement, each of the other. The question of emigration is perhaps the most practically important involved in the reciprocal

*Colonial Policy, pp. 190-91.

relations of Great Britain and the Colonies, but unfortunately it has not received that attention at the hands of English Ministers which its gravity deserved. No well-directed or energetic effort has been made in England to divert the tide of emigration to those countries which would make the most valuable return. Mr. Froude, a couple of years since, directed public attention to the importance of the matter, through the columns of *Fraser's Magazine*,* and in a warm argument dwelt upon the urgency of the English Government taking some steps to people the colonies with annual contingents of English recruits. At present, through the activity of their energies, the United States attract the bulk of British emigration and thereby annually absorb a vast amount of wealth, a great part of which might under proper direction have remained British, or at least not passed into foreign hands. Had English Ministers, at the time, risen to a level with the exigency of the occasion, and offered free transportation to the colonies to the Irish emigrants whom the potato famine drove out of Ireland, they would not have left their native country "with hate in their hearts and curses on their lips" for the English Government. Nor would the millions who have followed have been lost to England, Fenianism would never have had an existence, and the costly tribute which England is now laying at the feet of its sister kingdom would never have been extorted. The Irish residents of the Colonies are as well-affected towards the Crown as their fellow-subjects, but their brethren in the United States nurse a feeling of inextinguishable hatred of the nation which they charge with the crime of their expatriation.

But it is said that there is really no surplus population in Britain, that trade and commerce are growing with magic rapidity, and that the lack of employment, with its consequent poverty and distress, is due to temporary lulls in trade incident to all great manufacturing communities. But there rises up the eloquent answer, furnished by the pauper statistics, that there *is* a surplus population. What more crushing reply to the optimists could be had than the fact that in Great Britain one adult out of nineteen is a pauper, and that the rate is yearly rising? It may compose the rich to learn that mills and factories are multiplying at an enormous rate, and that commerce is flourishing luxuriantly, but the blood of the body-politic must be charged with corruption when such loathsome

* Re-printed in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, pp. 180, 348, Vol. I.

pustules break out all over its surface, and that persistently. Pauperism in three cases out of five means want of labour, and want of labour means that hands are a drug in the labour market. What more fitting for statesmanship to endeavour to compass, than to bring these English hands and arms and the virgin soil of the Colonies together; and afford elbow-room and breathing-space to those who remain behind? The employer of labour, anxious to keep wages low, steps in the way, and declares that it is foreign to its legitimate business for Government to interfere with emigration affairs, which should be allowed to regulate themselves by natural laws. But, answers Mr. Froude,* "human things are as much governed by laws of nature as a farm or a garden, neither less nor more. If we cultivate a field it will yield us corn or green crops. The laws of nature will as assuredly overgrow it with docks and nettles if we leave it to govern itself." The lion in the path set up by the manufacturers is that state-aided emigration would indirectly increase wages to such an extent that they would be unable to defy foreign competition in the sale of their wares. There is little danger to be apprehended on this score, as the natural increase in England will always fill the labour market; notwithstanding the outward flow. There is more danger to be feared, unless properly weeded out, that the population of the British Islands will become so dense, and the difficulty of bread-winning so aggravated, that the masses will take the matter in their own hands, and attempt to redress the grievance in a manner one shudders to think of. We may affect to despise the wisdom of the ancients, but the advice of Pericles to the Athenians that they must colonize, to prevent their people from being degraded by poverty, might with good effect be taken by modern English statesmen. That poverty has degraded the English masses is unquestionable, but there are not wanting indications that they are becoming restive and dissatisfied with the condition of affairs which keeps them poor. Even the most degraded of the English population, the agricultural laborer, has lately made an attempt to assert his right to get, at least, a decent living out of the wealth created by his hands, and in which his more fortunate fellows wallow. The social condition of no community can be said to be satisfactory where the rich get rich and the poor poorer. † A remedy should be found ere it is too late. That remedy has been

* Ibid, p 186.

† Fast hastes that land to threatening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.—*Goldsmith.*

indicated. not in the confidence that it would purge English society of the evils dwelt upon, entirely, but that it would do so to a very large extent, and in a most salutary fashion.

There is very excellent authority for the statement that emigration is a business for legitimate Government concern. In his *Political Economy*, Mr. John Stuart Mill thus refers to the question of state-aided emigration :—

“ The question of Government intervention in the work of
 “ Colonization involves the future and permanent interests of
 “ civilization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively
 “ narrow limits of purely economical considerations. But even
 “ with a view to these considerations alone, the removal of
 “ population from the overcrowded to the unoccupied parts of
 “ the earth’s surface is one of those works of eminent social usefulness, which most require, and which at the same time best
 “ repay, the intervention of Government.

“ Much has been said of the good economy
 “ of importing commodities from the place where they can be
 “ bought cheapest ; while the good economy of producing
 “ them where they can be produced the cheapest, is comparatively little thought of. If to carry consumable goods from
 “ the place where they are superabundant to those where
 “ they are scarce, is a good pecuniary speculation, is it not an
 “ equally good speculation to do the same thing with regard
 “ to labour and instruments ? The exportation of labour and
 “ capital from old to new countries, from a place where their
 “ productive power is less, to a place where it is greater, increases by so much the labour and capital of the world. It
 “ adds to the joint wealth of the old and the new country, what
 “ amounts in a short period to many times the mere cost of effecting the transport. There need be no hesitation in affirming that Colonization, in the present state of the world
 “ is the best affair of business in which the capital of an old and
 “ wealthy country can engage.” *

State-aided emigration would certainly prove an excellent investment for Great Britain, for, in addition to the reasons above quoted, the colonists are by many times larger consumers of English goods than the residents of foreign lands, and the bread thus cast on the waters in emigrant ships would certainly return increased and multiplied. The question certainly “involves the future and permanent interests of civilization itself,” and should not be subordinated to the

greed of British manufactures whose interests are not the highest interests of the kingdom or empire.

It would not only "pay" in the modes already indicated to divert the stream of British emigration more fully in the direction of the colonies, but state-assisted emigration would liquidate its own cost by reducing the poor-rates, the shame and disgrace of Merrie England. Many of the paupers in receipt of relief are forced paupers, receiving alms of the parish because the country refuses to give them work whereby to procure the means for buying food. They are burdens on the state, not from choice, but from necessity. Let the labour market be balanced by a wisely framed scheme for assisting the deserving poor out of the country to colonial towns and farms, and the consequent saving in the poor rates would more than fully compensate for the expense thereby incurred. On this point we have direct and convincing testimony. In his *Colonial Policy*, Sir Charles Adderley thus bears witness to the correctness of the above statement:—

"But ratepayers generally do not yet take in the fact that every able and industrious family of labourers going out to new scenes of industry prevents another family from becoming paupers at home; and that successful emigration increases the general employment of labour and capital. I recollect when this subject was rife, when the Poor Law amendment saved England from permanent ruin, a Hampshire Board of Guardians remonstrating with an enlightened proprietor who proposed a large subscription to enable a great accumulation of healthy laborers who crowded the parish to emigrate. The plan was ultimately carried out, and the result was that the paupers left behind soon ceased to be paupers, and the poor rates shrank to a quarter of their former amount." * This is very convincing proof of the beneficent results flowing from emigration, even on those left behind. Poverty, it certainly will not eradicate. Poverty will always, must always, exist in England to a painful extent; but it is idle to assert that its present dimensions cannot be curtailed, and criminally foolish for English statesmen to stand by with folded arms and do nothing to alleviate the misery, when the door of relief can be so easily opened. Roman soldiers have left behind them enduring monuments of their industry, as well as the fame of their martial achieve-

* pp. 112-13.

ments. And why should not English war-vessels in time of peace be employed in the transportation of emigrants to colonial soil?

The difficulties however which stand in the way of the adjustment of a wise and beneficent scheme of state-aided emigration should not be underestimated. That it should be carried on by Great Britain alone would be only to secure its failure. It can only be properly carried out by the conjoint action of the United Kingdom and the colonies, each party bearing a share of the expense. To send ship-loads of emigrants to a colony without first inquiring the labour needs of that colony would be a most unwise proceeding, for the colonies are neither populous enough, nor their industries so varied, that they can absorb all the immigrants that Great Britain could profitably spare. To send an artizan to a colony where there is no market for the productions of his craft would be a cruelty. Emigrants should be sifted and assorted, unless they be agricultural laborers, for millions of whom the colonies contain ample room and verge enough. A writer in the *Cobden Club Essays* * makes the admirable suggestion that one of the best class of emigrants would be pauper children, who by translation to a distant land would have the stigma of their birth removed, and be preserved from the risk of being drawn back into the ranks of hereditary paupers. Such children should emigrate when their labour begins to be of value. They would grow with the growth of their new homes, and be able to choose the employment of their lives. One objection there is to this, the necessity of freeing any scheme of assisted emigration that may be devised from the taint of pauperism, for its benefits would be as tardily accepted by the self-respecting, as the emigrants themselves by the colonies to which they were transferred. But these are minor details. Though important, the difficulty of their arrangement could not prevent the success of state-emigration if taken up by England with a helpful interest. Her willingness to co-operate with the colonies obtained, the difficulties would rapidly vanish. The adoption of such a scheme would be worthy of true and enlightened statesmanship, and achieve a more comely triumph than the most successful foreign war.

What, it may be asked, in conclusion, will be the destiny of the Colonies? The answer lies buried in the womb of futurity, and we cannot pretend to furnish it. How long their

* Second Edition, p. 245.

present relationship with Great Britain will last cannot be predicted, though we feel assured that it is the most enduring tie with which they can be bound together, and the most wisely adapted for mutual profit and advantage. That a splendid future awaits both the Australian and British American provinces can scarce be doubted, if they prove themselves loyal children of the "mother of free nations." They have had kindly nurture, wise bringing-up, profitable instruction and generous assistance. In their systems of polity they have adopted the best features of the Republican form of government, and of the most liberal monarchy the world ever saw. The foundations of their national structures were laid when the old and false systems of Government were being supplanted by the modern and more true, and they have had the experience of the past to warn them from error, and guide them aright. They fortunately escape, on the one hand, the turmoil and intrigues of an election to the Chief Magistracy, on the other, the incapacity, sometimes the fruit of hereditary transmission of power. They have reproduced to a pleasing extent the most healthful features of old-world Anglo-Saxon society, transplanted with success those homely virtues, and borrowed the flavour of that moral sweetness which have done more for English liberty than all the victories from Agincourt to Waterloo. "Great Britain confides," said Bulwer-Lytton, "the records of her Empire not to pyramids and obelisks, but to states and communities whose history will be written in her language," and they give promise of being loyal custodians of the charge, and worthy co-adjutors in the civilizing task of extending English laws, manners and freedom over the world. In the assurance that they will run this lusty race, may we not re-echo the aspiration of an eloquent divine, who thus takes leave of Canada with words of admiration equally fitting Australia?—

"When I consider that here is a land which reaps all the benefit of monarchy—without the caste or cost of monarchy—a land where there is no degradation in honest toil, and ample chances for the honest toiler; a land whose educational appliances rival any other, and whose moral principle has not yet been undermined; a land which starts its national existence with a kindling love of freedom, a quickened onset of inquiry, and a reverent love of truth, and of its highest embodiment, Religion—I feel that never

" a country began under fairer auspices, and that, if Canada's children be but true to themselves, whatever their political destiny may be, they will establish a stable commonwealth, rich in all the virtues which make nations great—mighty in those irresistible moral forces which make any people strong. *Esto perpetua!* May no Marius ever sit among the ruins of a promise so fair." *

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* Preface to Sermons and Lectures, by W. M. Punshon, LL. D., Toronto; Adam, Stevenson & Co.

