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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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| UN Convenes Third Special Session on Disarmament | 1 |
| Carleton Verification Symposium | 3 |
| Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to UNSSOD III | 4 |
| UNSSOD III Provides Consultative Group Focus | 6 |
| Canada Contributes Further to Peacekeeping Operations | 7 |
| Moscow Summit Furthers Arms Control and Disarmament | 9 |
| Recent Polls Show Government and Public Share Similar Concerns | 11 |
| Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations Since 1987 | 12 |
| International Meeting of Physicians in Montreal | 13 |
| Ambassador Marchand Addresses CD on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space | 14 |
| Success at May Meeting of United Nations Disarmament Commission | 16 |
| United Nations Convenes Meeting of Verification Experts in USSR | 17 |
| Canada Accedes to the Antarctic Treaty .. | 18 |
| Appointments to CIIPS | 18 |
| Canadian Participation in Australian NGO Verification Conference | 19 |
| Selected Recent Department of External Affairs Publications | 19 |
| Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund to Date — Fiscal Year 1988-89 | 20 |

UN Convenes Third Special Session on Disarmament



Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations presenting petition in support of UNSSOD III.

UN Photo 171795/Saw Lwin

The Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III) was held May 31-June 25, 1988 in New York. After four weeks of deliberations, the participating states were unable to reach agreement on a concluding document. Why was this so? Should the four-week conference be considered a failure? An attempt to answer these questions and a brief analysis of the Special Session are included in the following report.

Preparations

The Canadian Government engaged in extensive preparations for UNSSOD III. Following the disappointing failure of the UNSSOD III Preparatory Committee to reach agreement on a document on which the Special Session could build, Canada made *démarches* in some 45

countries in all regions urging governments to make special efforts to bring the Special Session to a successful conclusion. In particular, Canada stressed the importance of developing a co-operative approach, maintaining flexibility, seeking common ground and avoiding polarization.

The Government also convened a meeting of the 50-member Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa last April on the subject. The group put forward a broad range of policy recommendations, many of which had already been or were subsequently adopted as part of the Government's position for UNSSOD III. (See the Spring 1988 edition of *The Disarmament Bulletin* for more details concerning UNSSOD III preparations.)

The Disarmament Bulletin is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to: The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2.

ISSN 0715-7134

Cette publication existe également en français.

Proceedings

UNSSOD III commenced in grand style with higher-level representation than at either UNSSOD I in 1978 or UNSSOD II in 1982. Statements were delivered by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 23 Heads of State and Government and 55 Foreign Ministers, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

The Canadian Delegation, headed by Mr. Clark, included 15 Parliamentarians as observers and 20 non-government individuals as special advisers. Canada was one of only eight countries to include NGO representatives on its delegation. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, acted as Deputy Head of the Delegation. Other Delegation members included Stephen Lewis, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and de Montigny Marchand, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva.

The statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), delivered on June 13, placed major emphasis on recent concrete achievements in arms control and disarmament (ACD) and the need for UNSSOD III to complement and enhance that progress. Mr. Clark noted that the UN has an important role to play, but will only advance the ACD process if efforts are focussed on practical approaches and the issues capable of mustering consensus. Canadian ACD priorities include step-by-step progress toward the realization of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiation of a convention banning chemical weapons, the achievement of deep reductions in nuclear-weapons arsenals, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the recognition of the central role of verification and confidence-building measures in the ACD process. In the latter regard, the SSEA drew specific attention to a joint Canada/Netherlands proposal for a UN Experts Study on a UN role in verification.

Recent progress in ACD in the USA/USSR context, especially the

ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement at the Moscow Summit, which concluded on June 2, was welcomed by virtually all speakers and had a pervasive and positive impact on the atmosphere of the Special Session. Nevertheless, some fundamental differences of approach became evident virtually from the outset.

The most significant areas of disagreement included: (a) the overall orientation — most Western states favoured a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to ACD issues, while some of the Non-Aligned, and to a lesser extent the Socialist states, preferred a more political, declaratory emphasis; (b) a general tendency among the Non-Aligned to place the onus for progress on the nuclear-weapon states, and the superpowers, in particular; and (c) different approaches to the role of the UN in the broad ACD process, with some countries seeking a broader UN role, and others placing more emphasis on negotiating efforts at the bilateral and regional levels.

These differences translated into significant disagreements on specific issues such as: whether the UNSSOD I Final Document of 1978 remained valid and should be reaffirmed in all its aspects, or whether it should rather be seen as a valued historical point of reference subject to modification in the light of new realities; the importance that should be attached to nuclear as opposed to conventional disarmament; the nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security; the need to bring weapons-related research and development and the qualitative development of weapons under more effective policy direction; the utility of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; support for the NPT; the pace and manner of progress toward the realization of a CTBT; and consideration of the naval arms race and prevention of an arms race in outer space issues.

Following the two-week Plenary debate, a Committee of the Whole (COW) was convened which established three working groups to consider the substantive agenda items, as follows:

Working Group I

- Review and appraisal of the present international situation

- Assessment of the decisions of UNSSOD I and II

Working Group II

- Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects

Working Group III

- Disarmament machinery

- UN information and educational activities

In the week allowed for their work, none of the working groups succeeded in adopting agreed reports. Non-consensus "Chairman's Papers," together with lists of proposed amendments, were, however, forwarded to the COW Chairman to assist him in preparing a draft concluding document for the Special Session.

Following extensive consultations, the COW Chairman released his paper with only four days remaining. Despite some specific difficulties, Canada was generally pleased with its balanced and pragmatic tone. The COW did not meet again until the last day of the Special Session in an atmosphere of growing concern regarding the prospects for success. In the interim period, the Chairman held informal consultations with a group of selected countries (including Canada). Both during the informal consultations and in the COW, major areas of disagreement remained in the face of numerous and often conflicting proposed amendments.

When, by the evening of June 25, differences remained on numerous sections of the revised "Chairman's Paper," the Chairman adjourned the COW and called together a small group of "Friends of the Chair," including Canada, for further consultations. These continued until almost 3:00 a.m., June 26.

With the clock running out, it was clear to all participants that this informal meeting offered the last opportunity to salvage the Special Session. Despite the general fatigue, a sense of urgency and drama prevailed. The Chairman iden-

tified the major outstanding issues (outer space, new technologies, nuclear disarmament, naval arms race, conventional disarmament, the verification study, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, disarmament and development, and non-proliferation) and wondered whether, in four hours, existing differences could be bridged. By 2:30 a.m., however, despite considerable progress, major differences remained and the Chairman was obliged to finally admit defeat and call a halt. The Chairman's group had not had time to overcome its differences on the "Assessment" and "Disarmament Machinery" sections of the draft paper and still failed to agree on several substantive elements of the section dealing with "Future Development and Trends."

The final Plenary session concluded at 7:30 a.m., June 26 with exhausted delegates expressing their disappointment. The concluding statements of several countries, however, reflected a desire to focus on positive aspects of the Special Session and avoid recrimination. In his final statement, the President of UNSSOD III acknowledged that points of disagreement had been reduced and areas of agreement broadened.

Assessment

Canada shared the broad sense of disappointment in the wake of almost a month of concentrated effort. One could, nevertheless, derive some comfort from a number of developments. Despite the existence of major differences of approach, a much more positive atmosphere prevailed at UNSSOD III than had been the case at UNSSOD II. Furthermore, there was increasing recognition among the Non-Aligned of their responsibility in the ACD process, particularly in relation to conventional arms, and a general avoidance of unhelpful ideological rhetoric.

In view of these encouraging trends, why did the Special Session end in failure?

There are several reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is that the fundamental differences of approach to ACD noted above remained so entrenched as to preclude a meaningful consensus on key ACD issues, despite

the improved atmosphere. Such differences have long been apparent in UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee voting and within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In addition, there seemed to be little sense of purpose or urgency at UNSSOD III. Despite the active presence of many articulate NGO representatives, there was little discernible public pressure, as reflected by the lack of media interest. Even when the clock was evidently running out, many delegations preferred to reiterate national positions rather than focus on overcoming substantive differences. Despite last-minute efforts, the strength of purpose required to forge consensus simply failed to materialize.

The Canadian Delegation at the Special Session was active throughout. The Government's extensive pre-UNSSOD III preparations facilitated the submission of substantive Canadian position papers, subsequently published as official conference documents, on the three major agenda items.

In addition, Canada played a particularly active role in the COW, its three working groups and during the informal consultations with the COW Chairman. Canada was a leading member of the small group which negotiated language on the verification study, having earlier submitted a joint paper on the subject with the Netherlands. Canada also submitted papers recommending a "UN orientation programme for NGOs in the field of Disarmament," on the subject of "UN information and educational activities" and, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, on the "Advancement of women in the disarmament process."

Looking ahead, a major objective for Canada will be to seek broader support for pragmatic and realistic approaches to ACD, building upon the UNSSOD III experience. Of more immediate concern will be to ensure that such approaches become a predominant feature of the deliberations of the First Committee which Canada expects to chair at UNGA 43. A major Canadian objective will be to translate the progress achieved on verification at UNSSOD III into a concrete UNGA resolution calling for UN experts study on the subject. □

Carleton Verification Symposium

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) of Carleton University hosted its Fifth Annual International Symposium on Arms Control Verification March 23-26, 1988 in Ottawa. In cooperation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs, NPSIA has sponsored a unique series of symposiums, each of which has focussed on a different aspect of the verification process. Last year, in conjunction with the School of Journalism at Carleton University, NPSIA successfully hosted a symposium which considered the role of the media in verification.

This year, Professor Brian Mandell undertook a retrospective examination of the 1973 Sinai war in an attempt to apply that experience in developing a verification model. Using his recently published study *The Sinai Experience: Lessons on Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management* as a guide, some 30 academics and arms control specialists from within government and from independent institutes undertook the identification of elements following the war which might be applied in a setting designed to prevent a future war.

The keynote address by Ambassador James Goodby, now with the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, set the stage. He described the problems likely to be encountered in the proposed conventional arms reduction talks, the mandate for which is currently under discussion in Vienna. Academics, researchers and other experts from Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland and the United States presented papers identifying significant issue areas to be addressed. This Canadian-sponsored symposium is one of the first to focus almost exclusively on the way ahead in term of future multilateral negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe, which are likely to commence in late 1988 or early 1989. The results of the symposium and its predecessors are available from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at a price of \$6.00 per issue. □

Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to UNSSOD III

The following are excerpts of the address given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III).

"...Six years ago, at the outset of the Second Special Session on Disarmament, the President of that Assembly could correctly observe that nothing had been achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control since the First Special Session.


This year, we meet in circumstances which are vastly different. The past six years have recorded progress and achievements that will have major implications for arms control and disarmament. The measure of success of this Special Session will be the extent to which our deliberations sustain further the spirit so essential to continued progress and achievement in international disarmament. We must, therefore, reaffirm our dedication to the success of arms control and disarmament, and pledge ourselves to advance ideas which will keep hope and progress alive.

Our efforts here can only be aided by the outcome of the recent meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

That Summit clearly demonstrated the degree of progress which has been made in East-West relations. It was the fourth such meeting between the two leaders in just over two-and-half years, an unprecedented pace for discussion and negotiation.

I was struck by how many observers of the Summit referred to the new agreements signed in Moscow on verification and testing as 'minor' arms control measures. When we gathered in previous Special Sessions, the very notion of 'minor' arms control agreements would indeed have sounded strange. We have come to have high expectations of this process.

It is in the vital Soviet-American relationship that much of the progress has been made since the last Special Ses-



Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark addresses UNSSOD III, June 13, 1988.

UN Photo 171694/Y. Nagata

sion. Intensive negotiations between those two states in the last several years have brought new and historic achievements, most notably in the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement signed in Washington last December and the agreement in principle to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. Those accomplishments present this Special Session with both the opportunity and the stimulus to pursue other avenues leading to greater international security and stability.

The multilateral arms control process has also had significant success in the context of East-West relations. The Stockholm Agreement, which came into effect in January 1987, has brought greater openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. Anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability covering the whole of Europe between all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact offer us the opportunity for more progress.

There has also been some movement forward in non-East-West forums, but it has been much less spectacular. The Conference on Disarmament has made some progress on negotiations on a global convention to ban chemical weapons, but the repeated reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf

War only demonstrates how far we are from an effective agreement and the urgency of our obligations. There was also progress in last year's successful Disarmament and Development Conference, the endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty, the inclusion of conventional disarmament on the agenda of the United Nations and the consensus report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) on verification.

In this Special Session, it is important that we take realism as our guide and apply what we have learned from our successes, and from our failures. We have learned that arms control and disarmament cannot be viewed as ends in themselves. Both have value only if they contribute to security and well-being. Most countries accept the desirability of constraining or banning weapons systems. But, we cannot aspire to the reductions we seek, or the agreements necessary to sustain them, unless all states take advantage of opportunities to support those objectives.

Experience has shown that successful arms control and disarmament agreements share a number of essential qualities. The first and most obvious is

enhanced security. Arms control agreements must maintain and enhance the security of all those involved in the negotiation.

There are other essential qualities as well.

One is mutual benefit. Realism in arms control demands that a successful negotiation offer something for all parties.

Negotiations must also be substantive. We must not spend our time negotiating the non-essential or the frivolous. A proliferation of arms control forums is not likely to lead to more arms control agreements unless they have clear and substantive mandates.

Arms control agreements must also be crafted to ensure that the benefits of limits on weapons are not undone by redeployment or by qualitative improvements to remaining weapons.

A fifth, and related criterion, is non-transferability of the threat. Arms control agreements will achieve little and are unlikely to succeed if they remove the threat from one region by increasing it in another.

Finally, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. The agreement must include not only thorough verification provisions, but the substance of the agreement must be such that compliance can be effectively demonstrated.

These essential qualities are demanding.

Nonetheless, our experience clearly shows that while the negotiation of agreements will not be easy, it is not impossible. An effective disarmament and arms control *régime* can meet these criteria only through measured and individual steps which see every contentious aspect settled. The issues on which we seek agreement vary much too widely and are too complex to allow us to behave otherwise.

Canada sees confidence-building as essential to arms control and disarmament. We regard the concepts of openness, transparency and predictability as imperative. The establishment of agreed procedures for inspections at the

Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 is an accomplishment which stands as a precedent and model for other arms control negotiations, at bilateral or regional levels.

The principles essential to the success of confidence-building measures should be promoted on every occasion. In this regard, we urge members of the United Nations to comply with the General Assembly recommendation on reporting annual military expenditures. Only 20 or so countries regularly comply with this recommendation. It is a small step, but we cannot hope to take larger steps without more members of this Assembly giving effect to our own recommendations.

Indeed, one of the happy consequences of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits is to broaden the responsibility for arms control. For some time, the focus of arms control discussions was to encourage the superpowers to act. Now the superpowers are acting, and the question becomes whether other states are prepared to demonstrate themselves the leadership we have asked of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is no longer enough to advocate action by others. Whether the issue is chemical weapons or adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or fidelity to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new climate involves new obligations for all of us.

Ultimately, neither arms control nor disarmament can succeed without a general will to make them succeed. The issue is fundamentally political, and this Special Session is one assembly in which political will can be cultivated and demonstrated. Increasing trust, good relations and arms reductions go together: they are mutually reinforcing.

It is not enough that the established framework of international institutions and laws must remain in place; they must as well be respected in practice by members of the United Nations.

The strength of this institution is not the responsibility of any one group of nations; it is the responsibility of all its

members. We must work in support of the UN and not undermine it. We cannot ask it to do the impossible. We have to set realistic goals, and we have to give it the means to achieve these goals.

In that context, the frequent calls we have heard at this Special Session for a new fund to transfer the resources saved from disarmament to development is an example of a failure to learn from past experiences. Last year, the Disarmament and Development Conference issued a final document stressing the multi-dimensional nature of security. The participants rejected both a direct linkage between disarmament and development and the creation of a fund. Nations like Canada already have mechanisms for providing funds to development, as does the United Nations itself, and in many developing countries there are ample existing claims upon any resources made available through disarmament.

Just as arms control and enhanced security are not a monopoly of the superpowers, neither is disarmament limited to nuclear arms alone. The terrible consequences of military actions in the decades since the Second World War have been caused by conventional, and lately, chemical weapons. We must face this issue squarely.

No conflict or arms build-up, however small or isolated, is irrelevant or can be ignored, as any of them can undermine the security of all of us.

Canada is determined to play a leading role in moving the agenda forward. Our commitment and contribution to the cause of arms control and disarmament is well established. We will use the influence we have, and make available the expertise we hold, to help reduce the danger of conflict and to reverse the build-up of arms.

Our first goal at this Special Session, therefore, should be to endorse continued adherence to a well-founded and realistic approach to arms control and disarmament.

This requires that we set clear, realistic goals, and that we choose and adhere to priorities. In arms control and disarmament, priorities must be established no less than in other areas if we are to

have specific landmarks against which to measure progress. This lesson is especially true for the United Nations and for its arms control activities.

This Special Session will help to keep alive the spirit of progress and achievement if it can identify and isolate those areas which command consensus and where we can agree we should concentrate our efforts. Canada has listened with interest and attention to the statements of the Special Session. We believe that a measure of agreement does exist on certain issues where Canada considers it would be worthwhile to concentrate our attention in the future.

First, deep and verifiable reductions in the arsenals of nuclear weapons must remain as the highest priority in international disarmament.

The achievements of a comprehensive test ban treaty remains a fundamental and enduring objective for Canada. The Special Session should recognize the successful efforts already made in Soviet/American negotiations in this area and endorse this full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiating procedure.

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beginning last week and throughout this Session, officials of the Canadian Government on my instructions, will be calling on the governments of all non-signatories of this Treaty strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that this Special Session will issue a similar call. It is no longer possible to argue, as some have, that the superpowers must first reduce their own nuclear arsenals. If that was a condition preordinate, it has been met.

The focus of attention on nuclear arms should not, however, be allowed to deflect attention from the need for progress in arms reduction in the field of conventional arms. This question must be addressed with no less urgency than that attached to nuclear questions. It is

in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well provide the best returns.

The negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance. This Session should unequivocally condemn their use. While progress has been accomplished, greater efforts must be made to conclude an effectively verifiable comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Until such an agreement is reached, every step must be taken to prevent the transfer to other states of chemical weapons, and to follow the example of those countries which have moved to control the export of highly toxic chemicals and to institute a 'Warning List' procedure for others.

The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.

Verification is essential to the arms control and disarmament process. It has been a major preoccupation for Canada, and we are encouraged that so many speakers in this forum share that priority.

To help promote the cause of multilateralism in this field, we and the Netherlands have proposed that an in-depth study be undertaken by a United Nations Group of Experts. Such a report will advance international understanding of verification within the UN framework, and help develop an appropriate role for the organization in this field. I ask that members of the United Nations support this proposal."

Mr. President, in the last six years, we have shown that arms control and disarmament can work, and that it can be made part of the growing fabric of our international relations. Canada stands ready to work with member states in the pursuit of goals agreed by this Special Session. Let us continue to nourish further the cause of arms control and disarmament." ■

UNSSOD III Provides Consultative Group Focus

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met April 14-16, 1988 in Ottawa to discuss the Third UN Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III).

Created in 1979 in response to a recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the Consultative Group meets periodically with officials of the departments of External Affairs and National Defence to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control.

The meeting was highlighted by presentations by Ambassador Dave McDowell, the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations, and Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs. Seventy individuals participated in a program which gave considerable emphasis to workshops.

The following executive summary of the meeting was prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report are available by writing to the Editor.

The Third Special Session follows the highly successful UNSSOD I of 1978 and the stillborn UNSSOD II, held four years later. It comes at a time when there has been much progress in superpower bilateral arms control but few advances on the multilateral front, and thus can be viewed as a test of an opportunity to reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process. This will not be an easy task. The Preparatory Commission for the Special Session has revealed sharp divisions both among and between West, East and the Neutral and Non-Aligned. While an epoch-making final document is not to be expected, the disarmament process and multilateralism will be


fortified if a new international consensus — however imperfect — can be forged on disarmament issues at UNSSOD III. The challenge of Canada's Government and NGOs is to make this happen.

The Consultative Group discussed three major themes, based on the anticipated organization of work at UNSSOD III: a review of past developments and appraisal of the present situation in the disarmament field; new developments and trends affecting the disarmament field; and disarmament machinery and education.

In general, participants recommended that Canada view the Special Session as an opportunity to affirm and renew the multilateral disarmament process and thus should seek consensus there. They strongly advised that the Prime Minister head the Canadian delegation to UNSSOD III, as an indication of the priority this country places on arms control and disarmament.

Participants agreed that recent progress in arms control, such as the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures and the outcome of the UN disarmament conference should be endorsed, but noted this should not obscure the need to shore up other arms control regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and to take further steps toward disarmament. The need for a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban was emphasized and many suggestions were offered on how UNSSOD III could aid their attainment. Canada was urged to support the application of confidence-building measures in other regions of the world.

Participants expressed much concern about the qualitative dimension of the arms race and recommended that Canada put forward arms control proposals that address technological advances in both nuclear and conventional weaponry. Several participants opposed Canada's apparent abandonment of the strategy of suffocation and called on the Government to reconsider this strategy, particularly the aspect of a ban on flight testing of nuclear weapon



Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

delivery systems, as a means of limiting nuclear weapon modernization.

The group emphasized the need for qualitative and quantitative limits on conventional forces. It was recommended that Canada reaffirm the importance of the UN's established matrix for reports on military expenditures, encourage all states to file such reports, and support efforts to establish an international arms trade registry. Participants also recommended that UNSSOD III attempt to set in motion serious efforts toward naval arms limitations.

There was general interest in a multilateral agency for the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. The group recommended that Canada give special emphasis to exploring the possibilities for an international verification network, perhaps under UN auspices.

Participants opined that the problems facing multilateral disarmament are not due simply to a lack of political will, but also to the need for procedural and organizational reform of disarmament machinery. Canada should strive toward this.

It was recommended that Canada look for ways in which the UN role in war prevention and conflict resolution could be strengthened. It was also suggested that the UN develop and broaden its facilities for the application of innovative confidence-building techniques.

Participants endorsed the Government's intention to help the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) maintain its present status. There was strong support for the idea of an orientation and training program for NGOs implemented by the DDA; participants called on Canada to assist in the establishment of such a program. In addition, most participants thought Canada's support for the World Disarmament Campaign should remain firm. □

Canada Contributes Further to Peacekeeping Operations

Afghanistan and Pakistan

In April 1988, for the 17th time since 1945, Canada responded positively to another request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to participate in a new peacekeeping operation. On May 2, 1988, five Canadian officers arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan to serve in the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which will oversee the implementation of agreements relating to Afghanistan, including monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

This new United Nations operation has been set up in accordance with the terms of the Geneva agreements signed April 14, 1988 by representatives of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and the Soviet Union. UNGOMAP consists of 50 military officers under the command of a Finnish officer, Major-General Rauli Helminen. The other contributors to the force are Austria, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland and Sweden.

Iran-Iraq

On August 9, 1988, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) operating between Iran and Iraq. The Force is being established to assist in the implementation of a cease-

fire agreement which represents a vital first step in efforts to end the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.

Canada is contributing a fully self-sustained communications unit which will be responsible for all of the Observer Force's communication requirements along the entire 1,200 kilometre border between Iran and Iraq. In addition to this communications unit, which will comprise close to 500 Canadian Forces personnel, Canada has agreed to provide 15 officers to assist at UNIIIMOG headquarters and observer positions on the Force.

The Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the announcement by the United Nations Secretary-General of the August 20 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and commended both parties for having reached this agreement. They conveyed their appreciation to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar for his unstinting efforts that have brought the prospect of peace to this region of the Gulf.

Other Operations

Since the Second World War, Canada has participated in 16 forces and observer missions under UN auspices and in four peacekeeping operations outside the United Nations. In addition to UNGOMAP, Canada is actively involved in four peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and the Middle East, three of which are under UN auspices. These operations are:

a) the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The mission was established in 1948 to supervise cease-fire and armistice agreements between Israel and surrounding Arab states. The UNTSO headquarters is in Jerusalem. Canada provides 22 officer observers to UNTSO.

b) the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The operation was established in 1974 to supervise the areas of separation and limitations between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights, and Canada has participated from the outset. The Canadian contingent of 226 personnel, based at Camp Ziouani in Israeli-occupied territory, provides logistics and communication support, a role shared with Poland.

c) the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Canada has contributed forces to UNFICYP since its inception in 1964. Currently, Canada provides a contingent of 575 officers and other ranks. The role of UNFICYP is to supervise cease-fire agreements between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot forces.

d) the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). This mission was established in 1981 to monitor security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Canada joined in April 1985, providing up to nine helicopters and 140 personnel to form a Rotary Wing Aviation Unit and to fill certain headquarters staff positions.

In assessing potential peacekeeping commitments, Canada has developed a set of prerequisites, which a proposed mission should meet if it is to enjoy a reasonable measure of success. These prerequisites underline Canada's view that peacekeeping is not an end in itself; its purpose is not only to prevent conflict but also to create conditions in which the search for solutions to the underlying causes of conflict take place, the process of "peacemaking." For this reason, Canada has stressed the inter-

dependence of the peacemaking activities of political negotiators and peacekeeping operations, along with the importance of pursuing both with vigour and determination. Some of the more important prerequisites are as follows:

- the peacekeeping endeavour should be associated with an agreement for political settlement;
- the peacekeeping organization should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the United Nations;
- the peacekeeping mission must have a clear mandate which enjoys the support to all parties of the dispute;
- there should be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation; and
- participation should serve important Canadian foreign policy interests.

Peacekeeping is likely to remain a continuing feature of our international relations, an important aspect of our participation in United Nations activities, and a significant complement to our efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament in the pursuit of peace and security. □



Canadian soldiers on United Nations peacekeeping duties patrol the "Green Line" in Nicosia, Cyprus.

Canadian Forces Photo

Moscow Summit Furthers Arms Control and Disarmament

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met May 29-June 2, 1988 in Moscow to discuss a wide range of issues, including arms control, human rights and humanitarian concerns, regional issues and bilateral affairs. Canada believes that the breadth of the discussions is an excellent indication of the increasing depth of the US/Soviet relationship and, in particular, welcomes the progress made in arms control. The following are excerpts of the text of the USA/USSR Joint Statement at the conclusion of the Summit.

Arms Control


"The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF

The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the Treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and



US President Ronald Reagan (left) and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev place their signatures on the instruments of ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement at the Kremlin in Moscow. The Treaty was formally agreed to during the Washington Summit in December 1987.

U.S. Information Agency

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol.

The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 on the aggregate of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft Treaty also records the sides' agreement that, as a result of the reductions, the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level, approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations, the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the Treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and Short-Range Air-Launched Missiles (SRAMs) will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the Treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, as a minimum, include:

- A. Data exchanges to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically.
- B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.
- C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.
- D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.
- E. Short-notice, on-site inspection of:
 - (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
 - (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
 - (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).
- F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of

locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspection party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The Delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)....

Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the US and the USSR on notifications of launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed during the Moscow Summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a

result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations, the sides, as the first step, will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders, therefore, noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, the considerable preparation underway for the Experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites. They also noted the substantial progress on a new Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment has

been conducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 Treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security....

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the US-Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the Centers can play an important role in the context of a future treaty on reducing US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of ongoing multilateral negotiations and bilateral US-Soviet consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable,

and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons (CW) ban and to achieve an effective convention.... The leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants....

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the

leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting....

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The US and USSR will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology...." □

Recent Polls Show Government and Public Share Similar Concerns

A number of recent public opinion polls have been conducted in Canada on a variety of peace, security and arms control issues which reveal that the Canadian Government and public share many similar concerns.

Nowhere is this more clear than in attitudes toward Canadian membership in NATO — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On January 15,

1987, the Minister of National Defence stated:

"Canada has fully chosen to combine with other like-minded democracies in collective security arrangements in the unshakable belief that it is through collective defence undertakings that our protection is best assured. We are not in NATO and in Europe today out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because

our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada."

The results of a Gallup Canada, Inc. poll released August 24, 1987 indicated that a majority of Canadians (57%) thought our troops should continue to serve in Europe within the framework of Canada's membership in NATO. Less than half that number (26%) believed the Government should bring these troops back to Canada, while 16% were not sure.¹

Public support for NATO is even more clearly illustrated in a Decima Research and Public Affairs International Poll, where respondents were asked to declare their views on NATO (and not specifically on the stationing of Canadian troops in Europe). In this poll, 83% of Canadians believed we should stay in NATO.² When the question was posed as a statement ("Canada should withdraw from NATO") in a poll conducted by Environics, the extent of public support for NATO declined to 66% (with 11% advocating withdrawal).³

In a Gallup poll released January 25, 1988, it was ascertained that the recent Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement had the backing of 74% of Canadians.⁴ Canada had been encouraging such a treaty for quite some time, and its signing was a vindication of NATO's policy of combining deterrence and dialogue, a policy which Canada firmly supports.

¹ Based on 1,040 personal, in-home interviews with adults, 18 years and over, conducted between August 5-8, 1987. Accurate within a four percentage point margin, 19 in 20 times.

² Based upon 1,500 interviews between September 12-18, 1987. Accurate within a 2.6 percentage point margin, 95 times out of 100.

³ Environics Autumn 1987 Focus Canada Report. Based upon 2,014 interviews between October 1-18, 1987.

⁴ Based on 1,033 personal, in-home interviews with adults, 18 years and over, conducted between January 6-9, 1988. Accurate within a four percentage point margin, 19 in 20 times.

On a more general level, in April 1987, the Department of External Affairs commissioned the Longwoods Research Group Ltd. to undertake a national survey on a variety of topical foreign policy issues. Respondents were asked to describe in their own words what one issue facing the world today was of greatest personal concern to them. While no one issue was mentioned by a majority of Canadians, issues broadly related to war and peace were the most widely cited, being mentioned by 46% of Canadians. This included concerns related to the arms race (16%), nuclear war (12%), wars in general (9%) and world peace (9%). It should be noted that this concern with war and peace intensified from 36% of respondents in 1985.⁵

⁵ Conducted from April 4-27, 1987 in a national random sample of 1,011 qualified respondents during in-home, personal interviews. Considered accurate within 3.1 percentage points, 95 out of 100 times.

The poll also identified 11 specific issues for which it wanted measurements of Canadians' overall attitudes, with a view to determining opinion on what Canadian policy priorities should be. Of all issues, international peace was rated first, with 54% of Canadians according it "a great deal of concern." Arms control ranked fourth at 44%.

These findings appear to be consistent with the priority which the current Government attaches to arms control and disarmament. Indeed, on October 31, 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney stated to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs that: "Canada would work relentlessly to reduce tensions, to alleviate conflict, and to create the conditions for a general and lasting peace. The exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue, on whose outcome the lives of our children and of humanity depend." □

Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations Since 1987

In accordance with the arms control and disarmament objectives of the Canadian Government as outlined in Prime Minister Mulroney's address to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs on October 31, 1985, Canada conducts annual and ad hoc consultations with a variety of nations at the senior officials level. The following is a list of recent consultations:

| DATE | COUNTRY | LOCATION |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| January 15-16, 1987 | France | Ottawa |
| February 9, 1987 | German Democratic Republic | East Berlin |
| March 5-6, 1987 | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Ottawa |
| August 31 - September 1, 1987 | People's Republic of China | Ottawa |
| September 17-18, 1987 | Australia | Ottawa |
| October 20, 1987 | Czechoslovakia | Ottawa |
| January 11, 1988 | Japan | Ottawa |
| March 17-18, 1988 | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Moscow |
| March 21-22, 1988 | United Kingdom | London |
| March 23, 1988 | Federal Republic of Germany | Bonn |
| April 11, 1988 | Spain | Madrid |
| April 13, 1988 | Portugal | Lisbon |
| April 18, 1988 | New Zealand | Ottawa |

International Meeting of Physicians in Montreal

During the recent 8th Annual Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Montreal, Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, welcomed Congress delegates on behalf of the Canadian Government. Excerpts of his address follow:

"I am honoured to be present here this morning among such a distinguished gathering of individuals from many countries, and it is with pleasure that I welcome you to Montreal on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada. I also wish to take this opportunity to commend the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the Canadian organizers in particular for their enormous effort and dedication in staging this 8th Annual World Congress — 'Healing our Planet: A Global Prescription.'

Since your last meeting in Moscow, in May 1987, there have been significant developments in the arms control and disarmament field. Clearly, the most important of these has been the Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In addition, we have seen substantial progress at the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Treaty. Preparations have also begun in Vienna to create a new forum to negotiate conventional force reductions in Europe. The Stockholm confidence-building agreement has enabled NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to conduct 16 unprecedented on-site inspections of each other's military exercises. There has also been an improvement in the risk reduction operation of the USA and the Soviet Union, which aims at reducing the possibility of accidental nuclear war. And there is also a strong likelihood of a strategic arms agreement in the next year.

Canada believes that in order to usefully contribute to arms control discussions, we need an active and well-informed public, and we have taken a variety of steps to achieve these ends. The Government's participation in this forum, through our Permanent Representative to the United Nations, our



The Honourable Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Ambassador for Disarmament, and other officials of the Department of External Affairs and members of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security as well as our financial contributions is evidence of both our commitment and our appreciation for the work of the IPPNW, and especially its Canadian branch, in pursuit of this goal....

Canada is committed to playing an active role in the arms control and disarmament process. Firstly, recognizing and respecting the bilateral nature of some of the key negotiations, Canada regularly communicates its views and support to both the USSR and the USA. It is, however, Canada's view that we are entering a period in which multilateral arms control agreements will be increasingly significant and necessary. Canada is an active member of all the significant multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, and the new mandate negotiations on conventional stability in Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Canada is especially committed to the role of the UN in international peace and security. We are the fourth largest contributor to that organization and are actively involved in seeking to strengthen its role, including the contribution it can make in the arms control and security process....

Canada has stated six main principles in arms control and disarmament:

- i) radical reductions in nuclear arms;
- ii) the realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty, which would halt all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time;
- iii) the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation treaty, which is critical to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and to ensuring the safe transfer of technology and materials for the development of nuclear power systems;
- iv) the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban;
- v) the prevention of an arms build-up in outer space and,
- vi) increased confidence-building measures, agreements that promote better communications between nations and improve the East-West negotiating atmosphere.

In its pursuit of arms control, Canada has made a unique contribution in the field of verification, which is the process of ensuring that an arms control agreement is not being violated. In 1983, we launched a verification research program which concentrates among other things on techniques for seismic monitoring, monitoring chemical weapons use, and studying the feasibility of space-based satellite sensing. It should be noted, however, that even the most stringent verification *régime* cannot unequivocally ensure that signatories to an agreement are complying with the letter and spirit of the accord. Successful arms control requires a demonstrated commitment by governments to honour such agreements, if the atmosphere of confidence necessary for further arms control is to be achieved. Thus, we make a special point of encouraging full compliance with existing treaties.

Events of the last year have brought us progress and increased hope. Canada continues to believe that arms control is essential to the search for a more peaceful and secure world. We are confident that with the participation of citizens and groups like the IPPNW we will succeed in building this more secure and peaceful world." □

Ambassador Marchand Addresses CD on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Constituted in its present form in 1978, it meets in Geneva and has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament, the Conference works on the basis of consensus. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more often, as may be appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultation with the Conference, and also acts as his personal representative. The budget of the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary meetings or under any arrangement agreed upon by its members.

Non-members may submit written proposals or working documents and may, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship rotates among all members on a monthly basis. The Conference meets annually in Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the Assembly is not in session.

*(The above description of the CD was amended from *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. Volume 12: 1987, p. 10).*

The following are excerpts of the text of a July 26, 1988 speech to

the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand.

"In my statement today, I will address Item 5 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space....

Speaking for the first time in plenary since the Third Special Session on Disarmament, I will not hide my disappointment that the session ended without agreement on a substantive final document. However, like many of you who spoke before me on this subject, rather than pin blame for this situation on one participant or the other, I believe we must, in this forum, build on the common ground which emerged during the deliberations at that session and continue the dialogue in those areas where divergences continue to exist.

The emerging consensus at the Third Special Session on Disarmament confirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and participants urged the CD to intensify its efforts in this area. The draft document also referred to the significant contribution that a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations between the USSR and the USA would make to the common objective of preventing such an arms race. The Government of Canada concurs fully with this analysis which recognizes the significance of the task before us and gives proper weight to the importance of the bilateral dimension.

Notwithstanding this latter point, it is clear that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. This is as it should be, a point that is implicitly recognized in the draft document of the Special Session where it calls upon all states to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space, given 1) the potential for an arms race in outer space; 2) the increase in the number of countries with significant interests and capabilities

in space; and 3) the continuing growth in space activities. The Canadian Government believes that it is appropriate that this dimension should take on and, indeed, that it must take on increasing significance.

Having made this very general point, it is clear that if the multilateral dimension is to take on greater importance, the CD will have to carve out a more substantive role in preventing the development of an arms race in outer space. Our efforts to assume such a role must start from four important considerations:

- 1) we must take very great care to enhance stability and not detract from it;
- 2) our negotiations must complement, in the strictest sense of the word, the negotiations between the two major space powers;
- 3) we must recognize that a very considerable measure of prohibition and protection already exists in outer space and base our efforts on that foundation; and,
- 4) we must not confuse or lose sight of the very useful and practical division of labour that we have established between the CD and UNCOPUOS (United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space).

Establishing our starting point is relatively easy. What comes next is a lot harder. Prevention of an arms race in outer space clearly involves a significant effort in both dealing with space weapons and defining legitimate space activities. Everyone here recognizes the bewildering complexity of the problems regarding both the emplacement of weapons in space and the deployment on earth of weapons capable of attacking objects in space. We are also aware of the difficulty of defining the kinds of military activities that might or might not be legitimately conducted in space.

The fact that the task is difficult and complex does not dictate that we eschew it. It does suggest, however, that we should perhaps focus more narrowly on measures that could provide a starting point in the complicated task of coming to grips with the establishment of an appropriate international regime.

One response to such an approach is to assert that the problem requires a comprehensive solution and not piecemeal or partial treatment. While we would agree that the viability of incremental measures would depend on their compatibility with existing and future ones, any measures must also be susceptible to effective verification of compliance with legal obligations undertaken.

We also believe, as the Australian delegation noted last year, that the degree of success in meeting these ultimate objectives will be strongly dependent on the degree of transparency that states give to their activities. Indeed we must face the fact that unless we can make significant steps in the direction of greater transparency, our chances of negotiating an effective regime for the prevention of an arms race in outer space would not be such as to inspire much confidence.

One obvious area for practical progress in increasing transparency would be multilateral exchanges of data on space objects with military functions. There is clearly potential for progress as far as such objects based in space are concerned through taking advantage of the registration convention. In particular, Article IV(E) thereof stipulates that each state shall furnish to the Secretary-General information on the general function of a space article carried on its registry.

At the outset, it should be noted that the registration convention is not exclusively or even primarily an arms control or disarmament treaty. It should further be noted that the outer space treaty — although also negotiated in the committee on the peaceful uses of outer space — is in part incontestably an arms control measure. Clearly, it is the terms

of an agreement and not its negotiating provenance, which should determine its purpose and functions.

As noted, Article IV of the 1975 convention requires, *inter alia*, that each state furnish information concerning the general function of the space object to be launched. In the past, descriptions furnished to the UN Secretary-General under this heading have tended to be extremely vague. In fact, as both the UK and Canada have pointed out in working papers to the Conference in 1985, not one of the launchings registered has ever been described as having a military function despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, well over half of all space launches are primarily for military purposes. While we accept the fact that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning military space activities may, by necessity, be limited by considerations of national security (although even this point might deserve some examination), we do not believe that this should extend to a refusal to describe space objects as having military functions. Here again, it is a question of using elements of the existing legal regime in outer space to instill further confidence and effectively promote greater transparency.

What we are suggesting, therefore, is that states party to the registration convention examine the possibility of taking their reporting responsibilities much more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the 'general function of the space objects' to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening, for arms control purposes, of state practice under the convention.

Assuming that states party to the convention could reach an understanding that in the future they will, systematically, at time of registration, provide information on the military or civilian nature of a space object, then space powers that are not party to the convention could submit the same information

under General Assembly Resolution 1721(XVI) of 1961 which called on all states to provide information on their space objects.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to appeal to members of the Conference who has launched space objects and are not party to the convention or who are party to the convention but either do not register their space objects or delay several years before doing so, to, as appropriate, either become party to the convention or better observe the spirit of its provisions.

Clearly, the proposal set out above would represent a very small step toward more transparency and openness in outer space. How it could or would be effected would also be a matter for study. Here, perhaps, there is a possibility of taking up a point made by the delegation of the FRG in 1987, with regards to the possibility of joining efforts with other forums having at their disposal the necessary legal expertise.

Strengthening of state practice under the registration convention might even pave the way for eventual establishment of a code of conduct for outer space as advocated by France, the UK and the FRG in the CD in 1985. It could also go some way toward advancing suggestions concerning the legal immunity of satellites. In this connection, we have noted with great interest that Foreign Minister Dumas of France, at the Third Special Session devoted to disarmament, urged that the CD give close examination, *inter alia*, to strengthening the system of notification under the 1975 registration convention and framing a code of good conduct for outer space.

The important point, we believe, is that if this Conference continues to work in the hope that we can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then we will never accomplish our work. However, we must start somewhere. The elaboration of modest confidence-building measures would surely constitute a useful beginning...." ■

Success at May Meeting of United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) met in New York from May 2 to May 20, 1988. This year's session had extra significance in that it immediately preceded the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly (UNSSOD III). There were, consequently, added expectations that the UNDC could complete consideration of several items and report the result of its work to UNSSOD III.

Under the effective chairmanship of Ambassador Davidson Hepburn of the Bahamas, the UNDC was able to get down to substantive business very quickly. Among its most notable accomplishments, the Commission agreed upon a set of "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level." This significant and detailed document sets out an agreed set of guidelines on principles, objectives, characteristics, implementation and development for confidence-building measures. Canada has strongly supported the UNDC's efforts to develop these guidelines, which first began with an initiative by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1982.

One of the most significant successes of UNDC during its 1988 Session was in the area of arms control verification. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, for a second year, chaired a working group on the subject which reached consensus on a set of 16 principles relating to verification. This comes as a culmination of several years' effort by Canada which began with the initiation of a General Assembly resolution in 1985. This resolution and those of the two subsequent years, also initiated by Canada, were adopted by consensus.

The overall objective of Canadian efforts on verification at the UNDC was to enhance international understanding of the verification issues, with a view to improving opportunities for negotiating meaningful and adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament (ACD)

agreements, particularly multilateral ones.

At UNDC 87, Canada, as chairman, submitted a detailed and comprehensive paper which outlined draft conclusions for the working group. Most delegations were complimentary of the quality of this submission text. Divergent views were reconciled through careful and patient negotiation, and a shorter report was adopted by consensus. This report incorporated an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of ten verification principles that elaborate upon or add to those found in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

The 1988 session of the UNDC built upon the success of the previous year's session, with the adoption of a report on May 18 that concluded the UNDC's consideration of verification. This report added six new verification principles to those agreed upon in 1987.

The 1988 report also summarizes the UNDC's discussions on techniques of verification and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. While there was no consensus for making firm recommendations regarding these latter two topics, the UNDC's deliberations can still be regarded as useful in that the exchange of views on these points resulted in a much better understanding of the issues involved.

The substance of the UNDC's report on verification is particularly noteworthy. As Ambassador Roche said in his concluding remarks at the UNDC: "The sixteen principles that have now been adopted by consensus, as outlined in Part 1 of the report, represent a new consensus by the international community with respect to this very important subject and, moreover, lay a new foundation for all future activities by the United Nations in this area."

The successful conclusion of the UNDC's consideration of verification underlines the appropriateness of Canada's evolutionary approach to verification. Canada's previous efforts in the General Assembly and other international forums, bilateral discussions with

various governments, production of practical yet innovative reports, and other activities in this field, all helped to prepare the foundation for the UNDC's success by sensitizing the international community to the importance of verification. Also crucial to the success of the Commission on this item was the spirit of co-operation and support manifested by the members of the verification working group both in 1987 and 1988. It is this spirit which underlays the new consensus of the international community on this subject.

While the UNDC has advanced consideration of the verification issue significantly, Canada still believes that important work needs to be done on this subject within the context of the United Nations. To this end, Canada and the Netherlands tabled a detailed paper at UNSSOD III which examined the role of the United Nations in verification. The paper concludes with a proposal that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, undertake a study on the role of the United Nations in verification. In the course of discussions between Canada and other countries at UNSSOD III, a mandate for this study was refined, which received widespread approval during the late hours of the Special Session. However, because of the inability to reach agreement on other points, the Special Session was unable to arrive at a concluding document.

Any role for the United Nations must develop in a step-by-step fashion based on what is realistically feasible in today's political and financial environment. In Canada's view, a Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification, based on the mandate worked out at UNSSOD III, would be the next logical step for advancing the consideration of verification within the United Nations and the role of the United Nations in this field. This mandate would ensure that the merits and implications of all proposals in this context are considered and assessed. Canada will continue to pursue this proposal at the United Nations. □

United Nations Convenes Meeting of Verification Experts in USSR

At the 1987 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Soviet Union offered to host a United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification in Dagomys, USSR, commencing on April 12, 1988. Organized within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) and financed from the contribution by the USSR to the WDC Trust Fund, responsibility for the form and substance of that meeting was assumed by the United Nations. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, as Chairman of the Dagomys meeting, invited some 35 experts from more than 20 countries to participate in the meeting to discuss the conceptual issues and the technical aspects of verification.

Regarding conceptual aspects, the participants focussed on issues such as an overview of the relationship between verification of arms control and disarmament agreements and security, principles of verification, lessons from existing arrangements, institutional aspects and the human factor, and openness, transparency and confidence-building. The technical issues included topics such as multilateral aspects of the verification of underground nuclear explosions, scientific and technological progress in verification techniques, and whether there is a growing gap between advances in weapons systems and verification capabilities. The meeting also addressed verification issues relevant for the future.

Included in the group of experts who took part in these discussions were a number of ambassadors closely related to the arms control and disarmament (ACD) negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The presence of Mr. Lynn M. Hansen and Mr. Oleg A. Grinevsky, respectively USA and USSR representatives to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), added a particularly positive flavour to the proceedings since that Conference



Delegates at the April 12-15, 1988 United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification at Dagomys, USSR.

had succeeded in producing the Stockholm Document, thought by many to be a singular achievement in the field of multilateral ACD diplomacy. The successful implementation of the verification procedures included in the Stockholm Document combined with the successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiation in Washington on December 8, 1987 contributed significantly to the positive atmosphere of the Dagomys meeting. As Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom remarked, there seems to be no disagreement around the table regarding the significance of verification in the ACD negotiating process.

Canada was represented at the Dagomys meeting by two experts in the concept and technology of verification. Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs, was invited by the Under-Secretary-General Akashi to present a paper on the principles of verification in a multilateral context. Dr. Peter Basham, a seismologist with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, who acts as the senior Canadian representative on the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in Geneva, participated in the technical discussions

relating to the verification of a Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban (CTB).

The Dagomys meeting permitted both the conceptual problems and the more practical technical considerations of verification inherent within the global setting to be addressed together. This gathering of a relatively small group of specialists in the verification process permitted a more intimate exploration of the role and primary responsibilities of the United Nations deriving from the UN Charter, the UNSSOD I final document, and from provisions of existing agreements to be undertaken. The results of the meeting are likely to be of interest to a broad array of generalists as well as experts in the ACD process.

The most tangible and practical result of the meeting was the collection of the presented papers. These have been reproduced in the summer 1988 edition of *Disarmament*, a periodic review by the United Nations which is intended to serve as a source of information and a forum for ideas concerning the activities of the United Nations with regard to arms limitation and disarmament issues. It can be obtained from the United Nations, Sales Section, New York, N.Y. □

Canada Accedes to the Antarctic Treaty

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on May 4, 1988 Canada's accession to the Antarctic Treaty.

The Antarctic Treaty System provides a legal regime designed to freeze all territorial claims to Antarctica, preserve the delicate Antarctic environment and its living resources, and

promote the peaceful use and development of Antarctica.

In making the announcement, Mr. Clark said that Canada, as a leading Arctic state and a major player in polar science and technology, was taking its place among countries with a strong interest in Antarctic matters. "Canada wishes to endorse a Treaty that has created the world's sole, effective non-militarized

area," he said. "Canada is acutely aware of the uniqueness of the Antarctica and will, through accession to the Treaty, be better able to work for the protection of its sensitive environment and dependent ecosystems," he continued. Canada will also initiate the steps necessary to accede to the conventions associated with the Treaty.

Canada has supported the Antarctic Treaty System in the past and has spoken out in its favour in the United Nations. □

Appointments to CIIPS

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has recently announced the appointment of a new Executive Director and four new Board members of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS).

On August 11, 1988, Mr. Clark announced the appointment of Mr. Bernard Wood as Executive Director and Member of the Board of Directors of CIIPS. The appointment is for a five-year term, commencing February 1, 1989. Mr. Wood is the founding and current Director and Chief Executive Officer of the North-South Institute in Ottawa, established in 1976 as a non-profit policy research organization concerned with the relationships between industrialized and developing countries. In diverse other

capacities, he has rendered valued public service both nationally and internationally, including as Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Canada to leaders of Commonwealth States preparatory to Heads of Government meetings on Southern Africa from 1985-86.

In announcing this appointment, Mr. Clark expressed his deep appreciation to Mr. Geoffrey Pearson first and current Executive Director, for his imagination, skill and dedication in presiding over and effectively guiding the activities of the Institute in its critically important early years.

Mr. Clark observed that, "Under the capable direction of Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security has already become a well-established and respected institution, which is making a valued contribution to the quality of discussion in Canada on international peace and security issues.... Under the direction of Mr. Wood, already widely respected for his experience with and knowledge of the complexities of the international scene, the Institute will build on its strengths and fully meet the purposes for which it was established by Parliament."

Also recently joining the 17-member Board of Directors for a three-year term were:

Dr. Edward Green, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

Dr. Orest Cochkanoff, Consulting Engineer and former Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Technical University of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia.


Vice-Admiral Harry Porter (retired) CD, marine consultant, Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Ms. Mary Simon, President, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Kuujuaq, Quebec.

The Institute was formally established on August 15, 1984 with the support of all parties, and reports annually to Parliament. The purpose of the Institute is to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to international peace and security from a Canadian perspective, with particular emphasis on arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution. For further information, the Institute can be contacted at 360 Albert Street, Suite 900, Ottawa, Ontario, K1R 7X7, telephone (613) 990-1593. □



CIIPS Executive Director designate, Mr. Bernard Wood.



Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, current CIIPS Executive Director.

Canadian Participation in Australian NGO Verification Conference

In May 1988, two Australian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) combined to host a verification conference in Sydney "Checking the Arms Race: Australia's Role in International Verification." Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) and People for Nuclear Disarmament (PNA), two of the larger and better known Australian NGOs, with financial assistance from a broad range of sponsors, designed the Conference as a means of studying the possible application of Australia's technology for verification purposes in the multilateral aspects of the international arms control and disarmament (ACD) process. More than 150 representatives from across Australia, plus a number of invited guests from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, India, Japan and Canada, undertook three days of discussion and presentations.

The Conference itself as an NGO activity was impressive both by the variety of expertise assembled and by the low-key and even-handed approach which the organizers took to the subjects at hand. The keynote address was delivered by the Australian Minister of Defence, Mr. Kim Beasley. He focussed

mainly on the Australian NGO preoccupation with the Joint Facilities issue. This refers to a number of bases operated jointly by Australia and the United States for the purpose of monitoring certain military activities of other nations. He presented a reasoned case for continuation of the present policy with a fairly convincing rationale of the importance of these facilities to reinforce international security and ACD verification. He particularly underscored the immediate relevancy of this type of facility in the verification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) (and presumably follow-on) treaties.

Four senior representatives from the Australian Department of Defence participated actively in the Conference throughout, as well as one representative each from the ministries of foreign affairs of Australia and New Zealand. They succeeded collectively in highlighting common ground in a number of other ACD issue areas, specifically relating to chemical weapons negotiations which are reaching a final stage in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

At the invitation of the Conference coordinators, Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs, presented a paper focussing on the European and Canadian perception of the role of verification in international arms control and disarmament negotiations. In addition to the Canadian paper prepared for the Conference and reproduced in the main Conference document, Mr. Cleminson provided an audio-visual presentation on the PAXSAT concept, which focusses on the application of space-based remote sensing for verification purposes. A number of NGO participants made a point of complementing Canada for having undertaken this innovative type of research and for having made it readily available.

If any other particular characteristic of the Conference was notable, it was the relative youth of many of the major NGO presenters and the serious research which they had undertaken in developing their presentations. Overall, the Conference illustrated the utility of a multi-disciplinary approach to ACD issues. ■

Selected Recent Department of External Affairs Publications

General

1. **News Release No. 094**
"Appointment to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." April 29, 1988.
2. **News Release No. 096**
"Canada Accedes to the Antarctic Treaty." May 4, 1988.
3. **Press Release No. 28**
"Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to the Third United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament." New York, June 13, 1988.

4. News Release No. 169

"Appointments to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." August 5, 1988.

5. News Release No. 171 (Government of Canada)

"Canadian Participation in the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)." August 9, 1988.

6. News Release No. 172

"Appointment of Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." August 11, 1988.

Consultative Group


7. Report on the Meeting of October 1-3, 1987, "Peace and Security in the Arctic: Decisions for Canada." Prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, November 12, 1987.
8. Report on the Meeting of April 14-16, 1988, "The Third UN Special Session on Disarmament." Prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, May 3, 1988.
9. Report of Cross-Canada Tour, December 1-16, 1987, "Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament."

Arms Control Verification Studies Series

- 10. "A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification." by F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman. January 1986.
- 11. "The Role of Astronomical Instruments in Arms Control Verification." by Chris A. Ruthowski. September 1986.
- 12. "The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management." by Brian S. Mandell. 1987.

Arms Control and Disarmament Studies Series

- 13. "Confidence- (and Security-) Building Measures in the Arms Control



Recent Publications of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs.

Process: A Canadian Perspective." by James MacIntosh. August 1985.

Verification Brochures

- 14. "Seismic Verification." 1986.
- 15. "The PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification." 1987.
- 16. "Verification Research: Canada's Verification Research Program." 1987.

Others

- 17. "Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152(o)." April 1986.

All the above publications are available free of charge from the Editor.

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund to Date — Fiscal Year 1988-89

CONTRIBUTIONS

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| 1. Peace Centre Project, St. John's — library material | \$3,500 |
| 2. University of Manitoba — Political Studies Students' Conference | \$4,500 |
| 3. Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto — Conference | \$5,000 |
| 4. Peace Education Centre, Vancouver — Youth Forum | \$5,000 |
| 5. Pacijou — presentation at International Conference | \$3,200 |
| 6. Dr. Matthew Speier — attend International Teachers for Peace Congress in Bonn | \$1,300 |
| 7. Dr. Peggy Falkenheim — attend Conference on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region | \$2,000 |
| 8. Voice of Women — attend UNSSOD III | \$1,000 |
| 9. Group of 78 — participation at UNSSOD III preparatory committee | \$1,200 |
| 10. J.A. Boutillier — attendance at ISIS Conference, Malaysia | \$1,800 |
| 11. Canadian Federation of University Women — Women, Leadership and Sustainable Development Conference | \$2,000 |
| 12. Science for Peace — Peace Studies Lecture Series | \$2,500 |
| 13. Project Ploughshares, Calgary — Outreach Program | \$1,000 |
| 14. United Nations Association in Canada — Disarmament Week Project | \$10,000 |
| TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS | \$44,000 |

GRANTS

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|--|-----------------|
| 1. Peacefund Canada — UNSSOD III | \$2,000 |
| 2. North American Model United Nations — Toronto | \$1,500 |
| 3. Albert Legault — translation | \$7,000 |
| 4. Beyond War — Western Canada speaking tour of Alexander Nikitin and Craig Barnes | \$5,680 |
| 5. NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. — publication of five issues for UNSSOD III | \$3,000 |
| 6. Brock University — Sanity, Science and Global Responsibility Conference | \$5,400 |
| 7. Radio Centre Ville St-Louis Inc. — programs on peace and disarmament | \$4,600 |
| 8. Kornel Buczek — seismic verification | \$4,000 |
| TOTAL OF GRANTS | \$33,180 |
| TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS | \$77,180 |