



**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 877-4503

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages detached/
Pages détachées |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Showthrough/
Transparence |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur | <input type="checkbox"/> Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents | <input type="checkbox"/> Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la
distorsion le long de la marge intérieure | <input type="checkbox"/> Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont
pas été filmées. | <input type="checkbox"/> Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,
etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à
obtenir la meilleure image possible. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplémentaires: | |

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



Library of the Public
Archives of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

La bibliothèque des Archives
publiques du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

T

A REVIEW
OF
THE MILITIA POLICY
OF THE
PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.

BY JUNIUS, JR.

"O TEMPORA, O MORES."

HAMILTON.

1863.

ing
pre
thi
the
ren
an
Sy
inc

wi
tu
fo
m
th
ta
vo
ef

A REVIEW
OF
THE MILITIA POLICY
OF THE
PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.

The following lines are published with a view of clearly explaining to the Members of the Legislature the course adopted by the present Government in their administration of the Militia affairs of this Province, and the motives which have induced them to act as they have in their management of the Volunteer Force; and if the remarks herein contained will throw any light on the subject, or have any effect whatever in bringing about improvements in the Militia System, the time and trouble bestowed upon them will not have been incurred in vain.

I.

THE MILITIA SYSTEM FROM 1855 UNTIL 1862.

In the year 1855, when the British Army in this Province was withdrawn on account of the Crimean War, the Provincial Legislature passed the first bill organizing the Active Force, which was founded on the report of a Commission appointed by the then Government. This law was a wise and judicious measure, well adapted to the capabilities of the country, agreeable to the people, and advantageous to the volunteers themselves. Under its provisions the volunteer force was a *reality*, was fast acquiring discipline, and was efficient as far as the organization went.

In the year 1859 the law was amended, the force was considerably reduced, and the amount paid to the different services greatly diminished. Under these adverse circumstances the volunteer militia rapidly deteriorated, and was fast dwindling away, when, suddenly, the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on the steamer *Trent*, startled the Province from her state of fancied security, and gave an unnatural impetus to volunteering, drilling, and soldiering of every description. The spasmodic efforts of the inhabitants of this country to array themselves to resist the aggressions which, at that time seemed imminent, the well meant, but ill directed zeal which animated them, and the chaos into which the whole militia system became at once inextricably involved, made manifest the evils of the short-sighted policy that had neglected the volunteer force on the score of expense and had considered it unnecessary to prepare for war until the foe were actually thundering at our borders.

The want of preparation and the deficiency of all organization or system in the militia, were so deeply felt at that time by the people of the Province, that the existing Government appointed a Commission to report upon the best organization for providing an armed force in case of war. The report of this Commission, and the law founded upon it, were brought before the Legislature during the last Session of Parliament, but, unfortunately for the Militia Bill and for the Government, when the vote was taken, the danger of war was not quite so imminent as when the report was drawn out, and the consequence was that many members of Parliament, who, two months before would have voted for twice as expensive a Bill, threw it out on the score of expense. And the Government, having resigned on account of their defeat, the present Administration taking their place, passed a new Militia Law, which has been in existence for nearly a year.

Let us now consider the comparative merits of the different laws

relating to the Militia that have been passed and proposed since 1855.

1. THE LAW OF 1855.

This law provided for a force of 5 000 men, to be armed by the Government, and to be paid—the infantry and cavalry for ten days in the year, the artillery for twenty days; the men to receive \$1.00 a day, and an equal sum for each horse. Under this law the men had to provide their own uniforms, and if any corps was not properly uniformed, equipped, and efficient at the periodical inspections, it was disbanded. The drill under this law was not bound to be consecutive, and the men were paid their allowances as soon as the drill was over. Under this system the force, although not numerous, flourished, and was an efficient, compact and organized body.

2. THE LAW OF 1859.

In the year 1859 the Provincial finances were very low, and, to reduce the expenditure, the Militia Law was amended. By this amendment, several corps were struck off Class A, and the drill of the remainder was reduced from twenty days in the artillery to twelve days a year, and from ten days a year in the other forces to six days. The number of men in each corps was reduced from fifty and upwards to thirty; the pay for the cavalry horses was taken away; the drill was necessarily consecutive; and the men were not paid until December in each year. This law had a very prejudicial effect on the whole force, and many corps broke down, and were disbanded. Others dwindled away, and the Prince of Wales' visit, and the excitement it created, alone held the force together, until, as before remarked, the *Trent* affair gave a fresh stimulus to the military spirit.


3. THE REJECTED MILITIA BILL OF 1862.

This Bill was intended as a war measure, that is to say, as a mea-

sure that would have provided a sufficient force for peaceable times and, at the same time, have organized such a system in the Militia that, in case of war being declared, the machinery for bringing a large army into the field would have been all arranged, so as to have applied the strength of the Province in the most advantageous and skillful manner for the purposes of defence.

4. THE LAW OF 1862.

This law provided that the Active Force, Class A., should consist of not more than ten thousand officers and men; and also provided that the men should be drilled twelve days in each year, for the same pay that they formerly received for six days drilling, viz., \$6.00; that the drill should not be consecutive; and that each volunteer militiaman should receive \$6.00 a year in lieu of clothing if he was uniformed, or, if not, that he should be supplied with clothing at government expense. This law also provided for the appointment of Brigade-Majors. Having now briefly reviewed the provisions of the various measures that have been adopted for organizing the Militia of the Province, let us now proceed to explain how this last law of 1862 has been administered by the present Government.



II.

THE MILITIA POLICY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.

"Vir bonus est quis?
Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat."—HORACE.

The existing Militia Law, if administered by military men, or by those who understood military matters, would be a very good and efficient law, and one that would suit the wishes of the Volunteers and the people. But, unfortunately, the revolution of the political wheel of fate has pitchforked into office and power the present Administration, a number of gentlemen who are about as well qualified to have charge of the Militia or military affairs of a large Province, as they would be to preside over, and take charge of a college of Chaldean astrologists.

The public, knowing what a difficult matter the organization of a Volunteer Force is, would not have felt half so keenly, or have so greatly deplored the mere military ignorance of the present Administration, were it not for the fact that it has been noticed with the sincerest concern, that the Government have abandoned themselves to the pernicious course of using the Volunteer organization for party and political purposes, and of having exhibited the grossest partizanship in their management of Militia affairs.

This favoritism and partiality has not been carried on in a legitimate manner. It can easily be understood that a Government, on coming into office, should desire to aid, in every way possible, those supporters by whose votes and influence they were placed in power. But this aid and patronage should be distributed among their followers with some show of decency. The rules of propriety should, at

least, be acknowledged; and if offices in the Militia are to be given away for political reasons, a show of adherence to military custom and precedent should be made manifest. How has it been with the present Government? Have they adhered to the rules of discipline? Have they cared for the country; for the Militia; or for the people? Have they made even a show of improving the defences of the Province? No. They have acted directly contrary to this. They have sapped the very foundations of military discipline. They have encouraged insubordination and disobedience. They have swept away all those land-marks of the greater principles of military organization, and all those rules of discipline which for hundreds of years in all armies have regulated the course of military responsibility. And what have they substituted? Nothing. They have swept away the land-marks and rules that have hitherto guided officers in their duty; and have left the force wandering about in a labyrinth of incongruous and conflicting orders, uncertain what to do, or which way to turn, who to obey or who not, and perfectly at a loss as to the correct method of performing their duties.

It may be thought by some that these remarks are stronger than the occasion calls for, and that the danger is not so great as is apprehended. But let military men be consulted, let their ideas be ascertained, and see if their views do not support the foregoing opinions. Or, if the reader is afflicted with the absurd prejudice against military men or good volunteer officers, that it is said the premier labors under, then let war come upon us, let the enemy march through our towns and villages, and then see whether the armed mob, into which the Government is fast turning the Militia, is the best style of force for defensive purposes.

This unfortunate Province deserves, indeed, the commiseration of all people for the sad fate which has, in a crisis in her destiny,

placed at the helm of affairs one whose ignorance of military matters is so great that he does not even know enough to be able to perceive how ignorant he really is; and whose personal feelings and antipathies are so strong, that for the purpose of venting his private spleen against an officer of his neighborhood, is willing to upset the whole discipline and organization of the Militia, and to place brigade majors on the staffs of officers in all parts of the Province, with powers sufficient to destroy the esprit and obedience of the whole force.

The Militia is a subject that should be free from all party or political relationship, and should be considered solely with a view to the benefit of the Province at large. Unfortunately, it is not so with us at present, and it is to be hoped that the Legislature will not allow this session to pass away without settling the affairs relating to the defensive force of the Province on a more satisfactory basis.

Having thus alluded briefly to the subject generally, we will proceed to review the conduct of the present Administration with reference to the Militia affairs, since their advent to office last year.

In the first place, then, is a well-known fact that in former times, before the paid Militia were organized, the officers who took any interest in the matter were for the most part old-fashioned "Tories," who had learnt a little military discipline during the rebellions of 1837 and 1838; and that even after the Active Force were paid, the officers who were most energetic mainly belonged to the Conservative party. This was not through any influence of the Government, but happened merely from the fact that the members of that party were the only men who would entail the great risk, the great expense, and the ridicule that formerly attended the organization and keeping up of a volunteer corps. At that time, commissions went begging about, and it was only the superior military feeling of the Conservative party that kept up the Militia.

The result of all this was, that Mr. Sandfield McDonald found that all the higher officers in the force were not of the same political stripe as himself, and, because they were not of his party, he forgot the consideration they were entitled to from their long services, dating, in some instances, from the war of 1812. He forgot the claims they had on the country from their continued good conduct; he forgot the necessity of preserving discipline in the Militia; he forgot the welfare of the Province, whose interests he was sworn to care for; in fact, he forgot everything in an insane political prejudice, and looked about him for some means to slight those officers and curtail their influence, in the hope of driving them to resign and to leave the force forever.

Having thought over the matter, he considered that he could not dismiss them without any reason, and without a trial, and came to the conclusion that the neatest trick he could adopt would be to appoint brigade majors on the staffs of these officers, and then give them instructions which would insult the Colonels and take all the power out of their hands, and then trust to the ignorance of military etiquette—which necessarily prevails in the country—to save him in the House from the effects his shameful injustice should have entailed.

It can safely be said that, in the memory of man, or as far back as the history of armies will inform us, no officer in command of any force, however small or however numerous, was ever before placed under the instructions of his own adjutant assistant or clerk, which is the effect of a brigadier being placed under his brigade major. It has been left for a *politician* of a dependency of the British empire to inaugurate a new system of organization for an army—one which is opposed to the doctrines laid down by Cæsar and Hannibal in ancient times, by all the great generals of the middle

ages, and by those wonderful warriors who shone out so conspicuously in the military art in the wars of the early part of this century.

A merchant might as well be placed under the orders of his clerk, a foroman of a factory under the orders of an apprentice, a post captain under a mid-shipman, or a lawyer be compelled to obey the directions of his copying clerk, as for a colonel to be placed under the instructions of his own brigade-major. Further discussion on this subject is superfluous, as the shallowest intellect can perceive the absurdity of the brigade-majors' instructions. It may also be remarked that the premier seems to have been obliged to eat his own words, for when asked in the House whether the colonels were to correspond through the brigade-majors, he distinctly said they were not, although the instructions to those officers expressly state that they shall be the sole medium of communication with headquarters.

To show the evil of the orders given to the brigade majors it will only be necessary to call to mind the effect those orders have occasioned. The first thing that occurred was the resignation of Col. Campbell, C.B. whose superior military knowledge caused him to be unwilling to obey the instructions, but, at the same time, made him also unwilling absolutely to disobey the orders of his superiors, and who, therefore, took the only course open to him as a soldier, and left the force in disgust. Col. Sir E. P. Tacho resigned next, upon the same grounds, and in these two officers the militia service lost two of its most efficient and most worthy members. Others, perhaps, not so well posted in military etiquette, or, perhaps, knowing the meaning of the dodge to get rid of them, still retained their commissions, and either openly refused to obey the instructions calling upon them to communicate through the brigade majors, or, on the other hand, quietly evaded them, trusting to time and the

common sense of the community, or the chances of the game of politics to bring about a more reasonable state of affairs. One colonel, it is well known, stood up in his place in the Legislative Council and declared that he had never obeyed the orders, and openly boasted of his disobedience. The common sense of the reader will at once show him the pernicious effect on the discipline of the force that such an example must necessarily entail.

The next thing that occupied the premier's attention was the necessity to do something in the Militia to show the Legislature, at the next Session of Parliament, that his Militia Bill was not a failure, and that he had been very successful in raising new corps without drafting. The Ministry, therefore, sent circulars to the leading members of their party all over the Province, requesting them to raise volunteer corps, and also wrote privately to their leading supporters, telling them it was necessary, for the sake of the party, that volunteer corps should be organized, and that if they would send down fifty or sixty names they would be gazetted, uniformed, armed, and equipped at government expense.

After an immense deal of correspondence, a certain number of men send down lists of names, and the Government, without even knowing whether there are such men *bona fide* willing to serve, without even caring, immediately gazette them, and send them arms, greatcoats, and equipments before, even, they send the uniforms, and carry on this principle to a great extent. And then, when the House opens, lay a report of the progress of the Militia on the table of the House, and show that so many thousands of names have been sent in, that so many corps have been gazetted, that an immense number of valuable arms have been scattered broadcast all over the country, and that the volunteer movement has been *imminently* (?) successful; while, at the same time, they know, and

so do we know, and so do the whole of the old Volunteer Force know, that not one tenth of those men will ever be paraded, drilled and uniformed fit for service, and that only a proportion of the arms that have been so recklessly distributed through the country will ever be returned into store, or recovered by the authorities.

There have been many instances of gentlemen who, at the time of the *Trent* affair, could not be prevailed upon to raise or join a volunteer corps, and would not even drill when the country was in danger, who, having lately had the party whip applied to them by the ministry, have, to the astonishment of their neighbors, declared their intention to raise volunteer corps, and have boasted how easily it was to be done, as all they had to do was to send down lists of names (whether *bona fide* or not) in order to be gazetted, uniformed, armed and drilled at government expense. Sad, indeed, must be the fate of a country defended by an army commanded by such patriotic and enthusiastic officers.

How different were the rules under which the old force was raised. The officer had first to get the names of those willing to join, he had then to get a recommendation as to his capability from the colonel of the district, he was then obliged to have his men inspected, and his corps was gazetted. It was afterwards necessary that he should have all his men uniformed, and inspected *in uniform* by the inspecting field officer before the arms were issued. Now, however, no checks of this nature seem to be required; no care seems to be taken by the Government that they should be *bona fide* corps. The only solicitude of the Government appears to be, that they should be able to have the best possible excuse for gazetting the largest number of volunteer corps, and for scattering the largest possible amount of government arms or stores throughout the country.

The working of this policy is such that let any supporter of the

party in power ask leave to be gazetted in command of a rifle corps, and no matter whether he is a tinker, shoemaker, cobbler, or blacksmith; no matter whether he is able to read or write or not; no matter whether he is a cripple or is sound, so long as he only votes right he is sure to be gazetted. While, on the other hand, let a Conservative raise a corps, let him be ever so well qualified, let him learn his drill and teach his men, and let him apply to be gazetted, and his application will be reserved for future consideration, and will, in all probability, be laid on the shelf, having, in the style of the Norfolk Commission of the Peace, the words "Violent Tory," or "Strong Partizan," written on its margin, in the ill-spelt handwriting of some village politician in his neighborhood.

This picture is not overdrawn, for it is well known that instances have occurred where the recommendations of colonels of battalions have been sent to storekeepers and tavernkeepers in their neighborhood to be revised as to the political character of the parties recommended.

There is another subject to be noticed, which, although considered last, is of the greatest importance. We refer to the allowance, in lieu of clothing, granted by the Act. Section 3, of the Militia Law, directs, "That *each Volunteer Militiaman* shall, in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, be supplied with uniform clothing while on drill or service, or receive such sum not exceeding \$6.00 per annum in lieu thereof, as may be directed by the Commander-in-Chief." Under this section, the Active Force expected to get the allowance mentioned. But how did the Government act? They could not bear the idea of doing anything for the old force, Class A., because that force was raised by the late Government, and was, as before remarked, mainly composed of Conservatives. They therefore granted the allowance of \$6.00 to Class B., but, in defiance of the law

of the land, absolutely refused to give it to Class A., although the act says distinctly that *each volunteer militiaman*, without any distinction as to class, should receive the allowance. But the Government did not even stop here. They waited till after the beginning of the year, and, in the early part of February last, sent a circular to the Class B. corps, telling them to drill twelve days, and they should receive another \$6.00 allowance for clothing, while Class A. will, in all probability, not receive orders to drill till late in the year, as was the case last year, and then will not be paid until December.

The reason of this gross partiality in favor of Class B., in spite of the act of Parliament, is also the effect of political feeling, as it is well known that the government supporters are all in the new force, or Class B. It is greatly to be deplored that the parties in power should destroy the faith of the Militiamen in the Government, and in the laws of the Province. The men belonging to Class A. know that they are entitled to certain rights under the act of the Legislature, and they cannot understand how the statute book of the Province can contain a law giving them rights, and that there can be any power that can deprive them of those rights. They have universally characterized the proceeding among themselves as a swindle and a chiselling operation, and no one can imagine what disaffection and insubordination it has caused, not because the men care so much for the paltry sum in dispute, but no British subject will tamely submit to have the rights which he is entitled to under his laws, trampled upon. The Legislature, it is hoped, will enforce the laws it enacts, and punish those who break them, no matter what their power or what their influence may be.

JUNIUS, JR.

HAMILTON, April, 1863.

