

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
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SURVEY OF WORLD AFFAIRS --
MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons, January 29, 1954.

(See also Statements and Speeches No. 54/6)

This motion is for the purpose of making it possible to have in the House a discussion on external affairs. This is the first opportunity the House has had for such a discussion at this session, and I am sure I will be expressing the views of hon. members if I began by saying that on this occasion we will miss especially the presence of the late member for Peel (Mr. Graydon), whose constructive criticism and knowledge of international affairs has always added so much to our discussions of this subject in the past. We shall miss his contribution to the debate, as we still miss his friendly and happy personality in this House. Mr. Graydon had opponents in the House, but no enemies; and we shall long lament his loss.

Also I have a sad duty--and I hope it will not be inappropriate for me to refer to it at this time--to mention that our country has recently suffered another grievous loss, and I another close friend, in the passing of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Hume Wrong. Of proud lineage and brilliant mind, with wise and honest judgment, Mr. Wrong had, beneath a shy, almost austere exterior, a warm and generous spirit. I think I have been possibly in as good a position as anyone in the House to appreciate the quality and worth of his service to Canada over the years.

Then, Mr. Speaker, I would also like to mention with great regret that the foreign and indeed the public service of Canada suffered a third loss recently in the death of Mr. George Patterson, a member of our delegation to the recent United Nations Assembly, and our consul general in Boston. Mr. Patterson was a quiet, sincere and dedicated man, whose whole life was devoted to the service of his fellow men. For many years in the Far East as an officer of the Y.M.C.A., and later in China as our representative there. Like that of Mr. Wrong and Mr. Graydon, Mr. Patterson's life was shortened by his refusal to recognize any limitations on the energy and hours he gave to his work.

We in Canada often, and quite rightly, refer with pride to the great natural resources of our country. But greater even is Canada in its human resources, when it has men like these three to serve it.

A pleasant task is now to extend, if I may, my good wishes to the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), as he takes over responsibility as critic for the official opposition in matters of external affairs.

In a sense I suppose that makes him my opposite number. I know that he will not spare the government or me when he thinks we have done the wrong thing, or left undone the right thing. But I know also that he will find his work the more satisfying, as I do, because on the fundamental objectives of our foreign policy, as opposed to details and methods, there is a great and fortunate degree of unity on all sides of the house.

I propose today--and I am afraid even though I shall take probably longer than I should, I shall leave many subjects untouched--to make a general and, I fear, a somewhat discursive survey of international affairs. Some subjects I shall not attempt even to touch, because they will be dealt with, at least some of them, at a later time by my friend and colleague whom I am so happy to have as my Parliamentary Assistant, the hon. member for Chambly-Rouville (Mr. Pinard).

For instance, he will refer to the recent Assembly of the United Nations at which, for most of the time, if I may say so, the Canadian Delegation was led with such distinction and efficiency by the Postmaster General (Mr. Cote).

The reduction of tension in Europe--and I am going to talk about European affairs first--which began a year ago, and which was mentioned in this House about that time, has been maintained. Nevertheless, the menace of Soviet imperialism remains and foreign and defence policies of our country and other countries of the free world must continue to be based on this fact. And I suppose we should also not forget that if there has been improvement--and I think there has been--it is largely due to the increased strength and unity of the free world, especially within the Atlantic alliance.

In Europe two developments have occurred since I spoke last in the House on international affairs, which I think deserve special attention. In the first place there has been a change, whatever it may portend, in the attitude and in the tactics, if not in the foreign policy, of the Soviet Union since the death of Joseph Stalin. There has been some indication in the past year of a trend away from the sterile rigidity of Stalinist policies both in domestic and in foreign affairs.

Among the more interesting Soviet internal developments have been the new emphasis on collective leadership in Moscow as opposed to personal dictatorship, and the modification of Stalin's denationalizing policy as applied to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. And there has been a greater stressing, I think, in their governments of practical considerations, of technical efficiency, rather than of Marxist orthodoxy. However, the outstanding domestic development in the Soviet Union during this period has been in economic policy, where a programme of increased production of consumer goods has been given such wide publicity that the failure of the regime to carry out its promises in this respect would, I think, cause very great disappointment among the people, and possibly even some unrest.

Agriculture in Russia has received particular attention, with an apparent reliance on greater money

rewards for the peasant as the best way now to get results. The Communists have not of course retreated from the principle of collectivization, but the peasant's own plot now seems to have become again a respectable part of the system; whereas previously, in recent years, it was merely a reprehensible survival of capitalism.

As for Soviet external policy, it still presents a mixed pattern of some things that are hopeful and more that remains stubbornly discouraging. There have been some minor concessions and some reassuring words. However, I suggest that nothing in all this gives us cause to believe that basic Soviet objectives in foreign policy have changed, or that Soviet leaders are in fact ready to accept reasonable solutions to major international problems. That is one reason why we are watching so closely the Berlin conference today.

The second European development which stands out in the last year is of course the remarkable, and to some people disturbing, recovery of West Germany. While this process has been under way for some time, both in the economic and the political field, the decisive electoral victory of Chancellor Adenauer last September, drew special attention to the progress and the stability of the West German republic. The people of the Soviet zone of Germany, where an election such as that would never have been permitted by the occupation authorities, nevertheless managed to show their own will for freedom during June of 1953 in courageous demonstrations against the communist regime, and by so doing they exposed once and for all the hollownes of the claim that the Soviet puppet regime could speak for them at home or before the world. And that fact is worth keeping in mind, particularly at this moment. The Soviet Delegation at the Berlin conference may once again pretend that Germany can be united in an all-German Government, formed not by free elections but by merging the present East and West German governments. Well, we all know what happened to democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia when Russian Communist agents were allowed to share governmental responsibility with genuine democrats. It would be deplorable if that tragic error were repeated in Germany.

There is of course a reverse side to this medal. The very qualities of energy and discipline which have served the West Germans so well and resulted in their new strength are beginning to arouse concern among some old friends of ours who are also old neighbours of theirs, and it is easy for anyone whose knowledge of European history goes back beyond the last two or three years to understand this concern. Europe is no longer simply an East and a West, with a void left in the centre by the total collapse of Germany in 1945. Once again there is a centre. We have therefore not only the continuing danger of Soviet imperialism; there is also fear of what many Europeans and others who remember 1914 and 1939 regard as the reviving danger of German ambition and German armed strength. I think we can understand this fear without agreeing with the conclusions which are sometimes drawn from it. But let us assume that there is a basis for it, a reality to the fear. What then is the best method of removing it, to restrain a rearmed and perhaps a reunited Germany from aggression again?

Well, one method of controlling the menace of German aggressive expansion is the old unhappy one, by which the west joined with the east against an independent armed

Germany in central Europe. Neither in 1914 nor in 1939 was such an alliance effective in preventing war, though that alliance later contributed enormously to Germany's defeat and punishment. The second method, which is new, and not yet tried, is to bring Germany into an alliance of west and central Europe against aggression, an alliance in which European unity can develop for other than defence purposes. And we have that in the European Defence Community.

The Canadian Government has already expressed its support for EDC as a method for associating Germany with the European system and with the Atlantic community. Surely the harnessing of German rearmament to a defensive collective purpose would provide the best security for all, east as well as west, from the possible danger that Germany isolated and with renewed strength in central Europe, might once again play off east against west and eventually be tempted once more to follow the old policy of defeat and attack, subdue and occupy.

I do not think myself that a solution of this European problem, which is also an Atlantic problem and therefore a Canadian problem, can be found in Germany's disarmament and neutralization, or indeed in Germany's rearmament and neutralization. That solution might of course and indeed does appeal to the communists for obvious reasons. It would mean the exclusion of Germany from the developing European system, and it would release her from any responsibility for sharing in collective defence against aggression. In any event, as I see it, such a solution even if it were desirable - and it certainly has its appeal - is simply not practicable. For four or five years, perhaps; but surely it is unrealistic to base any permanent policy on the disarmament, the control and the neutralization of 65 million Germans inside their present boundaries. Surely it is better to bind Germany, not only to the rest of Europe, but to the Atlantic community. I know it will be argued that the Russians and their satellites will simply never agree to this, and therefore will never agree to any unification of Germany on these terms. Nevertheless, this is the policy that has been accepted as best and wisest in the present circumstances by the German Republic, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, by ourselves and by many other countries. It would, I think, be a great misfortune if it were abandoned now.

The establishment of the European Defence Community is the best and quickest way of implementing this policy. It is the only proposal now under consideration, and it came originally, we should not forget, from France itself.

But it is not, of course, the only way it could be done. West Germany could, for instance, be permitted to rearm as a member of NATO. She could also rearm outside NATO but in treaty relationship with NATO countries. But not many of those who oppose EDC would support either of these courses as a preferable solution to the problem. The EDC could be altered into an arrangement of co-operating national armies instead of a consolidated supra-national European army. This weaker form of EDC could

then be brought into association with a stronger, and more unified, NATO, which would have greater collective control over the national defence budgets and policies of its members. But there are also objections to this idea and it is unlikely that it would secure greater support than the present EDC proposals. However it is to be done, close and organic association with a free, strong and cohesive international community, European and Atlantic in character, with membership in the United Nations, provides I think the best guarantee that the military strength of a revived Germany will be used only for defensive purposes.

There is one thing we can be sure of. The Communists will use these German and European questions as they use every other opportunity to divide and weaken the free world coalition. If the situation seems to be a little less critical now the temptation is therefore the greater to relax and indulge in the costly luxury of quarrelling among ourselves. If we yield to that temptation too often we will soon dissipate the unity and strength that have been so patiently and effectively built up, especially since the establishment of NATO.

Personally I am more than ever convinced that the continuing cohesion of all the Atlantic powers, not merely the European powers, is vitally important to the preserving and reinforcing of the peace of the world and that no security and no stability can be achieved through isolated arrangements, either in North America or in Europe. Continentalism, whether of the European or American variety, is not enough for safety.

Because of this I feel that the essential steps which are required to bring about European unity can be taken only when there are also close and continuous life-lines across the channel and indeed across the Atlantic. One of the most heartening developments of the postwar period has been the building-up of those lines which are now I think, or at least I hope, strong enough to stand the strain, psychological and otherwise, on certain European countries of including Germany in our arrangements.

Obviously that inclusion must be brought about in such a way that the fears that come from the past will be replaced by new hope for a future where Germany will be only one country in a group that will embrace more than Germany and even more than Europe.

This question naturally leads to the consideration of the meeting between the foreign ministers of the four great powers going on at Berlin at the present time, a meeting which seems to have got down to business with a minimum of argument over the agenda. We can at least take some encouragement from that. It is to be hoped that this meeting will concentrate on the Austrian and German problems and that something constructive will come from it. It seems hard to understand that in 1954 Austria, one of Hitler's first victims, should still be occupied while other countries which were his accomplices have long since had their prewar status restored by treaties.

As for Germany, we shall soon see whether or not the Soviet Union is really prepared to allow its unification on acceptable terms, namely, under a government freely elected by the whole of the German people and with freedom to make its own political arrangements, within of course

the framework of the United Nations Charter. I think we can express a hope for some good results from this meeting, but we should not expect too much from it.

From even this cursory survey of European affairs it is clear that there are still numerous obstacles to be overcome before the security and prosperity of the free nations of the Atlantic community can be insured. However, I think there has been a significant advance from the fear and instability of the immediate post-war period, and for that I suggest we ought to be grateful to NATO.

NATO's work, which I think has been pretty effective in this regard, is far from finished. Indeed it is just getting under way. It has taken time for the decisions taken and the plans approved to bear fruit, and their full impact has only recently begun to be felt. For the majority of NATO countries the proportion of the total output of their economy devoted to defence is only now reaching its peak. According to General Gruenther, the present supreme commander in Europe of NATO forces, the forces under his command have approximately doubled since 1951, and the gain in their effectiveness, in their modernization and in their fighting efficiency is greater still. These NATO forces are now strong enough to make an aggressor think twice before taking them on.

But the Soviet and satellite forces are also being steadily increased in numbers and in effectiveness. That is why it is still important for the West not only to add a German contribution to the existing NATO strength but also to improve further NATO forces in equipment and in quality so that if the worst emergency should happen, these forces could act as a shield behind which the full strength of the member countries could rapidly be mobilized.

To complete this very short review of the work of NATO I should refer, if only for a moment, to the ministerial meeting of the Council which was held in Paris in December last. I attended that meeting with my colleague, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), and with our permanent representative to the Council, Mr. Wilgress. I think the most significant discussions which took place in Paris at that time were those relating to the international situation as it affected the various NATO countries and with the question of future NATO defence planning.

At these discussions the members of the council spoke their minds very frankly and freely. I think by doing so we brought about a better understanding between the various countries, even though, at times there was a difference between us on some things.

It was agreed at this council meeting that the NATO countries would continue to seek three basic objectives. First, not to let down our guard. Second, to promote at the same time our economic and social development and to strengthen our political unity. Third, to seek to negotiate with the Soviet Union on outstanding differences whenever and wherever possible.

The broad lines of future NATO defence planning to meet the threat of aggression over an extended period were agreed to in Paris in December. Member countries

should be prepared to maintain a high level of military preparedness. We felt, however, that it would be unrealistic to expect to build up and maintain further substantial increases in our collective forces for the long haul. Therefore, the plan is to see that the NATO forces which now exist and which will be strengthened are furnished with the most modern equipment possible, including new types of weapons; that they are given adequate support and are ready to go into action rapidly. Effective local defence of this kind, plus the certainty of swift and crushing retaliation, including atomic retaliation from the air, is the defence combination upon which we now rely to deter the aggressor.

The Council had before it at this meeting a report of the Annual Review Committee for 1953. On the basis of the recommendations of this report we agreed in Paris on our NATO force goals for the next three years. The figures for 1954 were firm commitments while those of 1955 and 1956 are provisional and for planning purposes only. Following the practice established at previous ministerial meetings, the Council has released no precise figures, but I can say that the aggregate forces planned for the end of this year are to be a little larger in numbers--that is, collectively--and substantially better in quality than those now in existence.

There were other activities of the ministerial council and the permanent council in Paris, apart from those concerning defence, which I will not be able to go into at this time. They included how to bring about closer parliamentary association with NATO's work; how to correlate production programmes in Europe; co-ordination of civil defence plans; the preparation of emergency plans; the study of information and cultural relations questions. These matters received little or no publicity but they are an increasingly important part of the process of keeping the North Atlantic Alliance together, and they are in tune with the needs of our time.

I should now like to move across the world to the Far East and to say a few words about developments in Korea. Since I last spoke in the house on this subject an armistice agreement has been signed there which ended on acceptable terms more than three years of fighting by the United Nations in resisting the unprovoked aggression launched against the Republic of Korea. With that aggression repelled, the military purpose of this great collective resort to armed force has been accomplished but, of course, only at a cost to our own forces, and great cost to those of the United States and those of Korea which bore the brunt of the struggle. We remember that cost as we talk about Korea today.

This armistice marked the end of the first step toward a peaceful settlement in Korea. The next step has been to try to convert that armistice into a peace settlement through the convening of a conference. The United Nations Assembly, last summer and last autumn, long and carefully, considered how that conference could be brought about. As a result, as most hon. members know, when the general Assembly last summer closed at the end of August it had, by formal resolution, made provision for the United Nations side of the Korean political conference. These decisions did not meet in full our own wishes but they were those of the United Nations and we accepted them and respected them as much. Moreover, we thought that those decisions, even though they were not perfect from our point of view, were good enough to provide a basis for a Korean political conference if the other side wanted such a conference.

Then, as hon. members will recall, last autumn discussions began at Panmunjom with the Communist side in an effort to work out the details for this conference. Those discussions are theoretically still going on, although they have been suspended for the time being. As these discussions were taking place in December last they removed some of the pressure at the Assembly, which was meeting then from continuing its deliberation into January. As hon. members will recall, at that time a resolution was passed making provision for recall of the Assembly if a majority of the members so desired if the President of the Assembly, Madame Pandit,--who has been acting in that position with such skill and distinction--should decide that the time had come or should be asked by any member to recall the Assembly. Such a request has now been made by the Government of India. Our reply to that request has just been sent today to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the President. This reply was made after a great deal of consideration and exchange of views between ourselves and the Indian Government, the British Government, the United States Government and other governments. Possibly I might put this reply on the record, Mr. Speaker. It is as follows:

Please inform the Secretary-General as soon as possible that the Canadian Government has given very sympathetic consideration to the request of the President of the General Assembly that the present session be reconvened on February 9. The Canadian Government appreciates the desire of the Government of India to report to the United Nations General Assembly on the discharge of its responsibilities as chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in respect of the prisoners-of-war placed in its custody under the provisions of sub paragraph 51 (b) of the Korean armistice agreement, but considers that in present circumstances it would be inadvisable to reconvene the General Assembly for discussion of the general Korean question of which the Assembly is seized. In the view of the Canadian Government a session on this subject--

That is on the general Korea question.

--might more usefully be reconvened at a later date in March or April.

We took that position because of developments in Panmunjom where steps are now being taken to bring about a resumption of the talks, and we hope that these steps will be successful within the next few days; because of developments in Berlin where Far Eastern questions have been put on the agenda; and because we came to the conclusion, after the inquiries we made, that it would not be possible, if the session opened on February 9, to restrict its deliberations merely to the action of India and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

It should have been possible before now at Panmunjom to work out a satisfactory plan for the Korean political conference. Differences of viewpoint occurred at once, of course, as one would expect, between the negotiators from the two sides on this question. But on their face, none of those differences were impossible or

even difficult of reconciliation. Indeed I think a solution might have been found if the communist representatives had not turned from negotiation to abuse, thus indicating that if their principals wanted a conference at all, they did not want one at that time. Hence the negotiations were suspended. As I have said, steps are being taken--which we hope will be successful--to bring about their resumption. The present situation in Korea is simply that there is no fighting, but there is no peace. Our servicemen in that area, while they remain at the alert, have for more than five months, however, been spared the tragic consequences of actual conflict. That is a blessing which we would all do well to remember.

One other issue out there has now been disposed of in the prisoners-of-war question. I do not need to go into details of that matter inasmuch as they will be familiar to most hon. members. We have taken the position as a government that the action of the United States commander in releasing and returning to civilian status the prisoners-of-war under his jurisdiction when they were returned to him by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was not only legally correct but morally sound and quite consistent with the terms of the armistice agreement itself. It seems to us that no other course was open to the United Nations commander at that time. Our own position in regard to this matter has been, I think, quite clear and consistent from the beginning. We have not believed nor do we now believe that any prisoner should be compelled by force to return to what was once his homeland. The provisions of the commission's terms of reference were drafted to prohibit enforced repatriation, and those of us who took part in the long, complicated and difficult negotiations to that end will recall this very clearly. But that prohibition would have little meaning if the only alternative facing a prisoner was indefinite captivity. Therefore the terms of reference in the armistice agreement made clear provision for the final release of prisoners to civilian status 120 days after their being placed in the custody of the commission. In the words of General Hull--

The plain intent of paragraph 11 of the terms of reference is to prevent either party to the agreement from frustrating the basic purpose of avoiding indefinite captivity for the prisoners.

We subscribe to that position.

Of course if there had been a different attitude taken by the Communist representatives on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Communist side in Korea it would have been, I think, quite possible, almost easy, to have arranged for the examination of these prisoners in the time allotted for it, ninety days. It was understood by those who took part in these negotiations that the ninety days meant ninety consecutive days. However, after the first examinations took place, and when it was clear to the world that the great majority of the prisoners would rather go back to captivity than to go home under Communist rule, this was such a terrific blow to the prestige of communism in the Far East that the Communists themselves from that time forward did everything they could to prevent further examinations. That seems to me to be a simple and pretty obvious explanation of why the examination of prisoners broke down before the end of the ninety-day period.

But even if we solve these Korean questions they are only one aspect of the more fundamental question of relations with the Far East and with Asia generally. We should ask ourselves, as I am sure we do, and it is very much in our minds now with the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) to that part of the world, what should be the basis of our policy as a government, as a country, towards what I think we can call now the new Asia. I suggest we would be wise to observe the following principles in our relations with these Asian states. We must not compromise with Communist military aggression in Asia or in any other place. But while, I think, it is easy to be clear on that point, that does not mean that we should assume that every anti-colonial, nationalist or revolutionary movement in Asia is Russian Communist in origin or direction any more than we should assume that, with patience and sympathy, every Asian Communist leader can be turned into a Tito.

Secondly, I suggest that we must convince or try to convince the Asian peoples that democracy, our kind of democracy, free democracy, can do more for the individual than Communist tyranny can ever hope to do. We can do this in many ways, by constructive policies in our own countries, by plans for mutual aid, and also by avoiding giving the impression that the western allies are in the east associated only with regimes and societies that do not meet the desire for change of the awakening masses of that part of the world. Our policy in Asia then, if this principle is correct, must be more than a policy merely of opposition to communism. It must be constructive, and anti-communism should not be the only claim to our assistance.

We should recognize, and I think we do recognize in this country, that social, national and economic forces are at work in Asia that would have erupted in disturbing ways if there had never been a Communist revolution in Moscow. We cannot reverse these forces and we ignore them at our peril. Where communism has been able to take over these new forces, as in China, we should neither, I think, blind ourselves to the dangers of the situation by wishful thinking that this is merely an agrarian revolution, nor increase these dangers by rash and provocative policies. Furthermore, as I see it, by associating counter-revolution, which can develop indigenously as the whole history of China shows, with foreign intervention and foreign assistance we may strengthen rather than weaken Communist regimes.

The fate of our world may be decided quite as much by the direction taken by the march of Asian millions as by the failure or success of the Kremlin's plans for Communist imperial domination. Canada has a special obligation and a special opportunity in these matters as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, for the Commonwealth is now of Asia and Africa as well as of the Western world. We can, I think, be happy that our relations with the other members of the Commonwealth remain close and friendly though problems, especially economic and financial problems, exist to test our co-operation. I think these relations will be even closer and even more friendly as the result of the voyage of friendship, goodwill and exploration which our Prime Minister is beginning at the end of next week.

We can be happy, then, that our relations with the Commonwealth members remain so close and so friendly. But there is another country with which our relations must also remain close and friendly, and that is our neighbour, the United States. We have a special responsibility here too, not only because these relations are so fundamental to our joint security and prosperity but also because the United States is the leader of our free world coalition and is bearing the greatest share of the burden to maintain peace. These relations with the United States are becoming more and more important to both countries, and more varied and more complicated. That was inevitable, as the state of the world has changed, as our own progress towards economic and political strength has accelerated, and as we become more important in the scheme of things. Naturally, therefore these relations with the United States have become more important and more complicated for us. We should not be surprised or discouraged by that. We will work out these problems, these increasing problems--these problems of security against attack, security against subversion, of trade and communications, of border crossings--we will work them out with less difficulty if we keep constantly in mind how great our dependence is on each other for safety and prosperity, if we in Canada do not forget on our side the heavy burden of leadership and responsibility which the United States is carrying, and if our neighbours remember that partnership and co-operation are a two-way process and, above all--and this is a simple rule--if neither partner asks the other to do what it would not like to be asked to do itself.

One important specific problem at the moment in our relations with the United States which has been causing us a good deal of concern is that of the St. Lawrence Seaway. As hon. members know, we have now reached a point where the only thing that stands in the way of the beginning of Canadian construction of that seaway is an appeal before the courts of the United States. We have just learned today that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit Court has delivered judgment on the appeal brought against the order of the Federal Power Commission granting a licence to the power authority of the State of New York. The court has denied the appeal, and confirmed the order of the Federal power commission. This removes the second last legal obstacle to the development of power in the International Section which is an essential preliminary to the development of the seaway itself. That is the way in which we have, over the years, been able to settle our difficulties with our neighbour, and I am satisfied we will be able to settle them in the same friendly spirit in the days to come. We must certainly do our best to face and solve these complicated Canadian-United States questions, these neighbourly difficulties, with that minimum of bickering and maximum of goodwill which has been characteristic in this century of relations between the two countries.

If Canada and the United States cannot grow closer together in friendship, in mutual respect and in the understanding on which friendship must rest, there is not much chance for peace and stability in the rest of the world. But we can solve our problems with our neighbour in a reasonable manner, and there is somewhat more hope for peace and stability in the world than existed a year ago. We can take some comfort from this, as we face the numerous problems before us, and so long as we do not forget that the world still remains an unsafe place for the weak, the weary and the unwary.