


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DOCS

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1989 SESSION



PV

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA
OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1990

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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1989 SESSION

PREFACE

IX

This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

PV

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
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(The President)

We may not be entirely satisfied with the results reached so far in multilateral forums or in the multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues but we also have good reasons for an encouraging assessment of future prospects. First of all, we should take stock of the progress achieved in past months on certain important issues, in particular in the field of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

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(The President)

Finally, as I have already pointed out, the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was a most successful and significant event, particularly in the way it underlined the commitment to conclude, at the earliest date, the negotiations on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

All of us recognize that the major Powers have special responsibilities for the prevention of war, for preventing international tensions and for the reduction of nuclear and conventional arsenals, yet every country has its own share of responsibility in contributing what it can to such noble goals. The preservation of world peace and security as well as the realization of genuine disarmament are the common aspiration of the peoples of all countries, besides constituting the main task of the Conference on Disarmament. I therefore believe that it falls to all of us to provide the opportunity for imparting new momentum to the process of disarmament, by pursuing its objectives with determination and preventing any risk of a stalemate in multilateral negotiations, which would mark a sharp contrast with the dynamism in bilateral negotiations.

The more favourable conditions which have emerged should be an encouragement to the Conference on Disarmament to produce more concrete results. In this respect allow me to make a particular reference to the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. I have already mentioned the significant progress achieved by the Ad hoc Committee during the last session - for which our appreciation goes to Ambassador Sujka for the competent guidance of our deliberations - and the importance of the results of the Paris Conference. We should now be able to speed up the negotiating process and make every possible effort to reach a final agreement at the earliest date.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations):

... I will now read the message of the Secretary-General addressed to the Conference.

... "In this context, 1989 has begun with an auspicious development. The recent Paris Conference on chemical weapons - and here I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Government of France for hosting that Conference - produced a Final Declaration which clearly affirmed the commitment not to use chemical weapons and unequivocally condemned their use. It addressed a number of subjects relating to the role of the United Nations with respect to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. In that connection, I have noted the wish of the participant States for early completion of the work undertaken to strengthen the

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

efficiency of existing procedures for investigation of alleged violations. Let me assure you that the Secretariat will do its utmost to implement the relevant parts of the Final Declaration.

"At the opening of the Paris Conference, I appealed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament to quicken the pace of the Geneva negotiations and to conclude as promptly as possible a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which can receive universal support. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, together with the resolutions adopted by consensus at the forty-third session of the General Assembly on the subject of chemical weapons, reflect the consensus of the international community on the need to conclude, at the earliest date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. Such an agreement, to be effective, must be of world-wide scope, and consequently it is the responsibility of your Conference to proceed, in the words of the Paris Final Declaration, 'to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues' requiring agreement. I very much hope that this commitment, undertaken at such a high political level, will accelerate the pace of your negotiations.

The PRESIDENT:

... I should like to welcome the presence today in the gallery of the members of the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament, which is holding its spring session at the Palais des Nations. The Special NGO Committee has also addressed a communication to me, wishing the Conference every success in meeting the challenges before it and stressing the importance and urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to conclude as soon as possible a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction.

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(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

... The second issue, which, as I have already said, I shall briefly consider in this statement, is that of a convention for the elimination of chemical weapons or, to put it in the official terms, a convention "on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", a task which the Conference on Disarmament has pursued with determination and in which my delegation has actively participated. On this matter emphasis should be placed on the importance of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, which met in Paris from 7 to 11 January last under the chairmanship of Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. At the opening session of that conference the President of France, Mr. François Mitterrand, said, inter alia:

(continued)

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"The Geneva Protocol constitutes the only rule applying to chemical weapons, and this will continue to be so until the treaty which is currently being negotiated takes its place in international law. But if it might be dangerous to try and amend the Protocol, it is essential to reaffirm it and to declare that the commitment contained therein will not be betrayed. Because that, it seems to me, is what is expected from those meeting here: a formal declaration that States refuse to have recourse to chemical weapons and consider it imperative to eliminate them from the face of the Earth. The reaffirmation of a legal, political and moral prohibition, the expression of a clear resolve to achieve not only the prohibition of use but also of development, stockpiling and transfer: these are the two objectives of our Conference. They are interrelated. We will not achieve a complete ban unless we reaffirm today the prohibition of use. This prohibition will in turn be all the better underpinned when production, stockpiling and transfer have become impossible."

Mexico has been a party to the Geneva Protocol since 1932 and, I am proud to say, without any reservations. During the almost 60 years which have elapsed since that date, not only has it scrupulously respected the obligations it entered into then, but it has also demonstrated in practical terms its resolve never to resort to the use of chemical weapons. We welcomed the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, which by consensus adopted provisions such as the following:

"The participating States are determined to promote international peace and security throughout the world in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and to pursue effective disarmament measures. In this context, they are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use. They recall their serious concern at recent violations as established and condemned by the competent organs of the United Nations. They support the humanitarian assistance given to the victims affected by chemical weapons ...

"The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This convention shall be global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable. It should be of unlimited duration. To this end they call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. All States are requested to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields."

It should also be borne in mind in this respect that, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized in his statement to the same Paris Conference:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"Not only would it be a resounding success for multilateral negotiations if the chemical threat was eliminated, but such a victory would also constitute a remarkable achievement in the cause of multilateral disarmament and of international peace and security, in full conformity with the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations."

The necessary conclusion is that chemical weapons must disappear. The inhuman suffering they cause, both among troops and among the innocent civilian population, no longer have a place in the civilized world of today. Consequently, we must redouble our efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons at an early date. This is a fundamental premise which we should not lose sight of in our work: the convention will not represent any threat to the security of any State: on the contrary, it will strengthen the security of one and all.

... Turning to the fifth chapter, dealing with disarmament measures, it should be borne in mind that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to adopt positive agreements, among which the "Joint Statement at the Moscow Summit", dated 1 July 1988, provides an eloquent example of the efforts that can be made jointly to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

proliferation of nuclear weapons. Concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it has been possible to reach consensus on most of the basic elements for that objective. It has also been possible to indicate the obligations and responsibilities of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to preventing an increase in the numbers of the former and reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, it has been agreed that all States should accede to the Geneva Protocol. There is agreement that it is necessary to make all possible efforts to secure the positive conclusion of the negotiations that are being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament on an international convention that will bring about the elimination of all chemical weapons; there is also agreement that a treaty should be concluded on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

1988 was the year when the tide turned. 1988 was the year when nuclear disarmament began. 1988 was the year of hope. As the poem reads:

"Hope is the bird which senses the dawn and sings while it is dark."

It is still dark. The world is loaded with weapons - conventional weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons. But the mistrust is receding like mist on an early spring morning, as the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme said in his last interview three years ago.

... To this positive picture may be added the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons a month ago. With some 150 nations participating, at political or high governmental level, the Conference became a powerful manifestation of the world community's repudiation of chemical arms. The unanimously adopted Final Document is an equally important and welcome success for international disarmament work.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... It is sufficient to ask the question: How could two States achieve a total ban on nuclear tests when six have already exploded nuclear devices and a few more have the technical capacity to do so? Or to mention the burning issue of the Paris Conference: How could two States - no matter how powerful - free the world from chemical weapons when in principle all States with a modern chemical industry are in a position to manufacture such weapons? Or how could the prevention of an arms race in outer space be ensured except through multilateral action? The international community has expressed its firm stand that the exploration and use of outer space must be for peaceful purposes and to the benefit of the whole of mankind.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... My delegation will listen with great interest to the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Roland Dumas, and his report on the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As I mentioned earlier, the Paris Conference was an important success in terms of the task entrusted to it. The international community was able to concentrate on one priority issue - that of chemical disarmament. The Conference raised the barrier against using chemical weapons by unanimously condemning such use. It reaffirmed the commitment to the Geneva Protocol and the urgent necessity of concluding a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

However, the task of ensuring that the Paris Conference becomes a real and lasting success lies with the Conference on Disarmament. It is up to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to organize its efforts in such a way that the universal commitment to a convention demonstrated in the General Assembly and at the Paris Conference is translated without delay into tangible results. The General Assembly has urged the CD to intensify its negotiations on chemical weapons with a view to the final elaboration of a comprehensive convention at the earliest possible date. In Paris the participating States unanimously called on the CD to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. It is up to us, here and now, to draw practical conclusions from these forceful declarations.

How shall the Conference on Disarmament live up to the expectations of the international community and of the public at large? First, it seems odd, in view of the unconditional calls for the final elaboration and conclusion of a comprehensive convention, that the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee omits reference to the key element of "use", and that it explicitly excepts final drafting. Sweden does not favour lengthy mandate discussions. We have criticized the waste of time in procedural controversies on other agenda items. It would, however, seem natural that the CD in 1989 should demonstrate that it takes the calls of the General Assembly and the Paris Conference seriously, by immediately changing the mandate for its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in these two respects.

Secondly, a more dynamic method of work must be adopted whereby the hard-core issues are continuously identified, pursued and resolved. Many difficult problems transcend individual articles and will have to be dealt with concretely and systematically throughout the draft convention. This might call for a greater number of working groups and a more flexible approach to the time allotted to them. My delegation notes with great satisfaction that the incoming Chairman of the Committee apparently plans to organize its work in this manner. The co-ordination of the work will put a heavy burden on the Chairman, and necessitates the continuous and active involvement of its bureau. Consequently, other committees should be prepared to concede some of their time in favour of the chemical weapons Committee.

Thirdly, the interrelationship between ongoing bilateral and multilateral efforts must become more dynamic and efficient. It has been a waste of time for the CD to discuss the order of destruction at the very same time as it was being discussed bilaterally by the two major possessors. If bilateral efforts could be scheduled so as to produce results for the multilateral negotiation, our work would significantly gain in speed and efficiency. However, this might necessitate greater flexibility on the part of the CD also. Provisions enabling the Ad hoc Committee to meet continuously throughout the year, but with intermittent recesses for consultations and preparation, must be considered.

My delegation gave its detailed views on most aspects of the "rolling text", article by article, in its statement to the plenary on 13 September 1988. Our views have not changed. Since then, however, some encouraging developments have taken place. My Government has noted with appreciation that President Bush has identified a ban on chemical weapons as

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

one of his highest priorities. Sweden welcomes the fact that there now exists a consensus regarding an effective ban on production under international control as of the entry into force of the convention, and regarding effective international control of all chemical weapons stocks as of the same date. The announcement by France on this latter issue opens the door to the rapid conclusion of the negotiations regarding articles IV and V. The Soviet Union and the United States should now present to the CD their detailed proposals for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities.

Sweden is encouraged by the fact that 16 countries have so far engaged in trial inspections of the chemical industry. We would, however, prefer that even more countries, in all groups, performed such inspections. The lessons to be drawn from the common evaluation of the trial inspections, which we have to undertake this year, will directly influence our final agreement on the verification of non-production in article VI. Sweden also welcomes the recent proposals made by the Soviet Union on article VI and by the United Kingdom on article X. Both proposals demonstrate a constructive and flexible approach to the negotiations and could serve as a basis for agreement on the two issues at hand. It is our hope that initiatives like these will be forthcoming at a rapid pace, and that such efforts to find compromise language will be recognized by other delegations. Our work must become more results-oriented. Opportunities for agreement must be seized.

The importance of the successful conclusion of a chemical weapons convention cannot be overstated. It would radically improve the security of all States. It would once and for all eliminate a whole class of existing weapons of mass destruction. It would be the first multilateral disarmament treaty embodying the principle of international challenge inspections without the right of refusal. It would constitute a major break-through for the very principle of multilateral disarmament.

However, in our work to reach agreement, we are racing against time. The further refinement, development and spread of chemical weapons seriously undermine our efforts. But the solution is within reach. If there is political will - if we are all prepared to translate our declarations into political action - the comprehensive chemical weapons ban can be ready in 1990 or maybe even earlier.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

... Our delegation also welcomes hopefully the appearance before the Conference of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Roland Dumas. I am certain he will have an expert analysis and present us with sensitive perceptions of the Conference on chemical weapons which he so ably chaired in Paris last month. I would be remiss today if I did not mention the warm hospitality extended by the French Government during the Paris Conference to all delegations, and the outstanding preparatory work performed by our friend and esteemed colleague, Ambassador Pierre Morel. It has been less than four weeks now since representatives of 149 nations concluded on 11 January their work at the Paris Conference on chemical weapons. In the Declaration issued by that Conference, those 149 nations stated their determination "to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". Consequently, the Declaration addresses prominently the ongoing negotiations here in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The Paris Conference has provided a real impetus - the force of the consensus view of 149 nations - for our negotiations. It is our challenge now to seize this moment and to search for practical solutions to the problems that remain. As anyone who has followed our work over the past years can attest, there is ample room for the contributions of all members of this body, as well as those of non-member participants, to this search. Such broadened participation would constitute a real redoubling of our efforts in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The problems that remain are not insignificant. Verification is clearly the major difficulty. There are other problems as well, including ensuring undiminished security during the transition period, the possible development of new agents, assistance, and globality. Our delegation is prepared to do its part to resolve all of these issues. We are ready to get down to work as soon as possible in the chemical weapons Committee.

Ambassador WILLIAM B. FRIEDERSDORF (United States): I should first of all like to associate myself with the condolences expressed on the decease of Miss Levin.

As co-ordinator of the Western Group, and in taking the floor for the first time in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express my satisfaction at seeing you, Mr. President, presiding over our meetings. Aware of your qualities as a diplomat, your patience and understanding, I feel reassured in addressing the Conference after such eminent and competent speakers as Ambassador Garcia Robles, Ambassador Theodor and Friedersdorf and the distinguished representative of Egypt in his capacity as spokesman of the Neutral and Non-aligned Group. We also hope today to hear Mr. Dumas, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, who was President of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical

(Mr. Koicai, Kenya)

... I have requested the floor today to read a statement on behalf of the Group of Neutral and Non-aligned States that are members of this Conference, regarding the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The statement reads as follows:

"The Group of 21 would like to make the following statement on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

"The forty-third session of the General Assembly adopted without a vote two resolutions on chemical weapons that referred to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The first, resolution 43/74 A on 'Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention', specifically 'urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction'.

"The second, resolution 43/74 C on 'Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons', after expressing the regret and the concern of the General Assembly that a convention with the scope mentioned above has not yet been elaborated, 'urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1989 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future

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(Mr. Koicai, Kenya)

initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session'. The Group of 21 would like to recall that both these resolutions were adopted by consensus exactly two months ago.

"The Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which took place in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in its Final Declaration, adopted unanimously by all participating States, went still further in stressing the urgency and the priority of the task entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, when it stated: 'to this end, they call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date'.

"The Group of 21, taking into account all these facts, considers that the Conference on Disarmament should address the question of the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons afresh. Never before has the international community, through all its different means of expression - Governments, parliaments, press - been so engaged in the issue of banning chemical weapons. Never before has political will been so clearly manifested from all quarters. This commitment, this expression of political will needs to be reflected in our work for 1989. The Group of 21 therefore believes that the mandate to be adopted by this forum should, first, include reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, to be consistent with General Assembly resolutions 43/74 A and C and with the language enshrined in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, and second, that the phrase 'except for its final drafting' should be deleted from the text of the mandate in order to convey to the international community our full acceptance of the responsibility entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee, as contained in the three texts referred to above, which the States represented here adhered to without exception."

Ambassador HOULLEZ (Belgium): I should first of all like to associate myself with the condolences expressed on the decease of Miss Levin.

As co-ordinator of the Western Group, and in taking the floor for the first time in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express my satisfaction at seeing you, Mr. President, presiding over our meetings. Aware of your qualities as a diplomat, your patience and understanding, I feel reassured in addressing the Conference after such eminent and competent speakers as Ambassador García Robles, Ambassadors Theorin and Friedersdorf and the distinguished representative of Kenya in his capacity as spokesman of the Neutral and Non-aligned Group. We also hope today to hear Mr. Dumas, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, who was President of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical

(Ambassador Houlliez, Belgium)

weapons, an event which will have a profound influence on our future activities in the area of chemical weapons, an influence already stressed by the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

I should like to indicate first and foremost that the Group I represent here fully shares the views just expressed on the importance to be given to work to be accomplished in 1989 by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and principally on the priority and urgency of this task. For years the delegations which are members of the Western Group have constantly and unequivocally proclaimed their desire to see the very early drawing up of a convention on the total, universal and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. They have made significant contributions to the drawing up of the "rolling text", from which we hope a convention will emerge as soon as possible, a convention meeting the hopes, the goals and the requirements that the international community has set itself. Need I mention the contribution that the Western Group made, with many others of course, to the drawing up and adoption by consensus of the recent resolutions of the forty-third United Nations General Assembly on chemical weapons, very properly cited by the Co-ordinator of the neutral and non-aligned States?

It was President Reagan who in New York launched the idea of a special conference on chemical weapons. This proposal, positively welcomed by all United Nations Member countries, ultimately crystallized in the invitations issued by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, to a conference in Paris whose audience and importance need not be stressed in this forum, and one in which all the participants made a distinguished contribution to the success of this initiative.

In Paris the countries belonging to the Western Group confirmed, through their very active participation in the deliberations and in the production of the Final Declaration, the vital interest they attach not only to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but also, and especially, to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the complete, universal and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons. Today, we solemnly reiterate here that, as in the past, and with a keen awareness of what is at stake, we shall continue to do our very utmost to reach the goal set in Paris for the search for solutions to still outstanding problems with key elements of our work, which will continue to be manifest throughout our debate.

Within the context of the direction laid down and the political impetus given at the Paris Conference, we have the desire and the political will to resume our work as rapidly as possible, and with that enthusiasm without which no objective can be reached. This impetus is to be found in the Final Declaration of Paris when it calls on us to redouble our efforts, "as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". We fully support these objectives, whose adoption by consensus was the result of an enormous effort at conciliation and a rapprochement which, happily, is now manifest in many aspects of international relations. The achievement of these objectives will be facilitated by an attitude enabling us to tackle the real problems as soon as possible without pointless procrastination, without wasting any time on procedural debate.

(Ambassador Houlliez, Belgium)

First and foremost it is necessary to tackle our work with a well-structured plan which, while taking into account the urgency of our role, enables us to achieve a logical and effective distribution of the various categories of problems. What we need, first of all, is a sincere political will to create conditions to ensure the progress and the success that we set ourselves as a goal in Paris. In this forum marked by important statements by figures who have left their profound imprint on the process of disarmament, and whose words have been inspired by very lofty considerations, I would not wish to go into the detail of the means to achieve our goal. For that purpose there are more appropriate means, places and circumstances. What I can assure you of is that the Western Group, together with all the other delegations, will seek the most realistic, the most effective and the most expeditious way to arrive at the conclusion of a convention which will free mankind from the fear of chemical weapons. This cause is universal; it calls for the support of all States and requires us to rise above partisan interests. This too is one of the messages left by the Paris Conference.

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Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese):

... After listening carefully to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Kenya on behalf of the Group of 21, and the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium on behalf of the Western Group, I would like to briefly state the views of the Chinese delegation. China has all along attached great importance to the negotiations on the prohibition of CW, and stands for the conclusion at an early date of a convention to

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(Mr. Fan, China)

comprehensively prohibit and completely destroy this type of weapon, so that mankind can be rid of this scourge for ever. The Chinese delegation will continue to exert its efforts in this regard.

The present international situation has turned from confrontation to dialogue. This is very favourable to the negotiations on the CW convention. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of CW last month was held at a high political level. The Final Declaration adopted unanimously by 150 States reflects the common will of the international community. The participating States unanimously call upon the CD to redouble its efforts and to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date. The Conference on Disarmament should respond with concrete actions. Our country therefore shares the view of the Group of 21 that the CD should, in the light of the new developments, entrust the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a more appropriate mandate. Our delegation is of the view that the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the mandate is in order. In the first half of the 1980s, the CD repeatedly considered this issue. The views of various parties have gradually converged. It is generally believed that the future convention should include elements on the prohibition of use. In fact, article 1 of the present draft already contains this element. For this reason, its reflection in the mandate should not pose any problems. As to the proposal to delete the phrase "except for its final drafting" in the original mandate, the Chinese delegation has no difficulty with it. Furthermore, in order to take due account of the outcome of the Paris Conference, the adoption of the relevant phrase from the Final Declaration, "at the earliest date", in place of the words "as soon as possible" used in the original mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, is also a possibility worth considering.

The Chinese delegation is in favour of modifying the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, but we are also willing to adopt a flexible attitude and consider in earnest the views of other delegations. At the same time, we hope that the mandate will not take up too much time. We should start the substantive negotiations as soon as possible and, through concrete actions, strive for the conclusion of the convention on CW at the earliest date.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria):

... As has been stated on many occasions, the Group of Socialist Countries is in favour of speeding up the efforts of the Conference on all items on the agenda. We attach special importance to the item on a chemical weapons convention, as was stressed by our country's representative at the Paris Conference. Of course we applaud the results of the Paris Conference, which we think was a clear success for the whole international community. We

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

consider that the declaration of the Paris Conference concerning the redoubling of the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament should find adequate expression in the mandate of the Committee on Chemical Weapons. On the other hand, we wish to express our opinion that your efforts, Mr. President, should make it possible to resolve the question of procedure speedily in order not to take up much time on this point and to begin substantive work in the Conference. In that sense we support the statement of the Group of 21 and we hope that speedy consultations will be taken up in order to find a solution to this problem. We also think that the mandate of the Committee on outer space should be improved, and we are looking forward to discussing this question with you, Mr. President.

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Mr. DUMAS (France) (translated from French):

... I asked to take the floor today, at the opening of this new session of the Conference on Disarmament, in order to present to it officially the Final Act of the Paris Conference. You are all already familiar with this document - most of you because you personally took part in drafting it, in Paris. In passing, I wish to thank you very warmly for your support and your contribution, which helped to ensure the success of the international conference. But to bring it here, myself, I felt had a symbolic value: the purpose of my initiative is to encourage you to "convert the try", as sports enthusiasts would say, and to gather within your Ad hoc Committee that is drawing up the convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons, the fruits of the political impetus given to the work in Geneva by 149 countries that met in Paris.

With a month's hindsight, what sort of reading can one give to this document? I would say that it provides a point of reference, as well as a stimulus for your work. First of all, a point of reference. It really establishes firmly the indispensable foundations for your deliberations, by confirming the will of the entire international community to bring the endeavour of chemical disarmament to a successful conclusion. Some people doubted that this collective will still existed. Some said that the use of chemical weapons was commonplace now; others asserted that certain regional circumstances could justify their acquisition. The wager that we made in convening the January Conference was that no country, faced with the shared feelings of all the others, could deny that chemical disarmament was a just cause that it deserved to be pursued for itself to a prompt and successful conclusion. We won this wager, all of us together. The hope that I have

(Mr. Dumas, France)

drawn from this is that the consensus obtained in Paris will allow us to anticipate universal accession to the convention as produced by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

On what does this consensus rest? How does this "reference" I was speaking about translate into practical terms? I will do my best to answer these two questions.

Briefly running through the articles of the Declaration, I would say that first of all there is now a confirmed link between the present prohibition on use and the future convention, a convention which will prohibit not only the use, but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. 149 States have declared that they are "determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". This wording from the Paris Declaration sums up perfectly, I think, the argument expounded by the President of the French Republic when he said: "We will not achieve a complete ban unless we reaffirm today the prohibition of use. This prohibition will in turn be all the better underpinned when production, transfer and stockpiling have become impossible." Beyond the differences in legal commitments that exist at present between States, according to whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Protocol, or whether they have tabled reservations to it, we now know - you now know - that there is a collective conviction on the part 149 States, a conviction that makes it possible to move from the Protocol of 1925 to a global convention: the universal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons.

The second element of reference, in the Paris Declaration is the political endorsement given there for the first time to the philosophy of the 1925 Protocol by more States than the signatories alone. The 149 States recognized the "importance" of the Protocol and its "continuing validity". They called upon those that have not yet done so to become parties to the protocol, and 12 of them have already responded positively to the appeal. Furthermore, despite the fears of those who predicted that the use of chemical arms would become widespread, dooming the negotiation of a new convention here in this very room, to failure, we have provided a new reason for persevering, new grounds for confidence in the wisdom of peoples.

There is a third encouragement, which is essential for the 40 of you who are negotiating here, as well as for those who are not members of the Conference on Disarmament but are now clearly invited to contribute to this work: the Paris Conference reaffirmed the need to step up the pace in Geneva, without overlooking the remaining difficulties but on the contrary to solve them as soon as possible. The Paris Declaration will serve as a point of reference: we will be accountable in the coming weeks for the way in which we translate this political impetus into action. If you will allow me, I will come back shortly to the way I view the resumption of your work here.

The fourth area in which I believe the Paris Declaration provides a point of reference is prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons. It is clear to all now, I think, that we must refrain from applying to chemical weapons a logic which would bring the haves and the have-nots into confrontation. Let us therefore refuse to place one side in opposition to the other, and let us work together, industrial countries and developing

(Mr. Dumas, France)

countries, military Powers with chemical weapons and Powers without them, to curb a worrying trend, the only treatment for which is a complete and verified ban. In the mean time, until the future convention formalizes this ban, let us all exercise restraint and act responsibly, as the Paris Declaration invites us to do, to avoid any developments that we would all regret later.

Another area where the Paris Declaration is of obvious value relates to the confirmed support of the 149 States for the role of the United Nations. This concerns in particular the investigatory powers entrusted to the Secretary-General by virtue of procedures that, I might venture to recall, France had the honour of originating, with resolution 37/98D. I welcome the presence of experts here today who are meeting for the second time, and whose task it is - as the Paris Declaration states - to "strengthen the efficiency of existing procedures". These procedures, as we know, give some latitude to the Secretary-General. It is important that, when he decides to implement them, they should be promptly applied. Here again, the Paris Declaration, which "calls for the co-operation of all States in order to facilitate the action of the Secretary-General", indicates the path we must follow.

A second aspect of the role of the United Nations which is underlined by the Paris Declaration pertains to initiatives that could enable the international community to exercise its vigilance with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons: some have deemed that the Declaration is not sufficiently precise on this point. It is clear, however, that such an expression concerns the penalties that could be applied to a State that ignored the ban.

A renewed condemnation of CW use, definition of the link between the old Protocol and the future convention, the need to redouble efforts in Geneva and to settle outstanding issues, detailed analysis of the phenomenon of proliferation, precise mention of the essential role of the United Nations: on all these points the Paris Declaration is a point of reference for your work. But at the same time it gives new impetus, on behalf of the international community it expresses a fervent obligation: to conclude at an early date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. This feeling of urgency cannot be modified by anything except for the conviction that problems still remain to be solved. It is the existence of these problems which deterred us from setting a precise deadline. What we want is not a convention on the cheap but one that is effective and effectively verifiable. These problems must be solved rapidly.

What are these difficulties that have yet to be solved? They may be grouped under five headings, corresponding to the five working groups which I would like to be the immediate and visible reflection of our determination.

Verification, first of all: this is much more difficult in the chemical domain than in the nuclear domain. It must enable us to ensure not only that no one keeps a secret stock of chemical weapons, or militarily significant precursors, but also that no party can use its chemical industry to produce such stocks in conditions that would escape the notice of even random inspection. It will therefore be necessary for you to elaborate a complete range of procedures combining routine inspection and challenge inspection.

(Mr. Dumas, France)

What is essential here is to be assured that the necessarily intrusive character of these procedures does not jeopardize the protection of industrial and trade secrets. In this connection, I should like to say that I attach a great deal of hope to the results of the trial inspections that several countries, including France, are carrying out at present, or have just completed, in their domestic chemical industry.

Second area still to be worked on: legal aspects. I will not dwell on this here. I would just like to recall the need to provide for the best possible articulation between the 1925 Protocol and the future convention.

The third area on which we should focus our attention concerns the institutional aspects: the jurisdiction of the organs to be set up under the future convention, their role in inspection, detecting violations and imposing sanctions, the articulation with existing machinery linked to the organs of the United Nations; the possibility that, through the Scientific Council that France is proposing, the convention may be continuously adapted to technological progress. The French delegation plans to table a document on the Scientific Council shortly, and we hope that you will give it a favourable reception.

The fourth area of difficulty is the definition of the field of negotiation itself, where progress should be possible now that the Soviet Union has announced that it no longer wishes to introduce a fourth category of products to be subject to control. But we have yet to come to an understanding on the exact definitions of the weapons and products that are to be covered, the thresholds considered significant, and especially the way of dealing with new agents which may emerge and cause serious concern. Here I am thinking of the increasingly blurred boundary between chemical weapons and biological weapons, especially in the very difficult area of toxins.

I have kept for the end the fifth area for consideration which, after verification, seems to me the most delicate, not to say the most difficult: it pertains to the transition period during which stocks will be destroyed. It concerns more particularly two problems: maintaining the security of all during the transition, and upgrading the status of the convention. First, upgrading the status of the convention. During the Paris Conference the public will have become aware of one of the political dilemmas that we have yet to solve here: how to make the convention a universal instrument straight away, and not just a bilateral agreement between the two main chemical-weapon Powers. To reduce it to those dimensions, as you well know, would be to fail to achieve our goal.

The Paris Declaration recognizes this clearly, emphasizing the "indispensable universal character" of the convention and calling upon "all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded" - and I emphasize these last six words, which form a key phrase. But we have to devise the necessary inducements for this to be done, so that those who hesitate - either because of fears arising from a specific regional context or because of a concern that the development of their civilian chemical industry will be hampered - will be convinced that the agreement which will be put before them presents no risk to them and is solidly based. And it is there that a comprehensive approach to undiminished security during the transition period

(Mr. Dumas, France)

seems to me to be crucial; it must address simultaneously the order of destruction of stocks, non-use as long as stocks continue to exist, assistance and protection, and penalties which could be applied to those holding back the process or evading their obligations.

It goes without saying, obviously, that this question of undiminished security is very closely connected to the nature of the verification régime that I referred to earlier on. Our task - your task - on all these points is immense: drawing the logical conclusions from France's decision to give up all possibilities of producing chemical weapons from the very entry into force of the future convention, we have just withdrawn from the "rolling text" the details of our proposal concerning security stocks. The negotiating text now contains only skeleton provisions which simply remind us of the need to devise a régime that will ensure the security of all when some still have stocks while others no longer have any. We see clearly what should be the essential elements of this future régime: the solution lies in particular in the rejection of any monopoly, even a temporary one; in the asymmetrical destruction of stocks by those who have the most and the others; and in the placing of production and stockpiling facilities under control. If we can reach a rapid understanding on such a régime, if we can supplement it with satisfactory provisions on assistance, if arrangements are made for the application of penalties to any party failing to observe the timetable for destruction, I think that we would have sound arguments to convince anyone who might still be hesitant about becoming party to the convention. It is in this spirit that France adopted the important shift in position you learned of when the President announced at the United Nations that France possesses no chemical weapons and will not produce any once the convention enters into effect.

If disarmament is pursued, there is no reason why France should not draw the consequences. We are resolved that it should be pursued and attain the sought-after result as quickly as possible: this is the purpose of my coming here today, and the meaning of my message to you; it is also the purpose of the effort that we made in convening the Paris Conference; and it is the message I would like to leave with you; it can be concluded, it must be concluded, and this presupposes - as was recognized by the 149 States in Paris - redoubled efforts in order to bring about a satisfactory solution on the five major issues that I have outlined to you.

The considerable work that the Conference on Disarmament has already accomplished, for which I wish to pay you a very special tribute, convinces me that success is within your reach.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

... Whilst nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, we must recognize that the time has come to conclude without delay a convention for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Since the end of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament, decisions have been taken which highlight the existing consensus on this issue in the international community, namely, resolutions 43/74 A and C of the United Nations General Assembly and the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Resolutions 43/74 A and C contain references to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda item 4. In particular, resolution 43/74 C expresses the hope that the Conference will give a strong impetus to the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, intensifying its efforts during the 1989 session with a view to the final elaboration of the convention.

The chemical weapons issue was also addressed at a high political level at the Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons that took place in

(continued)

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

Paris from 7 to 11 January last. I consider that this is an appropriate occasion to express our gratitude to the Government of France for the efficient organization of the Conference as well as the hospitality offered to delegations. The Paris Conference was an international event of great significance in the long history of multilateral efforts aimed at limiting and eliminating chemical weapons. A hundred years have elapsed since the signature of the Hague Declaration in 1899, a pioneering document in this field, inasmuch as it banned the use of projectiles to spread asphyxiating and poisonous gases. Moreover, 63 years have passed since the Geneva Protocol was signed.

Seen in a historical perspective, the Paris Conference marks the start of the final stage in the process towards chemical disarmament. The participation of delegations from 149 States, in other words practically the entire international community, as well as the presence of numerous Ministers for Foreign Affairs, demonstrated the importance of a meeting that had a great impact on world public opinion. The adoption of the Final Declaration by consensus proved that it is possible to reach agreement at a multilateral level on a global scale, thus strengthening this dimension of disarmament. The Declaration also includes a unanimous condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and emphasizes the need to finalize the text of the convention at an early date. The Conference on Disarmament must respond to this appeal in an effective way, both at the procedural level and as regards the substantive issues in the negotiations, because it could not continue its work in a routine manner, impervious to the influence of such a singular political development. The Paris Conference not only focused the attention of world public opinion on the problem of the existence of chemical weapons, but also raised growing expectations in respect of negotiations on the convention. In this regard, we deem it important to draw the attention of the Conference to the terms of the statement made by the Group of 21 on 7 February, expressing the views of the neutral and non-aligned countries on the need to bring the terms of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on this subject into line with the political commitment entered into by our Governments, and by almost the entire international community, through the above-mentioned pronouncements. The message of the Paris Conference must be put into practice now, and to this end the designation of the representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel, to preside over the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year seems to us to be a very timely decision.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... At a time when international relations are experiencing great changes owing to the East-West rapprochement and the replacement of confrontation and distrust by dialogue, the Conference must ensure that large-scale mobilization goes hand in hand with this evolution. The cosmogony of rigid positions that has always presided over our debates and our negotiations is in the process of becoming obsolete, thereby aggravating the risk that our Conference will be sidelined by standing aside from this great epic of disarmament. The Conference, which already has 10 years of work behind it, unfortunately has few achievements to its credit - except for the chemical weapons convention - bearing in mind the effort and energy invested up till now in discharging its mandate. That is why at the beginning of this new period we must strive to find other paths in order not to commit the error of revelling in lethargy and resignation.

The Conference could have drawn on this progression by emphasizing the necessary flexibility which would make it possible, without denying or renouncing principles, to reach agreement on the greatest number of common denominators that can overcome the deadlock in the negotiations. The wind of change is blowing throughout the world. And it is time for the Conference on Disarmament to move into its slipstream. In fact, this session could not begin under better auspices. The success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the announcement by the Soviet Union that it is to begin destroying its chemical weapons stocks without waiting for the conclusion of the convention, the recent agreement in Vienna concerning the negotiating mandate on conventional weapons in Europe, testify - if proof were still needed - to the new trends in international relations. Indeed, these recent developments, which are a source of great satisfaction for us all, must inspire our Conference. It must find in them the political impetus, as well as the example to be followed, so that its work may evolve in the direction of the hopes it carries with it.

The international Conference on chemical weapons that was held in Paris last month is indisputably an event of great historical significance. Besides the new lease of life that it gave to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, it was the

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

illustration of universal mobilization to promote the banishment of these inhuman weapons forever, and it showed the consensus reached with regard to the importance and urgency of concluding the international convention on chemical weapons which is being negotiated by our Ad hoc Committee. In our view, this consensus does not reflect only a harmony of views among the 150 participating countries. It is the expression of a universal commitment to eliminate chemical weapons totally from the surface of the Earth. Just as it also bears witness to unanimous tribute and unfaltering support by the international community for the work that has been going on in the Conference on Disarmament for a decade in this particular area. Finally, this consensus carries in it the political impetus so much sought by our Conference. I hope that our Conference will be able to make maximum use of it in order to progress rapidly in its negotiations so that the chemical weapons convention becomes a reality soon. My delegation will return to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at greater length in a future statement.

I would not like to close this chapter without carrying out an agreeable duty, by expressing our immense gratitude to the French people and Government for the hospitality and perfect organization of the Conference, to the success of which Ambassador Morel contributed a readiness to co-operate, dynamism and talent.

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(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... The day before yesterday the distinguished French Foreign Minister quite impressively summed up the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and submitted proposals on future action. In fact, the Paris Conference has entrusted us with a mandate to conclude the negotiations

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(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

and deliver mankind from the burden of this dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction. In this endeavour, the Paris Declaration is a programme of action, from all points of view.

In Paris, 149 States came out in favour of redoubled efforts for the prohibition of chemical weapons, to be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament. One hundred and forty-nine States demanded that the convention should be concluded at the earliest date, and they called upon all States to make an appropriate contribution towards achieving that end. My country is fully committed to what was agreed upon in Paris. It is among the States which have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and we have introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. We continue our efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe - an area of ultra-high weapons density - because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution. We are prepared to sign the chemical weapons convention immediately after its completion.

The USSR's cessation of its chemical weapons production, and its announcement that it will unilaterally start the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles this year, is a significant advance to foster the speedy continuation of our negotiations. In that light, we are all the more concerned, frankly speaking, over decisions on the production of binary weapons. None the less, we have to step up our efforts so that 1989 will become a crucial year for the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

For the achievement of a real breakthrough, it is imperative now to focus the work of the Conference even more on solving the still pending essential issues. As we see it, these issues include:

Firstly, harmonization of the verification régimes as set forth in the text of the draft convention. Verification must be adequate, effective and feasible - which means it must give sufficient assurance of compliance with the convention; the methods of inspection and monitoring must be highly reliable, and their costs affordable and appropriate to their objectives. It must be clarified whether the types of inspections so far provided for in the draft convention, namely routine and challenge inspections, are sufficient or whether they ought to be complemented by others, for example ad hoc inspections. Experience gathered in the context of trial inspections, including those carried out in my country, may be used for taking a decision of principle in that regard.

Secondly, completion of the provisions concerning challenge inspection. They are indeed an essential element for the verification system.

Thirdly, the order of destruction for chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. This is a crucial aspect of ensuring the principle of undiminished security during the period of destruction.

Fourthly, agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. This organ will have to take important political decisions in future daily work in the implementation of the convention being negotiated.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We support dynamic methods to be applied in the Ad hoc Committee and in its working groups, concentrating on the identification and solution of such essential problems. We are prepared to chair one of the working groups.

Such an approach would help to make headway in matters of substance, as is rightly demanded. It would also be a concrete follow-up to the Paris Declaration. The German Democratic Republic is ready to make its own contribution towards this end by submitting substantive proposals and carrying out an international trial inspection.

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Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express my satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has started its work under your experienced leadership, which I believe will ensure a good start for this important working year.

I am taking the floor today as outgoing Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee on 3 February and which is now before you as document CD/881. This report

(continued)

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

covers the work carried out during the inter-sessional period on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Committee's last report of 12 September 1988 (CD/874), and approved by the Conference on 20 September.

As requested by the Conference, the Committee resumed its work under my chairmanship. Firstly, in preparation for the resumed session, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee were held between 29 November and 15 December 1988. Secondly, the Ad hoc Committee held a session of limited duration during the period between 17 January and 3 February 1989. The results of the Committee's work have been registered in the report in an updated version of the "rolling text". In general, it maintains the structure and follows the pattern of previous sessions. In particular, it reflects the results of consideration of the following issues in the framework of the three working groups.

Group A, under the chairmanship of Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia, considered the issue of confidentiality with regard to verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. Agreements reached enabled us to include in appendix II two new texts: a set of guidelines to be used in the elaboration of a régime for the handling and protection of confidential information, and a classification system for confidential information. Appropriate references to the issue of confidentiality were also placed in articles IV, V, and IX of the draft convention in appendix I. More work is needed on this issue, but a broad exchange of views on this delicate and very important problem will be very useful in the further search for common ground in this area.

Issues pertaining to schedule [1] chemicals outside the single small-scale production facility were also discussed in this group, and some progress was achieved, especially concerning facilities producing schedule [1] chemicals in quantities exceeding 100 g per year. The present state of affairs is reflected in appendix II.

Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, concentrated its work on two issues, namely undiminished security during the period of destruction of chemical weapons, and article X on assistance. Although it was not possible to transform the results of the intensive discussions on the first issue into concrete language, and further work on this subject is needed, nevertheless we now have a clearer picture of possible approaches to this outstanding issue and, I believe, a good foundation to resolve this problem. On the other hand, we have an indirect result of these discussions: following the statements made in the Committee on 31 January by Ambassador Morel of France, Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR and the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia and China, appendix III as contained in CD/874 has been removed in its entirety from our report. In addition, several footnotes relating to the concept of undiminished security were either deleted or redrafted. I would like to underline that this is an important step forward on this politically, militarily and technically intricate question.

As concerns article X, the title of which now reads "Assistance and protection against chemical weapons", the new text as developed and agreed to in Group B is reflected in appendix II as a basis for future work.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Group C, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan, invested a good deal of practical work in elaborating how challenge inspections may be conducted in practice in the context of the guidelines on the international inspectorate. The result of very active and intense discussions is the addition of section IV to the guidelines in the addendum to appendix I. However, to the extent that the work has been carried out using as a basis the principles governing on-site inspection on challenge contained in appendix II of the "rolling text", which require further consideration and elaboration, there are still important issues to be resolved.

There has been valuable progress in this Group in clarifying the interrelationship between the highest organ of the Organization, which we will now call the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the technical secretariat under article VIII. As a consequence the numerous references in the earlier "rolling text" to the International Authority, Consultative Committee or General Conference have been clarified and made more precise.

The results of the work during the resumed session are embodied in the report I am submitting today. I should like to take this opportunity to add a few personal comments.

In 1982 as well as in 1988, I was privileged to preside over the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in both of these cases I was faced with the exceptional requirement of three reports. I do hope that this report will bring us nearer to our common goal of completing the negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. Valuable progress has been made in many important areas. I would also like to underline that this text does not fully reflect what was done during the entire 1988 session. I have in mind very useful and important events like the preparations for multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry, and a meeting of experts from chemical industry in many countries which took place last July.

I wish to stress, however, that despite hard and intensive work by all of us during the whole session, the results achieved, though important, are, at least in my opinion, not fully satisfactory. We must all ask ourselves whether we have done everything possible to achieve results matching our expectations. This is particularly important bearing in mind that we are now entering into a new phase in our negotiations. The world community expects us to conclude our work urgently and responsibly. This request was made explicitly during the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in its consensus resolutions on chemical weapons, as well as in the Final Act of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We must not lose our impetus and the strong political will demonstrated by some 150 countries. We have a special opportunity for a real redoubling of our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, as stated in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.

I believe that the present report constitutes a good starting-point on this path. This being said, I wish to pay a warm and special tribute to my immediate collaborators in this endeavour - the chairmen of the three working groups. I am sure that all delegations will join me in extending to them our

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

sincere appreciation and thanks for their competence, dedication and hard work. I also wish to thank all delegations for the co-operation they have never failed to extend to me, especially at difficult times, and for their contributions to our work.

I would like to express my special gratitude to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. His competence and highest professional skill, which I already had the opportunity to appreciate during my first chairmanship of the Committee in 1982, greatly contributed to our negotiations. My thanks go also to Ms. Darby and other members of the secretariat for their indispensable and effective support. I also wish to express my thanks to the interpreters, translators and all technical staff who have helped to make our work smooth and effective.

My last words will be addressed to my successor. We are all familiar with Ambassador Pierre Morel's qualities. I am sure that besides his competence, dedication and charm, he will bring to this Committee all the enthusiasm that is needed to take us a long stride along the road to success. In handing over the task of carrying the work further, I wish to pledge to him my full support and that of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should like to convey to Ambassador Sujka the appreciation of the Conference for the effective manner in which he conducted the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I also wish to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. In this connection, I should like to inform members that I intend to put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday 14 February. I do hope that, on that occasion, we shall be able to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee and appoint its Chairman, so that we may resume work immediately on this important agenda item. If so, we shall also take up for decision all requests by non-members to participate in the work of the Conference on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

Let me now turn to a somewhat more positive aspect of the work of the CD, where considerable progress has been made during the last year. I refer to the negotiations relating to a chemical weapons convention. A comprehensive, universal and effective prohibition on chemical weapons would lead to an enhancement of security for all nations by removing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The Final Declaration of the recently concluded Paris Conference, in which I participated, reflects clearly the urgency of concluding "at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". We share the sense of urgency reflected in the Final Declaration, and would urge the Conference on Disarmament to set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We are happily close enough to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Any slow-down at this critical stage would be a serious setback to our efforts, as has happened in other areas of disarmament negotiations in the past. At the same time we also need to refrain from actions which may complicate or frustrate the momentum of the negotiations.

The time has come for us to reflect on how the convention will enter into force with the least possible delay. In our view, an open-ended preparatory commission would need to be set up once the convention is opened for signature. In this interim period till the convention enters into force after the requisite number of instruments of ratification are received, the preparatory commission will have to prepare for the first general conference of the States parties, and also enter into procedural and technical details with the host country and States parties. At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil):

... This spring session of 1989 begins under very good auspices. On 11 January the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States adopted an important Final Declaration, which my delegation expects will give further impetus to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and take us nearer a universal and non-discriminatory convention banning forever those terrible means of warfare.

I cannot let pass this opportunity to thank the French Government warmly for the kind hospitality and excellent conference services they provided, which undoubtedly were instrumental in facilitating the outcome of our collective endeavour. Ambassador Pierre Morel must be specially thanked for his untiring efforts in the preparations for the Paris Conference. This augurs well for his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee, a nomination that has pleased my delegation not only for very personal reasons, but also for the hopes it brings of a renewed impulse to the chemical negotiations during his tenure.

The Paris Conference helped to heal some of the wounds recent experience in multilateral conferences on matters of disarmament had inflicted on the international community. Consensus was reached, and this is surely something to be hailed. My delegation, however, regrets that consensus seems now possible only in certain specific areas of the disarmament agenda, those that

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(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

appear to have been designated jointly by the two major Powers as being ready for universal negotiations. In other equally vital areas, things proceed as if it were necessary to be heavily armed as a preliminary step to be able to have a word to say on subsequent disarmament negotiations.

The Final Declaration adopted in Paris has six paragraphs, which very clearly spell out the concerns and expectations of the 149 nations that endorsed it. The first one states unequivocally their commitment not to use chemical weapons. In this light, Brazil hopes sincerely that those States which have made reservations to the Geneva Protocol will seriously examine the possibility of withdrawing such reservations. This would be a positive step towards bringing the international regulations in force prior to the adoption of the new convention into line with the situation which will come into being after the goal of the complete and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons is reached.

The second paragraph reaffirms the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which was indeed one of the main objectives of the convening of the Paris Conference. Let me also welcome another development directly related to that gathering, the important number of new accessions to the Protocol.

The third paragraph - for my delegation the real hub of the entire text - is the emphatic appeal to the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". My delegation, as well as the other members of the Group of 21, considered that this very clear language, adopted by all participating States, meant the same to all of us. As we have seen in the negotiations on the question of the mandate to be adopted for the re-established Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we were wrong, and the mandate could not be brought entirely into line with the letter and the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris meeting.

The fourth paragraph gives the Geneva negotiations a very well-defined framework, as it emphasizes that the only answer to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the spread of chemical weapons is the conclusion and entry into force of a universal and non-discriminatory convention.

The fifth paragraph, regarding the role of the United Nations, reiterates language already widely accepted and gives further impetus to the work of the Group of Experts established under resolution 43/74 A, now meeting in this very building.

The sixth and last paragraph takes up the subject with which I began my appreciation of the successful outcome of the Paris Conference. The consensus around chemical disarmament and the hopes that our work here at the Conference on Disarmament arouse around the world should not let us forget the priorities enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly. In spite of the real progress made with the Washington Treaty, the so-called INF agreement, we are still a far cry from approaching in nuclear disarmament the levels that would quiet and comfort mankind's deep and well-founded anxieties.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

In this regard, I would like to recall the words pronounced by Mr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, Minister of External Relations of Brazil, at the Paris Conference:

"Concern regarding recourse to chemical weapons must be inscribed in the wider frame of the interdiction of use and threat of use of any weapon, be it conventional or nuclear, for the solution of conflicts - a rule of international law incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations. The engagement through which we try to realize the goal of disarmament in the field of chemical weapons must have its counterpart in other realms, specifically in the nuclear one."

As I said before, 1989 begins with good winds filling our sails. After the Paris Conference, we are all solemnly committed to conclude at the earliest date the convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. We know there is no other way, no parallel track. The Brazilian delegation hopes to see this new engagement of the international community reflected in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The work carried out during the inter-sessional period already furnished proof that things are moving. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the three working group chairmen made us advance in some relevant points of our agenda. We would like to single out the work done in Group C, under the co-ordination of Mr. Numata of the Japanese delegation, especially taking into account the sensitivity of the main item tackled therein - "Guidelines for the conduct of challenge inspections". While my delegation agrees that these guidelines should be seen in the light of the principles of on-site inspection on challenge still contained in appendix II, it should be recognized that the discussions were enriching and that the different and diverging points of view expressed were very even-handedly reflected in the text finally included in appendix I.

Many important parts of our "rolling text" could not be addressed, for obvious reasons, in the short period between sessions. They should be dealt with in the coming weeks. At this juncture, I would like to underline that my delegation considers that the time has come to address more forcefully the issue of economic and technological development, which is the core of article XI of our draft, still in appendix II. Some resistance to the basic concept of the article seems to be withering away. This would be a most welcome development, for this article, as well as article X, constitutes a key to the universality of our future convention. We think that economic and technological co-operation, besides its intrinsic merits, can serve also as a significant confidence-building measure. As stated in the "Guidelines for confidence-building measures" adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session, and endorsed in resolution 43/78 H, "since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields" (paragraph 1.3.2.2). The document goes on to state (paragraph 2.3.1) that "confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour".

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

What better setting and what better model for co-operation than a disarmament agreement such as the one we are in the process of negotiating? What better reason to have confidence and engage in a free flow of scientific knowledge in chemistry than the formal and verifiable obligation of other States parties not to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons? And in return, what better way to be confident that the activities of other parties are really geared to purposes not forbidden by the convention than to share with them information, knowledge and a general co-operative approach?

By the same token, we hold in great esteem the idea and the implementation of national trial inspections. I can announce today to this Conference that Brazil conducted such an inspection on 6 December 1988, at a facility in Camaçari, Bahia. My delegation will circulate the report of this inspection later in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and present its conclusions in the presence of one of the experts that participated in it. This trial inspection is one more proof of the readiness of my Government to successfully complete our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We hope more delegations will conclude trial inspections and report their findings to the Conference.

I have concentrated my attention today on the Paris Conference, on the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the able and stimulating new chairmanship of Ambassador Morel, and finally on the national trial inspection conducted by Brazilian experts. I reserve for another occasion my observations on other relevant points of our agenda.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

International tension has diminished, and the world has become a quieter and safer place. The "cold war" is on the way out and real prerequisites are being created for humanity to enter a peaceful era in its history. The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is being implemented. Prospects are fair for reaching agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The agreement in Vienna on a significant Final Document, along with the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, are indicators of the effectiveness of the new, realistic approaches to international affairs. There are grounds to expect a successful outcome at the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (I shall be referring to this issue in greater detail later on). There is a shift towards putting an end to regional conflicts. These first real steps in improving the international situation in the field of disarmament have become possible because understanding of the need for a period of peace is gaining momentum and is becoming the dominant trend. To consolidate this sound trend it is necessary to promote all the positive achievements of the past few years, to develop and intensify political dialogue, aiming at the search for solutions to problems rather than confrontation, the exchange of constructive ideas rather than recriminations.

Today's realities are such that this dialogue requires continuing and active participation by all countries and all regions of the world. The internationalization of the dialogue and the negotiating process is necessary to bring harmony to international relations and put them on a more stable basis. To us the above-mentioned ideas are not just abstract notions. The Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament draws its inspiration from these ideas and will continue to do so, both at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and in discussing other agenda items.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

... Before I turn to the state of affairs at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, I would like to dwell upon the importance the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has for these negotiations. The Paris Conference occupies a prominent place in the 1989 chronicle, which has just begun to be written. This is demonstrated by the number of its participants - 149 - by the record time by world standards required for its organization, and by the preparedness of the world community manifested at the Conference to reach agreement on complex military/political issues. In fact the Conference became a world assembly on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Without belittling the importance of the other provisions of the Paris Final Act, I would especially point out the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

chemical weapons. In essence, the States participating in the Conference in Paris declared their intention of working towards the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

We listened with keen interest to the statement made at the meeting on 7 February by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. R. Dumas, who officially introduced the Paris Final Act and set out interesting ideas about ways to step up negotiations on the convention. Whilst giving due credit to the considerable contribution made by the initiators and organizers of the Paris Conference, I would nevertheless venture to express the view that the success in Paris would have been impossible without the progress achieved in the past few years at the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. It was not only a refusal to accept chemical weapons, but also the understanding that the issue of their complete prohibition was ripe for a final solution, and that nearly all the basic elements of the future convention have already been worked out, which made it possible to draft the provisions on the early conclusion of the convention that appeared in the Paris Declaration. Thus, by building upon the progress already achieved and giving a power impetus to further efforts, the Paris Conference became a major event marking the entry of the negotiations into their decisive stage.

We believe that now it is extremely important, without losing momentum, to translate the Paris Declaration into the language of the Geneva negotiations, to transform the political provisions agreed therein into concrete positions. We regard this document as a direct instruction to urgently redouble our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. This objective is based on a realistic assessment of the situation. In actual fact relatively few unresolved issues remain. Furthermore, work on these issues is now well advanced, with greater or lesser progress having been made on each in the form of a greater or lesser degree of agreement on political or technical problems.

The Soviet Union has done everything in its power to eliminate difficulties with the future convention. In particular, during the last inter-sessional period we developed our position as regards permitted production of schedule [1] chemicals. The Soviet side has agreed to laboratory synthesis of small amounts of such chemicals (up to 100 grams) for research and medical purposes provided the convention ensures the strict prohibition of the development of chemical weapons everywhere. We have also expressed our readiness to include provisions in the convention under which it would be possible in each individual case to give consideration to production of schedule [1] chemicals outside a small-scale facility in amounts exceeding 100 grams for pharmaceutical purposes, with a specific amount laid down for each chemical depending on its characteristics and specific uses, naturally under effective international controls. As you know, these steps of ours have already made it possible to move towards agreement on article VI. According to the assessment made by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.-B. Theorin, in her statement here in the Conference on 7 February 1989, they "demonstrate a constructive and flexible approach to the negotiations and could serve as a basis for agreement". Yet, the solution of the remaining problems does not depend only on us. The elaboration of the convention is a multilateral process in which forward movement can be assured

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

only through joint efforts. Specifically, there is another State possessing a chemical weapons stockpile which is as considerable as ours, and we cannot expect a successful outcome without its positive contribution to the negotiations. We have, of course, duly noted the statements in favour of a chemical weapons ban made during the election campaign by the newly elected President of the United States, G. Bush. We hope that it will not be too long before we see these statements materialize into specific positions on the part of the United States delegation at the negotiations. We also welcome the positive changes in the French position which were announced by President Mitterrand at the United Nations and which were referred to here in Geneva by Minister Dumas.

Now a few words about our approach to the main tasks facing the negotiations. They include in the first place the issue of undiminished security of participants in the convention during the first 10-year period after entry into force. The solution to this issue should be based on a complete cessation of development and production of chemical weapons, strict verification of stockpiles of these weapons and facilities for their production, assymetric reductions leading to a levelling out at a certain point after the entry of the convention into force, and the creation of machinery for co-operation in the field of protection from chemical weapons. Another important factor that should not be ignored, in our view, is confidence-building not only during the initial period after the convention enters into force but also prior to its entry into force, as well as the need to ensure universal accession to the future convention as soon as possible. The Paris Conference provides an impetus to solving this problem as well, by calling upon all States to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. In fact the preparations for the convention's entry into force have already begun. This is being facilitated in particular by the national verification experiments being conducted in a number of States. Judging from our experience, they may prove useful not only from the standpoint of elaborating inspection procedures, but also in enabling States to gain initial experience in their practical application.

Soviet specialists are getting ready for the entry into operation of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Chapaevsk, so as to proceed immediately to the destruction of the chemical weapon stockpile as soon as the facility is ready, even before the convention enters into force. In this connection, special attention is being paid to security and ecological aspects of the problem of destruction.

It is important to finalize agreement on the issue of verification. First and foremost, I am thinking of challenge inspections. Work carried out during the past two years provides a sound basis for that. Agreement also has yet to be reached on verification under article VI of the draft convention, including verification in respect of laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals and the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical warfare agents. We believe that in order to finalize the verification system we can use the existing potential in the form of ideas which have been advanced. What I mean is the possibility for the international inspectorate to conduct on-site inspections on its own

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

initiative if, in carrying out its verification activities of a systematic nature, the need arises to clarify any ambiguous situations. Last year, ideas to this effect were advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom and before that by Australia. We hope that the authors of the idea of ad hoc inspections will make their proposals more specific.

National trial inspections can play a significant role in the elaboration of the verification system as a whole. We concluded such an experiment last December at the chemical plant in Dzerzhinsk, at the facility producing N,N-dialkylaminoethanols, i.e., a key precursor considered in the context of schedule [2]. Both an initial visit involving the preparation of a facility attachment, and a routine inspection, were carried out. In preparing for and conducting the experiment considerable use was made of the recommendations drawn up in September 1988 at the multilateral consultations under the guidance of the Swedish delegation. In our opinion, as early as this spring session it is necessary to analyse thoroughly the results of national experiments and map out the programme for future work in this field. It is also evident that the problem of verification of non-production of chemical weapons cannot be adequately solved without parallel progress on other aspects of article VI. Therefore, we deem it important to continue efforts to secure agreement on the provisions relating to the schedules of chemicals and a procedure for including in the schedules, when necessary, new chemicals posing a risk for the convention.

In this context, it is very important to block off all possible avenues for developing new types of chemical weapons. In this connection, I think we should give more substantive consideration to the proposal to set up a scientific council within the framework of the organs of the convention. We are looking forward to receiving the document on that subject which Minister R. Dumas of France promised to submit to the Conference in the near future. Other aspects of the machinery of the future convention also remain to be finalized, including the issue of the composition of the Executive Council.

Finally, efforts should be continued to draft the final clauses of the convention and to resolve other legal issues. The new stage the negotiations have entered requires a new approach to the organizational aspect as well. It is clear that we currently face a situation in which many outstanding issues run through all our work, and that their solution requires an integrated approach to various articles of the convention, annexes and other parts of the "rolling text". We therefore lend our support to the efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador P. Morel, to change the structure of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to create additional "administrative opportunities" for redoubling our efforts at the negotiations. Naturally, in so doing our main attention should continue to be directed towards reaching agreement on the text of the convention. The results of the Paris Conference impose a great responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first response should be the adoption of an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons taking those results into account and guiding the participants in the negotiations towards their early successful conclusion.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We note with satisfaction, that responding to the call by the Paris Conference, a number of countries have for the first time submitted requests to participate in the chemical weapons negotiations as observers. Bringing new participants into the negotiations, in our opinion, proves on the one hand that the negotiations have entered a decisive phase, and on the other should contribute to the elaboration of a truly global convention. We agree with those who believe that it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of the Conference now on finalizing the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons. This, however, should not justify marking time in other areas of the Conference's work. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has so far been unable to begin practical work on banning nuclear tests is absolutely inadmissible. I would like to recall that the United Nations General Assembly has called upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive work on all aspects of such a treaty at this year's session. In our opinion the basis for such work is contained in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", advanced jointly by the USSR and other socialist countries in June 1987. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be possible at the present stage to focus on verification issues and put into practice the proposal made by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts to prepare as soon as possible practical proposals on a system of monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear tests. We favour the early drawing up of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of tests, and believe that under the present circumstances, a step-by-step approach to resolving this problem is justifiable as well. In our opinion, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear testing, which are based on such a step-by-step approach, do not replace multilateral efforts in this field. These two processes should be mutually complementary and lead to a single final result.

(The President)

I had hoped today to be able also to re-establish the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but unfortunately consultations have not yet produced results. However, I know that members are consulting actively, and it is my hope that we will succeed soon, so that the Conference might adopt the relevant decision at the plenary meeting next Thursday. I shall be happy if we are able to do so, as the secretariat is processing draft decisions on the participation of non-members in both ad hoc committees, under items 4 and 5, and I am sure that you will all agree with me that invitations to them to participate in our work should be extended at the earliest possible date.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 487th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... As announced at our 485th plenary meeting, when we reach the end of the list of speakers, I intend to put before the Conference, for adoption, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/881. I am also glad to inform you that agreement has been reached at informal consultations on the mandate and chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We shall also deal with requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I shall put those questions before the Conference at an informal meeting once our list of speakers is exhausted. Immediately afterwards we shall resume the plenary to formalize those decisions.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

... This situation is growing increasingly untenable. Consequently, my delegation suggest that the Conference may wish to reassess, in a pragmatic manner, the priorities for its deliberations in this year's session. We might ponder the possibility of developing consensus on what I would call a temporarily selected concentration on those subjects of the agenda the urgency of which is undisputed, and for which the prospect for consensus solutions is well founded.

Nobody would belittle the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange or of an intensive conventional conflict. Nobody will deny the Conference the right to study in depth the issues which relate to such events, including possible security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon countries or the eventual insertion of efforts in this direction into a comprehensive disarmament programme. It may be, however, that such issues are not immediately amenable to constructive resolution here in the CD. Indeed, dissenting views in these areas appear to be at the forefront. Moreover, there are other urgent subjects on our agenda with a higher degree of commonality, and which seem closer to a consensus solution. One of the subjects which come immediately into mind is chemical weapons.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

I think that the recent activities which have resulted in a notable alleviation of East-West tensions could now permit the Conference to concentrate its work on the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, even if this results in somewhat lesser attentiveness to some other points of our agenda. The unexpected and unhappy spread of the idea of the possible usefulness of chemical weapons, and the recent use of those weapons, making no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, has sharpened our eagerness to secure a global chemical weapons ban. We have seen that as long as the development, production, storage and transfer of chemical weapons is not prohibited, the danger of their use continues too. The States which attended the recent Paris Conference declared that only a comprehensive and global interdiction of chemical weapons can solve this problem.

A total of 149 States have confirmed the urgency of this task and vowed to redouble their efforts at the negotiations on the subject here in Geneva. Redoubling our already solid and conscientious work can only mean more time, more manpower and more focused and success-oriented work. The new work programme and method proposed by the Chairman-designate of the Ad hoc Committee for 1989 reflects this view. I plead, therefore, that the Conference should utilize all possibilities to put at the disposal of this programme the necessary time and resources.

I would like to close my remarks with a thought that goes beyond the immediate necessities before us. A convention banning chemical weapons is an urgent task, in itself, and does not need elaborate justification. But there is an aspect of our efforts which goes beyond this immediate aim of the conclusion of a multilateral CW convention, and which will have an impact on future chances for all multilateral disarmament efforts. The importance of the subject of a CW ban, and the importance of our being able to negotiate an acceptable agreement on a multilateral basis, combine to constitute a litmus test of whether it is possible for the world community to conduct meaningful multilateral negotiations at all and to come up with consensus final products or not. Since Paris, we know that there is a fundamental consensus in this world that chemical weapons should be banned. Our Conference should not only acknowledge that consensus, but execute it in the appropriate way.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

... I would now like to share a few ideas of a general nature with you on the state of disarmament negotiations and the problems therein, as well as on some avenues the Conference might pursue. Present-day international life, in our view, continues to be marked by the existence throughout the world of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons. Their destructive capacity has been only slightly affected by the Soviet-American Treaty on the prohibition of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles, and may indeed be enhanced as a result of the modernization of tactical nuclear forces being contemplated by NATO. At the same time, there are substantial stocks of chemical weapons, which are to be supplemented by the production of binary weapons. Nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are an integral part of armament plans and combat tactics in certain countries. All this, together with the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent as the basis for military doctrines, is hardly likely to ensure peace and strengthen security, and stimulates the arms race and maintains the risk of war.

... We would also like to recall that a few years ago, when the idea of a new start in disarmament efforts was being mooted, Romania suggested the idea of a global integrated approach to disarmament. It spoke in favour of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, based on nuclear disarmament and also including measures to eliminate chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as substantial reductions in conventional weapons, troops and military expenditure. We had in mind that in the way people think, as in every day life - in doctrines, in the very conception of defence and armed forces, there was an indissoluble link between the various types of weapons. It took some time for this to be recognized. But although a step is going to be taken in that direction soon in Vienna, much remains to be done. Because the individual, separate, piecemeal approach to various types of weapons still prevails. It is high time to ask a question: is it possible to guarantee peace and independence for peoples and at the same time forge real and equal security for all if we continue to act in isolation to eliminate one or two types of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear weapons and chemical weapons?

(continued)

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

We do not consider that it is possible. This approach, by its very nature and by the nature of the results that could be achieved does not protect us against attempts to use force or the threat of force, against the possibilities that certain States might blackmail others by threatening to use one or other of these weapons.

An effective and equitable nuclear and chemical weapon disarmament process should be so designed that it does not lead to new imbalances in international life and does not open the way to the appearance of power centres which might impose their own domination on the world. Such a process would have to be based on the principle of equal security for all States. All this leads us to consider that nuclear and chemical disarmament should be dealt with in a unitary manner and that the simultaneous elimination of these weapons, and the shift to general disarmament, constitute the major objective at the present stage. Romania, which possesses neither nuclear weapons nor chemical weapons and has no intention of producing them, believes that firm action is required to achieve the stage-by-stage elimination of these weapons as soon as possible, which would pre-suppose the cessation of production and testing as well as the destruction of all nuclear and chemical weapon stocks and the outlawing of these weapons.

On this basis it would seem necessary for this new session of the Conference on Disarmament to make its contribution to establishing the foundations for an effective negotiating process in nuclear and chemical disarmament taking place simultaneously. Specific measures must be adopted which could lead to the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. These measures should be designed in a unitary way as components of a set of actions intended to contribute to international stability, to place relations between States on new foundations, on equality and respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the elimination of force and the threat of force.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

... On the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, Romania submits the following proposals:

In the light of the interdependence between chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, the development and implementation of the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons should be carried out at the same time as the development and implementation of a universal treaty on the prohibition and the complete stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons;

The future convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the agreed verification measures should in no way affect the development of the chemical industry or the technical and scientific potential of each and every country, or their use for economic and social progress;

The guaranteeing of the broadest possible access by all countries to the achievements of modern science and technology, and the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the chemical field;

Pending the destruction of all chemical weapons, chemical-weapon States should undertake not to make any use of these arms in any circumstances.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

... Moreover, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons which took place from 7 to 11 January 1989 was a reaffirmation of the universal political will to ban chemical weapons. The Final Declaration, which was unanimously adopted, should serve as a clarion call for the speedy conclusion of the long-awaited convention.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

... It is gratifying to note that much progress has been made in the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons during the past year. In this regard, I hasten to add that the Paris Conference has been a resounding success. We note with satisfaction that the Conference not only made the reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol possible, but also called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

In this connection, I would like to seize this opportunity to convey the profound appreciation of my Government to the Government of France for convening the Conference and for its generous hospitality. I would also like to proffer our sincere thanks to His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for having taken his precious time to officially introduce to us the Final Declaration of the Conference. Let me also pay a particular tribute to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel, for his indefatigable efforts in the preparations for the Conference.

It is evident from the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference that there is an expressed general will to ban chemical weapons once and for all. Moreover, the Final Declaration states, inter alia: "The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction".

Ethiopia was among the first States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is one of the paradoxes of history that Ethiopia was also one of the first countries to fall victim to the use of chemical weapons. Ethiopia therefore considers these weapons and their complete destruction a matter of the utmost priority. Furthermore, it is my duty to inform this Conference that my country does not produce or stockpile chemical weapons.

At this juncture, we would like to note with satisfaction the considerable progress made during the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We welcome the deletion of appendix III on security stocks. My delegation also commends the work done in the areas of confidentiality, assistance and protection, as well as the conduct of challenge inspections. In this regard, I would like on behalf of my delegation to express my sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for his timeless efforts in successfully guiding the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee. Our appreciation also goes to the chairmen of the three working groups, namely Mr. Andrej Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan.

The PRESIDENT:

... I should like now to put before the Conference, for adoption, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/881. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As agreed at the outset, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting to take up the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the appointment of its Chairman and requests from non-member States to participate in our work.

(The President)

I now turn to working paper CD/WP.360, dealing with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In connection with the process leading to the adoption of that working paper, I would like to make the following remarks.

I had consultations in connection with some proposals advanced about the mandate of the Committee on CW at the plenary session on 7 February. From my consultations with all the groups, a consensus did not emerge, but there was a general will to start the work of the Committee without delay. In consideration of these facts and in order to start the work, I propose that we re-establish the Committee on the basis of the existing mandate. Therefore, I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for adoption working paper CD/WP.360. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to add some other words after the adoption of the decision on the mandate. I hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which has just been re-established, will work in the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.

I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I understand that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, as recommended in the report of the Ad hoc Committee adopted today. May I take it that the Conference so agrees?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend our congratulations to Ambassador Morel on this important assignment. We are glad to have him in that position. I also wish him every success in discharging his important responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mr. MOLANDER (Sweden): As item co-ordinator for chemical weapons of the Group of 21, I have been empowered to make the following statement.

The Group of 21 expresses its satisfaction that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been re-established. The Group would also like to take this opportunity to extend its sincere congratulations to Ambassador Morel of France as the new Chairman of the Committee. Ambassador Morel embodies the very spirit of the Paris Conference, to which he made such decisive contributions with his dynamism, enthusiasm and intellectual discipline. The Group of 21 pledges to work with him in that very spirit.

At the opening meeting of the Conference, on 7 February, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, the Group of 21 proposed that the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be improved, firstly by including a reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and secondly, by deleting the phrase "except for its final drafting". The Group of Socialist States and China supported these proposals.

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(Mr. Molander, Sweden)

The proposals were not intended to be controversial. In fact, the Group could not foresee that the proposed amendments could cause difficulties to any group or any country which participated in the General Assembly and the Paris Conference, where such language was agreed to by consensus. It is therefore with a considerable degree of disappointment that the Group of 21 has taken note of the fact that the Conference as a whole is not in a position to join consensus on the two proposals.

The Group of 21, however, considers that it is of paramount interest that work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be pursued immediately. It has therefore agreed not to press further its proposals for an improved mandate, thus enabling the Committee to start its substantive work as of this week. The position of the Group is clear, however, and it hopes that the Conference will wish to review the mandate at an appropriate time during the 1989 session.

Whatever the mandate, the Group of 21 is ready, in the words of the Paris Declaration, "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". It is our hope that the future work of the Committee from its very beginning will show that our resolve is shared by all.

This concludes the statement of the Group of 21.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): It is a pleasure for me to congratulate Ambassador Morel on behalf of my Group on his election as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to assure him of my Group's readiness to co-operate in the course of the negotiations which lie ahead during this year.

We have just adopted the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to make the following statement for the record on behalf of the Group of Socialist States.

First, the Group of Socialist States believes that the final elaboration at the earliest date of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction, is a matter of highest priority for the Conference on Disarmament.

Second, the world community expects us to conclude our work urgently and responsibly. This request was explicitly made in resolutions 43/74 A and C of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We consider these documents as manifestations of the strong political will of all participating countries to do everything possible to rid the world of chemical weapons.

Thirdly, the year 1989 will be crucial on our way to a chemical-weapon-free world. We are obliged by the world community to mark

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

that we are entering a new phase in our negotiations. From this point of view last year's mandate is outdated and does not duly reflect the present situation and the tasks before us. We have in mind, first of all, the need to delete the restrictive provision "except for its final drafting", as well as to indicate that we have a clear mandate from the Paris Conference to achieve a convention not "at the earliest possible date" or "as soon as possible", but simply "at the earliest date". It was also suggested that we should reproduce the full title of the convention, which includes the prohibition of use, as in the General Assembly resolution and as in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Changing the mandate would be a clear signal that we are seriously addressing our commitments expressed in the Paris Declaration.

Fourthly, our group made specific proposals to this effect during the consultations on the mandate. We also supported the amendments to the old mandate proposed by the Group of 21 at the plenary meeting on 7 February.

Fifthly, we are disappointed that it has not been possible so far to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. We still do not understand the rationale of the Western Group, which opposed any change in the mandate. However, bearing in mind that lengthy discussions on the mandate would be detrimental to the substantive work of the Committee, we decided not to stand in the way of the decision just taken. But we do not consider this issue closed, and believe that it should be possible to continue the consultations on the mandate with the aim of coming to an agreement during the current session of the Conference.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): I look forward to congratulating you, Mr. President, and to welcoming our new colleagues when I take the floor to speak on behalf of the United Kingdom. This morning I am speaking on behalf of the Western Group.

As Co-ordinator of the Western Group, I warmly welcome the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The speed with which this has been accomplished is a good augury for our future work. It has followed detailed, informal consultations held by yourself. I thank you, Mr. President, and colleagues from all groups who have helped to make this possible.

The Committee has a task of great importance before it. We look forward to resuming the substantive negotiations without delay. The important thing is that each of us here should contribute to our utmost to resolving the remaining problems in our negotiations. We will all have in mind the call of the Final Document of the Paris Conference to redouble our efforts. Indeed the report of the Ad hoc Committee in CD/881, which we have just adopted, contains the consensus recommendation that "the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons be taken into account in the future work on the convention".

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Western Group countries have made major contributions in the past, and intend to maintain their efforts intensively in the months ahead. We want a good convention as soon as possible. As the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium, speaking as the Western Co-ordinator, said on 7 February, "What I can assure you of is that the Western Group, together with all the other delegations, will seek the most realistic, the most effective and the most expeditious way to arrive at the conclusion of a convention which will free mankind from the fear of chemical weapons".

While I have the floor, I would like to refer to one particular passage in the Paris Declaration, namely that which establishes that "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". The Western Group of countries is pleased that a larger number of Governments, not members of the Conference on Disarmament, have applied to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons than ever before. We believe the work of the Ad hoc Committee will much benefit from the presence of all these countries, and look forward to co-operating with them.

Lastly, I should like to join others in expressing the pleasure of the Western Group of countries at the accession of Ambassador Pierre Morel as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. His well-known personal qualities, and above all his eminent contribution to the successful outcome of the Paris Conference, give us every confidence in his leadership of our work during the coming months.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): At the outset, I am most pleased to express my warm congratulations to Ambassador Morel of France on his assumption of this year's chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on CW. I am confident that, under his able guidance, the work of the Committee will be crowned with new successes. I also wish to avail myself of the opportunity to express my appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland for his positive contributions.

As far as the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, we have conducted serious discussions under your guidance, Mr. President. I have made known the position of the Chinese delegation, including its views on the statement made by the Group of 21. Today I would simply reiterate that the Chinese delegation hopes that this year's mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will see some improvement in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the forty-third session of the General Assembly and the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. At the same time, the Chinese delegation is also ready to adopt a flexible attitude and to go along with the existing mandate so that the Committee may start its substantive work as soon as possible.

(The President)

I now turn to requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. In that connection, I should like to note that for technical reasons relating to a process of consultations, the secretariat had to prepare the working papers relating to invitations to non-members with a reference to a subsidiary body on agenda item 5. This should be disregarded, as we have not been able yet to re-establish that Ad hoc Committee. We shall consider the references to a subsidiary body on agenda item 5 as deleted from working paper CD/WP.359 and Add.1 to 19. When we re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, we shall then take the working papers up again to deal with agenda item 5. I shall list those countries requesting participation under agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons": Norway, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Portugal, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Denmark, Turkey, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Bangladesh, Syrian Arab Republic, Greece, Tunisia, Zimbabwe (which has also requested participation under items 6, 7 and 8 on the agenda) and Iraq.

(Mr. Ardekani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... Unfortunately, there are a few who do not discern this change. Those who do not appreciate that the world is changing or do not want to believe that. Let us hope that global negotiations on effective disarmament, with their collective nature, will be the instrument which expedites and paves the way for increasing understanding about this changing world. When we say the move toward disarmament is being expedited, it is because we observe that the draft of the convention banning chemical weapons is in the process of being finalized. This is an achievement for the Conference on Disarmament as the sole international body for disarmament negotiations. We have noted that the Paris Conference reaffirmed the role of the Conference on Disarmament in finalizing a convention on all aspects of chemical weapons.

Adherence to an absolute prohibition of chemical weapons should be globally verifiable, unconditional, and subject to no divergent interpretation. It should be unlimited in its application and duration. It should also have horizontal and vertical scope within and between countries. Under this convention, no justification should ever permit the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, nor should any one even seek to invoke Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to justify the production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons within the territory of a country or against any other nation. The verification and investigation procedures should be effective and leave no room for any violation. Any violation should be dealt with in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

As the Conference on Disarmament is reaching the final stages of its deliberations on the draft of the new convention, it is our duty to involve non-member States and seek their adherence to this convention. In this regard, in particular, the adherence of those States which have used chemical weapons, those which assisted the violators in obtaining the technology to produce and use chemical weapons, those which provided them with delivery systems, and those which violated their commitments under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, is of the paramount importance. It is also essential to secure the adherence of those States which have or can acquire the capability to produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons.

Obviously, the dynamics of change in the world dictate that if a Government considers itself free of obligations with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the determination of the world community should prevent such behaviour and should not allow a fiasco to take place.

It is in this sense that we believe the presence of observers in this august body should not be utilized for old polemics and politics of chicanery. This Conference has heard declarations in recent times by members which announced unilateral and bilateral reductions of weapons of mass destruction and the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Conference therefore cannot make its podium available to those who do not move in this direction. This is not a podium for those who do not move toward peace and collective security and relaxation of tension. The Conference should allow those observers which would like to work genuinely for the cause of disarmament in general, and the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the removal of the nuclear threat in particular, to render their sincere contribution. It is in this spirit that their performance at the Conference

(Mr. Ardekani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

will be judged - on their future co-operation and participation in the Conference on Disarmament. Their performance in other areas in easing tensions and moving toward peace will also be under advisement and evaluation.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to thank you for your very kind words and to thank all the delegations here for the trust that they have just shown, first of all in my country, in my delegation and finally in me personally. I would like to take up the very words of Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, who said a few days ago, in this very room, that we were very appreciative of the honour and responsibility conferred on us in this way with the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. For my part I would add that we will do everything within our power to live up to this honour and responsibility. Allow me also on this occasion to thank all my colleagues here for the gestures of friendship, encouragement and good wishes that have been extended to us. I can say very sincerely that they will enable us to cope together and to deal with very demanding tasks in our work. These signs of friendship, this encouragement, these wishes also show that, beyond political will, above and beyond the facilities that are made available, there is a human and personal element without which no major endeavour is possible.

Next I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, who in an exceptional way represents in the Conference, and in particular with regard to chemical weapons, continuity and also, in a certain way, the history of these negotiations, because he was Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons twice. And I would like to emphasize that what he accomplished with his three group chairmen, and with contributions from all delegations, during the year 1988, was a remarkable effort on the substance, which is reflected in the "rolling text", but which goes beyond what is recorded in the "rolling text". I am stressing this because I think that without that effort, what was achieved at the Paris Conference would have remained slightly insubstantial, and that as a result of the work accomplished in 1988 that achievement, on the contrary, can now take on its true dimensions.

And this will be my last point. The impetus has been building up for a long time. We must pursue it and build on it. The best way of responding to

(Mr. Morel, France)

the confidence which has been shown in me - and for which I would like to thank all the delegations again - the best way of applying our collective determination, as manifested in the United Nations resolutions adopted by consensus, as manifested in the Paris Declaration and, of course, in the mandate itself, is quite simply to announce that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m., then again on Monday, at 3 p.m., and that during next week each of the five working groups will have its opening meeting with full conference services. In this way, at the end of next week the actual substantive work will have begun in all the areas where serious problems remain for us to solve.

CD/PV.488

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(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

In 1979 your "Decalogue" presented you with an ambitious picture of sectors where you could work. Notable among them, because of the seriousness of the problem and the emphasis placed on it by the United Nations General Assembly and the international community, is the problem of chemical weapons. Last year the Conference on Disarmament, which has long been active in this area, and aware of "its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective

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(Cardinal Casaroli, Holy See)

prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention", re-established the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with pushing that process ahead. It is the wish of the Holy See that your work, backed up by the results of the recent Paris Conference that brought together the signatory States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other States, and stimulated by the request made to you to redouble your efforts as a matter of urgency, will be crowned with the success the world is awaiting as fast as possible. This result will be parallel to those that humanity also expects in the domain of nuclear weapons, remembering always the horrors for which chemical weapons have already been or can still be responsible, and the durability of their harmful effects, even decades after they have been used. On this point I think that no security argument can be reasonably put forward against the aim of complete and unreserved disarmament, while acknowledging the existence of many technical or legal problems in its execution. If cruelty and the involvement of the civilian population are characteristic to some extent of any type of modern weaponry, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, or those like them, the cruelty factor, one might say, is there in the pure state, that is without any of the corresponding advantages of a military nature - advantages which are debatable and in some cases unjustifiable - that are inherent in other types of weapon used for "deterrence".

There remains the question of an effective system of verification and control, a question which is just as important in all the other schemes for the complete elimination or the "progressive and balanced" reduction of weapons, to maintain an equal balance, particularly in the strategic area, which is still regarded as essential for safeguarding peace. On this problem your Conference is certainly able to provide a focus and a contribution that I think are particularly valuable.

However, in the case of chemical weapons, such efforts will have less the character of the convention that the proposals are being discussed in Paris, as well as in the other countries, are not only quite realistic, but might also usefully contribute to the progress we have made in the field of disarmament.

Paragraph 2 of the Final Declaration requests all States to make contributions to the negotiations in Geneva and to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. As the Czechoslovak Government, in the statement mentioned above, we are prepared to be among the first to accede to the chemical weapons convention. We regard the nationalization of a chemical industry facility as effected on 23 and 24 January 1975, the case of Pilsen in central Bohemia as a contribution to the work of the convention. The inspected facility is producing a certain chemical. The report on this inspection will be submitted soon.

We share the belief expressed by many representatives of the States, as well as at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that measures of a regional nature could also be a significant contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. With this in view, our country, together with the Danish Government, has proposed back in 1969 the creation of a chemical weapons convention for Central Europe. If established, in Europe as well as in other parts of the

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

... Of course, the Conference on Disarmament today is working in substantially different international circumstances from those of its predecessors. Moreover, the international climate has been changing rapidly in recent years. Constructive dialogue, replacing confrontation, has already brought tangible results in the negotiations on disarmament, the easing of tensions and the solution of regional conflicts, as well as co-operation in the humanitarian field. The end of last year and the first weeks of this year were particularly promising in this regard. The Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe concluded its work, adopting important decisions. A number of member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization announced their decision to reduce their armed forces and armaments unilaterally and significantly. The Paris Conference issued an unprecedented call for the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons at the earliest date.

... The Czechoslovak delegation considers the Conference on Disarmament sufficiently representative to address successfully the priority questions related to nuclear disarmament and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention. Naturally, while specific measures are being discussed and negotiated in this direction, arms must not be moved into outer space. Czechoslovakia does not see the tasks I have just mentioned as noble but distant goals. We are ready to contribute to their achievement through specific steps, including unilateral steps when there is a hope that they will lead to positive developments.

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(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

Two days before the Paris Conference, on 5 January, the Government of Czechoslovakia released a statement on issues concerning the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. This statement reaffirms that Czechoslovakia does not possess, manufacture or stockpile on its territory any chemical weapons. Nor does it own facilities for their development or production. All scientific research in this field is oriented exclusively towards protection against the effects of chemical weapons and other peaceful goals.

We are in favour of prevention of the further proliferation of chemical weapons. We are ready to contribute to this goal as far as we are able. With this objective in mind the Czechoslovak Government has adopted legislative measures providing for controls on the export of dual-purpose chemicals. I would like to stress in this connection that the only purpose of this measure is to contribute to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. It is not discriminatory against any country. We also consider that it will not hinder international co-operation in the peaceful development of the chemical industry. The full text of the said statement is contained in Conference document CD/878.

The Paris Conference and its Final Declaration have already been welcomed here by practically all speakers taking the floor since the beginning of this session. We share the view that the Conference was an important political gathering confirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol while at the same time calling for the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest date, as the most reliable guarantee against the use of chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia regards that as a highly urgent task. It is argued by some that fixing deadlines is arbitrary, and not acceptable for disarmament negotiations. Perhaps this might be so if there is a total absence of specific negotiations on a subject covered by a suggested deadline. However, in the case of chemical weapons so much effort has already gone into the elaboration of the convention that the proposals for the time frames for its achievement advanced in Paris, as well as in this room recently, are not only quite realistic, but might also usefully remind us of the pledge we have all so solemnly subscribed to.

Paragraph 3 of the Final Declaration requests all States to make contributions to the negotiations in Geneva and to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. As the Czechoslovak Government said in the statement mentioned above, we are prepared to be among the first States to accede to the chemical weapons convention. We regard the national inspection of a chemical industry facility we effected on 25 and 26 January 1989 in the town of Mnisek in central Bohemia as a contribution to the early finalization of the convention. The inspected facility is producing a schedule [3] chemical. The report on this inspection will be submitted soon.

We share the belief expressed by many representatives in our Conference, as well as at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that measures of a regional nature could also make a significant contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. With this in view my country, together with the German Democratic Republic, proposed back in 1985 the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. If established, in Europe as well as in other parts of the

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

world, such zones could limit the proliferation of chemical weapons and lessen the threat of their use. In so doing they would strengthen efforts aimed at the global ban on chemical weapons and would create more favourable conditions and a political atmosphere conducive to its early achievement.

Starting at the end of last November the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons met twice to continue work on the convention during the inter-sessional period. We consider the work done in the course of the six weeks useful. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland certain progress was registered on a number of issues, and some obstacles complicating the Committee's work in the past were removed. The Ad hoc Committee has just started its work for the 1989 session under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel of France. The programme adopted is ambitious and should lead to intensive work. We welcome the fact that problems related to article VI are going to be discussed actively. My delegation also hopes that due attention will soon be accorded to the question of challenge inspections. Agreement on this issue would be a major step in the development of a general pattern of verification under a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

... I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without placing on record the most sincere and profound thanks of my delegation to the French Government for hosting the historic Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and for the generous hospitality and most satisfactory services extended to the participants in the Conference, including my own delegation. This initiative of the French Government was a most timely and welcome step at the right historical moment. My tribute also goes to the French Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, who addressed this august body and formally presented the Final Act of the Paris Conference on 7 February. His statement was a source of inspiration and encouragement for all the delegations in the Conference on Disarmament.

As we survey the world political scene at the beginning of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, we can see many encouraging signs. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has generated a political momentum that will give added impetus to the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union has made a unilateral declaration that it will start destroying its chemical weapon stockpiles (the United States also announced earlier its plan to destroy its old stocks of chemical weapons). Another unilateral measure declared by the Soviet Union and its allies was to reduce their conventional forces in Europe. The United States-Soviet START negotiations are well advanced on 50 per cent cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons. East-West negotiations on conventional arms reductions are due to start in Vienna next month with new vigour. All these developments create an atmosphere of optimism. It is incumbent on all of us to translate this optimism and hope into reality by producing maximum possible tangible results.

The tempo of negotiations on chemical weapons in the CD has somewhat slowed down in the past two years, at a time when the threat of chemical weapons is looming ever larger and the need for the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons is becoming much more urgent. We require a renewed political commitment by all countries, large and small, at a high political level in order to move those negotiations out of the doldrums. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons fulfilled this very requirement. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, inter alia, stressed the necessity of concluding a convention on chemical weapons at an early date and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. We can consider this solemn and strongly worded Final Declaration of the Paris Conference as a

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(Mr. Aung Thant, Burma)

mandate for the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year. Inspired by this solemn and serious political commitment in the Final Declaration, it is imperative that the CD move into high gear and press ahead with new verve and vigour this year in our task of elaborating the draft convention on chemical weapons.

Some doubts have been raised as to the assurance of undiminished security during the transitional period after entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons. This is a complex question, and I do not wish to get into the substance or the detailed discussion of this question at this point. However, my way of reaffirming the fundamental position of my delegation, I wish to stress the conviction of my delegation that the security of all countries can be strengthened only by the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons, but not by postponing it. It is hardly necessary nowadays either to look back far into history or to go into deep research in order to realize the terrible reality of the use of chemical weapons. The risk of proliferation of chemical weapons is already running high. We must act before the situation gets out of control. The only long-term guarantee for security against chemical weapons is undoubtedly a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons through early conclusion of the convention. Even pending and prior to the achievement of that goal, there will surely be viable unilateral measures that could be helpful in confidence-building. The United States and the Soviet Union - the only chemical-weapon States which have declared their possession of these weapons - will unilaterally start destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons before entry into force of the convention. Moreover, once the convention is signed, signatory States will have an obligation to refrain from actions that will jeopardize the objective of the convention, unless of course they have subsequently explicitly declared their intention not to ratify it. Thus, even prior to entry into force of the convention, there will be certain restraints, though short of binding legal obligations, that will preclude or lessen the risks of the use of chemical weapons by signatory States, since this kind of worst-case scenario violations will obviously jeopardize the fundamental objective of the convention.

(Mr. Fan, China)

... At the beginning of 1989, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a high-level political meeting, was held. Through the joint efforts of the participating countries, the Conference adopted a Final Declaration, with positive results which have received wide attention and welcome from the international community. In the Final Declaration the participating countries state clearly that they are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitment not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use. The Declaration stresses the necessity of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Declaration furthermore points out the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons, as long as such weapons remain and are spread.

At the Paris Conference, the Chinese Foreign Minister clearly stated China's basic position on the prohibition of chemical weapons. He reiterated that China neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons. China has all along stood for the early conclusion of an international convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and will continue to participate actively in the negotiations. The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate the following position: while we continue to attach importance to nuclear and conventional disarmament, we also consider it imperative to pursue the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons as an urgent and important task and as an objective of our endeavour. The member States of the Conference on Disarmament should expedite negotiations to conclude at the

(Mr. Fan, China)

earliest date an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons. The new convention should give priority to efforts to ensure the total destruction of existing chemical weapons and of their production facilities, guarantees against the production of new chemical weapons, and prevention of the emergence of new chemical weapons. To ensure compliance with the convention it is essential to provide for necessary and effective verification measures. The countries with the largest chemical arsenals should take the lead in ensuring an immediate halt to the development, production and transfer of chemical weapons, undertaking never to use such weapons and to destroy them within the shortest time possible. All countries capable of developing chemical weapons should stop the research, development and production of chemical weapons. The negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons have now entered a crucial stage. The CD should respond to the appeal contained in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and redouble its efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The encouraging events in the domain of disarmament are not confined to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States, or to Europe. The

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States testified to the success of efforts made towards disarmament on a truly global, multilateral basis. The Conference accomplished its task by accepting its final document by consensus. It is of paramount importance that States renounced "any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them". That is a timely and welcome development in the face of recent events that have caused considerable concern among world public opinion.

It is in complete accordance with the aspirations of the disarmament policy of the Hungarian Government that the Paris Conference and the 150 or so States participating expressed a unanimous position as to the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and the destruction of existing stocks. The Conference urged the Conference on Disarmament - thereby giving it a clear mandate - to "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to include the convention at the earliest date". The Declaration appealed to all States "to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields". The Hungarian Government is determined to contribute to the earliest successful conclusion of the negotiations and to sign the convention as soon as it is opened for signature.

My delegation is confident that the Paris Conference has created a momentum for the ongoing Geneva negotiations. This momentum is upheld in an appropriate way by the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Committee. It is a matter of regret, however, that because of well-known circumstances the CD has been unable to come to an agreement on improving the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. My delegation is of the opinion that the mandate given to the Ad hoc Committee lags far behind both the actual possibilities created by the Paris Conference and the pressing political necessities of the international situation. It is not always possible to do everything that is necessary, but what is possible should always be done. The consensus reached in the First Committee of the General Assembly last fall and during the Paris Conference this year demands and makes possible more than is contained in the present mandate. I hope we will be able to rectify this during this session.

In recent years it has become habitual for delegates speaking about our negotiations on chemical weapons to state that the most promising and most ripe item on the Conference's agenda is the prohibition of chemical weapons. Statements from time to time have gone even further, predicting or demanding the immediate solution of all the outstanding problems, and the conclusion of the convention before the end of the given year. Only a few weeks after the Paris Conference, we must all realize that the fruit is far from being ripe for harvest. The problem of chemical weapons demands untiring efforts and purposeful negotiations - with that we agree most readily, and are partners in them. However, the problem also demands an objective and sober evaluation of the pending questions, a sincere will and determination to solve them, and the concerted action of all interested States in one and the same direction.

The Paris Conference has created favourable conditions; now it is for us to live with them. First, we must do everything to avoid a situation where

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

the solution of this problem is held hostage to other problems, no matter how urgent and important they are. The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons must not fall hostage to certain aspirations.

There are many pending questions, but we must select the ones that are vital to the solution of the problem as a whole. Verification, we all agree, is one of them, maybe the one. The satisfactory solution of all issues in this context must, therefore, figure first on the list of priorities of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Our delegation has always asked for a strict and most effective verification system. As Hungary does not possess and does not intend to possess chemical weapons, and as the chemical or engineering industry in our country is in no way geared to chemical warfare, we are in favour of creating a foolproof verification system. That applies, I must add, not only to the prohibition of chemical weapons, but also to all other agreements relating to international security and disarmament.

Verification of a CW convention would require various forms and methods of international verification. For obvious reasons, Hungary is mainly interested in the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in civilian or commercial industry, that is, in devising and negotiating the relevant provisions of the draft convention. That is why last year we welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union aimed at testing verification procedures to that effect.

The idea, as usual, started developing only at a slow pace but then, towards the end of the session, the process gained momentum. Following open-ended consultations, a useful working paper was put on our table, containing guidelines and check-lists for trial inspections. In Hungary, as in several other countries around the world, preparations started without any further delay to organize and conduct national trial inspections. At an informal meeting of the CW Committee on 7 December, over a dozen delegations were already in a position to provide information about the status of the preparations. The Hungarian delegation was among them, and was able even to go a step further, giving a preliminary report on our first trial inspection.

Today I am glad to present an official document containing a detailed report on that experiment (CD/890), which will also be presented in due course to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The paper was prepared by Hungarian experts who participated in both the preparations for and the conduct of the trial inspection. I believe it speaks for itself, and I will therefore refrain from any further introduction. I only wish to add that our team of experts is already engaged in the drafting of new undertakings in the fairly unknown land of on-site inspections in the chemical industry.

The Hungarian delegation feels convinced that the initiative to conduct full-scale experiments was most proper and timely. We are looking forward to a series of meetings in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that will have to be convened before the end of the spring session for the purpose of formal presentations of reports on the first series of national trial inspections. That series of meetings should be organized well in advance so that experts may come and participate actively in presenting, discussing and

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

evaluating the reports. Sufficient time should be allocated to the meetings so that experience can be properly analysed, and useful, practical conclusions drawn. We are aware that a number of trial inspections will be held only later, but we still prefer to organize the first exchange of experience now, before quantity might be detrimental to quality. A similar exchange will, of course, have to be held some time during the summer session to continue the exercise.

When all the trial inspections have been conducted, reported and evaluated, a new set of guidelines, check-lists and other practical aids will have to be developed for the third stage: a series of trial inspections with multilateral participation. We can foresee that the exercise will take quite some time, but if it is spent well, it is worth spending. Only on the basis of such experience can we hope to devise the relevant provisions of the draft convention. However, if we accept that verification is the key to a disarmament agreement and we certainly have to agree on that, then there is hardly any shortcut to it. Objective and sober evaluation of the situation has obliged me to state what I have ventured to say.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... It is very encouraging that the right conclusions are beginning to be drawn from experience, confirming the vainness of the policy of overarmament and the failure of efforts to shape the world by military power. Such a policy has not only fallen short of its expected results, but has been discarded as illegitimate by the international community. Indeed, the substantial improvement in East-West relations and co-ordination in resolving regional crises, as well as an unprecedented negotiating effort in the field of disarmament, primarily at the bilateral and regional levels, also open up new prospects for multilateral endeavours, including those in our Conference. In spite of the outcome of SSOD-III, the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons proved that a number of critical disarmament and security issues cannot be solved without common efforts. This is the reason why I would like to comment on that gathering in a wider context, as evidence of the validity and vitality of a multilateral approach to disarmament - the more so as it reaffirmed the lasting value of the Final Document of SSOD-I.

Turning back again to the Paris Conference, whose outcome is of relevance to us here and now, I think that its significance transcends by far the declaration of political intentions. It contains a number of basic positions that deserve to be analysed at several levels: the consolidation of the lasting validity of the Geneva Protocol, condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and a pledge that they will never be used again, an appeal to our Conference to strive for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention imposing a complete and universal ban on the development, stockpiling and use of any chemical weapon, and of course destruction of the existing arsenals, as

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

the only answer to the problems posed by chemical weapons. It is extremely important that the role of the United Nations was duly recognized. Thus, the Paris Conference provided a major stimulus to disarmament negotiations on CW, but its reach is more universal, as it reflects the widest international consensus ever attained on one concrete issue of disarmament in all its dimensions.

In the new situation we cannot behave as if there were no Paris Conference, or, of course, as if it had resolved all the issues. For if, after Paris, there are fewer dilemmas, we still cannot ignore the profound differences on a number of tangible issues. The international community has endorsed the Paris Conference as an expression of a will to proceed with chemical disarmament at a faster pace, and to start dealing with the core of the problems, with the objective of finalizing the convention - in other words, to start genuine negotiations on drafting the convention. We can do so because the Paris Declaration contains highly specific understandings on where and how fast we should move. To that end the proclamation of a moratorium on chemical weapons production would be most helpful for our negotiations.

The Paris consensus has undoubtedly deprived chemical weapons of any legitimacy by unconditionally condemning their use and recording agreement on their complete elimination. It is therefore a major step towards the universality of the future CW convention.

We are aware of the difficulties involved in negotiations - of the problems arising, for instance, from the complexity of verification, undiminished security for all States, or protection of victims of chemical attack. Co-operation in the development of civil chemical industry is also one of the key questions. These difficulties are yet another reason to redouble our efforts, as required under the Paris Declaration. We therefore see the renewed political will not only as an expression of adherence to the ultimate goals, but as a readiness to settle unresolved issues. Without any intention of disputing the achievements of the last year, it nevertheless seems to us that the rhythm of negotiations is not in conformity with often reiterated political commitments and growing coherence in the process of confidence-building. In our view the changed French position on security stocks, followed by the broad range of trial inspections and work done on assistance and protection, have strengthened the convergence of views, which transcends what is contained in the text of the report.

Irrespective of the fact that we cannot be satisfied with what we have achieved so far, and I think that we could have done better, I wish to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, for his dedication and his initiatives in clarifying a number of sensitive issues and extending the negotiations to new chapters of the convention. My delegation agrees to the restructuring and reorganization of our work and the establishment of five groups to cover the main problems relevant to the entirety of the convention. I wish the incoming President, Ambassador Morel, every success. I am confident that, with his inherent dynamism, diplomatic skill and mastery of the subject, he will compel us, at least, to work harder, better and faster.

The future CW convention will be a sort of a model, not only for future disarmament agreements, but for a wider international co-operation,

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

introducing new qualitative ingredients. To play such a role the convention must be acceptable to all, in other words, it must be based on the undiminished security of all its signatories and their full equality in rights and obligations. To become global, verifiable, universal and non-discriminatory, and in particular to be effective, it should not only prevent the production of chemical weapons and ensure destruction of the existing arsenals, but provide for adequate assistance to the victims of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It must also ensure co-operation in technological and economic development in the utilization of chemicals for peaceful purposes, and lay the foundations for an effective but rational international mechanism for control and verification, which would rely on the United Nations to the maximum possible extent. I want to repeat once more that adequate solutions regarding economic and technological co-operation will greatly enhance the universal acceptability of the convention and the equality of all members of the international community. May I recall the Yugoslav proposal at SSOD-III for a special United-Nations-sponsored conference for the signing of the convention?

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

An undeniable achievement of multilateral diplomacy was the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. One hundred and forty-nine countries reached a consensus on a problem both complex and important. After the detailed and eloquent presentation of the Final Act of the Paris Conference by Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, it would be redundant to dwell again on the merits of that document. All the elements of the Final Act have equal moral and political force. However, if we are to single out just one element of particular immediate importance for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, it should undoubtedly be the emphasis laid at the Paris Conference on "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction", and

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

its explicit call to the CD "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

It would be fair to note that the success of the Paris Conference would hardly have been possible without the years-long work of the Conference on Disarmament and the progress made in the elaboration of the draft convention. It could be said, without exaggeration, that the core of the consensus achieved in Paris was gradually taking shape in the negotiations held in the Conference on Disarmament. In this vein the Paris Final Document stands both to the credit and to the debit of the CD.

The last report of the Ad hoc Committee clearly shows both the achievements and the blanks in the elaboration of the draft convention. The progress in the negotiations is illustrated by the removal of appendix III, and by the texts dealing with chemical weapons production facilities and economic co-operation and the final clauses of the convention. It should also be noted that agreement was reached to hold an international experiment in the civil chemical industry and that "national trial inspections" have been or will be carried out. The meeting of experts from the chemical industry also played a useful role. I would like to take this opportunity to express to the former Chairman, Ambassador Sujka (Poland), the gratitude of my delegation for his tireless efforts aimed at ensuring progress in the negotiations. I would also like to thank the three chairmen of the working groups, whose contribution also deserves high appreciation.

The common task of the Conference on agenda item 4 is a clear and indisputable one - to intensify efforts in order to conclude the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. This goal is within reach provided the work of the Ad hoc Committee concentrates on the solving of the complex problems still pending. Without trying to exhaust the question or to set priorities, we hold the view that the following problems are of key importance: the order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, i.e. the need to ensure the implementation of the principle of undiminished security in the first 10 years after the convention comes into effect; conclusion of the elaboration of provisions on all aspects of verification, and in particular those dealing with challenge inspections and verification of non-production of chemical weapons; and reaching an agreement at least in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. At the present stage a number of aspects of some pending problems require an integrated approach to take fully into account the existing relationship among them. For that reason we believed that it was justifiable to reorganize the work of the Ad hoc Committee with the purpose of creating as many prerequisites as possible for holding intensive and fruitful negotiations. Having supported the efforts of Ambassador Morel (France) aimed at this goal, my delegation wishes to assure him of its readiness to co-operate with him in the future as well.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... My delegation is satisfied that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has got off to a good start this session under the able guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, whose constructive contribution towards the realization and successful outcome of the Paris Conference last January received commendations from most delegations. Nigeria's Government's appreciation to the Government of France for hosting the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States was highlighted in our statement.

The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising, and will eventually lead to a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons as well as their development, production and stockpiling, and the destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Much work has now been done on the draft, and its conclusion is now in sight. We note with satisfaction that the convention will have a distinct advantage over the Geneva Protocol as it will ensure the non-use of chemical weapons through total elimination.

There are still a number of outstanding issues under consideration. Apart from the exact definition and elimination of production facilities, there are still activities not covered by the convention. Even though we all agree that the convention should provide an effective mechanism for verification, how do we ensure that the chemical industry is not used in producing chemical weapons? I need not emphasize that some work still remains to be done on the question of challenge inspection or limited spot check

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

arrangements to ensure that the equal rights of all States can be guaranteed. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will intensify its efforts to conclude the outstanding work on the convention at the earliest possible time. A spirit of mutual concession and mature compromise is required at this stage to overcome the outstanding differences.

CD/PV.489

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Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia):

... Despite being confronted with a serious situation and various obstacles last year, nevertheless the international community was able to pronounce again its willingness to get rid of chemical weapons once and for all from the arsenals of nations. Through resolutions 43/74 A and C, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations with a view to finalizing at the earliest possible date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons also called on the Conference on Disarmament to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues in the negotiations and to conclude such a convention at the earliest possible date.

In order to capture and put into practice the spirit contained in those resolutions, the Group of 21 tabled a proposal on 7 February 1989 for a slight change in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Given the urgency of finalizing the draft convention and its importance to the process of multilateral disarmament, the Group of 21 is also willing to assume greater responsibility this year by chairing three out of the five working groups. As is well known, it is within these working groups that the real negotiation will take place. I hope that the disagreement on the question of the mandate at the beginning of our session was not a sign of a lack of political will to implement those resolutions, but is due to certain unavoidable temporary circumstances. In this connection we took note of the readiness of the Soviet Union to go forward with the negotiation, as stressed by Ambassador Nazarkin last week, as well as the commitment of the President of the United States of America, George Bush, to treat efforts to ban chemical weapons as one of his priorities.

Indeed, efforts have to be exerted in order to avoid the recurrence of last year's experience, where, in the words of Ambassador Ekéus on 13 September 1988, "our work in 1988 has fallen short of the repeated calls for renewed or even continuing urgency. Some important issues have hardly

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

been addressed; solving others has taken unnecessary time and effort". It was only due to the untiring efforts of the chairmen of the Committee and the three working groups that the Committee managed to keep the negotiation continuing and in the end gain certain concrete results. The work of Ambassador Sujka, Mr. Numata, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Cima merits our thanks.

At this juncture, I wish to welcome the appointment of Ambassador Morel of France as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His diligence and excellent stewardship during the preparatory stage, which made the Paris Conference successful, are well known to us. His chairmanship of the Committee, as well as the presence of Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in the plenary session, raise hopes on the implementation of one of the most important aims of the Paris Conference, which is to give impetus to our negotiation here in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation looks forward to the Committee resolving the remaining issues this year.

As stated in the programme of work of the Committee for this spring session, one area of our future work is the relation between the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In-depth negotiations have taken place on this question, including in the open-ended consultations in 1985 chaired by a member of the Indonesian delegation. Some concrete results have already been achieved, such as the formulation of the preamble and a short paragraph 3 of article I, which simply states that each State party undertakes not to use chemical weapons.

Article IX concerning on-site inspection on challenge is one major issue which needs to be tackled straightforwardly this year. Much time has been invested in this subject, and attempts have been made to formulate the necessary paragraph, as in 1986, when Indonesia provided the Chairman of then Working Group C. In 1987, the Chairman of the Committee himself, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, presided over the negotiations, and concrete results were achieved, as appeared in appendix II of document CD/881. The time has come to capitalize on this paper by using it as a basis for further negotiations.

Speaking on the question of verification as a whole, we believe that the verification system envisaged in the "rolling text" is adequate to deter prohibited activities. Nevertheless, we see some good points in the efforts to close the so-called "verification gap" or in the need to search for a type of "non-confrontational inspection" short of on-site challenge inspection, and we will keep an open mind on these issues. In the meantime my delegation is now in the process of studying the papers presented by the Chairman of Working Group 1.

My delegation awaits with interest the result of our discussion in Working Group 3 concerning article VII. As is well known, this article as it appears in the "rolling text" was formulated years ago and had never been discussed until last Tuesday. Since various parts of the "rolling text" had not yet been negotiated and drafted, attempts were understandably made in the formulation of article VII to include as many important rights and obligations of States parties as could be thought of at that time. Now the situation is very different. The "rolling text" is more developed, and the negotiations on important aspects such as verification have advanced, resulting in a high

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

degree of mutual understanding. Accordingly, certain adjustments are needed. One of them concerns national technical means. I believe there is already a consensus that for the purposes of the convention verification activities, be they systematic or on challenge, should be carried out by the international inspectors. I do understand that States parties may wish to, and have the right to, establish national technical means to carry out inspections within their countries; but that would be strictly an internal affair of those countries and would have no direct relevance to the convention. Therefore, we should leave this issue to those countries alone, and the convention should not interfere with their work.

In the efforts to solve the issue of jurisdiction and control and at the request of the Chairman of the Committee, a working paper was produced in 1987 by Dr. Bolewski of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Szénási of Hungary and a member of my delegation. As indicated in their report, the discussion and drafting should be directed towards defining the obligations or responsibilities of the States parties, which include all the subjects relevance to the convention, to avoid difficulties in legal interpretation of attribution as well as to prevent legal "loopholes" in the convention.

These are some of the issues and, of course, there are also other more important ones which remain to be negotiated. On those issues we have also various working papers, and these papers are not only national papers, but papers produced by previous chairmen of the Committee or by the respective working groups, as well as by various "friends of the Chair". Some of them have even been negotiated and revised.

The point that I wish to raise by way of conclusion concerns continuity and consistency. We already have the "rolling text" and various working papers, and we should benefit from them or refer to them during the course of our negotiations. I do realize that the finalization of a paragraph or an article often depends upon the result of negotiation in another part of the "rolling text", and at the same time there is no denying that it would be practically impossible for the Committee to devote simultaneous attention and equal time to each of the remaining issues in our negotiation. Thus the risk of inadvertently overlooking the problem of this interdependence cannot be underestimated. However, whatever the method in approaching this problem will be, care should be taken in order to avoid as far as possible the danger of unravelling tentative agreements or the springing up of footnotes and brackets on already agreed paragraphs or articles.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

... In the multilateral arena, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, though without a consensus final document, proved to be a valuable process from which emerged areas of broad convergence such as a nuclear test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. The forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations reflected these areas of convergence, as well as the emerging priorities on conventional disarmament and on issues which cut horizontally across various disarmament areas, such as verification. Most recently, we were greatly encouraged by the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish to pay the sincere tribute of my Government to former President Reagan of the United States for taking the initiative for such a conference, and to the Government of France, and especially to Ambassador Pierre Morel, for their untiring and constructive contributions which were crowned with success. I shall address its implications for our work a little later in this statement.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

... The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the most urgent and achievable tasks before us. Japan participated in the Paris Conference with the basic recognition, as Foreign Minister Uno said in his statement, that "so long as chemical weapons are allowed to exist, mankind can never be freed from the danger of the use of these weapons, and conversely, so long as the possibility of their use is left open, we can never rid the world of chemical weapons". We succeeded in mobilizing world opinion to check the undesirable trend of erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and chemical weapons proliferation. It remains for us in the Conference on Disarmament to translate the determination expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference into reality by concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest date.

The positive impact of the Paris Conference is also demonstrated by the fact that we now have 22 non-members participating in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, a significant step forward toward ensuring the universality of the convention. I particularly welcome the countries in Asia and the Pacific - the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Viet Nam, participating in the chemical weapons negotiations for the first time.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Even with the best of efforts and intentions, the convention cannot be finalized and brought into effect overnight. We will have to work very intensively to resolve a number of hard-core issues. As we engage in these efforts in the negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament, it is also vitally important that we foster further the international climate conducive to the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention. As paragraph 4 of the Paris Declaration states, each of us is called upon to exercise restraint and to act responsibly, in meeting the concern of the international community caused by the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread.

As for the negotiations before us in the coming months, I believe that we are now into the final crucial phase where some fundamental hard-core issues have to be faced and resolved. Some issues do not lend themselves to easy solutions if we just look at them piecemeal in isolation. That is why I welcome the approach taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, and the chairmen of the five working groups in their working programmes to address the remaining issues in their interrelationship in a structured manner. As we proceed further, it will probably become increasingly necessary for us to consider some issues which cut across different working groups.

With this in mind, let me comment on what I consider to be the priority issues. In Group 1, we have the opportunity to bring together the various loose ends on the subject of verification. With respect to on-site inspection on challenge, the experience of my delegation, which had the honour of chairing Group C in the 1988 session, indicates that we now have in the "rolling text" a fuller picture than before of what a challenge inspection régime based on the assumption of "any time, anywhere, without the right of refusal" may look like. At the same time, basic issues remain, such as the specificity of the request, the alternative arrangements, the involvement of the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties after the submission of the report and possible further actions. Underlying these issues seem to be different perceptions among States as to the nature of challenge inspections, including their usability, and how their security, industrial and other interests may be affected when challenge inspection is invoked against them. If there are such differences, they need to be thrashed out further in search of common ground.

It is also time for each of us to take a considered look at the whole range of verification measures contained in the convention, with a view to ensuring that these measures give reasonable confidence that the objectives of the convention will be fulfilled. For this reasonable confidence to be felt by all States parties, it is important that the burden resulting from the application of verification measures should fall equitably among States parties in a manner commensurate with the risks they pose to the objectives of the convention. My delegation is open to examining closely whether there are gaps in the verification measures that need to be filled. In doing so, we consider it important that the whole balance of rights and obligations throughout the spectrum of various verification measures should be considered. For example, when we consider the risks to the convention which

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

may be posed by particular chemical agents or facilities, we should ask ourselves whether the risks to the convention increase in simple proportion to the toxicity of the agent or the number of relevant facilities, or whether other factors should also be taken into account. Care should be exercised to ensure that no particular State or group of States is unduly penalized, and that the technical secretariat is not politicized, either wittingly or unwittingly.

In addition to the above, my delegation is looking forward to the pooling of experience from our national trial inspections, which should give us practical guidance in bringing the current verification provisions closer into line with reality. Japan has conducted its national trial inspections on several schedule [2]-related facilities since last autumn, and is now preparing the report. This practical experience, together with the accumulation of data provided voluntarily by States, should give us a more realistic idea of the staffing requirements and costs of the organization, which will be addressed in Group 3. It is hoped that the work in Group 1 on verification, in Group 3 on staffing requirements and costs, and in Group 5 on data exchange and the Preparatory Commission, will bring us closer to a truly balanced and cost-effective verification régime.

The new additions to the "rolling text", in appendices I and II, of the elements on confidentiality provide useful general parameters for the consideration of this issue, which merits careful consideration in ensuring that the convention gains full public acceptance, and is lived up to by our civil chemical industries. We look forward to further elaboration of the related provisions, in constructive dialogue with our industries.

My delegation notes with appreciation the focus in the work programme on several underlying political and legal problems. They represent the hard nuts that we have to crack to achieve a meaningful and effective convention. Among these issues, the question of how non-compliance or violations should be dealt with is a major unresolved problem which runs throughout the convention and merits in-depth examination. Though my delegation does not necessarily feel that "sanctions" in the normal sense of the term provide the best answer to the problem, it will be necessary to address this problem through the whole spectrum from the question of ambiguities or anomalies arising in the course of inspection to the possibility of sanctions.

At this early stage of the 1989 session, I have limited myself to presenting my views on these few items. I do sense that there is again in this Conference a considerable degree of anticipation on what we may be able to achieve this year. It is up to us to make this come true. I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation to that end.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

... This year in the Conference on Disarmament, we have all chosen and given priority to chemical disarmament. All the Conference's topics have given up some time and made room for the negotiations on chemical disarmament. The Peruvian delegation thinks that this is right and logical, because since the Paris Conference it would appear that there are greater political possibilities for chemical disarmament. We might say that at present chemical disarmament is less difficult than making progress in other areas, for instance nuclear disarmament. That is all very well, but this also involves a risk because if, on this subject that we have chosen and to which we have given priority because of its political possibilities, we do not come up with a draft convention by the end of this year or the beginning of next year, then, if we cannot manage to do this, if we cannot manage to make maximum possible headway in disarmament now, this could cause irreparable damage for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and could have a depressing effect on all the work in general. For this reason, we should be resolutely determined to make progress in the negotiations on chemical disarmament. It is absolutely vital to do so because all the confidence that we may place in the Conference on Disarmament in the future is at stake. For these reasons, my delegation would like to focus this statement on agenda item 4, on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. President, my delegation was particularly pleased to see the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for the reasons that I have just described, as well as the election of Ambassador Pierre Morel to chair its work. Nevertheless, it cannot hide a degree of disappointment at the unexpected difficulty encountered by the Conference in adopting an updated mandate in the light of the important results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Even if we proceed from the assumption of transparency which underlay the consensus on the Final Declaration that was adopted in Paris by 149 countries on 11 January this year, it remains

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(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

paradoxical that the reaffirmation of political will and commitment to ban chemical weapons as soon as possible has not been reflected in a new mandate that would enable the Ad hoc Committee to agree on a draft convention (without needing to refer to a final version) during this session of the Conference, or by the very latest in 1990. And what is most paradoxical is that the reasons for which a group of countries has not been in a position to go along with the consensus promoted by the Group of 21, with the support of the socialist countries and China, are not at all clear, at least officially. It is to be hoped that this state of mind, which is at variance with the spirit of Paris, will change in the coming months for the benefit of all of us and all peoples throughout the world, who are waiting for the conclusion of negotiations which, once and for all, will lead to the final elimination of all chemical weapons, as well as facilities and equipment designed to produce them.

For all these reasons my delegation welcomes the restructuring of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to facilitate the thematic treatment of the present "rolling text". The proliferation of footnotes, square brackets, appendices and annexes has turned this document into gibberish for the uninitiated. There is an urgent need to streamline it, rationalize its content and possibly structure it in such a way that at the end of this session we will be able to have a cleaner, more coherent text without any interruptions, which is closer to the format and language of a convention and not what we have now, which looks rather like a hybrid, because it tends to mix the setting of standards with the regulatory aspects. If there is a conviction that this is inevitable, then it will be necessary to see how far we have to go with regulatory clarifications or aspects.

Despite what I have said, the establishment of five working groups at first sight deserves a somewhat cautious welcome, because of the risk of overlapping of subjects, or watering down of subjects which are differentiated but complementary. Another additional problem with this distribution of work is that which will face delegations with a small number of members that have to follow all the activities of the Conference on Disarmament with the same zeal. My delegation greatly appreciates the steps taken by Ambassador Morel of France to minimize the difficulties that might stem from the functioning of these five working groups, as well as this commendable initiative of favouring the Group of 21 with the chairmanships of three of these working groups, which is an important precedent. It is to be hoped that the good will that inspires Ambassador Morel and his remarkable skill and diplomatic tact will enable the Committee to overcome its own mandate, politically speaking, and place the Conference on the home straight of the negotiations in 1990.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference had the merit of casting light on some of the basic issues which are still awaiting a solution in the Ad hoc Committee. First, we have the problem of "second use" by way of recourse to retaliation or self-defence. In paragraph 1 of the Paris Final Declaration there was evidence of the unwillingness of some States that are parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to withdraw the reservations that they have made in this regard. Obviously, every State has sovereign power to indicate the conditions within which it expresses its consent to be bound to a treaty. Nevertheless, the problem arises when that position is in conflict

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

with its decision to negotiate a convention designed to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not managed to add the prohibition of use to its mandate this year only reconfirms this uncertainty and gives rise to doubts about the intrinsic value of the entire negotiating exercise that has been under way now for some years.

Secondly, we have the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons. Paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration did not accurately reflect the state of thinking and feeling at the Paris Conference about this. On the one hand, there was the concrete and urgent problem of halting the production and refinement of chemical weapons. And on the other, nothing was done to avoid the risk of an increase in the number of States with the capability to produce chemical weapons, a risk which could be smaller if certain supplier States were less complacent in their trade policies. Discussions are being held on whether the two aspects of chemical weapons proliferation can be dealt with on an equal footing, but what there can be no doubt about is the indissoluble link between them, as well as the frame of reference established by the priorities in the negotiations on disarmament which are set forth in the Final Document of 1978.

This question of proliferation leads me to make a few remarks on the principle of undiminished security. As understood by my delegation, this principle cannot come to an end with the agreed 10-year destruction period. It is obvious that during that time there will be greater interest in avoiding any deterioration in the existing levels of security for each State. But, in addition to the bilateral, regional and global dimensions in which this principle should be seen, it cannot in any way serve as a pretext for discriminating qualitatively or quantitatively among stocks in the order of destruction, nor for justifying a delay for certain chemical-weapon States parties as compared to other States parties in the process of destruction of their respective chemical stockpiles. In the view of my delegation, the mere fact of becoming a party to the convention should offer States parties sufficient proof of the good will and necessary mutual trust of all concerned with a view to the full achievement of the objectives set out in the convention. In other words, the principle of undiminished security cannot be based on the implicit presumption of suspicion, but on the conviction that the confidence and political will of the States parties for the full application of the convention must be strengthened. Consequently, we must not await the entry into force of the convention to ensure that this principle is applied. There is a need for prior work, basic and preventive work from the moment the convention is adopted and opened for signature, in order to avoid any change in regional or subregional security levels as far as chemical weapons are concerned, or any vertical multiplication of the existing chemical arsenals. It would be illogical and of dubious morality if, during the negotiation of the convention and the time necessary for its entry into force, the world were made to witness an ill-timed chemical arms race, however discreet, cloaked in the precept of undiminished security which should subsequently govern the destruction of larger and more deadly arsenals.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Another dimension concerning this issue of undiminished security is that which will arise on the day after the end of the 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons. Proceeding from the logical assumption that all States parties will faithfully comply with the obligations entered into, one may suppose that the chemical industry, including the pharmaceutical industry, will continue its development, handling chemicals which may be more sophisticated and dangerous. This possible or probable risk brings us out of the political dimension to the human dimension of undiminished security. Once chemical weapons, for example, have been destroyed and eliminated forever from the face of the Earth, the most urgent problem in the next century will undoubtedly be chemical pollution of the environment, with its negative and indiscriminate effects. For these reasons, we consider that the drafters of the convention must not overlook this potential threat, and one may suppose that the future international organization will not remain indifferent or defenceless in the face of this problem which homo sapiens is inflicting on himself. Therefore, Peru believes that article X on assistance and protection could far-sightedly provide for assistance and support to those States parties that are victims of chemical disasters which cause great harm to their people or go beyond national borders with the ensuing implications for the integrity of ecosystems. This is an issue that demands consideration in future negotiations.

Another question arising out of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference relates to the role that the United Nations should play in bringing about the total prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation believes that the convention cannot institutionalize a parallel system; the arrangements must fall within the broader system of the United Nations. Therefore, besides drawing on the purposes and principles of the Charter, the convention could bring about a correlation between the two international instruments in order to resolve situations in which a State party was, for instance, confronted by a State that is not a party, or in those cases involving two or more States that are not contracting parties to the convention. The interest here lies not only in the production and maintenance of stockpiles, but also in possible allegations of use. It is to be hoped that improved machinery to carry out investigation missions can be supplemented by another system entailing the application of sanctions so that there will be some sort of disincentive to States that might wish to stand aloof from the convention.

There is no doubt that the verification system to be established under the convention cannot be absolute nor can it decipher the private intentions of States parties. This is very difficult. In other words, it should be based on good faith, mutual trust and the willingness of all to abide faithfully by commitments that have been entered into. From this angle it is necessary to have ad hoc inspections as a way of dispelling any doubts that might arise out of a routine inspection but that are insufficient to give rise to a formal allegation. However, care will have to be taken that this procedure does not lead to a sort of hysteria causing an unnecessary increase in the costs of verification. Without achieving absolute verification we can ensure a reasonable and financially feasible level of verification if we proceed from the presumption of the good faith of all.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Finally, the institution of the competent national authority should be elaborated upon further. For the present my delegation considers that the convention should contain an article devoted specifically to the national authority, with provisions drafted in a generic way, endeavouring not to be exhaustive, because of the wide variety of possible forms that the national authority might take, depending on the capacity of the chemical industry of each State party. But it would be desirable to give the national authority the status of the State party's sole representative vis-à-vis the international organization, and also to declare it competent in matters of co-ordination with regard to all the sectors covered by the convention for each State party. Finally, it is also desirable that a State should designate its national authority at the same time as it deposits its instrument of ratification or accession to the convention.

The question of amendments is of special importance if we take account of the special nature of the convention which we are negotiating. We are legislating on something new, and so the fundamental precept underlying the convention must be its privileged nature. Obviously, like any human endeavour, the convention may be subject to improvement; nevertheless, the commitment should be to safeguard its integrity to the greatest extent possible. Proceeding from the assumption that amendments will be the last resort available, once attempts to reform this multilateral instrument from within have failed, it would be of great value, in the view of my delegation, to establish a special régime during the 10-year period of transition. A kind of pause or truce could be provided for during the destruction stage as far as the presentation of amendments is concerned. We do not envisage the triggering of the amendment procedure during a critical period of implementation of the convention, since that might jeopardize the principle of undiminished security. If, after the 10-year period, the contracting parties agree that it is necessary to amend the convention, a distinction should be made between the convention as such, or main treaty, and the additional annexes or protocols. In the former case, a stricter procedure could apply, especially if the amendments involve fundamental obligations set forth in the convention, both as regards acceptance of the amendments and as regards their entry into force. We cannot set aside the rule of unanimity, which would be accompanied by a waiver clause to avoid deliberate or involuntary vetoes. In the second case, it would be advisable to adopt a simpler procedure, in keeping with the nature of the amendments, which would not entail any fundamental changes in the convention.

My delegation will play an active part in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee and the five working groups, with the aim of contributing to the speedy conclusion of the ongoing negotiations, which, as I said at the beginning of this disquisition, constitute a very important responsibility for us all.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As 28 February is the last day of your presidency, allow me to express my satisfaction at the manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference in the month that is now ending. Today the Soviet delegation has taken the floor in order to communicate the results of a trial inspection held in the Soviet Union, which was organized at a chemical facility near the town of Dzerzhinsk in the Gorky region. At this facility, among other chemicals, certain dialkylaminoethanols are produced. These chemicals, as you know, are included in the "rolling text" for further consideration from the standpoint of their possible inclusion in schedule [2]. The national experiment, including the necessary preparatory work, was conducted during the period September-December 1988. It was based on the recommendations contained in document CD/CW/WP.213. The results of the experiment are set out in the report which we have passed to the secretariat for publication as a document of the Conference and the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the symbols CD/894 and CD/CW/WP.225.

In the course of the experiment two types of inspection were tried out. First of all there was the initial visit provided for in the annex to article VI of the draft convention. It included a detailed inspection of the areas of the facility, including production areas, storage facilities for raw materials and finished production, the control centre, administrative areas and laboratories. When the flow chart was examined the specific characteristics of the equipment were studied and the key points at which the production process could be monitored were identified. As a result an agreement was prepared on the facility, on the basis of which a routine inspection was subsequently conducted. The initial visit took five days, of which two days were required for the preparation of the draft agreement on the organization of the systematic inspection of this facility. Next, monitoring equipment was set up at points on the process path which had been identified in the course of the initial visit. These operations were carried out over a period of 24 hours during a scheduled shutdown of the production process, and therefore did not affect the operation of the facility as a whole. Between that moment and the holding of the routine inspection samples were taken automatically, hermetically sealed and placed in a sealed container.

The routine inspection was conducted in the course of one day. A further day was required for the preparation of the report of the inspection team. The inspectors examined the production equipment, checked the condition of the seals on the monitoring and measurement apparatus and samplers, checked the instrument readings and compared them with the facility records. A number of staff of the facility were questioned. When the inspectors arrived at the facility, the sample container was opened in their presence and two samples were extracted. The analysis of these samples, as well as the samples taken on the initial visit, was conducted on the spot (in the facility laboratory) by representatives of the facility in the presence of one of the inspectors. Both on the initial visit and on the routine inspection the inspection team was made up of four persons. It included a specialist in monitoring (team leader), a specialist in chemical technology, a specialist in monitoring and measuring instruments and automation, and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis. They were all representatives of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR. In addition, the routine on-site inspection

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

was attended by representatives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.

In the course of the inspection, issues relating to the maintenance of confidential information were addressed. In actual fact, no real problems arose in this area, as all those participating in the experiment, including the observers, have specific obligations under Soviet legislation. Nevertheless, in the course of the inspection the management of the facility drew the attention of these persons to the degree of confidentiality of each type of information. The participants studied the question of what information can be conveyed to the technical secretariat and what should be retained at the facility. As a result of the holding of the national experiment, it was recognized that, in cases where the inspection team detected no violations at the facility, it might perhaps compile a short report, in the form of replies to questions based on the inspectors' mandate. Where breaches of the provisions of the convention were detected, a more detailed report would have to be drawn up. It should include information confirming the violations detected.

Generally speaking, the national experiment confirmed the practical applicability of the monitoring procedures agreed upon during the negotiations, and supplied answers to a number of concrete questions which have yet to be considered in detail in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (duration of inspections, specific composition of the inspection team, etc.). The experiment also demonstrated that it is possible to conduct inspections without disrupting the operations of chemical plants.

The results of the experiment, the specific procedures followed, and actual data on production and consumption of chemicals are set out in greater detail in the report. Official documents used during the experiment are annexed to the basic report. These are: the initial declaration concerning the facility; a notification regarding the proposed production of dialkylaminoethanols in 1989; a facility agreement, prepared on the basis of the results of the initial visit, containing a detailed description of areas and buildings, the technology and production processes, measuring points and sampling points, etc. Annexed to the agreement are a layout diagram of the facility indicating its position in relation to Dzerzhinsk and the railway line, a diagram of the dialkylaminoethanol production plant, a diagram of the principal material flows in the facility, a plan of the facility, a schematic of arrangements for monitoring output of chemicals, and a schematic of the dialkylaminoethanol production monitoring system. We have also attached the mandates for the initial visit and for routine inspections, which were followed by the inspection team, as well as the inspection team's reports on the initial visit and the routine inspection. Although the inspection team did not observe any violations or divergences from standard procedure, the outline for the conduct of the national experiment included various violation scenarios which were "acted out" in theoretical terms and reflected in the report, and also in a special document entitled "Possible instances of discrepancy between the actual situation and earlier declarations concerning a facility". I should like to draw attention to the fact that in the context of actual application of the convention, part of the information contained in the report should not, in our opinion, be forwarded to the technical secretariat

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

but should remain at the facility. However, guided by a desire to do our utmost to promote the analysis of the results of national experiments, we put this information in the report.

In submitting this report, the Soviet delegation considers that it will contribute towards "fine tuning" of the system for monitoring the production of key precursors. Naturally, our experts will be prepared to provide any clarifications required and answer any questions you may have.

We note with satisfaction that three reports have already been submitted - from Sweden, Hungary and Italy - and that 13 other States have either conducted or intend to conduct national trial inspections and to submit reports on them. A positive factor is the fact that the trial inspections are being conducted not only by members of the Conference on Disarmament but also by States participating in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons as non-members of the Conference.

We consider that the holding of national trial inspections testifies to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have entered a decisive stage, where work on the drafting of the future convention is going hand in hand with practical preparation for its entry into force.

The PRESIDENT:

... First of all, I would like to express to all of you my sincere gratitude for the spirit of co-operation you have shown, for the effective support you have so kindly granted to my presidency, and also for the many expressions of friendship addressed to me. The Conference on Disarmament opened this year's activities in a promising world climate, which was not only characterized by the satisfactory trend in East-West relations, but also by the significant progress towards solution of many local conflicts and by the general decrease in international contention. In the multilateral arena the successful outcome of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of use of chemical weapons was undoubtedly an event of primary importance, which raised growing expectations for the specific work of this Conference and the disarmament process in general.

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(The President)

... Owing to the assistance and good will of all, it has also been possible to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under agenda item 4, appointing moreover an able Chairman, Ambassador Morel of France, to that subsidiary body. As you are all well aware, many hopes and expectations are bestowed on the work of this important Committee, especially after the Paris Conference: International public opinion is looking at this subject with particular attention and sensitivity. Therefore I cannot abstain from renewing the appeal for all political groups and delegations to redouble their utmost efforts for the decisive progress of this negotiation. The success brought about by an agreement on a convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons could only increase the prestige and renown of the Conference. To this effect, I would like, on behalf of you all, to renew the most sincere wishes of success to Ambassador Morel, who has been assigned the responsibility of leading the work of this important Committee for the 1989 session.

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The PRESIDENT: The 491st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

As Japan assumes the presidency for the month of March, my Prime Minister has asked me to convey a message to the Conference which I would like to read. I quote:

...
"Recent years have witnessed marked improvements in the international climate surrounding bilateral relations as well as regional and multilateral issues. These trends give us a sustained hope that the priority objectives of the Conference on Disarmament, to which the Government and people of Japan continue to attach high importance, will become a reality.

"Such attainment requires, no doubt, patient and continuing efforts on the part of all member States to bridge the differences and to widen the areas of convergence. The very success of the recent Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to obtain concrete results, when such efforts are made. Our mission is to make steady progress, building upon those successes as in chemical weapons and other important areas of disarmament.

...
... of this year, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted on its initiative a regulation under article 113 of the EC Treaty which subjects to authorization the export of eight chemical substances suitable as precursors of chemical weapons. Her aim is to achieve

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

Mr. President, the most urgent contribution to disarmament expected of this Conference by the world is the elimination of a particularly cruel and insidious category of weapons of mass destruction: chemical weapons. In this respect, the multilateral disarmament process on a global scale is facing a crucial test. A year ago, I emphasized here, together with my colleague Mr. Andreotti from Italy, that the global, comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a matter of the greatest urgency. Above all, we warned of the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. Meanwhile it has become painfully clear how right that assessment was. The shock caused by the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war led to the international community, on the suggestion of the American President and at the invitation of President Mitterrand, holding a conference in Paris on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the Paris Conference high-level representatives from 149 countries jointly sought ways and means of putting an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. The international community was at one in condemning chemical weapons. This permitted consensus on the Final Declaration of Paris, which demanded the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. We must now do justice to that call here in Geneva. Everyone's words must be followed by deeds.

In Paris, the recognition that only a comprehensive and global ban can solve the problem of chemical weapons gained considerable ground. As long as there are no peremptory rules of international law prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, the risk of their unlawful use will persist. As long as national export controls

(continued)

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

remain the only legal instrument for preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, it will not be possible to rule out reliably any misuse of chemical substances and equipment allegedly supplied for peaceful purposes. As long as there is no international monitoring system that permits systematic on-site inspections at short notice, it will be hard to dispel any suspicion of the clandestine development and production of chemical weapons. And as long as the arsenals of chemical weapons are not eliminated world-wide, it will be almost impossible to obtain a voluntary renunciation of the capacity for chemical warfare, especially in areas of crisis.

More and more countries are trying to acquire with foreign assistance the capability for producing chemical weapons. Foreign companies, and unfortunately German ones as well, supply components and chemical precursors or provide the requisite know-how. The alarming proliferation of chemical weapons confronts all countries with a grave responsibility that no government can shirk. Particularly for our country this is a deeply moral matter, which directly affects the identity and credibility of our State.

The Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the production and use of chemical weapons through an internationally binding pledge. It is the only country thus far to subject its chemical industry to regular on-site inspections by an international agency. We consider it our duty to do everything humanly possible to prevent the participation of German companies and individuals in the production of these terrible weapons in other countries. Such participation is a crime and must be treated and punished as such. The laws and controls will be tightened. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has therefore responded to the recent occurrences with a series of measures, of which I would like to mention the main ones:

Firstly, we shall extend the authorization requirements for the export of technical documents and know-how. In future, the export of production and other technological documents, as well as the transfer of not generally accessible technical know-how to other countries in the world, will require authorization in all instances. Secondly, the authorization requirements for the export of precursors of chemical weapons will be extended from 8 to 17 substances. This will apply to exports to all countries without exception. Thirdly, it will be made obligatory, even before any export, to notify the production of equipment capable of being used for the purposes of chemical weapons. Fourthly, the criminal provisions governing violations of foreign trade and payments legislation are being tightened. Penalties of up to five years' imprisonment may be imposed. Fifthly, new provisions are being introduced which make it punishable for Germans to assist - in whatever manner, be it at home or abroad - in the production of chemical weapons facilities or the development and manufacture of chemical or biological weapons. This offence will be subject to not less than 2 and up to 15 years' imprisonment.

On 20 February of this year, the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted on my initiative a regulation under article 113 of the EC Treaty which subjects to authorization the export of eight chemical substances suitable as precursors of chemical weapons. Our aim is to achieve

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

consensus within the European Community on considerably expanding this list so as to achieve the most comprehensive instrument possible for preventing the spread of precursors of chemical weapons. We are also striving together with our partners in European political co-operation to introduce mandatory authorization with regard to the export of facilities and equipment suited to the production of chemical weapons. It is our aim that such an agreement should as soon as possible be made binding on all 19 countries united in the "Australia Group". I appeal to the bodies that I have just mentioned to accord the highest priority to these measures. Every effort must be made to ensure that the chemical weapons production facilities now under construction are not completed.

However, on no account must we succumb to the illusion that national and international measures can effectively prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, though such measures are at present greatly needed because this Conference has not yet concluded a convention fully banning chemical weapons world-wide. There is no alternative to a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention which prohibits without restriction the development, production, possession, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons and brings about the complete destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks under international supervision. The risk of proliferation will grow as long as this legal vacuum persists. It arouses the desire of those who do not possess chemical weapons. I strongly warn against confining the fight against chemical weapons to measures designed to prevent their spread. Such an approach would undermine the determination of the international community to effectively ban chemical weapons through a global, comprehensive convention.

On 18 April 1984 President Bush, then still Vice-President of the United States, rightly stated at this very Conference: "The essence of verification is deterrence of violations through the risk of detection." A global ban will only be effective if it is verifiable. In the matter of verifiability, especially in challenge inspections, the security interests of mankind must take precedence over the economic interests of companies that are worried about their business secrets. This must not be the hour of the pusillanimous who encumber the substance of the negotiations with more and more technical and legal problems and describe the verification issues as unsolvable. Time is pressing! The negotiations of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a convention that prohibits chemical weapons world-wide must therefore be brought to a successful conclusion at last.

In the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, the countries participating in this Conference here were called on "to redouble their efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". This signal from Paris must be translated into practice here in Geneva. This imposes a duty on all negotiating delegations in this forum and on the Governments they represent. I wish Ambassador Morel as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons every success in his new responsible post. I would also like to thank his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for his dedicated and purposeful conduct of the negotiations in 1988.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

I share the expectation of the United Nations Secretary-General that the commitment expressed at such a high level in Paris will expedite the negotiations here. It is possible to solve the problems still obstructing the conclusion of a convention by the end of this year. This also applies to the subject of verification. The Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the United States-Soviet INF Treaty, opened the door to a world in which systematic checks and mandatory challenge inspections play a natural confidence-building function. In the efforts towards chemical disarmament, too, the technical complexities of the verification issue must not become a pretext for deferring the solution of what is essentially a political problem.

As the outcome of many years of work by this Conference, an advanced draft convention is available, which also contains the fundamentals of a comprehensive verification régime. However, over the years this text has become more and more complicated. Some points are unclear or ambiguous, as inevitably results from different views at a particular time. It is now essential to consolidate the draft where consensus has already been achieved on substantive issues and, at the same time, to find suitable solutions to those questions still in abeyance.

During this year's round of negotiations, we must succeed in solving the main problems involved in the envisaged verification régime. While chairing the new Working Group on verification, my delegation will make special efforts to bring about consensual solutions to the outstanding verification issues. Above all, two important questions concerning the verification of a chemical weapons convention, namely the monitoring of non-production of chemical weapons and challenge inspections, have yet to be resolved. One of the most difficult tasks is that of reliably monitoring the chemical industry. It must be ensured that the permitted production of substances which are also suitable as precursors of chemical weapons exclusively serves peaceful purposes. This Conference has developed a graduated monitoring system to that end.

To supplement the measures already discussed for monitoring non-production, my delegation introduced during the last round of negotiations a concept for additional inspections at short notice in the form of ad hoc checks applicable to the entire chemical industry. With the aid of a simple analytical procedure, it is to be established whether any prohibited or undeclared substances are being manufactured at the time of the inspection. Such ad hoc checks are intended to supplement routine inspections and can be carried out without time-consuming, excessive interference with production processes. This new flexible instrument offers clear-cut advantages for the verification of a chemical weapons convention: even if there is no suspicion, the entire chemical industry is accessible to the inspectorate. With the aid of simple, scarcely intrusive checks, a high degree of transparency is achieved in what is at present a grey area. Therefore, these ad hoc checks ought to be acceptable to everyone.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

However, mandatory challenge inspections remain indispensable as the main means of obtaining certainty in a specific case as to whether the convention is being complied with. They permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concern about security. This problem should be tackled as a matter of priority. The associated political and technical difficulties are well known but confidence-building, protection against violations of the convention and the protection of human life and dignity must take precedence. Absolutely nothing can justify the rejection of mandatory challenge inspections, and certainly not the business interests of individual companies.

Even before the convention is concluded, practical experience should be gathered so that its verification provisions can be made as realistic and effective as possible. We have therefore unreservedly welcomed the suggestion of trial inspections and have, like various other countries, declared our readiness to undergo such inspections. A few weeks ago, the Federal Republic of Germany carried out its first trial inspection in the form of a routine inspection at a facility of the civilian chemical industry. The results were encouraging. Our experience has convinced us that it is possible with the aid of routine inspections to ensure adequate monitoring of the non-production of prohibited substances.

As with routine inspections, we expect practical trials of ad hoc checks to yield important information. We are, therefore, at present preparing a trial inspection in the form of an ad hoc check at a major chemical plant. The chemical industry is receptive to this new verification instrument and its testing. We shall report in detail on the experience we gain. The exchange of experience here in Geneva on all national trial inspections will provide important information on how to improve the verification rules. It will also lay the basis for international trial inspections, which we shall gladly participate in. The German chemical industry will also make a plant available for that purpose.

The national or international trial inspections carried out or envisaged in many countries also reflect the growing openness and co-operation of countries in the field of chemical disarmament. This creates a new dimension of confidence, which is beneficial for the negotiations on a verifiable chemical weapons convention. The aim must be to achieve such a degree of monitoring that it is not possible for anyone to manufacture and stockpile militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons without being discovered.

We must reach agreement soon if we are to live up to our common responsibility for putting an end once and for all to the atrocities of chemical warfare. Given good will on the part of everyone concerned, this ought to be possible by the end of this year. I appeal to the world's scientists to refuse to participate in the development and production of these terrible weapons of mass destruction. I therefore address this urgent appeal to the Governments of the countries represented here: for the purpose of definitively eliminating these weapons, let us demonstrate maximum commitment, creativity and readiness for compromise. Let us make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at a convention that is ready for signature. We must not shatter the hopes of our nations. We must not cause the process of

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

disarmament, which is now under way on a broad basis, to founder on this decisive threshold. We all know that there are still difficult problems to be solved. But at this advanced stage, invoking those problems can no longer serve as a pretext for relaxing our efforts.

We must do everything possible to ensure at an early stage that countries which are not members of this Conference are suitably informed and become involved where appropriate. We must avoid a situation where, after this Conference has completed its work, individual countries refuse to accede to the convention on the grounds that they had insufficient opportunities to participate in drafting it. The requisite globality of the convention presupposes that the opportunities for participation open to all countries are actually used. We should therefore encourage all interested countries to take part as observers in the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I expressly welcome the representatives of those countries who already perform this important task, and especially this session's newcomers.

Mr. President, we are in a position where we can make the vision of a world without chemical weapons become reality. You may rest assured that my delegation will continue to contribute actively to this endeavour. The obstacles on the path to a convention banning chemical weapons can now be surmounted. This lofty goal merits our full commitment. It is my most fervent wish that this Conference will prove an unqualified success.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

... Finally, the results of the Paris Conference of 7-11 January have vindicated the initiative taken by Mr. Genscher and myself in February 1988, when we pressed for a general commitment to intensified negotiations on a total ban on this kind of weapon. In Paris, we realized that the concerns we had expressed on that occasion were broadly shared by the international community. From that Conference, which was attended by practically every country in the world, there emerged a generalized rejection of chemical weapons and a firm commitment on the part of everyone to give a further boost to negotiations on a convention which would not only ban their use, but at last prohibit their development, production, possession and very existence.

Let us seize on this favourable opportunity that the political situation is offering us, which we may never be offered again, to stave off for ever the scourge of war in its most devastating forms. The Paris Conference reaffirmed the role of the United Nations and gave it renewed vigour, strengthening its monitoring powers and its political and moral authority which no one will wish to evade. It is now necessary to set up the procedures that will allow the Secretary-General to promptly and effectively act in the face of future allegations on the use of chemical weapons. The outcome of the Paris Conference will be measured above all in terms of your work. Hence the additional responsibility of this institution, which has to pursue concrete objectives in relation to peace and stability by proceeding towards the elimination of a whole class of weapons, as has already been done in the case of intermediate-range missiles.

Over-estimation of the requirements of one's own security hinders disarmament, while an imperfect knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of the other side fuels suspicion and mistrust. This is the main reason why it is so difficult to solve intricate problems in an area where the risk of violating commitments is increased by the many connections that exist between civilian production and potential military uses. Italy is endeavouring to enhance the role of the international scientific community, precisely to help solve the problems relating to verification and transparency.

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(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

We are firmly persuaded that only a global solution can root out the growing risk of proliferation of weapons which are not only deadly, but also hideous, in a context of rigorous verifiability that will deter violations. Italy neither possesses nor intends to develop chemical weapons, and does not host them on her soil. Our commitment to the rapid establishment of conditions which will persuade all countries to resolutely and effectively reject them, in line with the conclusions of the Paris Conference, is therefore all the more credible.

One of the main objectives, in our opinion, is the rapid neutralization of all existing stockpiles and production facilities. Their destruction should begin as soon as the future convention comes into force, at a faster pace in the case of the largest arsenals. I also believe that the storage depots and production plants should be immediately made subject to rigorous international monitoring, pending their total elimination.

All of us have appreciated the willingness of the Soviet Union to unilaterally begin the destruction of its large quantities of chemical weapons; our only regret is that this decision had not been taken earlier - for example, before the United States resumed production of such weapons after an interval of 17 years. We view the Soviet initiative, which in due course will have to be channelled into the verification procedures provided under the future convention, as a step in the right direction, to which the other great Power will certainly not remain insensitive.

We have already supplied information on Italy's production of substances relevant to the convention, and we are ready to participate in a wider and even more detailed and exhaustive exchange of data. Until a total ban is imposed, we are also willing to adopt further measures to check the export of chemicals that could be used for military purposes, as well as appropriate sanctions. Italian legislation is in fact one of the strictest in this regard. The more advanced industrial countries are duty-bound to act rigorously and consistently and co-ordinate their actions. We have stressed this need in multilateral forums, such as the Western European Union and the European Community.

We have also promoted a trial inspection in some Italian chemical plants by an international group of scientists, whose findings have just been made available to this institution. For this reason too, it is satisfying to note that the experimental method was recommended at the end of the most recent session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The countries most concerned, which certainly include Italy, could also promote and co-ordinate scientific initiatives that will help to settle the still unresolved issues in the negotiation; gather and disseminate useful information for effective implementation of the ban; and co-ordinate possible initiatives taken by the industrial associations of different countries in this particular field in order to increase public awareness of the risks proliferation entails.

(Mr. Andreotti, Italy)

Supported by an increasingly attentive public opinion, negotiations have now reached the point of no return, and this is likely to be a decisive year in overcoming the greatest obstacles. Hence the need to deal resolutely and in an open spirit with those aspects of the convention that still require further political and juridical development. I am referring specifically to non-production, the institutional aspects, challenge inspections, and the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Through serious debate, we have to resolve our existing differences and make a quantum leap forward without ignoring legitimate national concerns. For years now, the working group system has worked to everyone's satisfaction, and I am convinced that it will continue to do so in the light of the constructive changes recently adopted. However, we must also think in terms of restructuring some negotiating methods, so that we can more rapidly bridge the distance that still separates us from our goal.

A year ago, when I addressed this gathering, I suggested that a select working group should be given the task of identifying proposals to intensify the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I believe that this proposal is still worthy of careful consideration, and I wish to advance it once again today. In this context, it is first of all our view that the long intervals in the negotiating activity of the Committee should be reduced, so as to give the negotiations the necessary lasting impulse and an increased incisiveness. I consider very appropriate the creation of an ad hoc working group - as we had advocated - responsible for all verification aspects. To my mind, it is evident that, however complex this essential problem might be, it has to be dealt with comprehensively, not leaving the various aspects of it to be handled by different groups with little functional linkage between them.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations):
The message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament read as follows:

... "The participants in the Paris Conference stressed the urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Although some obstacles still remain, we urge all the participating States to do their utmost to expedite the negotiations. We would like to see a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction before the end of this year.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

In my initial plenary statement of the current session, I would like to begin by stressing that Canada shares the generally hopeful assessment, already expressed by most preceding speakers, that our session is being held at a particularly propitious time, when new, encouraging prospects appear to be opening up in international relations, including in the disarmament field. I would begin by recalling the generally positive atmosphere that attached to SSOD-III, even though it ended without agreement on a substantive document. This positive atmosphere was even more perceptible during the forty-third United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee, which Canada had the honour to chair. When the representative of the USSR addressed the final meeting of the First Committee on 30 November on behalf of the Group of Socialist States, I suspect he spoke for us all when he noted that, as never in the past, the Committee's work had been promoted by a positive international political climate. The number of resolutions and decisions adopted increased over the forty-second General Assembly, and so also did the number of consensus resolutions. The other major development was, of course, the January Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Final Declaration of which was officially presented to us on 7 February by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Roland Dumas. Most importantly, there was the successful conclusion last month of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE. This included the major decision to open two new negotiations relating to conventional armed forces in Europe. Little wonder that we should therefore be beginning our work for this session with heightened expectations of further progress.

That being noted, however, we should not allow too great a sense of euphoria to blind us to the very difficult outstanding issues that still confront us in relation to each of the eight substantive items on our agenda. When I first spoke in plenary, last year, on 10 March, I emphasized the fundamental importance attached by Canada to an element that must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, namely effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. I further suggested that, to maintain confidence in compliance, precise and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of politically viable arms control and disarmament agreements. The Canadian Government is still of that view, a view which I hope all of us share. If this is so, then all of us must also agree that, particularly in the context of our ongoing work on a chemical weapons convention, we must give intensified effort to resolving outstanding issues to formulate verification measures which will be both practical and effective.

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

Finally, let me turn to the fourth subject on our agenda, chemical weapons. Here too we have papers to distribute, which we hope will also prove useful to you. One is the first issue in a new series which we will be preparing of arms control verification occasional papers. It is entitled "International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards: Observations on lessons for verifying a chemical weapons convention". Others among these occasional papers will be issued periodically. They are primarily intended for a specialist audience, and they represent the results of selected independent research undertaken by our Verification Research Programme. For this reason the views expressed in them are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three-volume compendium on chemical weapons covering our 1988 session. The volumes cover plenary statements (PVs), plenary working papers (WPs) and Ad hoc Committee papers (CD/CW/WPs). I would draw to your attention that several Ad hoc Committee papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me to the more substantive remarks on our work on chemical weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that nevertheless must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be "global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable". In our view, to be effective, the verification régime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at a tolerable cost. In this context you may recall that on 31 March last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the chemical weapons convention context.

If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is challenge inspections: here, notwithstanding what appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of States still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the convention and how to hold it accountable for its action. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive: but

(Mr. Marchand, Canada)

solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available: it will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be alleviated. Another, different but still difficult, issue is that of confidentiality. It is of especial interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a chemical weapons convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase "jurisdiction and control", a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Conference, to the effect that conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons should be conditional on progress in nuclear arms control. The Canadian Government emphatically disagrees. A complete ban on chemical weapons is desirable in itself. It is, in the Canadian view, in the interest of countries of all regions. It should not be conditional on progress in other areas.

My list of outstanding "difficult" issues is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended in any way to downplay the importance of others which I have not cited. My purpose has been, rather, to remind us that more than mere good will and the intention to work harder will be required from us if we are to make the sort of progress at this session which both the General Assembly and the Paris Conference have called for.

In concluding, I am pleased to be able to tell this Conference that Canada will be joining those member States that have already carried out or plan to carry out trial inspections. We will provide the results as soon as they become available.

Mr. REESE (Australia):

... While it is my intention to address particular items on our agenda as the session progresses, I have asked for the floor today to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament an important arms control initiative of the Australian Government.

The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, announced today, 7 March, that Australia will host a major international chemical weapons conference later this year. The conference will bring together Governments and representatives of the international chemical industry to discuss the growing problem of the international trade in feedstocks, plant and equipment which are to be used for chemical weapons purposes. The initiative follows discussions between Australian and United States officials, and between Senator Evans and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, about how best to build on

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the momentum generated by the Paris Conference on chemical weapons in January. The date of the conference, and details relating to participation in it, are still to be finalized.

In his announcement Senator Evans said that for some time Australia had been actively developing measures to address the problem of the spread of chemical weapons. Since 1985, Australia had brought together representatives of industrial nations which export certain relevant chemicals, to ensure that their industries were not associated, even inadvertently, with the production of chemical weapons. This group, which met regularly in Paris, has now become known as the Australia Group.

Australia has had a productive dialogue with other Governments and the chemical industry for some time, including as leader of the Australia Group, on how best to advance the objective of preventing the spread of chemical weapons while not impeding the legitimate activities of the civil chemical industry. One clear lesson from these discussions has been the need to work closely with the chemical industry. Senator Evans said that the proposed conference - designed to bring together Governments and chemical industry representatives in a joint problem-solving dialogue - would benefit from the background of close relations which have developed between the Australian chemical industry and the Australian Government. Australia sees the purposes of the Conference as being supportive of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive and universal ban on chemical weapons. The chemical weapons convention remains Australia's priority objective.

I will ask the secretariat that the full text of Senator Evans' statement be circulated as a document of the Conference.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia):

... The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons met the world's expectations and served as an important landmark in the struggle to rid our planet of chemical weapons. This being so, as we see it, the quest for disarmament is gaining qualitatively new parameters in all its basic directions. There is growing awareness and determination to renounce the

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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

principle of over-arming and to turn to the principle of defensive sufficiency. Not only are old stereotypes being overcome and certain values reassessed, but a new realistic approach to greater confidence and security is taking shape.

... Like many others, we think that conditions for disarmament are now as favourable as they are ever likely to be. Therefore, it would be an unforgivable mistake if the Conference were not to take advantage of the day, and did not offer its worthy contribution to furthering the positive changes taking place the world over. Here, in our opinion, the current year, 1989, should be a crucial turning-point as we move towards completion of work on the chemical weapons convention.

As was rightly pointed out by His Excellency Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his statement on 2 March 1989, given good will on the part of everyone concerned, the finalization of the convention ought to be possible by the end of this year.

(continued)

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

It is extremely important that the negotiations on chemical weapons should not lose momentum. During the negotiations, all efforts should be directed towards finding solutions to pending problems, rather than revising compromises achieved through a great amount of painstaking work.

The current state of affairs of the negotiations allows us to conclude that today there is no problem that cannot be resolved or that could long hamper the ongoing negotiations. Yes, there are problems, for the moment, which are mainly of a technical nature. Given the desire on everyone's part to search for common understanding, they could be agreed upon without much difficulty.

Speaking on the question of chemical weapons, I will limit my remarks mainly to its verification aspects. As for the other problems related to the chemical weapons negotiations, I will address them in a future statement. The Ad hoc Committee is now focusing attention, inter alia, on the question of verification, which occupies a prominent place among the outstanding problems. Hence, we welcome the creation of a working group to deal with the subject. The "rolling text" of our future convention contains the main mechanisms of verification which have been elaborated to varying degrees. Some of them have almost been completed, whereas others are being worked out.

Like many others, my delegation considers that whenever one raises the question of verification of the convention, one has to proceed from the premise that the security interests of States should prevail over commercial and other interests. Naturally, we could think about the specific interests of given companies and take them into consideration wherever possible. In the course of negotiations, a number of delegations have come up with valuable ideas and proposals on the question of verification, including the idea of making good use of relevant verification provisions contained in the INF Treaty and the document of the Stockholm Conference, as well as the day-to-day practice of the International Atomic Energy Agency wherever feasible. Though we understand that they cover different subjects, nothing will prevent us from studying the good experience gained there. This could be done, in our opinion, in Working Group 1 on verification.

The PRESIDENT: The 494th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

... Much remains to be done at all levels, and we, the members of the Conference on Disarmament and the non-members participating in it, have a heavy responsibility in advancing our negotiations to achieve new effective and verifiable disarmament measures. That responsibility assumes particular relevance at present, when the international situation shows considerable improvement and multilateral forums are proving once more that they are indispensable instruments in the search for disarmament. Clear indications in that respect appeared at the last regular session of the General Assembly. The success of the Paris Conference in recognizing the importance and continuing validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as in providing further impetus to our negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, is a timely example of the irreplaceable role of the multilateral approach to disarmament. Last but not least, this year we have welcomed in our midst an unprecedented number of non-member States wishing to participate in the work of the Conference. Twenty-four States have been invited to join us in dealing with the issues facing this multilateral body.

The 1989 session of the Conference has begun on a positive note. A number of organizational questions have been settled quickly. Five subsidiary bodies are working under their competent chairmen and, as requested by the Paris Conference, the Conference is redoubling its efforts in the field of chemical weapons. However, we should not forget that several agenda items and other subjects still need to find an appropriate organizational framework for

(The President)

their consideration. This applies in particular to the nuclear issues on our agenda, agenda items 1 to 3. Among those, I would like to single out agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", on which we have not been able, unfortunately, to find an acceptable arrangement since the end of 1983. I have initiated with our co-ordinators the process of exploring possible progress on the item, and I am very encouraged by the positive response. I assure you that I will continue to intensify my consultations and to co-operate with you in the search for a solution to those pending matters.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, permit me to thank you for the warm words of welcome you have just extended to me. I am very pleased and honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. Let me also express my pleasure at seeing you occupy the Chair of the Conference. I know that under your competent guidance, the Conference will work effectively.

Chemical disarmament has gained new urgency on the agenda of the world community. Alarm at the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is global. The 149 participating States at the Paris Conference in January aired their common awareness of this danger. It marked a unique expression of political resolve by virtually all States of the world. The Declaration of the Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons by redoubling its efforts on this issue. The present global alarm now provides a momentum which this negotiating body should not fail to seize. If this Conference succeeds in these efforts, it will give a new impetus for multilateral disarmament as a whole.

There is now an increasing understanding of the scope of the chemical weapons problem. Many countries are taking measures to strengthen export controls on chemicals, equipment and facilities which may be used in the production of chemical weapons. International trade in this kind of merchandise has to be put under scrutiny. But this alone is not enough to stop the spread of chemical weapons. Finland welcomes the Soviet Union's announcement at the Paris Conference that she will unilaterally start the elimination of her chemical weapon stockpiles. We also welcome the recent

(continued)

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

statement by the United States that she plans to explore ways of ensuring the accelerated withdrawal of her chemical weapon stockpile from the Federal Republic of Germany.

These kinds of unilateral measures are encouraging signs. They help to strengthen the momentum which is further highlighted by developments in other areas of disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union and the United States are expected soon to resume their nuclear and space talks. Deep reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals will be a vital element in making the world safer. In Europe, two parallel sets of negotiations on military security within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started only a week ago. In addition to the continued work on confidence- and security-building measures, conventional armed forces in Europe have finally become an object of negotiation.

Disarmament at the bilateral level and in the regional context is advancing. The Conference on Disarmament is responsible for advancement at the multilateral level. Among the first priorities is the completion of the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference demonstrated the globality of the chemical weapons question. The effectiveness of the future convention requires universal adherence to the convention from the very beginning. Every country is expected to abide by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, every country that is willing to contribute to the negotiations should have an opportunity to do so. Finland welcomes the decision of the Conference to open its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to new observer States. The restructuring of the work of the Committee is a positive sign that the redoubling of efforts is taking place. We wish the Ad hoc Committee and its Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, every success in turning the unanimous message of the Paris Conference into reality.

Verification of the future convention is undoubtedly one of the most difficult issues facing the CW negotiations. The Finnish research project on the verification of chemical disarmament - Finland's contribution to the CW negotiations - has for 15 years developed sensitive and selective analytical methods to meet verification requirements of the convention. The results have been published annually here at the Conference on Disarmament in the form of "Finnish Blue Books" totalling about 2,500 pages of research data in 13 volumes. These reports contain analytical data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors and degradation products studied using seven instrumental methods. Some of the methods require sophisticated stationary instrumentation, but some are also usable in mobile laboratories. Application of the methods for air monitoring was found feasible in on-site, near-site and remote verification tasks.

To make the results more readily available for other laboratories, a computerized verification data base is being prepared. A prototype of this data base was introduced at this Conference last year, and delegations were encouraged to test it by allowing them access to our computer. The ultimate goal is a comprehensive chemical weapons verification data base for the Technical Secretariat. In the first phase, an analytical data base will help the future Preparatory Commission in developing verification methods. We hope to be able to demonstrate its use to the delegations in Geneva during the coming summer session.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

To allow reliable use of the identification data collected into the data base, work within the project has proceeded to describe the numerous methods of sample preparation and analysis required in a way which meets the criteria of standard operating procedures. Concrete international co-operation is vital to the success of the pioneering work towards the standardization of methods. We are pleased to announce to this Conference that we have recently signed an agreement with Switzerland on co-operation in methods development. We are confident that our project will benefit from Swiss scientific expertise.

In order to facilitate international validation of the procedures the Finnish project is planning an inter-laboratory "round robin" exercise. The project will also test the suitability of the methods during the first trial inspection in Finland, which incidentally is taking place today.

Finland has put her capability to verify alleged uses of chemical weapons at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Once the convention has been signed, Finland is also prepared to offer the facilities of her research project to the Technical Secretariat for analytical work. Continuous methods development and updating of chemicals lists will remain important after the convention has entered into force.

In addressing the Paris Conference, Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa announced that, as of next year, Finland is prepared to train each year, free of charge, chemists from the developing world in the use of technical methods and instruments relevant to the verification tasks of the convention. Details of this offer will be worked out before the summer, and invitations will be extended directly to the Governments concerned. Close acquaintance with the technical methods is necessary for every party to the convention that has a chemical industry of its own. National organizations should be able to ensure compliance with the obligations set out in the convention. Acquaintance with the methods would also facilitate the recruitment of staff to the Technical Secretariat on a broad geographical basis.

CD/PV.495

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Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic):

... I should like to introduce at today's plenary session document CD/899, i.e. the report on the national trial inspection of the German Democratic Republic.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the holding of trial inspections in chemical industry facilities in order to expedite work on the draft convention on chemical weapons. This initiative was taken up and developed further by the Ad hoc Committee, resulting in document CD/CW/WP.213. On this basis, the German Democratic Republic carried out a trial inspection in an industrial plant in the autumn of 1988. It was conducted in a multi-purpose pharmaceutical facility, a production unit of the "Dresden" pharmaceutical enterprise, which processes a substance listed

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in schedule [2] as "To be discussed further" - dimethylaminoethanol. The substance is converted into meclophenoxate hydrochloride, a chemical which is used as a medicine.

In preparation for the trial inspection an initial visit - actually a sequence of several visits - was carried out. During the "initial visit period" a facility agreement was negotiated and a document outlining the detailed verification approach was drawn up. The initial visit included four one-day visits to the facility and several weeks for the analysis and study of basic documents to prepare the verification concept and negotiate the facility agreement. The routine verification lasted for two days, while the elaboration of the inspection report took one day.

The following inspection methods were applied: inventory controls by direct measurement, enumeration of standard tanks, verification of records and sampling and analyses for confirmation of data in the material balance declaration and of non-production of schedule [1] chemicals. At the same time, the operating condition and the production régime were checked on the basis of the facility agreement. Moreover, interviews were held with plant workers.

During the inspection two technical principles were investigated, namely material balance verification and anomaly detection. In the case of material balance verification, a narrow inspection mandate was drawn up and successfully implemented, based on the facility agreement and the verification approach. For anomaly detection, it was difficult to formulate a tight inspection mandate.

The facility was notified in advance of the inspection date, mainly because material balance verification, and inventory verification in particular, can only be performed at specific points in the production cycle. Therefore, the time of the inventory verification must be agreed with the operator of the facility, while interim inspections can be conducted at short notice in accordance with the "rolling text". The inspection did not have a major impact on facility operations. But with a view to making facility operations suitable for verification under the convention, some adjustments became necessary, both in facility accounting practice and in the operating régime at the facility. We are looking forward to expert discussions on the experience gathered during trial inspections, to be held in the coming weeks here in Geneva.

Since I have been given the floor, I should like to air some further observations on topical issues concerning current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The verification problem has attracted great attention in recent consultations. Our delegation welcomes the efforts made in Working Group 1 with respect to the pattern of verification. A conclusion to be drawn from this debate is that the existing elements of verification included in the "rolling text" constitute a solid foundation for a functioning and reliable verification system. Chemicals which are chemical weapons and have little or no use except for CW purposes, as well as key components for binary or multicomponent chemical weapons, are covered under the most stringent régime.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The second category, key precursors, will also fall under systematic verification by on-site inspection. In both cases, the inspections will have to prove not only that the chemical is not used for other than the declared purposes, but also the absence of any production prohibited by the convention in the facility under inspection. A third category of chemicals will be subject to verification by data monitoring.

At present the question of whether there is a need to supplement these verification system elements is being discussed. We feel that an answer to this question may be found in trying to identify the aim of additional verification measures. It will be easier to make a choice concerning the verification methods to be applied on the basis of this identification. One target for verification is chemicals which are not included in any of the three schedules and which, because of their toxicity or other characteristics, can be diverted to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, the facilities producing these chemicals might be converted into or readily used as CW production facilities. In our view, a solution could perhaps be brought about by including such chemicals in schedule [2]. In so doing, sufficient assurance could be obtained that the chemical in question is not produced for prohibited purposes and the facility not used for CW production. This relates to problems which have been the subject of discussion for some time under the heading "schedule [4]" or "super-toxic lethal chemicals" (STLCs). To arrive at the aforementioned solution, the guidelines for schedule [2] would have to be drafted to allow for the inclusion of such chemicals. The ambivalent characteristics of some chemicals, however, might create difficulties in reaching agreement on whether a specific chemical requires systematic verification or not. For these cases, another pragmatic approach seems to be advisable.

In our opinion it would be sensible for a list to be drawn up comprising those dubious chemicals which cause concern. Requests from States parties should form the basis of such a list, which should be compiled by the Technical Secretariat and communicated to the States parties. The idea of maintaining an open list of this kind was advanced by the delegation of Italy last year. The production of chemicals set forth in this list, probably above a certain threshold, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, would have to be declared by the States parties. Following such declarations, checks could be carried out on an ad hoc basis. The creation of weighting factors, as suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany, could serve as a means of choosing the proper frequency of ad hoc checks. The scientific council whose establishment was proposed by France could assume an advisory role in the overall process. By applying this method, only one point of possible concern would be left unaffected, namely facilities which do not produce chemicals contained in the schedules and are consequently not declared, but which have the capability of being used as or easily converted into a CW production facility. The discussions on this subject did not reveal any possibility of defining sufficiently clear characteristics so that they can be included in a list or a special register. We are ready to discuss further ideas to provide assurances regarding the absence of prohibited activities in such facilities. There is, of course, always the alternative of requesting a challenge inspection.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Another problem I should like to touch upon concerns the Executive Council. We attach great importance to reaching agreement on the composition of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The work to be accomplished on this subject would, to our mind, also help make headway in other subjects which are linked with the functions of this organ. In working paper CD/812 of 4 March 1988, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic set forth its views on the composition, size and decision-making of the Executive Council. In this approach we proceeded from the fact that the proper implementation of the convention would have a strong bearing on the security interests of the States parties. For this reason, the stability of the convention and its global character will largely depend on the political body acting as the executive organ. The composition of the Executive Council will have to correspond to the character of the convention as a disarmament agreement. That is why its composition should be in accordance with the political balance established in the Conference on Disarmament, as the appropriate multilateral organ to negotiate this kind of agreement. Therefore, the conclusion has been drawn that the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution should play a crucial role. In addition, the groups should be made up of an appropriate number of countries with a developed chemical industry as well as those not having a major industry of this kind. We are still of the opinion that this organ, to be effective, should be composed of a limited membership. We deem the figure of 21 adequate.

Since we are now to continue the debate on these issues in the various working groups, I would like to offer some observations on the outcome of discussions held in the meantime. In our view they revealed that the relationship between political balance and equitable geographical distribution, being the governing principles for the composition of the Executive Council, was widely supported. A limited size for this body was also considered essential. Different views have been expressed only concerning whether the stage of development of a chemical industry should be taken into account. We arrived at these conclusions during the consultations held last year in the working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. The same goes for observations offered on this subject in the plenary. I am referring especially, in this context, to statements made by the delegations of Brazil, France, Pakistan, the United States, Sweden and China last year. The quotations contained in the circulated text of my statement delivered today speak for themselves. 1/

1/ The relevant section of the text circulated by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic read as follows:

"The delegation of Brazil stated on 26 April 1988: 'Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

I believe that this justifies the conviction that there already exists a foundation for elaborating an agreement in principle on the composition of the Executive Council. Following this agreement, the details of a text to be included in article VIII could then be worked out. We value the intention expressed by the Chairman of Working Group 3 to start consultations on this item, and we welcome the fact that this endeavour was also supported by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France.

Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity.' The CD was proposed as a model for a 'strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30 ...' (CD/PV.460).

"The French delegation stressed in its statement of 17 March 1988 that the composition of the Executive Council should not be 'simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies'. The view was expressed that it is 'on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria' (CD/PV.449).

"In the statement of the delegation of Pakistan of 28 April 1988, it was stressed that the precise composition of the Executive Council 'should be based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of political balance' (CD/PV.461).

"We appreciate the positive comment made by the United States delegation in its statement of 14 April 1988 concerning our working paper CD/812. In this context, it was stated that 'the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention'. The statement recognized that care must be taken to achieve political balance, and recommended that it should be brought about indirectly. The interrelationship between political balance and decision-making procedures was also stressed (CD/PV.457).

"In its statement of 13 September 1988, the delegation of Sweden expressed the following view: 'The composition of the Executive Council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution.' It was further stated that the wish for special representation of countries carrying a higher burden of routine inspections was understandable (CD/PV.481).

"In its statement of 31 March 1988, the delegation of China recognized 'a convergence of views' on 'the three elements of geographical distribution, chemical industry capacity and political groupings'. We fully share the conviction expressed by China that 'so long as we give full consideration to the above three elements and show mutual compromise and understanding, a composition of the organization compatible with the requirements of the convention will be found' (CD/PV.453)."

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Winding up my statement, I have grounds to reiterate on this occasion what has already been said at SSOD-III, during the Paris Conference, and here in this very room. The German Democratic Republic possesses no chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons, nor has it facilities to produce them. The German Democratic Republic advocates an international moratorium on the production of chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention, and has introduced strict export controls for dual-purpose chemicals. My country continues its efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, because this, we feel, will facilitate a global solution.

These measures are truly building confidence. They add, we think, to the successful work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. These steps, in fact, promote the early conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic is keeping its word given at the Paris Conference that it will advance these negotiations by displaying a constructive and action-oriented approach and submitting substantive proposals. Our delegation is in favour of focusing these negotiations on the essential issues of the CW convention and achieving a real breakthrough. We do this because the implementation of the Declaration of the Paris Conference will not come about on its own. We do this since concrete action is called for when we are about to seize the chance offered at the Paris Conference, namely to conclude the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

CD/PV.495

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Mr. VAJNAR (Czechoslovakia):

... As I informed the Conference last month, Czechoslovakia carried out a national trial inspection of a chemical industry facility on 25 and 26 January this year. In my short intervention today I would like to introduce the report on this inspection, contained in what will be document CD/900.

The facility selected for the inspection is a medium-sized plant situated close to the town of Mnísek, producing an agent commercially designated as Spolapret OS which is used mainly for non-flammable treatment of cotton. This substance is produced from phosphorus trichloride, which is converted into

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

dimethyl phosphite, these being substances which would under CD/881, be declared schedule [3] chemicals. For the purposes of the inspection these compounds were hypothetically considered as schedule [2] chemicals.

The inspection team was composed mainly of officials with a technical background. However, representatives from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated, either as members of the inspection team or as observers. The main sponsor of the trial inspection, the Ministry of Industry of the Czech Socialist Republic, paid thorough attention to the preparations for the experiment and to the establishment of all necessary conditions for its effective and instructive implementation. Special emphasis was placed on the thorough preparation of the facility attachment, since it soon became evident that the provisions included in the attachment would play an important "regulatory" role for the designation of areas or places to be inspected, as well as access by the inspectors and the conduct of the inspection itself.

The plant was visited six times between November 1988 and January 1989 before the facility attachment was finalized and concluded on 25 January. In its preparation maximum use was made of the provisions contained in the "Model for an agreement relating to facilities producing, processing, or consuming chemicals listed in schedule [2]" (CD/881, pp. 124-127). The inspection proper took two days. Its technical proceedings are described in detail in the report. The conclusions drawn from the inspection, which are specified in the report, might be summarized in the following way.

Firstly, the provisions relating to the verification of chemical industry facilities which have been developed so far in CD/881 can be considered as accurately reflecting the requirements for such verification. The national trial inspection convinces us that reliable verification of civilian chemical industry is feasible. At the same time, under normal conditions, the inspection is not exceedingly intrusive for the facility, or too demanding for the inspecting personnel, either in terms of participants or in terms of time. We hope that our experiment, together with the evaluation of other national trial inspections, will contribute to the completion of the verification provisions and procedures of the future chemical weapons convention.

Secondly, the participants in the inspection repeatedly realized the importance of the facility attachment. Attention paid to this kind of document in the previous work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has proved fully justified, since the facility attachment indeed plays the role of a "guide" to a facility, while at the same time protecting it from unnecessary intrusiveness and disclosures of confidential information. Two footnotes attached to the text of the Model on which facility attachments will be based indicate that some work on the material is still needed. We favour the initiation of such work as soon as possible.

Thirdly, the size of inspection teams will, in the course of real inspections, vary quite considerably, depending on the type of facility. It seems useful to envisage, in the case of larger inspection teams, specialization of its members. In view of the need to protect confidential information, the participants in the inspection came to the conclusion that access to all information should be limited to the head of the inspection team.

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

Fourthly, certain conclusions, albeit only approximate ones, might be drawn with regard to time periods required for various operations. For instance, the elaboration and conclusion of a facility attachment will require about one week. The routine inspection itself could be carried out effectively within one or two days, depending on the type of facility inspected. The preparation of a final report on an inspection might take about five to seven days.

The first stage of the trial inspection of chemical industry, which I am speaking about, confirmed the timeliness and usefulness of the initiative on this matter advanced in February last year by the delegation of the USSR. As was said in the statement of the Government of Czechoslovakia issued on 5 January this year, we are prepared to participate in the second stage of the experiment, namely, inspections with the participation of international inspectors.

Allow me to add one short remark concerning our present proceedings. One of the valuable conclusions to be drawn from the experiment, as well as from the work of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament to date, as far as the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is concerned, is that it should be as specific and as goal-oriented as possible. What we need is not the redrafting of essentially agreed provisions, while some important issues are still unsolved in the "rolling text". In our view a pragmatic approach would now require concentration of our effort on the solution of these outstanding problems. In this spirit of practical work Czechoslovakia is prepared to provide information on facilities, laboratories and other scientific institutions producing or handling chemicals of relevance to the convention. We could start releasing such information soon.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

... On the broader multilateral canvas, we have seen the culmination of the CSCE review and the commencement of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as the continuation of negotiations on confidence - and security-building measures, the latter with the participation of non-aligned and neutral States as well. There are also strong expectations of drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. Finally, in Paris in January this year 149 countries, by a remarkable act of consensus, together forged an unequivocal political commitment against chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously remaining issues and to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was in many ways a product of the times, and the Government of France needs to be congratulated for articulating and vigorously pursuing an idea whose time had clearly come.

Some aspects about the Paris Conference require particular emphasis. Firstly, it was an endeavour in which 149 nations participated despite proclaimed differences in approach. In short, it was a genuine multilateral effort. Secondly, it was a multilateral exercise that ran simultaneously with ongoing efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to complete an effective ban on chemical weapons. It did not undermine, obstruct or complicate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, Paris showed that a broad-based, multilateral and - this is significant - clearly political approach need not upset the highly specialized negotiating process continuing in the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, the consensus reached at the Paris Conference was hailed throughout the world as a manifestation of political determination and will to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them.

The strong political message thus emerging from Paris should have found a corresponding echo in the Conference on Disarmament's work. In fact, a task of the Paris Conference was to positively influence the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament's task in turn was to respond to the challenge offered by the Paris document. The Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the representative of Kenya, has already expressed our concern that the Conference on Disarmament's mandate was not adjusted and strengthened in such a way as to reflect more fully the international will clearly articulated at the Paris Conference.

Much of the success of the Paris Conference was due to the patient preparatory work undertaken by the French delegation, particularly our colleague Ambassador Pierre Morel, who now deservedly steers the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. His thematic or conceptual approach to negotiations takes us beyond the specific individual provisions of the "rolling text" and helps to give a clear perspective of the inter-relationship of different articles and provisions. In this way the convention can be envisaged as a balanced and integrated package which meets the concerns

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

of all countries. At the same time we should be cautious about any over-conceptualization that might lead to a loss of focus and shift emphasis away from treaty-oriented negotiation.

Discussions in the Working Group on Verification should not lead to a point where the convention is called upon to legislate for every single eventuality. Such an approach could pose restrictive burdens on small chemical industries, particularly in developing countries. We have requested the relevant authorities in Sri Lanka to study how our small chemical industry could respond to a non-production verification régime.

We would like to commend the Chairman of Group 5 for his suggestions with regard to the question of assistance and protection. The provisions in the convention on the question of assistance, together with those for technological co-operation, will help ensure wider adherence. We would like the envisaged Organization to be more actively involved in the provision of assistance and protection. Availability of assistance to a victim State through the envisaged Organization would be a practical and indeed effective manifestation of collective political will that should serve to deter attacks with chemical weapons. Timely protective assistance is essential. Chemical weapons have been used mainly against those who do not have the requisite protective capability. Affected countries should have the confidence to seek security through the convention's protective régime rather than through dubious attempts to develop their own chemical weapons capability. It is in this context that we understand the emerging agreement on the relationship between protection, assistance and the concept of undiminished security. A dependence exclusively on voluntary assistance would not afford the same degree of security as would the availability and provision of assistance through de-politicized mechanisms under the Organization.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

... In my statement today, I wish to identify, in a concrete way, some of the contributions the Conference on Disarmament can make to multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts on the three agenda items: nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and chemical weapons. All three of these items represent disarmament objectives which can be pursued in their own right. They are ideally suited, indeed require, global and hence multilateral solutions. The CD is engaged in fully-fledged negotiations on only one of these three agenda items - chemical weapons. While consensus does not yet exist to launch negotiations on the other two items, there is a pressing need to begin work on the basic technical and legal groundwork of these issues. Failing to do so would understandably be interpreted as a dereliction of duty on the part of the CD.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

... Verification is also of central importance to the chemical weapons convention, and it is this particular aspect of the current negotiations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that I wish to address today. The Ad hoc Committee has made encouraging progress in the verification of the destruction of stockpiles, and to a considerable extent in the area of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. But verification of non-production of both chemical weapons and of their specific precursors is an area which my delegation considers requires further elaboration.

The proposed monitoring régime for both schedule [1] and schedule [2] chemicals is now well developed. There is general agreement that monitoring of schedule [2] chemicals would involve data reporting which will be the foundation for on-site inspections by an international inspectorate with monitoring by tamper-resistant instruments as an adjunct to the on-site visits. The frequency of such visits will then be determined both by the confidence which can be placed in such instruments and the requirement to service them. There are of course other details which remain to be resolved, but these do not appear insurmountable.

Schedule [3] chemicals, by contrast, are made in large amounts and have a multitude of uses, so to monitor these with the same stringency as is envisaged for schedule [2] chemicals would clearly be impractical. None the less the importance of these chemicals and their relevance to the chemical weapons convention is almost as great as that of schedule [2] chemicals. Schedule [3] chemicals have been used recently as chemical weapons, and could conceivably be so used again. Others are precursors of schedule [2] chemicals and/or schedule [1] chemicals.

Australia's concern about schedule [3] chemicals can be illustrated graphically by looking at two such chemicals: phosgene, which caused massive numbers of casualties in the First World War, and which is a commonly used precursor for plastics, pesticides and pharmaceuticals; and trimethyl phosphite, which is a commonly used precursor for pesticides, flame retardants

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

and oil additives. The over-production of phosgene is quite common in the chemical industry, although this is normally not a particular problem. During a production "run" what phosgene is not required is simply burnt off. But it would be technically easy to separate off and contain a chemical which can provide a hideous form of death. Hence our concern to see facilities which either produce, or use, phosgene come under more rigorous monitoring than is currently envisaged.

Trimethyl phosphite can be converted to a phosphorite by using an appropriate catalyst, and the resulting substance can then be converted, in the same reaction vessel, to form compound No. 2 of schedule [2]. The further addition of chemicals not in schedule [2] or [3] to this same reaction vessel would result in the production of Sarin, and the neat agent could then be tapped directly into munitions. Safety measures would be needed to protect personnel, but these would not be unusual in a modern facility.

By making this brief foray into the world of chemistry, I am drawing attention to an essentially simple chemical process in order to underscore Australia's concern that schedule [3] chemicals must come under an appropriate inspection régime if the chemical weapons convention is to be perceived as one which provides the necessary assurances to ensure full compliance. Australia, together with a number of other countries, has conducted national trial inspections, and we are hopeful that when the results of all of these are fully analysed and evaluated, we will have a clearer picture of the problems before us and, hopefully, a better idea of how to resolve these.

Although we are still evaluating the results of our own trial inspection, certain preliminary conclusions are already clear. Monitoring of the civil chemical industry will necessarily involve a significant element of intrusion. Adequate verification will necessarily require the disclosure of confidential and possibly commercially sensitive information, the extent of this depending in part on the nature of the facility being inspected. From the industry perspective at least, confidentiality safeguards will need to be built into the inspection processes, to ensure that such information is afforded the maximum possible amount of protection.

We are conscious that the monitoring of schedule [3], or dual-purpose, chemicals raises particular problems for the chemical industry, but are confident that these concerns can be accommodated through the inclusion of a confidentiality annex within the chemical weapons convention. In this regard, I would confirm my delegation's strong support for the approach currently being taken by the Chairman of Working Group 1 on such an annex. I should add that we are far less attracted to the notion of adding confidentiality "markers" throughout the convention, as we believe that these will only overburden the text and, possibly, give a distorted picture of what we are trying to achieve.

Australia's clear position is that an unequal balance has to be struck between verification and confidentiality. Verification must be the overriding objective, and the protection of confidential information must be secondary to this objective. Australia also believes that some information should not be

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

subject to any confidentiality safeguards, and in this regard we welcome the move to greater openness by States about their chemical production and facilities, as a contribution to greater confidence which will help move the chemical weapons negotiations forward. For its part, Australia has prepared a response to the questions set out in the Federal Republic of Germany's working paper CD/828, and I have asked the Secretary-General of the Conference to distribute this to delegations in the usual way.

At the beginning of my statement I noted that the work of the CD can always benefit from complementary exercises which are conducted outside this forum. The Paris Conference on chemical weapons exemplifies this. Certainly the exchange of views in Paris helped broaden the international community's understanding of the work we are doing here in Geneva and, clearly, helped enrich our own thinking on a number of issues. As many before me have said, the Paris Conference also helped give a political impetus to our work here.

My Government has recently taken the initiative to propose the convening in Australia of a conference between representatives of government and industry later this year. Australia considers that dialogue between government and industry must be developed to ensure that there is no inadvertent association between the chemical industry and chemical weapons programmes. We are also hopeful that a practical exchange of views between government and industry will lead not only to a shared understanding of the problems facing industry, but to greater support for the aims and requirements of the chemical weapons convention. I would also recall that Australia is currently pursuing an initiative in our own region to promote the shared perception with our neighbours that chemical weapons are inimical to regional security. A concurrent objective is to enhance the universal acceptance of and adherence to the chemical weapons convention. However, the Conference on Disarmament must remain the focus of our efforts. This applies especially to the ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, but also to a range of nuclear testing and space issues where the participation of experts at the delegation level continues at this stage to be the most productive use of the resources available to us, and the most effective organizational format for making substantive progress on the full range of items on our agenda.

Mr. ARDEKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would also like to join our colleagues in welcoming Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and since we are discussing chemical weapons listed on our agenda, I would like to remind all of us that today is the first anniversary of the horrible use of chemical weapons in the city of Halabja, where over 5,000 innocent lives perished, and I would like to take this opportunity to remind us of our divine task here at the Conference on Disarmament, to put an end once and for all to this abhorrent weapon demeaning all human values and, with your permission, I would like to ask the Conference to observe a minute of prayer in silence in tribute to the memory of those who perished during that incident.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): It was your Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. President, who said at the Paris Conference that "as long as chemical weapons are allowed to exist, mankind can never be freed from the danger of the use of these weapons". That is one of the reasons why chemical weapons should continue to have high priority on our agenda. That is also the reason why a ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, which also provides for their total destruction, should continue to have priority on the world's disarmament agenda. The urgency of reaching agreement on such a convention found expression in the Paris Declaration, where we participating countries in this Conference were called upon to redouble our efforts, as a matter of urgency. We should therefore direct our efforts at resolving expeditiously the remaining issues and concluding the convention at the earliest date. The language the Ministers chose could not have been clearer. This signal coming from Paris should be translated into practical action here in Geneva.

Let me first say a few words on the underlying reasons why agreement on an effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons is so urgent. First, of course, because there are horrendous weapons of mass destruction with a capacity to kill and wound people indiscriminately on a massive scale. But second, also, because chemical weapons have actually been used recently. They are no longer weapons of the past. The taboo that long seemed to exist on the use of chemical weapons has been lifted. That is why the reconfirmation of the condemnation of the use of chemical weapons at the Paris Conference was so important. A third reason for accelerating our pace is that agreement on a convention seems to be within reach. Also for that reason we consider any linkage with progress in other arms control and disarmament areas not a fruitful approach. The bird, almost in our hand, would escape us.

There are other reasons why the chemical weapons negotiations are urgent. And I return now to what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan said when he added to the words I have just quoted that, apart from the risk of use arising from the existence of chemical weapons, there was another risk: the threat of the use of chemical weapons may in its turn prevent countries from actually getting rid of their chemical weapons. It is this vicious circle that we must break through, and that is a fourth reason why we have to cut some Gordian knots, why we must urgently work towards a situation in which all chemical weapons - and therewith the risk of their use - are eliminated. In a world in which countries continue to produce chemical weapons and more and more countries possess those weapons, it will become increasingly difficult to achieve our common objective of banning those

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weapons. The risk of proliferation cannot effectively be averted by imposing a freeze upon the further spread of chemical weapons, or by any other half-way interim measures. Only a total ban responds to our common objective. Only a total ban can effectively be verified.

There is a fifth reason: countries have been devoting their attention to the elimination of chemical weapons now for more than 18 years. I am not sure whether the world community could be proud of itself in 1991 when celebrating the twentieth anniversary of these negotiations without a final agreement. There is a limit to the duration of such negotiations, beyond which the air becomes stale. We believe that, with the advent of ever-newer technologies, time may, at some moment in the future, become our enemy. Aristide Briand once referred to time as "my most useful colleague". That is not the case here at the Conference. Ambassador Pierre Morel, as the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, has rightly placed our work under a certain time constraint, drafting a work programme that exerts the required degree of pressure on our delegations, as well as on those at home that have to furnish us with instructions. We thank him for that and for the impulse he has given to the work. We also thank last year's Chairman, Ambassador Sujka, and the Polish delegation for their efforts and devotion and the useful work they undertook.

In our view, the most formidable problem to be solved is that of verification. Not because of the technicalities of the problem of finding an adequate verification régime. Although the technical problems are complex, they cover more fundamental questions. They conceal the underlying issue of how to strike a balance between confidence and suspicion. If there is no effectively verifiable convention, suspicions about non-compliance cannot be removed. On the other hand, confidence is required, confidence that the risk of detection is sufficiently serious for countries to deter them from illicit action. The risk of undetected deliberate non-compliance can never be entirely eliminated. But we must at some moment reach the point at which we can say that that risk is considered smaller than the risk of getting entangled in an ever-expanding cobweb of proliferation and building up of new chemical weapons.

Challenge inspection remains fundamental for the verification régime to be established. An international inspection team should at any moment, at very short notice, be permitted to inspect a site or plant, if a country has doubts about compliance with the core rules of the convention. We are pleased that this concept has broadly been accepted. An essential feature of the challenge inspection régime remains that the country to which the request is addressed has no right to refuse and, in fact, should fully co-operate, guided by the desire to remove the doubts that are at the origin of the request.

However important challenge inspections under the convention may be, the basic pattern should, of course, remain the routine inspections, inspections that are part of the normal system, not triggered by a country that is suspicious about non-compliance. Routine inspections will take place to monitor chemical weapons stocks, production facilities and destruction plants, as well as to search for hidden operations within parts of the chemical industry. It is important that this "normal" part of the verification régime

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should not only be effective, by deterring non-compliance, but also realistic, by being geared to specific situations, as these may arise, and by being pursued with a sense of practicality. It is for that reason that we welcome trial inspections being carried out by various countries, in particular to test schedule [2] procedures. The results of the trial inspections will help in paving the way for a number of international trial inspections, which in turn should give us here in the Conference the information required for the finalization of the detailed provisions concerned.

I might recall that the first trial inspection was held in the Netherlands in 1986 at a time when, of course, work on the verification provisions was less advanced. In a few months, a new trial inspection will be held in my country in a sophisticated schedule [2] multi-purpose plant. Moreover, preparations to test certain challenge inspection procedures in military establishments are at an advanced stage. Trial inspections are also helpful in alerting ministries and governmental agencies concerned to the role they will have to play with respect to the actual implementation of the verification provisions. The experience thus gained will be a starting-point for the preparation of national legislation and other provisions required for the implementation of the convention, including the appointment of the national authority, which is needed as a liaison with the Technical Secretariat.

Various speakers have addressed the question of whether we may need another type of inspection, in addition to the routine inspections and challenge inspections, and if so, in what form. In my statement on 13 September last year, I briefly touched upon the concept of ad hoc checks, a system to deter illegal production in chemical facilities that may be capable of producing chemicals relevant to the convention, but that are not covered by the routine inspections under schedules [1] and [2]. Minister Genscher made clear in his statement of 2 March that these ad hoc checks could be triggered without the prior request of another country. It is clear that other variants of inspections could be envisaged, inspections that are not triggered by suspicion, yet are necessary in order to enable inspection teams to visit locations outside the areas of schedules [1] and [2]. Perhaps it is premature to discuss the modalities of additional types of inspection, as long as we have not a sufficiently clear picture of the nature of the lacuna to be filled. At any rate, my delegation has an open mind on ways to cope with possible devices to make the inspection régime more comprehensive, more suitable to deter any form of circumvention of the core obligations under the convention. However, we wish to make a few general observations on any possible complementary types of inspection, whether they are called ad hoc checks, ad hoc inspections, or otherwise.

The first is that we should review any additional types of inspection as to their deterrence value. What is the risk assessment of situations that would be covered by these inspections? What is the risk assessment of situations outside declared or registered activities? What is the chance of detection? Of course, the higher the risk and the greater the deterrence value, the more reason there would be to consider additional measures. Second, we think additional types of inspection should also be considered in

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terms of their cost-effectiveness. The higher the cost and the greater the risk that illegal activities will not be detected, the more cautious we must be in treading new paths. Third, any inspection outside the realm of routine inspections cannot rely on procedures laid down in the "facility attachments", or on permanent verification equipment installed on the spot. The effectiveness of challenge inspections and any other additional inspections outside routine inspections will greatly rely on the intrusiveness and analytical capabilities of portable equipment carried by the inspectors. In my country an initial modest research programme on mobile verification equipment has started. We understand that in other countries research and development is also under way. It is important that such efforts focus on the development of portable equipment that can easily be carried by inspectors. The exchange of information on different programmes in this area could lead to the development and production of a full range of tools necessary for effective inspections.

Besides verification, there are other complex problems to be addressed. They may be delicate, sometimes thorny, but perhaps they can more easily be solved once an effective verification régime has been agreed upon. I am thinking of such problems as: the tasks of the Executive Council vis-à-vis those of the Conference of States Parties, and the composition of the Council; ratification requirements; questions of assistance and sanctions in the event of non-compliance; the relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925; and the issue of technical co-operation, which is particularly important for developing countries.

Let me at this moment limit myself to the time perspective within which the ban could be realized. Minister Genscher said earlier this month that, given the good will of all concerned, it ought to be possible to reach agreement by the end of the year. Others think that we will need the whole of next year and perhaps even much more. But let us assume for a moment that the convention will be signed by the end of 1990. For some it undoubtedly sounds like an optimistic scenario. But then an interim phase starts, which lasts till the convention enters into force. We think that, given the great complexities of the convention and the need for elaborate national legislation to permit implementation, it would be realistic to assume that a couple of years will elapse before the required number of ratifications has been reached. In that case the destruction of stocks would start well into the 1990s, and the last stocks would be destroyed at the end of a 10-year period - maybe far beyond the year 2000. I for my part do not consider this an entirely satisfactory perspective. What can we do to shorten this period, without, of course, deviating from the course of diligence and caution that has characterized the negotiations up to now?

First, we must consider leaving purely technical matters as much as possible to the Preparatory Commission to be established after the signing of the convention. This is normal practice during the inception phase of an international convention. Time can be saved, and it has the additional advantage that arrangements can be made without the time-consuming legal niceties inherent in treaty language. We feel that sometimes costly time is spent in working groups on issues that are in themselves important and

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interesting, but do not need to be settled now in legal texts. Moreover, certain matters should, in our view, be left to the Technical Secretariat, under the guidance of the Executive Council, in order to ensure effective handling of purely technical and administrative matters.

Second, we would be in favour of a more rational, effective rhythm for the conduct of the negotiations. As Minister Andreotti said, we should also think in terms of restructuring some negotiating methods. The tempo of our negotiations seems mainly to be determined by the time required for the drafting of position papers and the response to such initiatives. My delegation still believes that time would be saved if more time were available for preparing positions, at home and within our delegations, but also in consultations within groups and in informal contacts between members of different groups. In my statement a year ago I made a few organizational suggestions for the Conference on Disarmament, including a change in the time schedule of the Conference, by spreading the sessions over the whole year, allowing delegations to use the intervals for reflection and preparation of positions. Limiting myself now to chemical weapons only, I wish to repeat what I have already said for the Conference as a whole: a system of, let us say, four to six weeks of negotiations alternating with three-to-five-week intervals for preparation of positions and informal contacts would in our view be far more effective and would in itself lead to intensified efforts during the sessions.

A third way in which we could accelerate the process would be to make optimum use of the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention. Therefore discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on the tasks of the Preparatory Commission are useful, in particular in order to assess the financial needs for the work of the Technical Secretariat, as well as possible ways to cover those needs. We also hope that the period between signature and entry into force might be shortened if countries could prepare in time for the legislative process. As I said, trial inspections may have a catalytic function in this respect.

Finally, I wonder whether there would not be scope for shortening the destruction period. Many years ago the transition period was set at 10 years. At the time, the two major Powers considered that such a period was technically needed to destroy all obsolete and modern chemical weapon stockpiles, assuming also that actual destruction would only start some time after the entry into force of the convention. In practice, the situation seems to have changed. Both Powers have started, or will soon start, with the destruction of their stockpiles on a voluntary basis. We assume that at the time of entry into force of the convention the bulk of the obsolete stocks may have been destroyed. Once we have a better insight into the size of the stocks of the two big stock-holding countries and their destruction capacity, we may also be able to assess the existing technical capacity for any possible accelerated destruction programme. In fact, would it not be worth considering creating the technical facilities that would enable parties to shorten the destruction period?

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I would remind delegates that it was in 1899 that the issue of chemical weapons was addressed for the first time. In that year, 90 years ago now, the Hague Declaration on the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gases was adopted. We hope that, 100 years later, after a century of suffering and perseverance, a world without chemical weapons will no longer be an illusion.

Mr. TRAN HOAN (Viet Nam) (translated from French):

... Among the very important matters on the agenda of this Conference, even if nuclear disarmament always has the highest priority, the elimination of chemical weapons would also deserve special attention from the international community. In my view there is not the slightest doubt that chemical weapons, whose appearance on our planet dates back earlier, constitute one of those means of mass extermination which has caused so many disasters for all of mankind. During the First World War, where chemical weapons were used for the first time, although they were still primitive in nature, they caused the death of nearly 90,000 people and left their mark on more than a million others. During the Second World War, more than two and a half million prisoners in concentration camps died because of the effects of these same weapons. During the war in Viet Nam, the utilization of the toxic Agent Orange had harmful long-term consequences for the ecology and the environment and for successive generations of Vietnamese. Today, 14 years after the end of the Viet Nam war, one may still see areas of arid land, denuded forests and deformations.

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Currently, the prodigious development of the chemical industry has led to the appearance of new types of highly sophisticated chemical weapons with a destructive power several times greater than the chemical weapons which existed at the beginning of this century. Needless to say, chemical weapons now constitute a grave danger for peace and international security, a great danger indeed for the whole of mankind, both for human life and human health and for the ecology and the environment. And in the face of such a threat, we may rightly rejoice at the success of the international conference on chemical weapons held in Paris in January 1989, where a common feeling emerged which President Mitterrand in his opening statement described in the following terms: "Everywhere there is an expectation, a new demand that the world should be released from the threat of chemical weapons". It was in Paris that the 149 States taking part in the Conference stressed "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". Moreover, whilst recognizing "the importance and continuing validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva", the participating States called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". Is the international Conference in Paris not a decisive milestone for the whole of mankind on the road towards the elimination of chemical weapons?

Whilst appreciating the historic importance of the international Conference in Paris on chemical weapons, we cannot in any way underestimate the problems which will be encountered by the negotiations in Geneva on the elimination of these weapons. To arrive at a global convention to ban chemical weapons, the negotiations here in Geneva will have many concrete problems to resolve relating to the intricate system of verification, the guarantee of undiminished security for all participating States, protection of the victims of chemical attack, the system of assistance and co-operation to develop civilian chemical industries in the participating States, the composition of the Executive Council, and so on. Yet it could be stated that once the basic issues have been settled, all the outstanding problems will be certainly resolved by a spirit of consensus, provided that all the parties concerned continue to display the necessary political will. Is there any need to add that France's decision to abandon the maintenance of security stocks, the Soviet Union's unilateral decision to destroy chemical weapons, the positive statements made by the leader of the present American Administration during his election campaign, and finally the active participation of all delegations in the Conference on Disarmament all constitute favourable factors which will help to speed up the negotiating process in this decisive stage as we work towards the final draft of the convention?

We fully agree with the view expressed by several delegations that for the time being the negotiations ought to be focused on the settlement of the principal outstanding problems relating to the order of destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities in order to guarantee undiminished security for all participating States during the 10-year period of transition

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from the entry into force of the convention, and the elaboration of inspection procedures within the context of an effective international system for verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in industry. Obviously, we would like to stress here the need for the convention to include specific provisions guaranteeing protection for victims of attack using chemical weapons, as well as provisions which provide for assistance and co-operation to participating States in the development of their civilian chemical industry. We welcome the national trial inspections of chemical weapon production facilities conducted by a number of countries. The experience gained from these inspections could undoubtedly help to speed up our work to draw up inspection procedures.

On the one hand, Viet Nam has been the victim of the use of chemical weapons on an enormous scale, while on the other it neither produces nor holds any chemical weapon. We oppose the use of any chemical weapon of any description. We call for and are working for a world without chemical weapons. Together with the other countries in South-East Asia we are striving for a chemical-weapon-free and nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this spirit we continue to support the initiative of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe. We also support the Australian initiative for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Allow me to conclude by expressing the hope that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date", thus responding to the pressing appeal of the 149 States participating in the international Conference in Paris on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and meeting the interests of peace and international security.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, my first words go to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation at the end of your term as President, which you have served with competence and talent. No representative of Morocco could resist the temptation to point out the major similarities between our two countries, despite the geographical distance which separates the empire of the rising sun from the country of the setting sun. I will mention only our firm foundation of tradition and our openness to the modern age. Personally I have had the great pleasure of appreciating in you this twofold virtue which characterizes your people. In the message that he addressed to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 February last, the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, welcomed the improvement characterizing the current international situation. In this context, he added: "As the international situation improves, so must the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, meet the challenges before it". In the view of my delegation, the challenges which were referred to in the Secretary-General's message, and which we should take up this year, certainly include the items relating to nuclear disarmament. However, there is another task on whose priority we are also all agreed, which is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The international campaign which is burgeoning around such a ban and the need to step up efforts to formalize it reflects the urgent necessity for the international community to fill a major gap in the law. The fervent international determination to ban these inhuman weapons forever and to free the world of the threat they represent is not new. It is the logical extension of sustained and persevering efforts going back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. The first steps towards such a ban already reflected the concern then felt at the use of poisons and poisoned bullets as weapons of war. This use was the first sample of what was later to become terrifying chemical weapons.

The initial groundwork towards the prohibition of certain toxic gases and weapons was laid in the Declaration of the Hague of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907. These legal hurdles were unfortunately so fragile that they did not withstand the first blast of poison gas used during the First World War. These events, which were shocking because of the large numbers of victims both military and civilian, and because of the appalling suffering they caused, obliged States at that time to reiterate and strengthen the ban on chemical weapons. This led to the drawing up of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This international legal instrument, which since then has been the corner-stone of all efforts to eliminate chemical warfare, spared mankind the horrors of poison gases during the Second World War.

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Efforts to ban recourse to these weapons once and for all were to be stepped up after the Second World War. And thus the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the United Nations since its inception. Twenty-five years later, it was the General Assembly which, in its resolution 2826 (XXVI), recommended that States should sign the biological weapons Convention of 1972. This new legal structure, alas, did not meet the expectations of the international community, which sought a comprehensive and unequivocal ban on chemical weapons. Hence the continuation of discussions within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the various aspects of a chemical weapons ban, and particularly the scope of such a ban and the question of its verification. These debates were to remain of little significance until the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In paragraph 21 of its Final Document, the Assembly stressed that "an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority". The provisions of this paragraph were rapidly followed up following the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament duly mandated to negotiate a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. These negotiations have been continuing for almost a decade. It is true that progress has not been in line with our expectations. None the less, chemical disarmament at the present time is the most promising area of our agenda. Consequently, we believe that more than ever this convention is within our reach. Indeed, the optimism which inspires us leads us to say that our Conference has never been so close to its goal as it is now.

At a time when the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has entered a decisive phase in its negotiations, some might wonder about the purpose of this historical survey. The reasons for such a recapitulation are manifold. Firstly, to grasp the disappointment of the international community and the hurdles it has encountered on its path towards the prohibition of these weapons. Secondly, to sound out ways and means as well as the necessary political will better to meet the exigencies and priorities which are internationally recognized in chemical disarmament. Thirdly and finally, an attempt to make good use of this unprecedented international context in the annals of negotiations on chemical weapons. Within the same perspective, my delegation would like to stress that the resumption of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has this year been preceded by a two-fold consensus, incontestably corresponding to two developments of equally unprecedented historical significance. First we have the adoption by the last session of the General Assembly of two resolutions by consensus, 43/73 A and 43/73 B. This "first" in this particular area of disarmament is the reflection of a new universal state of mind in the perception of chemical weapons, based on the rejection of these weapons, which should no longer have a place in a civilized world. It is encouraging to note that these two resolutions stress both the high priority that should be accorded to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention as well as their urgent nature. The second consensus was that which led to the adoption of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This consensus was described by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, in his statement before this Conference, as a "point of reference" and a "stimulus". A point of reference, he explained, which "establishes firmly the indispensable foundations for your deliberations, by

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confirming the will of the entire international community to bring the endeavour of chemical disarmament to a successful conclusion". As for the impetus, he explained that "on behalf of the international community it expresses a fervent obligation: to conclude at an early date a convention on the prohibition" of chemical weapons. In the view of my delegation, this two-fold consensus provides the political underpinning for our negotiations on an international convention. Hence it is our duty not only to strengthen this underpinning but also to draw from it the thrust which is necessary for the conclusion of our work as soon as possible. The conditions currently obtaining both within the Conference and in the international arena, which are favourable to negotiations, require consistent behaviour and a political commitment commensurate with their importance. The many statements made here since the beginning of our session encourage us in our optimistic assessment of the likelihood of the rapid finalization of the convention. The repeated commitments and readiness to step up the negotiations mark the beginning of the implementation of the provisions of the two United Nations resolutions mentioned above and the articles of the Paris Declaration.

Before making certain comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons itself, I must first of all reiterate my delegation's congratulations to its new Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel. We wish him every success, as we do the chairman of the five working groups. I cannot fail to pay a very special tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, who was the dedicated Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1988. Turning to the work of this Committee, my delegation is pleased at the thematic approach begun this year by its Chairman. It is an innovative method which is best suited to the current stage of the negotiations. It is also a step that enables us to identify the problems and define the difficulties they raise in order better to focus efforts on the search for solutions that are called for.

One of the subjects that has caused most debate within the Ad hoc Committee as well as in plenary remains the question of verification and respect for the provisions of the convention. It is, moreover, a subject that has been covered by a considerable number of proposals and documents. The wealth and abundance of the documentation of the Conference on this issue marks the extremely crucial nature of error-free international verification. Certainly, verification is not and must not be perceived as an end in itself, but rather the means of making sure that the various provisions of the convention are scrupulously respected. Past experience, whether the recent past or the distant past, teaches us that without appropriate verification machinery no disarmament treaty is immune from breaches. That is why we believe that the viability, not to say the effectiveness of an international instrument depends on what we can call its very backbone, namely, verification. In this connection, my delegation would like to stress that the proliferation of proposals on this aspect of the future convention is a positive trend. The process of comparing them, analysing them and collating them will necessarily give rise to procedures that will ensure maximum respect for this convention.

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The international procedures currently being considered in the first working group, chaired by Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, should in our view lead to a minimal degree of interference, to ensure the full confidence of all parties in the aims of this convention. The duality of national and international machinery is necessary. These two institutions, whose roles are complementary, must perform their verification functions in a spirit of co-operation and consultation. The international organs should not be resorted to automatically in cases of alleged breaches of the terms of the treaty. Such resort should first give way to extensive consultations between the parties to seek solutions to problems, before the appropriate verification procedures are triggered. Currently, the Ad Hoc Committee is debating one of the most sensitive elements within the verification system, namely, the arrangements relating to the handling and protection of confidential information. The consideration of this issue in the inter-sessional period provided a better understanding of the various positions on this aspect of verification. My delegation, while in favour of a continued exchange of views on this delicate problem, believes that the role of the convention is to set out major principles which should preside over respect for the confidentiality of information. As far as details are concerned, it would be a good idea to leave them to the various organs of the organization that is going to ensure respect for the convention. It is up to these bodies to lay down, as precisely as possible, the code of conduct to be followed in the matter.

The question of the scope of the future convention is of major importance by virtue of representing its *raison d'être*. It is an area where divergences still persist. Consequently, we greatly rely on the perspicacity of the Chairman of the second working group, entrusted with legal and political questions, Mr. Mohammed Gomaa of Egypt, to stimulate and relaunch the negotiations on this question. The main goal of this convention is the complete and unreserved prohibition of chemical weapons and the permanent elimination of the threat they embody for the international community. Consequently, one of the priorities of this working group should be to channel all its energies towards eliminating the obstacles that prevent this major part of the "rolling text" from being "clean", i.e., without brackets and footnotes. We are aware that any advance in the negotiations on the general provisions on scope is dependent on progress in negotiations on article II on definitions. None the less, current differences should not prevent the group from redoubling its efforts to arrive at a consensus text on scope. The other subject this group is entrusted with, which is of particular interest to my delegation, relates to article XI - "Economic and technological development". This article was the subject of an ample exchange of views last year. This debate provided an opportunity for countries to set out the hopes they place in this article, but left us with the impression that it still causes much hesitation. We hope, none the less, that this year the debate on the subject will lead to positive results.

To have such an article in a treaty on chemical disarmament is neither innovative nor anachronistic. It is a clause which draws on other arms limitation treaties that have proved themselves and shown their usefulness. We can cite the example of the Convention on biological weapons and that on nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, through this article, we plead for the internationally recognized right for the promotion of co-operation, particularly in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology. The

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principle of this right, which has been recognized elsewhere, should be neither denied nor concealed, nor even modified by any suspicion that such co-operation might be diverted towards non-peaceful purposes.

Working group No. 3, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rakesh Sood of India, deals with the general subject of the institutions which are to be set up by the convention to enhance its application. This group has a hard task before it, since while those involved agree as to the bare bones of the organization, there are still many areas of disagreement in respect of the composition, functions, decision-making machinery and financial cost of this administrative apparatus. This pyramid-shaped structure, whose prime function is the implementation of the convention, requires very careful preparation. This difficult task has devolved upon the Preparatory Commission which will have the delicate task of ensuring the effectiveness of the convention from the first day by making sure that it enters into force in the best possible conditions. In this connection my delegation is pleased with the generally convergent points of view expressed concerning this Preparatory Commission and its tasks. In respect of the latter, my delegation would like to express the wish that the mandate to be entrusted to this Commission will be confined to ways and means of ensuring that the convention is effectively operational from the moment of its entry into force, ruling out any possibility of a re-opening of discussion of the terms of the convention. The task of the Commission should be oriented towards preparations for the future rather than going back on the substance of the treaty. It is obvious that any attempt to call the text into question will lead to a delay in the entry into force of the instrument in question. Finally, my delegation is awaiting with keen interest the paper promised by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, containing the French proposal on the Scientific Council.

The area of definitions remains the area where positions are still very far apart, not to say static. For many delegations this bottleneck in our negotiations constitutes a source of concern. The standstill concerning the definition of chemical weapons, production facilities, stockpiles, the concept of jurisdiction or control by a State party, etc., is a sort of incapacitating shock wave affecting the other articles of the convention. Over the years, the question of definitions has been perceived as the parameter indicating more or less accurately whether progress has been made in our work. Let us hope this year, however, that the problem of definitions will be resolved positively to give us concrete grounds for believing that the conclusion of the convention is imminent.

The fifth and last working group, chaired by Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, deals with the transition period. All speakers on this point have agreed on the crucial nature of this period. There is also unanimous agreement on the need to ensure that this 10-year period begins and ends in the best possible conditions. In my delegation's view, the future of the convention will hinge on this period passing smoothly. Any departure from or breach of commitments entered into will threaten the edifice we have been building for a number of years with collapse. This is why we believe that responsibility for a smooth transition is collective, as indeed is the security of all the members of the community. The concept of "undiminished" security should have no place in consideration of this period. For we believe more than ever that the destruction of chemical weapons will in no way

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

diminish the security of States. On the contrary: the very existence of the convention will create and then strengthen a new security context, not only for those States that will be destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons, but also for all other countries. To attain this objective common to all mankind, all the future States parties must become persuaded that in order to negotiate this transition period successfully, trust must take the place of suspicion.

The history of the clause concerning assistance and protection against chemical weapons is a great source of satisfaction to us. The place that this provision has acquired, not to say conquered, within the body of the convention is the expression of a need for international solidarity to come to grips with the horrors of chemical weapons. This article, along with the article on economic and technological development, constitute elements which are likely to contribute to the universality of the convention - a universality for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a fervent plea in his message to the Conference.

Much as we note with satisfaction the progress recorded in the last two years in the negotiations on this convention, we are obliged to recognize that certain problems - and not the least important ones - remain insoluble. These include problems whose complexity is fundamentally technical in nature. They do not concern us unduly, as we have full confidence in the negotiators, and more particularly the experts among them, who will be able to find appropriate solutions. As far as the other problems are concerned, we must acknowledge that they call for political decisions. These decisions may be difficult to take, but the collective responsibility we all assume in this Conference makes them essential in order to realize the universal promise of this convention. May each member of this Conference find in the expectations of the whole of mankind, as well as in the commitments we have all entered into, both before the General Assembly of the United Nations and at the Paris Conference, the necessary stimulus to display his or her share of political will. Only the sum total of these efforts will enable us to present to the world at the earliest opportunity this convention on chemical weapons so long awaited.

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

... The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons bears testimony to the urgent desire of numerous States to ban the use of such hideous weapons for ever. The holding of the Conference was an international reaction to events which were definitely eroding the spirit and letter of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. I would like to repeat once again the gratitude of the Kenya Government to the Government of France for the very excellent organization of the conference and for the very warm hospitality accorded to all participants, including the Kenya delegation. I would also like to thank, through the delegation of France, His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, who, on 7 February this year, the opening day of the spring session of this Conference, presented to the Conference the Final Act, including the Final Declaration adopted by the Paris Conference. The Kenya delegation, aware of the important role played by the Government of France in hosting the Paris Conference and its subsequent success, was therefore pleased with the appointment of Ambassador Pierre Morel, the head of the delegation of France

(Mr. Bullut, Kenya)

to this Conference, as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We all remember his untiring efforts, before and during the Paris Conference, to ensure that the Conference realized its goals. We are confident that with his dynamism the Ad hoc Committee will be able to achieve positive results in its 1989 session.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference records, among other important issues, the determination of 149 States to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. This important document also stresses the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which is being negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Ad hoc Committee has been re-established, albeit after serious efforts to modify its existing mandate to bring it into line with the letter and spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the most recent General Assembly resolutions on chemical weapons. It was clear that the genuine enthusiasm of the Group of 21 to have the mandate changed to reflect the important results of the Paris Conference foundered on the perceivable reluctance of the Conference as a whole to accommodate the proposed changes in the mandate.

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The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has embarked on its work in earnest, and it will of course build on the achievements accomplished in its 1988 session and during the inter-sessional period. The Ad hoc Committee will also address all existing problems through a very inspiring organizational framework as proposed by its Chairman. The Kenya delegation would like to thank Ambassador Sujka of Poland and the three chairmen of working groups A, B and C for the very valuable work that they performed to achieve the results contained in the report of the Ad hoc Committee in document CD/881.

During the current session, the Ad hoc Committee has established five working groups to concern themselves with specific and clear tasks which we believe will further refine the quality of the existing "rolling text". The Kenya delegation would prefer the resolution of as many problems as possible currently existing in the "rolling text". The Kenya delegation would like to urge the Conference to conclude negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. I would like to repeat the declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Kenya, His Excellency Dr. Robert Ouko, in his speech to the Paris Conference prohibiting the use of chemical weapons:

"Kenya has no capacity to manufacture chemical weapons. Kenya does not desire to acquire such a capacity, and Kenya will neither purchase chemical weapons nor use them on humans or on any living thing. We pledge our total commitment to the banning of chemical weapons. Kenya is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and will sign and ratify the convention as soon as it is concluded."

It is hoped that all States will accede to the proposed convention once it is opened for signature.

CD/PV.499

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Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil):

... I asked for the floor today to introduce document CD/895, containing the technical report on a national trial inspection conducted by my country.

The inspection was carried out at a facility owned by Química da Bahia S.A. located at the Camaçari petrochemical complex in the State of Bahia. It is a multi-purpose plant, operating on a batch system, to produce amines used as intermediates in the manufacture of pesticides, pharmaceuticals and synthetic rubbers. For the sake of carrying out a simulated inspection, the

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(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

chemical substance monoisopropylamine (MIPA) was treated as if it were one of the substances listed in schedule [2] (listing key precursors for the production of chemical weapons), although MIPA does not possess the properties required for its being assigned to any of the lists of controlled products.

Some very general conclusions can be drawn from our experiment at this stage. Firstly, the test inspection was conducted according to the general outline contained in document CD/CW/WP.213, prepared under the co-ordination of the former Swedish representative to this Conference, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. These guidelines were considered to be appropriate for the conduct of experiments that aim at assessing the efficiency of the verification procedures set out in our "rolling text". Secondly, our experience would appear to prove that these trial inspections do not necessarily inconvenience or significantly disturb the normal operation of the facilities in which they are conducted. The data collection in Química da Bahia S.A. was carried out without introducing any alteration in the programming or in the outcome of the production run. Thirdly and lastly, the protection of confidential information and sensitive equipment, which we consider to be a very critical point, was assured throughout the inspection. This would appear to prove, in our view, that it is possible to strike a fair balance between the requirements of effective verification and the protection of sensitive information.

In our trial inspection, a confidentiality agreement was signed by the inspection team, adding to the confidence of the party which was to open its facility for inspection. This practice of confidentiality agreements, or some similar arrangements, could provide part of the answer to the important question of how to safeguard the commercial and industrial interests of the chemical industry. This agreement and other additions and corrections will be included in a revision of the report to be circulated very shortly, and the Brazilian consultant who was in charge of the whole operation will be joining us very early next week to give further clarification and the authority of his personal experience.

My delegation considers that the willingness of a significant number of States members of the Conference on Disarmament to conduct national trial inspections is a very important development in work towards a global ban on chemical weapons. We hope that the experience of national trial inspections will help to speed up our negotiations and bring us nearer the conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This kind of initiative is absolutely without precedent in negotiations on disarmament agreements, and should be sufficient to reassure those that still doubt the effectiveness of the verification measures already contained in the draft convention.

The Brazilian participation in the national trial inspection programme testifies to our strong commitment to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria):

... Indeed, the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, the prospect for 50 per cent reductions in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons, the general improvement in relations between the two great Powers and between East and West as a whole, ought to create a new atmosphere around the question of nuclear testing. One might rightly expect in these circumstances that the problem of priority in the relationship between an NTB

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

and nuclear disarmament, which for a long time was subject to debates, would disappear. We hope that the lack of any progress is not due to some new and hidden plans in the military field, but is rather a result of continuation of the standstill which has persisted over the years. Accordingly, we are tempted to believe that the answer to the question put by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Loeis could lie in Antonio Gramsci's words: "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears". We view the proposal for the convening of a conference of the States parties to the 1963 Treaty precisely as an expression of disappointment with the practical inaction of the Conference on Disarmament and a desire to find a way out of the crisis. This proposal was supported by Bulgaria. We do not think that such a conference would have an adverse impact on our work here in the CD. On the contrary, we share the view expressed by Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka on 16 March this year that a conference of this kind would provide fresh impulses to the CD, as this year's Paris Conference did with respect to the negotiations for a chemical weapon ban.

(The President)

... "As the Conference on Disarmament continues its deliberations on its important tasks, it is necessary to take stock of its achievements to date. Progress has been achieved in the negotiations to conclude a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. It is hoped that the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held in early January this year, will enhance further the pace of the negotiations so that a convention prohibiting chemical weapons becomes a reality soon.

"On my part, I offer you my best wishes for success in your present and future efforts."

This concludes the message from His Excellency the President of the Republic of Kenya. Allow me also to make a few comments in connection with the work of the Conference.

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria):

... The negotiations in this Conference and the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-third session on disarmament matters give a clear indication of the generally positive evolution of international relations. The work of the General Assembly's First Committee was marked by constructive discussions and compromise. Important issues on its agenda, such as a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, the prohibition of an arms race in outer space, chemical and biological weapons, the question of verification and compliance or the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, were dealt with in a new spirit. But resolutions, even if adopted unanimously or by large majorities, are not sufficient achievements in themselves; they need to be translated into effective actions.

Before commenting on some of the items on the agenda of the Conference, let me briefly touch upon the question of confidence-building measures. They play an important role in paving the way towards substantial agreements by improving the climate of international relations. Exchanges of information and data, invitations to on-site inspections and ad hoc inspections on demand without right of refusal are new ideas in the field of international disarmament policies. Initiatives of this nature have been taken with regard to biological weapons, chemical weapons, military budgets and military manoeuvres.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

... Let me now turn to the question of chemical weapons. The proposal made by President Reagan before the forty-third General Assembly of the United Nations for a conference of all States parties to the Geneva Protocol and other interested States in order to take efficient action against the erosion of its provisions was a timely step. When President Mitterrand tabled an invitation to convene such a conference in Paris in January 1989, intensive preparatory work, conducted and co-ordinated by France, and especially its Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, paved the way for the elaboration of a draft declaration. I wish to thank the French authorities for the efficient preparation and conduct of that Conference. I would also like to express warm thanks for the generous manner in which the French Government hosted the Conference. And finally I wish to underline the efficient work done in the Committee of the Whole under the able guidance of the Finnish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sorsa.

The fact that it was possible to elaborate a consensus document can in itself be regarded as a success and as a signal to all peoples of the world. But we are still confronted with questions about its substantive content and the political follow-up. To put it in simple terms: where do we stand now, three months after the closure of the Paris Conference? To answer this question, we have first to look at the text of the Final Declaration and analyse its merits as well as its shortcomings.

The Paris Declaration clearly endorsed the aim of concluding a global convention, condemned the use of chemical weapons and supported the role of the United Nations Secretary-General in the field of verification. Its full impact, however, cannot be assessed until a universal convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction has been completed.

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(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Only if the Conference on Disarmament succeeds in finishing its work on the convention in the near future will we have real grounds for calling the Paris Conference a major success in multilateral disarmament diplomacy.

The Paris Conference brought a new problem to our attention - the link established by a number of countries between chemical and nuclear weapons. I have to express our concern about this development, which puts new obstacles on the road towards a global convention banning all chemical weapons, and might lead to a major setback to multilateral disarmament efforts in general. If we fail to conclude a global chemical weapons ban in the near future, dramatic effects on the chances of progress in other areas of arms control and disarmament might result. We understood that certain interim measures are envisaged by some countries as preparatory steps towards the global convention. Among such interim measures, export controls on relevant chemicals are considered to be helpful, provided these controls are effective and without major loopholes. We believe that such controls ought to become part of the future global convention and be internationally supervised, possibly with the help of a multilateral information centre which could assist countries in establishing their own export control systems, arrange for the exchange of information and inform all parties concerned of disruptions to enable them to react accordingly. Such a centre should be incorporated in the verification system of a global convention banning all chemical weapons. What we do not have in mind, however, is the establishment of a separate non-proliferation system before such a global convention is concluded. We have some doubts about such a separate system in a world where a number of States already possess stocks - admitted or not admitted - of chemical weapons, in a world where many States are capable of producing such weapons, in a world where an even larger number of States have the know-how to produce or are actually producing chemical substances which are used for peaceful purposes but could also become part of a production line for chemical weapons. It has also to be taken into account that any hindering of international co-operation in the application of chemical technology for peaceful purposes has to be avoided.

With this understanding we welcome the initiative taken by the Australian Government to convene a conference in Canberra on these questions in the course of this year. This conference should be a useful first step in establishing the necessary close links between the political will of Governments to stop the spread of chemical weapons and the technical capabilities of the chemical industry.

Turning more closely to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the elaboration of a global convention on the prohibition of the use, development, stockpiling and possession of chemical weapons and on their destruction, I would like to express my sincere hope that 1989 will see major achievements on the way towards its conclusion. Among the various questions still to be solved, I would like to mention assistance and protection against chemical weapons, questions of verification in general and the structure of the future control agency. In this context I wish to recall the statement made in this forum last year by the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Dr. Alois Mock, that Austria would be willing and pleased

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

to host the envisaged organization, should the international community consider such a choice in the interest of the most effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention.

Provision for assistance and protection against chemical weapons is an important element of the future convention. It has to be kept in mind that providing assistance means taking action within a very short period of time so that effective aid can be delivered. The provision of protection against chemical weapons has to be focused on specific situations where a case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons has taken place or is likely to take place.

We have to live with the fact that absolute verification will not be feasible in the context of a chemical weapons ban. Consequently, we have to find an answer to the question of adequacy in relation to verification. The underlying basis of our negotiations has not only to be a certain degree of confidence but also - above all - a sufficient degree of probability that any violations of the treaty will be detected. Providing for sanctions in the framework of the convention will serve as an additional impetus.

It gives me particular pleasure to submit to the Conference on Disarmament information on measures my country has taken in order to contribute to international efforts aiming at halting the spread of chemical weapons capabilities, as well as to the work of the Conference. Austria has recently introduced export controls on 12 relevant chemicals which can serve as key precursors in the production of chemical weapons. Furthermore, my country is transmitting data on national production of chemical substances under schedules [1] to [3], as contained in the draft convention. This information will be made available as an official document of the Conference next week.

With regard to a national trial inspection to be undertaken in Austria, I wish to inform the Conference that talks held between the competent Austrian authorities and senior officials of the major Austrian firm concerned permit the conclusion that after the clarification of a few remaining questions such an inspection will take place in the near future.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

... Arms control agreements must be effectively verifiable. Only in this way can a basis of confidence be laid for future agreements. In a world where global imbalances threaten to invalidate regional stability and where, on the other hand, regional imbalances may undermine global stability, the criteria of disarmament and arms control just mentioned also apply fully to the field of global multilateral responsibility. And they apply especially to the most urgent contribution that the world expects of this Conference, namely the elimination of chemical weapons.

CD/PV.500

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(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

... Hardly any other international body would appear to be as suited as the Conference on Disarmament for analysing the impact that new trends in weapons technology have on all security systems, irrespective of the direct conclusions drawn for negotiating purposes. The complexity of the subject-matter makes it necessary to select certain aspects. Urgency and the

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(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

potential for consensus are the selection criteria to be applied. But the criterion of urgency also needs consensus. At present this exists only in respect of a few subsectors. Such consensus is probably strongest, as borne out by the Paris Conference, in respect of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. In Paris, the realization prevailed that only a comprehensive and world-wide ban can solve the problem of chemical weapons. As long as the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons do not constitute a violation of peremptory international law, there is the persistent danger of the unlawful use of chemical weapons. Despite the increasingly complex nature of the subject, it would definitely seem possible to resolve the issues that are still impeding the conclusion of a convention for the comprehensive prohibition of such weapons. There is virtually no significant area that has not been explored, examined and discussed.

Foreign Minister Genscher stated here on 3 March 1989 that it is essential to consolidate the "rolling text" where consensus has already been secured on its substance and, in parallel, to find suitable solutions for filling the gaps that still exist. It cannot be denied that there remain difficult technical problems to resolve. Yet if we are to live up to the common responsibility of putting an end once and for all to the atrocities of chemical warfare, it is urgently necessary that we agree on a balanced and adequate convention. This is at the same time a crucial test of the multilateral disarmament process in the global context and this justifies our redoubled efforts.

Concentrating on what is urgent and feasible - precisely this led to the agreements concluded by the CD's predecessors. Admittedly, their demands were less wide-ranging. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee devoted its daily sittings to test ban issues and confidence-building measures. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament widened the range of tasks, but still concentrated on areas capable of commanding a consensus. The CD is often unable to live up to its own ambitious, wide-ranging demands, which do not always rest on the necessary consensus of the participating countries. The negotiations on chemical weapons in recent years have shown how complicated and time-consuming comprehensive arrangements are. Yet it has become evident that, in view of the danger of further use of chemical weapons, there is a broad, basic consensus in favour of a ban on chemical weapons. The understanding reached by the 149 countries at the Paris Conference was an important breakthrough in this respect. The impetus generated by that Conference must be exploited, and the combined potential of this Conference used to conclude as soon as possible a convention banning chemical weapons world-wide. This concentration on chemical weapons negotiations does not imply degrading or neglecting the other subjects entrusted to the Conference. In his message to this year's session of the CD, the Secretary-General of the United Nations particularly emphasized this aspect. But the Conference should not squander its energies. By focusing constructively on chemical weapons negotiations, it should demonstrate that, above and beyond its indispensable function as a body for dialogue, it is able to reach agreement on urgent and complex matters. The world expects this of the countries participating in this Conference, and my delegation will contribute to work on the other items on our agenda during this session in a constructive way.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Let me turn now to the subject of chemical weapons. In July 1986, the United States delegation introduced CD/711, a document entitled "Chemical stockpile disposal programme", prepared by the United States Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground in the State of Maryland. That document summarized preliminary planning for the destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and unitary chemical munitions. We pointed out then that, in planning and implementing this disposal programme, the United States would gain valuable experience and technical expertise, which could prove helpful in our negotiations.

Today, I would like to bring you up to date on the progress we have made in our destruction programme. Some of you will recall that the United States was weighing its options as to whether United States-based chemical weapons should be destroyed in place or moved to one or more central destruction facilities for disposal. After considerable study, public debate, and assessment of environmental impact, the decision was made to destroy these chemicals and their munitions at their stockpile sites. Accordingly, chemical weapons destruction facilities will be operated at nine locations, including Aniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Newport, Indiana; Lexington, Kentucky; Aberdeen, Maryland; Umatilla, Oregon; Tooele, Utah; and Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. All United States unitary chemical weapons stocks, including those located in the Federal Republic of Germany, will be destroyed at these nine facilities. Several of these facilities have been constructed already and have been, or are, in operation.

The United States Chemical Weapons destruction programme did not begin with the destruction plan described in CD/711. In 1970 - shortly after the United States began a moratorium on chemical weapons production that would last almost two decades - we began systematically destroying chemical weapons stocks. In its destruction facility at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, the United States began incinerating mustard agent in 1970. Neutralization of nerve agents began in October 1973. Millions of pounds of mustard and nerve agents were destroyed at Rocky Mountain Arsenal during the 1970s. The failure of other States to take into account this destruction is perhaps a partial explanation for the exaggerated estimates of the present size of the United States chemical weapons stockpile.

In 1979, a small-scale pilot facility at Tooele Army Depot began operations, and its destruction activity continues today. This is the facility that most members of the Conference on Disarmament visited in 1983, and that representatives of the Soviet Union, including our friend and colleague Ambassador Nazarkin, visited in 1987. The Tooele facility has the capability to perform pilot-scale destruction tests on all types of lethal agents and munitions. The technology developed at Tooele for eliminating those agents and munitions has been applied successfully at other destruction sites, as I will discuss momentarily. It appears that the Soviet Union is taking this same approach as it inaugurates its destruction programme: as we understand Soviet intentions, the technology and experience gained at Chapayevsk will be applied to a number of other destruction facilities. Our 10 years' experience at Tooele convinces us that this is a sound and effective approach.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Profiting from the lessons learned at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Tooele Army Depot, the United States designed and constructed a chemical weapons destruction facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, that began operations in May 1988. Using incineration technology developed at Tooele, the Pine Bluff facility is even now destroying the incapacitating agent BZ. By the end of 1989, the entire United States stockpile of that agent will have been destroyed. Now, on Johnston Atoll, the United States has completed construction of the world's first full-scale, modern chemical weapons destruction facility. Right now, as we struggle with the issues of the chemical weapons negotiations, the Johnston Atoll facility is undergoing final testing, using chemical simulants. We expect to begin actual destruction of chemical munitions this year. Thus far, the United States has destroyed about 15 million pounds of chemical agent, and we have a comprehensive, integrated, tested plan for the destruction of the rest of the United States unitary chemical weapons stockpile. When the job is completed by April 1997, the United States will have spent well over \$US 3 billion implementing the congressionally mandated destruction programme outlined in CD/711. This figure, of course, does not include money spent prior to the enactment of that programme. Our experience thus far demonstrates convincingly that chemical weapons destruction is not easy, and that it is not inexpensive.

The United States chemical weapons disposal plan conforms to some of the strictest environmental laws ever enacted. But clean destruction alone is not the final answer to environmental concerns. Because of the fears and abhorrence associated with poison gases, it is important also that destruction operations not only be safe, but that the civilian population be confident that they are safe. In the United States, the environmental impact of every step of the process has been subjected to intense scrutiny and public debate. The incineration technology developed at Tooele Army Depot and being used at Pine Bluff, and which will be incorporated in destruction processes at other facilities, has been endorsed by the United States National Academy of Sciences. Environmental impact, and the attendant public information and educational processes, are matters that will need to be considered by other chemical weapons-possessing States in their destruction plans.

It appears that when the Conference on Disarmament completes its negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have in place the infrastructure needed to comply with their treaty obligations to destroy all chemical weapons. Unless planning begins well before entry into force, however, other possessor States will not be prepared. We urge all chemical weapons-possessing States to begin now to plan and initiate the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles.

As discussed above, and as elaborated in CD/711, the United States is committed by law to destroy its unitary stocks by 1997. We also are committed to achieving a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global chemical weapons ban - a commitment the United States confirmed last month in Vienna. Indeed, this global ban remains our primary objective with regard to chemical weapons. Pending achievement of that objective, however, the United States will continue with its plans to replace a small portion of the unitary stocks being destroyed with a safer, more modern deterrent. The result of the

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

United States modernization programme will be a greatly diminished stockpile of safer chemical weapons. Of course, we are prepared to cease all chemical weapons production upon entry into force of the chemical weapons convention presently being negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons here in Geneva.

Our delegation had a second objective when it tabled CD/711 in 1986. The information we provided to this Conference included the location of every chemical weapons storage site in the United States; the description, in considerable detail, of the specific chemical agents located at each site; the type of weapon or container used; and the percentage of the total United States-based chemical weapons tonnage located at each site. It was our hope that, by demonstrating the kind of candour that we sought from others, we might inspire others to be similarly open about their chemical weapons, and thereby foster the confidence so vital for a global chemical weapons convention. The following year, the Soviet Union conceded for the first time that it possessed chemical weapons - a disclosure that marked the beginning of serious, productive discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a period of unprecedented progress in chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We have been disappointed, however, that no States have come forward to make the detailed disclosures found in CD/711, and that no State but the Soviet Union has even declared that it possesses chemical weapons. Much more candour will be necessary before we are able to achieve a truly global convention.

I would like to turn to another aspect of our efforts to bring into being a global chemical weapons convention. That is the subject of national trial inspections, a subject that a number of other delegations have already addressed during the opening weeks of the 1989 session. The United States has conducted its first trial inspection at the facility operated by Akzo Chemicals Incorporated, in Gallipolis Ferry, West Virginia, approximately 450 kilometres west of Washington, D.C. The inspection exercise was conducted in late February of this year. The United States has not completed its evaluation of this exercise, and accordingly, my remarks today are of an informal and preliminary nature, subject to the more detailed and definitive analysis which we hope to submit to the Conference during the summer half of the session.

Our trial inspection exercise was a joint effort between the United States Government and the American chemical industry. It was our good fortune to have the help and close co-operation of the Akzo Chemical Company and other representatives of the chemical industry in the conduct of the trial. I am happy to express publicly our thanks to them. The Akzo facility at which the exercise took place produces a schedule [2] chemical, dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), from a schedule [3] chemical, trimethyl phosphite (TMP). Some of the DMMP is used at the facility to produce a polymeric flame retardant that also falls in schedule [2].

In carrying out this first trial, some of the procedures that would be necessary during an actual inspection under the chemical weapons Convention, such as notification, transportation and escort arrangements, were omitted in

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

order to simplify the exercise. Moreover, we have recognized gaps in the inspection procedures, as well as some specific procedures that need to be improved. In our view, these point to the need for considerable further work on procedures at the national level. The principal objectives of our exercise were to evaluate the ability to determine whether schedule [1] chemicals had been produced in the particular facility; to evaluate the ability to determine whether the facility had produced types or quantities of schedule [2] chemicals not included in its declaration; and to estimate costs, determine physical constraints on inspections, measure the impact of an inspection on a facility, and evaluate the preparation needed for an inspection. In carrying out the exercise, the inspection was governed by a mock facility agreement that was based on the model in the "rolling text". A separate document contained detailed inspection procedures for schedule [2] facilities. The inspection team consisted of six persons, five chemical engineers and an analytical chemist. Three of the chemical engineers had past chemical weapons production experience, and two had commercial backgrounds. The team engaged in three types of activities during the trial: examination of process equipment, auditing of records, and collection and analysis of samples.

An initial visit was made during December 1988, lasting slightly more than a day. The actual inspection took two and a half days. The analysis of samples is still being carried out, and the results of the exercise are still being evaluated. Accordingly, our delegation is not now in a position to comment on how adequate the provisions in the "rolling text" are with regard to routine inspections. Nevertheless, some of our preliminary findings do warrant discussion. First, with regard to the area to be inspected, it will be difficult to define this area precisely, because of the complexity and flexibility of modern multipurpose plants. Our delegation believes that further discussion of this issue is warranted. Second, with regard to planning for an inspection, the exercise demonstrated that a very thorough initial visit is essential for effective inspections. This aspect of the "rolling text" may, therefore, need to be strengthened.

Third, with regard to the general approach to an inspection, a joint government-industry trial exercise does not, of course, reflect the tensions that will undoubtedly arise during the course of an actual inspection, making the inspection more difficult. The implications of this difference between trial and actual inspections need to be analysed. In addition, our trial inspection demonstrated that routine monitoring by inspectors must be supplemented, in some cases, by continuous monitoring by instruments in order to foil attempts to conceal production that is not documented in the permanent records of the facility. Also, the cross-checking of records from suppliers and customers needs to be considered. Fourth, the inspection of equipment proves to be especially useful in assessing whether the declared areas of the facility have the capability to produce schedule [1] chemicals.

Fifth, records audit was the most time-consuming aspect of the exercise. It is primarily useful in checking whether input and output match. However, such material balance is not sufficient basis for reaching the conclusion that quantities have been correctly declared, because unrecorded production could take place. Sixth, with regard to sample analysis, it is clear that careful

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planning is needed to determine what samples should be taken, and to provide for their security, transport and analysis. It is essential to carry out off-site analysis, with very sophisticated instruments, in searching for traces of schedule [1] chemicals. Finally, with regard to confidentiality, extensive access to confidential information will be required for inspections. Thus, ways to reduce the need for confidential information should be reviewed, and reliable means to protect such information should be developed. It is clear that when we arrive at the multilateral phase of trial inspections, confidentiality will be an important issue.

Our delegation welcomes the information provided by delegations, and the discussions of national trial inspections that have taken place this spring. In our view, another series of such discussions early in the summer would also be profitable. We believe that the experience to date points to the utility of additional work on trial inspections on a national basis, including additional national exercises. We look forward to learning about other national trial inspections during the closing weeks of this part of the 1989 session of the Conference.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... My comments this morning concern the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and more particularly its work on strengthening the verification provisions of a future convention. I would like to submit for the consideration of this Conference a suggestion by my authorities for a system of inspection which we would call "ad hoc inspection".

The United Kingdom delegation, like many other delegations, has often emphasized that an effective system of verification is an essential prerequisite for a convention if it is to command widespread adherence. The negotiations have already made considerable progress towards developing a layered pattern of on-site inspection to cover the widely varying facilities and activities which could put at risk the objectives of the convention. We have certain régimes of routine on-site inspection, together with a system of

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challenge inspection for use in order to clarify doubts about compliance. In the view of my authorities all these existing provisions are valuable and should be preserved.

However, we are concerned about what seems to us areas of weaknesses in the present inspection framework. Some of these areas are of major significance for the viability of the convention. Let us consider some of them:

Schedule [3] chemicals, produced for legitimate purposes but usable as chemical weapons or precursors: so far no routine inspection for them;

The many thousands of industrial chemical facilities and military and other facilities not subject to declaration, which may be capable of playing a role in establishing a clandestine chemical weapons capability: no routine inspection as yet for them either;

Even on sites where some activities are subject to verification, other activities are not covered by any provisions for routine inspection.

We believe that the inspection framework must be strengthened. The solution needs to provide adequate assurance and deterrence for the large numbers of facilities concerned. It needs to be both workable and cost-effective.

A number of possible solutions have been suggested, which have made valuable contributions to thinking on this subject. I have in mind in particular the proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for an additional verification system based on ad hoc checks. My authorities would like to submit an alternative option for consideration by this Conference. Our proposal owes much to these previous suggestions I have mentioned, as well as to experience in operating the inspection system established under the Stockholm document. I should like now to describe our suggestion.

The United Kingdom proposes an on-site inspection system which, together with the existing provisions in CD/881, would in our view adequately complete the inspection framework. We would call it "ad hoc inspection", and it would be on the following lines:

Each State party would have the right to initiate inspections by the Technical Secretariat in civil and military facilities and elsewhere on the territory of any other State party.

These requests would not be linked to any allegation of breach of the convention.

Each State party would have the right to request a stated number of inspections a year and would be obliged to receive up to a stated total of inspections a year. The exact numbers are open to discussion. This quota system is one aspect distinguishing ad hoc from challenge inspection.

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Access to the site would be mandatory within a given number of hours.

The purpose of the inspection would be to check whether any activity in the facility concerned was subject to declaration or prohibition under the terms of the convention.

The inspection would be carried out by inspectors from among the full-time Inspectorate of the Technical Secretariat. They would inform all States parties that the inspection had taken place and of its findings.

The format would differ from that for existing routine inspections and from that for challenge inspection. For example there would be no "facility attachment", and there might be no need for an observer from the requesting State to accompany the inspection team. My authorities are still considering in detail, with the help of our experience in national trial inspections, just what would constitute the most appropriate format, and I shall be returning to the subject in the near future when I submit our conclusions to the Conference.

In addition to the procedures I have just described, it would be open to any State party or group of States parties to reach agreement with another State party or group of States parties to establish a bilateral system of inspections of the same or similar character: the cost of any such bilateral scheme would be met by the parties concerned.

This then is our proposed system of "ad hoc inspections". It would operate alongside the two types of régimes already set out in CD/881, namely those for existing routine inspections and that for challenge inspection, both of which would remain crucial elements of the verification régime.

It seems to us that ad hoc inspections would have a number of important advantages. Firstly, ad hoc inspections would complete the on-site inspection framework described in CD/881 with a manageable number of régimes. Secondly, nomination by States parties would focus attention on facilities of most interest both to the convention and to the requesting States parties. Thirdly, the level of reassurance and deterrence would be further enhanced by the mandatory nature of the inspection request and the very short advance warning. Fourthly, the targeted nature of the system would enable the vast numbers of facilities involved to be subjected to verification at a high level of cost-effectiveness. Fifthly, the annual quota available to each State party and the absence of expressed doubts about compliance would give the system a routine character.

That is the proposal for ad hoc inspections I wish to submit to the Conference. It is described in document CD/909. This has just been circulated this morning in the English language text, and the other languages will be available very soon. I would stress again how much my authorities welcome the constructive suggestions which have been made by other delegations who share our concern to strengthen the inspection framework. We hope that our own alternative option of "ad hoc inspections" which we are now putting forward will prove a useful contribution to the debate.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic):

I have asked for the floor today to express some considerations in connection with the fact that we are holding today the 500th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. We thought it would be appropriate on this very day to reiterate the importance the socialist countries, including the German Democratic Republic, attach to this single multilateral disarmament forum. Disarmament is a universal concern, and the Conference on Disarmament has indeed shouldered a high responsibility in undertaking to bring about multilateral agreements on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. At a time when we may witness unprecedented positive changes in the international political climate, including important achievements in other disarmament-related forums, the Conference on Disarmament, in our view, cannot and should not remain behind or outside of such a process. What is needed are concrete results, and if this is not possible on all items under consideration, then it should be at least on some major items of our agenda. This is particularly valid for the earliest possible conclusion of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. The Paris Conference, and I think this is an agreed position, gave us a clear-cut mandate to this effect. The priority we attach to the issue of a chemical weapons ban does not, of course, diminish or decrease the importance of other disarmament areas under consideration - I mean, in particular, the nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that it will be possible to start substantive and action-oriented work on item 1 of our agenda very soon, and we therefore appeal to all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility and good will for a reasonable compromise. As far as the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space is concerned, we expect that the Ad hoc Committee will resolve the outstanding organizational issues as soon as possible and proceed to substantive consideration without delay.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French):

... It is not my intention to make a statement on the problems facing this Conference. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Leo Tindemans, who wishes to stress the importance which Belgium attaches to the work of the Conference, will be making a general statement himself before the end of this month. I asked for the floor to inform the Conference of the forthcoming distribution of a report on a national trial inspection carried out in Belgium. In order to show how keen it is on the rapid conclusion of the convention, my country wished to make a contribution to the process of national trial inspections, although our administrative and technical facilities do not suffer comparison with those which larger countries have been able to bring to bear for these trials.

The inspection was carried out in a multi-purpose plant in accordance with the model contained in document CD/CW/WP.213, which the Swedish delegation submitted to the Conference last September. I would like to take this opportunity to extend our warm appreciation to that delegation for producing this working tool which has turned out to be most valuable and useful, as has rightly been pointed out by other delegates before me. The point of departure for the trial inspection in the chemical complex was as follows: the facility was not subject to declaration because it produces no chemicals falling in one of the three schedules as contained in the present "rolling text" CD/881. The prime aim of the inspection was to make sure that

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it is possible to check that no activity prohibited by the convention is taking place in a facility which has legitimately not been declared because in principle it produces none of the substances contained in any of the three schedules in article VI. There was no question of carrying out a challenge inspection, but the scenario involved simulating an on-site inspection to remove certain doubts. For this type of inspection, there are as yet no provisions, and as you know discussion is under way to try to include additional measures as the Conference feels appropriate in the "rolling text". A second aim of this inspection was to obtain information on the level of intrusiveness which this type of inspection might lead to. I will mention four conclusions which seem to us to be of interest. Firstly, the excellent co-operation from the management and staff of the facility. Access was granted to all the parts of the industrial complex, the only restriction being that there should be strict compliance with the safety regulations. All documents relating to production, acquisition and storage of chemicals could be consulted, provided that none of the documents and no copies thereof were removed. The inspectors were able to check inputs and outputs of materials.

Second conclusion: the people in charge prefer sampling to be carried out at the end of the batch process in order not to disturb normal production activities, although the dissuasive effect of a verification system would be enhanced if samples could be taken at any point. The facility made available to the inspectors the competent staff and instrumentation required for sampling, following the instructions and under the control of the inspectors. It was noted that inspectors should be in possession of the wherewithal to seal the samples: it might be necessary to repeat an analysis elsewhere with other instruments if inspectors were to detect anomalies. Moreover, it would be useful if a representative of the host State, who in fact could be a member of the national authority, were to fix a second control seal on the samples. Another suggestion was made: the samples, once taken could be divided into three identical "sub-samples" and sealed in the appropriate manner by an inspector and the representative of the national authority.

Normal procedure would involve an on-the-spot analysis of the samples under the control of an inspector. If there was a problem or disagreement, a second sample could be analysed by an inspector, under the control of the representative of the facility, in another place, for example a university laboratory. The third sample could be used for subsequent analysis in accordance with procedures yet to be defined, if disagreement were to persist. Procedures would also need to be drawn up for the storage and transport of samples. Concerning sample analysis, it was noted that the use of sophisticated, sometimes totally computerized instruments would in theory give an operator scope for "cheating", that is to say producing a totally different spectrum through off-line processing. That is why at least one of the inspectors would have to be an experienced analytical chemist familiar with the use of the principal techniques of analysis.

Third conclusion: we studied the possibility of checking the presence of prohibited substances in the storage area through a check of computer listings. This checking through computer control procedures in fact proved impossible during the inspection because a special coded numbering system is used to introduce the name of the substance being sought. The introduction of

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a scrambled code could result in the indication of "non-presence" of the particular substance. To verify the possible presence of undeclared chemicals, a check would have to be carried out throughout the storage area, which is virtually impossible in a time-limited inspection. However, such a check would be possible if a more intrusive means of inspection were to be used.

Fourthly, a few brief conclusions of a more general nature. First of all, the managers of the facility felt that the International Organization would have to take steps to prevent inspectors leaving the Organization from being engaged for a certain period by industrial competitors. The inspectors should possess an official warrant from the International Organization setting out the principles of the convention. We therefore feel that a specific annex on respect for confidentiality would be most appropriate. Secondly, the conduct of an inspection of this nature may be carried out without any significant interference in the normal operations of a chemical complex.

We hope that the information and results contained in the report will make a useful contribution to the development and implementation of effective measures to monitor the non-production of certain substances in industry. We are very interested in participating in the general consideration of the national trial inspection reports which to date more than 10 countries have submitted to the Conference. We have noted that most of the NTIs have taken place in countries in Eastern Europe or in Western countries. Brazil, Sweden and soon, I believe, Austria are exceptions. We are particularly pleased at the important contribution from Brazil, which is extremely interesting because the report goes into a great deal of depth and detail. I therefore appeal to the other non-aligned countries to become involved in large numbers in the practical consideration of as effective a verification system as possible. Their contribution would make it possible to consolidate the aim of universality of our convention, of which we had a happy glimpse at the Paris Conference.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese):

... Today I would like to present some of the Chinese delegation's views with regard to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The current session of the CD is being held in favourable international circumstances. At present the international situation is witnessing a significant change, turning from confrontation to dialogue and from tension to relaxation. This may herald the dawning of a new period favourable to the maintenance of world peace and the promotion of social and economic development. Such an international environment augurs well for progress in the negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons.

The Paris Conference convened at the beginning of this year, and its Final Declaration adopted by consensus, have added new impetus to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Banning such weapons has become a matter of great significance for all countries in the world. The States participating in that Conference solemnly declared in the Final Declaration that they are "determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them", demonstrating thereby the collective will of the international community in calling for the total prohibition of chemical weapons. The Final Declaration also called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, should respond to such a call with concrete actions so as to realize the lofty goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons at an early date.

The negotiations on chemical weapons have traversed a long and tortuous road. In recent years, obvious progress has been made. As a result of the sustained efforts of all the member States of the CD, the conclusion of a convention has become more likely now. We already have in our hands a quite

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substantial "rolling text", which represents a basis for the future convention. We should cherish this hard-won achievement. We should seize the current favourable opportunity to resolve the remaining problems rapidly so that the historic task of concluding the convention can be fulfilled as early as possible.

Since its re-establishment this year, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the able guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, has been conducting its work intensively over a broad spectrum of topics in five working groups. This enables us to make the best use of our time to elaborate and resolve political, legal and technical issues as well as those relating to organization, verification, finance and other aspects of the convention. It also enables us to work more thoroughly, in new circumstances, on those issues which have not been examined for some time.

The Chinese delegation is pleased to see more non-member States participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We applaud this development and hope that still more States will join them in the future. China has always held the view that all States should have the right to participate in the consideration and settlement of disarmament issues. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference also stated that "all States are requested to make, in an appropriate way, a significant contribution to the negotiations in Geneva by undertaking efforts in the relevant fields". The participation of non-member States in the negotiations on chemical weapons is of great and positive significance in working for the universality of the future convention. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will further consider proper measures to facilitate better understanding of and greater participation in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons by more and more States.

In the field of disarmament, bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement and promote each other. It is our hope that, at a time when multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons are gathering speed, the States possessing large chemical weapon arsenals will accelerate their bilateral negotiations in a more serious and positive manner so that results conducive to the complete prohibition of chemical weapons can be obtained as soon as possible. It is also our hope that they will provide timely information to the CD on the developments in their bilateral negotiations. All this would be helpful to progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The world has yet to get rid of the danger of chemical warfare. Therefore the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is still a very important issue. In the view of the Chinese delegation, the future convention should be one which prohibits chemical weapons completely, including their use. Several years ago there was a convergence of views by all parties, after repeated consultations and negotiations, that the scope of prohibition in the convention should cover the prohibition of use. This has in fact been reflected in the preamble and the relevant articles of the "rolling text". We do not wish to see any upheavals or back-tracking on this issue. This year, at the time when the Ad hoc Committee was re-established, differences emerged as to whether the prohibition of use should be reflected in its mandate. This

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is a matter of concern to the Chinese delegation. We believe that it is reasonable and rational to include the prohibition of use in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. We hope that the States concerned will take positive steps so that this problem can be resolved effectively.

Verification remains one of the major outstanding issues. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Lüdeking of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Working Group 1 has conducted useful discussions on the general pattern of verification. In order to ensure the realization of the objectives of the convention and establish confidence among States parties, the convention should provide for effective and practicable verification measures. The effectiveness of verification lies in ensuring the destruction of existing chemical weapons and facilities for their production and preventing chemical industry from producing chemical weapons. In the field of verification of the non-production of chemical weapons by chemical industry, verification measures should focus on those facilities which pose major risks to the objectives of the convention. Effectiveness and practicability should both be taken into account in a verification régime. Neither of these two elements should be neglected. As an ideal, it is hoped that a type of absolutely flawless régime could be devised, but reality tells us that such an idealized verification régime can hardly be established. What is needed is a system which provides adequate assurance of compliance and at the same time is both realistic and practicable. As the Chinese saying goes, "the net of heaven has a large mesh, but it lets nothing through". If what we are seeking is an absolute and flawless régime, rather than a balance between ideal and reality, and between effectiveness and practicability, the outcome may well turn out to be counter-productive to our efforts to establish an effective and practicable verification régime.

The consultations on challenge inspections are still going on. Challenge inspection is a very important issue that needs in-depth and comprehensive discussions. As a few key issues still require further work, the relevant text remains in appendix II at this stage. Last year, under the chairmanship of Mr. Numata of the Japanese delegation, Group C conducted useful discussions on the general rules governing challenge inspections, and some preliminary results were achieved, as reflected in appendix I. But some main elements require further consideration during the elaboration of the principles of challenge inspection.

I would now like to make a few comments on challenge inspection. First of all, on the nature of challenge inspection, a view has been expressed to the effect that challenge inspection should be "properly and adequately" used in a non-confrontational manner. This is indeed possible in some cases, but one cannot rule out that challenge inspection may also have a confrontational nature in other cases. In view of the complexity of international politics and the highly intrusive character of challenge inspections, this type of inspection inevitably tends to be confrontational and politically charged in some circumstances. Challenge inspection is therefore a very serious matter which needs to be treated with the utmost prudence. Secondly, the Chinese delegation maintains that incidents of non-compliance which the challenge inspection aims to address are the concern not only of challenging States but also of all the States parties. Hence the relationship between the

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Organization, the challenging States and the challenged States should be handled appropriately. In other words, during a challenge inspection, reasonable requests made by the challenging State should be satisfied; the Organization should play an essential and appropriate role; and the legitimate rights and interests of the challenged State should also be respected and protected. Thirdly, the issue of preventing misuse and abuse of challenge inspection merits further in-depth consideration. In our view, requests for challenge inspections should be reasonable, specific and precise. They must not be used to carry out activities irrelevant to the objective of the convention or to disrupt chemical industry production excessively. Once facts of non-compliance have been established, the challenged State should assume full responsibility. Otherwise, the challenging State should bear political and economical responsibility.

The protection of confidential information acquired during inspections was the subject of serious discussion in the working group chaired by Mr. Cima of the Czechoslovak delegation last year, and preliminary results were produced. At the moment, this issue is under further consideration in Working Group 1, with a new approach. On the one hand, we view the issue of confidentiality as one concerning not only confidential industrial and commercial information but also confidential military information bearing upon national security. The convention should provide for necessary measures to protect confidentiality in order to ensure that the confidential nature of the States parties' industrial, commercial and military information is not subject to undue breaches. On the other hand, we think that such measures should not undermine the effectiveness of verification.

The Chinese delegation welcomes the fact that national trial inspections have been conducted or are about to be conducted in more than a dozen countries. The results of these national trial inspections are helpful in reviewing and improving the inspection procedures. The experts in the Chinese delegation have participated in the experts' meetings and will study in earnest the experience accumulated by other countries in this regard.

The issue of assistance constitutes an important provision of the convention and needs to be addressed properly. An express provision in the convention for assistance to the States parties which are victims of the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons will enhance the universality of the convention. Furthermore, it will act as a restraint on the use of such weapons. In the view of the Chinese delegation, assistance from the Organization to States which are victims of chemical weapons is of great significance as a demonstration of the collective will of all States parties to the convention against the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons. Working Group 5 has conducted helpful discussions, under the chairmanship of Dr. Krutzsch of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, on how to achieve this objective. We hope that a compromise solution acceptable to all can be found so that that the problem can be solved as soon as possible.

The Chinese delegation fully understands the importance attached by many delegations to article XI concerning economic and technical development, and supports their reasonable views on the matter. We believe that the convention should not impair the development of chemical industry and international co-operation in this field.

(Mr. Fan, China)

Lastly, I would like to comment on the issue of proliferation of chemical weapons. China is opposed to the proliferation of chemical weapons in any form. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference pointed out that "as long as such weapons remain and are spread", there is a risk of their use, posing an increasingly serious threat to international peace and security. The spread of chemical weapons is indeed harmful to world peace and regional security, but the existing chemical weapons are serious threats to international peace and security as well. The maintenance of chemical weapons, and continuation of the production and improvement of chemical weapons, not only militate against prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons but also run counter to international efforts to eliminate such weapons through the conclusion of a convention which completely bans chemical weapons. In this regard, the Chinese Foreign Minister proposed in his statement at the Paris Conference that "the countries with the largest arsenals of chemical weapons should take the lead in ensuring an immediate halt to the development, production and transfer of chemical weapons, undertaking never to use such weapons and pledging to destroy them within the shortest possible time. All chemical-weapon-capable countries should stop research, development and production of chemical weapons."

The Chinese delegation has noted that in his statement to the CD on 2 March, His Excellency Mr. Genscher, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, emphasized that the really effective way to solve the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons lay in the conclusion of a global convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the total destruction of existing chemical arsenals. He rightly pointed out that "the risk of proliferation will grow as long as this legal vacuum persists". He further stated: "I strongly warn against confining the fight against chemical weapons to measures designed to prevent their spread. Such an approach would undermine the determination of the international community to effectively ban chemical weapons through a global comprehensive convention."

The complete prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent and arduous task facing mankind. Time and tide wait for no man. Let us seize the historic opportunity to achieve the lofty objective of completely banning chemical weapons at the earliest date. At this crucial stage of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Chinese delegation will as always continue with its efforts to bring about a complete ban on chemical weapons.

Mr. REESE (Australia):

... Like our Belgian colleague, I have asked for the floor this morning to speak about a national trial inspection. I wish to introduce document CD/910, concurrently numbered CD/CW/WP.234, which contains the report of a national trial inspection carried out by Australia from 17-18 November 1988.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

The inspection was conducted at a multi-purpose complex of an agricultural chemical company, the major purpose of which is the production of trifluralin and other herbicides. At present the company produces no chemicals currently listed under schedule [2] of the "rolling text", but for the purpose of the inspection Dinitro was treated as a schedule [2] chemical. The declared activity at the facility during the inspection was the production of herbicide from Dinitro.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in the annex to article VI [2] of the "rolling text", and preparations for the inspection were made on the basis of the Chairman's working paper CD/CW/WP.213. In this regard, I should like to record my delegation's appreciation for the efforts of the delegation of Sweden, and particularly Ambassador Hytenius, for their positive contribution to the conduct of national trial inspections and their continuing involvement in the evaluation of these inspections.

To assist in the evaluation process, Australia's report follows the outline provided in the Chairman's working paper. The report also contains a number of conclusions and observations, including comments on models for agreement, a suggested check-list of equipment relevant to the production of schedule [1] and [2] chemicals, and a note on the inspection team's use of a vapour monitor to check for the absence of vapour of schedule [1] chemicals during the course of the inspection.

My delegation, in fact, has been able to highlight a number of these conclusions and observations in the course of the informal open-ended consultations Ambassador Hytenius has been conducting over the last two weeks. I would none the less draw the attention of the Conference to a few specific practical findings of our inspection.

Firstly, careful attention must be given to the composition of the inspection team, and particularly to the possible need to include in the team one or more auditors. As a rough guide, it was estimated that it would take four to five man-days to conduct a complete audit of the documentation relevant to a declared schedule [2] chemical; and depending upon the complexities of use of the declared chemical within a facility being inspected, an appropriate inspection team might therefore consist of one chemist, one chemical analyst, one chemical engineer and two auditors, to enable the inspection to be completed in less than one week.

Secondly, our inspection demonstrated the usefulness of a chemical agent monitor during the inspection, and its acceptability to the company illustrates the potential for modern instrumentation to assist in tackling some confidentiality problems.

Thirdly, a video recording of the inspection, which was done during this inspection, could be a useful tool for the conduct of subsequent inspections, subject to measures to protect the confidentiality of information.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

More generally, our conduct of a trial inspection underlined to us the mutual benefit, indeed necessity, of government-industry co-operation in resolving the complex verification issues associated with a chemical weapons convention. We were, accordingly, pleased with the co-operation of the Australian chemical company concerned. This, in fact, was a key element in the successful conduct of the inspection. An important aspect too was the good working relationship which developed between the team and company personnel during the initial visit and the negotiation of the facility attachment. Problem-solving was conducted through frank, productive two-way exchanges. Our assurances and practical steps to protect commercially confidential information were a foundation to securing the confidence and full co-operation of the chemical company.

As a concluding remark, Australia believes that through the conduct of national trial inspections and, subsequently, international trial inspections, the chemical industry's understanding of the convention and its implications for their operations will be enhanced, and ultimately will ensure that the chemical weapons convention is both comprehensive in scope and practical in its application.

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

... An agreement on conventional forces in Europe is in itself a major objective. It would, however, be further and significantly enhanced by the conclusion of a global ban on chemical weapons. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is indeed focused on the necessity of concluding the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date. We must take advantage of the momentum generated by the successful Paris Conference on chemical weapons. Not least due to the thorough preparations by the French Government, the Conference achieved its two main objectives, which were to reaffirm the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and to give further impetus to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The Final Declaration adopted in Paris represents a solid basis for further efforts and a commitment to intensify the negotiations on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban in the Conference on Disarmament.

The chemical weapons convention would enhance international security by banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, such a convention, which is now within reach, should be concluded at the earliest date. This requires that all participating States make every effort to come to grips with the issues that are still unresolved. Nineteen hundred eighty nine will be a year of crucial importance as regards efforts to solve the outstanding political and technical issues. I therefore welcome the dynamic leadership of the present Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France.

Sensitive and complex issues still remain to be resolved, in particular questions concerning verification of non-production. The chemical weapons convention would entail monitoring relevant chemical facilities on a permanent basis. In this regard the national trial inspections will facilitate finalization of the relevant inspection procedures. These procedures should, of course, ensure that a State party is not prevented from pursuing legitimate activities or from developing its chemical industry for peaceful purposes.

Another major unresolved issue is the challenge inspection system. In our opinion the convention must contain a provision giving States parties the right to submit a request for on-site inspection within 48 hours, which cannot be rejected. The mandatory nature of the challenge inspections represents, in fact, one of the corner-stones of the new convention.

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(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

The multilateral negotiating process has been facilitated by the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We therefore call on these two States to resume their talks without delay. The United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom possess large stocks of chemical weapons, have a special responsibility in contributing to the conclusion of the convention.

My Government has appreciated the information concerning the United States programme of destruction of unitary chemical weapons, and welcomes the decision by the Soviet Union to begin eliminating its chemical weapon stockpiles in 1989. We look forward to the announced visit of experts to the new destruction facility in Chapayevsk. We also note with satisfaction the decision by the Government of the United States to explore ways to accelerate the removal of stocks of United States chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The United States and the Soviet Union are still the only countries which have declared that they possess chemical weapons. We call on other countries possessing such weapons to make similar declarations and draw up plans for the destruction of their stocks. As a confidence-building measure, all chemical-weapon States should furnish information about the number of their stocks, their location, composition and overall size. This is in keeping with the proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the multilateral exchange of data relevant to the chemical weapons convention. Norway has recently provided the Committee on Chemical Weapons with information concerning production, processing and consumption of relevant toxic chemicals and the precursors.

Norway is continuing her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons being carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The programme is based on field experiments designed to provide realistic data for the development of procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. During the coming summer session we intend to present the results of studies on a new system for analysing gas concentrations in samples of soil, vegetation, clothing, etc., not previously used for such purposes.

My Government has strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol. Efforts must be made to see to it that these insidious weapons are not used again. It is necessary to rid the world of these weapons. This can only be achieved through universal adherence to the new convention. The Conference on Disarmament should bear this in mind in its negotiations.

Until a global ban becomes effective, export controls on dual-purpose chemicals will play an important role in preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. Norway has imposed export controls on 13 such dual-purpose chemicals. We support the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his address to the Conference on Disarmament on 2 March, that government authorization should be required for the export of facilities and equipment which can be used in the production of chemical weapons. In this context, we also note with interest the

(Ms. Hernes, Norway)

initiative taken by Australia to convene an international conference in 1989 to discuss the growing problem of international trade in chemicals, plant and equipment which can be used for chemical weapons purposes.

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(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

... I must also mention the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and Other Interested States, a conference which has made a remarkable contribution to strengthening the positive tendencies in the international situation. The Conference clearly and forcefully denounced chemical weapons.

The improved political environment also affected the proceedings of the First Committee during the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. There was a greater willingness on the part of States to meet each other's positions, and some genuine efforts were made towards mutual accommodation. I venture to say that a forward-looking approach prevailed throughout the session, indicating prospects for further progress in disarmament. Not without significance has been the role of multilateralism reasserting itself in the field of disarmament, especially the role of the United Nations. All that must be seen as promising for further progress in the process of disarmament. This Conference must prove able and willing to live up to the expectations of the international community. The only way to do so is both very simple and very difficult at the same time: to produce new disarmament instruments.

Poland has always attached great significance to multilateral disarmament measures and to the performance of multilateral disarmament forums. As someone who has been associated with that area for more than two decades, I am in a position to evaluate the development of the state of affairs in this field. Today, notwithstanding our initiatives focusing on Europe, our commitment to the Conference on Disarmament is bigger than ever. This is because of the role which the Conference is destined to play, no matter how deeply one may regret the modest results which the Conference can show for the past decade or so.

The Conference, which was designated by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body of global scope, must take advantage

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

of the new strength which the United Nations system has gained, particularly in the sphere of consolidating peace and international security. Being composed of the representatives of all groups of States, the Conference is best prepared to meet the concerns of the entire world community within a negotiating process in which multilateral, regional and bilateral disarmament endeavours must be complementary. This means that each level of negotiations, this body included, should produce concrete agreements. Indeed, there are problems for which durable solutions are conceivable only in a global framework. This is particularly true of future agreements calling for a global verification network, or agreements which seek to ban weapons that could be obtained by a considerable number of States. Chemical weapons certainly belong to this latter category.

My delegation is very pleased to join the delegations which have already paid tribute to the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The unanimous condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the reaffirmation of commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol should facilitate preventing the proliferation of those abhorrent means of warfare. However, it has been Poland's firm view all along that the only effective way to exclude any possibility of chemical weapons use is to conclude a comprehensive convention on the elimination of these weapons at the earliest possible date. Therefore, a final say concerning the lasting validity of the Paris Conference belongs to the body which you, Sir, are presiding over. For it is here, at the Conference on Disarmament, that the universal appeal for a convention must be transformed into international legal obligations. I am sure that this Conference is able to live up to the expectations of the world public, to match the courage and wisdom demonstrated in Paris, provided sufficient political will is mustered by all concerned.

Regrettably, my delegation feels obliged to say that to date we have failed to see the Paris appeal properly reflected in the pace of the negotiations in Geneva. Moreover, the efforts to expand the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons so as to include the final drafting of a convention - which were logical following the Paris Declaration and the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly - have failed. Time is not our ally in work on the complete elimination of chemical weapons. Recent years have demonstrated painfully enough how disastrous chemical warfare can be. Mankind has every right to aspire to be free of these weapons as soon as possible. The important provisions of a future convention already agreed are certainly most appreciated. Now the Ad hoc Committee should concentrate on a few important remaining questions: verification, future organization, undiminished security during the transition period, destruction of stocks and effective monitoring of non-production. We do not try to underestimate existing difficulties, but we still believe that a convention could be completed this year. To achieve this goal the injection of political will into negotiations is indispensable. If all Governments were ready to translate their declarations into politico-legal facts, then a convention would really be within reach.

We agree with these delegations which have advocated more result-oriented work by the Ad hoc Committee. Some progress was made in this direction last year. But further efforts are needed. My delegation supports the

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

organizational changes introduced by the present Chairman of the Committee. We are also encouraged by the active participation in negotiations of 22 non-member States.

As the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tadeusz Olechowski, declared before the forty-third session of the General Assembly, my country is ready to join such a convention as soon as it is open for signature. In the meantime we are making all the necessary modifications of our internal law. At the beginning of January 1989, for instance, new strict controls on the export of dual-purpose chemical agents were introduced.

The successful completion of a chemical weapons convention would have a great positive impact on the entire situation in international affairs. It would liquidate a whole category of operational weapons of mass destruction. It would transform the concept of challenge inspections, without the right of refusal, into a multilaterally agreed principle. And last, but not least, it would open up new vistas for multilateral disarmament.

Chemical weapons undoubtedly represent a top-priority issue in the work of the Conference. We must remember, however, that the Conference also deals with other problems of great importance which are equally ripe for a negotiated solution. The question of nuclear disarmament comes first, because a nuclear war would pose a threat of the total physical annihilation of mankind.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Federal Republic of Germany carried out a trial inspection on 9 February 1989 in a multi-purpose facility producing a substance listed in schedule [2] of article VI. The outcome and report of this inspection is before you in document CD/912. The inspection of the installation, which is located within a large integrated complex, was preceded by an initial visit which took place on 24 January 1989 and was meant to familiarize the inspection team with the facility. A facility attachment was worked out on the basis of the framework provided in the model agreement proposed in appendix II of the "rolling text". Due to the careful preparations made it was possible to carry out the inspection within one day.

Our trial inspection showed that, as a rule, routine inspections are an appropriate means of verifying whether production in a chemical facility is for purposes not prohibited by the convention. In addition to the very useful insight gained into the detailed procedures for on-site inspections in the chemical industry, the following three problem areas were of particular interest.

First, the inspection of a multi-purpose facility poses certain problems because the area to be inspected must be clearly delimited. The inspectors need to have a precise notion as to which parts of the plant they are inspecting are actually involved in the production of the substance in question. It also became clear that in large plants consisting of several multi-purpose installations it may well be possible that substances listed in schedule [2] can also be produced in facilities other than that which is actually declared as producing a schedule [2] substance. This again gave rise to the question of how to cover these facilities which might be considered as capable of producing chemical weapons.

Second, another area of particular interest was the question of how to take account of the legitimate concern of the company in question to protect confidential information. During our trial inspection it became clear that the schedule [2] type of inspections have to be rather intrusive in order to be effective and to meet the requirements stated in the aims set out for the verification of schedule [2] facilities in the "rolling text". Success will largely depend on exact and complete documentation concerning the declared quantities of the schedule [2] substance. A materials balance established with the help of original documents of the enterprise proved to be of crucial importance. Despite the intrusive character of the inspection, the trial inspection also demonstrated that it is possible at the same time to protect commercial interests like technological know-how and customer lists.

Third, the trial inspection clearly showed the need for a well-trained and experienced inspection team. Five inspectors were necessary for the careful, rapid and proper implementation of the inspection. The training and recruiting of inspectors is a subject which will require particular attention in preparing for the entry into force of the convention.

We are grateful for the very useful work undertaken by Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden in evaluating the results of the national trial inspections which have taken place so far. The informal consultations he has held in the last two weeks have already given some detailed insights into the experience gained through the national trial inspections. The process of

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

these inspections and the evaluation of their results will also accompany our work here in future months. As Minister Genscher announced during his speech on 2 March 1989, we are currently in the process of preparing for a trial inspection in the form of an ad hoc check at a major chemical plant.

Upon the conclusion of the national trial inspection phase, it is planned to carry out multilateral trial inspections. Again I wish to state that the German chemical industry, with which we co-operated closely in carrying out this trial inspection, has expressed its preparedness to make a facility available for a multilateral trial inspection.

The results of future national and multilateral trial inspections notwithstanding, I believe that the existing reports should enable us to draw first conclusions already. The experience gained so far should be used in re-examining and wherever necessary improving the existing provisions in the "rolling text" on the verification of non-production. We are looking forward to the work to-be undertaken in this regard in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the summer session.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

... Turning now to item 4, allow me to seize this opportunity to thank the French Government for convening the very important Paris Conference on chemical weapons. I wish in this respect to pay tribute to the efforts made by Ambassador Pierre Morel and the French delegation to the Conference of Disarmament for their meticulous preparations to ensure that the Paris Conference succeeded. The Paris Declaration recognized that the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons should not be treated in isolation from all other weapons of mass destruction. In our view the crux of the issue is that States are entitled to be reassured that they will not be threatened by the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Granting certain States the right to possess such weapons is always discriminatory. Moreover, in the absence of effective international controls comprising credible assurances as well as viable monitoring arrangements, the threat to national security persists.

Egypt is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and fully supports the current efforts to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons. Egypt was also in the vanguard of States that signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction in 1972. Unfortunately, as has been stated more than once before the CD, certain considerations prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. We do hope that such considerations will not arise with respect to future disarmament agreements.

I seize this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt considers that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is the objective we should all strive to attain. Any attempt at reaching interim measures on non-proliferation of chemical weapons should not be accepted. The prohibition has, in our view, now become a basic norm of international law, and therefore should be scrupulously observed. Though Egypt recognizes that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved, we do however realize that we still have a long way ahead. Many of the remaining differences, as my delegation has stated on more than one occasion, are not confined to mere drafting refinements. Many issues are still not resolved. I shall address myself to some of these issues.

The first issue, in the view of my delegation, pertains to the relation between the chemical weapons convention and other international agreements. Our understanding, in accordance with the general rules of international law, is that the chemical weapons convention, from the moment of its entry into force, should prevail over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter as that of the chemical weapons convention. Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden summed up this problem pertinently in a statement before this Conference on 13 September 1988 when he rightly said "our whole work would be undone if unilaterally declared 'rights' under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were to be transferred and thereby somehow eternalized

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention". Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish a universally applicable convention with enhanced effectiveness.

The second issue is the question of "sanctions". This issue has not been dealt with in the past within the context of the chemical weapons convention. However, this year the Ad hoc Committee is going to take it up through its Working Group 2. Egypt, for its part, would like to see provisions containing specific sanctions should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions are applied effectively and without discrimination or delay. Sanctions should not be construed as a mere device for punishment. In our view the reference to sanctions encompasses a more comprehensive approach that could provide requisite elements of security. We believe a clear distinction should be drawn between nuclear and chemical weapons. The nature and consequences of the use of chemical weapons are of more limited scope. Where chemical weapons are concerned, the international community should not in our view limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the NPT when the Security Council adopted resolution 255 in June 1968. The chemical weapons convention in our view, should aim much higher. Positive and credible assurances should be the ultimate objective.

Egypt does not subscribe to the view that the Conference on Disarmament should submit the convention directly to the General Assembly for adoption. Egypt prefers that an invitation be addressed to all States, members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament alike, to attend a conference devoted to the consideration of the convention. We also believe that some form of preparatory work should be initiated as soon as possible to exchange views on all the dimensions and possible implications of the convention. We support the convening of an international conference under United Nations auspices open to all potential parties to the convention. In our view this procedure ensures direct participation and consequently would greatly contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive document acceptable to all States.

Another pending issue is that of the settlement of disputes. There is no provision at present in the "rolling text" on this subject. Certain references exist, however, though scattered among some articles and specifying only one method, namely negotiation. What happens if a solution to a problem is not reached through negotiation? It should be expected that certain disputes may arise out of the application or interpretation of the convention. We must therefore provide adequate means for the resolution of such disputes.

With respect to reservations, it is the view of my delegation that there should be no reservations whatsoever attached to the chemical weapons convention. If, however, such a view is not accepted, my delegation believes that reservations should be confined to certain provisions only, and that they should be compatible with and not derogate from the scope and purpose of the convention itself.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Another area which Egypt is following closely is the negotiations on the organizational aspects. The Executive Council remains for most members of this Conference one of the most important issues. We believe that its size should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to undertake timely decision making. Its composition should be based on both a geographical criterion and an industrial criterion. As for voting in the Executive Council, we favour the application of the rule of unanimity when it comes to substantive matters. However, we realize that unanimity might not always emerge. We should therefore provide for some other rule to avoid paralysis in the Executive Council. This is a point which should be further considered.

An issue which attracts special attention is that of "verification". We do share the views expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention should include effective verification provisions. Yet such requirements should not be abused. Verification should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device to be as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions on verification procedures, in particular with respect to challenge inspection. In our view considerable progress has been achieved in this regard. The present state of the "rolling text" provides a basis for verification of activities relating to schedules [1] and [2]. However, we do realize that more time has yet to be devoted to the super-toxic lethal chemicals listed in schedule [1] and produced on a laboratory scale, and the relevance of this to medical and defence research. With respect to the schedules annexed to this article, we believe that for practical reasons, there should be a procedure to update them whenever necessary. Egypt is of the view that schedules [1] and [3] should be subject to modification whenever new chemical agents are produced.

We are rather concerned with the lacunae elsewhere. In this respect my delegation can only support the efforts undertaken by Mr. Lüdeking, Chairman of the Working Group on verification, to reach agreement on this issue. In this connection we welcome the proposal for ad hoc checks put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany in an attempt to bridge the "verification gap". Meanwhile, Egypt is following the work on this issue with great attention.

Egypt welcomes the positive step taken by certain States to have national trial inspections in their chemical facilities. These trials have resulted in a progressive boost in the area of inspection and verification, where the core of the problem lies. Through this experiment we may be able to solve the difficult equation of verification versus confidentiality, and avoid impeding the work and production of the chemical facilities. These trial inspections prove the importance and vitality of national verification and the creation of national authorities in this domain as stipulated in article VII.

My delegation considers that the convention should provide an umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by other States parties to limit the effect of the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons. We believe that accession to the convention will depend to a large

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

extent inter alia, on the nature and scope of the provisions that will provide for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries, but not, however, impede peaceful chemical activities.

In conclusion it is appropriate to emphasize that Egypt, like many other States members and non-members of the Conference, believes that the conditio sine qua non for a State to become a party to a convention that affects important aspects of national security is that such a convention must be applicable to all States. It is imperative that certain key countries, including all those in the "hot" regions, should become parties simultaneously.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

... Our delegation has already had occasion during our debate to stress the importance that Romania continues to attach to a unitary approach to disarmament. We are in favour of a complex programme of disarmament focused on nuclear disarmament and also including measures to eliminate chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as substantial reductions in conventional weapons, troops and military budgets. International peace and security cannot be guaranteed by acting in isolation through the prohibition and elimination of only one category of weapons, or through the maintenance of so-called "nuclear deterrence" or other concepts that are likely to promote the arms race. On the contrary - security can be achieved only through disarmament in all areas, through the prohibition and elimination, as part of a consistent process, of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destructions. In short, the problem is not that of keeping a particular area of the negotiations in reserve, but of making progress in all areas. In other words, all disarmament measures should be viewed in a unitary manner, as part of a set of actions designed to contribute to stability in the world and to place relations among States on a

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

new basis of equality and respect for the fundamental principles underlying international relations. As far as the context of our Conference itself is concerned, such a unitary, consistent approach to disarmament also presupposes measures designed to ensure necessary conditions and appropriate working arrangements for the substantive consideration and negotiation of all important issues on the agenda of the session. You will recall in this context that unfortunately this is not yet the case with the first three agenda items, namely the issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament.

Ms. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor today to report some conclusions of the national trial inspection carried out in Finland in March this year. The full report of the inspection has been circulated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as working paper CD/CW/WP.233.

Though not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Finland undertook a national trial inspection in a civilian chemical facility to implement the initiative of the Ad hoc Committee. Since Finland has no facilities producing scheduled chemicals, the inspection was carried out at a plant producing carbamate-type pesticides. The main purpose of the trial inspection was to try to find evidence of the previous production of a chemical which was not currently produced. The inspected facility produces two structurally closely related pesticides, one of them in large quantities and the other in a relatively small quantity, and only during short production periods during the year. The latter was chosen to be a mock schedule [1] chemical. The production of this chemical had been stopped two months before the inspection.

The most important result of the inspection was that it revealed clear proof of the now ceased production of the mock schedule [1] substance. This proof was obtained by analysis of wipe samples, air samples and waste samples, while the samples taken from the process did not bear any traces of the previous production. Samples were analysed both on the site and in an off-site laboratory using different analytical methods. The correlation between the results obtained by the different methods and between the on-site and the off-site analyses was very good.

On the basis of the Finnish national trial inspection the following conclusions can be presented: Firstly, the samples taken from the ongoing process may not be sufficient to confirm the non-production of scheduled chemicals between inspections. As a complementary measure, samples should also be collected from the air, from wastes and from surfaces in the premises, including warehouses for raw materials and finished products. The further development of the corresponding methods and instrumentation deserves due attention in our future work.

Secondly, as the number of samples to be taken out of the facility should be as small as possible, the necessary analyses should be performed on-site. These on-site analyses should be performed by the inspectors, with their own instruments. Although many modern chemical facilities use for process control purposes the same type of instruments as those that the inspectors will be using, these should not be relied upon for verification purposes. In order to be able to identify listed compounds reliably, the equipment should have pre-recorded identification data in its computer on all chemicals listed under the convention. This of course is not the case with process control equipment. Moreover, the sophistication and individual characteristics of

(Ms. Rautio, Finland)

some of the instrumentation call for thorough knowledge of the operation of the instrument that is used for the analysis. In the case of facility-owned equipment, the inspectors would have to rely on the facility personnel to perform these analyses without being able to verify the validity of the results. The same problems would arise if the samples were to be analysed only in a laboratory within the State party, even in the presence of the inspectors. Therefore further work should be done to prepare a procedure by which samples can be sent to other laboratories of the Organization, taking due account of the confidentiality aspects.

Thirdly, there was further indication that monitoring the absence of listed compounds is feasible without the need to identify fully the composition of the samples. This constitutes a rapid and non-intrusive verification method which reduces the risk of undue disclosure of technologically or commercially sensitive information. The prerequisite for its functioning is the recording of the identification data of all the listed chemicals in an analytical verification data base for the future Technical Secretariat. The Finnish verification project has been working on this data base for the last two years, and we will report on its progress during the summer session in the form of a new volume of the Finnish "blue books".

At this point, I wish to repeat and reaffirm what I said back before the United Nations General Assembly and at the Paris Conference in January: the German Democratic Republic has no chemical weapons, nor has it any weapons of other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons nor does it have the equipment for their production. The German Democratic Republic is ready to join a chemical weapons convention immediately after its conclusion. Let us make 1988 the decisive year in the drive for a ban on chemical weapons. Chemistry in the service of life and not of death should be everyone's watchword.

There is no doubt that a convention banning chemical weapons would also stimulate further global disarmament measures. This applies in particular to the nuclear field. Independently, Soviet-American negotiations play an outstanding role in that area. We advocate the early conclusion of a treaty

(Mr. Fischer, German Democratic Republic)

... The prohibition of chemical weapons, a task which can be solved in the near future, ranks prominently on the agenda of this Conference. Another "global zero" solution would be an essential link in the overall process of disarmament. In Berlin, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States reaffirmed their determination to do everything they can in order to attain that goal as soon as possible. The value of the Paris Conference regarding the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date will now have to be measured by the readiness of all sides to support practical solutions. Clear signals would be given if, firstly, all States having such weapons were to stop producing them now and were to begin destroying their stocks; and if, secondly, the other countries were to renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons. Such moves would stem the further proliferation of such weapons, both vertically and horizontally, even before a convention is concluded.

We welcome the decision of the Soviet Union to start destroying chemical weapons this year after having stopped their production earlier. The interest in a complete ban on chemical weapons voiced by President George Bush could already be convincingly demonstrated if the United States decided to renounce the further manufacture of binary weapons.

In the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel of France, important steps have been taken for the intensification of the talks. Now it appears that it is time for a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at foreign minister level to set the course for a purposeful effort to complete the convention. The foreign ministers could concentrate on key issues, i.e. challenge inspections, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council of the future organization for chemical disarmament, and sanctions in cases of violation of the convention. The German Democratic Republic is ready to participate in such a meeting.

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(Mr. Fischer, German Democratic Republic)

The verification procedure to be provided for by the convention will reach deeply into civilian chemical industries. While the legitimate interests of those industries must be protected, they must not serve as a pretext for undercutting the verification measures needed to make the convention work. The chemical industry of the German Democratic Republic already supports the cause of the convention in many ways. My country is prepared to accept any form of verification required under such an instrument. The German Democratic Republic has already submitted data on its chemical production relevant to the convention, and has carried out a national trial inspection. A facility of the pharmaceutical plant "VEB Arzneimittelwerk Dresden" will be available from the month of May for an international trial inspection.

We agree with all those who consider the elaboration of modalities and procedures for challenge inspections to be a high political priority. In this regard, trial inspections in the military field would also be advisable. Ideas on what procedure should be followed in future inspections could be tested and fleshed out.

We consider that trial inspections "on challenge" might be undertaken in a bilateral as well as a multilateral framework. For example, the German Democratic Republic would be ready to prepare such an inspection together with the Federal Republic of Germany and carry it out on the basis of reciprocity.

Transparency and openness create favourable conditions for the completion of the convention and for its observance. The German Democratic Republic is in favour of making full use of every chance that brings us closer to a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. A zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe, for instance, could be established relatively fast. We have taken note with interest of the announcement made by the United States that it will examine ways of speeding up the withdrawal of its chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany. Would it not be logical, in these circumstances, to ensure Central Europe's freedom from chemical weapons by an international instrument, thus giving a powerful boost to the elimination of these weapons on a global scale?

At this point, I wish to repeat and reaffirm what I said both before the United Nations General Assembly and at the Paris Conference in January: the German Democratic Republic has no chemical weapons, nor has it such weapons of other States stationed on its territory. It is neither engaged in the development of chemical weapons nor does it have the equipment for their production. The German Democratic Republic is ready to join a chemical weapons convention immediately after its conclusion. Let us make 1989 the decisive year in the drive for a ban on chemical weapons. Chemistry in the service of life and not of death should be everyone's watchword.

There is no doubt that a convention banning chemical weapons would also stimulate further global disarmament measures. This applies in particular to the nuclear field. Indisputably, Soviet-American negotiations play an outstanding role in that area. We advocate the early conclusion of a treaty

(Mr. Fischer, German Democratic Republic)

providing for a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, together with adherence to the ABM Treaty. In view of the rate at which science and technology are advancing today, any standstill in disarmament negotiations is bound to add to the arms build-up. As for SDI, it would not only bring no benefit to security, but would further destabilize it.

CD/PV.504

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I have asked for the floor today to commemorate an anniversary - an anniversary our delegation considers of signal importance. It was five years ago today, on 18 April 1984, that the United States introduced CD/500, a draft treaty for a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. We consider this an anniversary important for two reasons. One is that CD/500 introduced what was, at that time, an entirely new concept for overcoming the greatest obstacle in the path to a chemical weapons ban, that obstacle being verification. The concept we introduced on that date was mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection. But this anniversary also serves as a sombre reminder that five long years have passed without the Conference on Disarmament reaching consensus that such a verification régime is necessary or acceptable.

Our delegation has felt some concern that more tangible results have not been achieved in chemical weapons negotiations thus far during the 1989 session. We returned to Geneva with expectations that significant inroads could be made in resolving the remaining unsettled issues with which we were confronted. I know that other delegations had similar expectations. Indeed, our delegation was concerned that, with the new United States Administration reviewing arms control and disarmament policy, progress in the chemical weapons negotiations might outdistance our delegation's instructions. That has

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

not proven to be the case. On almost all issues examined in our working groups, there is such wide divergence of views that consensus seems as distant as it was before the Paris Conference. It would be overly pessimistic to attribute this state of affairs to any general retrenchment, although we have not witnessed much flexibility in positions taken by various delegations.

We were enjoined in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference to redouble our efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban, and we have endeavoured to do that. Under the guidance of our energetic and capable Ad hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel, we have maintained a fast pace as we addressed a large number of important issues which affect the national interests of all delegations. It seems to our delegation that States have been preoccupied with preserving their own positions, and less concerned with reconciling their views with those of others. We would hope that the forthcoming pause in our negotiations will enable all delegations to catch their breath and reassess their approach to these issues, with a view toward compromise and a convergence of views.

Our delegation is concerned, however, about the disquieting possibility that, while all delegations earnestly may want a chemical weapons ban, they may not want the same chemical weapons ban. That is, we are concerned that there are fundamental aspects of this convention upon which there is no agreement, and no willingness to compromise.

I will limit my remarks today to only one of those issues - the issue of mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection. This issue has loomed in the background as something too hard to confront head on - something to be skirted as we have attempted to resolve other, less provoking issues. But, if we are to complete a verification régime for the convention, this issue cannot be avoided. Mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection is the linchpin of such a verification régime, and until we all have acknowledged that fact, there will be no firm foundation for the resolution of other verification issues.

Consider the activity of Working Group 1 on the critical issue of verification of non-production of chemical weapons. We have been unable to make progress in this area despite the commendable stewardship of the Working Group Chairman, Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany. This lack of progress is not attributable to a lack of effort. Many delegations have addressed the concept of a "verification gap", and I am sure other delegations also have carefully considered this topic. The Federal Republic of Germany and, more recently, the United Kingdom, have tabled papers offering proposals designed to fill this so-called gap.

Although our delegation is not convinced there is such a gap, we willingly participated in the examination of this important topic, because the United States has been particularly concerned about civil facilities that are capable of producing chemical weapons agents or key precursors, but which would not be declared under present provisions of the "rolling text". After several months' work on this subject, however, our delegation is convinced that we are approaching the question of the so-called "verification gap" from the wrong direction, and I will explain what I mean.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

A verification gap necessarily presumes that there is some discernible boundary defining either side of the void. More specifically, as applied to the draft chemical weapons ban as set out in the "rolling text", any gap in verification would be bounded on the one side by routine inspection of declared facilities, as defined in article VI of CD/881, and on the other side by ... what? The quick answer would seem to be challenge inspection, as defined in article IX. And it is here that we come to the source of our difficulties: we have not yet reached agreement on the content of article IX. Indeed, the only elaboration of views on this aspect of the convention is found in a Chairman's paper in appendix II of CD/881, which is prefaced with the Caveat that "nothing contained therein constitutes any agreement and therefore does not bind any delegation". Since we have not yet defined the boundaries of any so-called "verification gap", it is understandable that we are having difficulty devising a verification scheme to fill such a gap. We must reach agreement on article IX before we can determine if there is a gap in the verification régime of the draft text, and, if so, how it should be filled. For that reason, our delegation believes it is time to get back to basics.

The position of the United States on article IX of the chemical weapons convention is well known. When President George Bush, then Vice-President, tabled the United States draft convention, he made clear that mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection is indispensable to an effective convention. He stated:

"For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. This elementary, common-sense principle is the essence of what we mean by verification. No sensible Government enters into those international contracts known as treaties unless it can ascertain - or verify - that it is getting what it contracted for."

As related to a chemical weapons convention, Vice-President Bush explained that each party must know:

"First, that all stocks have been destroyed;

"Second, that all declared production facilities have been destroyed;

"Third, that the declared stocks really do constitute all the stocks;

"And fourthly, that the declared facilities are all the facilities."

For the first two requirements Mr. Bush enumerated, the United States proposed continuous, on-site monitoring and periodic random inspection. We are pleased that, during the past five years, there has evolved substantial acceptance of these proposals by the members of the Conference on Disarmament, although we recognize that there remain specific aspects to be addressed.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Regarding the third and fourth essentials for verification, the Vice-President stated:

"The verification difficulties inherent in the problem of undeclared sites - determining that there are no hidden stocks and no clandestine production facilities - remain our most formidable challenge. It is formidable because the problem of undeclared sites can be resolved only if States commit themselves to a new, but absolutely necessary degree of openness."

That assessment is no less accurate today than it was five years ago. Indeed, as recognized in Working Group discussions, verification is becoming a more formidable task as a result of two continuing trends: first, the trend in the chemical industry toward versatile, multi-purpose facilities easily convertible to production of chemical weapons agents and precursors; second, the configuring of chemical facilities to comply with stricter environmental and safety standards, which makes it more difficult to distinguish a chemical facility manufacturing chemical-weapons-related products from those facilities engaged in more benign production.

To allay concerns about undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles and clandestine production, Vice-President Bush proposed the unprecedented verification procedure he called "open invitation" inspection - a mutual obligation of parties to open their territory to mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection, as set forth in article X of CD/500.

Recognizing the intrusiveness of such inspections, the Vice-President stated that the United States was willing to pay that price because "an effective ban on chemical weapons requires this kind of 'open invitation' inspections we propose." He concluded that:

"If the international community recognizes that such a provision is the sine qua non of an effective chemical weapons ban and joins us in subscribing to it, we will not only have realized the noble longing for a treaty that actually bans chemical weapons, but we will have changed in an altogether salutary manner the way governments do business."

Thus far, the international community, as represented in our negotiations by the members and participating observers of the Conference on Disarmament, has been slow to recognize that such stringent verification measures are essential to a chemical weapons ban. Significant progress was made in that direction in August 1987 when the Soviet Union, which had been one of the most vocal opponents of mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection, announced through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, that the Soviet Union accepted the principle of "mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal."

So long as the United States and the Soviet Union were advocating opposing views on this issue, some other delegations found it unnecessary to express, or perhaps even to formulate, their national positions. Shortly

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

after the Soviet pronouncement, however, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, held intense consultations on the subject of challenge inspection. These consultations revealed that, while there was a convergence of views on some procedural aspects of an inspection, not all delegations were able to accept the fundamental concept of the United States proposal. Recognizing this as an area of major disagreement, the members of the conference chose to move on to other, less controversial issues and have not returned for serious re-examination of article IX during the past year. Perhaps it is time for us to do so.

While the members of the Conference on Disarmament contemplated year after year the concept of mandatory, short-notice, on-site inspection, such inspections have become familiar verification measures in the implementation of other international agreements. Close to 20 such inspections have been conducted pursuant to the Stockholm accord. Furthermore, under the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are each allowed up to 20 such inspections during each of the Treaty's first three years. Both sides have conducted such inspections during the first year, at a pace that indicates that each side will use most, if not all, of their first-year quotas. While the verification régimes of the Stockholm agreement and the INF Treaty are not identical to that proposed in CD/500, their inspections are mandatory, they are on-site, and they are conducted on short notice.

Moreover, while the members of the Conference on Disarmament contemplated year after year the concept of such inspections, chemical weapons have been used, and possession of those weapons has become more widespread.

In closing, I would repeat the observation made in this chamber last Thursday by the distinguished Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Jaroszek: "Time is not our ally in work on the complete elimination of chemical weapons." We cannot afford to wait another five years to come to grips with this difficult verification issue.

(Mr. Al-Kital, Iraq)

Fourthly, the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on chemical weapons reflects the importance which the international community attaches to the total elimination of these weapons and the prohibition of their production and use, in the context of the commitment of the participating countries to the strengthening of international peace and security in furtherance of the objectives of the United Nations Charter and progress towards effective measures for disarmament. The Final Declaration also stressed disarmament priorities with reference to the Final Document of the first United Nations special session on disarmament, held in 1978, and the right of all States to peace and security. In accordance with these views Iraq will continue to participate in the work of the committees of the Conference, as an expression of its concern and strong desire to contribute to international efforts to rid the world of all weapons of mass destruction and create a world in which all States enjoy an equal right to peace and security and in which confrontation and the threat of the use of force would be replaced by political dialogue.

(Mr. Larco Cox, Peru)

... The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons gave new hope to the international community by making possible consensus among 149 States regarding the full validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the need for the speediest conclusion of the current negotiations in order to eliminate chemical weapons forever. The Final Declaration is an essential point of reference for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The universal nature of the future convention calls for a concerted effort that must encompass all States during the final period of negotiations. At the same time the verification system, though not perfect, must maintain mutual trust and be

(Mr. Larco Cox, Peru)

appropriate in terms of costs and benefits. Finally, there is no doubt that the prohibition of chemical weapons must be absolute, with neither loopholes nor ambiguities, and the commitment entered into must be free from any reservations.

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

... An accurate description of the general improvement in the international atmosphere would not be complete without mentioning the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, which invited the Conference on Disarmament, after 17 years of negotiations, to conclude as soon as possible the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This appeal meets the expectation of all of mankind, which is concerned about the awful danger of these weapons. The international situation is favourable for the continuation of our work towards the final conclusion of our convention. It is essential that the success and hopes mentioned at the beginning of my statement should take concrete shape in the area of chemical disarmament too.

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

Belgium was among the first to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which was a decisive stage in the codification of the prohibition of the use in time of war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological weapons. In the recent past, unfortunately, chemical weapons have been used in violation of the Geneva Protocol. Although this treaty still constitutes today the keystone of international law concerning the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons, it is not a disarmament treaty. Furthermore, the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, notwithstanding its obvious positive aspects, is certainly not the example to be followed for chemical weapons, because it does not provide for any effective verification measures. The international community clearly understood this when it commissioned the Conference on Disarmament to prepare a convention containing a comprehensive régime for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons under effective international control capable of guaranteeing absolute respect for the prohibition of the use of these weapons. The technical difficulties, but also the political reluctance that has to be overcome, are still great and complex: we are fully aware of that. Happily, in recent months a common will to move beyond the obstacles and to work to build a world free of chemical weapons has become apparent. At its last session the General Assembly adopted unanimously three resolutions dealing with chemical and biological weapons. The international community thus demonstrated its great concern with respect to recent cases of the use of chemical weapons and the terrifying prospect of the development of production capacities for these weapons. The General Assembly and the Paris Conference stressed the need to force the pace of the work in Geneva and the urgent need to establish an international régime for the elimination of chemical weapons once and for all.

Several countries have taken steps in the right direction, and we welcome this favourable trend. First of all, President Mitterrand himself announced a move in the French position on undiminished security during the transition period. Very recently Mr. Roland Dumas recalled that here. Secondly, we also welcome the fact that the USSR is demonstrating a more constructive and flexible approach in several aspects of the Geneva negotiations. Mr. Shevardnadze has announced the construction of a destruction facility at Chapayevsk and a commitment to begin the destruction of Soviet stocks as soon as the facility is operational, without waiting for the convention to enter into force. We see in this intention a very important manifestation of good faith on the part of the Soviet leaders. Like Mr. Andreotti in his recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Belgium regrets, however, that the Soviet Union did not take that decision before the United States adopted a new programme for the production of chemical weapons after a break of almost 20 years.

Thirdly, the new President of the United States has on several occasions indicated his intention to make the convention on the elimination of all chemical weapons one of the top priorities of his foreign policy. He said last October at Toledo:

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

"I want to be known as the President who, working with our allies, the Soviets and others, led to the elimination of chemical warfare and chemical weapons ... And if I'm elected President, if I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons."

After his election, Mr. Bush reaffirmed this formal and sincere commitment publicly and repeatedly, and no one has any reason to doubt it. As Ambassador Friedersdorf recently recalled, moreover, the United States is now engaged in a programme for the elimination of its unitary chemical agents, which will be completed in 1997.

Fourthly, we also welcome the fact that, in response to the appeal made by the Paris Conference, many countries are participating in and contributing to our work as new observers. This particularly important fact is a good augury for the universality of the future convention. We should also stress the importance of the new accessions to the Geneva Protocol during and after the Paris Conference.

Fifthly, we must thank Sweden in particular for its efforts with regard to international trial inspections. The recommendations which Sweden prepared in September 1988 and the multilateral consultations which it has held in this forum have been very useful and fruitful for the conduct of trial inspections in a number of countries, including Belgium. The report on the trial inspection carried out by Belgium was recently transmitted to the secretariat. Belgium hopes to see a greater number of countries, from all groups and from all quarters of the world, also carrying out national inspections, whose usefulness for our work has already been amply demonstrated. Belgium is sure that a detailed comparative analysis of the inspections carried out by many countries will be a crucial source of concrete information based on experience which can only be of benefit to our work in the Ad hoc Committee. Once this detailed analysis has been carried out, we will be able to think of moving on to the next stage, that of multilateral trial inspections, which it will be important to prepare in the best interests of the objectives we are pursuing, identifying the many practical problems to be settled, some of which have been listed in the interesting working paper submitted on this topic by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

The progress which I have listed is, very happily, a sign of the fundamental change from a situation of near-standstill in the negotiations towards a new take-off which is both political and concrete in the right direction. We are particularly appreciative of this because Belgium, along with other States, has made an international commitment to renounce the production and use of chemical weapons, even before the conclusion of the convention. On 20 February last the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted regulations whereby controls were placed on the export of eight chemicals capable of being used for the production of chemical weapons. However, like other States, Belgium does not believe that national and international measures can forestall the terrifying prospect of the development of chemical weapon production capabilities, which unfortunately is relatively easy. Together with other Governments which have set out their

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

views before us, we are profoundly convinced that there is no alternative to the drawing up of a universal and effective legal instrument so that anyone seeking to violate the rule will have to pay a very high price.

I should like to make a few observations concerning our work on chemical weapons. There is no doubt that our fundamental task is to devise global, effective and comprehensive verification machinery. Where chemical weapons are concerned, verification is particularly complex and restrictive in order to furnish a reasonable assurance of compliance with the commitments entered into, as well as sufficiently dependable dissuasion. The verification procedures which must cover all violations cannot of course offer complete guarantees, but must be sufficient to create and maintain mutual trust. That leads one to the conclusion that the convention must in this regard include a network of diversified and independent measures which, without making the system excessively complicated, can, by complementing and even backing up one another, lead us to the objective sought.

Combinations of different systems are also necessary as a result of the fact that there is no single solution to the problem of a concentration of risks of violations. No activity can be ignored - certainly not facilities which, in technical terms, present the greatest danger of production of toxic agents, and should therefore be inspected regularly. Verification should, in fact, be dissuasive and should be designed to discourage violations by making the risks greater than the benefits that a country could hope to obtain.

Challenge inspection is a necessary and important element, and for that reason we welcome its acceptance by the Soviet Union and other States which still had reservations about this system of inspection until recently. Nevertheless, we share the feeling expressed by other countries that it is, if not vital, then at least very important to secure the co-operation and good will of our manufacturers, who will have to bear the burden, not to say the risks, of verification. To that end we think it is essential to place in the text of the convention, I would even say in an exhaustive manner, provisions that will reassure industry as to recognition by the States parties of the need not to harm its interests, either technologically, financially or commercially.

I should like to address another aspect of the convention which is of great importance for a country like ours, which has a relatively extensive and varied chemical industry and accordingly will be among the States likely to be subject to frequent verification exercises. I have in mind the institutional aspect of our future Organization. A general consensus already exists concerning the structure and major areas of operation of the international organization. However, political agreement has yet to be found on certain points, notably the composition of the Executive Council. Each State must have a reasonable chance of joining the Council. The Executive Council cannot, in our view, become a "club of inspected States", but we consider nevertheless that a certain proportion of the seats on the Executive Council should be designated on the basis of a list of States with a large chemical industry. The other members of the Executive Council might be designated on the basis of criteria to be agreed in the future. In this context, I wish to reiterate my country's offer of Brussels as host city for the headquarters of

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

the international organization to be set up under the convention. In making this proposal, Mr. Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, underlined the symbolic nature that such a choice would have: the establishment of the organization's headquarters in the country where chemical weapons were used for the first time. Such a decision would also illustrate the improvement in the international climate, thanks to which we can look forward to a satisfactory conclusion to the current negotiations. Experience has shown that the Belgian capital is in a position to provide rapidly the infrastructure and logistical support needed for a major organization.

In conclusion I would like to say that the outstanding questions in the field of chemical weapons certainly require the greatest attention, since they touch on such sensitive issues as State security and the protection of industrial interests. However, the Paris Conference gave a powerful political boost to our work that no other initiative could hope to equal. It would be disastrous to let this impetus become dissipated. It would be unacceptable and in fact extremely dangerous for the future of the convention itself if the pointless build-up of technical and political difficulties, intellectual red tape, the very concern for illusory perfection were to lead to delay in the conclusion of an agreement and cause it to suffer the fate of other disarmament initiatives which the loss of a sense of priority objectives condemned to the limbo of oblivion.

An excessive concern for exhaustiveness on the part of the negotiators, apart from adding to the work-load of the Ad hoc Committee and inevitably slowing it down, would result in essential interests and goals being lost from view and would imbue intrinsically secondary issues with an importance they do not possess. Several ideas put forward here for expediting the convention's entry into force deserve our attention: the adoption of national measures in advance with a view to the application of the convention, the delegation of certain purely technical or administrative problems to the Organization or the Preparatory Commission, the destruction of stocks before the convention enters into force and, generally, initiatives for anticipating some of the obligations deriving from it.

As I have already emphasized, the negotiations will proceed in a more favourable international climate of profound commitment to unchallengeable precepts of law and morality. It is this context that we must draw on without delay in order to take up the challenge of chemical weapons and pass a new milestone in the cause of peace and disarmament throughout the world. Hence, more than ever, I believe in the importance of our Conference and in its chances of success.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): In my statement today, I wish to speak on item 4 of our agenda, Chemical weapons, but before doing so, however, I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, the appreciation of my delegation for the excellent manner in which you have presided over the deliberations of the Conference during the month of April. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, for his skilful guidance during his presidency in March, and especially for his efforts to

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

reach consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban, the first item on our agenda. My delegation hopes that these efforts will be crowned with success in the near future. I listened with great interest to the important statements made by His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Peru and by my colleague the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium, covering a wide range of issues. My own intervention, as I said, will be devoted entirely to the question of chemical weapons.

The 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament started with the firm joint commitment to redouble efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude a comprehensive Convention on chemical weapons at the earliest date. The support for our endeavour could not have been more clearly stated than in the Paris Declaration and in the consensus resolutions of the General Assembly. Public opinion world-wide, outraged by the suffering of chemical warfare victims, also expected rapid progress from the negotiations in Geneva. The risk of further spread of chemical weapons had made such progress imperative. The necessary framework to deal successfully with the remaining issues was quickly established, above all through the energetic, resourceful and methodical leadership provided by Ambassador Morel as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and by the five working group chairmen. The first half of the session is now drawing to a close, and it is time to take stock of the situation. I should, therefore, today like to offer a few observations on the part of the Swedish delegation.

Undeniably we have made some progress, but against the background of the political will and sense of urgency expressed in the Paris Declaration, and the negotiating framework and resources provided to us, this progress is far too modest. The question imposes itself of whether there exists a gap between declared intent and real commitment.

The inability of the Conference as a whole to reach consensus on a minor updating of the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee seemed ominous to some of us, already in February. During the ensuing months a considerable amount of important work has been done, including in some key areas of the draft convention. However, we have been unable to come closer to a solution regarding a few crucially important outstanding issues, e.g. challenge inspections, the Executive Council, the order of destruction and the effective prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. At the same time we have devoted considerable time to issues of detail which have acquired disproportionate importance. There is also a tendency to compensate for lack of penetration in key areas by prematurely discussing new concepts. Too many meetings have provided repetitions of discussions held in 1988 or 1987. It is evident that outdated instructions are not sufficient to make progress in these negotiations.

It is not my intention to paint too gloomy a picture. However, only if we realistically face the issues can we make substantive progress. The spring session has permitted us to clear the field and to identify and define a number of problems. Hopefully, the May recess will give sufficient time to delegations and capitals for thorough study and review of the main issues,

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

resulting in a renewed readiness to deal effectively with them during the second half of the session. If the time, enthusiasm and effort spent by most delegations do not lead to tangible progress in key areas during the summer session, there is a risk that discouragement will take the upper hand.

The verification system is the key to the chemical weapons convention. Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany has provided an inspired and dedicated chairmanship of Working Group 1. It is, however, a matter of concern that we have not been able to provide a clear picture of the general pattern of verification.

A number of delegations have felt that there may be a need for additional verification measures, beyond routine inspections of declared facilities and mandatory challenge inspections. Proposals like those on spot checks by Australia, ad hoc checks by the Federal Republic of Germany and ad hoc inspections by the United Kingdom, have considerable merit. They have been given thorough study by my delegation, and we have participated in the discussions of these proposals with an open mind. However, it seems that those discussions have left many questions unanswered. The reason for this is of course that it is difficult to concretize additional measures when we do not know to what they are supposed to be added. My delegation, therefore, is inclined to agree with the view stated by Ambassador Friedersdorf on 18 April when he said that we are approaching the question from the wrong direction.

The procedures for routine inspection under article VI have been worked out in some detail. Further input is expected from the national trial inspections so that the "rolling text" may be improved. This is one part of the general pattern of verification where important results have been achieved. It must be supplemented by further work on the schedules, not least on schedule [2], part B, and a consideration of new agents. In this context a "waiting and warning list" constitutes an interesting approach.

There seems to be general agreement on the need for mandatory challenge inspections. However, the agreement ends there. This stands in contrast to the degree of elaboration on routine inspection in the "rolling text". There is as yet no agreement, for example, on how to initiate a challenge inspection, the specificity of the request and at what time it should be communicated to the challenged State. Procedures for access to the facility, measures to protect confidential information not related to chemical weapons, report writing, submission and assessment of the inspection report are still not agreed.

Differing views are held regarding the role of the challenging State and the Technical Secretariat throughout the challenge inspection. To what extent should the observer of the challenging State be able to influence the decisions of the inspection team? Should conclusions be drawn in the inspection report, by the Executive Council or by States parties individually, first and foremost the challenging State?

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The dividing line goes between those who see the challenge mainly as a bilateral action through an international instrument and those who see it as a multilateral action triggered by a State party. For my delegation it is natural to regard challenge inspections as a truly international concern, reducing the role of the challenging State without overlooking it. Be that as it may, the important thing is to finally face the issue of mandatory challenge inspections, and to ensure that the perceived agreement on the need for such inspections results in agreed principles for their implementation. Only when the picture has been thus completed can we realistically assess the possible need for additional ad hoc verification measures.

From plenary statements it seems that the two major chemical weapons possessors hold similar views on challenge inspections. This has been the case for some time now. They also have, between them, the greatest experience of practical implementation of mandatory on-site inspections at short notice. In view of that shared experience, as well as their shared commitment to a chemical weapons convention, they could exercise some leadership on this issue and make, jointly or individually, practical proposals regarding challenge procedures. That would certainly be more constructive than simply to state that the divergence of views in the Committee is too wide to permit consensus.

Considerable time has also been spent in Working Group 1 on the issue of confidentiality. My delegation understands the concerns of many delegations over this problem. The trial inspections have already shed some light on what the real sensitivities might be. This having been said, the confidentiality issue belongs, in the view of my delegation, to a category which is attracting disproportionate attention. Except for general guidelines on confidentiality, included in an annex or otherwise, some detailed provisions on the procedures for routine and challenge inspections will be needed in the "rolling text". Many of the issues we address, however, should preferably be referred to the Preparatory Commission or to the Technical Secretariat. I should like to add in this connection that my delegation does not at present see the need for a special article on confidentiality.

Working Group 2 on legal issues may not have reached conclusive results, but the work it has carried out has been extremely useful in so far as a thorough inventory of different alternatives has been made and the problems have been well defined and identified. The detailed preparation and solid legal skills of its Chairman, Mr. Gomaa of Egypt, have decisively contributed to the systematic approach taken by the Group.

Sweden supports the efforts to establish a mechanism for amendments to the convention on the principle of equal obligations of all States parties. One means of excluding the possibility of amendments incompatible with the objectives of the convention could be an "immunity" period of 10 years, corresponding to the destruction period, during which no article could be amended. After this period, an amendment should require a decision by a qualified majority of the States parties. Certain provisions in the annexes should, however, not be subject to these stringent amendment procedures. Such changes as are necessary to keep the convention up to date and facilitate its implementation should be subject to a simplified procedure for revision.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The question of reservations is linked to the issue of article XII, on the relationship between the convention and other international treaties. In this regard, Sweden has again expressed its strongly felt conviction that no reservation should be possible with regard to the scope of the convention, which, as of its entry into force, must unambiguously rule out the use of chemical weapons, i.e. any use of chemical weapons under any circumstances. Reservations to this fundamental obligation of the convention should be explicitly prohibited.

There is also reason to take note with appreciation of the results achieved in Working Group 3 on institutional matters, under the soft-spoken but firm stewardship of Mr. Sood of India. This relates to the new text on article VII as well as the progress made regarding the Preparatory Commission. However, the most difficult issue in the area of institutions - the composition, functions, and decision-making of the Executive Council - has not yet been addressed. My delegation hopes that the informal consultations now being held by the Chairman of the Committee will facilitate consideration of this issue in the summer. Sweden's basic and pragmatic views on the subject were stated by my predecessor in September last year. I will not repeat them here. The important thing now is that delegations take a flexible and constructive approach to the question of the Executive Council. This constitutes one of the politically most complex outstanding issues.

In the institutional area my delegation welcomes the fact that the French delegation has now elaborated its proposal for a Scientific Advisory Council. While time has not permitted detailed study of the proposal, Sweden supports its general outline.

The matters considered in Working Group 4 under the chairmanship of Mr. Molander cover a complex area of highly technical issues, sometimes with important political implications. It goes without saying that my delegation welcomes the substantive progress made concerning the annex to article VI [1] and the proposed new annex on chemicals.

As regards the annex to article VI [1], the new text brought to the attention of the Committee in working paper 4/12/Rev.1 of the Group seems to offer the parameters for a comprehensive solution of the question of production and synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals. Hopefully delegations will be able to reach a compromise during the summer session. In the view of Sweden, there should be a possibility of declaring at the end of each calendar year at least those laboratories which have synthesized schedule [1] chemicals for protective purposes.

As far as verification, in this context, is concerned the view of my delegation is well known. Verification must be applied to a stage of the research and development process where it would conceivably be possible to demonstrate a violation of the convention, or at least a serious inexplicable anomaly. This would hardly be possible before research and development have left the laboratory and entered a pilot plant or testing phase. Trying to verify what is not verifiable does not create confidence. Verification must be applied to what is relevant and significant.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The major achievement of Working Group 4, the result of intensive work during recent weeks, is contained in the proposed annex on chemicals. The general outline of such an annex was proposed by my delegation last year. Sweden welcomes the constructive and supportive approach taken by all delegations in considering the annex, as well as their substantial contributions to it. The text now contained in Group 4 working paper 4/3/Rev.3, brought to the attention of the Committee and recommended for close scrutiny in capitals during the May recess, confirms our belief that such an annex is a practical and indispensable part of the draft convention.

As regards the contents of the annex, the Swedish delegation maintains a flexible approach regarding the placement of some of the chemicals in the existing lists. We do not, however, accept the view that toxins are of no concern to the chemical weapons convention on the grounds that they are covered by the biological weapons Convention. Toxins which have been weaponized or field-tested for chemical weapons purposes are for all practical purposes indistinguishable from other chemical weapons and should, in our view, be included in schedule [1]. Once included, however, my delegation feels that they are sufficiently covered by the definition of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Therefore, no special category of ultra-toxic lethal chemicals would be called for.

In the discussion we have also noted a tendency to argue that precursor chemicals highly relevant for the convention should be placed in schedule [3] rather than in schedule [2], part A, for the simple reason that they are commercially produced for purposes not prohibited by the convention. In the opinion of my delegation, the fact that a chemical is in fact being produced does not exactly reduce the risk it may pose to the convention. In our view, key precursors do not belong in schedule [3]. In that schedule, only such precursors should be listed which are produced in such quantities as to render the verification régime under schedule [2] impracticable. Finally, there would also seem to exist a contradiction between the search for so-called "verification gaps" elsewhere in the convention on the one hand, and a tendency to minimize the concrete concern caused by production of certain key precursors on the other.

During the summer, special emphasis will have to be given to the complex issue presently covered by schedule [2], part B. For the first time the text in the annex now contains the mention of certain chemicals. Two general criteria are also contained in the section entitled "Guidelines for schedule [2], part B". My delegation would hope that these elements, possibly together with a consideration of proposals for a "waiting and warning list", will permit substantive progress in the near future.

Sweden welcomes the constructive discussion on the guidelines for schedules [2] A and [3], which has produced new texts enjoying a considerable degree of support. We think those guidelines could be consolidated further and the guidelines for schedule [1] somewhat simplified. Those definitions which have now been transferred to the annex on chemicals call for detailed

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

consideration. According to the view of my delegation, some of them reflect an earlier stage of our negotiations. The question might, therefore, well be asked whether all of them are relevant or even necessary.

It should finally be noted that one crucial issue covered by Working Groups 4 and 5 offers another important opportunity for initiatives from the two major chemical weapons possessors, namely the order of destruction. On this key issue the Committee has now been at a virtual standstill for a whole year. It is obvious that no other delegation has the know-how and experience to make a decisive contribution to the resolution of this matter.

Working Group 5 has greatly benefited from the long experience and sense of purpose of its Chairman, Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. However, the issues under consideration in the Group are complex and do not easily lend themselves to structured discussions or concrete proposals. One such issue is covered by the heading "universality". The task of the CD in this connection is to elaborate a convention which in a balanced manner takes account of the legitimate concerns and interests of all nations. It is Sweden's view that the Conference, with the scope for non-members to contribute actively to our negotiations, is sufficiently representative to permit the elaboration of a convention that can attract universal adherence. Let me in this context express my delegation's deep satisfaction that so many non-member countries have joined the chemical weapons negotiations. My delegation hopes that still more countries from relevant regions will demonstrate the same interest and be given the opportunity to participate.

The key to enhancing universal adherence to the convention would, in the view of Sweden, be the concept of non-discrimination. This is an abstract concept that might sound too ideological to be practical. In terms of the chemical weapons convention, however, it would contain some very precise and concrete elements. First, the convention must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether they possess chemical weapons or not. Thus, the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons must be absolutely effective for all as of the entry into force of the convention. Second, the convention must provide for an effective system of verification giving reassurance to all States parties that the convention is being complied with. Third, the convention must ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, exchange, transfer and use chemicals and technology in the chemical field. Hence it is the view of Sweden that an effective way in the short term to ensure positive interest in the convention would be the immediate incorporation of article XI into the "rolling text", a view which is shared by the Group of 21 in its entirety. Fourth, the convention must ensure immediate and effective assistance in the case of use of chemical weapons against any State party.

Assistance in cases of perceived threat, however, is a moot question. Such provisions could in our view easily be abused and thus create unnecessary political confrontations in an organization whose smooth functioning is in the universal interest. Provisions for obligatory assistance in such unclear

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situations must be elaborated with great care. They may otherwise, for instance, compromise fundamental political principles of countries with a policy of neutrality, like Sweden.

Over the last few months an important number of countries have carried out national trial inspections. My delegation finds it very encouraging indeed to note the broad participation in these inspection activities. We welcome the fact that additional countries are preparing for such inspections. These activities permit concrete familiarization with the provisions of the "rolling text", and also serve to widen the circle of people and institutions in each country that get directly involved with the practical issues regarding implementation of the future convention.

As Chairman of the open-ended consultations I have reported on the current situation in documents CD/CW/WP.236 and 237. The first evaluation made during these consultations demonstrated that, although certain provisions in the "rolling text" will need further elaboration, the system provided for in the draft convention constitutes a sound basis for a routine inspection régime. It is the view of my delegation that the momentum must not be lost and that planning should be initiated for the next stage - multilateral trial inspections. In this context, Sweden welcomes the announcement by the German Democratic Republic that a plant has already been selected for a multilateral trial inspection. The next stage should be carefully planned in order to give tangible results of relevance for the draft convention. Also, those delegations which are still in the process of preparing for national trial inspections should be given the opportunity to present their results to the Committee. In the view of my delegation, the Ad hoc Committee would be well advised to start detailed consultations on preparations which may be necessary in order to embark on a multilateral stage of trial inspections as soon as possible.

Before concluding I should like to make a few brief comments on the forthcoming Canberra conference on chemical weapons. Let me first note that a comprehensive solution, a chemical weapons convention, is within close reach. Interim measures, which may sometimes be useful, may at this advanced stage of our negotiations even be counter-productive. All efforts must instead be concentrated on concluding the convention at the earliest date.

The Canberra conference has the potential of contributing positively to that goal, if the dialogue between governments and industries of participating countries takes as the starting-point the need to ensure both the free and non-discriminatory exchange of chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and the need for effective verification of the total prohibition of chemical weapons, within the overall framework of the convention. In that context it will be a useful contribution if that conference increases the awareness of the chemical industry of the implications of the coming convention and promotes co-operation by the industry in its implementation.

A dialogue between governments and the chemical industry may certainly serve a useful purpose, not least because a considerable measure of co-operation on the part of the latter will be required to establish an

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

effective verification system. But it is of utmost importance that the parameters for the dialogue are right, otherwise a potentially useful contribution to the negotiating efforts may be turned into the opposite.

In summary I should like to state that my delegation is encouraged by the progress on some important issues made during the spring, and impressed by the energy and sense of purpose brought to the negotiations by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and his Bureau. At the same time, however, it is a matter of concern that so many basic problems are being put aside, and that new initiatives are lacking in some important areas. As has been pointed out on several occasions, time is not on our side. We have kept our promise to redouble our efforts. Let us come back to Geneva in June with the firm determination to resolve the remaining issues.

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(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

... Let me turn finally to the subject of chemical weapons, which is exercising us all so deeply these days. The use of chemical weapons in the First World War led to the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which outlaws the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons, but not their development, production, possession or transfer. Thereafter, chemical weapons were perceived to be principally a super-Power problem, and the international community paid scant attention to these agents of warfare. However, with the deterioration in respect for the norms embodied in the Geneva Protocol and the recent use of chemical weapons in some regions of the world with devastating effect, the need for a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global chemical weapons ban has become apparent. This responsibility has been shouldered by the Conference on Disarmament, and we are gratified to observe that negotiations to conclude a chemical weapons convention are proceeding at a speed which is remarkable, but which nevertheless carries the real risk of marginalizing the concerns of developing countries.

Only the early conclusion of and universal adherence to a comprehensive convention, placing a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, provides a real solution to the danger posed by such weapons: no ad hoc, stop-gap, partial or discriminatory measures aiming at only selective fragments of this global problem can provide us with an effective solution. Above all, any attempts to divert the negotiations onto a side-track of "non-proliferation" which sanctions the production and possession of chemical weapons by some, while prohibiting them for others, would undermine these negotiations, and would delay the conclusion of a comprehensive convention.

Hopefully, such attempts will not be made, and we will be taking a major step in mankind's quest for general and complete disarmament by concluding a convention outlawing an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, the entry into force of such a convention would not by itself make chemical weapons vanish. The goal of universal adherence, if realized, will only be achieved gradually and over a considerable length of time. As long as some countries with a chemical weapons capability remain outside the

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convention, those which have given up the option will continue to feel threatened, and the prohibition régime will remain incomplete, if not fragile. It is therefore necessary that the convention should contain effective, reliable and mandatory provisions on assistance in protective measures to States which are either threatened by or are the subject of a chemical weapons attack. The importance of such provisions, particularly during the early stages of the implementation of the convention, is unquestionable. Equally certain is the fact that these provisions will call for inevitable financial outlays. We are therefore astonished at the dilatory tactics of some who seem not to appreciate the integral nature of these provisions vis-à-vis the future convention.

A matter related to the subject of assistance is the question of measures to be taken collectively against another country, whether a party to the convention or not, which uses chemical weapons or otherwise poses a chemical weapons threat to a State party. A reprimand or condemnation by the international community is not an adequate or effective deterrent. It is therefore essential that the convention should contain a mechanism either to make the delinquent State desist from its acts, or at least to raise the cost to that State of pursuing such a course. This matter needs to be discussed further in our deliberations.

Before concluding, I would like to point out that in our enthusiasm to conclude a chemical weapons convention at the earliest, we seem to have relegated the most important item on our agenda, namely nuclear disarmament, to the background of our collective subconscious. Is this because we in the CD have reached a mental plateau and thus lack the political will and the moral determination to forge ahead with the mandate entrusted to us by SSOD-I over 10 years ago? Or is it because some of us feel more at ease on the path of bilateralism, thereby contributing to the sure but steady erosion of the role assigned to this multilateral body in the field of disarmament? Perhaps, instead of the measured sessions in which we routinely sit and talk awhile before dispersing again, we might instead pause and reflect on these unanswered questions. The 10th anniversary is surely a good occasion for us to do so.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... A diverse range of interests in each of the particular areas dealt with by the Conference have, to some extent, decelerated progress in its work, and therefore demand a great deal of patience and perseverance on our part. In one area, namely the development of a convention banning chemical weapons, we all realize that a series of complicated aspects have still to be considered in an in-depth and broad approach toward finalization of the convention. It is encouraging to note, however, that negotiations in this particular field have shown positive signs towards the further codification of an international legal instrument banning those despicable weapons.

Despite the positive signs marking the said negotiation, one cannot help but see that the work of the Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been similarly matched by the work of the other established committees. It is the view of my delegation that efforts to introduce more substance into the discussion in the Committees other than the one dealing with chemical weapons, are still needed.

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(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... Touching upon the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, as mentioned earlier, even though we need further in-depth and broader approaches toward the finalization of the convention, we recognize a positive sign marking the negotiations in this particular field. It is my delegation's view, however, that the stage of negotiations during the first session of our Conference has exposed a series of aspects warranting further examination.

The question of assistance, dealt with by Working Group 5 of the Ad hoc Committee, needs to be thoroughly examined, giving particular emphasis, in the first instance, to humanitarian measures taken in the case of use of chemical weapons. One can always be an advocate of a view emanating from a wider source of thought. However, as I mentioned earlier, humanitarian measures in

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(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

the provisions of the convention should be given particular emphasis so that the convention has, in the first place, a pledge to protect mankind from suffering, death and other forms of mass destruction caused by the use of such horrific weapons. The idea of implementing assistance measures through the decisions of an organ which operates on a non-daily basis could impede the urgent adoption of measures to secure lives.

On this agenda item, intensive negotiation is currently being undertaken within the framework of the five working groups, and problems involved in issues of verification, amendments, organs of the organization, national implementation measures, lists of chemicals, undiminished security during the destruction period and assistance, as well as protection against chemical weapons, are being intensively considered. In my delegation's view, the success or failure of these exercises can be duly judged in the summer session when the Ad hoc Committee reaches consensus on translating its work into treaty language.

(The President)

On the one hand, the Conference was able to settle some organizational questions and to re-establish some subsidiary bodies on some important items on its agenda. On the other hand, the Conference was unable to conclude, within the time allocated to its spring session, its consultations on the nuclear issues on its agenda as well as other pending matters before it. The Conference was able to re-establish the Ad hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons, on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and on Radiological Weapons. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work. I note that all these Ad hoc Committees will continue their valuable work during the summer session, and I would like to thank all their Chairmen for the work done so far in these subsidiary bodies.

I do not wish to comment on the substance of the work being carried out in all these subsidiary bodies, but I do feel that I should make special mention of the work of the Ad hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons, on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This, of course, does not mean that the work in the other subsidiary bodies is of less importance. I also feel that I should mention briefly the consultations on the nuclear issues on the agenda of the Conference, and some pending matters before the Conference.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was re-established against the background of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons which was held in early January this year. The Final Declaration of that conference, which was adopted unanimously by all 149 States attending the Conference, underlined further the determination of States to ban for ever the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and ensure their destruction. This important document urged the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction, at the earliest date. It is hoped that this objective will be realized.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons commenced its work with its existing mandate after some efforts were made by many delegations, albeit without success, to inject some important elements into it which were part of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. The work of this subsidiary body is now being conducted in five working groups, each dealing with specific subjects, and it appears that this exciting approach may bear important positive results during the 1989 session of the Conference and the inter-sessional period on many of the outstanding issues under consideration.

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(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes the intensification of work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It represents a precondition for fulfilling the mandate of the Paris Conference, to which we still owe a lot.

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

A number of issues have been discussed thoroughly, and on some of them certain progress has been achieved. In particular the material included for further consideration in the annex on chemicals seems to lead us towards progress on some technical issues which have either not been discussed or have been considered without much success in recent years. Our delegation supports active continuation of this work and hopes that the results, once agreed, will be incorporated into the structure of the "rolling text" in a way which will not weaken but rather streamline and strengthen it.

The discussion on the "verification pattern" can hardly be described as conclusive. However, it was useful in so far as it confirmed, in our opinion, that sufficient clarity regarding the whole verification concept of the chemical weapons convention can only be achieved when basic types of control activities which have been suggested and discussed for years are finalized and subscribed to by all participants to the negotiations. We expect that the national and international trial inspections now under way will soon contribute to the completion of procedures for systematic routine inspections. Czechoslovakia is prepared to offer a facility for such an inspection. While we agree that such inspections should be well prepared, we do not think that certain divergences in approaches to individual MTIs will necessarily be detrimental. We suggest that there is no need to be afraid of possible conflicting situations. Their identification and thorough evaluation afterwards might be more useful for the accurate completion of the chemical weapons convention than scrupulous avoidance of problem areas during the stage of multilateral trial inspections. We therefore do not favour unduly postponing MTIs, and my country would be prepared to accept an international team of inspectors as early as during the CD's summer session.

Challenge inspections also require our attention during the summer session. Some consider this kind of inspection to be confrontational and politically charged; others maintain that they will constitute just another form of verification, which could be regularly applied. In some cases, perhaps in most of them, these inspections might operate in an ordinary and smooth way. In other cases elements of confrontation may be present, depending on the rationale justifying a request, the participants in the challenge process or the conclusions of the inspection. However, what is important is an agreement on all the procedures, so that they stipulate clearly the rights and obligations of the States parties, the role and activities of inspectors, and the process after the conduct of a challenge inspection.

At the same time we would not like to underrate the complexity of article IX. A number of approaches have evolved in recent years, and a lack of clarity is evident in the positions of more than just a couple of delegations. Indeed, it would be interesting to know whether the authors of CD/500 still subscribe unconditionally to all the relevant provisions contained in this document, or whether their approach to some of them has been modified. Occasionally we are under the impression that the mandatory nature of such inspections would not necessarily mean an unconditional obligation to accept such an inspection at the request of any of the States parties without the right of refusal. Our delegation also wonders whether inspection on challenge is regarded by the United States delegation as applicable to any

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place or facility without any limitations. We consider it important that these basic questions be cleared up before making a final assault on article IX.

During the spring session quite considerable effort went into discussion of the concept of ad hoc checks or inspections. The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a proposal in this regard, which we consider useful and interesting. Further discussion on this approach, as well as on previous relevant proposals, might be useful. Our delegation would be pleased if more clarity could be achieved during the summer session on the scope of application of ad hoc inspections as well as on procedures. Further clarifying of this verification concept could also contribute to the discussion on other forms of verification, including inspections on challenge.

My delegation shares the view that the equitable composition and effective decision-making procedures of the Executive Council will be important for smooth implementation of the CW convention. In order to ensure that the Executive Council is in a position to take effective action whenever necessary, this body must inevitably have limited participation. Such action should be based on considerations taking into account the views and interests of all regions and groups of States. The representative nature of the Executive Council should be ensured through the principle of rotation of its membership and through its composition, which should be based primarily on geographical and political criteria. The level of development of the chemical industry in individual States is also of relevance for the composition of the Executive Council. While a spirit of compromise and co-operation should prevail in the decision-making process, the functioning of the CW convention would be hampered if the composition of the Executive Council made it possible for decisions to be imposed unjustifiably.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French):

... The purpose of my statement as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to try to give an overall assessment of the work of the Committee, a personal assessment which reflects only the Chairman's view. That was done specifically yesterday, in the Committee, through the introduction of a "statement by the Chairman" which all the delegations are familiar with. Today I would like to try to take a more detached view and consider the main elements of a political nature which may concern the Conference in its plenary meeting. I would like to say on this occasion that I was unable to produce a typewritten text of this statement, for which I would ask all delegations to excuse me. The main points are in the statement that I introduced yesterday in the Committee. It was designed to summarize the work done during the first part of the 1989 session, and it was drawn up in conjunction with the chairmen of the five working groups. It is an informal interim report on the deliberations of the Committee and the working groups, and the aim is to help delegations to do further work in their capitals during the recess on the questions taken up so that they can be settled during the second part of the session. In this statement, then, I will deal with the following three points: first of all a general assessment of the results of the work in the groups, to see how it stands today; next, an overall political evaluation of the state of the negotiations; and finally some comments on working methods.

With regard first of all to the results of the work in the groups, I will begin with Group No. 1, chaired by Mr. Lüdeking, which has undertaken an overall review of the verification machinery under the convention. I consider that sooner or later an integrated approach will have to be arrived at. The Committee in general, and Group No. 1 in particular, are still searching on this central issue, reconnoitring and identifying the key elements in the

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convention's verification system; in doing so they have to comply with a double imperative: first of all, to consider verification as a whole, because we need a coherent overall system, and secondly, to consider very closely each of the parts of this whole which have been submitted for consideration by delegations and will have to be finalized in the "rolling text": - routine inspections, of course - and in this regard we have to incorporate all the lessons of the national trial inspections which have begun - the question which has been raised, and which is as yet unanswered, of the possibility of additional measures, and the well-known issue of challenge inspection, as well as clarification procedures under article IX, which have been re-examined in the Committee. Thus it is an essential element of the future convention which has been the subject of difficult but detailed work.

Group No. 2, chaired by Mr. Gomaa, dealing with legal aspects, similarly considered the problems in an integrated way. It dealt, on the one hand, with what we might call an external aspect, a very important one, the relationship between the 1925 Protocol and the convention, and also the relationship between the convention and other international agreements, an issue which is not yet settled, and one on which there are strong differences of opinion. However, in many ways this situation is understandable and natural, and choices will eventually have to be made. The Group also dealt with the internal aspects of the legal system of the convention, namely amendments, for which a specific draft article has been prepared, final clauses and the question of the settlement of disputes, which had not been taken up so far.

With regard to Group No. 3, chaired by Mr. Sood, dealing with institutions, its activities generally involved consolidating the fundamental tripartite structure of the convention, as it has already become familiar. This concerns primarily the Conference of States Parties, on which specific work has been done. Next it concerns the Executive Council, on which consultations have been initiated in two stages, first in the Group and now under the aegis of the Chair of the Ad hoc Committee; I think the work on this subject is promising because it is very progressive. Lastly, it concerns the Technical Secretariat, which has already been considered carefully through the intermediary of the Preparatory Commission, which has in a sense been entrusted with prefiguring the establishment of the organs, and in particular the operational organ of the Technical Secretariat. In addition, this Group held an initial exchange of views on the question of the scientific advisory council, which is not viewed as a separate organ and will have to be discussed again. It also studied the very important question of the articulation between this tripartite institutional arrangement and the national authorities in each country. The entire problem of national implementation measures under article VII has thus been organized and in a way updated after a long period without change. I think on this chapter genuine progress was made, considerably facilitated by the work done in the national trial inspections.

As far as Group No. 4 is concerned, chaired by Mr. Molander and dealing with the technical aspects, the activities covered two major aspects. The first concerns what the delegations now routinely call the chemical annex, or the annex on chemicals, and the review permitted a reordering with the very valuable help of experts from capitals, of an entire series of technical provisions which were scattered throughout the "rolling text", to produce a

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clearer and more coherent and usable presentation of the lists and the guidelines for each of them. This work is encouraging in particular in making it possible to incorporate in the overall consideration of the problem of lists the old and difficult question of "schedule [4]", and also to develop more coherent, better structured and more accurate schedules, in particular by deleting the products which hitherto appeared in the "rolling text" (CD/881) under the heading "to be discussed". The other aspect of the work of Group No. 4 dealt with the devising of a simplified structure for the presentation of the annex to article VI [1]. Two successive reviews were carried out in this regard, so that the question came before the Group twice for in-depth work, and the latest result offers in particular a possible solution for the very sensitive question of the production of schedule [1] chemicals outside the single small-scale production facility.

Group No. 5, chaired by Mr. Krutzsch, dealt with the transition, a topic which at the outset may have seemed less familiar and less conventional, but one which quickly found its place, I think, because it met a need. The Group accomplished very useful work in this regard, which comprised two components. The first concerns assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and here there are two aspects: on the one hand, the text, on which substantial work was done in an endeavour to move beyond the two alternatives that at present appear in the "rolling text" in order to prepare a draft - and the work that has begun on this, notably a draft on the provision of assistance at the request of a State party, is well under way and should be continued. In addition, and above and beyond the text, there is the question of the very principle of assistance, which now, thanks to the contributions from many delegations and a very lively debate, enjoys much clearer understanding among all delegations as to the *raison d'être* and the role of this essential assistance machinery during the 10-year period. The second component of Group No. 5's work covered the question of the preparatory period. Here too, the concept was perhaps a little vague, but it has become familiar and has proved very useful by making it possible in particular to identify and examine closely the question of confidence-building measures and the role that they can play even before the convention comes into force to achieve true universality in accession to the convention. The Group has also been concerned with economic and technical development, and here it has run into a familiar difficulty which may be summed up in a question: Should we seek a compromise on a text which may seem to be almost ready, or should we go back into substantive issues? The question has been asked, and it will be taken up again during the summer part of the session. Of course, the Group also had consultations on the vital question of undiminished security during the transition period, which were conducted with a view to the methodical treatment of this issue during the next part of the session.

How can the work accomplished so far best be described? In a word, I would say that it was work in depth. We worked on the foundations, and if we have not really seen the building rise into the sky, it must be said that without solid foundations, nothing can be done.

In this way I come to the second aspect, the general assessment of the state of the negotiations. The rapid outline I have given of the activities of the Ad hoc Committee and the working groups might seem to fall short of the ambitions set forth by the Paris Conference at the beginning of the year,

(Mr. Morel, France)

which have been reaffirmed by many delegations here at the Conference on Disarmament since the beginning of the session. However, from the viewpoint of the Chair, we should not misjudge the present situation. The involvement of a larger number of delegations and the detailed consideration of all aspects of the future convention constitute necessary groundwork for tangible and suitable progress. The Committee - and I mean all delegations as well as the Chairman of the Committee, the chairmen of the groups and the secretariat - has worked in an unprecedented way, I think one can say, and thereby it is taking fully into account the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Subjects which had been somewhat pushed aside have been taken up again. New topics have been introduced or developed, for the first time in the case of some of them. Others, high on the agenda for several years, have been subjected to intensive consideration. Furthermore, more than half of the delegations in the Conference on Disarmament - I think this must be stressed and re-emphasized - have been involved in the demanding work of carrying out national trial inspections. There has thus been considerable mobilization of delegations, but this cannot of course be an end in itself. The new pace and the new methods of work are necessary stages which should lead to real progress, and this will be the goal of the second part of the 1989 session. All the members of the Committee can now concentrate their attention in the most specific way on clearly identified difficulties and prepare themselves thoroughly for the search for suitable solutions. As has been the case since the beginning of the session, this will need careful scheduling of the Committee's work. The tentative programme submitted yesterday in the Ad hoc Committee for indicative purposes gives a first outline. It will be formally introduced at the beginning of the next part of the session in a revised and enlarged version incorporating delegations' reactions and suggestions, and it will then be submitted to the Committee for its approval. In the Chair's opinion, the co-operative attitude of the delegations that took part in the Committee's work is an encouraging sign for the second part of the session and should lead, especially in view of the very little time available, to even greater willingness during the summer. After covering very extensively the topics identified in CD/CW/WP.222, which is the Ad hoc Committee's work programme for 1989, the time has come to get down to intensive negotiations in earnest. In conformity with the Paris Declaration, the Committee has redoubled its efforts as a matter of urgency. It should now be ready to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date.

I would now like to put to the Conference some more specific thoughts about the method of work that we have taken up. There are three points. Firstly, the conversion of the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons into real progress in the negotiations cannot be immediate. It is difficult to get some 40 delegations, plus more than 20 delegations of countries which are non-members of the Conference on Disarmament to move still faster. Everyone has his own contribution to make, and that is natural. It should also be noted that the complexity of the treaty is considerable and inevitable. Moreover, we have witnessed a degree of change of perspective, with a greater concern for universality and a better over-view of what is at stake in the convention. Therefore it was necessary and it is necessary, to intensify our efforts, with more participants and more subjects to cover.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Secondly, these problems of method are very important. These are not secondary issues. For each of the major topics and each of the groups that I have mentioned, we can see how important the problem of method is. I have spoken of verification arrangements. We are having to consider verification methods which have no precedent or equivalent, and cannot have any. Hence the importance of dealing properly with these problems of method. Similarly, at the legal level, we have to cope with apparently contradictory arguments, each of which has its own *raison d'être*. We must take them into account. With regard to institutional aspects, all the delegations recognize the complexity of the arrangements to be made for the organization of the Executive Council, for example, each of them, of course, having its own preferences; but at least one thing is clear - that everybody recognizes the complexity of the method that we must find to ensure suitable representation, and satisfactory decision-making procedures in the Executive Council. As for the chemical annex, let me sum up the problem. It is a question of managing to combine the constraints relating to the security of States with those relating to industrial production. Two separate worlds, two value systems, two series of criteria to be put into a single document in a compatible way.

Finally, with regard to Group No. 5, security and trust among partners cannot be determined and decided upon in a day. We have to proceed by stages. The idea of the period of transition is obviously a key element of the convention, and there too we will have to determine very precisely the best method. It is therefore important, on the methodological level, not to minimize the differences between delegations, but to note that it is a question of jointly taking charge of a situation which is difficult to grasp.

My last comment concerning method will be as follows. I think that the common search for common solutions to unprecedented problems is already well under way - that is the general spirit of the assessment I have tried to give you. Simply, we must base ourselves on the actual situation and not on ready-made formulae; it is better for things to be stated clearly, since it is from that moment that the real negotiating work begins. In conclusion, I am tempted to quote a well-known Latin tag, labor omnia vincit improbus - "never-flinching labour proved lord of all", as Virgil put it in the *Georgics*, which constituted in a way his hymn to the land. But man is more changeable than the land, and negotiation is less predictable than ploughing. Nevertheless, I believe that while taking into account the element of unpredictability and the difficulty of the common effort, we have, with the general political guidelines, everything we need to demonstrate the political will of the international community. In these circumstances never-flinching labour should indeed enable us to achieve a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. There is much at stake; this is one of the means whereby we must jointly seek to master one of the aspects of the evolution of the contemporary world at the frontier of technology and security. We must continue the work under way and commit ourselves more and more to negotiation. This will clearly have direct consequences for the future organization of international security.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic):

... As in previous years, the Conference mainly concentrated this year on elaborating the convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. This corresponds to the current state of affairs in the area of multilateral disarmament and to the appeals launched by the Paris Conference to this forum to redouble efforts to resolve expeditiously the pending issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. We note that under the effective guidance of the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Pierre Morel, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, making use of the advantages resulting from the organizational structure of the Committee, has succeeded in intensifying its work. Certain strides have

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(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

been made concerning a number of issues, in particular the annex on chemicals, the régime for laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals, the confidentiality annex, a number of issues regarding the future organization, assistance for protection against chemical weapons, as well as some final clauses. Furthermore, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has at this session for the first time engaged in substantive discussion on a number of issues which objectively existed also before, but for some reason remained in the background. This has become possible largely due to the chairmen of the five working groups which were established within the Ad hoc Committee.

The socialist countries on their part made an active contribution in submitting a proposal on the laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals as well as in displaying their readiness for compromise regarding a solution for super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule [1]. Another proposal provided for testing the challenge inspection procedure in multilateral trial inspections. Four countries of our Group reported on the results achieved during trial inspections carried out by them. We call for an early start of well-prepared multilateral trial inspections.

It is deplorable that no noticeable progress has been reached on the outstanding key problems. Therefore, we appeal to all delegations to conduct serious work in a spirit of accommodation during the summer part of the session. We hold that a real breakthrough must be achieved in the CW negotiations, first and foremost in such areas as challenge inspection, the overall system of verification, the régimes under article VI, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council as well as the order of destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities. Reaching agreement on articles X and XI of the "rolling text" would contribute to ensuring global adherence to the convention. We believe that the present stage of negotiations calls for endeavours aimed at finding solutions rather than creating new difficulties.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

... Today's meeting is a farewell meeting for me, since I am leaving my post as representative of the USSR at the Conference on Disarmament for a new assignment. It gives me satisfaction to recognize that in the two years and three months during which I have represented my country at the Conference, the international situation has undergone important positive changes. They have had a tangible effect on the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, major advances have been made which have brought us closer to the conclusion of the convention, although progress in the negotiations has alternated with a slowing of the pace of work. I do not intend in today's statement to analyse the status of the negotiations. An assessment has been provided today on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries by its co-ordinator for this month, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Peter Dietze. I would like in a purely personal way to express my regret that I did not manage to take part in the completion of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, including its final drafting. I hope that this stage is not far distant. I also regret the fact that during the period in which I occupied the post of representative of the USSR at the Conference, we were not able to set up a working body on a nuclear test ban. I think that it has finally become possible for the Conference to begin practical work in earnest on this problem, which for many years has been item 1 on its agenda. This work must bring us closer to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, an important measure to curb the arms race.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish):

... In respect of the second of the items I mentioned above, that is the elimination of chemical weapons, we should bear in mind the importance of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, which met in Paris from 7 to 11 January of the current year under the chairmanship of M. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. Mexico, which became a party to this Protocol without reservations in 1932, welcomed with satisfaction the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, and along with all the participating States stressed "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction", and to that end called on the Conference on Disarmament to "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". The convention, as we have already said, will represent no threat to the security of any State; rather, it will strengthen the security of one and all.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... It is my Government's view that a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons within the near future is absolutely necessary. The risk of the further spread and use of chemical weapons is otherwise going to remain with us for ever. People all over the world are concerned about chemical weapons, and recognize the imperative need to ban them completely. Now it is up to politicians and diplomats to face this challenge.

At the close of the spring session, my delegation gave its detailed views in the plenary on the current stage of the chemical weapons negotiations. I will therefore limit myself to a few basic considerations. The Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress towards a chemical weapons ban in

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

recent years. After the Paris Conference, which underscored the urgency of our task, the machinery set up here in Geneva - under the creative guidance of Ambassador Morel - has taken up important aspects of the challenge before us. But, unfortunately, not enough political commitment has yet been devoted to some of the most problematic issues and key areas. We are, for example, not yet close to solving the difficult questions connected with challenge inspections. We have not made enough progress on the question of the Executive Council; nor on the order of destruction; nor on the effective total prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

Instead of focusing on these and other crucial problems, much energy has been spent on less urgent issues and also on new and probably less fruitful concepts. This is, of course, not due to anybody's bad intentions. It is simply because a strong enough political commitment has not yet been mobilized. The technicalities will be far from impossible to overcome, once the political commitment is manifested. It is unfortunate that recent positive developments in other areas of disarmament do not yet seem to have reached the area of chemical weapons. If that issue were to be energetically addressed by the two super-Powers, giant steps could be taken within a few months.

The only new initiative in this area is the Canberra Conference. It can make a useful contribution if it increases knowledge within the chemical industry about the implications of the coming convention, and encourages the industry to co-operate in order to implement its provisions. What that Conference must not do is limit our focus to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. That would distract from rather than support the work here in Geneva. The only solution to the threat posed by chemical weapons is a comprehensive convention, and we must make a concerted effort to ensure its speedy conclusion.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

... The time the CD is devoting to item 4 of its agenda clearly reflects the willingness expressed in the consensus Final Declaration of the Paris Conference to redouble efforts towards the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. My delegation, by words and deeds, has fully supported this thrust, conscious that a universal and non-discriminatory instrument on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons is an attainable though complex objective, which certainly justifies comprehensive, detailed and intensive negotiations.

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

... Let me comment first on the subject of chemical weapons. This Conference has a unique role and responsibility as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. In exercising that role and discharging that

(continued)

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

responsibility, the Conference is engaged in an undertaking of immense significance in the negotiation of a comprehensive and universal convention on chemical weapons. The improvement in international relations which is a feature of our times does present us with an opportunity to conclude the CW convention. This is an opportunity which cannot and must not be lost. All of us are united in our abhorrence of these weapons and our commitment to ensure that they are banned for all time. Through a universal convention, the Conference will make an historic contribution to international security and stability. The Paris Conference, held in January, provided the impetus for the negotiating process this year. The collective call by 149 States to intensify the chemical weapons convention negotiations, and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, could not have been clearer. We appreciate very greatly, may I say, the energetic and creative approach of the Chairman of the CW Committee, Ambassador Morel of France, whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier this afternoon, in injecting the international community's expression of commitment at the Paris Conference into the work of this Committee. Under his leadership, the Committee has the prospect of recording real progress this year.

Others who have addressed this plenary in recent times have asserted that the final text of the CW convention is within reach. I share that conviction. I am convinced that, with a concerted and sustained effort by all members of this Conference, the text of the convention can be finalized in the very near future. As a result of developments in recent years, most of the major conceptual issues, and many of the details, have been resolved. This has been achieved through the active participation of the entire membership of the Conference, which is essential if the convention is to have universal validity. A perusal of the "rolling text" reveals that a considerable amount of technical detail apparently still awaits resolution. However, this is not a reason for prolonging the negotiation process, which has now been going on for many years. Rather, it is up to us to address the outstanding issues rigorously - to look constructively for solutions that will bring about the early conclusion of an effective convention. The problem posed by chemical weapons is serious; a convention is needed without delay; this Conference has a responsibility to provide it.

The achievement of a global chemical weapons convention is one of the Australian Government's principal disarmament objectives. Our commitment to that objective is reflected in our active participation, over many years, in the negotiations in Geneva and our technical contribution to that process through, for example, the conduct of national trial inspections. An area of the convention with which Australia has been particularly associated in recent times, as you have been aware, has been those provisions which concern the interrelationship between States parties and their national chemical industries. This is of course a crucial aspect of the convention. It is imperative that the right balances be struck in the text - between the need to ensure that chemical weapons are not being produced by the chemical industry of a State party; the right of States parties to be able to engage in activities not prohibited by the convention; and for chemical industries to be able to operate without overburdensome monitoring or intrusion.

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

The provisions which have been developed so far represent, in our view, a sensible approach, envisaging as they do specific levels and schemes of monitoring for different categories of schedules of chemicals, depending on the risk they are considered to pose to the aims of the convention. A lot of work has already been done in this area. The "rolling text" indicates, however, that a number of questions remain to be resolved. In the last couple of years, successive chairmen have initiated discussions with representatives of industry, to help them understand what the negotiations are seeking to achieve and to allow them to express their views and concerns to the negotiators. These consultations have been valuable initiatives, and Australia welcomes a similar exchange which is to take place under Ambassador Morel later this month.

But there will need to be further work done to achieve a universal understanding within the chemical industry of the implications of a chemical weapons convention, and the ways in which the industry can contribute to the elaboration of provisions which will be both practical and effective. In Australia's case, we have developed a very productive dialogue with our chemical industry on chemical weapons issues, encompassing the CW convention negotiations, over a number of years. Our industry has stated publicly its commitment to a CW convention and its total opposition to chemical weapons. Such a dialogue between governments and their chemical industries can be of enormous benefit for the convention from two perspectives: in resolving outstanding questions and thereby facilitating the early conclusion of the convention, and in ensuring that the convention is implemented effectively, both for government and industry. Through this dialogue, industry will be able to develop its understanding of its role and responsibilities in international endeavours to eradicate chemical weapons, in particular the contribution it can make to a global, comprehensive ban on those weapons.

There is a need as we see it for this dialogue to be intensified, developed and extended to all relevant countries. It is for this reason that on 7 March I announced that Australia would host a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The Conference will be held this year, from 18 to 22 September, in our national capital Canberra. The Conference will bring together governments and representatives of chemical industries world-wide, with the aim of raising their awareness about the problems of chemical weapons, and considering ways in which they can work together, in partnership, both internationally and domestically, in support of a comprehensive convention.

Australia has invited to the Conference all member countries of the CD, as you are aware, other countries with significant chemical industries and those countries with a particular interest in chemical weapons issues. Such participation will encourage the universal support which the convention must secure and which Australia is intent upon generating. It will be a joint effort designed to give, and which we believe will give, impetus to the negotiations here in Geneva. To facilitate the full and effective implementation of a convention, industry must appreciate its role in addressing the problem. Verification procedures under the convention will require the co-operation of industry to achieve full effect. The time to take this step is now, so that effective consultation begins while the convention is being negotiated. Let there be no misunderstanding as to what Australia

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

is about in hosting this Conference. It is fundamental to our approach that the Government-Industry Conference that we are proposing to host take place in the context of the important negotiations being conducted here, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a chemical weapons convention; that it support fully those negotiations; and that in its own way it contributes to and moves forward those negotiations. There is no separate agenda. This Conference is what we are about in pursuing chemical weapons objectives, and the universal chemical weapons convention is the only objective that we are seeking to obtain. We believe the Government-Industry Conference will provide that support and contribute to the early conclusion of that convention - which we must achieve without further delay.

In addition to bringing about an increased dialogue between government and industry, it is also important to ensure that those countries which are not members or observers of the CD be fully informed about the convention which is being negotiated, so that they can give it their support and become parties to it at an early stage. Australia has been active in international efforts towards this objective. In June 1988 our Prime Minister announced that Australia would launch an initiative to raise regional awareness about chemical weapons issues. In that respect Australian officials have visited South-East Asia, Indo-China and the South Pacific to promote understanding of and support for the chemical weapons convention. This dialogue will be followed by a regional seminar which is also to be held in Canberra on 3 and 4 August, which we believe will reinforce the growing regional consensus in support of a convention. This may be an example which could usefully be followed by other CD members in their own regions.

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

... And it is not one-way traffic. The spread or use of weapons of mass destruction outside Europe's borders could lead to crises with world-wide implications. They could produce devastation in the regions directly concerned, and affect the security of other regions. The NATO declaration acknowledges this. It commits the allies to work to contain the security threats and destabilizing consequences of an uncontrolled spread of modern military technologies. The declaration makes plain that one of NATO's long-term priorities is to work for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve national independence and territorial integrity.

The issue of chemical weapons is immediately relevant here. A convention to ban chemical weapons is the active item on the agenda of this Conference. This is right, for in Europe the imbalance in chemical weapons between East and West is a potentially destabilizing factor of great significance. Outside Europe the number of countries with chemical weapons capabilities is growing. The problem is not just one of proliferation, serious though that is. Chemical weapons are also being used. We have all seen the horrifying consequences of their use relayed on our television screens. It is an awful reminder of our common vulnerability, and the pressing need for a global solution.

The Paris Conference, which I attended in January this year, made clear the widespread revulsion of the international community against the use of chemical weapons. It recognized that a comprehensive and global ban on such weapons offered the only effective solution. The clear message from Paris to Geneva was to urge you - to urge us - to redouble efforts here to achieve a ban. You have put a great deal of work into this. The general concept of the convention is in place. Progress has been made on the detail, although there is still much hard, technical work left. The need now is for a clear, practical, problem-solving approach to removing the remaining obstacles.

Verification remains the top priority. For a convention to work it needs verification which works. The existing verification provisions go a long way towards achieving this. But areas of particular concern remain. We must be satisfied that all high-risk facilities and activities are adequately covered, whether they are dual-purpose production plants or military installations. Further efforts are needed. The British approach is on two levels: practical verification proposals and efforts to shape the climate of international opinion.

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(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

On the practical level, we have recently presented ideas for ad hoc inspections to strengthen the verification framework. Our aim was to carry forward the debate originating with the proposals of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany in this area. More work is needed in this key area in order to establish a convincing structure for the verification régime. We have also recently presented a working paper on novel agents which aims to point up issues which have to be addressed in the negotiations. It is essential that the convention should be able to deal effectively with developments in chemical and biochemical technology.

On challenge inspection, we have been concentrating on a comprehensive programme of national trial inspections at a wide range of military facilities. Challenge inspection will of course be crucial to the verification of a convention. Yet there is still uncertainty about how to reconcile the rigour necessary for effective verification with the protection of legitimate national or commercial secrets. Our national trial inspections are starting to produce some answers. The paper, CD/921, which I have the honour to present today offers some interim observations in the light of our experience to date in trials at ammunition storage facilities. We will be giving a presentation on this subject with supporting video material during this session. And we hope to offer more considered conclusions after further practice inspections at more sensitive facilities.

We hope the United Kingdom's experience will be useful to others. For our part, we have found these trials invaluable. We strongly encourage others to carry out similar trials, if they have not already done so. The benefits of practical experimentation have also come out clearly in the considerable number of routine civil trial inspections held by various nations. Two points have emerged particularly strongly - concerns over commercial secrecy, and the need for work on verification technology. It is right that you should be looking closely at these issues. The time is now ripe to assess the lessons learnt from the trials for the "rolling text".

I return here to the second of the themes I introduced earlier. Underlying all this work is the basic question of confidence. Confidence between East and West is growing in many areas. Chemical weapons must not be exempt. This is why the lack of Soviet openness about their stockpile matters. It damages that indivisible quality of trust. We hope that the general improvement in the Soviet attitude to publishing data will soon extend to the area of chemical weapons, where evasion and distrust are currently a major obstacle to progress. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are well placed to offer a lead.

But all countries - not just NATO and the Warsaw Pact - have a collective responsibility to demonstrate in practical ways their commitment to the control of chemical weapons. We must all take practical steps to control the proliferation of chemical weapons and join international efforts to apply pressure to countries seeking to conceal their production or use. We must all give data on our national chemical weapons capability where this exists. We must all honour existing international obligations against the use of chemical weapons. Above all, we must recognize that the leap-frogging acquisition of chemical weapons undermines rather than enhances security, and we must work

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

seriously - here in the Conference on Disarmament - for a global ban. The United Kingdom feels an increasing urgency about this. Our response must not be simply to bypass the work which remains to be done, but to put our backs into doing that work. Hence the detailed papers we keep tabling.

It is sometimes argued that the acquisition of chemical weapons is a justifiable response to the possession or acquisition of nuclear or conventional weapons by other States - whether suspected or actual. This is a false argument. There is no evidence that chemical weapons have ever had this deterrent effect in the past. But what we can predict is that, wherever they are introduced, chemical weapons are likely to have a destabilizing effect on the local balance of power as the other side looks for ways to catch up. In the medium term, everyone will gain from the verified, total ban which is the prime aim of this Conference. As for the threat from nuclear weapons, the best way to reduce that is not to oppose them with other weapons, but through a common effort to reduce existing numbers, and prevent nuclear proliferation.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... The next priority item - the universal and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons - represents a historic challenge for the Conference and for the multilateral approach to disarmament. It is not only the negotiating capacity of the Conference that is at stake here, but also the credibility of the repeated declarations of political commitment. The declaration adopted by the Paris Conference was a welcome expression of an universal political consensus on the need to conclude the convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible. Any hesitation now would have a serious impact not only on the work of the Conference but on the dynamics of disarmament as a whole.

The Conference has already done considerable work on a number of complex conceptual and technical issues. While mindful of the differences on various substantive aspects, I nevertheless believe that the convention is within our reach and that the degree of agreement in principle is greater than it may seem at first sight. Ambassador Morel continues to inject new energy into the work of the chemical weapons Committee. However, it is our impression that the Ad hoc Committee has not yet tackled thoroughly the substance of certain key problems.

I wish to address only some of them. First of all, we should abandon any ambition that the convention should cover every single detail, any possible event or situation. We would never reach our goal in that way. The demands for strict control of the production of chemicals, even in the smallest facilities, and the overplaying of the importance of protecting commercial secrets, fall into this category. By adopting a more rational and realistic approach to these two questions we could more easily come to satisfactory solutions.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The system of international control and verification should be rational - i.e. cost-effective and efficient. We consider it fully justified to raise the question of how to control and verify facilities that would not be subject to routine or challenge inspection, bearing in mind that both of these kinds of inspection obviously have their own limitations. A number of suggestions and opinions on that question have been put forward. They offer quite a solid base for establishing a common framework acceptable to all.

The starting-point on this question must be an understanding that, once established, an international mechanism to oversee the implementation of the convention should have specific responsibility, including the capacity to take action on its own initiative and preserve its independence vis-à-vis any State party to the convention. On the other hand, the strict obligation of States parties to respect the ban on chemical weapons production fully should be verifiable through declarations in a national register, e.g. of any facility that could represent a potential risk for the convention. To this end, the international inspectorate should include these facilities too in the draft annual programme of control. A schedule for inspections might also be based on the quota system, leaving the final choice of facilities and dates to be decided upon by the international inspectorate. The international inspectorate could take into account, for example, not only general risks for the convention, but also specific requests, suggestions and suspicions from various sources.

In spite of the different approaches still existing in the Conference with regard to the question of "challenge" inspection, we consider the largest part of this question as agreed upon, especially the part formulated in the "Ekéus paper". However, an important question in this domain remains open. The final judgement should be the responsibility of the international organs, and not only the concern of the States parties involved. Otherwise, we might ask ourselves what would be the real role of the Executive Council or of the Conference of States Parties. Of course, any politicization of the final judgement on the outcome of the inspection and its content should be avoided.

Although the question of the composition of the Executive Council has not been fully addressed so far, we consider that its solution should reflect our common concern for the universality of the convention. The first condition should be the full equality of all States parties. Membership in any organ or body of the future international mechanism should not be treated as a privilege. We are, however, aware that the composition of an international organ cannot avoid some reflection of realities and divisions in our world, and has to provide the necessary balance aimed at the elimination of political partiality and tension. This might be achieved through adequate political and regional representation. Any additional criteria or a different approach should be supported by relevant and valid reasons.

In our current negotiations on article XI, relating to economic and technological development and co-operation, some differences still exist. It seems, however, that these differences are in a way artificial. The convention in itself will represent simultaneously a result and an instrument of international co-operation. It will be, in itself, an incentive for co-operation in economic and technological development. In short, the

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

convention will lead to fewer suspicions, less distrust and less fear. We will be turned towards each other, rather than confronting each other. In this article the convention must reflect exactly such an approach, and we believe there is, in fact, already a broad consensus on that point.

Regarding adherence to and duration of the convention, the text must explicitly provide that they will not be limited. The question of withdrawal from membership is related to this. The final solution of this question must be viewed within the framework of the justified demands for universality, or, at least, the need for the inclusion of all countries with a technological capability to produce chemical weapons. Such an approach already contains specific limitations on withdrawal from the convention.

(Mr. Bild, Canada)

... With these reflections in mind, I turn briefly to the specific issues before us at the CD, starting with agenda item 4 - chemical weapons. Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps - hammering out the details - will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focused and practical work programme.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the 16 verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the corner-stone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. This consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the United States/Soviet Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm

(Mr. Bild, Canada)

accord on confidence- and security-building measures. Both agreements have been successfully implemented and fully complied with, a result, I would argue, to a large measure attributable to the possibility of such inspections.

Allow me to amplify these remarks by applying them to the draft chemical weapons convention. I find it difficult to imagine that any future disarmament treaties can be reached without the prospect of potentially intrusive international verification. Should this be alarming or a cause for disquiet? Not at all. We should always bear in mind that no verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand. Moreover, co-operation and consensus over these details will make the intrusiveness of international on-site inspection into a means of assuring all concerned that the treaty is being fully complied with by the parties.

I have heard it suggested that in the case of the chemical weapons convention, requests for challenge inspections would generate political sensitivities and suggestions of guilt. This outlook misconstrues the objective of such inspections. They need not be regarded as provocative, but rather as confidence-inspiring. Until such time as experience and technology permit more systematic methods of inspection to carry the full load of verification, I submit that challenge inspections will be de rigueur in virtually all disarmament treaties, the chemical weapons convention being one of the more prominent. What we could be encountering is an "attitudinal" problem, a problem that can be overcome as long as we keep our eyes firmly on the following: first, an essential concern of the convention is to ensure that international inspectors have access to any facility where clandestine activities might be undertaken; second, the essential obligation is on the challenged State to demonstrate its compliance, and not on the requesting State to prove non-compliance. As we have all indicated an abiding interest in a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention, this objective in regard to verification should be fully embraced, with the obligations willingly, indeed cheerfully, shouldered. There is thus no reason to shrink back in fear. Since we have already agreed with the UNDC conclusion that the request for inspection not carry with it implications of guilt but rather be considered a normal element of verification, let us put this "attitudinal" problem behind us and move to a more practical, less anxious understanding of what challenge inspections imply.

By the same token, we should not venerate challenge inspections as the "be-all and end-all" of chemical weapons verification. Careful thought should be given to elaborating a verification régime that would avoid unnecessary recourse to the challenge provision. Indeed, we can also explore other avenues, perhaps by making challenge inspections as "routine" as possible; by keeping them as multilateral as possible in execution and reporting of findings; and by allowing as much flexibility as possible in solving compliance problems to everybody's satisfaction through other means. These other means could include, inter alia, mutually agreed bilateral measures, fact-finding "clarification visits" or other means of demonstrating clarification short of invoking the challenge provisions. I have every confidence that, with ingenuity and perseverance, the Ad hoc Committee will find a way to accommodate the concern over intrusive on-site challenge inspection without jeopardizing the integrity of the "mandatory, short-notice" principle.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... We all know how things stand at the moment. We know about the deficiencies. But we are also cognizant of the possibilities that need to be exploited to arrive at constructive solutions regarding the pending contentious issues. Meaningful steps have, in fact, been undertaken to intensify the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I share the views on this subject expressed this morning by Ambassador Kosin. In addition, however, we feel that it is now high time to focus more attention on the outstanding essential questions. In this respect, we are thinking in particular of the following: finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to make a distinctive contribution during the summer session.

To ensure the speediest conclusion of the convention, as agreed upon in Paris, let me also refer to the suggestion for a meeting of the Conference at foreign minister level. If it is deemed possible to reach agreement in Vienna within six months or one year, then there is all the more reason to consider that the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention constitutes a realistic goal.

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

... Despite this picture we have described in general terms, which prompts encouraging and well-founded hopes for world peace for the coming years, we cannot fail to express our concern at the lack of progress in the multilateral framework in which the question of disarmament is being dealt with. For many years there has been no concrete progress within the Conference on Disarmament. We recognize that intensive negotiations are taking place to conclude a convention which will ban chemical weapons once and for all, and we are certainly aware of the technical difficulties which have to be resolved. It is clear that, over and above their undeniable complexity, the technical problems will be overcome in so far as there is a real political will to conclude the convention. Strictly speaking, in sum, only these negotiations in the area of chemical weapons may be noted as a specific prospect in the multilateral field of the United Nations. But within a broader framework, and ominously, we must also note the failure of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held a year ago at United Nations Headquarters in New York. To retrieve for the United Nations the exercise of competence in the field of disarmament is an aim which should be borne in mind by member States in their immediate actions.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... We cannot fail to derive satisfaction from the continuing positive trends in the development of international relations which many speakers before me have referred to here. These trends emerged once again during the May visit to Moscow by United States Secretary of State, James Baker, which we regard as a good beginning to a major undertaking, a serious and substantial dialogue. During the visit, agreement was reached in particular to set in motion once again the Soviet-American machinery for negotiations and consultations on a wide range of arms limitation and disarmament problems, including nuclear and space weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the limitation and cessation of nuclear tests. This is important because in disarmament matters the pace of negotiations is extremely significant, since the forces of inertia and the constraints are considerable. This is why we would like to end the pause in the negotiating process as soon as possible and begin intensive discussion of outstanding issues.

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(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... In general the spirit of the times is noticeable in the NATO documents, although both the text and the subtext still contain many concepts inherited from the period of confrontation, including those serving ideologically motivated didactic purposes. From time to time they crop up in the discussions at our Conference. The understandings reached between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to that country are of fundamental and long-term significance. We believe that they have imparted new dynamism to the process of East/West co-operation, overcoming the legacy of the "cold war". The joint statement on the results of the visit not only sets out basic approaches to the creation of a Europe of peace and co-operation and the further development of bilateral relations, but in fact puts forward a programme of concrete action in the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including the prohibition of chemical weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, confidence-building, the development of transparency and the prevention of crises. The foreign ministers agreed on a special statement on the prohibition of chemical weapons aimed at the speedy implementation of the decisions of the Paris Conference.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... Like the delegations of many other States, the Soviet delegation sincerely hopes that during the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament we will succeed in translating the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons into real progress at the negotiations within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, making it possible to prepare a convention on the subject for signature at the earliest date. The efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, to attain that goal deserve the highest appreciation. We trust that with active and constructive participation by all member States of the Conference on Disarmament and observers in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons we shall be able shortly to reach agreement on a general system of verification of compliance with the future convention, resolve outstanding issues relating to the régime of authorized synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals, and move forward in resolving the issues of economic co-operation and development (article XI) and assistance in the event of the use of chemical weapons (article X). As for verification of compliance with the convention, in our view it should be based on a combination of systematic international verification and challenge inspections of any site or facility without the right of refusal. On this understanding we will not object to the proposal made by a number of States that no specific mention of the activities of national technical means of verification should be made in the convention.

A number of interesting considerations designed to improve the system of verification have recently been set out at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, in April this year the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Oskar Fischer, advanced the idea of testing challenge inspection procedures. We are also studying with interest the working paper introduced by the delegation by the United Kingdom containing the first results of such trial inspections carried out in that country. For my part I wish to inform you that the USSR is also carrying out a national experiment related to challenge inspections, within the framework of which one visit to a military storage facility has already taken place. A summary of the results of this experiment will be presented at the negotiations.

Since the Soviet delegation intends to make a separate statement on the problems involved in the prohibition of chemical weapons, I shall refrain from a more detailed presentation of our views on this issue now, and limit myself to just one additional remark. Like all other delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome the active interest in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons on the part of a great number of countries, and note with satisfaction that the number of countries now

(continued)

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

participating in the negotiations is no longer 40 but 64. This is a very positive development that paves the way to ensuring the universality of the future convention, which in turn is important both from a global point of view and from the standpoint of strengthening security and stability in various regions. In this connection the Soviet delegation attaches great significance to the provision of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference which states that any State wishing to contribute to the negotiations on chemical weapons should be able to do so. Let us be mindful of the agreement reached by all of us in Paris.

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(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

... The impact of these developments has certainly been appreciated in the CD, as many of the statements in plenary have indicated. Nevertheless, in most areas of work in the Conference, despite its accepted position as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, a corresponding will to negotiate has not been built up. In Sri Lanka's last statement, comment was made on the lack of tangible progress in respect of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and on initiatives consequently being taken outside the Conference that might help to spur the CD's own efforts. Similarly we expressed the hope that following the Paris Conference of January this year, which underlined in universal political terms the urgency of the CD's tasks in respect of chemical weapons, the requisite political determination would be manifested to expedite a comprehensive and effective ban on these weapons. We have been kept briefed about the proposed Canberra conference. While we acknowledge the important need to "prepare" the chemical industry for the effective implementation of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, the Canberra conference should not give credence to any possible partial or interim measures which could detract from the Geneva negotiations or lead to industry restraints on the transfer of technology.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America):

... As you mentioned, Mr. President, we are pleased and highly honoured to note that with our delegation today are members of the United States Senate Arms Control Observer Group and their staff, who are visiting Geneva for consultations on the nuclear and space talks, the nuclear testing talks, and the chemical weapons negotiations. Our delegation welcomes Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who represents the State of Rhode Island, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, Senator Jake Garn of Utah, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and Senator John Warner of the State of Virginia. Their presence here testifies to the strong interest in the legislative branch of the United States Government in our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

(continued)

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Today I would like to present the views of the United States on some of the current issues in the chemical weapons negotiations. At the outset I want to stress the personal commitment of the President of the United States, George Bush, to chemical weapons arms control. Our delegation knows that this commitment is shared by our colleagues here in the Conference, and particularly by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the chairmen of the five working groups serving under Ambassador Morel. They have all amply demonstrated their ability and commitment, and there is no lack of dedication in the Conference.

We are also encouraged by the fact that most of the countries that need to be parties to the convention to make it effective are already participating in the negotiations. The future convention must be a truly global one. For that reason the United States attaches great importance to the principle that was expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference last January, namely, "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". All of us supported this principle in Paris; let us all support it in Geneva.

The negotiations, however, show us that commitment is only part of the solution to the problem of chemical weapons. Hard work on the details of a multitude of complex issues is necessary as well, particularly in the area of verification. With that in mind, let me address specific verification-related issues in the negotiations. Working Group 1 on verification is dealing now with a number of issues that are vitally important to an effective ban. Our insistence upon verifiability of arms control agreements is broader than just the agreement being negotiated here in the CD. It is indeed an insistence that is well known in all arms control areas. As arms control negotiations aim for substantial cuts in existing arsenals, and as arms control agreements increase in complexity, detailed and effective verification provisions become even more critical. We welcome the growing recognition by the international community of this very important fact. The building of confidence, however, must begin well before an agreement enters into force. We need confidence that the information to be provided under a particular agreement will be accurate and that the verification procedures will be sound. For these reasons, we strongly support advance data exchange, with provisions for its verification, and trial inspections as an essential component of the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban.

Our striving for effective verification is not, as it is sometimes described, an effort to achieve perfection. Rather, it is an effort to ensure that the future chemical weapons convention protects our security. We will not lower our standards for security simply to meet an artificial deadline or to experience the exhilaration of a treaty-signing ceremony. As we have said before, having an agreement without effective verification would be worse than having no agreement at all.

One critical task in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban involves verification in the chemical industry. We welcome the informal consultations being held this week between negotiators and chemical industry representatives from many countries. We welcome as well the convening of the conference in

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Australia in September. It can provide an opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry, not only on the negotiations but also on other aspects of chemical weapons arms control, such as the growing problems of the movements of chemical weapons precursors and technology in international commerce. From the beginning of the negotiations, the United States Government and the United States chemical industry have recognized the importance of providing assurance that the civil chemical industry is not being misused for illegal chemical weapons production activities. Since 1977, government and industry have been working together to develop provisions for a future chemical weapons convention that will provide effective verification and at the same time protect legitimate sensitive and confidential business information.

The United States welcomed the suggestion in 1988 that States participating in the negotiations conduct trial inspections in the civil chemical industry to assist the negotiating process. In February 1989, United States experts conducted a national trial inspection at the facility operated by Akzo Chemicals in West Virginia. This facility produces schedule [2] chemicals from a schedule [3] chemical. The schedule [2] chemicals are legitimate commercial products that are used as flame retardants and for other purposes. I have already provided preliminary comments on this trial inspection in my plenary statement on 4 April. Today the report on this first trial inspection is being distributed as document CD/922. This report describes in detail the activities that were carried out, and it outlines our findings.

One of the most important findings is that further work is necessary in specific areas identified in the report. The United States views this first national trial inspection as the beginning of a process to develop and refine inspection procedures, not as a test of procedures that are close to final form. This first trial inspection omitted testing some necessary procedures, such as notification, transportation, and escort arrangements. Other gaps have also been recognized, and procedures need to be improved. Thus, it is clear to us that further work on a national level, especially additional trial inspections, will be necessary to establish a realistic data base. This emphasis on further work at the national level does not mean that we oppose discussion of possible approaches to multilateral follow-on efforts. We will seek to ensure, however, that multilateral activities contribute to the negotiation of effective verification provisions. In our view activities should be organized to facilitate broad acceptance of the results. Thus, the activities should be based on multilaterally agreed objectives, they should provide realistic tests, and they should involve all interested delegations in the preparation and conduct of the activities.

In the absence of realistic and valid multilaterally agreed inspection procedures, and adequate protection for confidential business information, we question the value of multilateral equivalents of the national trial inspections. We need well grounded, business-like experiments, and not media events. We are concerned that such efforts either will be superficial, and therefore a poor model for inspections under the convention, or that they will be inadequate to protect confidential information. We also are sceptical that

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

such inspections could add much to what has already been learned from national inspections. Instead of focusing attention on multilateral inspections, it would be better to undertake several types of multilateral activities related to chemical industry verification. Collectively, these might be termed a multilateral verification experiment. This could include such activities as visits to chemical plants and on-site demonstrations of inspection procedures. Work by multilateral expert teams to solve problems discovered in national trial inspections, such as the need for on-site instrumentation and the question of how to handle verification data that is acquired on industry activities, are other important matters deserving attention.

Before leaving the subject of trial inspections, I would like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius and the Swedish delegation. They have been instrumental in the success of the initial trial inspection activities. We hope that the Conference will be able to draw on their political skill and technical expertise in future work in this area.

With regard to monitoring the chemical industry, the Conference has sought to find a way to extend the verification system of the draft convention to chemical production facilities that are not covered by the existing data reporting and inspection régimes, but that could be used for chemical weapons production. These are the so-called "CW-capable" facilities. For this reason, some had advocated that a new list, which was initially called "Schedule [4]", be established with a monitoring régime very similar to the already agreed régime for key precursors under schedule [2]. The United States position, based on the 1984 United States draft convention, has been that any toxic commercial chemical that poses a substantial risk should be placed under the same monitoring régime as key precursors, and that a separate, new schedule is not necessary. In addition, we have expressed concern about "CW-capable" facilities.

Positions have been evolving as a result of the detailed technical discussions of the schedule [4] concept. The flaws in a separate schedule [4] are now broadly recognized and delegations are groping for an alternative. During the spring part of the 1989 session, a proposal to subdivide schedule [2] to create a "schedule [2B]" for toxic chemicals attracted considerable interest. In addition, the United Kingdom has suggested that its concept of "ad hoc inspections" could assist in dealing with the "CW-capable" facilities themselves. Most delegations, however, have not formally committed themselves on these ideas. Nor has a clear picture emerged of what specific chemicals should be placed on a list.

After carefully reviewing the different approaches, the United States believes that both a schedule [2B] and ad hoc verification provisions are necessary. We propose that the insecticide "Amiton" be placed on schedule [2B]. This insecticide, which is no longer produced, is chemically related to the nerve agent VX and is extremely toxic. Existing toxicity information is sparse, but it suggests that this chemical falls in the super-toxic lethal range. We are not persuaded that any of the other toxic chemicals suggested for the list are appropriate.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The United States welcomes the very constructive proposal by the United Kingdom for "ad hoc inspections", as outlined in document CD/909. This proposal, and the significant proposal for "ad hoc checks" presented by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/869, have opened up important possibilities for strengthening the verification of non-production. While the two approaches are somewhat different, both have strong points that could be incorporated in an eventual provision for ad hoc verification. We hope that such a provision can be developed relatively soon.

Let me turn now to the question of challenge inspection. From the beginning of the negotiations, challenge inspection has been recognized as one of the key issues. The United States proposal in April 1984 for mandatory, short-notice challenge inspections represented a turning-point in the negotiations. Another turning-point was reached three years later in August 1987, when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced to the Conference that his country also supported challenge inspection without the right of refusal. For almost two years now, the United States and the Soviet Union have had a common approach to challenge inspection. Yet during that time there has been no concerted effort to complete this key provision. Delegations which have serious concerns have remained largely silent. This has left a gaping hole in the most important area of any convention, the verification régime.

We are heartened, however, by the positive developments. The initiation of trial inspections represents a major contribution to the negotiations. In this connection, we welcome the ambitious efforts by the United Kingdom as reported in document CD/921, as well as the announcement that the Soviet Union has carried out a trial challenge inspection. It is our hope that these efforts will help to resolve concerns about the intrusiveness of challenge inspections. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the plans to hold consultations on challenge inspection this summer. We urge delegations to participate actively and to make their views clear. In this connection I want to emphasize that ad hoc verification and challenge inspection are complementary. Both are normal and necessary types of verification and each has a separate and distinct role to play. Neither can take the place of the other. Both types of verification should be discussed in parallel in the Conference.

With regard to the question of protection of confidential information, in our view, a convention must contain detailed safeguards for sensitive information. This topic was discussed at length during the spring and is expected to receive attention during the summer as well. As a result of the spring discussions there now appears to be general recognition that the need to protect information applies not only to commercial secrets, but also to sensitive military information, such as security arrangements for CW storage sites and technical information on CW production facilities. We believe that a special annex on confidentiality is warranted. The Chairman's working paper resulting from discussions in the spring provides an excellent basis for further work. A certain amount of refinement and strengthening is necessary, however. It is important that the planned annex provide a clear and simple framework for the detailed regulations of the Technical Secretariat that will

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

be needed. We have a number of specific suggestions that will be provided to the Chairman of Working Group 1. It is our hope and expectation that a revised text for the annex can be incorporated in the "rolling text" in August.

While the annex on confidentiality is already well along, work is just beginning on the proposed protocol containing detailed inspection provisions. We welcome this new undertaking, which builds on earlier accomplishments under Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and Mr. Numata of Japan. Developing the inspection protocol will be a complex undertaking that will require great care. It is critical to an effective verification system. Thus, it should not be drafted hastily to meet some artificial deadline. The United States has carefully considered these matters and plans to participate actively and constructively in development of the protocol.

Finally, I would like to comment on activities in Working Group 4 that relate to verification. I have in mind the development of the so-called "chemical annex". We applaud this effort by Mr. Molander to consolidate technical provisions related to the lists of chemicals subject to restriction or monitoring. The chemical annex makes the structure of the convention more logical and comprehensible.

I wanted to focus today on verification-related issues because of their critical importance to an effective ban. There are, of course, other important issues which I was unable to address today because of time limitations. However, I plan to present additional United States views in some of these areas later in the session.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

... The traumatic experience with chemical weapons during the First World War made the international community aware of the barbarity of these weapons and led to the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We are now in a somewhat similar situation: the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq and against the Kurdish civilian population has alarmed the international community. Is the recent actual use of chemical weapons only an indication that the taboo on chemical weapons is disappearing? The alleged rapid spread of these weapons seems to confirm this notion. Chemical weapons are now said to be in the arsenals of more than 20 countries. This situation which must cause serious concern, calls for determined action. And we have to act expeditiously. We are called upon to stem the tide and prevent chemical weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. The Paris Conference united high-level representatives from 149 countries in the common endeavour to put an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. To this end, all participants in the Paris Conference stressed in the Final Declaration the urgency of concluding, at the earliest date, a convention banning chemical weapons.

The Geneva Protocol has proved - as we have become painfully aware - inadequate to prevent the use of chemical weapons. It still allows the development, acquisition and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Another major drawback is that the Geneva Protocol does not provide for any verification measures. Clearly the best way to stop the proliferation of chemical weapons and to free mankind once and for all from the scourge of chemical weapons is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that any further manufacture, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited and that this is subject to effective verification. Unless such a comprehensive solution is obtained, the risk of use of chemical weapons will persist.

Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons are far less effective than a comprehensive chemical weapons convention and I will say why. A comprehensive ban is the only means of establishing an internationally and globally accepted norm that makes the possession of chemical weapons illegal. A régime providing only for non-proliferation measures would be considered by many to be discriminatory. There may not be sufficient incentive to renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist. Interim measures, moreover, cannot reliably rule out any misuse of chemicals and equipment which have been supplied for peaceful purposes. And there will be no means of verification to deter such misuse and dispel suspicion of clandestine production of chemical weapons. If we perceive the fight against chemical weapons as consisting only of measures to prevent their proliferation, we are ignoring the real scope of the issue. We could thereby undermine the commitment of the international community to erase chemical weapons from the face of the Earth by way of a global and comprehensive convention.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

My plea today for a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons is prompted by my Government's concern not to miss a historic opportunity. The Paris Conference called for a redoubling of our efforts at the negotiating table here in Geneva. Despite the tight schedule of our meetings and the increased pace of our negotiations, I cannot but observe that we have so far failed to turn the impetus given by the Paris Conference into the urgently needed progress on the crucial issues of our negotiations.

Let me try to illustrate this point. The verification of compliance with the provisions of the convention we are endeavouring to achieve is one of the crucial aspects of our negotiations. From the outset we knew that it would be one of the most difficult issues to resolve. We welcomed the progress which has been achieved on this problem over the last few years. We now have a verification system, the elements of which have already been largely developed. Yet I get the impression that some delegations are still hesitant to commit themselves. Challenge inspections must - and all delegations seem to agree on that - be considered a corner-stone of the whole verification system, as they constitute an all-embracing measure enabling all States parties to clarify doubts about compliance. The concept of this measure has been under discussion for several years. Yet views still seem to diverge on the specific modalities of this measure. However, these differences are, in my opinion, by no means insurmountable. Rather, I am under the impression that their significance is sometimes overestimated. It should be possible to achieve concrete results which would be reflected in the "rolling text" by the end of this session. A text on challenge inspections in appendix I completing the existing draft of article IX would be a manifestation of our common resolve. Such a result would also provide the necessary basis to complete the verification system. It would be understood as a long-needed signal which could also stimulate work on other parts of the convention.

The numerous national trial inspections which have been conducted over the past few months bear witness to the fact that we are on the right track. The report on the British trial challenge inspections confirms this notion. It should provide a very useful input on the further discussions, in particular on inspection procedures. A review of the reports on national trial inspections in chemical industry facilities demonstrates that article VI and its annexes provide a sound basis for the verification of non-production. The valuable experience gained in these trials should have a reassuring effect and enable us to put the finishing touches to the verification régimes of article VI.

The extensive discussions on the need for additional verification measures in the convention have as yet not been conclusive. At the beginning of last year it was my delegation which put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks that are intended to supplement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We proposed this concept in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry. Ad hoc checks are a flexible, easily manageable and unintrusive means of verification which can cover all facilities in the chemical industry capable of producing chemical weapons and deter any production of chemical weapons in them.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Only last week we concluded a trial ad hoc check at a chemical plant in the Federal Republic of Germany. The results, on which a report will be submitted to the Conference soon, are encouraging, and corroborate our view that ad hoc checks are effective and feasible. We have presented our proposal as an input to an ongoing debate, as I explained in my statement on 13 September last year, in which I introduced our second working paper (CD/869) on ad hoc checks. It has been our intention to stimulate further thinking. We are open to any other suggestion or compromise which meets the requirement of a solution that is manageable and at the same time effective.

Let me stress again that we consider the existing verification system sound and reliable. Any ad hoc verification measure we may add to it should be regarded only as filling out the existing draft provisions. It should not in any way fundamentally change or detract from the established verification framework. The convention we are envisaging poses particularly difficult verification problems. But we should keep in mind that no disarmament agreement will be 100 per cent verifiable. Yet we believe that the verification system of the convention will be effective in deterring possible violations of the convention.

And at a more general level, all States would in terms of security be better off with a comprehensive and global convention than without it, even if the convention did not contain verification measures which could come up to the ideal of 100 per cent detectability. This should be especially clear in view of the current situation, which is characterized by speculation and suspicion about the threat posed by existing or allegedly existing CW stockpiles and the proliferation of chemical weapons. A convention would provide confidence: existing CW stockpiles and production facilities would be eliminated, and this process would be subject to strict verification; the production, processing and consumption of the chemicals in question would be monitored, thus giving assurance that such substances are not diverted for chemical weapons purposes; even if doubts about compliance were to persist, States parties could resort to the instrument of challenge inspections, which would permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concerns about security. Had the international community been able to resort to such an instrument in the past, many ambiguous situations - also pertaining to the alleged proliferation of chemical weapons - could have been resolved or, more likely still, avoided in the first place.

The Paris Conference gave expression to the world-wide consensus for a global ban on chemical weapons. Let us not lose this consensus. The conclusion of our negotiations is overdue. It is not possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We here in Geneva should not succumb to the danger of getting bogged down in protracted discussions of unnecessary details. It is our responsibility to seek early breakthroughs on the crucial issues which remain to be resolved and stand in the way of final agreement. Let us make use of the "window of opportunity" provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in. Let us also remember this: time is not on our side. The risk of further proliferation, and of chemical weapons becoming an accepted means of warfare, is growing. Thus, there is no time to lose.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands):

... Today I shall only introduce some working documents. Later in this session I hope to give a somewhat more elaborate presentation on a number of issues. Let me start by introducing a document on behalf of those countries of the CD that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which I believe will be available at the end of this morning. It is CD/926, to which are attached two documents in the original French and English, a "Declaration of the heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels (29-30 May 1989)", and a report entitled "A comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" as adopted on the same occasion by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. These important documents together reflect the views of the North Atlantic Alliance on progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. They point the way to achieving increased security at substantially lower levels of armaments. As such they are highly relevant for our work in the CD. The "comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" reiterates the Western commitment to a total ban on chemical weapons. The documents also make clear the Western position on nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. On this basis heads of State and Government have demonstrated both what can be achieved and the limits of what is feasible. I recommend these documents to your close scrutiny.

On behalf of the Netherlands delegation I would like to introduce working papers CD/924 and CD/925 on two trial inspections recently held in the Netherlands both in the same plant. I wish to recall that in 1986 the Netherlands organized one of the first trial inspections, which was followed by a workshop for all participants in the chemical weapons negotiations. The value of testing out inspection procedures has now been widely accepted, and a surprisingly large number of national trial inspections has been held since last year's summer session. Ambassador Ekéus and later Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden have played a pivotal role in preparing these trial inspections and guiding their follow-up, and I wish to thank them for it. It has, up to now, been a very successful exercise.

(continued)

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Our efforts should, indeed, be called inspection exercises, as we have not taken all necessary steps required for a real international inspection. The United States delegate, Ambassador Friedersdorf, made a similar remark this morning. We conducted two exercises in order to highlight some problems which we encountered in the negotiations recently. These problems are related in particular to the objectives of an inspection. For example: Is this inspection required because we are afraid that a declared schedule [2] compound is being misused? Or is it required primarily because the production equipment of the declared plant is suitable for the production of schedule [1] chemicals? In short: is the inspection concerned with the chemicals or with the equipment?

In fact, in our view, it concerns both. In article VI of the present "rolling text" more attention has been given, however, to misuse of particular chemicals and not so much to that of equipment: a plant that produces non-toxic schedule [2] chemicals will be brought under routine inspections, even when it is clearly incapable of producing super-toxic chemicals. On the other hand, under the currently envisaged régime, a plant that is perfectly suited for large-scale production of super-toxic chemicals will not have to be declared and routinely inspected as long as it does not produce or process one of the scheduled chemicals.

I would like to suggest that different objectives call for different approaches. In the Dutch verification exercises we have therefore pursued two different tracks. In one exercise we monitored the batch processing of a schedule [2] chemical in one reactor of a very versatile multi-purpose plant. Before the inspection took place, a facility attachment was negotiated with the plant management. In the second exercise we verified the non-production of chemical warfare agents in the whole chemical complex, consisting in fact of more than 100 reactor vessels. This inspection had an ad hoc character, i.e. it was not based on an agreed facility attachment. Both exercises were carried out satisfactorily, but they also gave us quite some food for thought, as will be clear from the working papers.

For example, a question that may seem purely technical at first sight, but which in fact is crucial for the relevance of routine inspection under annex [2] of article VI, is the definition of "facility". Do we mean one reactor with associated equipment? Do we mean all reactors within one building? Or do we mean the whole chemical complex?

The reports on trial inspections conducted so far show that all three interpretations have been used. The implication is that the scope of those trial inspections that have used the broadest interpretation might be 100 times or even 1,000 times as wide as when the most restrictive interpretation has been used. The relevance and feasibility of routine inspection is therefore highly dependent on a clear definition of "facility".

During the ad hoc exercise in the whole chemical complex we studied some specific characteristics of a plant that is capable of producing chemical warfare agents. A list of some possible characteristics is included in CD/925. We hope that our suggestions will be discussed in the relevant

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

working groups, together with important proposals made by others, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and that they will contribute to solving the difficult problem of the CW capability of the chemical industry.

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(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

... At the same time, the differences that have to be reconciled in the course of the negotiations should not be underestimated. It is very important not to undertake measures that are likely to complicate the negotiating process in Vienna. It should not be forgotten that the problem of tactical nuclear weapons also requires negotiations. The appeal from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the member States of NATO, contained in document CD/918 submitted by the delegation of Romania, states that "the disarmament process, which ensures confidence-building, must cover the entire complex of the armed forces, infantry, air force and navy, and all armaments - conventional, nuclear and chemical - ready to be used in a European contingency".

It is generally recognized that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts should not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is desirable that they should, as much as possible, be complementary options. In this vein, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to the declaration signed on 23 April this year by the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece, Andreas Papandreou and distributed in the Conference as document CD/919. In our submission the declaration is consonant with the positive trends in international life. The leaders of the two States, which belong to different politico-military alliances, state the intention of their respective Governments to "elaborate norms of behaviour with a view to turning their territories into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons". It should also be noted that the two leaders state that they are encouraged by the favourable prospects for concluding a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and are determined to sign it immediately upon its opening for signature. The declaration as a whole is based on a wish to contribute by concrete actions to promoting multilateral Balkan co-operation and working out confidence-building and security-building measures in the region.

... Speaking about expectations and hopes, it is natural that we ask ourselves what role the Conference on Disarmament can and should play in the new political environment that is taking shape today. We would not be honest

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

if we did not admit that the Conference still has difficulties in joining the general stream of events in the world and - at least to some extent - remains unaffected by the positive trends in international life. There is definitely a change - in the tone and in the general atmosphere. We welcome that. But international public opinion is expecting results, at least one multilateral convention as soon as possible.

It could be said, without exaggeration, that at present the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, is staked mainly if not exclusively on one card - the elaboration of a draft convention on a comprehensive and total chemical weapon ban. In January of this year 149 countries gathered in Paris were unanimous in acknowledging "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". The Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

My delegation highly appreciates the efforts deployed so far by Ambassador Morel in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as well as the energy and dedication of the five chairmen of the working groups. There is no doubt that the work has been intensified. We have a new structure for the negotiations, more meetings, more discussions, more participants in the negotiations. A great amount of technical work has been done, and some results have been achieved. Most unfortunately, however, we have been unable, during the spring session, to come closer to the solution of a few critically important outstanding issues which are generally recognized to be the crux of the future draft convention. In our view it is imperative at this stage for the Ad hoc Committee, and in particular its working groups, to avoid a repetition of past discussion. It is also imperative for them not to be obsessed with issues of detail which have - at least to some extent - acquired disproportionate importance during the spring session. It is high time for the negotiations to give priority to efforts aimed at finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making powers of the Executive Council. Given political will on the part of all participants in the negotiations, it should be possible to reach agreement on a general scheme of verification of compliance with the convention and to resolve the outstanding issues related to the régime of synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals not prohibited by the convention. It is also time to move forward in finding solutions to the problems involved in article X and article XI.

My delegation welcomes the resumption of the Soviet-American consultations on chemical weapons. We expect them to produce results which give a strong impetus to the negotiations in the framework of the Conference. My delegation hopes that during the summer session the Conference will succeed in translating the spirit and letter of the Declaration of the Paris Conference into real progress in the elaboration of the draft convention.

(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

In the establishment of a régime to totally ban chemical weapons, doubts have arisen as to whether the Conference has achieved a tangible result. It has been argued that the plethora of technical details means that more time is

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(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

needed. It could also be argued, however, that the improvement in the international political climate which presents us with a positive momentum should be seen as an opportunity to speed up the conclusion of the régime. A great deal of effort has been directed towards the conclusion of a convention to totally ban chemical weapons. The technical as well as the conceptual details of establishing such a convention have been thoroughly examined during these last few years, and we believe that the establishment of the régime is within our reach. The efforts and dedication of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, as well as the five Chairmen of the Working Groups, in guiding the work of the Committee deserve our special appreciation. In this regard, my delegation particularly appreciates the initiative to invite experts to give their comments and suggestions to the Committee. This constitutes a useful practice which could enrich our discussions in drafting the convention.

The issue of verification of the convention is of utmost importance for the Committee. We believe that the establishment of a comprehensive and applicable verification régime embodied in the future convention will be the litmus test of the sincerity of States' intentions to remove the chemical weapons they possess. Another element which is no less important is the order of destruction of chemical weapons, as well as their production facilities. A verifiable order of destruction which assures the total elimination and banning of these weapons will be a source of credibility for the future convention. This particular part of the draft convention is in need of a practical and problem-solving approach which takes into account the wish of those who really want to see these horrific weapons banned soon once and for all.

At the last spring session of the Conference, my delegation mentioned that we could only judge the success of the Conference in establishing the régime if, at the end of this summer session, we could see the result of our exercise in treaty language incorporated in the "rolling text". It should be remembered that the international gathering of 149 States in Paris in January of this year resulted in an obligatory mandate to redouble our efforts to conclude the régime at an early date. Technical information suggests that protection against a chemical-weapon attack is nearly impossible in a tropical climate like ours. Recovery from such a catastrophe is also said to be an extremely difficult task. These are only two of the many reasons why Indonesia, as a densely populated tropical country, has as one of its principal disarmament goals a total ban on chemical weapons.

My delegation has an open mind and constructively considers any idea or initiative which would contribute to the goal of totally banning chemical weapons. Any initiative which will enhance endeavours to finalize a global, comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament should be supported. Our readiness to positively consider such an initiative also applies to efforts outside the framework of the CD, provided that they would speed up the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention being negotiated in the CD.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... One of the most significant items on the agenda of this negotiating body is the elimination of chemical weapons. The horrors of chemical warfare were hardly remembered in 1980. Yet, the 1980s became a turning point in the banalization of chemical weapons and their treatment as conventional ones. The almost unabated and indiscriminate use of these weapons of mass destruction by Iraq in the course of its war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran added yet another frightening dimension; that is, even this despicable method of warfare and genocide can be employed almost with impunity in a world dominated by political expediency. Repeated warnings by the Islamic Republic of Iran, reports by international mass media, and even eight reports produced by United Nations teams of experts did not create any genuine reaction by the international diplomatic community, or even the States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. And in this atmosphere of silence and acquiescence, the world witnessed a quantitative and qualitative intensification of chemical warfare by Iraq.

Chemical warfare started with sporadic use of chemical weapons in limited areas and developed into a regular method of warfare. The victims, who in 1981 were a limited number of Iranian soldiers, grew in numbers, and finally engulfed innocent Iranian civilians in Sardasht. The emotional report of United Nations specialists witnessing the martyrdom of chemically wounded children did not move the custodians of international peace, security, law and human rights. Had they reacted differently, the Iraqi régime might have been deterred from resorting to such a massive chemical attack in its genocide in Halabja. The chemical agent with which Iraq started its chemical warfare was simple mustard gas. However, they gradually moved on to technologically sophisticated nerve gas and agents such as Sarin and Soman. This development is not only significant because of the vast difference in toxicity, but also because of the significant change in the required technology. Sarin cannot be produced with the normal equipment of pesticide plants. It is evident, therefore, that the technology for the production of these agents was supplied to Iraq, regrettably, in the course of the war and certainly after the Iraqi policy of chemical warfare had become public knowledge.

The delivery system of chemical weapons had an even more dramatic development. According to the report of the United Nations team, in 1984, the delivery system was so imperfect that many of the chemical bombs did not even operate. By 1986, this shortcoming had already been overcome. In addition, spray tanks, and more importantly surface-to-surface missiles carrying chemical agents, were introduced, once again proving the complicity of others in the criminal development of the Iraqi chemical war machine.

The Halabja chemical massacre shocked international public opinion and created the expectation that effective measures would be taken in order to reverse the conventional approach of indiscriminate use of chemical weapons. Against this background, and following the establishment of a cease-fire

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

between Iran and Iraq, the Paris Conference was announced. But in a bid to pre-empt any action against the culprit, the Iraqi Foreign Minister in an interview with a Kuwaiti paper on the eve of the Conference threatened that he would reveal the names of European suppliers of chemical agents and technology to Iraq, if those countries persisted in their pressure against Iraq. The blackmail was so effective that the Conference did not even name the culprit. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that although the Paris Conference called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts for the speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons, no agreement has been reached in CD even for minor improvements such as changing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to add "prohibition of use" in the title of the convention being negotiated.

What is really needed for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention is a strong political will by all parties. Our collective efforts should be directed towards total and absolute elimination of chemical weapons through the early conclusion of a convention enjoying universal adherence. Interim measures such as non-proliferation of chemical weapons will not serve the objective of abolishing chemical weapons and preventing their use. In this connection, the order of destruction envisaged in the convention should include qualitative and quantitative aspects of these weapons. The order of destruction should give priority to destruction of the most lethal ones such as nerve gas, and not start with mustard gas, which because of its obsolescence will have to be destroyed sooner or later. The big Powers should prove their genuine will by acting indiscriminately in this direction. The Canberra Conference should also refrain from acting towards non-proliferation of chemical weapons, since that will adversely affect the work of our Conference in Geneva. In order to ensure the universality of the convention, it is necessary to provide incentives, and in this respect article 10 plays a key role. Assistance to victims of chemical weapons should be automatic and mandatory, because any delay in providing assistance such as antidotes, medical care and first aid would cost human lives. Another area which still needs to be specified is punitive measures against States parties which may breach the convention.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The Conference on Disarmament has its own share to contribute to the positive general trend in world events. Negotiations on the comprehensive and total ban of all chemical weapons are definitely one of the areas where the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to make a significant step. The work resumed in the five working groups under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, in the view of my delegation, should be directed towards the solution of the remaining problems which have been identified so far, and the agreements achieved should be fixed in the rolling text. When I speak about the remaining problems, I mean those of considerable political importance. The five working groups in our view should give their attention to resolving the problems which may facilitate the earliest completion of the convention on the global ban of all chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that the Conference has done useful work with the accomplishment of quite a number of national trial inspections. The practical experience gained and the conclusions drawn will facilitate the final elaboration of the verification system of the future convention. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Swedish delegation for the excellent work it has accomplished.

While in Geneva the Conference on Disarmament is engaged in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and an increased significance is attached to the problems of verification, a number of countries are busy in their efforts aimed at contributing to the solution of that key issue.

Hungary was one of the first to conduct a national trial inspection late last year. As declared on several occasions Hungary does not possess chemical weapons, nor an industrial establishment for their production. It does not conduct any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire such weapons in the future. Furthermore no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or conducts any kind of related activity on the territory of Hungary. Our participation in trial inspections serves purely political purposes: to promote negotiations and help create mutual confidence.

The objectives of the first trial inspection were limited: to provide opportunities for a Hungarian team to learn and practise the basics of inspection. In view of the favourable experience gained, and the desire to maintain the momentum of the negotiations in Geneva, we think it useful to give consideration to following up - at the appropriate time - the national trial inspections by different types of multilateral activities including multilateral verification experiments.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

... I should now like to make one or two comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My first words of course are to Ambassador Morel, to congratulate him, and also the Chairmen of the five working groups, for the dedication and brilliance with which they are conducting their work. Bent as we all are on concluding the negotiations as soon as possible, in accordance with the spirit of the Paris Conference, my delegation cannot but salute the great effort that is being made by the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibilities in this field. As you know the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to arriving at the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons are unique in post-war multilateral negotiations, and that is worth remembering. In the first place, we are faced with negotiations that have no deadline; that is to say, we attend them and take part in them without any time-limit, remaining exposed to changes in the international environment, and hence liable to go over the same ground year after year. If we had a deadline for completing our work, or at least a particular year accepted by everyone, then our work might take on a different pace and a different look. The lack of such a date might make an unkind observer think the conclusion of the convention could be put off ad infinitum.

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(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Another factor that makes these negotiations unique is that so far the mandate still does not explicitly refer to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Obviously, this is in everybody's mind, but when it is a matter of establishing the relationship of the future convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a divergence appears. Obviously, nobody is thinking of a total prohibition, but of a limited prohibition of use, whether it is first, second or whatever use. But the fact is that this is still not clear.

Another factor has to do with the proliferation of provisions and texts, all of them related to the future convention, which would also make it unique, because it would be necessary to agree not only on the basic provisions but also on all the regulations and subsidiary aspects connected with the application of the various articles of the convention. We are therefore faced with a situation in which we have to concern ourselves with both legislating and regulating, sometimes finding that the regulatory aspect prevails over the legislative. The interrelationship that in the end exists between them, their value from the legal point of view and the differences that could arise as a result of different régimes in domestic law do not allow us to rule out the possibility of new and unwelcome complications in the future.

Related to this last factor is the question of the "rolling text" - a good term coined some time ago - which has made it possible to maintain continuity over the past few years. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether we should keep that term. Perhaps the time has come to give a new name to the text coming out of the Ad Hoc Committee, because it could happen that continuity comes to mean continuing for continuing's sake, which is not at all the same thing. We could think of a preliminary draft convention for next year, and that would appear to be the most logical thing if we wish to be consistent with the Final Declaration of Paris.

Finally, another factor that makes these negotiations special is the method of work. At first sight, it would appear logical to try to make specific progress in all areas related to the future convention, and yet when the pace and progress of the work is not smooth and even in all areas, that is to say, when there are ups and downs, we do not see why we cannot choose to defer until a later stage those subsidiary questions that need to mature further so that we can concentrate our attention and efforts on the major subjects that are interdependent and indispensable, in order to give the convention its final form. A popular saying is "Jack of all trades, master of none", and it might be advisable not to disregard that advice, incidentally making it easier for everyone to get a grasp of all the really substantive issues that will shape the future convention. I think it is very good to redouble on efforts and hold all kinds of meetings, but only in the knowledge that we are not going to disappoint expectations and that we are going to have a final text of the convention within our reach.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, first of all I would wish to express my great appreciation for the fact that I have the possibility of addressing the CD under your chairmanship.

I shall devote my statement today to the issue of chemical weapons, although Finland attaches great importance to all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A complete ban on chemical weapons has clearly become one of the foremost priorities of international disarmament efforts. It is an issue of today, not of any undefined later day in the future. The negotiations for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention within the Conference on Disarmament are where our efforts should be concentrated. The global approach is the only one that can have durable results. At the same time Finland is ready to participate in complementary international efforts as long as they truly uphold the main objective and do not lead to any diversions from it. It was in this spirit that we participated in the Paris Conference last January. It is in this spirit that we support the United Nations Secretary-General's role in investigating reports of possible use of chemical weapons and the work of the qualified experts' group in developing this procedure. It will be in this spirit that we shall go to Canberra next September.

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(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

In Paris last January the world community, practically in its entirety, condemned once again these sinister weapons of mass destruction, and gave strengthened impetus to the on-going negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference called for the redoubling of efforts in these negotiations; and redoubled they were. The Conference also called for all States to make their contribution to these negotiations. As a result new countries joined the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as observers. Despite these positive developments one can sense widespread disappointment after the spring session of the CD as to the concrete results achieved in the aftermath of the Paris Conference. We acknowledge the fact that an effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is both technically and politically complex and no quick breakthroughs are to be expected. During the spring session several issues which had not been discussed for some years were taken up again. This was helpful as a reminder of the wide scope of issues that still have to be addressed. Lengthy discussions were dedicated to other issues, which, although relevant to the final outcome, could now be left aside for the time being in order to have more time for tackling the major problems.

We share the concern of several other delegations that the impetus created by the Paris Conference will wither away in the absence of meaningful concrete results on the major questions. We strongly feel that the time has come for shifting the main emphasis in the negotiations to the politically problematic aspects. This would also help the technical experts to correctly focus their work on the real needs of the convention. Otherwise the technical discussions will become a never-ending story of new gaps and new theoretical possibilities to be covered. The basic information available to the negotiators is already sufficient for this shift to take place.

I will now turn to some of the issues at hand in the negotiations which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their destruction. It is of cardinal importance for the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning and that their destruction be promptly initiated. The order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibilities for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force. It goes without saying that the verification measures covering this issue have to be the strictest possible under the convention. We have welcomed the information the two major possessors of chemical weapons have provided about their destruction programmes already under way. As was pointed out during the spring session the safe destruction of the existing stocks is both technically difficult and costly. We hope that the technology that has been developed for this purpose by the Soviet Union and the United States could be made available in due course to any interested country. This would ensure that all existing stocks were disposed of safely within the lime-limits set in the Convention.

Secondly, effective verification that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Unlike the arrangements for the destruction of the existing stocks, these

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measures have no fixed time-limit. When approaching this issue one has to keep constantly in mind the purpose of the convention, which sets the limits to the verification measures. The main task is to verify non-production of chemical weapons. We have not undertaken to monitor the whole production of all the chemical industries of the world. Not even the production of dangerous or lethal chemicals as such. We are interested in the weaponizable chemicals, in weaponizable quantities, and, in making sure that they are not being used to produce weapons. Beyond that, the verification of non-production of minor quantities in a cost-effective way will become increasingly difficult. The best we can strive for is to create a régime that can be used to clear any doubts of non-compliance. If possible, that should be done even before such doubts become serious. In practical terms that would mean a régime that allows selective intrusiveness, includes a factor of surprise, and uses technically and scientifically sound methods. We are convinced that all the main elements required are already in existence. The technical methods have been developed to the extent that non-production of the named chemicals can be verified. The further tuning of these methods now depends on clear definitions of all parts of the régime.

The concept of mandatory short-notice on-site inspections and the details of that part of the verification régime should be taken up as a matter of priority during this summer session. The challenge inspections and the different proposals concerning ad hoc procedures should be moulded into a consistent régime which allows for a flexible application of measures to the variety of situations that may arise. Without going into the details of such a régime we feel that the inspections should always be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. There should also be a possibility for the Technical Secretariat to initiate the process. The most important feature, however, is that the inspections falling under this category should constitute a normal procedure under the convention. Their role should be regarded as preventive and not as offensive or as a last resort. Care should also be taken to create reasonable safeguards against abuse of the régime. The inspection activities should not decrease the confidence of the country being inspected or its industry in regard to the overall usefulness of the convention.

The third part is the relationship between the chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In our opinion the convention will have to supersede the provisions of the Protocol, including the reservations made to it. The convention bans chemical weapons from the day it comes into force. The destruction period of 10 years is there to create a realistic timespan to get rid of the existing stocks safely. When the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the convention there can be no excuses for circumventing that obligation. The maintenance in force of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol would maintain the option of the second use of chemical weapons. This would clearly undermine the convention.

Fourth comes the right of every nation to strive for the normal and legitimate development of its own industrial base including the chemical industries. The convention cannot compel the Governments of the States parties on behalf of the individual enterprises to transfer technology when it

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

is against the interests and will of the owners of that technology. However, nothing in the convention should prevent the transfer of technology for permitted purposes. Under the convention the verification régime is for the purpose of ultimately verifying that the technologies and chemicals are not used illegitimately.

We clearly understand that the inclusion of this kind of a provision in the convention is important to the nations whose chemical industry is in the early stages of development. As a confidence-builder it is comparable to the value some other countries, including my own, attach to the verification provisions. The export controls that many countries are preparing or already imposing on relevant chemicals and technologies should be regarded as necessary provisional measures. In the absence of a global ban the spread of chemical weapons and the widening availability of long-range delivery systems for them is everyone's concern. The spectre of long-range chemical warfare should not be allowed to go free. After the chemical weapons convention has come into force the importance of these controls will diminish. Their application to trade between the States parties could then be relaxed.

Universal adherence to the Convention is of utmost importance for it to be effective. The legitimate concerns and interests of all nations should be given equal attention during the negotiations. This can be done in two parallel ways without hampering the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating body. First, all countries willing to make an active contribution should be encouraged to do so. The observer countries here in the CD should make full use of this opportunity to put forward their views and have them duly reflected in the process. The number of observers has grown considerably since earlier years, and we hope that this trend will continue. Secondly, efforts should be made to inform those countries which, for different reasons, cannot participate in the negotiations even as observers. In this field we acknowledge the valuable work done by Australia in promoting regional awareness about chemical weapons issues.

I would like to turn now to some more detailed and technical aspects of the convention. Earlier I touched upon some general aspects of the verification of compliance with the convention. However, verification does not only involve working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself. The development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out the specific verification tasks that those procedures entail is equally important. Moreover, this work is continuous and requires constant attention, testing, research and improvement in all the fields connected with the inspection activities.

It is precisely these aspects of CW verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project is conducted by a team of scientists and financed by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Project develops instrumental methods for detection, identification and analysis of chemical warfare agents. The results of this work, as we know, have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the Finnish Blue Books. The latest

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report, the fourteenth of the series, will be introduced here in the very near future. The new Blue Book is a revised version of Report D.1, "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" which was presented to the CD last summer. Revisions have been made on the basis of experience gained in applying our procedures to 40 chemicals. A chapter on liquid chromatography has been added, and all experimental data have been presented in the Appendix.

During the last years the Finnish Project has devoted considerable efforts to some of the basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the Convention. These are: instrumentation, standard operating procedures and computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals.

The instrumentation of the verification laboratories has been described in the recent working paper submitted by Finland (CD/CW/WP.253) which was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the meeting with the representatives of chemical industries two weeks ago.

So far there is no generally accepted method for CW verification analyses. The standard operating procedures designed by our Project try to fill that gap. The need for generally accepted procedures is evident. All the analyses of the samples taken by the inspection teams should be carefully handled by identical procedures and analysed by exactly the same methods. Only then can the results become comparable. Only, then can they be universally relied upon, and leave no doubts about the scientific value of the findings. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, as any violation will immediately become a political issue of large international dimensions. There must be no uncertainty about the soundness of the results.

Moreover, such precision combined with total impartiality can only be guaranteed if there is a network of qualified laboratories especially accredited to conduct the analyses. On one hand, the scientific and operational quality of these laboratories would have to be constantly tested and verified. On the other hand, the origin and nature of the real samples would have to be concealed from the laboratories. This would guarantee the impartiality of the analyses and minimize the risk of the disclosure of confidential information.

In order to guarantee world-wide distribution of the accredited laboratories, training in the analytical methods and in the use of the instruments is crucial. Also the inspectors of the International Inspectorate will have to be trained in these skills. Finland announced at the Paris Conference last January that it would be willing to provide this type of training for chemists from developing countries. I am now in a position to give more details of this training programme. It will be made available at this first stage to the interested member States of the Conference on Disarmament belonging to the Group of 21. The training course will have a duration of four months, and three analytical chemists can be trained at each course. We envisage organizing two courses a year, and thus six qualified

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

chemists can be trained annually. Originally we had hoped to be able to offer training for a larger number of chemists at a time. However, doing that would necessarily have meant a considerable loss of quality in the instruction. The real instructor/trainee ratio of our programme of about one to one during the entire four-month period also reveals the dimensions of the training efforts that are required internationally well before the entry into force of the CW Convention. During our course the participants will be trained in sample collection, preparation of the samples, chromatographic methods, laboratory automation and the use of the computerized data base. Also, the basics of mass spectrometry and its use as the detector of a chromatograph will be taught. All the instruction is designed especially for the purposes of the CW verification. The cost of the training, travel from home country and back, accommodation as well as a daily allowance will be provided by Finland. The only financial implication for the sending Government would thus be the basic salary during the time of the course. We hope that this offer will meet the interests of several of the members of the Group of 21.

The computerized data base was first introduced to the CD a year ago, during the summer session of 1988. It will enable any analyst anywhere in the world to compare the results of his analysis with the characteristics of the scheduled chemicals stored in the data base. In an instant he will be able to tell for sure whether the compound he has been analysing is one of the scheduled compounds or not. This is an indispensable tool for the inspectors. To achieve the desired result, only one condition has to be met: the sampling, the handling of the samples, their analysis, and the instrumentation should follow the same detailed procedures that were followed when the data base was prepared. Again the need for the standard operating procedures is evident. Another prerequisite for the functioning of the data base is that the chemicals that are to be monitored must be individually defined. Broader definitions like families of compounds will not suffice. Furthermore, every one of these compounds must be synthesized and analysed for data storage. As of today the data base of the Finnish project includes 40 compounds. Here we should like to thank both the United Kingdom and Switzerland for having supplied us with the necessary material to get us where we are now in this work. In order to make it easier for everybody to visualize the functioning of the data base, a live demonstration of it will be arranged here in Geneva during the second week of August, to which all the members and observers of the CD will be invited.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet delegation in its previous statement of 22 June expounded the basic approach of the Soviet Union to a broad range of disarmament issues in a wider context of creating a secure democratic world. Today I would like to elaborate in more detail on the problem which is in our view central to the work of the Conference, that is, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would hardly be an overstatement to say that we are living through a critical turning point in the negotiations, with all the controversies that are to be expected at such times.

To speak of the positive aspects, there is in particular the fact that the draft convention is in an advanced state of preparation. At the Conference held in Paris earlier this year, virtually all States assumed, at a high level, moral and political commitments in relation to the earliest conclusion of the convention. Many countries and groups of countries have recently stated, individually or jointly, their support for the cause of banning chemical weapons. The relevant provisions of the comprehensive arms control and disarmament concept adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels are very much welcome in this connection, and particularly the intention expressed in it by the NATO leaders of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable treaty banning any chemical weapon, its development, production, storage or transfer. We also notice that the most recently published NATO documents seem to suggest that chemical weapons are not regarded as an integral element of deterrence, which in view of NATO's general philosophy of arms limitation raises hopes of a truly complete renunciation by all its members of this gruesome means of extermination. As for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the leaders of the allied countries at their summit meeting held literally a few days ago in Bucharest called for efforts to speed up the preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stocks.

Finally, among the positive elements we have are the restructuring of the negotiating process carried out under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel, the presence of a significantly greater number of observers at the negotiations, and the fact that progress towards a convention has gone beyond the limits of pure negotiations and reached a stage when a whole number of countries have started practical preparations for their participation in the future agreement.

On the other hand, during the spring session of 1989 and in the early days of the summer session, the multilateral negotiations failed to reach the desired tempo. We get the impression that external political stimulus is taking too long to be transformed into progress in negotiations which necessarily requires the readiness of every participant to take resolute steps and make bold compromises. A considerable portion of time this year was consumed by the discussion of technical details. In itself, this might be no bad thing, but even then we were often going round in circles. The devil is in the details, they say, and exorcizing him from wherever he might be always requires an extreme effort of will, which in our case, naturally, means political will. It is also needed to resolve some of the still outstanding

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basic issues. The foregoing does not necessarily imply that nothing has been achieved recently. One positive example in the area of technical details is the adjustment of the schedules of chemicals covered by the convention on the basis of limiting the radicals of alkyl and o-alkyl fragments in the respective chemicals, undertaken by the Chairman of Group 4. In the realm of political problems the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Morel on the composition of the Executive Council and challenge inspections (article IX) are highly commendable.

However, we can and must move ahead faster than we are now doing. Many representatives, in giving their analysis of the state of negotiations, stressed that any loss of time or momentum now is extremely dangerous and that the impetus generated in Paris would fail to be a long-term factor if not supported in Geneva. The Soviet delegation fully shares this opinion. Delay in the negotiations is all the more unacceptable in that it takes place against a background of dangerous trends in chemical weapons proliferation. Being decidedly opposed to the spread of chemical weapons, we lend our support to international efforts to counteract this threat and we are improving our national measures in this field. In doing so, we are fully aware that the only thoroughly effective solution to this problem is a comprehensive convention concluded at the earliest date and without any linkage to other disarmament measures.

Negotiations are not the only way we use to pursue this goal. In the USSR the appropriate agencies are preparing recommendations on the order and time of construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, including their location. Their capacity will ensure the destruction of our entire CW stock in the Soviet Union in the time period set by the draft convention. This will demand the solution of a whole set of problems related to the transport of the weapons, their disassembly and destruction. Priority attention is given here to environmental protection.

We are also engaged in active bilateral discussions with a whole range of countries on the problem of a chemical weapons ban. In particular, during the recent visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn, a statement on a chemical weapons ban was adopted at the level of the ministers for foreign affairs. At the request of the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, this statement, together with the joint statement of the leaders of the two countries on the results of the visit, are being distributed as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/930 and CD/931).

In June, beginning right on the very first day of this summer session, the eleventh round of Soviet-United States discussions on a chemical weapons ban took place here in Geneva. This has been one of the most productive rounds since we began meeting with the United States delegation in pursuance of the agreement reached in Geneva in November 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Substantial progress was made as a result of intensive work at the plenaries, restricted meetings between the heads of delegations, and meetings of experts. This relates in the first instance to the draft paper on procedures for challenge inspections, which we believe might soon be submitted

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for examination to Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Considerable progress was also made in preparing proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities, though some questions relating to certain numerical parameters and terminology still need to be resolved. A useful discussion was held on permitted production and synthesis of Schedule I chemicals as well as on toxins. Finally, although no complete agreement has been reached as yet, we have made progress on a whole range of bilateral measures of confidence-building, openness and mutual inspection. These measures are to be implemented even before the future convention is signed. All in all, we are encouraged with the results of the round and hope that after some time they will have a favourable influence on the multilateral negotiations as well - the subject which I would now like to turn to.

We believe that by now the conditions are ripe for us to finish putting together the essential verification system. The basis for such a system is there - it is the combination of systematic and challenge inspections. Yet unresolved issues still remain in every area. We are convinced that challenge inspections without exemptions or the right of refusal, extending equally to any site or facility, be it military or civil, State-owned or private, are an essential element of the future verification system. We urge all those who have not yet done so to make an unequivocal statement that they accept the principle of such inspections. Should any members have specific difficulties, let them openly state where such difficulties lie.

We do not share the opinion which has sometimes been voiced here that challenge inspections are excessively confrontational. (By the way, I should like to ask whether it might not be as well for us to stop using the word "challenge" and say "request" instead.) At the same time we would be prepared to give an attentive look at the arguments of those delegations which believe they would be more comfortable if alongside the mechanism of challenge inspections the convention contained procedures which did not involve expressing suspicions about any State.

The proposal of the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections which could, as we understand it, be carried out at any site or facility could form a good basis for such an additional verification sub-system. True, we would prefer that quota limitations should only apply to the number of inspections which a State would be obliged to receive on its territory within a given period of time. The so-called active quota would not then be introduced. Otherwise, States would always have to be afraid of exhausting their quotas too quickly, and this in its turn could limit their real possibility of exercising the right of request. As for the passive quota, we believe it could amount to about five inspections per year. Provisions should also be worked out containing specific requirements for requests to make ad hoc inspections, namely, an indication of the location and the specific type of activity to be verified. This is necessary if such inspections are to be effective.

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The issues of what should be the starting point for challenge inspections and what their scope should be are of fundamental importance. Of equal importance is what the end result of these inspections should be. In our opinion, for the sake of having an effectively functioning convention mechanism there is everything to be said for taking no decisions as to compliance by a State with the convention when reports on challenge inspection results are discussed in the bodies of an international organization established under the convention. Instead, where necessary, recommendations would be adopted on measures to ensure compliance with the convention. Among such measures certain sanctions could also be considered. We believe that a similar procedure could also be applied to the consideration of reports on routine inspection results.

Recently, there have also been signs of progress in working out a régime of systematic verification, in particular within the framework of article VI of the draft convention. In this context we take note with satisfaction of the support given by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf to the idea of including Schedule 2B in the convention.

We also support the idea that in addition to the so-called "régime" schedules of chemicals, on the basis of which certain measures of limitation or verification would be taken, a "marker" list - or as it is called - a "waiting and warning" list should be envisaged for substances capable of posing a risk for the purposes of the convention. The scientific and consultative council which would be established within the framework of an international organization under the future convention and which would perform the function of keeping track of innovations in chemistry would also participate in drawing up the list. A part of the council's membership could be elected from candidates proposed by international scientific organizations.

Taking into account the view of a number of States that laboratory synthesis of Schedule I chemicals should be permitted not only for medical and research purposes, but also for the purposes of protection, we would be prepared to agree to such synthesis being carried out at a State's discretion either at a small-scale facility or at one laboratory synthesizing not more than 100 g of Schedule I chemicals, with its location and the names of the chemicals synthesized being declared. We do not propose that either this laboratory or any other laboratory synthesizing Schedule I chemicals should be subject to systematic international verification. At the same time we believe it is important to envisage approval and declaration by States parties of all laboratories synthesizing Schedule I chemicals for permitted purposes. A positive solution to this problem would considerably facilitate agreement on this section of the convention in general. As for production of Schedule I chemicals for pharmaceutical purposes outside a small-scale facility, we would be prepared to agree to the proposal that their annual quantity should not exceed 10 kg for each facility in question.

A number of delegations have recently expressed concern that with the verification systems under article VI as they now stand, multi-purpose facilities, as well as facilities which are not producing chemicals posing a

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risk for the purposes of the convention but whose characteristics would make it quite possible to organize such production, would not be covered. To a certain extent the solution to this problem would be facilitated if thresholds for declaration and verification were determined on the basis of the design capacity of facilities, rather than their production levels. It would also be useful for the Technical Secretariat to be entitled to submit independently a request for inspection if in the exercise of systematic verification activities by the Technical Secretariat a need arises to clarify certain obligations. We are also ready to consider constructively other proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry and will support any verification measure leading to greater security. The solution of the problem of non-production of chemical weapons in industry is possible on the basis of a balance between the need to have the most stringent verification and the legitimate industrial and commercial interests of States parties to the convention.

Finalization of work on the system of verification would be much facilitated by the early introduction of international trial inspections under the experiment launched last year to test procedures for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry. As far as we see, some delegations have certain apprehensions over the idea of international trial inspections. I believe these apprehensions are somewhat exaggerated. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold such an experiment at a facility in Dzerzhinsk as soon as the procedures for it are arranged and agreement reached on starting such inspections in other countries. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be appropriate to agree on the most important problems to be studied in the experiment. We propose that this work should be begun as soon as possible. In our view, the membership of the international group of inspectors and observers for visits to facilities should be limited and should not exceed 10-20 persons.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of having a truly global convention. The ultimate goal should be universal participation of States in the convention. Naturally, it is for each State to decide, by weighing all the pros and cons, whether participation in the convention would or would not be in its national interest. Hence the conclusion that for the widest possible participation of States in the convention, it should provide certain benefits in terms of protection against chemical weapons for its participants who have renounced chemical weapons, as compared with other countries. In this context we attach great significance, in particular, to article X of the convention, dealing with assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation would be prepared to support the idea of establishing a voluntary fund to render assistance to any State party against which chemical weapons were used. The fund would be an integral part of a mutual assistance mechanism within the international organization set up under the convention. We believe that financial resources and appropriate material facilities, including means of chemical protection, could be contributed to that fund.

In conclusion, a few words on the topic which has been repeatedly discussed both inside and outside the conference room - the forthcoming conference on chemical weapons to be attended by representatives of

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

Governments and industry at Canberra in September. The Soviet Union has decided to participate in this Conference. We are particularly satisfied with the fact that it will focus on joint action by Governments and industry aimed at the early conclusion and implementation of the convention banning chemical weapons. We believe, as I have already said, that taking into account legitimate interests of industry is essential for the success of the Geneva negotiations. From this standpoint the significance of the Canberra Conference is very great. The Soviet delegation at that conference will be prepared to make a constructive contribution to the discussions on the agenda items and to help it arrive at positive results.

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Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): We have just entered into the second third of the summer part of the Conference. Four weeks still remain for effective negotiation. Time is pressing if we are to reach tangible results in the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Together we have made a fresh start following the Paris Conference. In the Paris Declaration all States came out in favour of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. All States advocated that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be global and comprehensive as well as effectively verifiable. All States pronounced themselves in favour of concluding the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest possible date. This is from our point of view the substance of the agreements reached in Paris, and this is our view of their interrelationship - you cannot do one thing without the other.

Have not the events of the recent past visibly shown that the use of chemical weapons prohibited under the Geneva Protocol can only be precluded in future if they are completely banned with global effect at the earliest possible date? To stop the production of chemical weapons, to advance towards their destruction, to prevent their proliferation - these are, no doubt, significant moves for their comprehensive prohibition. Do not measures against the proliferation of chemical weapons however, lose something of their positive impact if they are deprived of their character as an interim measure? Is it not urgently necessary to finalize work on the verification system without allowing any further delays in the negotiations? Otherwise, we think, a situation could arise where the existence of ever more sophisticated chemical weapons in ever more hands would render effective verification of their prohibition extremely complicated or would even make it impossible.

The verification system for a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has a key role in the present negotiations. Permit me, therefore, to offer a few comments on this problem. Article VI of the draft convention together with the annexes thereto already contains a sound system of provisions for effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This system is being supplemented at present in Working Group 4. The final touches are being put to the régime attached to list 1. The lists of chemicals are being amended and defined.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As regards verification of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons production outside the framework set by article VI, this should, in our view, be ensured, in the first place, by means of challenge inspections. A provision to this effect, however, has not been agreed upon so far. The basic ideas set forth in the "Ekeus Paper" (document CD/881, pages 141 and 142) have not been developed further since 1987. Therefore, the next logical step would be to seek understanding in principle on challenge inspection and to include relevant provisions in article IX of the draft convention. All efforts undertaken by the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, to this effect deserve our unqualified support.

It is, in fact, high time in our view for delegations to disclose their positions on such questions as: the right to request an on-site inspection at any time and anywhere; the mandatory character of such an inspection without a right of refusal; the procedure to be applied in case agreement on arrangements alternative to full and comprehensive access cannot be achieved; and the procedure after submission of the inspection report. In this way, it would be possible to bridge existing differences of opinion which have surfaced on this matter and to draft a mutually agreed text of article IX, part 2.

The question whether additional verification provisions are necessary beyond the framework established by article VI and the means of challenge inspection has been discussed to date without conclusive results being attained. If the general opinion tends to deem it necessary that the verification system be supplemented, we, for our part, will join in efforts to search for a generally acceptable and effective solution. It is our understanding that such measures shall correspond to defined additional verification needs and shall require no disproportionate additional costs.

I am underlining this since we should avoid formulating additional measures in the form of a costly and detailed mechanism similar to the one applied with articles IV, V and VI. On the basis of the provisions set out in article VI, it would suffice to outline the general framework for supplementary measures. It should be incumbent upon the organs of the future organization to render the procedure most effective by making use of the experience gathered in the implementation of the Convention. Here we need to clarify which supplementary measures would be eligible, routine inspections or inspections initiated by member States. Two possible approaches have been outlined in the working paper of the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/869) and in the working paper of the United Kingdom (CD/909).

At the present stage of negotiations, we believe the discussion ought to be focused on practical problems. What we have in mind in this context is to consider the possibility of concentrating additional routine verification measures, for example, ad hoc checks, on a relatively small number of facilities which on account of their technological parameters pose a risk to the convention. In this way, the available financial resources of the future Organization could be efficiently used for particularly sensitive facilities. To select such facilities would be the task in our view of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

It would be advisable to apply an objective selection mechanism. The application of advanced methods which are common practice in the chemical industry, for example, work with computer-aided synthesis banks and screening schemes, could serve as a suitable means to identify facilities which have a significant potential to be misused for CW production. Applying such a method, it would be possible to cover an important area where violations of the convention may occur, for example, facilities for organophosphorus chemistry.

Other facilities not accessible by this approach could, however, also be misused for the production of certain chemical agents. Verification on the basis of objective selection methods would not be an appropriate means of deterrence in this respect. The question is legitimate, we think, whether it would be possible to effectively make use of challenge inspection against potential violations of the convention which might occur in such facilities. If there is, however, a need for additional verification provisions, then it could, in our opinion, only be something rather different from challenge inspection. This could be done by means of a verification procedure for which the Organization would be responsible but which would be initiated by a member State.

From all this it can be gathered that the development of the verification system will be a permanent task in the implementation process of the convention. With the present system of verification provisions, which encompasses data reporting and monitoring, routine on-site inspection and challenge inspection, a reliable basis has been created to this end. It must be expandable and flexible. The provisions on the organs of the future Organization should ensure that the viability of this system is guaranteed on an institutional basis.

Those were a few comments on our part concerning the settlement of still pending essential issues in the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. We have made these observations in the conviction that given the requisite will and readiness of all parties, it will indeed be possible in the remainder of the session to reach an understanding on these issues and on other essential subjects under negotiation. The committed, creative and methodical guidance of the negotiations by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and his bureau encourages us in this endeavour. If we work energetically to bridge the remaining differences in a flexible manner and display the necessary sense of determination, it will be possible that the outcome yielded so far in the negotiations will be fixed in the "rolling text" and that the summer session will produce positive results. A good many things quite certainly remain to be done in order to bring about a solution on those issues where there is a possibility of promising results during the summer session. We should centre our efforts on these questions in the course of the intersessional period of work if agreed upon. Along these lines, our delegation will play an active part in compliance with the recent declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... Let me briefly comment on the ongoing negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the wise guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France. Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on her territory. As has been rightly stressed several times before in the Conference, the credibility of the convention will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of the verification régime that will finally be elaborated for the convention. The verification régime should therefore give very convincing assurance of compliance with the purposes and objectives of the convention, or that non-compliance will be detected. Such a régime would indeed strengthen the convention.

The many trial inspections undertaken so far are very vital for the elaboration of the verification régime. I wish to place on record our appreciation for the very commendable contribution by the Finnish delegation through its work in developing some basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the convention in the area of instrumentation, standard operating procedures and a computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals. We note with satisfaction the delegation's offer to train analytical chemists in the methods of analysis and instrumentation.

My delegation welcomes the intense discussions held by experts from industry on the question of confidentiality. The need to ensure effective verification by obtaining adequate information from industry was pitted

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

against the demand of industry to severely restrict the information that may be demanded for verification purposes. It is reassuring that although the experts were all too anxious to ensure that industrial secrets were given sufficient consideration and protection, as well as compensation if breached, they were also aware of the need to strengthen the convention.

This brings me to the question of sanctions. This issue received limited attention during the spring session. It is however now receiving serious consideration in Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee. We welcome any measure that can strengthen the convention that is currently being elaborated. The provision of sanctions or penalties for violations of the convention, is one such measure which my delegation attaches great importance to. The nature of the sanctions or penalty should be determined by the extent of the violation. Minor violations should attract automatic and mandatory sanctions while major violations should, after prompt investigation, be dealt with speedily first by the Conference of States parties and thereafter by the Security Council. Once a decision is taken to penalize a violation of the convention, the sanctions should be mandatory, effective and collectively undertaken by all States parties. It is equally important that sanctions should also be applied to non-States parties who violate the convention. By signing the convention a State party will be denying itself the right to produce or acquire this weapon, which a non-State party may produce and even use freely if there is no such deterrent measure. States parties will therefore be at a disadvantage, and also placed at the mercy of the non-States parties which may be tempted to use such weapons against them. Collective action by States parties against such violations of the convention would deter non-States parties from possible breach.

Let me conclude my statement with a brief comment on the forthcoming Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The involvement of experts in the work of the Conference on Disarmament has proved to be very useful in our negotiations. It is hoped that the Canberra meeting will enable the chemical industry to appreciate the need for a chemical weapons convention. However, my delegation is constrained to urge that the Canberra meeting should not be used to promote non-proliferation of chemical weapons, export control of chemicals to developing countries and restriction on transfer of technology to developing countries. To do otherwise would undermine the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed put in jeopardy the work that has so far been done on the convention.

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

... As I have already said, it does not fall within the purview of this body to examine details of negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 598, but it is clear that the Iranian Minister has sought to take advantage of this forum solely for purposes of propaganda and in a desperate attempt to raise the question of chemical weapons in the usual misleading Iranian manner. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran seems to forget his Government's intensive endeavours to purchase weapons, including chemical weapons by all legal and illegal means, and the international information media are still talking about the scandals concerning the smuggling of chemical substances in which the Iranian régime was involved. In the most recent scandal, substances smuggled from a European country were seized in a port in the Arabian Gulf. The country concerned expelled the Iranian diplomats involved in these contraband operations. On this point, I should like to remind everyone that Iran was condemned for having used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. He selected extracts to use for his own propaganda purposes and set aside everything that condemned his régime. These are the methods of equivocation and prevarication which have become a well-known behavioural characteristic of the Iranian régime. The Iranian Minister's

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(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

lamentation over the fate of children is the height of hypocrisy on the part of a régime that used children as human mine detonators, regarding such activities as feats of heroism.

Iraq played a constructive role in the Paris Conference, as everyone knows, and co-operated with other delegations objectively, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran has ventured to accuse all the countries which participated in that Conference at Paris of having succumbed to alleged blackmail by Iraq. Everyone knows how the Iranian régime is blackmailing the international community through terrorism and hostage-taking. During the war, Iraq challenged Iran in every international forum, including the United Nations, through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference, proposing that both parties should undertake without reservation, to respect all international treaties and conventions, as well as the rules of international law. The Iranian régime refused to enter into such commitments. Within the context of these endeavours, Iraq affirmed its full willingness to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 vis-à-vis any country that would for its part comply with the same Protocol, together with the provisions of all treaties, conventions and laws of an international nature. Finally, the most striking aspect of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is that it reflects neither a political will to seek peace nor a sincere intention to achieve it. At a very time when endeavours are being made to achieve peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that régime should realize that everybody is aware of what goes on under its rule. Accordingly, his Government should respect present-day rationality, as well as the rules of international relations and civilized behaviour, and abandon its policy of prevarication, deceit and duplicity so as to ensure security, peace, stability and progress for the region and all its peoples. Otherwise the Iranian régime will merely bring distress and ruin on itself.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): We have asked for the floor today to introduce the latest Finnish Blue Book entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, Second Proposal for Procedures Supporting the Reference Database". The first chapter of the report has already been presented about two weeks ago as a separate working paper on the instrumentation needed in the verification laboratory.

The starting point for our proposal of standard operating procedures as contained in this report is that the CW convention will include lists of chemicals and that laboratories must be able to monitor these chemicals reliably from real samples. The selection of the analytical instrumentation for a verification laboratory will entirely depend on the listed chemicals. Our methods have been developed for the monitoring of compounds at present listed in the annex on chemicals. At this stage the emphasis is on the chemicals listed in schedule (1), most of which date back to the two world wars. Although our techniques are intended to be universally applicable to a wide array of chemicals, novel agents might require new techniques.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The present annex contains large families of compounds. The usefulness of monitoring methods depends on the number of compounds to be monitored and on the availability of prerecorded identification data. If the number of compounds is large, they need to be grouped into subgroups to allow monitoring with specific methods. Monitoring of known chemicals, it may be added, is very much easier and speedier than structure elucidation of unknown chemicals.

The general-purpose definition of a chemical-warfare agent - that a chemical is a chemical-warfare agent if it is used for that purpose - will be useful in securing that the convention cannot be circumvented by claiming that an unlisted chemical is not covered by it. The definition can reasonably be applied in cases of alleged use. Owing to the rarity of such occurrences, the samples can be analysed with great care and in detail although the concentrations may be low. In cases of chemicals found in military arsenals there is plenty of the chemical available to enable a thorough analysis to be made quickly. But the general-purpose definition would be unwieldy as a basis for routine inspections of chemical facilities. In those cases the analysis must be based on named compounds whose absence rather than presence is verified. In a plant producing organophosphorus compounds, for example, the samples collected during routine on-site inspections should be monitored for their contents of listed organophosphorus compounds. Without a defined list of banned compounds and prerecorded identification data, the analyst would be faced with the task of identifying all compounds containing phosphorus, including intermediates, by-products, and impurities, in order to decide whether or not they belonged to the families covered by schedule (1). Using the computerized database the identification of a named chemical takes a fraction of a second, even on-site. The structure elucidation of an unnamed chemical could require weeks of hard work.

Accordingly, at least the chemicals in schedule (1) need to be individually defined, to allow the analytical laboratory to sign a report stating that no banned chemicals are present in the samples. The analyst must know exactly what chemicals to look for. The other alternative could be that the chemical industry declares and justifies all production, including raw materials, intermediates, by-products, impurities and so on. And these data would be included in the database of the verification laboratory. While it would succeed in revealing the production of undeclared organophosphorus compounds, I am afraid that it would be unacceptably intrusive and an unwieldy exercise for the Technical Secretariat. Moreover, it would not reveal novel agents whose structural properties were completely different from compounds listed in the schedules, unless declarations and justifications were expected of the whole chemical industry.

One of the tasks of the future Organization will be to follow chemical research and identify new chemicals to be included in the lists and placed under production control. To make implementation easier in the early days of the convention, as much development of analytical methods as possible should be done beforehand. The acquired expertise would also facilitate development and testing of analytical methods for possible novel agents.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

To ensure confidence among the States parties, the verification analyses will have to be done by methods accepted by the Organization. In our view, what this entails is the establishment of standard operating procedures and an analytical database accessible to all participating laboratories. The Finnish Research Project has been working toward this end for 15 years now.

The present report is a revised version of the proposed standard operating procedures for verification analyses presented in Report D.1 last year. Increased emphasis is now placed on quality control. Testing procedures are presented with a view to achieving good repeatability and reproducibility of results in different laboratories, which is needed to guarantee the reliability of analysis. It is essential that the quality of the analyses be demonstrated when the results must hold up in a court of law. Reproducibility also maximizes the advantages of an analytical database as a reference.

For this report we investigated 40 chemical warfare agents and their homologues. All relevant data including the spectra are annexed to this volume. As of now, all new data will be included in the VERIFY database immediately after analysis of compounds.

The methods we describe are written separately for each technique, so that each technique can exist independently. The eventual selection of equipment can be expected to vary from laboratory to laboratory and we wish to show what can be achieved with each technique separately.

The analytical procedure in each laboratory can be chosen on the basis of the combination of techniques available to the laboratory, the type of sample, and the nature of the task. During routine inspections the task may be the identification of known compounds. Challenge inspections may require also structure elucidation of unknown compounds.

It is our earnest hope that the basic work we are doing will prove useful to the Preparatory Commission and Technical Secretariat as they commence their arduous task of developing verification methodology and data in the first years after the convention has been opened for signature. In the meantime we will be happy if our efforts support and facilitate the ongoing negotiations in Geneva and the work of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in investigating the alleged uses of chemical weapons.

Mr. MOREL (France): All delegations have stressed, from the very beginning of this session, how much the recent improvement in the international situation is helping to revive the negotiations on arms control and disarmament. We, of course, share that view. But how can we fail to notice at the same time that there is no reason at all for euphoria? We can see still more clearly in these favourable circumstances that disarmament will not come about by itself. Now that we have got past the stage of breaking the political deadlock, we have entered upon another period which may be, which ought to be, a period of consolidation. If I hesitate, it is because we realize every day that an unceasing effort is required to equip ourselves for future success. This applies to the major negotiations under way in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields, but also to space, and to the other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Nothing can be gained in the field of disarmament without stubborn effort. The international community is too big, the challenges of security are too complex and the progress of technology is too disconcerting for us merely to sit back and say the wind is in our favour. Let me add here that being at present Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I am made very directly aware of the chances and risks involved in disarmament negotiations. The process of drafting the future convention banning chemical weapons, which I will not discuss today, speaks volumes, more perhaps than might be thought, on the opportunities and difficulties involved in the present situation. The Paris Conference has given an unprecedented boost to our negotiations. But it has not freed us from the difficulties inherent in

(Mr. Morel, France)

this unique exercise, and we realize every day that to "redouble our efforts" is not just an empty phrase or a useful formula, but a practical necessity. In a little over a month I shall be introducing the Committee's report to the Conference, that is to say, the new version of the "rolling text", and at that time I shall have to review all aspects of the chemical negotiations. Today I will just say that the remaining month's work we have to do on the substance is of the greatest importance. I believe all delegations are aware of the fact. They have all in various ways indicated their availability, and the Committee has put itself in a position to make progress. It is now up to each of us to play his part.

... Returning for a moment to the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons, I note that without fixing a deadline, the Paris Conference emphasized in its debates, and also in the Final Declaration of 11 January, how essential it was to achieve success within the next few years.

What all this means is that we are faced with an exceptional set of circumstances implying the conclusion within a brief stretch of time of major negotiations in three fields - nuclear, conventional and chemical - and three separate exercises - bilateral, regional and multilateral. The most remarkable thing, perhaps, is that this is not a prearranged plan; this triple

(Mr. Morel, France)

rendezvous is first and foremost an indication of the impatience of both Governments and peoples, which are now resolved to break the vicious circle of ruinous overarming.

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(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

Mr. Andreotti, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement here on 2 March, along with Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, stressed again the priority importance and the urgency that the Italian Government attaches to the conclusion of a convention on the total ban of chemical weapons.

In this context, I must clearly express Italy's strong wish that progress on this issue be much quicker than proved possible during our last session and that, therefore, our work may take on a faster pace and greater dynamism.

Indeed, after the success achieved by the Paris Conference, the call for an intensification of efforts for the achievement of early results has found particularly in Ambassador Morel's competent guidance and dedicated resolve the most reliable and committed interpretation of its requirements.

However, the stronger impetus imparted to the negotiations has not been rewarded so far by the corresponding substantial developments we were expecting. Whereas we feel that, while some progress on certain specific, quite significant, issues has been achieved, on the whole, not enough advance has been made, and most important issues remain unsolved.

Italy is concerned that we might lose the momentum to proceed towards the complete elimination of these hideous weapons and to prevent the existing risks of proliferation. We are firmly convinced in this regard that the only way to stop a possible catastrophic spread of chemical weapons is to conclude a total and global ban as soon as possible.

In this spirit we shall also participate in the Canberra conference, trusting that it will help to give a concrete turn to the efforts aimed at the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban and to a realistic comprehension of the background against which the convention is being elaborated.

With all appreciation for the many and useful national contributions on specific and highly detailed questions, we think that delegations should now try hard to concentrate and direct their efforts towards the solution of crucial issues that are still pending in the way of an early conclusion of negotiations. In spite of endless efforts to regulate in advance the future convention to the utmost detail, it might in fact prove illusory to aim at too

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

detailed perfection in the search for ideal solutions to extremely complex problems. The ban is bound to bear some kind of imperfection or other at the outset and will have to be submitted to a constant fine-tuning on the basis of subsequent implementation and experience: there should be no doubt that the same political will and sense of commitment that will allow the finalization of the convention should enable parties to co-operate to ensure full compliance.

Verification issues are clearly central to an effective ban and on many aspects they still present us with unsolved complexities. However, we are convinced that the definition of a reliable verification system along the lines identified through our work is not only possible, but even within reach, given the political will to overcome the remaining obstacles and a sufficient spirit of compromise. We are encouraged by the results of the trial inspections that have been carried out by various countries in the last few months, which, in our opinion, should contribute to a conclusive turn towards the solution of verification problems. Challenge inspections, in our view, will remain the essential element of a verification régime which is capable of deterring violations and establishing compliance.

We are certainly open to other suggestions and we have considered with interest the proposals of the United Kingdom and of the Federal Republic of Germany, envisaging additional means of verification. At the same time, we believe that the most urgent task is to concretely address the main aspects and to avoid academic debates that might distract our attention.

We also think that an advance data exchange with provisions for its verification will significantly contribute to a general increase of confidence and thus constitute an important element to facilitate the adoption of a ban.

In this context, Italy is heartened by the fact that a growing number of countries are taking a direct interest in the negotiations for a ban, which, to be really effective, must be supported by all countries concerned and - ideally - should be of a universal character.

We wonder whether it may be feasible to contemplate a methodological approach aimed at disposing of the solution of the most important issues in the shortest possible time while setting temporarily aside the cases of less vital character. These might indeed be tackled at a later stage. A prolonged lack of success in finalizing any instrument on the global prohibition of chemical weapons may in fact be interpreted as a failure in preventing an unchecked dissemination of militarily relevant chemical technologies around the world: a prospect casting an historic responsibility upon this body.

Another important element of the convention is certainly related to the institutional aspects. In fact, it will be essential, in the Italian view, to ensure a balanced and satisfactory representation in the organs which will have competence for implementing the convention and ensuring compliance.

Italy is convinced that universal and loyal participation in the future convention will only be ensured through a widespread feeling that all legitimate interests are protected through fair representation.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

With this in mind, we believe, as regards participation in the executive council, for example, that it will have to be wide enough and to adequately reflect regional, political and industrial realities, with no provision for unjustified differentiated membership.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

The participants are ready to continue to seek, together with all interested countries, agreements leading to the progressive reduction and subsequently to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the radical reduction of conventional armed forces, the prevention of an extension of the arms race into outer space, the gradual curtailment of military production and the substantial reduction of military spending. In that connection, they proceed from the assumption that disarmament measures must ensure equal security for all States with strict respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of every State within its existing borders, and must exclude the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force in inter-State relations.

... The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty support the idea of the possible extension to underground tests of the applicability of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in three environments as one of the ways of speedily achieving the prohibition of all nuclear tests. The participants in the Meeting expressed their concern at the danger to peace and international security represented by the use of chemical weapons, as long as they exist and spread. The participants call for the speedy preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

... In my today's statement I should like to concentrate on the chemical weapons ban. The Conference on Disarmament has started this year's consideration of this agenda item in very favourable conditions created by the successful conclusion of the Paris Conference. One hundred and forty nine countries expressed in the form of a final declaration their unequivocal demand for the conclusion at an early date of a convention aimed at total elimination of all chemical weapons. The Paris Declaration contains something we have been seeking for so long - clearly expressed political will, which is a decisive prerequisite for progress in our negotiations. This fresh political impetus generated by Paris was accompanied by the creative and competent guidance of the present Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel. And, indeed, important steps were undertaken to intensify the pace of negotiations. I wish to pay our tribute also to Ambassador Morel's closest collaborators in this endeavour, the chairmen of the five working groups.

An organizational restructuring of the Committee aroused expectations of fulfilling the mandate of the Paris Conference to concentrate our redoubled efforts on resolving expeditiously the remaining unsolved issues. This approach offered additional opportunities to enter into the decisive stage of our negotiations towards finalizing the convention. Did we take full advantage of these opportunities? It is very difficult to give a fully satisfactory answer.

Undoubtedly, in the course of long years of negotiation we have made considerable progress. Ten years have passed since the year when an ad hoc subsidiary body for chemical weapons was established for the first time. It has been re-established in each of the subsequent years. We have been through several stages in the process of negotiations on the convention: starting from identifying its scope, outlines and structure, shaping its skeleton, through consecutive steps of fleshing it out with appropriate formulas reflecting the positions of the negotiators on different aspects of the convention, particularly on the scope of obligations, their substance and their structure, on different types, measures and mechanisms of verification of compliance with the convention, and on legal, technological, economic and financial aspects of the implementation process and its consequences. The present "rolling text" in fact contains agreed substantive material and an inventory of negotiator's positions on all envisaged articles of the convention. They differ in the degree of detail or in the scale of convergence. Nevertheless, we have a clear picture of the various problems and their ingredient elements, even those which need further elaboration or on which divergences still exist. We call them "outstanding issues".

The harvest of 10 years of the Committee's work is really rich and significant. It is especially so in view of the complexity of the subject of the negotiation, unprecedented from the point of view of its scope as well as the number of participants. What is more, in many cases the output of our work actually exceeds the requirements of the process of drafting the convention. The collected material can not only be used for the elaboration

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

of the draft text of the convention, but will be valuable in creating the necessary understanding for a process of preparing for its entry into force as well as during the whole implementation period. A question arises whether this collected material constitutes a sufficient basis for the final draft of the convention. I think that in principle the answer could be positive.

What do we have at our disposal now? Firstly, clearly expressed political will; secondly, statements of position by negotiators on all the principal problems and, to a large extent, on specific aspects of the draft, including technical details; thirdly, a large convergence in the positions of the negotiators, extensive areas of agreement; fourthly, awareness of existing loopholes, their scale and interrelationships existing between them; fifthly, necessary negotiating experience gathered during these 10 years; sixthly, well-disposed attitude of the chemical industry to the convention; seventhly, effective engagement of various scientific and research institutes in the search for possible solutions to different technical problems; eighthly, pressure of world public opinion, justifiably concerned on well-known grounds. Then what is lacking? The answer is not so easy. We can assume that each of us has his own recipe for speeding up the process of negotiations. These recipes have been put forward in this forum. To various remarks presented here I would like to add just one, and in the form of a question - are the methods applied in our negotiations during the last three or four years adequate to the present advanced stage of negotiations? Or to put it in another way - whether penetrating more deeply into different problems - so to say, entering further into the forest, we do not concentrate too much of our attention on discovering and studying wonderful new trees. Could we not start in the coming session with sorting them out and selecting only those which are necessary as elements to be used in raising our building? After all, not all of these wonderful trees we come across are suitable and in fact necessary for our construction. Otherwise we can be lost in the forest.

Let me illustrate this with an example of the complex problem of verification. In the course of the process of negotiations we have made considerable progress. Exchanges of views on this subject during the present session, both in plenary meetings and in Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as during very intensive consultations of the Chairman of the Committee, have contributed further to this progress. We are also looking forward to the results of the eleventh round of USSR-United States bilateral consultations.

Taking into account the scale of progress, should not we ask whether our efforts to finalize negotiations on outstanding technical and procedural elements of the process of verification would not be facilitated if we tried to approach them from the point of view of their place and functions in a general pattern of verification? To reach an understanding on such a pattern is - I firmly believe - the crucial point for us now. This understanding could possibly help us to realize more clearly the borderline between the necessary level of guarantees to ensure that there is no breach of the convention and the level of intrusiveness of the envisaged systems and types of verification. To the same extent it could enable us to see the necessity of a proper balance between the required level of effectiveness of verification and its costs, as well as the preservation of confidentiality to

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

meet the requirements of the chemical industry's interests. This approach, it seems, could also help us to find the proper place in the verification system as a whole for one of the outstanding verification issues, namely, the most relevant production capabilities.

Let me add a brief comment on this very issue. It becomes evident that concentrating upon the most relevant chemicals does not automatically ensure that the capabilities are covered. During one of the industrial experts' meetings an interesting sentence was uttered: "The modern chemical facility which cannot produce a tabun is just not a modern one." It is not difficult to imagine that possible breach is more likely in undeclared facilities than in declared. It is therefore important to consider possible measures to cover at least to some extent facilities that do not produce or process any of the scheduled chemicals but pose a risk to the convention. In this very context we are also prepared to discuss further the United Kingdom's proposal for ad hoc inspections.

I should like to take another example from a different part of the "rolling text" - namely, articles X and XI. We are to try here another approach, namely, to narrow different views towards reaching a compromise solution. We can use here in this context a rule of logic which draws a kind of measure from the purpose. Although these articles deal with rights and obligations of States in two different spheres, their common function should be to stimulate positive interest in the convention so as to ensure its universality. We are to look for a solution of the divergences so clearly exposed in the text such as could make possible a compromise between the need to make the convention attractive and the desire of States to keep their chemical industries competitive.

Another element which is to be taken into consideration in our negotiations is the need for a cautious approach to the "rolling text". It is troubling that there should be more and more frequent returns to consideration of tentatively agreed parts of the text, returns which are justified neither by a change of position on a given aspect nor by progress on another, related part of the text. I would not like to be interpreted as implying that my delegation is wholly against renewed discussion on provisions on which convergence of views has been achieved. Nevertheless, at this stage of negotiations it is preferable not to take a step back if it would not result in making two steps ahead, so as to have at least a step-by-step progress. Otherwise we contribute ourselves to prolongation of the negotiating process.

I have touched upon only some aspects of agenda item 4. My delegation strongly believes that conditions have been created to undertake decisive efforts on this issue. I fully agree with all preceding speakers who have expressed their concern that we might lose momentum towards achieving the complete elimination of chemical weapons. There are legitimate reasons for critical assessment of the pace of negotiations on this item. The more so as in the rather quiet waters of our Conference the negotiations on this agenda item constitute a kind of "island of hope" for the Conference not to be in the deep arrièrè-garde of present disarmament efforts. It is an "island of hope" because an agreement seems to be within reach and because one can expect a positive impact of this agreement on other parts of our agenda.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway):

... I am not going to make a policy statement today, as State Secretary Helga Hernes did so at the end of the spring session. My contribution will be limited to the presentation of two working papers which have been circulated to delegations. One of these, CD/936, deals with verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and contains the main result of the past year's research at the Division for Environmental Toxicology of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment at Kjeller, near Oslo. The other, CD/935, deals with verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and gives an account of recent developments in the Norwegian seismic verification programme. Both of these documents concern research programmes which have been the subject of Norwegian contributions to this Conference for quite some time.

The working paper on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons gives a summary of this year's research report, which will be presented to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the near future.

This year the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment introduced a new technique of analysis for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This is known as the headspace gas chromatography technique, which permits analysis directly on samples without prior cleaning procedures. Based on this simplified method, research is being continued with a view to further developing procedures to be followed by an international inspection team.

In 1989 the research has focused on the application of this new technique. Two series of field trials have been carried out: one in February, the other in June. In the first exercise, four different sample materials were contaminated with 1 mg each of the nerve agents sarin and soman and left outdoors for exposure to the prevailing weather conditions. Samples were collected for analysis at different time intervals in order to get an idea of the deterioration rate of the agents. In the second exercise the number of agents was increased to five: tabun, sarin, soman, mustard gas and diisopropyl methylphosphonate. The number of sample materials was increased to 10. Analysis was carried out after two and four weeks. A separate exercise was conducted to evaluate the influence of various temperatures during the transport of samples.

I will not go into the results of these experiments here, as that would go too far, but will confine myself to referring to the working paper and the

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(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

research report. In this context, I would like to underline the close link between this research programme and the negotiations on article IX of the chemical weapons convention. Together with Canada, Norway has, as you know, submitted a proposal for a text concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons as an annex to this article (document CD/766 of 2 July 1987). In the light of the progress in the negotiations on the guidelines for the International Inspectorate, the time should now be ripe for a discussion on how the specific problems concerning verification of alleged use should be incorporated into the convention.

Before leaving the subject of our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I would like to inform the Conference that the Norwegian authorities intend to carry out a national trial inspection of a production facility towards the end of the year.

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(Mr. Romero, Chile)

... I have left for the end of this statement a brief analysis of the question of chemical weapons, which has taken on vital importance in this Conference and is currently the subject of discussion in the plenary. The relevant Ad Hoc Committee has achieved progress that is insufficient in the light of the mandate conferred upon it by the Final Declaration adopted by the special conference on chemical weapons held in Paris last January. Chile took part in that meeting because it is convinced that chemical weapons must be prohibited definitively and eliminated as soon as possible in view of their particularly cruel toxic and environmental effects, their indiscriminate nature, the difficulty or impossibility of controlling their spread or direction and the risk of their use by terrorists or irresponsible persons.

Moreover, the mere suspicion that a State possesses chemical weapons immediately creates in other States a perception of a threat that promotes the escalation of mistrust and the heightening of international tension.

It is not our intention to engage in a detailed technical study of the draft convention the Conference is negotiating, but we believe that the future treaty, as well as guaranteeing the establishment of effective, universal,

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(Mr. Romero, Chile)

mandatory, equitable and non-discriminatory verification machinery, should be sufficiently explicit about the point that the inspections necessary to prevent chemical weapons production should not constitute any obstacle to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes or a pretext for action having other ends. Inspection must, moreover, be harmoniously combined with State sovereignty.

Similarly, it should be laid down that States that use chemicals, even for purposes not prohibited by the convention, will be subject to a régime of strict liability, whether the harm that may be caused is direct, indirect or delayed. There should also be rules to cover the problem of transboundary pollution which, in the event that it occurs, should be subject to the principle that national territory cannot be used to the detriment of third States. Finally, consideration should be given to aspects such as the commitment of all parties to destroy the chemical weapons in their possession or under their control and the establishment of a more precise framework for the use of chemicals in the maintenance of public order within each State. This concept must be more clearly defined in order not to leave the door open for the use of certain substances which, while not lethal, can have extremely injurious consequences for people's health. It is urgent to redouble the efforts to reach definitive agreements in this sphere as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 522nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

My country has always attached special importance to disarmament. Today this importance is reflected in an initiative taken by His Majesty King Hassan II, who wished to mark Morocco's assumption of the presidency of this Conference formally by addressing a message to it. Consequently, I have the great honour to read it to you:

(continued in Arabic)

... "Quite apart from the fact that the volume of weaponry in the world has today reached a level which makes it impossible for any belligerent to gain a clear victory over his opponent, the devastation that would result from the use of the stockpiled weapons, and particularly nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons of mass destruction, places us under an obligation to avert the danger of extinction of the human race.

Mr. JACOBI (Switzerland) (translated from French):

... It is a privilege and honour for me to address this multilateral disarmament forum. Although our status as non-member of the Conference necessarily restricts our role, we have endeavoured to take up the opportunities to make a contribution repeatedly made available to observer States in recent years. This, together with the strengthening of our delegation, has enabled us to make a concrete contribution to the work and better follow the demanding and technically highly complex negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons, as well as the work of the Group of Experts on detection and identification of seismic events. We have also sought to co-operate with other observer States in the Conference, and thus in recent months have been able to make a contribution, though a modest one, to the Finnish draft on verification of chemical weapons. We are resolved to step up this co-operation and to have closer contacts.

It is the hope of Switzerland that the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons will have led all countries totally to renounce the use of these weapons against civilians and military personnel. The 149 countries which met at Paris unanimously recognized "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the" total and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts" to that end. Hence this convention should be concluded as soon as possible. It is true that attaining this objective is no simple matter given the technical and political complexity of the problem. Although we are aware of the long road that still has to be covered, we welcome the fact that the negotiations have been stepped up this year. And we should like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel and his delegation for their untiring efforts, energy and personal dedication to see that the work goes forward.

Switzerland rejects chemical weapons in every form and manifestation and condemns any use of them. That is why we are highly concerned at the fact that they are proliferating. This is not only a growing threat to international security and stability but might also seriously hamper the work being done here in Geneva, by calling its value and timeliness into question. This danger led the Federal Council and the Swiss chemical industry to place export controls on products associated with the manufacture of chemical weapons and to study the possibility of applying the same controls to chemical plants and some equipment that can potentially be used to manufacture such weapons. But these unilateral and temporary measures do not lead to the elimination of the CW arsenals that are still in existence, nor can they give

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a certain guarantee that chemicals and equipment supplied for inoffensive purposes will not be directed to other purposes. Such measures are meaningful only if they lead to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In the same line of thinking, and for the same reasons, we consider all regional disarmament and arms control measures in this sphere as inadequate and ineffective given the fact that CW arsenals are highly mobile.

Verification of the non-production of chemical weapons is without a doubt one of the most thorny problems still to be resolved. The provisions necessary to settle this problem should rule out any possibility of cheating, should be technically appropriate and should fit perfectly with the existing structures in the chemical industry. Finally, such provisions should strictly protect the confidentiality of the information provided during inspections. The guarantee of confidentiality is the essential prerequisite for the vital co-operation we must maintain with the chemical industry. And in this regard we welcome the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in recent years to maintain constructive dialogue with the industry. We also welcome the initiative taken by the Government of Australia in convening an international conference in Canberra to bring together governments and industry representatives.

Early, this year, further to a proposal made by the Ad hoc Committee, we carried out a national trial inspection in a facility belonging to our chemical industry. What we were seeking to do in particular was to determine what were the commercial documents, technical data and software of a confidential nature that would have to be communicated to the inspectors so that they could carry out their job properly. Furthermore, we wanted to know whether a modern multipurpose facility could be checked under the existing provisions. Our trial inspection clearly demonstrated that the inspectors must have extensive access to confidential data in the company being inspected if the inspection is to be effective. The results of the experiment also confirmed that the provisions which appear in the "rolling text" are not yet sufficiently developed for the verification of a modern multipurpose facility. In particular they do not take into account the technical sophistication flexibility of use of such facilities, which mean that not only can production be changed in very short order but also that it can be transferred from one facility to another. In order to take account of such a possibility, a régime will have to be devised that will make it possible to verify multi-purpose facilities which might pose a threat to the convention.

Our trial inspection had been designed as a routine inspection. None the less we consider that the future convention should also provide for spot checks such as challenge inspections and ad hoc inspections. These two types of inspection should constitute an effective tool to dissipate any doubt as to compliance with the convention. The resumption of Soviet-American consultations on this issue seems to us to be a good sign.

Is it desirable to draw up a convention that covers the slightest detail and every eventuality? In seeking to do our work too well we might hamper the conclusion of an agreement or arrive at a very rigid treaty setting out burdensome and complicated procedures. Such a text would have to be constantly updated to take account of technological developments and scientific evolution. The drafting of detailed rules for this purpose should be left to the preparatory commission, which would thus have a most important job to do.

Lastly, I wish to say that we are willing to make a special effort to support the work of this commission, and to make the necessary infrastructure available to it in Switzerland.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

... A few words now on heavy ICBMs. As a result of the 1987 Washington summit, the two sides agreed to cap heavy ICBMs at 154 and their warheads at 1,540. This agreement was reaffirmed at the Moscow summit meeting in 1988 and is not open to question. To meet certain United States concerns on the subject of heavy ICBMs, we have however taken a number of steps bearing in mind these concerns. Work has continued on provisions in the future treaty and the accompanying documents related to the verification issue. The Soviet side calls for the broadest and most effective possible verification of compliance with limitations and prohibitions covering all types of strategic offensive arms that will be covered by the treaty. In particular, in this round, we have considered in detail the issue of "suspect site inspections" (these are more or less the same as challenge inspections under the chemical weapons convention). Indeed, the difficulties we have encountered in this area are similar to those existing in the area of a chemical weapons ban. Similar, but not identical. Here too the Soviet side has taken steps to narrow down the differences separating the two delegations.

Mr. CESKA (Austria):

... The need to achieve results through the negotiations which take place within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament proves to be ever more pressing as time goes by. The long-expected breakthrough towards a global convention on a chemical weapons ban still seems beyond reach. We therefore share some of the feelings of disappointment emphasized by those who have rather soberly analysed this year's spring session of the Conference. After all, 17 years have elapsed since the last multilateral convention in the field of arms control and disarmament, namely, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, was adopted in this forum.

And yet, had I made this statement two months earlier, I would have been even more pessimistic about the prospects of significant progress in the field of chemical weapons. Today as we approach the end of this year's summer session, some modest hopes seem justified in this respect. Positive developments, among them progress in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the technicalities of verification, are to be noted. It is at present not easy to assess the importance of these bilateral understandings for a future multilateral convention. But though immobility appeared, as so often before, to be this Conference's fate, some movement towards concrete results can now be discerned.

Many unresolved questions, both of a technical as well as a political nature, will require renewed efforts and strong determination, particularly on the part of the main actors in the field of chemical weapons, in order to finally achieve a meaningful global convention. But, with all necessary

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(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

caution - for we have been disappointed several times in the past - we actually believe that hope might have a real chance. In particular, we are satisfied with the preliminary results achieved by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which has visibly stepped up the intensity of its work under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Morel of France. In this context, we would like to stress the importance of, and express our gratitude for, his efforts in convening informal meetings with non-member delegations. These meetings provide such delegations with a good opportunity to exchange views in a direct dialogue with the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. Moreover, they should be further encouraged to voice their interest and thereby contribute to the future convention. At the same time, these meetings constitute a useful step on the way to the indispensable universality of the future convention.

In this connection I also wish to underline the remarkable efforts undertaken by Finland in providing the Conference with expertise and particularly valuable technical input, as proven once more by the interesting presentation of this week. It is a source of satisfaction for us to see how a non-member of the Conference can contribute seriously and decisively to the progress of its work, and we welcome the establishment of the Technical Group on Instrumentation under Finnish guidance. Austria will endeavour to ensure adequate participation by experts in the work of this Group.

We have taken due note of the finalization of the deliberations on a special annex on confidentiality, and see therein a positive signal for expecting similar results in other areas dealt with by the different working groups. Likewise, we welcome progress achieved in the working group dealing with technical questions. In continuing its work the Ad hoc Committee will increasingly have to concentrate on the essential elements of a future convention and to continue streamlining the present version of the "rolling text".

Let me now state some preliminary views on the ongoing discussions on challenge inspection, which we follow with great interest. In our understanding, the definition of the mandate, the conduct of the challenge inspection and the evaluation of its outcome have to remain in the hands of a future international organization. We do see, however, a need to provide for a precisely defined role on the part of the requesting State in its capacity as initiator of an inspection. The requesting State should have its views adequately reflected and taken into account whenever the mandate of an inspection is to be changed, or in the case of any ambiguous conclusions resulting from such an inspection.

With regard to the concept of providing information necessary for the inspection at two different stages, we doubt whether such a procedure is likely to add substantial benefits to the foreseen modalities. The element of surprise, which is the aim of the two-stage procedure, would seem diminished by a factual announcement of any such challenge inspection. Any violator of the convention could, from that moment on and before the actual inspection, attempt to remove evidence. Likewise, the still foreseen possibility of delaying the actual on-site inspection procedure for another 24 hours could well offer additional time for corrective measures. Therefore, such a two-step challenge inspection procedure provides very few advantages - if any at all.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

In the context of the further elaboration of inspection procedures, I have pleasure in informing you that Austria conducted a national trial inspection on 8 and 9 August 1989. An initial visit took place on 13 July. A preliminary report will be submitted to the Conference before the end of the summer session. Let me just state that, thanks to the co-operative attitude shown by the chemical industry and the enterprise representatives, some quite interesting findings were reached.

Turning to the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons scheduled to take place in Canberra from 18 to 22 September this year, I wish to underline that my Government welcomes the Australian initiative to host such a conference and will participate therein. This will be an opportunity for an exchange of views between representatives of Governments and chemical industry. Such a dialogue is indispensable, since co-operation by the chemical industry in the implementation of a future global convention will be essential. The chemical industry must at the same time realize that it is in its own interest to assume a fair share of responsibility within the framework of an overall ban on these weapons. It is imperative for the chemical industry to be made aware of its responsibility in this field, and we thus view the convening of the Canberra Conference as most timely.

At the same time, there must not be any misunderstanding about the roles to be played in the preparation of the global convention. The main responsibility in this respect lies with those countries which possess chemical weapons or the industrial structure and know-how to produce them. Chemical enterprises as well as industrial companies will hopefully be partners in this process. As stated, their role in the implementation, national surveillance and enforcement of a convention, once adopted, is vital to the functioning of such a régime. This involvement of the chemical industry calls for an ongoing and constant dialogue between Governments and industry, yet this role will be determined by international treaty obligations - obligations which can only be undertaken by States. Therefore, in line with international law governing the conclusion of international agreements, only Governments can and shall negotiate a convention.

I take this opportunity to inform you that Austria has - within the framework of the Australia Group - joined in the efforts of other States in controlling its exports of certain chemical substances which can play a role in the production of chemical weapons. We are well aware, however, that this initiative is but an interim measure which would be abandoned once a global convention banning all chemical weapons has been concluded.

Mr. van SCHAİK (Netherlands):

... This year the negotiations on chemical weapons started on a new footing. The Paris Conference boosted confidence. Many countries expressed their interest by participating in the work, bringing the total number of participating countries, I believe, to 66. The able Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel, gave impetus

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

to the work by introducing a stiff time schedule, by organizing informal consultations and in many other ways. The Conference indeed owes a lot to Pierre Morel for reinvigorating the negotiating process.

It is perhaps too early to take stock of progress made. We find ourselves in the middle of a negotiating process, the outcome of which is partly uncertain. But it is clear that important work has been done and that we are moving forward. However, we cannot deny that some major outstanding issues have not been resolved and that we have not yet reached the "point of no return".

Let me first mention some of the achievements. On important details we have made progress, and on some substantial issues the road has been paved for later success. The structure of the convention has improved, consisting now of a shorter main body with core provisions and separate annexes with detailed specifications. Protocols on confidentiality and inspection procedures have been worked out. A new annex on chemicals covers all questions related to chemical agents under international monitoring. We hope progress will be made by consolidating the text and inserting all results in appendix I or Appendix II of the "rolling text", for further consideration during the inter-sessionals.

National trial inspections, carried out on a broad basis, have deepened our insight into the complexities and pitfalls of the inspection régime and have, at the same time, strengthened confidence that all of this will in the end be feasible. A useful special working group on instrumentation has been set up under Ms. Marjatta Rautio of Finland; a non-member of the CD that has done outstanding work on developing the technical tools for the future inspectorate.

We also draw courage from the successful outcome of the eleventh round of bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we look forward to more detailed information on the results. We welcome the fact that this month the next round of these consultations will take place. We have noted that in that context the Soviet Union offered on-the-spot inspection of existing stocks and facilities before the initialling of the convention, be it supposedly under a certain time constraint. We look forward to more information from the two delegations on these issues too. Indeed, they should not hide their light under a bushel.

In spite of such commendable achievements, we have not yet witnessed breakthroughs on remaining major issues. It sometimes appears to us that inspiration is still lacking to tackle the formidable hurdles that lie on the road towards definite success.

Of course, we should not become impatient. In particular for those who have been associated with the negotiations for a long time - in my delegation one has participated for 20 years - it is sometimes difficult to accept the slow pace at which we proceed. But what is more important, the momentum in the negotiations should not be lost. Therefore, these weeks are crucial, not only for the overall assessment of progress made, but also for the perspectives of our work when it continues in the inter-sessional period.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

"Momentum" is a notion that seems to evaporate on close inspection. The dynamics of these negotiations are complex. The ever greater risk of proliferation is at the same time an incentive and an increasingly formidable obstacle to successful completion of these negotiations. We believe that the time has come to strengthen the momentum in the CD negotiations. Next year we must really cut the knots in all major outstanding issues.

What we need is a consensus in which all or practically all relevant countries participate. A precondition for achieving such broad consensus is that chemical weapons must not, like a computer virus, spread all over the world. A definite halt to proliferation is only possible if there is at least a credible perspective of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban. Lingering doubts on whether or not such a ban is in the end politically and practically feasible may encourage threshold countries to "go chemical". The fact that these horrible weapons have recently been used, that the taboo was broken, may indeed lower the threshold ominously, that is of course if countries do not heed the Paris appeal and shy away from the ban.

It has been said before: the acquisition of chemical weapons is not a justifiable response to the possession or acquisition of nuclear or conventional weapons by other States. Chemical weapons do not provide reliable deterrence in a regional conflict situation. As Minister of State William Waldegrave of the United Kingdom said in his speech on 15 June, chemical weapons are likely to have a destabilizing effect on the local balance of power. An effectively verifiable ban is a matter of first priority, not only for obvious humanitarian reasons, but also because the world, as well as any subregion within it, will be safer without the destabilizing impact of these weapons.

It is against this background that we attach the greatest importance to full and effective participation in these negotiations by all countries. It would be a grave mistake if, contrary to the consensus conclusions of the Paris Conference, where all countries were invited to join the work, some countries were not admitted to the Conference.

Full participation in the negotiations means also that all delegations speak up. It is, for instance, important that all countries make clear whether or not chemical weapons are produced on their territory, whether chemical weapons belong to their weapons arsenals, or whether for other reasons chemical weapons are stocked on their territory.

I believe that the moment has also come for each and every delegation to take a position on important issues such as challenge inspections. Of course, it is understood that definite commitments can only be made when all pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have been put in place. But that is, in our view, not a reason to refrain from agreeing on a provisional basis on the main elements of a challenge inspection régime.

This leads me to ask two related questions. First: should we not, after important work still to be done on structure and details in the inter-sessional period, next year focus on resolving the major outstanding issues? And second: can we this year give expression to our consent more

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

clearly on issues upon which we do appear to agree? Or, as Italian Ambassador Aldo Pugliese said in his speech of 20 July, should we not seek an approach "aimed at disposing of the solution of the most important issues in the shortest possible time while setting temporarily aside the cases of less vital character"?

In this context, we strongly endorse the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee to incorporate in appendix I of the "rolling text" the essentials of the challenge inspection régime. We also hope that the essentials of an ad hoc verification régime can soon be developed. It is, as Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland, said in his statement of 25 July, the overall pattern of the verification régime that, most of all, should be consolidated.

But there is also the question how agreement should be nailed down. On the basis of the text adopted in February this year, we have agreed that the "rolling text", and in particular appendix I, may be used for further negotiations, but not more. We believe that the Conference could take one further step and accept a recommendation that appendix I should be adopted as a design acceptable to members and "as a basis for further negotiations on the convention".

In spite of progress made these last months, the verification régime remains the main stumbling-block and, in that context, the proposed challenge inspection régime constitutes the major challenge with which we are faced. It is important for the main elements of a challenge inspection régime to find their proper place in the "rolling text", before we adjourn in the last days of this month. Main elements are, in our view: the right to request a challenge inspection, "anywhere, at any time", in order to dispel doubts about compliance; the challenge inspection should be mandatory and the country to which the request is addressed should be under the obligation (and therewith have the right) to demonstrate compliance; access to the site should be granted at very short notice; the report of the international inspection team should be considered in an appropriate way by the Executive Council. These are, in our view, the major characteristics of challenge inspections, which, together with routine inspections under article VI, form the backbone of "strict and effective international control".

In addition, attention must be paid to ambiguous situations, not covered under the present article VI, which would not necessarily require a high-profile challenge inspection. We support in principle suggestions made for other types of inspection, ad hoc and at short notice, apart from the procedures to clarify ambiguous events that are at present foreseen under article IX, part 1.

Permit me for a moment to touch upon the results of the national trial inspections in the Netherlands, on which I made a brief introductory statement on 27 June this year. The trial inspections conducted in the Netherlands demonstrated not only that specific chemical substances cause a risk, but also that certain facilities, with or without modification, are capable of producing chemical weapons. Under the present régime of article VI these facilities do not have to be declared. We would be in favour of extending the scope of article VI so as to cover facilities that, due to the nature of the

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

equipment, are particularly suitable for the production of relevant very toxic chemicals. We also think that the routine inspection régime should permit inspectors to carry out checks in other sections of the plant visited, in particular to ensure that the declared chemicals are not being used for the production of chemical warfare agents in those sections of the plant that are not the primary target of the inspection.

This year the Committee also paid attention to the question of sanctions, or punitive measures, where it is demonstrated that a State party has not fulfilled its obligations under the convention. It is clear that the prospect of being branded as a violator will in itself provide a deterrence. But, as recent history has shown, resolutions to that effect, such as those adopted by the Security Council, may not be sufficient. Therefore, deterrence should be strengthened by creating a credible risk that in such situations clear language will be spoken and punitive measures indeed taken. Such punitive measures may be the outcome of a decision by the Executive Council. In particular, in the case of very serious violations of the convention, specific measures must be taken, including the suspension of all rights of membership and export control measures.

However, we should frankly face the fact that a foolproof guarantee that the deterrence will be credible enough cannot be given, nor that the necessary punitive measures will follow once the ban has been violated. A summing up in the convention of possible types of action to be considered will be of limited value, as a decision by the Executive Council will at any rate be required. Therefore, the option should remain open that individual countries may take punitive actions, in case of serious violations of the main obligations.

A few words on the future Organization. We consider a discussion on the major outlines of the Organization, on some of its critical features, useful, indeed indispensable. But we believe it would be unwise to try to settle details that clearly fall within the competence of the Preparatory Committee and of the organs to be established under the convention. Generally speaking, some rules have to be worked out now in order to ensure the proper and effective functioning of the convention, but many details are better left for later. Otherwise, we may not see the wood for the trees, get unnecessarily entangled in bureaucratic brushwood and set in stone patterns that ought to be adaptable to unforeseen situations.

One of the issues that needs to be clarified concerns the character and scope of the tasks of the secretariat, both in the phase before the entry into force of the convention and immediately thereafter. This applies to inspectors as well, most of whom must be trained in advance. We should also assess the order of magnitude of the financial consequences of the future international machinery.

We are faced with the unique problem that conditions should be such as to permit the Organization to begin working in full swing right from the start. In the interim phase between the signature and the entry into force of the convention, a provisional core secretariat must be set up. We suggest that directly after the entry into force of the convention, inspection should focus on chemical weapons stocks and facilities rather than on the civilian industry.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

It is clear that, as long as countries have not ratified and the convention has not entered into force, national constitutions may not always permit governments to make financial commitments related to the implementation of the convention. There are certain precedents for the pre-financing of international organizations in statu nascendi, but not on the scale required in this case. We cannot, for instance, expect the United Nations to pre-finance a significant share of the funds needed, which in total would amount to tens of millions of dollars, if not more. We may therefore have to consider the option of a special interim financial agreement between countries willing to participate, with fewer hurdles to ratification at the national level.

Other crucial issues in relation to the Organization to be addressed concern the management of financial and human resources and salaries and allowances for qualified personnel. It should be kept in mind that the annual budget of the Organization may reach hundreds of millions of dollars. Therefore, proper management of resources, a vigorous fight against undue bureaucratization and an excellent personnel policy are prime requirements. In view of the high calibre of part of the technical staff to be recruited, we may also wish to consider what sort of remuneration system is appropriate.

(Mr. Ait-Chaalal, Algeria)

... I should now like to refer rapidly to the question of the ban on chemical weapons. Negotiations within our Conference on this issue are a source of relative satisfaction in view of the frustrations which we may well experience when we review the less than encouraging state of efforts on other items on the agenda of our Conference. We welcome all initiatives and contributions which help to move us more swiftly forward to the conclusion of a convention whose aim is to ban completely and for all time the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The Paris Conference unquestionably gave fresh momentum to the chemical disarmament process. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the French Government which organized this important international meeting and congratulate Ambassador Pierre Morel for the decisive role he is playing at the head of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

One of the main recommendations of the Paris Conference was to give new impetus to the work of our Conference by inviting its members to redouble their efforts to achieve the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. To achieve this goal it is essential for the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee to be appropriately improved so as to reflect the relevant resolutions adopted last year by the

(Mr. Ait-Chaalal, Algeria)

General Assembly of the United Nations and also the terms of the Final Declaration of Paris. It was with these recommendations in mind, and drawing inspiration from a firm determination to put them into practice, that at the very beginning of the present session of the Conference the Group of 21 proposed - alas in vain - that the Committee's mandate should contain a reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. We continue to hope that the Conference will review the possibility of improving the mandate of its Committee at the beginning of the next session.

As regards the actual work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we would mention the merits of the thematic approach in giving a new stimulus to negotiation within our Conference. This approach has made it possible, above and beyond the identification of the political and technical difficulties inherent in the future convention, to focus efforts better so as to overcome differences on some of the most contentious issues. However, at the present state of negotiations an objective assessment of results does not prompt great optimism. Much remains to be done on fundamental issues, which are certainly benefiting from great efforts and consultations, but will still require for their solution considerable perseverance, imagination and, above all, a common will to succeed. We cherish the hope that no effort will be spared to reach a convention which is comprehensive in its content, durable in its life time, universal in scope and non-discriminatory in its application. It must on no account be reduced to a simple non-proliferation treaty or place any obstacle in the path of the development of the chemical industry, the transfer of technology or international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this domain. Meanwhile, would it not be significant if the Powers which currently possess gigantic arsenals of chemical weapons of all kinds set an example by beginning the destruction of their existing stocks, thus offering concrete proof of their determination to banish such weapons? By means of such actions they would undoubtedly make a decisive contribution to speeding up the process which should lead to the conclusion of a comprehensive and global convention banning chemical weapons for ever.

The negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are certainly of considerable importance. Today the international community is fully aware of the need to eliminate such weapons. But these negotiations, however important they may be, cannot eclipse, still less conceal, the terrible dangers which weigh upon humanity because of the existence of nuclear weapons. The trees must not be allowed to hide the forest. Whatever the prevailing circumstances and the needs of the moment, the hierarchy of priorities remains exactly the same as that established by international bodies and profoundly felt by the world community because of the extent and the seriousness of the real dangers which threaten it. The negotiations on a chemical weapons ban must be properly assessed and given their rightful place in the general and overall process of disarmament in relation to the real concerns the international community, and its aspirations for the establishment of equal security for all.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today's statement by the Soviet delegation, in which we intend to touch on some aspects of the problem of a chemical weapons ban, will be fairly brief. The point is that recently the mass media have been putting out a number of sensational reports on the development of the Soviet-American dialogue in this field. Specifically, these reports relate to the new Soviet initiatives put forward at the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, J. Baker, in Paris on 29 July this year. While the reports on the whole present an objective picture of the thrust of the Soviet proposals, they contained a number of inaccuracies. Furthermore - and this is quite understandable - we are continuing to receive questions and requests for clarification on these points. As requested, the Soviet delegation intends to respond to these today.

First of all I wish to confirm that for the Soviet Union the early conclusion of an effectively monitored convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons is a priority issue. The Soviet Union is making every effort to resolve the most difficult questions standing in the way of an early ban on chemical weapons. We are making active use of our international contacts to discuss matters relating to chemical disarmament, and are doing our utmost to promote intensification of the negotiating process in order to reach agreement expeditiously.

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(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union has responded with a great sense of responsibility to the appeal of the Paris Conference for the conclusion of the convention at the earliest date and its recommendation to all States to make a significant contribution to the negotiations. The Soviet delegation has been guided by this in the multilateral talks, and our latest proposals to the United States are aimed at achieving these goals. At the meeting between Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State J. Baker in Paris, a memorandum was transmitted to the American side which, on the eve of the next round of the bilateral consultations, set forth the views on joint action by the USSR and the United States to bring about the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

As is well known, the Soviet-American consultations on this subject are being held in pursuance of the agreement reached at the November 1985 summit and are intended to buttress the multilateral talks on the convention and contribute to the achievement of generally acceptable solutions at those talks. However, these consultations are not a substitute for the multilateral process and, contrary to what one might conclude from certain articles in the press, it is not their purpose to produce a final draft of the convention.

Major progress was made at the eleventh and latest round of consultations, which as you know were held in June in Geneva. It proved possible to make substantial advances on the issue of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and their production facilities, and proposals were developed on challenge inspection procedures. We attach major significance to the early presentation of the results of the Soviet-American consultations, in particular on procedures for challenge verification, at the multilateral talks.

We also consider that the results of the eleventh round constitute a sound basis for further efforts, and offer grounds to hope for agreement on other matters. This is the aim of the additional proposals contained in the memorandum of 29 July 1989.

We have advocated comprehensive work on one of the most complex issues at the talks - monitoring of compliance with the convention. Recently, with the guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, markedly more active consideration has been given to challenge inspections, with - and this should be emphasized - solid results already achieved; the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, among others, have introduced proposals on additional verification procedures; in addition, on the initiative of the USSR a series of trial inspections have been held at the chemical plants for practical testing of procedures for the monitoring of non-production. The Soviet Union and the United States have accumulated useful experience in implementing effective monitoring measures in the context of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. All this provides valuable background for consideration of the entire monitoring system for the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the search for a comprehensive solution.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to openness and confidence-building in the development of the convention. In Paris we reaffirmed our proposal on the expeditious exchange of information on chemical weapon stocks and production facilities. Specifically, the Soviet Union is prepared as of now to publish information on the location of its chemical weapon production and storage facilities, and also to provide detailed information on the composition of its chemical weapon stocks, if the United States on a basis of reciprocity declares the volume of its chemical weapon stocks, as the USSR has already done, and the location and composition of all its chemical weapons. Thus both sides would publish adequate information on their chemical warfare potential in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

At the eleventh round of the bilateral consultations progress was made on a special agreement between the USSR and the United States on a two-phase exchange of data and verification of such data. In order to overcome the main obstacle to such an agreement - the time frame for verification of the accuracy of the submitted data - the Soviet Union gave its consent to on-site data verification in the framework of the future agreement immediately prior to the initialling of the convention. Unfortunately, many reports inaccurately presented this Soviet initiative. It was erroneously asserted that the Soviet Union had agreed to inspections before the signing of the convention, whereas that was our earlier posture. Now, however, it is during the period prior to the initialling of the convention that we have agreed to on-site inspection. As the mass media reported, this step, in the words of the representative of the United States, will facilitate the conclusion of work on the convention and help resolve one of the main bones of contention between the two countries. If this is so, then we can say that our proposal achieved its goal. The conduct of inspections in the framework of the bilateral exchange of data while work is still under way on the convention - that is, prior to initialling - will be a very major measure to build confidence and develop openness in the military field.

So we now stand on the eve of a new round of Soviet-American consultations on a chemical weapons ban, where the Soviet delegation intends to finalize agreement on those areas where the positions of the USSR and the United States are close. We call upon all participants in the Geneva talks on a chemical weapons convention to step up their efforts both bilaterally and multilaterally. They will find the Soviet Union a constructive partner.

(Mr. Fan, China)

... Opposing the arms race and promoting the realization of disarmament have been major components of China's foreign policy. We will never join in the arms race. We stand for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and space weapons. We also favour deep cuts in conventional armaments. It is our hope that the United States-Soviet bilateral disarmament negotiations will achieve concrete results at an early date, benefiting world peace and security. We also hope for the early reaching of agreement in the conventional disarmament talks in Europe. We expect progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Fan, China)

... I would now like to turn to item 4 of our agenda, "Chemical weapons". China has always stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, in order to free mankind once and for all from the threat and scourge posed by this cruel means of destruction. We attach great importance to the negotiations in the Conference aimed at the conclusion of a universal convention banning chemical weapons, and we have taken part in them seriously and constructively. It is our wish that an effective, feasible and equitable convention of a universal character should be concluded at an early date. The urgency of concluding such a convention is underscored by the fact that chemical weapons have been used time and again. The spectre of chemical warfare still haunts human society. This threat stems first and foremost from the huge arsenals of sophisticated chemical weapons possessed by a few big Powers. The development and production of the new-type binary chemical weapons arouse particular concern. The threat also stems from a trend towards CW proliferation.

The high-level international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held in Paris last January has provided a major political impetus to our negotiations. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France, and the chairmen of the five working groups, have made laudable contributions. The momentum and pace of the negotiations have been enhanced. There have been more thorough discussion and varying degrees

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(Mr. Fan, China)

of progress on all the specific issues. In general, however, the negotiations have failed to produce the expected major progress or breakthrough. What is now required is a joint effort from all the negotiators to translate the political and moral commitment into the necessary flexibility for compromise.

The Chinese delegation appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in conducting consultations on the two crucial questions of challenge inspections and the Executive Council. We also attach importance to the in-depth negotiations and consultations in the working groups relating to article VI and its annex, the annex on chemicals, the guidelines on verification, sanctions and article X on assistance.

Regarding the issue of challenge inspections, the Chinese delegation believes that the working paper produced during the consultations conducted by Mr. Ekéus, the former Ambassador of Sweden, can serve as a useful basis for future work. At the same time, we are not against trying a new way. This summer session has witnessed further explorations on the essential aspects of article IX. Challenge inspection, which is intrusive and sometimes confrontational in nature, touches upon the sovereignty and security interests of each nation. While it should be implemented speedily in order to achieve deterrence, challenge inspection must not be misused or abused for the purpose of activities irrelevant to the convention. Private business's reasonable concern for confidentiality should be taken care of, and national concern to protect military secrets must also be considered. In view of the above, it is quite natural that States have different opinions on the specific content of such inspections. It would therefore be inadvisable for the Ad hoc Committee on CW to push through to a hasty decision. What is needed is more careful study and an accommodation of the reasonable proposals of various parties with the purpose of achieving a future common position.

Challenge inspection is a device for clearing doubts on compliance. In requesting its application, the challenging State is understandably motivated by security concerns. But any problem involving compliance with the convention is at the same time a matter of common concern for all States parties. The primary function of the organization to be set up under the convention is to oversee the implementation of the convention. Obviously, in its essence challenge inspection extends far beyond the scope of bilateral relations and as such should not be regarded as a means of settling bilateral concerns. In fact, it is a multilateral exercise. Once a request is submitted by the challenging State, it is the organization that will carry out verification through its relevant subsidiary organs. And it is primarily the organization which will determine the mode of inspection to be employed. As an observer, the challenging State should not assume responsibility for supervising the inspection, nor should it ever attempt to replace the organization in such cases, though it will be consulted by the organization when the need arises. To that end, the convention should not only spell out the rights and obligations of the challenging State and the inspected State: it must also ensure a primary role for the organization so as to strike a proper balance in the relations between the three parties.

(Mr. Fan, China)

We have learned that the eleventh round of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons, which ended on 29 June, have scored success on challenge inspection and have resulted in a joint document. It is hoped that the document will soon be made available to our Conference to allow for deliberations among its participants. I listened with appreciation to the briefing on the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations provided by the head of the Soviet delegation, and hope that he will provide further such briefings in the future.

The Executive Council will be a major organ of the organization. During both the spring and summer sessions, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee initiated many rounds of consultations with interested parties, leading to the emergence of several proposals on the issue. The Chinese delegation believes that an equitable balance should be maintained in the composition of the Executive Council by proceeding on the basis of geographical distribution with due regard to such factors as the capacity of the chemical industry and political realities. But to put such an idea into a formula acceptable to all is a very complicated and delicate task indeed. We for our part will carefully study the various ideas and proposals in the hope of arriving at an early solution.

At this summer session some useful preliminary explorations have been pursued with regard to the issue of sanctions. In the view of the Chinese delegation, sanctions, like the verification régime, can also act to a certain degree to deter non-compliance. With appropriate provision for sanctions in the convention, we can expect better compliance and implementation and increased confidence among States parties in its effectiveness. The discussions of this issue have revealed its complexity as regards the political and legal aspects and implementation. Although many States agree on the need for sanctions, a series of problems still remain unresolved in seeking an appropriate régime in this field. The Chinese delegation stands ready to work with all the other delegations in that endeavour.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

... The transition from confrontation to dialogue and the lessening of tension have already made it possible to initiate the process of real disarmament which is a key to a safer world. The elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons - intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles - is proceeding successfully. The Soviet-American talks on 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear arms are continuing. Important activities such as the initiative of the New Delhi Six are leading to progress in disarmament. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has taken place. Negotiations on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building measures have been launched and are proceeding successfully in Vienna. However, new, resolute steps must be taken on the path to disarmament, not only bilaterally but also multilaterally, where the Geneva Conference has an irreplaceable role to play.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

It is to this end that the efforts of Czechoslovakia and the other Warsaw Treaty States are directed. At the Bucharest meeting of the supreme body of that organization, the Political Consultative Committee, last month, we took a stand on topical matters relating to disarmament and security-building in Europe and world-wide. We emphasized the need to take concrete measures both in the nuclear and chemical fields and also in the field of conventional weapons. The decisions adopted there are realistic and constructive. They open up new prospects for the attainment of mutually acceptable solutions in all respects.

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(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

... The Conference has once again accomplished useful work this year. However, we must say frankly that we had expected more, both as to the drafting of the text of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and as to consideration of the complex of nuclear disarmament issues.

The issue of prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is for us a matter of top priority. We do not deny that we placed substantial hopes in the implementation of the suggestions embodied in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, at which all the participants at a high political level affirmed their readiness to conclude a global convention which would ban these barbarous weapons of mass destruction once and for all and called for the expeditious resolution of the outstanding issues with the participation of all the States concerned. Although the work on the text of the draft convention has been intensified and a certain amount of progress has been made in the consideration of the technical and legal aspects, the differences of principle in approaches to certain crucial issues have still not been overcome at this year's session of the Conference in Geneva. Therefore, we are calling once again for political will and creative efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions. The results of the latest round of Soviet-American talks on chemical weapons are a good sign in this respect.

Czechoslovakia will continue to work actively for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The essence of our approach is set forth in the statement issued by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 5 January this year, in which we stressed our readiness to be one of the first signatories of the convention as soon as it is finalized; we are already undertaking steps to this end domestically.

At the end of January we successfully carried out a national experiment to verify non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry. It demonstrated that under present conditions in our economy verification based on the already agreed measures is basically feasible. It does not disrupt the production process in any major way, and the safeguarding of commercial secrets may be incorporated into it. We informed the participants in the Conference on Disarmament of the results of the experiment as early as April last.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

We have also adopted legislation limiting exports of certain types of chemicals. I wish to emphasize here that this measure is not meant to discriminate against anybody and does not impede further co-operation in the peaceful development of the chemical industry. Its only aim is to prevent misuse for military purposes of chemical products destined for use in civilian industry. We expect that the future convention will settle the question of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons so that these partial measures will lose their significance.

I can inform you today that Czechoslovakia is taking the following steps towards the speedy prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Firstly, within the framework of the multilateral exchange of information relating to the drafting of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons we are making public, in an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, all the principal relevant data on our chemical potential. I wish to reaffirm once again that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic neither possesses nor produces any chemical weapons, nor are there any such weapons on our territory. All the research and laboratory work being carried out is exclusively connected with protection against the effects of chemical weapons and is pursued for peaceful objectives.

Secondly, we are ready to receive a team of foreign inspectors within the framework of the international trial verification of non-production of chemical weapons in civilian chemical industry. The check will be carried out at a chemical plant at Mnisek near Liberec, where the national experiment has already taken place. We expect that the rules for the international phase of the experiment will be agreed upon very shortly.

Thirdly, Czechoslovakia will make available for use by the verification bodies to be established under the convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons a special laboratory designed for analysis of samples and testing of the toxic effects of new chemicals. The laboratory will be equipped to handle all highly toxic substances, including those falling in schedule I.

We hope that this contribution on our part, our openness and efforts to promote the speedy achievement of mutually acceptable compromises, will prompt similar steps on the part of other States. In this spirit, we intend to make our contribution to the success of the international conference which will take place in Canberra this coming September.

We remain convinced that partial, regional measures, too, can play an important role in the efforts aimed at limiting, banning and eliminating chemical weapons. That is why between 1985 and 1988 we and the German Democratic Republic put forward a series of constructive proposals for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. If they meet with a positive response, we might conduct a practical test in that sensitive part of the world of certain measures proposed in the convention, including verification. From this point of view, we continue to consider our initiative as timely. The creation of such a zone would make a substantial contribution towards lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

... High on the list of priorities of the Conference on Disarmament is the item dealing with chemical weapons. I shall focus most of my remarks today on this item. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the tireless efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel, and also to thank the members of his delegation as well as Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his assistants, for their very meticulous work. I wish also to thank the five chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The first session of the Conference on Disarmament to follow the Paris Conference is almost coming to an end. In Paris, 149 States, including all members of the Conference on Disarmament, solemnly called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". However, a breakthrough towards a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons seems at present to be still beyond our reach.

Though Egypt recognizes that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved, we do however realize that we still have a long way ahead. Many of the remaining differences, as my delegation has stated on more than one occasion, are not confined to mere drafting refinements.

Today, I wish to put before this body my delegation's reading of the balance-sheet of this session. The first issue I will address pertains to the relation of the chemical weapons convention to other relevant international agreements. Our understanding, which has already been stated in the CD, is that in accordance with the general rules of international law, the chemical weapons convention, from the moment of its entry into force, should prevail over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter. In the view of my delegation, our work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol were to be transferred and

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

thereby, somehow, eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish one universally applicable convention with enhanced effectiveness.

It is clear to my delegation from the divergence of positions on this question that the problem is not of a legal character, it is political. Given the nature of the prevailing positions an acceptable compromise has not yet materialized. It seems appropriate to propose that concerned delegations should consult further on this matter.

With respect to reservations, it is the view of my delegation that there should be no reservations attached to the chemical weapons convention. If however, such a view is not accepted, my delegation believes that reservations should be confined to certain provisions only, and that they should be compatible with, not derogate from, the scope and purposes of the convention.

This year the Ad hoc Committee undertook work on another issue of importance, that of "sanctions", through its Working Group on Legal and Political Questions. The discussion of this question has clearly demonstrated the highly delicate political nature of the problem, which needs to be further addressed in order to clarify additionally the issues involved and try to find appropriate solutions to them. Egypt, for its part, would like to see provisions containing specific measures to be applied should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions are applied effectively and without discrimination or delay. Sanctions should not in our view be construed only as a device for punishment. We believe the reference to sanctions encompasses a more comprehensive approach that could provide requisite elements of security for States.

On the question of security a clear distinction should be drawn between nuclear and chemical weapons. The nature and consequences of the use of chemical weapons are more limited in scope, and the international community should not, in our view, limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the NPT when Security Council resolution 255 was adopted in 1968. The chemical weapons convention should aim much higher. Positive and credible assurances should be the ultimate objective.

Another crucial part of the convention which has not been dealt with this year is the question of "jurisdiction and control". This topic is at an early stage of consideration, and we are of the view that this issue should be the subject of relevant provisions in the convention.

Another area which Egypt is following closely is the negotiations on organizational aspects. The Executive Council, which will be the principal political organ of the international organization, is of great importance. I wish once again to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for his efforts to conduct consultations on this very important subject.

The Executive Council remains for most members of this Conference one of the most important issues. We believe that its size should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to undertake timely

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

decision-making. As for voting in the Executive Council, we favour the application of the rule of unanimity when it comes to substantive matters. However, we realize that unanimity may not always emerge. Consequently, we should provide for some other rule to avoid paralysis in the Executive Council. This point should be further considered. We are currently studying with great care the various ideas and proposals on the composition of this body. However, I wish to put forward some of my delegation's reflections on this question. My delegation is of the view that all States parties to the convention are entitled to serve on the Executive Council. We also consider that the fundamental criterion should be that of equitable geographical distribution. Furthermore, we do not subscribe to any approach which calls for the creation of permanent seats on the Council.

Another issue which attracts special attention is that of "verification". We do share the view expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention should include effective verification provisions. Yet such requirements should not be abused. It should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device as being as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions on the procedure for verification, in particular with respect to the provisions on challenge inspection.

We have been following very closely the work on confidentiality and on the guidelines for inspections, and in our view, a degree of progress has been achieved in this regard.

Turning to another issue, I would like to refer to the question of the Canberra Conference. The Government of Australia has been in contact with my Government, and I would like to express our satisfaction at the results of these contacts. The conference, in our view, should be intended neither to create a parallel mechanism to what we have here in Geneva, nor to address the question of the so-called non-proliferation of chemical weapons or any interim measures to that end. This is what it should not do. We expect and hope the conference will endorse the objective of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and enhance the development of chemical industry and international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this field. I take this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt considers that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is the objective we all should strive to attain. Any attempt at reaching interim measures on non-proliferation of chemical weapons should not be accepted. The prohibition has, in our view, now become a basic norm of international law, and therefore should be scrupulously observed.

I turn now to another issue which enjoys high priority for a great number of delegations to this Conference: the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. You will recall that following the Paris Conference, and by reason of the high political will expressed in its Final Declaration, when the participating States "solemnly [affirmed] their commitments not to use chemical weapons", there was an attempt to amend the mandate so as to refer to the prohibition of use. This amendment did not acquire consensus acceptance.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The reasons why do not appear anywhere on the records. I must say that my delegation has difficulty in understanding this situation. Therefore, my delegation is raising this question once again for consideration. We hope that you could bring the loose ends together before concluding the 1989 session. It is our genuine hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will recommence its work in 1990 under a new mandate which would reflect the latest state of will and preparedness.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

... I have requested the floor this morning to make a statement on the Canberra Conference on behalf of the Group of 21. I shall read this statement in English because that is the language in which we have worked on the text.

(Continued in English)

"The Group of 21 firmly supports and actively participates in the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to conclude at the earliest date a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Group of 21 strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons and reaffirms its commitment to an early comprehensive ban as the only effective and non-discriminatory solution to the threat posed by chemical weapons. That threat, aggravated by recent developments, cannot be removed by non-proliferation measures but only by the total elimination of chemical weapons.

"The Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons scheduled to take place in Canberra on 18-22 September 1989 must not seek to establish any alternative or parallel approach to the chemical weapons negotiations in the CD. Apprehensions of the Group of 21 about the relevance, objectives and structure of the Canberra Conference need to be clearly understood and addressed so that its outcome does not run counter to the current negotiations in Geneva.

"The Group of 21 is firmly opposed to any restrictive measures which may hamper the development of chemical industry, the transfer of technology and international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this field.

(continued)

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

"The Group of 21 expects the Canberra Conference to unambiguously endorse the objective of an early comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and lend its support to the ongoing negotiations to that effect within the Conference on Disarmament."

(Continued in Spanish)

I have requested the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, to distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

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Mr. REESE (Australia): I seek the floor today to respond briefly to the statement delivered on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished representative of Peru. On behalf of my Government I would like to assure members of the Group of 21 that the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to be held in Canberra from 18 to 22 September will support the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a chemical weapons convention, and the conference in Canberra will do this by focusing on measures to conclude and implement the convention.

The structure of the conference in Canberra is designed to encourage discussion in support of the chemical weapons convention - and not for any other purpose, as indeed the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans, said in his address to this Conference on 13 June last.

The Australian Government has consulted extensively with a wide range of countries in determining the final shape of the conference. The conference format now reflects those discussions.

Australia believes that the chemical weapons convention will be a better convention and will operate more effectively as a result of the contribution which industry can make to the convention. We are conscious that the role of industry is and must remain one of providing advice to governments, which obviously retain the responsibility for concluding international agreements.

Australia looks forward to the constructive participation in its conference of the many countries which have accepted our invitation to attend.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea):

... The positive progress in disarmament and relaxation this year encourages those of us who are trying to overcome a lot of difficulties in negotiations. I think it is one of the merits of the Conference that, although no significant progress and breakthrough has been made, discussion on major issues has become substantive, especially on chemical weapons, and many more non-member countries have participated in the Conference.

World peace and the security of mankind are of concern for all countries and for all peoples. World peace and security and disarmament, being issues directly affecting the existence of ourselves and the coming generations irrespective of the size of countries, their military power and their level of scientific and technological development, have become a growing concern of all. Now the international political situation is gradually tending towards disarmament and relaxation. It is worthy of note that the abolition of medium-range and shorter-range missiles has been started and negotiations on 50 per cent cuts in strategic weapons and on chemical weapons are under way in the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States.

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(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

... Chemical weapons aimed at mass destruction pose a great threat to world peace and security together with nuclear weapons. Today the need to abolish chemical weapons completely has become one of the burning issues in international politics amid rising public concern, which constitutes a favourable environment for the Conference on Disarmament. The international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held last January in Paris played an important role; on the occasion of the Paris Conference the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925. On 26 January this year, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Government reaffirmed its ban on the production, storage and import of chemical weapons and its refusal to allow the transit of foreign countries' chemical weapons through our land, airspace or territorial waters.

(continued)

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Our Government hopes for the expeditious conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons covering all countries, through the Conference on Disarmament. Although there exist technical difficulties concerning the issues of development of peaceful chemical industry and co-operation, as well as ways and means of ensuring inspection and verification, they can be settled within one or two years unless there is a political intention of opposing or delaying the abolition of chemical weapons. Our delegation will continue to play its role for the fulfilment of the goal of the Conference in the future.

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Mr. SHARMA (India):

... As this year's session draws to a close, it is natural to take stock of developments and relate them to the anticipation that we voiced in February when our Minister of State for External Affairs addressed the Conference. 1989 has been a significant year in the field of disarmament. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons recorded the unequivocal commitment of 149 States to rid the world entirely of chemical weapons and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude the negotiations on a CW convention at the earliest date. In Vienna, an accord of historic significance on security and co-operation in Europe was signed, resulting in negotiations in earnest on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact member States. The initial proposals tabled by the two sides reveal a high degree of convergence of views. Later in the year, we saw the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space issues, as well as on issues relating to the chemical weapons negotiations. These developments are a reflection of the improvement in the current international climate for making meaningful progress, described variously as "the end of the cold war" or "a new détente". What is relevant is that there is resumption of engaged dialogue. Conflicts in different parts of the world have been arrested and negotiations are under way for their resolution. The United Nations has played an important role in this process, thereby demonstrating its unique position and singular responsibility in a multipolar world. Against this positive background, however, the assessment of our work in the Conference on Disarmament during the year is sombre.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference provided an auspicious beginning to our work this year. The support could not have been more clearly stated than in the commitment voiced by 149 States that urged the Conference on Disarmament to conclude negotiations at the earliest possible date. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was also set up through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and the five working group chairmen. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably we have made some progress but, against the background of political will and the sense of urgency expressed in the Paris Declaration, in the negotiating framework and the resources provided to us, it has been modest.

The optimism reflected in Paris was diluted, as was seen by the inability of the Conference to reach consensus on a minor updating of the mandate in February. This cast a shadow, which is evidenced by the fact that although during the last six months a considerable amount of work has been done, we have been unable to come closer to solutions regarding a few crucial outstanding issues. My Minister, addressing the Conference on Disarmament on 14 February this year, sounded a note of caution when he stated:

"At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD."

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(Mr. Sharma, India)

The volume of work done this year is clear from the fact that the report of the Ad hoc Committee runs to 242 pages. As many as 65 working papers were submitted to the Ad hoc Committee. Yet it is also clear that on the crucial issues of challenge inspection, the composition of and decision-making in the Executive Council, the order of destruction and some of the legal issues pertaining to amendments and the entry into force of the CW convention, we do not have new language included in the draft convention. After an initial discussion on the subject of verification which tackled the issue directly and squarely with regard to additional measures, the Working Group found itself in an impasse. At the same time, we have enlarged the discussions in a number of other areas such as instrumentation, confidentiality, inspection protocols, model facility attachments, etc. A number of national trial inspections have been carried out which confirm that the existing verification system developed in the draft convention is sound and reliable. All these are subjects that would help in the smooth implementation of the CW convention, but, before that, we have to ensure that we have a convention.

I do not think that it is possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We cannot let ourselves be bogged down in protracted discussions of certain details at this stage. As Ambassador von Stülpnagel reminded us, we must "make use of the 'window of opportunity' provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in". We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to free mankind from all chemical weapons for all time is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities are eliminated and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective we are working towards. Political reality dictates that the risk does not come from the possible use of chemical weapons but from the existence of chemical weapons, and the only way to address this political reality is to find a politically viable solution. A comprehensive solution is the only viable political solution. If we want a convention that will enjoy universal adherence, then we must work on a convention that will attract universal adherence. This requires the convention to be non-discriminatory and provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It implies that the convention must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. It implies that the Convention must ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes, and that the Convention must not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. These are some of the principles which need to be observed and safeguarded if we want to develop a convention which is universal and comprehensive.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

How would these principles translate into approaches to resolve the outstanding issues? The open-ended consultations carried out by Ambassador Morel on the subject of challenge inspection indicate that we are working on the right track. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that once a request for challenge inspection is received by the international organization created, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes a concern of all States parties. All States parties then are legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is being upheld. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured if these concerns and the universal interest in upholding the convention are to be met. On the subject of the composition of the Executive Council we have also had useful preliminary discussions. It is clear that the Executive Council will be small in size, much smaller in size than the Conference of States Parties. All States parties have a right to be represented in the Executive Council, and furthermore, during the period that they are not present on the Executive Council, they must feel that the Executive Council is representative of the various interests that are reflected in the Conference of States Parties. In our view, all member States represented on the Executive Committee should enjoy equal rights and obligations. However, it is likely that in practice certain States parties will serve more frequently on the Executive Council than other States parties in the implementation of the criteria accepted, which cannot be seen to detract from the basic principle of equitable geographical balance, the principle of non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

I am sure we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the CW negotiations are at a critical stage. If we look at other disarmament negotiations, we realize that any slow-down can be a serious set-back to our efforts. At the same time, CW negotiations are but part of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear issues, which enjoy the highest priority, also need to be addressed, and Conference resources allocated to them. We hope, therefore, that taking this priority into account, the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a CW convention. Setting a time frame would provide the necessary political thrust for concluding our work during the 1990 session.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

... The only ray of hope that inspires us with some confidence for the future is the continuing movement forward in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. The impulse provided by the Paris Conference, although it lost some force due to the lack of readiness of some delegations to switch immediately to the new reality, in the long run had a favourable influence on the pace of our work.

The new report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is an impressive document. Justice requires us to pay tribute to Ambassador Morel (France) for his energetic efforts aimed at accelerating the pace of the negotiations, which have brought some concrete results. It can now be claimed that there are no blanks in the "rolling text" as far as the inclusion of all problems and topics is concerned. We have at our disposal a more solid textual basis.

I think it is generally recognized that there are three main problems which will determine whether we will reach the end of the road leading to the finalizing of a draft convention on a chemical weapons ban. I am speaking about the system of control and verification, the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, and the Executive Council of the future organization. That is why, I think, the consultations carried out on Ambassador Morel's initiative and dealing with the challenge inspection procedures (article IX, part II) and the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council are a step in the right direction. The inclusion of the results of those consultations in appendix II of the "rolling text" is to be welcomed. Undoubtedly, the submission to the Conference of an agreed Soviet-American document on challenge inspection procedures would make a considerable contribution in this respect.

A number of useful and important conclusions in the field of verification were drawn from the national trial inspections. The presentation of reports on these inspections by a number of key countries belonging to all groups, and the holding of an open dialogue, contributed to the identification of a number of problems that might arise in that field. We hope that the holding of the second phase of experiments - international trial inspections - will bring us still closer to a model for international verification in the framework of the convention.

Consideration of the question of the Executive Council reveals that the three aspects of the problem - composition, terms of reference and the procedure for decision-taking - are interrelated. It is evident, for example, that the wider the terms of reference of the Council, the bigger will be the interest of the countries participating as members in it, and the greater the importance of the provisions for decision-taking. Although the document entitled "Outcome of the open-ended consultations on article IX, part 2" included in appendix II of the Committee's report outlines the political contours rather than the legal content of a possible agreement, it definitely marks an important step forward.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

Notwithstanding, we have to admit that the progress achieved so far is mainly on technical matters. Therefore, we have to be fully aware that if next year we continue at this year's pace and do not succeed in solving the main problems that have a political connotation, the convention will continue to elude us. It is important that all countries, and above all the chemically most developed ones, should show their readiness to translate their political declarations in favour of banning chemical weapons into practical deeds in drafting the convention.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

... The success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the outset of the year provided the momentum for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to conduct intensified negotiations and achieve many important results, particularly on technical issues. They are

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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

indispensable elements for drafting the chemical weapons convention. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Pierre Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, for his untiring efforts, wisdom and leadership. I would also like to commend the chairmen of the five working groups for their excellent work.

We have not, however, had a breakthrough on important political issues - for instance, how to reach a common basic understanding on verification régimes including challenge inspection, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council and undiminished security during the transition period. We must take into account the interrelated nature of those issues and others within the overall framework of the Convention.

The Paris Conference generated a global political momentum for the CW negotiations. But looking back over what took place in the Conference this year, I have a sense of uneasiness that the momentum might be slipping out of our fingers. Setting an artificial deadline for the negotiation is of course not necessarily conducive to a good treaty. On the other hand, can we just go on and on, business as usual, and get a treaty on issues like chemical weapons of such political magnitude? I am not sure if it will work. We must have a common perception of the political target of the time frame of the negotiation. We must have political determination to work with that political time frame in mind, if we are to have a CW Convention.

The Government of Australia will host the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in three weeks' time. Japan will participate in the conference and work for its success. We hope the conference will give further impetus to the CW negotiations here. I am grateful to Ambassador David Reese for clarifying the character of the conference in response to the joint statement of the Group of 21. Japan is gravely concerned at the growing danger of the spread of chemical weapons. In this respect, Japan is taking, individually and in concert with like-minded governments, appropriate measures in conformity with paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. On the other hand, our global efforts must be concentrated on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and not on any intermediate measures.

Verification problems are very difficult, both politically and technically. While it may be impossible to establish a watertight verification régime, we should strive for the setting up of a verification régime which is reasonably effective and reliable. It is also important to take note of the basic differences between the verification of CW destruction, which is conducted for 10 years, and the verification of "non-production", which lasts for ever.

Working Group 1 has worked out the "Annex on the protection of confidential information". It is indispensable to protect the confidentiality of both military and civil information in a proper way. For that, I believe, this annex is an important product. The Group has also addressed the "Protocol on inspection procedures", verification régimes under article VI and

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

others. We find it important to discuss details of those issues in order to solve verification problems and draft a consistent text. It is hoped that the chairmen's laudable initiatives will bring about further progress.

The national trial inspections have been very useful in drafting a realistic convention and raising awareness of the convention among those concerned in capitals. As a follow-on to the report on its trial inspection, Japan has already submitted a working paper on initial visits and "step-by-step inspections". Based on the results of national trial inspections, the Ad hoc Committee should continue to follow up this useful exercise in appropriate ways.

The "pattern of verification" is an issue of basic importance to the CW convention. If we go into detailed discussions with no common understanding on a basic framework of verification, we may well be faced with more confusion. In this context, I very much appreciate Ambassador Morel's serious efforts in trying to find some common understanding on challenge inspection.

Working Group 4 has worked steadily since the spring session so as to compile the annex on chemicals. When we discuss the schedules and guidelines under article VI, we should strike a proper balance between the risk to the purposes of the convention and the necessity to make effective and efficient use of the limited resources of the technical secretariat. Though it is easily forgotten in detailed discussions, we also need to note the basic difference between schedule 1 chemicals, which are in principle banned, and those in schedules 2 and 3, which are permitted for production, consumption, etc., under appropriate controls. We still find it necessary to continue detailed study with respect to specific problems. But I greatly appreciate the chairmen's initiatives based upon technical and expert knowledge, which have enabled the Committee to make important progress in the areas under study by the Group, including the annex on chemicals.

I would also like to add that, thanks to the serious efforts of the chairmen, we were also able to deepen our discussions and produce some tangible results in other working groups. To name a few, my delegation thinks that important work has been done with respect to amendment sanctions and others in Group 2, article VIII, article VII and others in Group 3, and article X, the preparation period and others in Group 5.

As was emphasized in the Declaration of the Paris Conference, it is imperative that the CW Convention should be global. We heartily welcome the increased participation in the CW negotiations by States not members of the Conference. As we agreed in Paris, any State wishing to contribute to the negotiations should be able to do so.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French):

... The time has come to introduce to you the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, reference CD/952, which the Committee adopted on Friday, 18 August. It contains the three well-known elements: the technical section; appendix I, which is the "rolling text" proper; and appendix II, which serves as a basis for future work. Here I would like to draw your attention to a typographical error in the French version of the report. In the table of contents for appendix II, the fourth line from the bottom on page 15 should read "Articles XII, XIV et XX de la structure préliminaire...". In the same way, the heading on page 215 should read "Articles XII, XIV et XX de la structure préliminaire...". The secretariat has informed me that a corrigendum will be distributed to put this right.

Before I take you quickly through the main results achieved by the Committee since last February, I would like to start by making a few general comments. Firstly, we have done an enormous amount of work. I am well aware that the result we are all looking for is not a question of quantity but of quality, and if the Committee, together with its subsidiary bodies, organized 209 meetings in all, the idea was to make as much progress as possible towards the completion of the convention banning chemical weapons, in accordance with

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(Mr. Morel, France)

the strong and clear call made in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. All delegations, those of the member countries of the Conference as well as those of the non-member countries - of which we have twice as many as last year - redoubled their efforts, and I take this opportunity to thank them for their readiness to work, their contributions and their encouragement.

The second comment is that as a result of this sustained work, the report I am introducing today provides you with a markedly improved draft convention. The thematic approach adopted this year by the Committee made it possible to cover all the aspects of the convention, to link them together and to put them in better order, the result being that today we have a more complete, more coherent and more methodical text. Does this mean - and here I come to my third point - that we are close to our goal? It may be tempting to note that the negotiations did not enable us to achieve the necessary "breakthrough" during this session, that the "point of no return was not reached", or that we dwelt too long on technical considerations rather than devising the "political package" which is essential for concluding our task. I am the first to regret that it was not possible to go even further, but at the same time I believe that the clichés to which I have just referred do not really give a true picture of the real state of affairs in the negotiations. The more we redouble our efforts, the more clearly we can see that we can only progress if there is a proper combination of political initiatives and technical improvements, both of which are essential and inseparable. The chemical weapons convention will be an extremely complicated document which will have to have solid scientific, technical and industrial foundations, while at the same time setting down unprecedented rules for security.

How in this light can we describe the work done by the Committee during the recent session? It seems to me that the bulk of the technical infrastructure of the convention is now in place, and that the substantial political headway we have recorded this year make it possible to properly define the general régime of the future convention.

After these opening comments, I would now like to describe briefly the principal results in terms of the five main subject categories which were covered by the five working groups. On the subject of verification in all its forms, we had a particularly heavy agenda. First of all I should mention the insertion of an annex on confidentiality in appendix I, which at a stroke allows us to deal substantively with a question which, even a year ago, was more often than not referred as "to be discussed". This document makes it possible to lighten the body of the convention and at the same time to meet the present and future concerns of Governments and enterprises, but also those of the technical secretariat. In the same way, Group 1 made progress on inspection procedures, and should be able, before the beginning of the next session, to complete the conversion of the directives for the international inspectorate, which are still contained in appendix I, into a protocol on inspection procedures which for the time being is contained in appendix II, which will give a more precise and more complete definition of the working conditions for the future inspectors.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I would also mention that this year the Committee continued a large-scale exercise which was started last year, namely the launching of national trial inspections and the consideration of national reports. This work, which was first conducted under Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, whom I would like to thank for his personal contribution, was the subject of an informal exchange of views with experts from industry at the end of June and was then pursued, as agreed, under the Chairman of Group 1. Thanks to this initial multifaceted work in the field, in conditions as close as possible to reality, the Committee was able to confirm the practicability of the provisions of article VI and make various improvements in the convention. This is already the case with the new version of the model agreement for facilities handling schedule 2 chemicals. Many more lessons can be drawn from these trial inspections, which should continue on a broader scale and be organized by other countries. I would finally add here that the Committee directly tackled one of the most sensitive issues in the future convention, namely challenge inspection. Intensive consultations conducted by the Chair made it possible to identify in a precise way those essential elements which will have to be contained in article IX, part 2, which, as everybody acknowledges, will be as it were the key stone of the general system of verification under of the convention.

Legal questions may be better defined, but are no less difficult to deal with. Appendix I now contains a series of final clauses; these are articles XV to XIX, which derive from the consultations conducted last year, together, in appendix II, with the results of the work done on the delicate issue of amendments, and elements to be taken up on relationships with other international agreements, duration and withdrawal, languages, depositaries and registration. The group also dealt with the very important question of sanctions, which had never been dealt with as such, and is of interest to a great number of delegations. The document which appears at the end of appendix II provides a good basis for further work on this subject.

The work of Group 3, on institutional matters, made it possible to update articles VII and VIII of the convention and thus to confirm the tripartite framework under the future convention, that is to say the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the technical secretariat. The same can be said for the document on the preparatory commission, which will have the task of establishing the future organization after signature and before entry into force. Going beyond the actual text, national trial inspections also made it possible to highlight the precise role to be played by the national authority which will be set up in each country to institute and maintain liaison with the technical secretariat. In the same way, the Ad hoc Committee started to examine very specifically, with the assistance of experts, the question of the costs and the staffing of the future organization.

Group 3 also started studying the question of the scientific advisory board, which might provide the Director-General, and where necessary the other organs of the convention, with an independent opinion on rapidly evolving areas. Consultations conducted by the group, and then by the Chairman of the Committee, also made it possible to establish a hypothetical working framework on the composition and decision-making procedures of the Executive Council. There is no need to stress that these issues, which for a long time were left on one side, are of great political importance. Agreement will no doubt only be reached towards the end of the negotiations; but to arrive stage by stage

(Mr. Morel, France)

at an agreed formula, we must first of all have specific elements to think about which will allow each delegation to clarify its position: this is the aim of the document contained in appendix II.

Turning to Group 4, it must be recognized that the "chemical annex" marks major progress. To go back to the general comment I made just now, this may be said to be a very technical issue, and thus one of secondary interest. But how can we not see that, particularly with schedules 1, 2 and 3, this annex contains the matrix of the general régime of the convention? The schedules are now clearly established, and closely tied in with specific declaration, monitoring and verification régimes. Going beyond the resulting technical improvements, regroupings, reordering and clarifications for the whole of the text, I would like to stress more broadly that this new annex strengthens the whole edifice of the convention. A year ago, at the same date, we were wondering about whether we ought to have three or four schedules because of the persistent difficulties related to the question of super-toxic lethal chemicals. The whole technical infrastructure of the convention was thus shaky. The question has been examined in depth, in all its complexity, with the valuable assistance of experts. I believe that all delegations today agree that a solution can be found in the context of the three régimes and the three schedules with the appropriate categories, giving prime attention to the revision of the schedules and thus to the identification of new products.

At the same time the group was able to substantially revise annex 1 to article VI and thus to reach agreement on the particular conditions for the very limited production of prohibited substances for research, medical, pharmaceutical and protection purposes. Work will have to be continued on this annex.

I now come to the fifth and last group, dealing with the transition, a theme which made it possible to look at the convention in a continuum of development, starting from the current negotiations and working up to the definitive régime at the end of the 10-year transitional period. Appendix II thus contains elements concerning the preparatory period, in particular relating to possible measures for co-operation even before entry into force, the role of the organization after entry into force, with the appropriate deadlines, and the exchange of data. Appendix II also contains a new text of major political importance, that is to say article X, relating to assistance and protection against chemical weapons. We need only recall that last year, in the same place, two texts confronted one another reflecting opposing conceptions, to be able to gauge the progress already accomplished in the search for solutions acceptable to all. I must also point out that on article XI, dealing with economic and technological development, consultations showed that there were no objections in principle, although for the moment it has not been possible to work on the text itself. Only one important aspect of the convention was not in fact dealt with directly this session - the order of destruction of stocks and production facilities - but for a good reason, since we can now count on the completion of the consultations conducted between the two States which have declared that they possess such stocks and facilities, that is to say the United States and the USSR.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I would also like to recall that the Committee established a technical group dealing with the instrumentation which will be necessary for the implementation of the future convention. This highly specialized group brought together experts from capitals, and will continue its work next year. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Rautio of Finland, who was kind enough to chair the group.

In accordance with long-standing practice, the Committee will hold open-ended consultations from 28 November to 14 December next with a view to holding a limited session from 16 January to 1 February 1990. Of course it will not be possible to take up all the topics which I have just spoken about. We will have to concentrate on current issues where specific results can be found for the new version of the "rolling text" which will be prepared for the 1990 session. The consultations which I have held with the group chairmen and with delegations lead me to propose the following subjects:

- Group 1: The protocol on inspection procedures and the Group Chairman's working paper on article VI;
- Group 2: Final clauses;
- Group 3: The scientific advisory board;
- Group 4: Guidelines for schedule 1 and machinery for revision of lists;
- Group 5: Undiminished security during the destruction period.

I would add that I will be resuming the Chairman's consultations on the second part of article IX, that is to say challenge inspection.

In order to prepare for a sustained pace of work comparable to that maintained by the Committee throughout its session, it is my intention to conduct private bilateral consultations with all interested delegations during the week of 20 November. As has been the case since last February, the inter-sessional work will be conducted as teamwork with the five group chairmen, Mr. Rüdiger Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Mohamed Gomaa of Egypt, Mr. Rakesh Sood of India, Mr. Johan Molander of Sweden and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to them for the decisive part they have played in the work on which I am reporting today. I would also like to extend my special thanks to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, his deputy, Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, and his assistant Ms. Cheryl Darby for their untiring and wholly exemplary assistance.

At the beginning of my statement I tried to suggest the perspective within which the work accomplished over the last six months should be assessed. But at the moment of concluding, I cannot but turn towards the future. My words will be simple and brief because the enthralling experience I have have lived through during this session has made this abundantly clear to me: let us constantly bear in mind that our time is not infinite, and that the Convention now being finalized will produce practical results only if it is universal in its application.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese):

... Many of my colleagues from different delegations have expressed such mixed feelings when talking about the work of the Conference. Disarmament affairs are no longer the monopoly of a few major military Powers. All countries, big or small, developed or developing, nuclear or non-nuclear, have the right to participate in work on disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is composed of 40 member States with equal rights. These mechanisms which were established in line with the trends of the time made one feel eager to try for prompt results. It is disheartening to note, however, that this single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, as established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, has made no progress on the agenda items concerning nuclear disarmament and outer space. Although some progress has been made in the intensive negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a breakthrough on key issues has yet to be made. The momentum of disarmament negotiations must be maintained and the multilateral negotiations on disarmament should by no means be weakened. How, then, can we resolve such a contradiction, which one might describe using the Chinese expression "much thunder but little rain"? It is in this context that many delegations have contributed various suggestions, including suggestions on how to continue the work of the Group of Seven.

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Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea):

... My delegation is pleased that the Republic of Korea has been invited again this year to participate as a non-member State in two subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament - the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament - in addition to the plenary

(continued)

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

meetings. This extended participation in the work of the CD is a reflection of my Government's positive interest in the United Nations-sponsored multilateral disarmament negotiations. My delegation also wishes to express special thanks to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the CD, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations.

... The conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons in Paris in January of this year was a timely and most significant event. The Final Declaration adopted by consensus is a testimony to its success. The conference provided a valuable opportunity to reaffirm the validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva, and to reaffirm the obligations established therein and commitments made thereto. The unequivocal support given to the United Nations and its Secretary-General underlines the world community's renewed awareness of their indispensable role in safeguarding mankind from the threat of this horrible weapon. It is a source of great satisfaction to my country that we participated in this global endeavour and were able to make constructive contributions to it. The accession to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by my country represents a worthy addition to broadening the basis for a global chemical weapons ban.

While attending the Paris Conference, His Excellency Choi Ho-Joong, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, made clear in his address the stand my country takes with regard to chemical weapons. He said:

"The Republic of Korea has never possessed and does not have at its disposal any type of chemical weapons. Nor will we consider developing, producing or stockpiling such weapons in the future. We categorically object to keeping chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula."

(continued)

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

He further proposed that South and North Korea should jointly renounce chemical weapons as a means of armed conflict with a view to freeing the whole Korean people, in both South and North, from the danger of such deadly weapons.

My delegation is impressed by the intensive efforts made under the able and dedicated leadership of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France to expedite negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. We wish to extend our deep appreciation to Ambassador Morel for the thoughtful arrangements he made for the participating non-member States of the CD to be informed of developments in the negotiations.

As understanding and co-operation by the civilian chemical industry is an integral part of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention, it is encouraging that the second part of the session saw the participation of representatives from the chemical industry. The Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to be held in Canberra in September this year is an important development in this endeavour. My delegation highly appreciates the invitation extended to my country by the Australian Government, and looks forward to participation in the conference. We hope that the momentum generated by the intensive efforts made and the other ensuing pertinent developments taking place this year will contribute positively to the speedy and early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would like to express our appreciation to the chemical weapons Ad hoc Committee Chairman Ambassador Pierre Morel and his five working group chairmen for the fine work accomplished this year. The report being submitted to the CD today reflects progress made this year in the many additions to the draft treaty text in appendix I and in the many useful papers in appendix II.

(continued)

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The draft convention text in appendix I has been enhanced by the addition of two annexes - one on confidentiality and the other on chemicals; by new articles on ratification, accession and entry into force; and by new material on activities of the preparatory commission. Additionally, some issues in articles VIII and IX concerning the organization and procedures for clarifying concerns of States parties have been resolved.

Appendix II of our report reflects the results of many long and intensive discussions on very difficult, important issues that required a delicate balance of the security and political concerns of all countries participating in these negotiations. Discussions on the composition and function of the Executive Council have taken place for a number of years. This year, however, following intensive consultations, the Chairman has summarized, in appendix II text, various proposals for the Executive Council in order to help guide our future discussions on this subject. On the issue of challenge inspection, the Chairman made a truly commendable effort toward achieving consensus on the principle of mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection, however, delegations still do not fully agree. Difficulties remain over how to protect sensitive non-chemical-weapons military and civilian facilities while at the same time providing satisfaction with regard to compliance. The Chairman's work on challenge inspection in appendix II reflects both the progress and remaining difficulties and, along with the previous work on this subject, will serve as a good basis for further discussion.

We are deeply conscious of the need to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth as soon as possible. This is a matter of security for all countries. In the world today, security against chemical attack takes a variety of forms. During the 10-year period after the convention enters into force, a transition will take place from security based on that variety of forms to one based on the convention. A number of countries have raised concerns about how to ensure security during that period, while some chemical weapons, albeit a diminishing amount still exist in national arsenals. Many of the issues we have been discussing in the CD have dealt with security during the transition period from a variety of interrelated perspectives - the order of destruction, reservations, assistance and protection in the event of CW use, measures to deter non-compliance, and incentives to encourage all CW-capable States to join the convention. I believe we can and must find arrangements, consistent with the objectives of the convention, that will relieve the concerns of all States. In view of the complexity of the security factor, several different provisions may be necessary to resolve all the concerns.

It is the hope of the United States delegation that when our work resumes during the inter-sessional period and again in 1990, further attention will be given to these interrelated security issues and that ways will be found to address all concerns. Resolution of these issues is important in helping to achieve the necessary universality of the convention.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... I should like to offer some brief comments on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In his statement at the opening of the summer session my Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Waldegrave, reiterated the commitment of the British Government to a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and underlined the need for a clear, practical problem-solving approach to remove the remaining obstacles. He stressed the importance attached by the United Kingdom to the achievement of such a ban as early as possible and the need for our approach to be marked by thoroughness and hard work.

The summer session, like its predecessor, has I think been to a large extent conducted in that spirit. The past year has been one of intense activity in these negotiations. The Paris Declaration urged us to redouble our efforts and we have done so. Our agenda has enabled us to consider the whole range of problems still outstanding. Many of us have conducted trial inspections. During the summer session my own authorities have submitted a report on our two practice challenge inspections of military installations - part of a longer series of challenge trials - and also a report on our civil national trial inspection. The result of all this work has been a good deal of solid progress. New issues have been developed, long-standing ones refined and the structure of the future convention has become clearer. Some of this progress is reflected in the report before us. More of it will, I trust, appear in the report to emerge from the inter-sessionals.

(continued)

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

It would of course be wrong to feel satisfied with our work. A number of difficult problems still remain to be solved, including some major aspects of our convention. Verification remains the top priority, where much has been achieved but much more remains to be done particularly as regards challenge and ad hoc inspection. The rate of progress in our negotiations sometimes seems too slow. But we are steadily increasing the areas of convergence of view.

We must sustain our efforts. The inter-sessionals should enable us to develop further a number of the items on which we have worked over the past year so that they can be brought into appendix I or II. To achieve this we shall have to focus our attention on those matters which hold out most promise of early agreement. We welcome the proposals on this given us by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We now all have a basis for work in our capitals during the coming weeks so that we can return to the inter-sessionals well prepared.

We hope that we shall come to these inter-sessionals further strengthened by a positive outcome to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as to the Government/Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in Canberra.

An encouraging aspect of this year's session has been the increased involvement in the negotiations by representatives of States not members of the Conference on Disarmament. Their presence here has given our work a wider perspective. We believe that, as called for in the Paris Declaration, all States should be free to participate in the negotiations as observers if they wish. I look forward to the participation of still larger numbers of such States.

We all owe a great deal to our Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, for the leadership he has given - for his energy, his enthusiasm, and his diplomatic and negotiating skills. My delegation much appreciates the very considerable contribution he has made. Our thanks go also to the hard-working chairmen of the working groups: Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Gomaa of Egypt, Mr. Sood of India, Mr. Molander of Sweden and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic; as well as to Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden and Dr. Rautio of Finland for their work as chairmen of their special groups. We have learned with great pleasure that Ambassador Hyltenius is to be the next Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, and we much look forward to working closely with him. My thanks also go to the secretariat for all their dedicated hard labour. Certainly the report we have just adopted would not have been possible without them. And lastly, three distinguished ambassadors are leaving us very soon, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Fan of China - all three much respected colleagues whom we shall miss, and I should like to offer them my best wishes for the future.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... Whilst expressing regret at the lack of substantive results on many items on the agenda of the Conference, the delegations of the socialist countries at the same time welcome the further progress that has been achieved in the talks on a chemical weapons ban, although here too we feel that not all our expectations have been realized. The Conference on Disarmament received a strong political impetus from the Paris meeting on chemical weapons, where 149 States called for the conclusion of the convention at the earliest date. The increase in the number of observers in the Ad hoc Committee on CW this year as a result of the call made in the Paris Declaration is a positive development in our view. The creation of an appropriate organizational framework for considering questions relating to the chemical weapons ban at the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on CW also played a constructive role. Thanks to the able leadership of the Ad hoc Committee by Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, as well as the painstaking efforts made by the chairmen of the working groups, much valuable work was done. This not only covered important technical details which are vital for the convention, but also made it possible to expand the search for political agreement on a number of key problems. In the view of the socialist group, we now have all the requisite elements in the Ad hoc Committee on CW for a breakthrough in the very near future. We call upon all participants in the negotiations to step up their efforts, to display a constructive spirit and show reasonable compromise, and to make maximum use of the inter-sessional period in order that the many years' work on a CW ban should finally be crowned with success at the 1990 session of the Conference. In this connection the members of the group believe that an important role in speeding up work on the convention must be played by confidence-building measures.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

They welcome the continuing process of providing data in accordance with the USSR's draft memorandum of 18 February 1988 and the arrangements proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, and also take an active part in it. Here, speaking as the representative of the USSR, I would like to inform the members of the Conference that the Soviet Union is finalizing the preparation of data for multilateral exchange along the lines proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in CD/828, with a view to publication; information on the subject will be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French):

... My second point relates to the progress recorded in the chemical weapons negotiations. The extraordinary Paris consensus undoubtedly gave political impetus to our work; yet it should be recognized that this impetus did not lead to all the effects we had hoped for. Nevertheless, a movement has begun and it must be sustained by continuously renewed back-up. We are convinced that the negotiations which will continue during the inter-sessional period will bring us still closer to the long-awaited aim, the burgeoning of the convention on chemical weapons.

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(The President)

These, then, were the few closing comments I wished to share with you. I have no other matters to discuss before the closure of this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before I close the session, I would like to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 6 February 1990, at 10 a.m. As agreed by the Conference when adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/952, in accordance with paragraph 14 (c), the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration between 16 January and 1 February 1990. I would also like to remind you that open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will be conducted between 28 November and 14 December this year.



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